JPRS ID: 9307 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000300030027-6
~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~F ~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
1~OI2 (1FFIC t.11. 1~`I~ (1N1,1'
JPR~ L/9307
19 September 1980 ~
/ rth Africa Re ort
Near Ea~t No p
CFOUO 34/S0~
Fgt$ FOREICaN BROA~CAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
~
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets _
[J are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate Yiow the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattz~ibuted parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
For further information on report content
call (703) 351-2833 (Near East); 351-2501
(Iran, Afghanistan); 351-3165 (North
Africa).
COFYRIGHT LAWS AND REGUI.ATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL U8E ONLY
JPRS L/9307
19 5eptember 1980
. NEAR EAST/HORTH A~RICA REPORT
(FOUO 34/80) -
CON7ENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
'Arafat Discueaes Reaults of Fourth Conference of Fatah
(Yasir 'Arafat Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
14-20 Jun 80) .............a........................ 1
Briefe
Oil Company Activity ~ 9
ALGERIA
Chadli Bendjedid Reinforcea His Authority
(Editorial; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
1 Aug 80) 10
Preparatione for Five-Year Plan Considered
(Mohamed Razine; AFRIQUB-ASIB, 26 May 80) 13
SONATRACH-Total Deal Reported
(MARCAES TROPICAUX ET 1~DITERRANEENS, 8 Aug 80) 16
Briefe
Negotiationa With France l8
IRAN _
Fourteer: Nominations Approved Including Defense Minieter F
(REUTER, 7 Sep 80) 19
Iranian Government Forces Battle Kurds 3n Northwest
(REUTER, 30 Aug 80) 21
Convoluted Conditions in Country Explored
(Faruq Abu Zahr; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Jun-
_ 4 Jul 80) 22
IRAQ . _
New Parliamentary Electione Extolled
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 14-20 Jun 80) 28
- a- [ I I I - NE & A-:121 FOUO ]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LEBANON
Soviet Ambassador Seea Bashir al-Jumayyil, Sham'un
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Jun-4 Jul 80) 33
Ex-Prime Minister al-Sulh Diacusaes Role of Political Islam
(Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
28 Jun-4 Jul 80) 39
Lebanese Arab Army's Hiatory, Goals, Situation Examined
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Jun-4 Jul 80) 43
LIBYA
Libyan-Egyptian Border Confrontation Analyzed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 28 Jun-4 Jul 80) 50
MAURITANIA
Briefs
Terwan Dam Opened 54 i
Agreement Regarding Guelbs Project Signed 54 ~
Central Accountancy Ser~ice Eatabliehed 54 I
Incident Behind Slavery Ab~lition 55
MOROCCO
Cedies Review of Econoury
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 13 Jun 80) 56
Continuation of Cedies Economic Review of 1979
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 6 Jun 80) 64
PERSIAN GULF AREA
- Question of U.S. Bases in Gulf Diacuased ~
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 21-27 Jun 80) 68
SYRIA
Briefs
Oil Output Drop 72
TUNISIA
Bourguiba, Wife's Domination Criticized
(Adel Wahid; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 May 80) 73
Briefs
Diacreet Contact 76
- b -
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFIC 1.AI. USE ONLY
INTER ARAB AFFAIRS
'ARAFAT DISCUSSES RESULTS OF FOURTH CONFERENCE OF FATAH
1
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Jun 80 pp 20-23
[Interview with PLO Leader Yasir 'Arafat by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, date and
place not given]
[Text] Announcement of the political program, which is c~nsidered to be the
most important accomplishment of the Fourth Conference of Fatah, the largest
and most independent of the Palestinian organizationa, did not put an end
to questions asked ar.d speculation made, eapecially in Palestinian circles,
concerning the conference and the occasionally sharp discusaions which took
place in it.
Th;s is not surprising for two raasona. The first is the importance of
Fatah, which ie the leading Paleatinian organization with the widest popular
support among the Palestinian Arab p~eople._ The second'~s the fact that
security, organizational and pclitical considerations dictate that political
programs be drafted cautiously when it comes to details and expansively when
it comea to generalities and slogans.
Although the conference ended about two weeke ago, and its recommendations
hav~ already been published, questions are still being asked about it~ For
this reason, it was neceasary to meet with Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat],
confirmed by the conference as the leader of the movement and the commander
in chief of the forces of al-'Asifah, which is a military arm of the
organization.
This interview was delayed a little, due to the continuous developments which -
keep the responsible leader busy. He had hardly finished d~aling with the
flare-up in the "southern suburb" of the Lebanese capital, which forced him ~
to leave the conference more than once, when he received the ugly news of the
assassination attempts on Bassam al-Shak'a, Mayor of Nablus, and Karim -
]Khalaf, Mayor of Ramallah. This is in addition to other issuea he has to
contend with, such as Lebanese reconciliation and the PLO's efforta to
realize it.
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR O~FICIAL USE ONLY
The following is the text of oL: interview with Mr Yasir 'Arafat:
[QuestionJ Your Fourth Conference has aroused the attention and curiosity of
both friendly and enemy observers. Many rumors have circulated concerning
its atmosphere and the debates which took piace in it. Could you give us a
true picture of what went on and what is your evaluation of the reaults?
[Answer] First we should remember that this conference was held nine years
after the Third Conference, and that during these years, major events and
developments have occurred on the Palestinian, as well as on the Arab and
international scenes. These events had their positive and negative effects
on the conference of our movement, especially as we have unconditionally
adopted the democratic process, based on a revolutionary concept which says,
"The greater the responsibility, the greater the confidence."
The exercise of democracy was very evident throughout the sessions of the
conference, maiuly in the sharp criticisms which dealt with the minutest
details. The rules dictated detailed work on all political, military,
organizational and financial levels. The conference dealt with (rivalries)
within the movement as well as at the level of the PLO and on the Palestinian
and Arab scenes in general.
As for the rumors which circulated about disagreements and divisiveneas, my
response is that any negative aspects of this democratic process are factors
which we do not fear. On the other hand, the positive aspects exceeded all
expectations. The results of the conference are a good indication of that.
Fatah emerged from the Fourth Conference more united and strong than ever
before. The enemies of Fatah and of Palestine, who bet on blowups and
division, were disappointed. The conference approved all recommendations,
elected a new command and issued a political program. Fatah resumed its
role and responsibilities with full strength and confidence.
We Did Not Interfere in the Elections
[Question] A lot has been said about the balance of power inside the movement
between the right, the left and the veterans who are nicknamed "the faithful
ten," etc. Does the new command have a new political identity, or is it a
continuation of the previous command?
[Answer] First, allow me to settle certain matters about the use of names
regarding us in Fatah. Ws have no faithful ten, and there is no such thing
as a veteran and non-veteran command. We have a collective command which
adheres to its unshaken revolutionary path.
I also would like to stress the point that many namea or designations,
which are used outside our movement, do not apply to us, such as Right or
Left, veteran or non-veteran, and extremist or moderate. Our movement is
the reflection of our peoples' values. It is distinguished in the names it
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
~
' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
uses, in th~ manner it conducts its struggle, and in its internal and
external relations. `
The conference was a new move on the road of our rew lutionary work. After
discussing and evaluating the past phase, the conference decided to renew
its confidence in the previous ce~tral com~ittee and all its members. The
conference then decided to add new blood to the committee by electing
five iiew brothers. This way the growing needs of our struggle will be
_ adequately met. The conference alsc~ gave the new committee the right to
choose three additional members, if the need arises, with the approval of
three-fourths of the members.
The five new members, in order of the number of votes won by each are: Abu
al-Walid, Rafiq al-Natshah, Hani al-Hasan, Majid Abu-Sharar and Qadri. Sixteen
~ candidates had been nominated for these positions.
If we review the number of votes received by the nominees, we can see how
close they were. The difference between the highest and lowest vote was
30 votes out of a total of 530. This ahould prove the important fact that
the real winner in this election and in the conference as s whole was the
unity and integrity of Fatah.
We hope that everyone understaads that we the members of the old committee
neither interfered in the elections nor tried to influence any member. If
there is anything to criticize, it could be our excessive det~.ocracy. We are
proud of our democracy, and we hope that this democracy will raflect on
our political life in our fut~re state.
There Is No Need For a Secretary General
[Question] Since we are talking about the elections and the organizational
structure of the movement, could you explain the ~urisdictions and
responsibilities of the organizational arms of the movement?
[Answer] The general conference ia the highest authority in the movement,
but the Fourth Conference decided to delegate some of its authority to the
new revolutioaary council whose L?embership will reach 78. This was a new
move in the history of our movement, but it was adopted for the purpose of
strengthening rhe actual participation of the highest number of our cadres .
in the struggle, in the execut3on of the conferenca's decisions and in
monitoring the ~entral committee.
It is important for me to explain that what we call a central comanittee
would be called a political bureau by other organizations. The committee
represents the executive power in the nation, although it is dirsctly elected
' by the general conference.
[Queation] Is this the reason why Fatah is the only organiz~ation without a
position for a security general?
3
FOR OFFICIAL USL ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[Answer] This is true~
[Questionj What is your official title in the movement? ~
[Answer] I am the official spokesman of the movement, and the conference
unar~imously appointed me commande.~r in chief of its armed forces. Brother
Abu-Jihad (Khalil al-Wazin), was appointed deputy of the commander in chief. -
[~uestion] You are also the commander in chief of the forces of the Palestinian
revolution and the chairman of the executive committee of the PLO. The
question arises as to the relati~nship between Fatah and the PLO, especially
as contradictory statements have been made in this regard.
[Answer] The conference made it clear that the PLO is the main structure
which includes all the F_~estinian people, and that Fatah is considered to
be the backbone of the revolution.
What appeared to be a disagreement in the relationship of F~tah with the
organization is due to ~he simple reason that a nwnber of political decisions
- were made by the national councils of the PLO. The Fatah conference was
not in session to approve or modify them. For this reason, and inspite of
the fact that all these decisions won the approval of the central committee,
the revolutionary council and the military command of Fatah, it was necessary
for the conference to confirm them.
This is exactly what happeried. After discussing these decisions, the
conference approved them and regarded them as a complementar~ part of its
own resolutions and political program, based on the concept that these
decisions are not contrary to the goals and principles of the movement.
At this point, I would like to stress that brother ~'~bu al-Lutf (Faruq
al-Qaddumi) and myself talked least about this issue, because we are
members of the executive committee of the PLO. However, other brothers dwelt
on it, especially Abu Ayad (Salah Khalaf) and Abu Sa'id (Khalid Hasan).
We Are Working Toward a Military Unity
[Question] We are going to hold up discussion of your political program
until the end of this intervie~. I would liice to pursue the issue of the
relationship between Fatah and the other organizations. In other worda,
what about the national unity?
[AnswerJ No one doubts that national unity is the basis for achieving
victory. The conference stressed its importance and the need to achieve
it, especially in the field of military unity. The con~'erence gave special
directions on this issue to the new leadership. We have to remember always
that this issue concerns other people as much as it concerns us and that
~ its realization requires coordination. I would like to point out that
the resolutions of previous meetings of our national cauncils already
4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
indicated the importance of the military uuity and gave the forces to be
united the name of "the Palestine National Liberation Army." The National
Council elected me as commander in chief of the forces nf the revolution.
. Based on this, we formed the supreme military council of the revolution. ~
Aside from the co~ander of the liberation army, it includes all top military -
officials of the Palestinian organizations. During a discusaion of the
national council concerning the distribution of financial assistance amc~ng
the Palestinian organizations, I indicated that we have a golden opportunity
to realize unity of the fighting men in every way such as in food, clothing,
pay, weapons, equipment and training. This wou14 'be similar to what the
Zionist enemy did when all its organizations were united to become the Israeli
army. This pro~ect is still under consideration by everyone.
Fatah declared its readinesa to form an immediate miZitary unity with any of
the Palestinian organizations that share this desire. We are ready to reach
an agreement based on any kind of arrangement, and we intend to continue to
pursue this subject. We have attai*.~,~d some progress in this respect, since
the Supreme Military Council approved the unity of the naval forcea, air
forces, comnnunications and central operations.
[QuestionJ Some observations have been made concerning the political program
as to what it contained and what it did not contain. I will mention these
points one by one in order to liaten to your comments.
Let us start with what was not included.
It is my opinion as well as the opinion of others that the political program
ignored what could be called the livelihood issues of the Palestinian who
suffers daily hardship.
(Answer] The fact that this issue was not included in the political program
does not mean that it was of no importance to the conference. I believe that
we should issue a complete statement on the work of the conference so that
all may see the complete picture. The political pro gram can be no more than
a framework of prospective action.
Nevertheless, I am going to dwell here on a number of negative factors in
our course of action, in order to overcome and correct them. But our negative
, factors will never overshadow our numerous and marvelous positive accomplish-
~ ments during the past stages of our revolutionary pro gresa toward the libera-
tion of our nation. Tkiese positive aspecta represent laurels which we wear
with pride and honor.
Among the negative factors is the issue of the daily livelihood of the
Palestinians. This iasue includes residence, passpo rts, entry visas, work
permits and others. We do not forget that in this revolution we wear two
hate, the revolutionary hat and the hat of government functions, such as
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FUIt OFFiCTAL USE ONLY
UNRWA functions, education, health, assistance to the municipalities inside
the occupied territories, and other responsibilities which have not borne
by any modern revolution as much as by ours. It should not be overlooked by
~ anyone that the Arab countries, or at least some of them, did not abide by
their resolutions to ease the life of the Palestinians, inspite of the fact
that such resolutions were adopted at the highest level of the Arab league.
The Pursuit of Those See~.ing Personal Gain
[Question] What about the negative factor of the Palestinian revolut~on in
Lebanon?
[AnswerJ This is a fact which is referred to in the political program. It
was thoroughly discussed by the conference. The result was the formation
of a com~ittee from the revolutionary council to pursue and punish those who _
are responsible. This decis ion was based on the fact that the selfish should
not be allowed to derive personal gains while the selfless shed their blood
iu martyrdom. In the3r march toward their land, our people alone have the
right to benefit from the heroism of those who sacrifice themselves for the
cause.
[QuestionJ Let us now talk about what was included in the political program. ;
[Answer] Before we get into this, I would like to say that you have failed
to mention another negative factor we now suffer from. It is bureaucracy.
This factor is the bane of the revolution, but we recognize that it was
not possible for us not to b e affected by it in our complex movement. We
have made,decisions which may not eliminate it, but they will at least control
it so that we can channel our potential in the most productive manner.
[QuestionJ You have indicated the possibility ~f issuing a complete statement
on the works of the conference. Awaiting that, the only thing we have is the
political program as it was published in the press. The first general obser-
vation is that the program contained nothing new. It is almost a repetition
of that which we have previo usly heard or read. Is this true, and what is
your opinion?
[AnswerJ Between our Third Conference, which was held in the wake of the
September defeat [of the Palestinians at t'hP hand of the Jordan Government],
when we were dressing the wo unda af A~an, 'A~lun and Jarash, and this
Fourth Conference, which was held to emphasize the effective existence o=
t:~e revoluti~n and its rnilitary and political activity inside and outside our
occupied territory, there was a period of time filled with battles and -
challenges. We came out of this period stronger and more determined to
continue our struggle. A few years ago, Dayan said that our revolution is
like an egg in his hand, and that he could crush it whenever he felt like
doing so. In 1978, [Israeli com~ander] Ghor was asked why he was not able
to occupy Tyre and al-Nabatiyyah. He answered: "What do you want me to
do when I am faced with men who have decided to die?"
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- We have been progressing, and there is something new. The conference
carefully evaluated devQlapments, such as the October war, the eight day war
and the continuing war of attrition. The conference also evaluated the
developing escalatiou of our military operations inside the occupied
territories, which led the enemy to form a special Knesset committee to discuss
the situation. It slso evaluated the magnifi~ent popular struggle of our
people in the occupied territories, which caused the enemy to lose h~a mind
and to revert to his o riginal routine of terror and treachery.
New political developments call for a new approach. What we have done over
the years has shown our superiority over_ our enemy. If this was not so,
we would not be en~oying this ovexwhelming international popularity, and the
Zionist enemy woul~i not have been in t:iis state of oppressive isolation. We
will not relent in repeating our nationalist demands until they are met.
Initiatives Require Cool Consultation
[Question] Prior to the conference, there were discussions ann differences
concerning the European initiatives. We were hoping that the political program
would be more definite and precise. What is your opinion?
[Answer) The conference discussed our political moves from a13 angles.
Frankly speaking, this took a lot of our time, especially since there wer
Arab and non-Arab attempts to undermine and distort these moves. This callect
for action by the central committee and its submission of detailed explana-
tions. As a result, the conference hlessed ouY political moves and called
for intensificat{on of the political effort. The conference held that the
political front has to be invaded, especially in the European countries,
Japan and Canada.
Of course, our activity i~ the camp of our friends, the socialist, Islamic,
African and non-aligned countries, did not need any decision. The conference
pressed for further developing our reLationship with all liberation movements
in the world. This is a distinguishing feature of the Palestinian struggle.
All resolutions adopted by our national council between the Third and the -
Fourth general conferences of Fatah were the object of enlightened, zealous
and frank discussion, and were approved. It is known that during this
period, the national council adopted its resolution to establish the
democratic nation. Subsequently, it adopted what became known as the ten
point program on the subject of narional authority, and resolved to establish
an independent Paleszinian state. The Fourth Conference of Fatah clearly -
approved of ail that.
The conference devoted time to the matter of the [West European] initiatives.
We arrived at the conclusion that the mattar requires that wa take our time
and be more deliberate. This is in view of the fact *_hat this ia a period
in which: Israeli terrorism and zionist inflexibili.ty are increasing; the
mask is being removed gradually to reveal the ugly face of America and its
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFICTAI. USE ~NLY
insolent and shameless support of zionist terror, intransigence and occupation
of our land; the Camp David process has reached a dead end; and Western
Europe is dragging its feet on adopting a clear policy. The new Central
Conmmi.ttee and the Revolutionary Council will follow the situation until we
gQt a complete and clear picture of the si~uation based on the hectic
developments in political and diplomatic activity relating to Che Palestine
and Middle East question.
For the same reasons, we p ut off discussion of the idea of forming a
provisional government. Such decisions require more reflection. It is also
necessary to intensify our deliberations first with our parr_ners on the
Palestinian scene, then with the Arab world, and, finally, with the outside
world. As I have said before, this dacision is being made by the Palestinian
command at a time when it feels t~iat its efforts and its revolution may have
an opportunity to make headway.
[Question] Inspite of clear indication in the political program of th~
movement's rejection of settlement outside Palestine, some believe that this
sub~ect requires more elaboration to support this re,jection, especially with
regard to rumors circulating in Lebanon.
[AnswerJ I no longer see any u~e in restating our position concerning this '
~ issue which we have already totally rejected in form and in substance. ~
Everytime we defeat an allegation, another one is made. And when people
run out of new allegations, they merely reiterate those which they
fabricated previously. Inspite of our daily military, political and
diplomatic struggle inside and outside our occupied homeland, an~ inapite _
of the heavy price which we pay in blood and lives for the sake of our land
and nation, we still find those who accuse us of res~trlement. We have
here a conference, which includes more than 500 of our best young men.
It declares its rejection of resettlement, and yet we find those who insist
on repeating this false accusation.
I would like to ask these peop].e this question: If Fatah, the other
Palestinian organizations and the PLO wanted resettlement, who c~ould there
be to oppose them, fight for liberation and for the establishment of the
Palestinian nation? Woul d it be Israel and its agents or its allies at
_ Camp David?
I do not want to elaborate anym~re on this broken record. It does not fool
us. It fools only those who play it. It may be that those who pretend
to be so worried about resettlement want to [suggest itJ. But you can quote
me and tell those who are spreading this lie that no matter how hard they
try to suggest resettlement to us, we reject it, reject it and re~ect it.
We accept no substitute for Paleatine.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WAT.~N AL-'AR.ABI "
8988
CSO: 4$02
i
_ 8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
OIL COMPANY ACTIVITY--The French Oil Company's (CFP) report for fiscal year
~ 1979 relates various activities of the group in the world. The CFP's pre-
sence is manifested in several African countries. In Algeria the tonnage mar-
keted by the affiliate was maintained at 11,550,000 tons, compared with
11,800,000 tons in 1978. The national company's services had to do with seven
reopened wells in Hassi-Messaoud, 13 drillings in the Alrar region and six in
In-Salah structures. In Tunisia the Thala Maktar permit was granted to the
local exploration affiliate. Two wells were drilled at sea in the eastern
marine center and four on land in the Sidi-el-Itayem concession whose declining
production was 200,000 tons, compared to 250,000 tons in 1978. In Egypt, sev-
eral permits located in tne Gulf of Suez are being added to the marine title in
the Mediterranean. In the Sudan, one 6,400-square-km permit was obtained in
the Red Sea. In the area of industrial cooperation, new agreements were con-
cluded with Africa concerning aid to SONATRACH [National Company for the Trans-
porting and Marketing of Hydrocarbons] for txaining personnel, building service
stations, transporting products and building warehouses. In the Sudan two
contracts were signed, one ~aith the Petrolewn Products Pipeline Corporation to
improve the operation of a pipeline first put into service in May 1980, the
other with the Petroleum General Administration far a general assistance agree-
ment. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICA[3X ET NIEDITEWtAI~iEENS in French
8 Aug 80 p 1961] 8946
CSO: 4400
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ALGERIA
- CHADLI BENDJEDID REINFURCES HIS AUTHORITY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITEItRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1831
[Editorial: "President Chadli Bendjedid Reinforces His Authority, After
Reorganizing the Algerian Government"--passages in slant7.ines published in .
italics ]
[Text] The reorganization of the Algerian Government that took place on 15
,7uly, is less extensive (MTM, 18 July) than the refox~ of the FLN political
department (MTM, 4 July, p 1674) which took place over 2 weeks earlier, on
29 June. Yet the two measures compl.ement each other. When the reorganiza-
tion of the arnry's staff is added to this, one can see the atyle of President
Chadli Bend,jedid. He is trying to establish hie suthority in using a series
of ineasures that modify systematically, and relatively slowly but surely,
- the political character of the government. �
Since the June movement, the measures adopted by the special congress of the
FLN (MTM, 27 June, p 1.616) significantly increase the president's power. Sy
reducing the number of peopl.e in the Central. Committee and in the Political
Degartment~ in modifying the latter's role which will be under the control
of the secretary general af the party, namely of the head of state~ review-
ing the important committees of the FLN, constitute a reduction in and a
simplification of the party structure, and shaw that its role will be mod-
ified, if not diminished. This review must affect a great many people; the .
difficult political balance, carefully estahlished by Mr Chadli Bend~edid,
who benefited from a compromise elecCion in Fehruary 1979, can now be recon-
sidered by the same individual who, in the meantime, became a head of state
with full powers.
Thus one can observe, without great surprise, that a certain number of sea-
soned politicians are not at the top in-the Party anymore. It is true that
for sone of them it is only a matter of making a distinction between a
party post and a governmental post, as shaan in the case of Mr Abdelghani.
It may be more surpriaing to see that certain job combinatione were kept,
and one cannot determine whether this is only a temporary precaution.
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
What is, thus, very remarkable is the continued presence in the Political
D~partment, now reduced to seven members, of Messrs Abdelaziz Bouteflika
and Mohammed Salah Yahiaoui, protagonists in the two leading rival groups,
Lhe liberals and the progressives, who were ~ust as f ar apart at the time
Mr Chadli Bendjedid's election to the presidency. However, since Mr
Boutef lika seems to be rather inactive and very isoLated of late, while Mr
_ Yahiaoui, whose post of party coordinator does not exist anymore, seems to
have re~igned himself to quasi retirement, one can only wonder whether
be~ng in the Political Department is as important as it once was, or wheth-
er iCs value is merely symbolic. Next to the prPsident of the Popular Na-
tional Assembly, Mr Rabah Bitat, and the army inspector general, Colonel
Belhouchet who has important duties, Mr Benhamouda would represent Islam and
Arabism. Mr Mazouzi would repreaent the Arab-Berber fact and the apprecia-
tion for loyal militancy.
From then on, with a reduction in the splitting of votes, though this is
still significant, in the Political Department, one could consider the
latter a temporary survival, an ultimate evidence of necessary po~wer-sharing _
ln a period of transition that is coming to an end. However, we cannot ig-
nore the possibility that President Chadli Bend~edid actual.ly wanted to
~hange the P arty`s executive branch into a high council of the highest au-
thority. Based on this assumption, it seems quite normal that Mr Abdelghani,
the head of state, would cease to be a member of the Political Department.
~ontrary to the expectations of some observers, he was not relieved of his
duties as prime minister, and the cabinet reshuffle is very limited, which ~
explains why it took place during Ramadan, a time for political break.
Evident].y, President Bendjedid plans to have strong personalities as minis-
ters in the executive branch, men whose strength, efficiency, and loyalty .
he had evaluated himself. One is not surprised to see the cenfirmation of
~he ministers of Planning and Higher Education, Messers Abdelhak Brerhi and
Abdelhamid Brahimi, whose handling of the university unrest and fight against
Shortages revealed a felicitous energy, and who are, in a way, very popular.
~ne also notes that Mr Boualem Benhamouda, who showed qualities desireable
in a minister of the Interior, kept this post and became the only person
Still a member of both the cabinet and the Pol.itical Department.
xowever, in keeping Mr Mohammed Cherif kharroubi, minister of Elementary
Education, considered to have been partially responsible for the Kabylia
~riais, the head of atate shows that he has not given in to demagogy in any
Way and that he does not necessarily ob~ect to some shaw of strength. The
choice of Mr Boualem Bessaieh as minister of Information and Culture, and
Who was completely trusted by Mr Bouteflika, ahows the f lexibility and '
broadmindedness with which these appointments were made.
The number of military men among the ministers of the new Abdelghani cabinet
remains unchanged: The new minister of Post and Telecommunication~ Mr -
Abdennour Bekka, comes from the army; on the other hand one notes the de-
~arture of Mr Abdelmegid Aouichiche, who was not successful enough with the
difficul,t tasks in Construction and Housing, for which the cooperation of -
Eastern countries was disappointing.
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE O~TLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ,
~ Moreover, the president, who is in charge of national defense, has, in this
capacity, deputy-ministera who are not cabinet members~ Col Abdallah
Behouchet (member of the Po7.itical Department) and Col Kasdi J~er~etii, former -
head of military security; the Ee-establiehment of the military staff com-
pletes the appointments, showing that the army has not been forgotten.
An Original Intiative: National Conference on Higher Education
As of 2 July, the relay of the gi~eat FLN debates was, to some extent, picked
up by an original. kind of national conferer:ce, due to the initiative of Mr
Abdelhak Brerhi, minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research. In
_ order to end a serioua criais at the university that was started by the
"Berber affair," he did not hesiCate to speak at stormy general assemblies
for students. He emphasized the fact that he was applying the directives
of tne president in order to "give more depth to the democratic debate at
its roots," and he gave instructions to the students that would satisfy
their desire to express themselvea; it was a question of preparing quickly
the first "National Conference on Higher Education."
In introducing these new debates~ Mr Brerhi declared: /"The university
has shown the need for debate by using dialog and democracy."/
Algerianization of higher education and Arabisation would provide the themes
for the most impassioned debates. The miniater was able to bring out the
fact that it was unrealistic to ineist on immediate Arabisation and monolin-
gualism, which, according to another cabinet member, Mr Abdelhamid Brahimi,
would only be /"another form of illiteracy"/. After a year of comanon-core
studies, /"orientation councils"/ will guide the studenta according to their
ability and inclination, keeping in mind the ~obs available as well as thoae
scheduled by the plan. With technical help from Jordan, an Institute for
Islamic Studies will be created~ with a view to placiag the teaching of the-
ology on a true scientific level.
The general statement adopted at the close of the conference recognizes
that the university reflects the changes and contradictions in the Algerian
society, and recomanends /"the responsible exercise of revolutionary
democracy"/ assuring the peaceful participation of a11. The participanta,
final.ly~ / express their conviction that the socialiet option of the
Algerian people is the best way to reassert the value of patrimony of the
Arab-Islamic culture and civilization, by opening up towards the outside
world and in favoring the generous values of Islam."/
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
9465
CSO: 4400
12
FOR OFFICIAL USE O~TL,Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ALGERIA
PREPARATIONS FOR FIVE-YEAR PLAN CONSIDERED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 May 80 p 13
[Article by Mohamed Razine]
[Text] In a few weeks the National Liberation Front (FLN) Party will
hold its special congress, planned since February 1979, to debate and
adnpt the 5-year plan (1980-84), the first of its kind in Algeria. When
they enter the conference hall, the delegates will be thinking about all
the economic, social, cultural and everyday problems facing the country
and all the questions, sometimes vital, which they are preparing to answer
in order to strengthen national independence and to expand the achievements
of nearly 20 years of hard work, sacrifice and struggle They wi~l not
be alone in their work. All around them will be the forces of the people,
"the fundamental forces of the revolution," as emphasized in the organic
resolution of the FLN Central Committee's last meeting, which calls for ,
their "general mobilization" to combine all efforts to assure the
success of this plan. That Central Committee session was the culmination
of long and detailed preparatory work carried out under President Chadli
Bendjedid's leadership with a concern for efficiency, thus including a .
rigorous self-critical examination. President Chadli Bend~edid has also
_ been supported unanimously in the efforts which he has made to strengthen
party structures and government agencies on the basis of the pr9.nciple,
"the necessary man in the necessary place."
The Three "Unities"
One of the first credits on Chadli's record during the short period of time
since he became chief of state is that of having established, in accordance ~
with the guidelines defined by the National ~harter approved in 1976, three
basic "unities": 1. Unity of pulitical leadership, represented by a 200-
member Central Committee, the supreme authority between congresses; 2. Unity
of ranks within one party, the FLN, whose not yet totally asswned role is
to be the vanguard of society; 3. Unity of political words and actions,
those of the National Charter. ThE:e will perhaps sti11 be some indecision,
particularly with regard to structures and clarification of the prerogatives
of political bodies, but certainly the most important thing is that everyone
has now become fully aware of the determination of the chief of state, the
13
FOR OFFICI~iL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOF OrFICIAL USE ONLY
FLN's general secretary, to eliminace foo[-dragging, fence-sitttng, double
talk and to use the legal framework for tackling all problems, regardless
of their nature. It is within this framework that careful consideration,
already at a rather advanced stage, ahall lead, through the congress, to
the establishment of the ma~or programa of the decade.
The FLN Central Committee's three previous sessions laid down the main guide-
lines in delicate areas in which the go~ernment plans to implement without
delay a sustained and versatile program to make up for the former inadequacies
seriously affecting all economic sectors: water resources, housing,
agriculture, etc.
Solutions have already been derived in the case of the agricultural sector.
Before the last Central Committee session opened, everyone agreed concerning
agriculture's persistent prablems and their effects on the daily lives of _
citizens: stagnant production in relation to rising incomes and population
growth, the inadequacy of supporting structures far business, aging of the
agricultural population, etc. Based on these same findings, various recom-
mendations were discussed from the standpoint of strengthening existing
production structures. The Central Committee first chose to take action
in regard to the business sector: marketing, financing, supplies, etc.
Significant improvements will also be made in the case of large self-managed
estates whose "hugeness" (1,000 hectares on the average) facilitntes n~ither
~ management nor supervision. In general, the government is being asked to
restore order "to free the agricultural sector from the internal and external
constraints altering its socialist develop~ent." Thus superfluous bureaus
. and agencies will simply be eliminated. Producers, for example, will he
able to freely sell their produce.
One of the most important measures involves the establishment of an agricul-
' 4:ura1 savings bank which will have very broad powers to finance business
investments and to grant capital goods and farm loans whose beneficiaries
will be able to use them as they see fit without prior supervision, as is
- still Che case at the present time. Through this measure, th~ aim is to
combat in particular the obvious ser3ous lack of investment in agriculture:
- obsolescence of plantations, maintenance of basic installations, etc.,
affirming the responsibility of the producer, currently deprived of this
by a meddlesomP, stifling bureaucracy. In other words, as President Chadli
put it: "An agricultural system based on trust and pratection of the pro-
ducer and utilizing the latest experien.ce to assure a considerable degree
of self-sufficiency in the area of foodstuffs, an zdequate supply of citizens'
staple commodiCies and preparation for the post-oil and -gas period."
One thing can already be learned from this debate on agriculture: Doubt
in this respect, actively desired by an alert middle class taking advantage
of the state of confusion between neglect and reform, has clearly been re-
jected. President Chadli stated strongly at the opening of the session:
"I have pledged to you and to the Algerian people to respect the National
Charter and I will pursue that path at all costs. I will also see to it
that all action is taken in the light of the charter and I will take the
14
FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FUR OFFICTAI. l1SF. (1NT,1'
responsibility for demanding an account, under the law, of anyone who should
overstep the charter."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
11915
CSO: 4400
15
FOR OFrICI6:. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ALGERIA
,
SONATRACH-TOTAL DEAL REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1963
[Text] The natioaal Algerian company, SONATRACH [National Company for the
Transporting and Marketing of Hydrocarbons] and the Total group on 24 July
signed a partnership agreement for exploration and exploitation of hydro-
carbons on two parcels, Sif Fatima (3,885 square km) and E1 Merk (3,330
square km), which are located in eastern Erg.
Total Algeria, an affiliate of the French Oil Company (CFP), holds a~ 17.5-per-
cent interest and is the operator for the exploration work, which will be
spread over four years. The national Algerian company, SONATRACH, for its
part owns a 65-percent interest and will be the operator if there i s any de-
velopment. BP-Gelsenberg is participating in the paxtnership also, for the
remaining 17.5 percent.
We recall that the Total group, on last 21 May, had already signed an explora- -
_ tion agreement for a parcel of approximately 4,300 square km in the
Ber-iane-Hassi R'mel region, and on 16 July another exploration agr eement for
a parcel of approximately 5,010 square km in the Berkine region (MARCHES TROP-
ICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 May, p 1254 and 18 July p 1788). ~
The total of the commitments underwritten by the Total grc~up for the four
parcels amounts to approximately $150,000,000.
The SONATRACH-Total agreement for exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons
in Algeria, announced in Paris on 31 July, is the third of its kind to be con-
cluded between the two companies and the eighth concluded by the Algerian com- ~
pany with foreign companies since last 21 May, an AFF dispatch from Algiers
eraphasizes. These agreemen�s, which mark the relaunching of hydroc~rbons ex-
ploration activities in Algeria--which has been reduced since 1976- -deal with
: parcels totaling approxim~.~ely 4~2;000 square km.
During this period when it was signing three accords with the CFP affiliate,
SONATRACH was signing similar accords with four other companies--Braspetro, ~
Standard Oil of Ohio (SOHIO), AMOCO Algeria and Sun Oil, and a West German
cansortium made up of Saabergwerke, Verba Oel, Union Rheinische Braunkohlen
Kraftstoff and Wintersall-AG.
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFtC IAI. USR ~NT.,Y
In SOHIO's case, exploitation expenditures to be committed will be financed
by the $3-per-barrel subsidy on crude imposed by SONATRACH on purchases by
its customers, who have no exploration activities in Algeria.
Total-Algeria (CFP~, one remembers, is not subject to this subsidy, the abol-
ishment of which could be announced soon by all ths customers for Algerian
crude.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
8946
CSO: 4400
i
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR (1FFICIAL USE ~NI,Y
ALGERiA
B RIEFS
NEGOTIATIO~iS WITH FRANCE--Negotiations to resolve the French-Algerian dis-
pute resumF.d in Paris on 18 August at the level of the secretaries general
of each coimtry's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The negotiationa hav~e beea
going on since the end of last January and were supposed to result in a
12 July meeting in Algiers between Algerian foreign minister Mohammed
Seddik Benyahia and his French counterpar.* Jean Francois-Poncet. At the
last minute, on the request of Algeria, 4ie meeting was pushed back be-
cause of "technical scheduling reasons." Explaining the postponement,
di~~iomat ic sources in Algiers cited the imminent Alg~rian government
shuffle decreed on ]5 Jul_y and the tired conditian of Algier's top diplo-
~at after a long succession of trips abroad (MARQiES TIi(JPICAUX ET
MEDIIERRANEENS , 18 July, p,1787) . Actually, various sources in Algiers
claims that differences of opinion on the conclusions of the six paneLs
set up since Benyahia's I.ast visit to Paris also have something to do
with the pcstponed. meeting between the two Foreign Ministers. Juat
prior to 12 July, both parties emphasized that cmly "technical details"
remained to be i.roned out before reaching a comprehensive agreement on the
dispute that has occassioned so much friction between cowztries for some
years. Now it appears that they might be going back to review the
entire portfolio in detail (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
11 July, p 1732) . [Text] [Paris MAR(~iES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEDiS
22 Aug 80 p 2072]
CSO : 4400
~
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLI'
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FGR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IRAN
FOURTEEN NOMINATIONS APPROVED INCLUDING AEFENSE MINISTER
JN070808 London REUTER in English 0746 GMT 7 Sep 80
[Text] Tehran, 7 Sep (REUTER)--Deputies were clearly taken aback by the
shrunken appearance of the cabinet, because the president had been expected
to approve more ministers than he has done. In the early stages of today's '
debate, which was attended by Mr Raj a'i, several members suggested post-
poning the scheduled vote on the reshaped cabinet.
Aside from the six ministers re~ected by Mr Bani-Sadr, no one was proposed
- for the education ~inistry. Mr Raj a'i had initially pencilled himself in
. to retain his old post, but after a week's reflection apparently decided
that the premiership would keep him fully occupied.
One cabinet job wa~ added to the original list today. The president approved
Mahmoud Ahmadaqdeh for the ~ob of minister of state and head of the national
steel company. This brings the totml cabinet size to 21.
~ao days ago, the president received crucial backing from revoluticnary
leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, who said he need only approve those
ministers he found acceptable.
But Mr Bani-Sadr's reaction to the revolutionary leader's decision was far
more bold than was predicted.
An economist by training, Mr Bani-Sadr has refused to give control of Iran's
economy to largely untested men.
Mr Ra~ a'i's proposed oil minister, 27-year-old Asghar Ibrahim, was one of
today's most significant casualties. Another was Mohammad Nurbakhsh, 32,
who was due to become minister of economics and finance.
Two men were at first slated for the commerce ministry, one representing
the president and another Mr Ra3a'i. Neither was put forward today, sug-
gesting that the two leaders also disagreed on that ~ob.
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
The following were the 14 proposed ministers approved by the president today
and presented to the Majlis:
Minister of Health: Dr Hadi Manafi-
Minister of State and Head of Welfare: Mohammad Ali Fayyazabakhsh-
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications: Dr Mahmud Qandi-
Minister of Roads and Transport: Musa Kalantari-
Minister of Science and Higher Education: Dr Hasan Arefi-
Minister of Industries and Mines: Mohammad Reza Nejmatzadeh-
Minister of Agriculture: Mohammad Salamati-
Minister of State in Executive Affairs: Behzad Nabavi-
Minister of State and Supervisor of Ministry of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment: Mohammas Shahab Gonabadi-
Minister of Power: Dr Hassan 'Abbaspur-
Minister of National Guidance: 'Abbas Duzduzani-
Minister of Interior: Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani- _
Minister of Def ence: Colonel Javad Fakhuri-
Minister of State and Head of Natienal Steel Company: Mahmoud Ahmadzadeh.
CSO: 4920 I
i
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IRAN -
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES BATTLE KURDS IN NORTHWEST
JN302032 London REUTER in English 2007 GMT 30 Aug 8Q
[Text] Tehran, 30 Aug (REUTER)--�Government forces battled Kurdish guerrillas
in and aroimd the Kurdish atronghold of Mahab ad today as the four-month-old
Kurdistan war appeared to be nearing a climax.
West Azerbayjan Deputy Governor Mo3taba Hashemi said fighting eruped last
night and continued through today in several parts of the city and surround-
ing area.
He said army troops and Revolutionary Guards had not qet launched a full-scale
drive to recapture Mahabad, centre of a West Iranian border zone controlled
by Kurdish autonomists for the past 10 months, but Chis was expected soon.
The government side had so far lost one dead and two in~ured, Mr Hashemi
said. He had no figures for insurgent casualties.
The official said the two sides were fighting heavy artillery duels on the
hillsides surroimding Mahabad, but the government forces had not so far turned
their big guns on thecity itself, in an attempt to avoid mass death and de-
struction.
Speaking by telephone from the West Azerbay3an capital of 'Urumiyeh, Mr
Hashemi said the armed forces were limiting themselves to matching the weapon-
ry being used by the Kurdisr "Peshmerga" guerrillas.
Scattered gunbattles continued past nightfall in the streets of Mahabad, whose
fall to the government would mark a virtual end to Kurdish control of urban
centres and drive the guerrillas back into the mountains.
' Mr Hashemi also reported fighting today in several other parts of Kurdistan
which he did not identify.
CSO: 4920
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
IRAN
CONVOLUTSD COPID ITIONS IN COUNTRY BXPL~tED
Paria AL- WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Jun -4 Jul 80 pp 46, 47
/Articla by Faruq Abu Zahr: "When the Angel Bats the Forbidden Fruit:
Yran--The Fall from Heavnn to Earth, without a Parachute"/
/Text/ There is always a red line separating revclution and chaos. Iran
hss cross ed the red line in bros~d otrides, to find itself on earth once
again, in the midet of devils, after having lived through a golden dream
with Rho~+eyni's angels in a World of hopes and destiny. ~
The polit ical thermometer ahaws that Tehran ia going through a hot summer.
The game of tug-of-war among the power centers atruggling for control hae -
been going on for 17 months and threatena to turn into heated confronta-
tione which might put the regime of the religious leader Ayatollah Khomeyni
~.n serioue danger.
About 2 veeks ago, Rhomeyni (age 80) gathered the governors of the pro-
vinces around him and etarted to talk to them in tones which those who had
rallied arouud "the guide of the revo~lution" had not been accuetomed to
since Shah Mohsmoad Reza Pahlavi fell ~aat year: "I have abaolutely never
felt the fear I feel today of asaing the Ialamic Republic end in failurs.
Wherever my eye fa118 I see diapute and struggle. If the aituation con-
tinues to deteriorate,it will be difficult to continue the revolution."
Rhomeyni refers bitterly to the intensifying struggle between forcee and
asys, "There are strugglea between students, between ~n of religion and
politiciana, between the military army and the ~tevolutionary Guard~ between
policem~n and revolutioaary committee~. Bvnryone is calling for agreement
but they do not agr~e."
Two days had not passed eince that meeting when a violent battle broke out
in the mi.ddle of the capital, Tehran, as groups belonging to the Hezbolla-
hie, the nxtremiet wing of the Ialamic Aepublican Party, invaded a featival
vhich the left-wing Islamic I~ojahedin-e Uhalq organization led by Mae'ud
Bajavl. had held. As a result of thst, ~ome people vere killed and dozens
were wounded.
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FUR OHl~ICIAL iJSE 4NLY
President Abol Hasan Bani Sadr took the opportunity to condemn the prac-
tices of the Republican Party partisans and said "Cudgels will not bring
inrcidel8 back to Ielam. Ona maiet ca~t dawn thie etick, because Islam pro-
hibita the uae of savage force."
The same day in which blood was floiring at Am~adieh Stadium near the
American Bmbassy, where the claah occurred, Hojjatoleslam Reyehahri,
chief of the revolutionary courts in the arnry, diecloeed the arrest of
seven peraone in the armed forcea belonging to an organization which was
planning to eliminate the exieting regime.
A number of days later Reyshahri returned to point out that 100 people in
the armed forces had been condemned or were on their way to trial and that
the authorities were punishing 150 others for their connection with a r~v-
olutionary conepiracy. -
Bani Sadr Char~es Ayat _
However, the apex of the recent Iranian events, and their moet provocative
event, was the publication of newe by thn newspaper JO[~4iURI-YE BSI.AMI, -
loyal to Bani Sadr, on a plot hatched by clerice to do away with the prea-
ident and monopolize power definiCively.
The paper, in two ins~alments, publiahed the details of the tape recordinga
of a meeting which took place betvaea Dr Haaan Ayat, the official spokes-
man of the &epublican Party and former candidate �or the presidency, and a
number of student leader~.
The plaa of the clerics' parCy was as follows:
Raise the cry of cultural revolution and crush the univeraities and cultur-
al inatitutions on the excuee of purging them of "eaemies of Islam."
Make publicity to eapel profeseore who do not have allegiance to the Re-
publizan Party, and aecure a climate which could guarantee that the uni-
veraitims remained auspended unCil next September.
Conduct a blitz to paralyze Bani Sadr's mavament, incapacitate him, accuse
him of cooperating with the Americans, and provide the neceaeary means
within the arury for confronting him.
Implicate Kho~neyni in the Ielamic Bepublican Party once and for all.
In his alleged conversation, Aqat says "I do not anticipate that Bani Sadr
will remain in his position, but we mnat make use of time and organize
ourselves while waiting for the appropriata time." The appropriate tiaie
Will be when Bani Sadr is compelled to reaign and a cleric ie appointed in
his place. Hasan Ayat reco~ended Ayatollah Montazeri, the former ir~am of
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
Tehran, who recently preferred to withdraw to Qom to devote himeelf en-
tirely to religious affairs.
Dr Ayat accused Bani Sadr of acting "in accordance with an American plan."
He referred to his role in the operatian which destroyed the rw~ American
helicopters in the desert in tha wake of the failure of the operation to
- r~scue the hoetagea which took place toward the end of April.
The IaZamic Party intervened to claim innocence of Ayat's views and to
describe what was published as "a conspiracy" againat the party, vhich en-
joqs a majority of aeats in tha Consultative Council (parliament). Ayat
claimed that what Bani Sadr published was diatorted and that he was pre-
pared to go before a firing sqGad.
Observera in the Iranian capital consider that the recordings which were
published, regardlese of how true they weYe, come at the peak of the
sCruggle underway betWeen the two main powera on the political ecene and
mean that relations have reached the point of no return between two
currente:
The political and technocratic current, headed by Abol Hasan Bani Sadr, j
which calls for the codification and organization of the revolution, in ~
- order to rally around "the process of building and remedying the deterior- I
ating economic and social problems."
Bani Sadr's partisans charge that the Islamic Republican Party ie made up
_ of a group lacking homogeneity which has agreed to grab power ao matter
what the cost.
The religious current, led by the Islamic Republican Party, which amerged
triumphaat from the recent parliamentary elections, led by Ayatollah
Beheshti. It atresses the need to follow through with Islamic premises
without inhibition until society ia purged of the dregs of the paet ear,
Without any consideration for the balance of domestic and foreign forces.
Iasuea the Dispute Revolves around
One can atate that the millstone of fighting between the two partiea is
revolving about four main issuea: the centers of power, the issv,e oE the
hostages, formation of the cabinet and the army. _
As regards the centers of power, Bani Sadr elaia~a that it ia neceasary to
establish the central authority and unify Che decision-making aources.
The tact is that the clerics rushed in after the fall of the Shah to take
over aensitive positione and inherited institutions and, by virtue of
their organization and their presence in the front ranks during the upris-
ing against the regime, managed to be cloeer to daily life tha~ the pvli-
ticians, Who were moetly in prieon or exile.
24
FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR 0~'FICIAL USE ONLY
Following his election a~ preaident laet January, Bani Sadr tried to re-
coup these poeitions in order to enaure his authority and etrengthen hia
grip. For examgle, as preaident, he iseuad a number of decreea related
to the judiciary authority, an grounde that that Was one of hie pawera
according to the constitution and that the revolutionary courta, which
Ayatollsh Khalkhali Was in charge of, could not detain citizene, try them
or issus death eeatences againet them arbitrarily and without providing
the neceesary guaranteee.
However, the clerics rasisted him forcefully, until he triunq~hed over them
and sent Khalkhali off to another position.
~ A8 regarde the iesue of the American hostages detained since last 4 Novem-
ber, Bani Sadr eoneidera that the detainment haa weakened the revolution
and has bluntly accused the clerica of standing behind the atudente' move-
ment. The ~tapublicaz? Party has considared that it is neceesary to try the
hoatages and treat them as hoata~ee.
With the eacalating inteneity of Che disputas betWeen Bani Sadr and the
clerics, the issue of the detainena hae been a baeic subject in the daily
record of Iraniaa evente.
The diepute reached its zenith betWeen the tWO parties over the designation
of the prima minister, although the conatitution has graated the praeident
this pownr, the Bepublican Party, Which emerged triumphant in the elactiona,
refusea to be bound to it and conaiders the matter to be one of ite arnas
of specialization.
Bani Sadr ealls for the eatablishment of a etrong coalition government
which Will be able to cloae rsnka and deal with the ecoaomic, political
and social problems the revolution haa identified.
The clerics reject this thinking, stating that Khameyni has insisted it is
necessasy to unify the govermoant and that this uaity makae the elimi.na-
tion of some groupe mandatory. Ona cannot eatablish such unity between
Moelems and Communiste or betwaen what ie called Ielm and whgt distorts
Ielamic thinking.
Same obeezvers etra8s that the timing of the publication of the recordings
indicating the Republican Party's implication in the "conapiracy" against
Bani S~dr ia related to the struggle going on over designation of the
premier and membera of the cabinet in particular and that Yadollah Sahabi, '
temporary preaident of the chamber of deputias, pointed out that parlia-
ment would begin serious Work next week.
The president wanted to record saa~e points againet the clerics in hia own
behalf ia hopea that he might be able to acquire the power to appoint the
premier. ~
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONZY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
There remains the iasue of the anned forces. Bani Sadr, by virtue of con-
etitutional proviaiona and in accordance with Khomeyni's desixe, ie the
supreme commander of the armed forces and sees a winning card in them which
might in the future help him atrengthen his etatua domestically as well as
guarantee stability in minority regions.
However, the clerics take a different view. The army, in their view, atill
is aubject to doubts. They anticipate evil consequence~ fram the call to
reorganize it and stress that it is necessary to develop the resources of
the revolutionary guard and the revolutionary committees and purge the
armed forces of senior officera, especially those who had previously re-
ceived training in the United Statea.
Tn this aphere, also, observere state that the operation of publiehing
the recordings was tantamount to a"password" uttered by Bani Sadr to cre-
ate radical changes in the army command. He appointed Gen Valiollah
Fallahi, commander of the ground forces, to the position of chief of gen-
eral ataff, the place of Gen Mohaa~nad Hadimemhr, who became a conaultant
to the president, and appointed Gen Qasem Ali Zahernezhad commaader of the
grou~d forces. Air force colonel Javad Fakhuri assu~aed cocr~mand of the air
forces in the place of Col Amir Bahman Baqeri, who had reaigned a ahort
time bafore. ~
I
Where Does Rhm,aeyni Stand?
There remaine a question which is baffling to all: Where doea Khomeyni
etand, precisely, and alongaide whom?
Khomeyni recently got in movement and adopted a group of ineasurea and de-
cisions which seemed to observera like the process of distributing a legacy
between two forces, out af his desire not to give either the chance to
monopolize pawer. One can summ4rize his moat conepicuoue acts as follaws:
In the middle of this month, he ~reed to the atart of the Islamic cultur-
al revolution "to eliminate the culture and training inherited from the pre-
vious regime, *ahich aimed at serv{-o +.-~-r �-r{ The cl~rice had preesed
thia demand to "clean" the univereities and achools of Ieftist and secular
forces which do not support them. In fact, the operation started recently
and 389 university profeasora and students were expelled on the charge of
working as agents of the previous regime.
Khameyni called on Ayatollah Montazeri to choose three members to the
Supreme Judiciary Council. However, the foraier imam of Tehran rejected
tl:e offer, knowing in advance that he would be confronting Ayatollah
Beheahti, who heads thia council.
Khameyni appointed three clerics as his personal representatives within
the armed forces (the army, police and revolutionary guard); their ta$k
is to present him with a weekly report on conditions in the armed forces.
26
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY F
This step hgs been considered a move on Khomeyni's part to try to reaesure
the religioua eatablishment that the army will remain under ite surveillance.
Tehran $ources streesed that Abbas Zamani, "Abu Sharif," con~nander of the
revolutionary guard, resigned hi8 position under direct preesure frcm
Khomeyui, in responae to the desire of the Hepublican Party, on grounds
that Abu Sharif was loyal to Bani Sadr.
In compensation, Khomeyni shawed Bani Sadr favor and ordered the ravolu-~
tionary guard forces to obey him; the "guide of the revolution" said that
those who broke the laws would be punished, enq~hasizing "Bani Sadr ia my
repreaentative and Islamic duty requires you to obey his orders, on grounda
that he ia the aupreme commander of the armed foresa."
While all this emphasizes thst Rhome}rni's survival ia the aafety yalve for
maintain~ng balance between the men of religion and men Af the world, any
movement taward a coup while he is alive will meaa real civil War.
~en Gholamali Oveysi, the former chief of ~taff, opposes this thesie, stat-
ing, "Thare ie not the least doubt that the existing regime in Tehrsn is
going through its last days. It has defaAaed Islam ae it defamed Iran."
Gen Oveysi, Who~served in the imQerial axmy for k0 yeare, is betting on ex-
iating contradictione and trying to aesemble forcea oppoaed to 1Chomeyni
abroad and domesticallq in order to bring him down.
However, some obaerver8 say "It ia early to anticipate whether the oppon-
enta will assume the role of tha ~ihite Rueaiane in the Bolshevi.k xevolu-
tion or whether theq will be a real power."
Experts in Iranian affairs add that the oppoeition's problem lies in its
lack of unity and coordination. Shapur Bakhtiar, the most prominent op-
ponent of the Iranian revolution is, like Gen Oveyei, acting without coM
ordination with other forces.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11887
CSO: 4902
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IRwQ
NSW PARLIAI~RNTARY BLBCTIOtiS BITO~LLBD
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Jun 80 pp 28, 29
/Article: "The Iraqis E:perience Thsir Fir~t Damocratic Bxperiment in
2S Years"/
/Text/ This 20 June the Iraqis will go to the pq11s to elect their firat
parliamsnt in 25 yaare. Howevar, will the Iraqia' preoccupation with
thair damocratic eiparinent deflact them from Cheir concerns over what fs
going on beside thtem in thia ar~a of thair vital, national concerns?
~.'he most active, vital c~ndidato in Che general electioas in Iraq ie the
Zraqi presidsnt himself. Mr Suddav Aueaqa is not latting up or growing
Freary thesa dsys as ha traver~sa tha length and breadth of the country,
- fro~ north to south, receiving tena of thousands of citizene in their
tama, villages and rural sreu and surpriaing tham in their homas, factor-
ies, farm~ and deaerts.
The extreme heat of the aummsr ssuon doee not affact the concern of this
young praeident, on vhoas faca a~mila appeara whenever he finds himself
among his ordinary compatriota, a~ ha shares 2heir ~eals and talk with
thsm, aska them about thair conditions, and wan ~haras thsir clothes with
them. ~
He appears in an Iraqi rural traditional turban, aplendidly exuding intim-
�ey and yo~th, with hia distinctive featuraa aad mxpreaeions, which have
baan drawn out by the naturn of the rich, fertil~ Arab soil of Iraq.
Saddam Huaaya wante to live with hia people, see them, experiaace them up -
oloae, nximine their affair~ and learn about their eufferinga by himself,
without barriera, agenta or int~t~m~diaries and not from bahind an elegant
desk, a televiaion screen or a radio spaalcer. _
While Saddam Hueayn doea not actually intend to compete with the hundreds
of candid~tne who are running for 250 seats in the National Council, he is
in fact bringing to the hearts and sinda of 13 million Iraqia an ambitioua
political, eaonomic and social program.
28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
He wante to move thia Arab country rapidly forward which even up to near-
ly the end of the sixties wae divided by a few hatrede and political and
party traditions, toseed about by foreign and regional capricea, monopo-
lies and aspirations, and put it in the forefront of Arab countries in
terms of movement, production and strength.
1'oday Sadd:am Husayn is building a country which by everyone's admiaeion is
the rising new force in the skies of the Middle Bast and Gulf area. He
believe8 that this force may not be gained by political bargaining, re-
gionsl struggles or Arab axes but by building a firm industrial and human
base from which Iraq may venture forth to play Che regional, national and
international role demanded of it.
Stability Is the Basis of the Revolution
Saddam Hueayn, in the last 12 years, has given the Iraqis, for the first
time in the history of this Arab country filled with conw lsione, the
atability which is the prime ba~is of the construction process, and he al-
so hae, for the firat time in the modern history of Iraq, given them aelf-
confidence and confidence in the political leaderehip.
Stability, in Saddam I~usayn's vieW, is the firet condition to bring about
revolution and tranafer the revolution from tha stage in which it was im-
posed by armed etruggle to the stage in which it was implanted and deepened '
through economic and social achievements.
Perhaps the Iraqis realize today, as they are blesged with stability and
are reaping the first fruita of long industrial programs and devel~pment
and servic~ projecte in various fielde, why Saddam Husayn has always been
anxious to have the stabilitq endura, and why he has not dealt lightly
with those who tried to play with the country's aecurity and eafet~.
Saddam Husayn wants the Iraqis to knoW the extent of what ie expected of
them, eapecially the new young generatione, in a short time frame. Hia
govercuaent does not heoitate to allocate billione of dollara to train man-
power and provide technology and job opportunitiea. All he wants ie that
the ordinary Iraqi feel that he ia embarking on a battle, a deciaive bat-
tle against backwardness and dapeadence, and that he feel that the battle
which ie developing and advancing him is the battle of all Iraq.
Thia year Saddam Husayn ie embarking on a unique~experienc~e-in tl~e h~~atorq
of the Iraqi revolution. It is the firat democratic experiment in about a
quarter century. It is an experiment in direct electiona fram which this
20 June will emerge the firat elected National Council (parliament) which
will participate with the government in its responaibilities for legiela-
tion, oversight, followup, holding to account and implementation as well.
Although the atmoephere and circumetances cauaed by the new Iranian re-
gime's poeition toward Iraq and it�s political leaderehip, which has
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY
rPached the point of deviaing attempts at individual and group assaseina-
tion, Saddam Husaya has been ineiating that the electiona be held at their
apecified time.
Bright Faces and Young Oaes
There are for example Measrs Dr Sa'dun Haaadi, minister of foreign af-
fairs, Dr Ahmad 'Abd-al-Sattar al-Juwari, former minieter, Iftikhar al-
Samarra'i, vice prasident of the i.'~+men's Federation, Dr Sadiq 'Allush,
former head of the doctors' trade u~o~, His Bminence Shaykh Nuri 'Abd-
al-Hamid al-Mulla Huwaqah, vice preaident of the League of Iraqi xeligiou8
Scholars, Hamid Sa'id Hadi al-Amin, director general of the General Radio
and Television Orgagization, the retired genaral Rhalid Malcki al-Hashimi,
and 'Ubaydallah al-Barzani, the eon of Muatafa al-Barzani.
In addition to these names, which are well knc~+n in the world of politics
and national atd vocational activity, there are candidates who caa?e from
varioue fields of ~+ork and activity, including White collar workere, lab-
orers, peaeants, Writera, artists and party mecsbera.
Bveryonn hae agreed to participate ia the exparimnnt, out of their faith
that its auccess ~ill provide Iraq with the first pioneering democratic
experiment and will be the basie of the development of ite free popular
exercise atd the implanting of its democracy.
The fact is that eatablishment of the po~ulgr constitutional organizationa
is, in turn, one of the decisive �igns of political stability in the
country. Yt also constitute~ a sound political link betWeen the political
leaderehip and the mass base, and a lung through Which the popular nation-
~ al Will breathes and e:presaes ita ~spirations, hopee, desires and daa?and~
as Well.
The prevailing belief i� that the more the Nationml Couneil exprease8 this
popular will, the more proper and real the link between the leader.hip and
the ba8e will be and the more firmly it ~ill be based on relationa of citi-
zenship alone.
Perhaps the hope now is that the Iraqia Will succeed in chooaing their
representatives for their future parliament and that theee representatives
will be honest in embodying the popular Will.
Iraqi Iudepende~.: e
The Iraqis' concem in building their coastitutional and legislative inati-
tutioas ha8 in no way diverted then from follawing up on what ia happening
around them in their regional or Arab area.
They Want to assert their indepe~dent platform in their Arab and inter-
nationsl policy and theq want their Arab brothera to follow this platform,
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
1'Vl\ VL'1'1Vllau V~lL Va~Ll
which causes the higher Arab interest to influence all other intereate,
including the interests of friends and enemies alike.
It ia firm independence which arises from this aelf confidence and the
abilizy to follow a nonaligned platform in d.ealing with the various major
and minor powere of the world.
This independence, which is based on national faith that the Arabs are
one nation, apecifically has ita regional and international role and per-
sonality which derive from ita traditions, its cultu~al and human legacy
and its religious values and beliefs. It is this independence which stirs
up resentment against Iraq on the part of the proponents of subservience -
and tactical or strategic connectiocis with the wheels of international
forces and thoae who hide behind a v~il of brilliant slogana. It also
stirs up the resentment of those who bear gr~idges against the Arab nation,
do not Want it to realize ita national unity or its national identity, and
deny it the characteristi.cs af united nation in order to cast it into a
sea of creede, obscure claime and bombast before its unity ia achieved, in
order to eliminate its personality and strike out at ita faith in its Arab
affiliation, while every day, under their religioue slogans, they exercise
their raciet domination of the peoples and minoritiee wham they have op- ~
- pressed in the past. I
Proceeding fram this independence, Iraq, which is always an~ciuus to assert
its friendahip with the socialist camp, haa not hesitated to condemn the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and it ia also Iraq which aent the
cream of its fighting forces to 8ave Damascus in the 1973 war, cut off its
relations with the United Statee in 1974, and refuaea to restore them to-
day as long as the United Sta~tes does not correct its historic error in
supporting and backing Israel and ita aggresaion agsinat the Arab nation.
It ie IXaq which is .extending its hand to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the
other countries of the Gulf, in spite of the difference in political re-
gimes and social platform, in order to strees that the national connection
and higher Arab interests are abave social allagiances, economic platforms
and political connectione.
Perhape it is a source of pride for Iraq that the trust between it anci its
Gulf brethren is becoming stronger and gxowing day by day and ia based on
mutual respect and pure fraternal relationa.
P.olitical independence also depends on economic independence. Iraq today
sees no embarrassment in economic and conmiercial cooperation and dealings
with other foreign countries, in spite of the difference in their political
and economic systema. In Iraq today Indian, Yugoslav, British, American,
- Jnpanese and Soviet companies are working in the sphere of implementing
development and conatruction projecta. Iraq is anxious to acquire deep
expertiee, excellent experience, advanced technology and well-conatructed
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
equipment from any source as long as theae do not conetitute a reatriction
on its political ~reedom of movement and independence.
Conversely, it exports its energy reaources to various countries at a
price dictated by national intereata and market considerationa, and the
intereats of international econamic cooperation. Iraq ia a rich country.
It poasesses oil reservea estimated at 100 billion barrels--that is, it ie
second to Saudi Arabia in the region from the standpoint of volume of re-
serves and the volume of production as well (3.5 million barrels a day),
guaranteeing it between $20 and $30 billion a year.
A shining star glows in the sky of the Gulf, helping to draw up an Arab
road to a better future for a nation which has still suffered from the
humility of fragmentation, disaeneion and falsification of its goala toward
unity aad social justice.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11887
CSO: 4802
32
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LEBANON
SOVIET AMBASSADOR SEES BASHIR AL-JUMAYYIL, SHAM'UN
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABZ ia Arabic 28 Jun-4 Jul 80 pp 28-29
[Article: "Soviet Diplomacy Tries Its Luck in Lebaneae Minefield; Dialogue
Without (Klashnikoffs) Between Lebanese Front and Soldatov")
[Text] Beirut--Dispatch from AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI Bureau--Soviet diplomacy
is trying its luck these days in the Lebanese minefield through its dia-
logue with the Lebanese Front leaders. The Lebaneae government, despite _
its ob~ection to Moscow's encroachment, expects Ambassador Soldatov to en-
dorse the results, if positiveY to its account.
At at time when attention was focused on ex-President Camille Sham'un's
meeting with Aleksandr Soldatov, the Soviet ambassador in Beirut, the offi-
cial circles were concentrating on the other meeting held between the Soviet
ambassador and Bashir al-Jumayyil, the co~ander of the Phalanges Party
militias.
This meeting took place on the same day as the Sham'un-Soldatov meeting.
But the Phalanges, resistance and Soviet Embasay circles have been eager to
suppress news of the meeting for fear that the nature of the current talks
will be revealed at this delicate phase through which Lebanon is passing.
The Lebaneae I~ational Movement--left--circles $ay that this meeting, which
is the third between the Soviet ambassador and Bashir al-Jumayyil, has not
produced,deciaive results because the sub~ects with which it has dealt can-
not be settled so quickly.
The National Movement circles add that the first meeting, which took place
last March, came in the wake of the Syrian decision to assemble the Arab
Deterrence Forces in Lebanon.
Through that meeting, Bashir al-Jumayyil wanted to establish an initial un-
derstanding on the phase following the asaembling of the forces. However,
when the assembling of forces stopped at the limit which it had reached,
the second meeting was an occasion for Bashir al-Jumayyil to make two pro-
posals to the Soviet ambassac'or:
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
The first proposal called for adequate Soviet guarantees for the Lebanese
Front regarding the establishment of. a balanced government with the other
forces.
The second proposal called for initiating a mediation with the Syrian off i-
cials to reach an understanding on the various issues projected in Lebanon.
Perhaps what has drawn the attention of observers in recent days i~ the vis-
it made to the border strip by two Soviet reporters, Vladia~ir (Kopolin) and
Oleg (Arzilov), and their meeting with Sa'd Haddad, the deserting officer
who is cooperating with Israel.
The two reporters were transported from Beirut by an official Soviet Embassy
car for what was called an endeavor to prepare a report on the Middle East
situation. Well-informed sources in Beirut say that this visit came as part
of the understanding between Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Soldatov and Bashir
al-Jumayyil and out of the latter's wish to acquaint the Soviets with the
situation in the border strip area.
Issue of Deal ing With Israel ;
What is evident so far is that Bashir al-Jumayyil's attempts have been moti- I
vated by more than one reason. The issue of dealing with Israel has begun '
to form for the Marunite Lebanese Front and for Bashir al-Jumayyil in partic-
ular a sensitive issue that foreshadows grave consequences. Bashir al-
Jumayyil has tried repeatedly to break into a circle through which he can
move flexibly toward the other Lebanese forces, the Palestinian resistance
and Syria. But the Israeli pressure exerted on him has made him abandon his
attempts.
Bashir al-Jumayyil repeats in his councils frequently that the attempts to
assassinate members of al-Jumayyil family and leaders of the Lebanese Front
could not hav e been all perpetrated by local Lebanese circles and that
Israel may not be far from these attempts. The Phalanges militia commander
lets no opportunity pass without declaring that the United States does not _
support him but supports his brother Amin and that this fact miist motivate
him to establish a balance among the international forces supporting the
Lebanese Front.
If we add to all this the desire to reach an agreement with Syria, then
Bashir al-Jumayyil has had enough motives to open the channel of dialogue
with the Soviet Union to get new guarantees and to obstruct some roles in
which the spell has almost turned against the magician.
The Syrian off icials have been aware of what has happened. Foreign Minister
'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam has stressed this fact to a number of the National
Movement members in recent weeks. Khaddam has expected the meetings between
the Soviet ambassador and the Lebanese Front leaders to continue because
34
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
such contracts cannot produce rapid results and because the Soviets are
awaiting better conditions to move openly in this sphere.
Goals of Soviet Diplomacy
Sources of the Soviet Embassy in Beirut say that the meetings with Camille
Sham'un and Bashir al-Jumayyil are part of endeavors being made by Moscow
to bring closer the v iews of the political f orces on the Lebanese arena.
These sources believe that the Soviet ambassador has not offered any com-
mitments of definite guarantees to the Lebanese Marunite political forces
even though he has actually conveyed some proposals to Moscow to be dis-
cussed with the Syrian officials.
As for Bashir al-Jumayyil, he says that the contacts constitute by them-
selves a penetration of the wall of isolation imposed on the Phalanges dur-
ing and after the events and that the goals are not so much the initial re-
sults as they are the final results which must secure fundamental guaran-
tees for the future Lebanon.
Bashir al-Jumayyil's sources say that keeping the.meeting out of the media
limelight was necessary for fear that it could have caused sensitive issues
to become sub~ect to the well-known local acts of oneupmanship.
These sources add tha t an agreement on this approach was reached between
al-Jumayyil and Soldatov, provided that future meetings be announced when
tangible results are realized.
Even though Bashir al-Jumayyil has been eager to point out, as his sources
say, his re3ection of the Camp David policy because it constitutes an inlet
to resettling the Palestinians in Lebanon, this re~ection has not been
coupled with a positive stance on the need to.create a position of confron-
tation in which all the forces opposed to the Camp David policy and the U.S.
peace process would participate.
Well-informed Phalangist sources say that such a position would constitute
a fundamental transformation against the U.S. policy in the Middle East and
that this issue is still the sub3ect of study in the Phalanges Party. T~ao
previous attempts to approve such a position had failed and this made it
necessary to refer the issue to a retreat which the party wi11 hold later
this summer.
The official sources v iew these development s cautiously. A government
- source has said in co~ent that Lebanon used to object to the direct U.S.
contacts with the Lebanese political forces and that it has now to ob~ect
to the direct Soviet contacts with these f orces and parties because all
this doesn't help the state to regain its role, legitimacy and sovereignty.
The official sources also say that the issues projected deal with sensitive
subjects that cannot b e brought up without leading to a renewal of the
35
~'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
confrontation between the political forces. The official sources cite as
an example of this the issue of the Syrian forces' withdrawal, even grad-
ual withdrawal, from Lebanon and say rhat this issue was one of the issues
brought up in the meetings between Bashir al-Jumayyil, Camille Sham'un and
the Soviet ambassador and that bringing up this issue amidst the efforts
to renew the stay of the Deterrence Forces will not be helpful.
The official sources further add that Lebanon had previously pointed out
in its international contacts the need for the major powers to confine
their Lebanese contacts to the official authorities, warning that direct
contact [with ttie parties] under the current circumstances constitutes in-
tervention in Lebanon's i.nternal affairs.
View of Security Agencies
Apart of the official position, there seems to be another position that
the security agencies are seeking to reach. This position calls on the
state to deal with the current contacts with the aim of containing the re-
sults and of making them flow into the course of national detente and of
what they may offer at the level of pacification.
Reports made by the security agencies say that the logic of international ~
guarantees may constitute one of the positive inlets to the path of de- !
tente and that the state must make use of the current contacts because ~
they create bridges of understanding among the Lebanese forces and parties
through these middlemen.
These reports recall the role performed by the U.S. and Soviet ambassadors
in 1978 during the confrontation between the Arab Deterrence Forces and
the Lebanese Front militias in Eastern Beirut and remind that the cease-
fire decisions were at times reached through these two diplomats.
The reports also suggest that the issues of the current contacts be dis-
cussed openly with the ambassadors of the major powers in ~rder to estab-
lish some kind of coordination and to understand the inclination of the
Lebanese forces in these meetings.
Dr Amin al-Hafiz, chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee,
says that he drew the attention of the Canadian Middle East envoy during
the latter's stopover in Beirut last month to the role that the major pow-
ers perform through their contacts with the parties to the Lebaneae con-
flict.
Dr Amin al-Hafiz has also said that he proposed that the envoy adopt the
idea of transforming the contacts with and invitations to these forces in-
to a dialogue aimed at encouragir.g these forces to join under the banner
of legitimacy in Lebanon.
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Western diplomatic sources say that this position is not new and that the
western diplomats heard it when numerous invitations were issued by t�he
United States to the Lebanese political leaders to visit Washington.
These sources add that the Lebanese officials had expected the leaders to
return with more moderate positions but that the leaders returned with
_ radical positions which did not give the impression that their contacts
had reached positive results.
Will Contacts Realize Their Goal
The diplomatic sources cite as an example of this the visit made by Bashir
al-Jumayyil to the United States last year and his statements upon his re-
turn from there--statements in which he attacked the U.S, administration
for its failure to understand what the Lebanese want.
The diplomatic sources add that th~e Lebanese officials thought that the
United States had initiated direct pressure on Bashir al-Jumayyil to con-
tain him and to give his brother Amin a free hand. But it bacame later
evident that the subject ['unwan] of r~:~ contacts was bigger than the fact
of the U.S. dealings with Bashir al-Jumayyil and with his brother who vis-
ited the United States in the same period.
The western diplomatic sources further add that the Lebanese off icials have
been eager to ref er on several occasions to the need to make use of these
- contacts, if they continue, to push the political leaders and the~leaders
of the parties and of the militias in th e direction of supporting the legit-
imate authority. The referencea came when the officials felt that these
contacts have begun to give the forces and the parties large dimensions and
a feeling of an international recognition of their presence and when, at the
_ same time, the contacts began to give the parties concerned the impression
that there is a r.our.dtable or roundtables to achieve detente under the pa-
_ tronage of this or that state.
It remains to be said that the Soviet contacts with the leader of the Leb-
anese Front Militias have not brought about so far a mediation for a meet- -
ing with the leaders of the national forces and parties, unless we consider
that Bashir al-Jumayyil's statements about the presence of constant con-
tacts between himself and all the parties and forces in Western Beirut fall
_ under the heading of the meeting with Soldatov.
The National Movement sources deny these possibilities and the Palestinian
r~sistance sources believe that Bashir al-Jumayyil's statements are exag-
gerated and a part of a psychological propaganda campaign.
As for the government sources, they believe that a lot of what is happening
has surpassed the stage of the question of whether these contacts have
started or not because the question now concerns what these contacts, which
are taking place at various levels and directly or through middlemen, have -
achieved.
37
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
The Soviets may be smarter than the Americans in the current contacts be-
tween the political sides in Lebanon. Or is the smartness in the kinds of
roles distributed to the two [U.S. and Soviet] sides now that they have
both realized that each of them has an extension on the Lebanese arena
which it cannot disregard?
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494
CSO: 4802
38
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LEBANON
EX-PRIME MINISTER AL-SULr; DISCUSSES ROLE OF POLITICAL ISLAM
- Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Jun-4 Jul 80 p 30
[Interview With Ex-Prime Miniater Taqi-al-Bin al-Sulh; With Candidate
No 2; Taqt-al-Din al-Sulh: Silence Is My Wespon in Government"]
[Text] IF Dr Salim al-Huss' cabinet doesn't return to government be-
cause of the impossibility of forming a detente government, then ex-
Prime Minister Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh is ready and waiting. He is now the
number two Sunni candidate, after Rashid Karami, to form the next cabinet.
He may even become the number one candidate. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has con-
, ducted this brief interview with ex-Prime Minister al-Sulh whose answers
seem like a brief draft for a cabine~ statement.
[Question] What is the role of the political Islam in making the govern-
ment decision?
[Answer] Since independence, the political Islam has assumed the role
compatible not only with the number of the Muslims but also with the rise,
awareness and capability of Islam's leaders in guiding the government poli-
cy in the various Lebanese internal and external affairs.
This role changed with the change of the men who have represented the Mus-
lims in the government and it hasn't always been easy. This role has
clashed, and at times violently, with the will of others, considering that
the rule doesn't belong exclusively to one sect and that it is a fair part-
nership ea?ong al.l.
The periods in which this role was performed best were the periods in which
taere was concurrence between the two winga of the rule, represented espec-
ially in the presidency and the premiership, on the basis of loyalty to
Lebanon's supreme interest--a loyalty free of personal and sectarian influ-
ences and of disregard for this interest.
[Question] What is the Islamic Grouping's position vis-a-vis the National
Movement--the left--and the Lebanese Front--the right?
39
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
[AnswerJ The Islamic Grouping's position vis-a-vis the Lebanese Front is
completely different from its position toward the National Movement. By
structure, the Islamic Grouping belongs to the factional grouping to which
the National Movement generally belongs. The National Movement may be dis-
puting with the Islamic Grouping over the representation of this faction.
But this is an issue within the same faction. The disagreement over some
issues or with some groups in the National Movement may be strong. But in
the brcad lines, there is agreement between the two sides.
As for the Lebanese Front, it disagrees with the Islamic Grouping and with
the National Movement over all the political and ideological issues.
There aren't in the Islamic Grouping, for example, ideas for changing the
political, economic and social system, even though the Grouping is not un-
aware of the shortcomings and drawbacks of this system. But the Grouping
does not view the cure as the abolition of the system and the establish-
ment of a new system. The Grouping believes that this system needs refo~s
that will free it of the impurities and will make it respond more fully to
the demand of the Lebanese citizen that his free democratic political, ec-
onomic and social system be an ideal system. ,
Though the Lebanese Front adopts the democratic system, there are issues
- over which disagreement has erupted between the Muslims generally on one
hand and the Front on the other, beginning with the Front's use of violence
and weapons to solve these issues, the Front`s violent opposition to the
Palestinian issue to the point of ineeting with the enemy, its opposition
to the relations with the fraternal Syria in a manner conflicting with the
requirements and duties of brotherhood, nationalism and neighborliness,
its projection of partitioning and cultural ideas that are alien to the
Lebanese reality, its [advocacy of] Arab regionalism and its clinging to
privileges whose continued presence is incompatible with the idea of equal-
ity, justice and of development toward a modern society and a modern state.
Sign of Success of Failure
[Question] What is the position of the political Islam toward the Arab
conditions?
[Answer] The political Islam shoulders a major responsibility in the mat-
ter of the Arab relations generally and the Syrian relations in particular.
The reason for this is the fact that the political Islzm is fully aware of
the Lebanese conditions on the one hand and knows the Syrian and Arab con-
ditions with its mind and in its heart. Therefore, the task of the politi-
cal Islam is to keep Lebanon affiliated and in interaction with the area
and to convey to the area the knowledge on how to deal with Lebanon in its
well-known social, economic and political structure.
This point is what constitutes the sign of the success or failure of the
political Islam. If Lebanon is in disagreement with the Arab countries,
40
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OF'FICIAi, USF. ONt,Y
then this means that the political Islam has not performed its internal
and Arab role or has not succeeded in performing it. If Lebanon is in .
agreement with the area, then this means that the political Islam has
done Lebanon and the Arab countries a major service.
The political Islam has always acted on the premise of Lebanon's inter-
_ est. However, the other Lebanese parties have not always been fair to
us and have at times even denied this fact even though the political Islam
has always inspired that sound nat~.onal Lebanese conduct that secures Leb-
anon's interest, stability and prosperity--a conduct that seeks to make
_ Lebanon a society of ~ustice and equality internally and a society of fra-
ternity and loyalty to the Arab brothers. This has always been in Lebanon's
interest.
[Question] What is the impact of the movement of the other sects--the
Shi'ites, the Druzes and the Marunites--,~n the Islamic Sunni movement?
[Answer] When the Sunnis were movir~ politically almost alone, their move-
ment was guided by the interest of the other Islamic sects and all the
other Lebanese sects as weli. The Sunna part of the Lebanese political Is-
lam can only be happy with the movement of all these sects. The current
Shi'ite movement and the Druze movement should not be in disagreement with
the Sunna movement.
So far, rule in Lebanon has been centered in a partnership represented by
the Marunite and Sunna sects primarily because these two sects hold togeth-
er the two positions of the executive authority that ahoulders the direct
responsibility of dealing with government issues.
This has made it seem as if the Sunna monopolize the power in the natne of
the other Muslim sects. But this is not true. I would like to remind
that shouldering the responsibility of government--the premiership--is not
a pure gain and that whoever shoulders it may also incur a loss, and a big
loss too,
The advice that I have always voiced is that no.sect.should try to reap -
benefita at the expense of disagreement between other sects, be they aects
within the same religion or sects belonging to Islam and Christianity.
Any faction that thinks any disagreement among the Muslims servea it and
that works to create such disagreement is a faction that commits a mis*_ake
in its long-range calculations.
[Question] Does al-Murabitun--an armed Arab organization in the Muslim
Western Beirut--represent, for example, the political Islam?
[Answer] The phrase 'political Islam' does not apply to al-Murabitun with
its structure which is based on armed organization. There is a difference
in method, and perhaps even in ideology, between a1-Murabitun and the poli-
tical Islam.
41
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
[QuestionJ What are your observations regarding the position of Dr Salim
al-Huss, the head of the outgoing [al-mustaqilahJ government?
[Answer] There is no doubt that the present prime minister en~oys moral
and educational qualities and capabilities that make him trustworthy but
there may be disagreement of opinion in judging his work since he assumed
the premiership.
He himself has said in his latest statement to the Chanber of Deputies
that the current situation in Lebanon is worse than what it was 3.5 years
ago. This is the period in which he has been in power. However, nobody
can deny that luck has something to do with these results. Had he assumed
the premiership under diff erent circumstances, the results would have prob-
ably been different.
I prefer to Work Silently
~~uestionJ If you were in power and were facing the same problems, how
uould you tackle the issue of the army decree and of or~anizing the army
command, the issue of the s~uth, the issue of deploying the army in the
various areas, the principles of detente and the security problems?
[Answer] I do not believe in words that harm actions. Therefore, I would
not publicize the presence of the problems as much as I would work silently '
to solve them. This is the diff erence. The diff erence is not at all in
the positions because they are the same positions on which the Muslims agree.
[QuestionJ Who is responsible for the political fragmentation of the Mus-
liws within the various frameworks and what has the Islamic Grouping done in
this regard?
[Answer] Why do you attribute the fragmentation to the Musli.ms exclusively?
The Islamic fragmentation does not apply to the Islamic society as a w'hole.
This society is one cohesive unit. It is my belief that the rise of the
Islamic Grouping has helped greatly not only to highlight this cohesion but
also to safeguard and preserv~ it.
There is a strong, profound and unbreakable bond between the Grouping and
this society. If somebody sees fragmentation in the Islamic society, then
this is due to the multiplicity of the parties and organizations existing
on the Islamic arena and frequently mesting within the framework of the so-
called National Movement.
There is no doubt that there are Muslims in the National Movement and that
it is among the Muslims. But the movement is not the Muslims.
COPYRIGHTt AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494
CSO: 4802
42 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LEBANON
LEBANESE ARAB ARMY'S flISTORY, GOALS, SITUATION EXAMINID
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Jun-4 Jul 80 pp 31-33
[Article: "Castro of Lebanese War; Is There War of Life or Death Between
Ahmad al-Khatib and Lebanese Military Intelligence?"] ~
[Text] Beirut--Dispatch From AL-WATAN AL-'AP,ABI Bureau--Ahmad al-Khatib
is an armed manifestation produced by the Lebanese war. At times, this
manifestation disappears and is almost forgotten by all those who have
and who have not engaged in the fighting and at others it surfaces and is
felt and breathed by all those who have and those who have not engaged in
the fighting.
A1-Khatib was an ordinary officer of the Lebanese army who, like any Arab
youth, was attracted to Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir one day. When the Lebanese
war erupted, al-I:hatib found himself heading an army which had broken away
with its troops, barracks and weap~ns from the official army to ~oin the
National Movement. A1-Khatib has engaged in both war and politics, 1et-
ting his beard grow like Castro's and, like Castro, swearing that he would
not shave it until the revolution triumphs. Cuba's Castro still wears his
beard, and so does Lebanon's Castro.
On Monday, (the 16th of the current month of June), elements of the Leban-
ese Arab army hijacked a Lebanese army truck on the Sidon road. On Tues-
day 3 June, the outcome of a clash between elements of the Lebanese Arab
Army and elements of the Lebanese army traveling in an army truck in al-
Rumaylah Quarter on the Sidon road was the killing of 11 persons and the
wounding of 16 others. On the 9th of last May, armed roadblocks of the
Lebanese Arab Army in Western Beirut and in al-Rumaylah Quarter kidnaped
22 soldiers, policemen and gendarmes and killed a staff sergeant of the
Arab Deterrence Forces.
These are examples of the reports of the internal security forces in the
past 2 months. We notice in the reports prominent activitq on the part
of the Lebanese Arab Army Organization which is led by First Lt Ahmad al-
Khatib. Despite the reasons behind such security incidents, what draws
the attention of both the officials and the citizens is th'e way in which
43
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
these clashes end only to be renewed again. The latest of these clashes,
and perhaps not the last, is the clash which took pla~e with elements of
the Shi'ite Amal Movement in al-Nabi Shit town in B'albakk District.
What is the truth of the role performed by the Lebanese Arab Army and what
ie the role to which its commander, Ahmad al-Khatib, aspires?
At the end of 1975, the war of barracks and of army posts erupted in many
parts of Lebanon and produced in al-B3.qa' area a broad movement which want-
ed to correct the image of the Lebanese army. This movement, led by First
Lt Ahmad al-Khatib, was able to start a series of uprisings in the various
Lebanese mi.litary barracks and areas within a period of few weeks.
As soon as Ahmad al-Khatib succeeded in imposing his control on the bar-
racks of B'albakk, Riyaq and Ablah at the beginning of March 1976, a staff
sergeant was imposing his control on the position of Arnun and al-Shuqayf
[Beauforte Castle] in the south and ~oining Ahmad al-Khatib's movement on
8 March. ;
The string of beads then broke. On 9 March, Rashayya Fort joined the Leb-
anese Arab Army and on 10 March, Marj'uyun and al-Khiyam barracks ~oined '
and were followed by the 'Araman barracks near Tripoli.
On 11 March 1976, and while Brig Gen 'Aziz al-Ahdab was declaring his tele-
vision and radio coup, the Lebanese Arab Army was in the process of con-
trolling Hulayl and Ghanim barracks in Tripoli, the command ef al-Qulay'at
military airfield in 'Akkar and al-Nabatiyah barracks in the south.
On the following day, the Zughayb barracks in Sidon, the Banu Barakat bar-
racks and 'Adlun barracks in Tyre and the Combat School in Beirut ~oined
the Lebanese Arab Army, Before few weeks had passed, most of the barracks,
with the exception of the command of Beirut position and the barracks in
the Christian areas from al-Fayyadiyah to al-Batrun, were under the control
of First Lt Ahmad al-Khatib.
Story of Lebanese Arab Army
The Lebanese Arab Army movement has been clear from the outset. It wants
to give Lebanon's army a fundamental role in the Arab battle against the
Israeli enemy and wants Lebanon's army to be a national army and not a
sectarian army, as was the case at the outset of the bloody events in 1975.
A commander of the Lebanese Arab Army at the time has said that the move-
- ment was born in the head of Ahmad al-Khatib and some of his colleagues in
the wake of the Lebanese army's confrontation of the fishermen's demonstra-
tion in Sidon in April 1975--a confrontation which resulted in the death of
a number of fisherman and in the assassination of Ma'ruf Sa'd, a former
Sidon deputy.
44
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
' But this movement did not see the light quickly because of the situation
: prevailing in the army command and of ~he iiiability of the officers to
~ move amidst the constant military alert and watch imposed on the barracks.
T~vith the successive fall of the barracks and their ~oining the Lebanese
j Arab Army, the number of officers 3oining Ahmad al-Khatib swelled to more
' than 200 officers ~~ith ranks ranging from colonel to.lieutenant, in addi-
i tion to a number of the War College cadets. What are the principles that
attracted all of them to Ahmad al-Khatib?
Ahmad al-Khatib's colleagues admit that he was an ordinary officer from a '
ma~or Sunna family in al-Kharrub District in al-Shuf, southeast of Beirut.
His colleagues also admit that he was not distinguished at the War College
or in his militar~ service, even though he complained at times of the army
command's treatment of the military generally and even though his dossier
in the intelligence bra,nch came to include references to this behavior.
Ahmad al-Khatib brought nothing new when he marched forth with his move-
ment from al-Biqa'. He himself said in declaration No 6 which defines the
main premises of the Lebanese Arab Army's uprising that the uprising was
not "a sudden leap or a military whim with narrow goals or personal aspira-
tions." Al-Khatib has also said:
"The Lebanese Arab Army's entity emerges through this army's national and -
pan-Arab aspirations and principles. The Lebanese people 4re Arab people
and an indivisible part of the Arab peoples. History tells, and even con-
firms, this truth with which some Lebanese are not pleased. But these
Lebanese cannot refute any of the elements of their national components.
On this premise, we can assert that the Lebanese homeland is a part of the
greater Arab homeland. A part of something means cchesion with this thing
in meaning and structure, in body and in spirit. Therefore, Lebanon is a
part of the Arab homeland and its people are a part of the Arab homeland's
great people. Lebanon's role is compatible with and even fatefully tied
to the Arab peoples.
"The recognition and acknowledgement of the Arabism of Lebanon and of its
people does not change the reality under which we live. It will remain a
superficial recognition and acknowledgement if we don't exercise and stress
the common pan-Arab bonds and the popular asp3rations, goals and interests
of all the Arab peoples.
"Acting on this premise and in honor of the sublime national and pan-Arab
interest, the magnificent uprising of the Lebanese Arab Army has been
staged to establish right, justice and equality, to highlight the Arab Leb-
anese identity, to defend the rights of the oppressed and the torinented, to
defend the lost homeland which they have wanted to be weak, to defend its
sanctities that are violated day and night before the eyes of all, to unite
with the deprived people and to stand with the'people in one trench on sev- .
eral fronts in the face of the enemy's people at home and in the face of ~
the escalating Zionist danger on the borders."
45
FOR OFFICIAL USE OI~I,Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
Canfrontation With Syrians and Later Retreat
These goals do not stop at this limit. Like the other National Movement
factions, Ahmad al-Khatib proceeded to launch virulent attacks against
the Marunite Lebanese Front and then against the entry of the Syrian forces
into Lebanon to put a stop to the bloody events.
At the time, al-Khatib described the Syrian forces as the "fraternal Syrian
invasion" and this angered the Syrian officials at him in the summer of
1976.
An officer of the Lebanese Arab Army has said that the army wages used to
be paid by the Lebanese army command in al-Yarzah with the approval of
Rashid Karami, the then minister of defense. However, the Lebanese Arab
Army used to receive very big aid from the Palestinian resistance.
' Ahmad al-Khatib himself admitted this aid in a television interview in the
summer of 1976 when he said that "the birth of Lebanese Arab Army came
~ with big contributions from the Lebanese National Movement and the Pales-
tinian resistance. We have marched forth for the sake of the National
Movement and to prevent liquidation of_.the_Palestinian resistance." ~
- - - - - - - - . ~
Sources of the National Movement, the left, in Beirut have said that the ~
Lebanese Arab Army movement emerged in reaction to the Lebanese army's
attempts to strike the Palestinian resistance. The Palestinian resistance
has participated in paying the Lebanese Arab Army's salaries only because
this army supported it within the framework of the joint forces which were
formed of the Lebanese parties and political forces in 1976.
Perhaps what motivated the Syrian officials to ge,~ still angrier at Ahmaci
al-Khatib and the Lebanese Arab Army was the fact that this army's comman-
der conf ronted the movement of the Lebanese Arab Army Vanguards which was
initiated by officers in the area of Riyaq and Ablah in coordination with
the Syrian army. This anger intensified further when al-Khatib called
for confronting the Syrian army which had launched the mountain [Mount
Lebanon] offensive against the joint forces.
As the campaigns of the National Movement factions stopped with the entry
of the Arab Deterrence Forces into the areas controlled by these factions,
so did the Lebanese Arab Army's attacks against the Syrian officials and
the Lebanese presidency.
On 7 November 1976, First Lt Ahmad al-Khatib declared his support for the
message which President Ilyas Sarkis had addressed to the Lebanese. In
his comment a.t the time, al-Khatib said: "We agree with his excellency the
president on every word he has said in his message to the effect that these
days in which we live are a delicate and serious historical phase not only
� for Lebanon but f.or this entire part of the world."
46
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
After enumerating the plots being hatched against Lebanon, the Arabs and
the Palestinian resistance, Ahmad al-Khatib concluded his comment by
saying: "The role of the Lebanese Arab Army in the south has now become
a unique leadership role and the preaence of this army there has become
a sacred national presence emanating from the Arab interest, including
the Lebanese interest."
A1-Khatib also called on President Sarkis to bolster and bless the role
of the Lebanese Arab Army and not to restrict the role of maintaining
security to the Arab Deterrence Forces.
Ahmad al-Khatib in Grip of Syrians
Thus, the Arab Lebanese Army forces, or whatever remained of them, moved
to the sou~h where the Palestinian reaistance forces were present. Ahmad
al-Khatib remained extremely cautious in his moves for fear that the
Syrian forces would arrest him. However, this didn't last long because
the Syrian forces did arrest him at the outset of 1977. He was taken to
Shtura and then to Damacus where he stayed under house arrest until Novem-
ber 1978.
The Lebanese Arab Army command tried on 22 January 1978 to avoid a crisis
with the Syrian officials and Col Yusuf Mansur, the former chief of staff,
issued statement No 68 on the anny's goals and principles in which he re-
nounced the army's previous position tow~rd the Syrians and reaffirmed
the role of the Deterrence Forces in Lebanon.
But this statemeiit did not change the attitude of the Syrian officials
_ toward Ahmad al-Khatib who remained under house arreat in Syria until he
was released in November 1978 when he returned to stay in his house in
Beirut and to refrain, in the initial period, fram engaging in any politi-
cal or military action.
Meanwhile, thE Lebanese Arab Army's activity had receded and the aYmy had
set up its command in al-Nabatiyah area next to the Palestinian resistance
positions. During this period, it was sub~ected to campaigns by the Leb-
anese army command, its forces, like others who were symbols of war, were
denied promotions and the military public prosecution sued them under var-
ious charges, including that of grand treason.
Ma~ Muhammad Salim, the Lebanese Arab Army chief of staffi was sued on a -
charge similar to that leveled against Maj Sa'd Haddad who is cooperating
with the Israeli enemy. This motivated elements of the Lebanese Arab
Army to engage in activities hostile to the Lebanese Army.
This confrontation developed with the beginning of the movement initiated
by the Lebanese Army command, and by the Intelligence Directorate in par-
ticular, against the Lebanese Arab Army. Ahmad al-Khatib has said that
the Intelligence Directorate has made numerous attempts at his life and
47
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
that it has tried to detonate radio-controlled bombs in al-Bastah Quarter--
attempts which have caused the death of more than 15 of the quarter's inhab-
itants. This confrontation has reached a~tage where not a single week
passes without a clash or more between Ahmad al-Khatib's elements and ele-
ments of the Lebanese Army.
The Lebanese Army command views this organization as a kind of "miliCary
insurgence," considering that its leaders emerged from the heart of the
legitimate Lebanese army. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, the
organization has turned at present, in the view of the Lebanese army com-
mand, ir~to one of the obstacles obstructing the spread of the legitimate
authority, especially in the western parts of Beirut and in southern Leb-
anon.
Retreat Followed by Renewed Activity
Sources of the Lebanese Arab Army say at present that the number of this
army's elements amounts to 1,800 officers and troops armed with various
kinds of weapons and trained well in special centers in southern Lebanon.
These sources also say that most of this army's forces are stationed in
al-Nabatiyah, 'Adlun, Tyre, al-Rumaylah and several parts of the capital
and of its suburbs. The Lebanese Arab Army has been relying on Arab finan-
cial aid to pay the salaries of its troops since the [official Lebanese] '
" army command stopped paying the wages of the troops who have not returned
to it. Perhaps this is what has turned this army into a mixture of sol-
diers, exceeding no more than 400, and armed militias which form this army's
backbone.
The same sources say that this army no longer possesses as large a number
of vehicles as in the past because it was forced in a certain period to give
up those vehicles with the Syrian forces' entry into the barracks of the
national areas. This is why this army stages clashes every now and then
with the aim of seizing some vehicles and weapons.
The Lebanese Arab Army still includes at present full-time military ele-
ments and is in better condition than others insofar as strength and cohe-
sion with the popular bases are concerned. If it has adopted a strict
[displinary] stance toward its elements recently, then the reward has come
in part from the military operations that these elements stage and in which
they seize weapons and vehicles.
A few days ago and while Ahmad al-Khatib was visiting the town of al-Nabi
Shit in B'albakk District, armed elements of Atnal Mo~ement attacked his
motorcade and told him to return to Beirut because he has a connection with
the Libyan regime. A limited clash ensued but was contained and the Arab
Deterrence Forces accompanied al-Khatib and his companions from B'albakk to
Shtura.
48
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY
With the continuation of the present conditions, the Lebanese Arab Army is
gaining new dimensions on the Lebanese arena. Even though some people say
that al-Khatib is still within the framework of the factions produced by
the war, supported by the resistance and adopted by Syria, it is evident
that the manner of his movement is embarrassing all of them. Will new
chaptera of an old story be begun again or are there chapters and roles _
that have not ended yet.
Ahmad al-Khatib is a phenomenon that emerged like a meteor in Lebanon's
sky. With his personality, his military uniform and his beard, al-Khatib
was able to embody the aspirations of many youths who carried the arms in
defense of Lebanon's Arabism and of the Palestinian resistance. But this
phenomenon has lost a lot of its brightness now for reasons, perhaps fore-
most among them is the fact that all the Lebanese, both Muslims and Chris-
tians, have gotten tired of the armed manifestations and of the interfight-
ing among the organizations--an interfighting which often takes place in
' populated quarters.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494
CSO : 4802
I
I
49
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFP'ICIAL USE ONLY
LIBYA
LIBYAN-EGYPTIAN BORDER CONFRONTATION ANALYZED
Paris AL-WATAN AL'ARABI in Arabic 28 Jun-4 Jul 80 pp 34-35
LArticle: "From 3uly 1977 to July 1980: All Not Quiet on the Weatern
Front"/
LText/ London--AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI--Has the time come for the second round
between President Sadat and al-Qadhdhafi in the Western Desert? What
. reasons move the two to recall the bitter memories of the 1977 Deaert War?
In less than a year, Libyan President Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi found his
regime entangled in more than one political and military battle along long
front lines, both near and far. They begin in Uganda and Eritrea and end
in London, Washington, Rome and Bonn, paesing through Tunisia's Gafsa.
A1-Qadhdhafi now turns toward his western borders for the first time in 3
years to find rimaelf about to come to blows with his former staunch ally
President Sadat.
In the past, these political and military battles did not disturb the
enthusiasm or spontaneity of the fiery young president. He knew how to
choose the time and place of battle. Despi+te tactical reversals, Y?e was
at least able to constitute an eleme~t of unrest for all of his enemies:
France in Chad, King Hassan in the desert, President Bourguiba in Tunisia,
President Nimeiri in the Sudan, the British in Ireland, the Palestinians
in Libya and Sadat in Egypt.
The reason for the dread which Qadhdhafi inspires in the hearta of his
opponents goes back to the fact that he follows the self-evident military
principle of not waging war on two fronts. For example, his guns on the
Egyptian Front must be silent so that he can skirmish with Nimeiri on the
Sudanese front. Then he makes peace with Nimeiri in order to march on the
land of the Chadians, or., Cu move against the desert people.
However, President Qadh.dhafi has forgotten his maxim lately. Today, he
finds himself with the whole world rallying against his regime, including�
Libyans themselves whd are fleeing into exile, or who are suffering under
the oppression of his revolutionary or popular committees.
~ 50
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
I
r'UK ur~ri~l~u. uoc v?v~l
Perhaps the most bewildering thing is that most of the crises stirred up
by President Qadhdhaf.i in the past fe~a weeks and months could have been
avoided easily if he had tried to curb "slips" of his tongue.
Since it is difficult now to review all of the Libyan president's crises
and battles with his adversaries at home and abroad, in view of the multi-
tt~de of interlocking fronts, it is sufficient now to review the lateat of
these battles. He fears it will turn into a hot battle with the arrival
of July, the monzh in which a lightning border war was fought 3 years ago -
between Egypt and Libya.
Sadat Takes Threat Seriously
In a recent speech, President Qadhdhafi threatened to direct all of his
weapons to overthrow the regime of his neighbor, the Egyptian president.
Sadat took the threat seriously, for he moved rapidly to annouce martial
law in the western region. He turned over its administration to his armed
forces and ordered his officers io withdraw several armored battalions
from the eastern desert to the western ~esert, where it is sai3 that Libya
is building a defensive line superior in streiigth to the Israeli Bar Lev
line. '
It seems that both President Sadat and Qadhdhafi have their reasons for
- turning the attention of their people toward the empty desert these days. '
Perhaps they are a little preoccupied with the difficulties facing the two
regimes.
Sadat may be more suspicious these days than at any time in the past as a
result of the shakiness of the success of Camp David, the worsening of the
domestic economic situation, and the rising waves of complaints and criti-
cism against it. A'1so, there is a sound reason for him to be on his guard.
Th is is the presence of a huge arsenal of weapons in Libya.
However, military experts here think it is unlikely that President Qadhdhafi
would resort to moving this arsenal across the borders, because the Libyan
army has only 35,000 soldiers, to face a trained army of 400,000 which lacks
modern equipment and weapons.
The Libyan arsenal includes 2,000 tanks, most of them of advanced Soviet -
design, supported by 2,000 armoured personnel carriers designed for desert
warfare and covered by 250 planes, including Soviet MIG-25, 23 and 21
French Mirage aircraft.
To operate this arsenal, President Qadhdhafi is forced to resort to
thousands of experCs, soldiers and pilots from variaus countries and of
various nationalities. There are Pakistani and French pilots for the
Mirages; Soviets, North Koreans and Palestinians for the MIGs; Cubans and
Turks for the tanks; and East Germans for th e missiles, which range from
SAM short and intermediate range misailes to Frog and Scud long-range
missiles.
51
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
What Sadat fears is what Qadhdhafi fears. Sadat says that the Soviets are
stirring up Qadhdhafi against him, at the same time that they have incited
~ Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile-Mariam to raise the question of the
Nile waters. At the sam~ time Qadhdhafi believes that the West : stirring
up Sadat against him to take advantage of his internal diffic.+.lties with
the Libyan opposition at home and abroad.
Obser~?ers here link the tense situation on the Libyan-Egyptian borders
with the arrival of a squadron of F-4 fighter planes early in July at a
base west of Cairo.
Although the American media have stated more than once that this squadron _
= will be flying over the Arab Gulf, a part of the maneuvers (in which the
Egyptian air force will participate) will take place in the western desert
= within sight of the Libyan borders. This squadron will be accompanied by
400 pilots, maintenance experts and intelligence employees.
As tension eacalates on the Egyptian-Libyan borders, the Egyptian media
these days are happy to emphasize that Egypt taught Libya an unforgettable
- lesson in the lightning border war between the two countries in July 1977.
The Egyptians say that they destroyed the Libyan flight school which was
founded in 1975 by 2,000 Libyans and 300 Yugoslav.experts. As for the
Western experts, they say that the Egyptians destroyed 10 Libyan planes
on the ground and 30 tanks. Several hundred ~.ibyan soldiers were killed
and wounded in the war. As for the Libyans, they shot down three Egyptian
planes and deatroyed several tanks.
The fighting stopped only through the mediation of the late Algerian -
President Houari Boumedienne and Yasir ~Arafat. At that time, the Arabs
had not yet boycotted Sadat, since he had not yet made his unfortunate
trip to the Israeli Knesset. .
Support of Defiance and Resistance
Preaident al-Qadhdhafi appealed for support from the states of the Front
of Steadfastness and Resiatance. The foreign ministers of Syria, Libya,
South Yemen, Algeria and the PLO met in Tripoli and issued a statement
confirming the Front's support for Libya in its anti-Sadat position.
However, the I'ront members would be in big trouble if large-scale fighting
broke out between Egypt and Libya and Qadhdhafi asked them to honor their
verbal commitments to support him.
Although Syria sent pilots as reported, to command the Libyan MIG-23~s
and 21's, it is not willing to send ground forces, since it bears the
burden of the presence of 40,000 soldiers in Lebanon, not to speak of a
part of its armed forces facing armed and violent religious organizations.
52
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFP'ICIAL USE ONLY .
As foi� Algeria, which since independence has chosen not to become enCangled
in Arab disputes, it does not want to find itself involved in an open Arab
war.
The PLO hes not been on good terms with Qadhdhafi since he tightened his
grip on it. Its functions in Libya were assigned to Palestinian "revolu-
tionary committees" which tried to "ele~ate" themselves to parallel the
Libyan revolutionary com~ittees.
The strong ally on whom President Qadhdhafi can rely in times of peace and
war remains South Yemen. In this field, the Libyan president can rely on
one of the Yemeni squadrons which fought beside the Ethiopians against the
Eritreans. They could be transported quickly by Soviet planes from ~Aden
to Tripoli or Tobruk.
But where do the other Arabs stand on the Egyptian-Libyan dispute?
The Arab states do not want to see the Libyan regime collapse under the
hammer of President Sadat for reasons connected simply and solely with
the Egyptian regime~s link with tlie American-Israeli Camp David events.
Any Egyptian victory on the Libyan borders will be a setback for the ;
etates which rejected the Camp David path and imposed comple~e isolation
on President Sadat and his regime. ,
Nevertheless, these states which are accustomed to the eccentric behavior
of the Libvan regime are quire astonished by the Libyan president's
behavior towaxd his adversaries and opponents and his insiarence on
threatening them openly with elimination and pursuing the-~. in the capitals
of Europe.
These states believe that President Qadhdhafi has taken a greatl deal upon
himself, and is risking the reputation of the Arabs, at a time when they
are in great need of winning the sympathies of international public opinion.
COPYRIGHT : 1980 AL-WATAN AL- ~AR~FiB7
7587
CSO: 4802
53
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY
MAURITANIA
BRIEFS
TERWAN DAM OPENED--The Mauritanian fiead of state, Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed
Khouna Ould Haidalla, dedicated the Terwan dam on 7 July. Work was begun in
September 1979 and finished in June 198~. The dam is located a few kilometers
southwest of the Adrar region. It will irrigate several hundred hectares and
help develop palm plantations. "This dam comes at an opportune time, when
the region most needs this kind of pro~ect to help cooperatives recover,"
Mr Ould Reggad, governor of the region,said. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANECNS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1793] 8782
AGREEMENT REGARDING GUELBS PROJECT SIGNED--The National Industrial and Mining
Company~(SNIM-SEM) and moneylenders �or the Guelbs project signed the agree-
ment and the documents governing ~elations'between the parties.. The signing
took place in the World Bank building in Paris on 7 July. The Mauritanian
side was represented by SNIM-SEM and its general administrator-director, Mr
[3aba Ould Sidi Abdallah; the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, by Mr Seck Mame
N'Diak, the Maurit:anian ambassador in Paris; and the Central Bank of Mauri-
tania, represented by Mr Mohamed Salem Ould Lekhal. The 12 lending organiza-
tions represented were the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, the
Arab Fund for Economic and Social nevelcpment, the African Development Bank, -
the European Investment Bank, the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation, the
]~rench~Bank of Foreign Trade, the Bank of Paris and the Low Countries, the
International Bank for Reconstruction~~and Development, the Kuwait Fund for
Arab Economic Development, the OPEC.Fund for International Development, the
Overseas Economic Cooperation~Fund, and the Saudi Fund for Econ~mic and Social
Development. !~t the end of 1983 the Gu~;lbs products refinery will go int~
production, thus enabling Mauritania to put 6 million tons a year of high-
quality concentrates on the market. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1793] 8782
CENTRAL ACCOUNTANCY SERVICE ESTABLISHED--The Mauritanian Council of Ministers
adopted on 8 July a drafc decree establisF~ing a central accounting service in
the ministerial departments. The text is a part of the austerity policy, and
~ its purpose is to reinvigorate central accounting services. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1793] 8782
54
FOR OFFICI.4; USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FUR UFFICTAL USE ONLY
INCIDENT BEEIIND SLAVERY ABOLIT~ON--The auction o� a black female slave on
the Atar market at the end of March provoked the righteous indignation of
~lacks and Mauritanian Haratines. This caused President Khouna Ould Haidalla
to "abolish slavery" in the country (.the ~neasure was adopted on 5 July by the
Military Committee of National Salvation). jText] jParis JEUNE AFRIQUE in
French 16 Jun 80 p 32J 8782 '
CSO: 4400
55
FOR OFFICIEw USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MOROCCO
CEDIES REVIEW OF ECONOMY .
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May, 13 Jun 80
[30 May 80, pp 1257-1258]
[Text] Steady Activity in Mining Sector
Moroccan mining sector operations were generally steady in 1979, continuing
the recovery trend which began in 1976-77 following the 1975 crisis. This
developr^ent is more or less reflected in the level of production and exports
of various products, although with respect to revenues some occasionally
notable performances have been recorded despite a drop in the exported tonnages
of certain ores.
In fact, based on the average price for the year, the rise of inetal prices
was 60 percent in the case of lead (second ore in importance after phosphates),
80 percent for silver, 40 percent for copper and cobalt, 9 percent for fluorine
and 4 percent for manganese.
The following table shows, for the various mining operations, the results
available for the first 11 months of 1979 in comparison to the corresponding
figuxes for 1978.
Mining Production and Exports ~
(in 000's of tons)
Production Ex orts
Jan-Nov Jan-Nov Variation Jan-Nov Jan-Nov Variation
1978 1979 % 1978 1979 %
Phosphates 17,526 18,141.4 + 3.5 15,482.2 16,046.5 + 3.6
Iron 62.9 60.7 - 3.5 39.9 85.5 +124.3
Lead 154 148.9 - 3.5 113 110.6 - 2.1
Chemical 113.1 122.
Manganese 113.1 122.5 + 8.3 132 118 - 10.7
Copper 10.9 21.8 +100 10.4 19.3 + 85.6
Zinc 8.4 12.8 + 52.4 15.4 16.1 + 4.5
Cobalt 8 7,3 - 8.7 8.2 6.9 - 15.9
Ba~ite 169.2 243.7 + 44 185.6 236.5 + 27.4
Pyrrhotite 186.7 186.6
~ 56
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
On the upswing, we note in particular: --A tonnage increase of approximately
3.5 percenz in the production and export of phosphates. However, with re-
spect to revenues there has Ueen a new drop in prices of nearly 8 percent,
thus 1.685 billion dirhams were collected for the period in question as op-
posed to 1.842 billion dirhams in 1978 and 1.878 billion for the entire year
as opposed to 2.034 billion for the previous year. This situation is bound
to became more favorable in 1980, however, with the expected rise of prices
on the world market~ --A notable recovery of iron exports, which have more
than doubled, rising from approximately 40,000 tons to nearly 90,000 tons.
But they are still far below the levels for previous years (429,000 tons
~ in 1977) preceding the effects of the crisis of the European iron and steel
industry. --Doubling of copper production and exports; an increase of
44 percent in barite production and 27.4 percent in barite exports. --A
- substantial increase in the production of zinc (+52.4 percent), but more
moderate in the case of exports (+4.5 percent). _
On the downswing, we note in parCicular the decline in the production and
export volumes o� cobalt (-8.7 percent and -15.7 percent) and lead (-3.3
percent and -2.1 percent). But zhis development has not affected the re-
venues collected for these two ores, which have en~oyed very favorable prices,
as noted above.
. ;
Strong Increase in Demand for Energy
The increase in the production and sales of electrical energy in 1979 was
more or less the same as in 1978 (9 to ~0 percent).
With regard to production, the total energy distributed over the ONE (National
Electricity Office) network amounted to 4.371 billion kilowatt-hours (GWh `
[gigawatt-hours]), an increase of 9.4 percent over 1978 (3.997 GWh). The
energy supplied by ONE plants represents more than 99 percent of the total
energy consumed, or 4.330 GWh, broken down as follows: hydroelectric energy:
1.582 GWh (or 36.5 percent of the total); thermal energy: 2.748 GWh (or
b3.5 percent of the total). The contribution of other power suppliers amounted
to 41.3 GWh (0.9 percent of the total), an increase of more than half over
1978 (26.6 GWh).
Electricity sales amounted to 3.749 GWh zs opposed to 3.399 GWh for the pre-
ceding year, or an increase of 10.3 percent. High- and medium-voltage sales
represent 94 percent of the total at 3.522 GWh, with 2.105 GWh for distribut-
ing subscribers and 1.477 GWh Eor direct subscribers (businesses, offices,
etc.). Low-voltage sales, mainly for public lighting and household consump-
tion, amounted to 227 GWh, an increase of 5.8 percent over 1978.
Petroleum products showed a conspicuous increase in consumption in 1979,
contrasting with the rate recorded for the previous year. The highest levels
were for sales of fuel oil and gas oil, which respectively increased 22.8
percent and 26.6 percent.as opposed to only 14 and 4.6 percent in 1978 in
relation to 1977.
57
FOR OFFICI~, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
An equaliy notable fact, essential to this analysis, particularly concerns
the increase in gasoline consumption, which reached nearly 10 percent in
1979 as opposed to only 1 percent in 1978, despite the price increase making
gasoline practically a luxury consumer item. The rise of petroleum consump-
tion should similarly be noted, recovering at the rate of 8 percent in 1979
after a drop of 9.4 percent in 1978:
% Variations
1978 1979
1978/77 1979/78
Fuel Oil (1,000 tons) 1,417 1,74~0 +14 +22.8
Gas Oil (1,000 m3) 1,230 1,55~8 + 4.6 +26.6
Gasoline (1,000 m3) 534 586 + 1 + 9.7
Kerosene (1,000 m3) ?5 81 ~ 9.4 + 8
Difficult Economic Situation for Most Industries
An examination of industrial operations shows that if export sectors have
more or less continued to resist the international economic trend, those
aimed at domestic markets, on the other hand, have felt the drop in the
general level of demand as well as the effects of the austerit~ policy which
has been in effect since 1978.
Export industries actually seem to have achieved good performances in 1979
despite the unfavorable trends of foreign markets (development of protec-
tionism an~ prospects for enlarging the EEC to include Morocco's main com-
petitors). Forecasts for the textile sector, for example, are based on
~ an export turnover of 80 billion centimes as opposed to 75 billion in 1978.
Recovery of foreign demand has also become apparent to a certain extent
in recent months in tY,e case of canned f ish. But this sector is facing
numerous difficulties reducing its prospects as a result of structural problems
in the regular supply of raw materials, the shortage of refrigeration and
storage equipment and rising production costs diminishing the competitiveness
of Moroccan prices in relation to foreign competition.
With regard to industrial operations geared to domestic markets (private
and public), their development in 1979 was characterized by a trend toward
stagnation or decline, depending on the case. The drop in public orders,
foilowing the decline in government investment, has indeed affected opera-
tions such as public works and metallurgy, whose recovery is closely tied
to L�he resumption of investnients and, among other things (which seems to
be the case since the beginning of 19ga), postponed or delayed programs
(road and port projects, sugar, phosphate and cement projects, housing con-
struction program, etc.).
Moreover, if import restriction measures have proved beneficial for certain
types of prod~iction (such as household appliances), their application has
interfered with the operation of a large number of businesses, resulting
in problems of supplying basic products, intermediate products and equipment.
58
FOR OFFICItiL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Similarly, the general decline in the level of demand and price increases
have strongly affected sectors such as automobile manufacturin g, whose
assembly and sales operations have declined by nearly one-half, especially
in the case of commercial vehicles.
Otherwise, the level of economic activity in 1978 was at best maintained
or increased slightly, as in the case of general industri.al engineering,
r.ement consumption, sugar production and carboaated bevPrages.
_ [13 Jun 80, pp 1496-1497]
[Text] Phosphate Industry and Its Development
With nearly 58 billion tons, Morocco has three-fourths of the world's phos-
phate reserves and ranks first among world exporters with one- third of all
exports. Curre~t extraction capacity is 16 million tons annua lly. It will
soon reach 24 million tons with the opening of two new extract ion plants,
which are in the process of being outfitted. Prc,cessing capac ity amounts
to 19 million tons annually and will be raised to 23 million tans with the
completion of the maintenance, storage and drying complex under construc-
tion at Oued Zem.
In the case of upgrading, ~torocco has the largest industrial complex in
the world for phosphoric acid production with Maroc-Chimie I and II and !
Maroc-Phosphore I. Completion of Maroc-Phosphore II in late 1980 will bring
upgrading capacity to 5.5 million tons of phosphates annually for the pro-
duction of 1.5 million tons of P205 (instead of 850,000 tons p resently). _
With regard to prospects, a new expansion plan has been set up t~ develop
extraction plants and to increase upgrading capacity. This program is in-
tended to make the OCP (Moroccan Phosphates Office) group the uorld's lead-
ing producer and, in an ~.nitial stage, to make it poss~ble to upgrade 30
percent of national production (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of
7 March 1980, p. 561).
Expansion of phosphate production hinges on the following pro~ ects: --Ex-
ploitation of the Sidi Ha~jaj deposit, which will begin in 19 84 with produc-
tion of 3 million tons in an initial stage and 6 million tons thereafter.
--Increasing the calcination capacity for "black phosphates" at Youssouf ia
from 500,000 tons currently (based on production of 6 million tons) to
4 millton tons. --Opening a new mining zone at Benguerir, whose first
digging operations, intended to supply Maroc-Phosphore II with 2 million
tons annually, started in late 1979. This zone's capacity will gradually
increase to 10 million tons annuaily, with additional tonnage to be pro-
cessed at the Jorf Lasfar site. --Outfitting the Meskala zone, which will
gradually reach an annual production capacity of 10 million tons. --Develop-
ment of the Boucraa zone to reach a 10-million-ton capacity equivalent to
that of the already existing Boucraa-Laayoune maintenance installations
for transporting phosphates from the mine to the processing p lant.'~
*Unlike the other deposits mentioned here, Boucraa is located outside
"Morocco's inrernationally recognized borders."
59
FOR OFFICIA,'., USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
I~Uit ~~1~ l~ I t: l AI. Util~; 11N1,1'
Development of phosphate upgrading in turn hinges on a vast chemical complex
planned at Jorf Lasfar, whose initial phase will include (1983-85): --A
Maroc-Phosphore III plant with a capacity of 4,000 tons/day of P 0 derived
from a Kouribga ore (start of. production in 1983 and completion of5construc-
tion in 1985). --A DAP [diammonium phosphate] and NPK (nitrogen-phosphorus-
potassium] fertilizer production plant for national agriculture and exports.
--A washing and drying plant for Sidi Hajjaj phosphates with a capacity of
3 million tons annually. --All port facilities for exporting the ore and
acid and importing sulf ur and ammonia.
The Fertilizer Industry
The Moroccan fertilizer market's growth is about 13 to 15 percent annually.
In relation to arable land, consumption is 27 fertilizer units per hectare,
broken down as follows: 10 units of nitrogen (N), 11 units of P 0 and
5 units of potash (K). This consumption, considered very low, represents
20 to 25 percent of Moroccan agriculture's theoretical needs. Plans have
been made to raise it to 120 fertilizer units per hectare by the year 2000,
with 40 units of N, 42 of P and 38 of K.
To be mor~ precise, the construction of 10 new fertilizer processing and
storage plants is planned between now and 1985, which will increase supplies
from 600,000 tons at the present time to 1.250 million tons in 1984-85.
In terms c` production and arketing, the OCP group is the largest producer
of fertilizer in Morocco, with its four plants at Safi: Maroc-Chimie I,
whose capacity in 1979 was raised from 130,000 to 180,000 tons/years of P O5;
production of TSP [trisodium phosphate], ASP [sodiu~ dihydrogen phosphate~J
and 14-28-14 C[chemical fertilizer]. Maroc-Chimie II, with a capacity of
165,000 tons/year; production of A~' [diammonium hydrogen phosphate] and MAP
[ammonium hydrogen phosphate] il1-55-0). Maroc-Phosphore I, with a capacity
of 495,000 tons/year of P 05 for AP and MAP production. Maroc-Phosphore II
(under construction), wit~i a capacity of 495,000 tons/year as well.
The OCP group exports most of its AP and MAP production. Through its sub-
sidiary, Fertima, it markets ASP, 14-18-14 and some TSP for dom~stic markets
(150,000 to 200,000 tons). This company is also responsible for importing
all nitrogen and potassium fertilizers, since Morocco possesses only phos-
phates. These imports amounted to 310,000 tons in 1979, broken down as follows:
urea, 46 percent (85,000 tons); ammonium nitrate (60,000 tons); ammonium
sulfate (100,000 tons); potassiim? sulfate (45,000 tons); potassium chloride
(20,000 tons).
The Morroccan Fertilizer Company (SCE) provides for the production of simple
superphosphate (130,000 tons), chemical fertilizers (50,000 to 100,000 tons),
aerated powdered sulfur (1,000 tons/year) and other chemical products such
as sulfuric acid, liquid 502, etc. It also handles business transactions
for imported fertilizers, various chemical products, seeds for planting and
agricultural equipment. Together, SCE and Fertima supply 80 percent of the
Moroccan fertilizer market.
60
~ FOR OFFICIA,'.. USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
t~~+t: ~>>�'t~'t~'t:~i, i~::r: ~~N~ ~
Finally, other coinpanies produce mixed and organic fertilizers, the largest
being Promagri (50,000 tons/year) and CpCM [expansion unknown] (50,000
tons/year).
Salt Derivatives Industries
Morocco has a sizable rock salt deposit at Mohammedia, whose praduction capa-
city is estimated at 1 million tons annually. This salt currently supplies
the electrolysis plants of the SNEP (National Electrolysis and Petrochemical
Company) and Cellulose du Maroc. The third electrolysis plant is located
at Tetouan.
The SNEP at Mohammedia is a government-o�aned business attached to the ODI
(Office for Industrial Development). Its production capacity is 25,000
tons/year of chlorine, 28,000 tons/year of soda and 25,000 tons/year of PVC
[polyvinyl chloride], with the ethylene needed for MVC [monovinyl chloride]
production being imported. This company also produces bleach and disinfectant,
hydrochloric acid and crystalline PVC for bottles.
Cellulose du Maroc at Sidi Yahia du Gharb, whose main operation is the produc-
tion of paper pulp, has absorbed a chemical products company formerly titled
Produits Chimiques du Gharb. This company has a sodium-chloride electrolysis i
plant capable of producing 3,500 tons/year of chlorine and 3,800 tons/year
of soda. It also produces sodium chlorate and S02 for its own production ~
operations. '
Coelma, located at Tetouan, produces hydrochloric acid, soda and bleach and
disinfectant. It also has a pla~it for producing calcium hydrogen phosphate
by treating Khouribga phosphates with hydrochloric acid. These defluorinated
phosphates are used to feed cattle. The plant's capacity is 2,000 tons/year.
Morocco's current capacities are largely adequate for meeting market needs -
of chlorine and soda until 1982. Possible imports of these products are
explained by the domestic price level, which is not considered competitive
in relation to international prices.
Paper Pulp Industry and Paper and Cardboard Production
Paper Pulp--This industry is represented by a single company: Cellulose
du Maroc, located at Sidi Yahia du Gharb. It produces short-fiber paper
pulp from eucalyptus wood and its production capacity is 100,000 tons/year.
Domestic consumers of this paper pulp are CMCP at Kenitra and Papelera de
Tetouan. These two companies' consumption of short-fiber pulp is less than
10,000 tons/year, which means that most, or 90 percent, of Cellulose du Maroc's
pulp production is exported.
Since the added value does not currently exceed 20 percent, however, Cellulose
du Maroc is looking into the possibility of increasing this added value by
diversifying its production further down the line. A plant has thus been
61
FOR OFFICIA;., USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- planned for manufacturing newsprint using short-fiber pulp. Another project
for using paper pulp obtained from esparto grass is also being studied by ODI.
It should be noted that the size of the Moroccan pulp market is about 28,000
to 30,000 tons/year. At the present time, imports may be estimated at 18,000-
' 2~,000 tons/year.
Paper and Cardboard Production--The largest plant is that of the CMCP at
Kenitra, which manufactures cardboard, wrapping papPr and cardboard boxes.
Its capacity is 45,000 t~ons/year of paper and cardboard and 30,000 tons/year
of cardboard boxes. It is followed by Papelera de Tetouan, whose capacity
is 20,000 tons/year.
The sector's added value is approximately 30 percent, whereas per capita
paper consumption is 6 to 7 kilograms in comparison to more than 100 kilograms
for developed countries. Total consumption is 125,000 to 130,000 tons/year,
60 percent of which is produced domestically and the rest imported. The
- market's growth is 8 to 10 percent annually. ~
Detergents and Maintenance Products Industry
The detergents and maintenance products industry includes two large plants
at Casablanca: IMM [expansion unknown] (a subsidiary of Procter and Gamble),
which mainly manufactures sulfonate-base detergents ("Tide"), and. Aetco-
Lever Maroc (Unilever group), a competitor of IMM ("OMO"). These two plants
consinne oleinn and sodium silicate, with the former being supplied by SCE
and the latter by the Silicates et Derives company. The other produ~ts needed
for their production, TPP [triphenyl phosphate] and sodium sulfate, are imported.
A third plant, Colgate Palmolive, has more diversified operations using imported
products.
The sect~r's added value is 50 percent (1975 figure) and its total production
capacity is 25,000 to 30,000 tons, used at the level of 80 to 85 percent.
Production value amounts to about 130 million dirhams, including 13 million
dirhams for bleach and disinfectant. The market's growth amounts to 10.50
percent annually.
Timber and Wood Panels Industry
This sector includes the following industries: plywood construction (Cema),
fiberboard manufacturing, particle board manufacturing (Cema), laminated
panel and layered panel construction.
The sector's main companies are the following: Cema, located at Casablanca;
Panalfa (an OCE subsidiary), manufacturing esparto-b3se panels; the Maghrebian
Timber Company of the Atlas Mountains, located at Meknes, and Sicomarbois,
Emballages et Contreplaques du Maroc and Eucopan, manufacturing particle board.
62
FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
PUIt Uh'FLCLAL USE ONLY
Plans have been made within this sector for construction of a urea-formaldehyde
glue plant with a capacity of 8,000 to 10,000 tons/year. Both the urea and
methanol needed for the production of formaldehyde will have to be imported.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1980 =
11915
CSO: 4400
i
63
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
MOROCCO
CONTINUATION OF CEDIES ECONOMIC REVIEW OF 1979
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ME DITERRP,NEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1312
[Report: "Economic Balance f or 1979"]
[Text] Food Industry: The 1979 national sugar consumption totaled
595,000 tons, showing a slight increase of 1.2 percent compared with the
1978 volume (588,000 tons). Its breakdown (in rounded 1,000 ton figures)
was the following:
1978 1979 Fluctuation %
Loaves 400 402
Lumps 49 44 - 10
Crystal ~ 139 149 + 7.2
Total 588 595 + 1.2
The consumption of sugar in loaves has remained on the 1978 level with
402,000 tons. It accounts for 67.5 percent or two-thirds of total
national consumption, thus showing active demand (in particular among the
broad population strata) for such type of sugar.
This explains, among others, the decline of lump sugar consumption which
had reached 67,000 tons in 1977 but has been steadily declining (49,000
tons in 1978 and 44,000 tons in 1979), which motivated the termination of
imports of lump sugar in 1979.
As to crystal sugar (powder) it appears to be the only category which is
rising gradually 7.2 percent in 1979). However, this is related more
to industrial consumption rather than domestic use which shows the same
resistance to this product as to lump sugar. Crystal sugar imports,
therefore, did not exceed 14,000 tons in 1979 as against 25,000 tons in
1978 and 64,000 tons in 1977.
Domestic sugar production reached 334,000 tons (unrefined and refined),
showing a decline of over 12 percent compared with 1978 when it totaled
381,000 tons. Domestic production made it possible to meet close to 60
percent of the country's requirements, the balance being covered by
64
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
t~t)K ur~N ~.t; i.ni, u~r. u~v?.r
imports which totaled 223,000 tons of unrefined sugar compared with
229,000 in 1978 (to which refined sugar purchases should be added, as
follows: loaves, 14,000 tons; sugar in crystals, 14,000 tons).
Let us note, Einally, that the price of table sugar, which had been
frozen at the 1973 level, was raised by 20 centimes per kilogram of
granulated sugar, and 30 centimes per kilogram of loaf or cut sugar. The
decision was based on the increased amount of state subsidies and the
raise of international prices. Nevertheless, subsidies will remain at
the level of 70 centimes per kilogram of sugar.
The balance of output in the products canning industry shows for the 1979
fiscal year a total export volume of about 125,000 tons, worth 424 million
dirhams.
The list is headed by olives, accounting for 32 percent of the exported
tonnage, followed by canned fruits (27 percent), vegetables (14.5 per-
cent), fruit juices (13.5 percent), gherkins (9 percent), and capers
(4 percent).
Let us note that, despite some attempts made to diversify markets, almost
all of these exports (over 83 percent of the total) are absorbed by the
EEC members. Yet, the CEDIES emphasizes, desp ite the cooperation agree-
ment between Morocco and the EEC, the community tends to strengthen the
restrictive and protectionist measures which make the situation of this
= sector exi:remely precarious and vulnerable.
The bread yeast industry has developed substantially thanks to the regular
increase in consumption and population growth.
Until 1977 the yeast market was supplied by a Casablanca enterprise. Zn
1977 a new plant opened in Fes, promoted by the Industrial Development
4Lfice (ODI), in association with the Moroccan private sector.
In 1979 the capacity of the two installations was, respectively, 10,000
tons per year for the first and 8,500 tons per year for the second. The
Casablanca unit was scheduled to complete an extension by the end of
January 1980 increasing its total capacity to 22,000 of yeast per year.
Moroccan yeast production would thus reach 30,000 tons per year.
The current Moroccan market is 20,000 tons per year. Starting with 1980 '
installed production capacities will be able to satisfy quite extensively
the needs of the market and the surplus could even be exported. While
making use of a domestic raw material (molasses), this would contribute
to a substantial savings on imports and, consequently, of foreign exchange.
- Public Works and Construction: The activities of the construction and
_ public works sector continued to decline but at a lesser pace. The 1979
. output declined 5 percent, compared with nearly 19 percent in 1978,
essentially as a result of a slowdown in construction.
, 65
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOlt OFI' IC I At. USI: ONTaY
Conversely, in cement producrion and consumption, 1979 showed a positive
development resulting in a certain increase in consumption, which reached
some 3.63 million tons as against 3.5 million in 1.978, or an increase of
nearly 4 percent; on the other hand, it was due to the development of
domestic output which made a reduction of imports possible.
Cement Consumption (in thousand tons)
1978 1979 Fluctuations %
Total Consumption 3,504 3,642 + 4
of which:
Domestic production 2,802 3,304 + 18
Imports 702 338 - 52
In effect, until 1977, one-third of the cement market consisted of
imports which had grown to meet the strong increase in demand experienced
nver rhe previous 5 years (1973-1977). Since 1978 cement imports have
shu~an a strong decline (702,000 tons in 1978 as against 1 million tons in
1977), as a result, among others, of import restrictions enacted in June
of that same year. The trend was intensified in 1979 with a drop of over
SO percent in cement purchases abroad: 338,000 tons as against 702,000
tons in 1978.
This development was made possible with the commissioning of two new
cement mills: Oriental (CIOR) and Temara, whose contribution rose domestic
production by nearly 18 percent (3.3 million tons as against 2.8 million
tons the previous year).
Machine Building, Metallurgical and Electric Power Industries: As to
these industries the 1979 results showed a certain improvement in the
area of consumer goods (household equipment, etc.), following the imposi-
tion of import restrictions.
Conversely, ir. the area of heavy industrial equipment there has been a
substantial regress which affected, in particular, the following:
- A decline in boiler making and metal construction as a result of a
slowdown of public investments and of the full completion of several
initiated projects; _
- Shipbuilding, as a result of aggressive foreign competition;
Vehicle spring assemblies, as a result of the slowdown in the utility
vehicles sector;
- The production of aluminum shapes as a result of the dizzying and fre-
quent increases in the local prices of shaped aluminum and difficulties
66
F~L. OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
H~x ur~r~lt;l~. UJ~ UNLY
in procuring supplies abroad at substantially lower prices. This state
of things would be a serious menace to this sector which is proving to be
less and less competitive compared with the production of substitute
goods;
- The manufacturing of flexible pipes as a result of massive imports.
The overall financial status of the enterprises has been unsatisfactory. -
A number of companies continue to suffer from delays in payments, par-
ticularly from public agencies. Generally speaking, the social climate
has been characterized by an improvement following salary increases which
sectorial enterprises have granted despite rather difficult circumstances.
Overall 1980 prospects appear average.
Activities in the metal containers sector seem to be related more to the
development of canning and exports of canned goods. On the one hand, ir
is influenced by weather uncertainties which affect agricultural output
(for example, the 1979 apricot crop was one-half that of 1978) and, on
the other, by the fluctuations in fishing and the marketing of canned
fish.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
5157
CSO: 4400
a
67
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PERSIAN GULF AREA
QUESTION OF U.S. BASES IN GULF DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 21-27 Jun 80 p 27
[Article: "The Problem of Foreign Bases in Arab Territory; American Specter
at the Neck of the Gulf"]
[Text] News reports concerning American bases and facilities in the Sultanate
of Oman have ranged all the way from denial to confirmation. However, it is
an established fact that the Omani Government has recently realized its
"historical" dream of having a"foreign" base on its Arab territory, a move
which pushes the situation in the Gulf to another peak of international
tension and polarization.
Omani minister of state for foreign affairs Qays 'Abd-al-Mun'im A1 Zawawi
revealed the nature of the agreement that has been reached between the
Sultanate of Oman and the United States. In a public statement in London
at the end of last month, the minister said: "The agreement gives the
United States the right to acquire naval and air facilities at Omani bases
during states of emergency on the condition that the United States must
consult the Omani authorities and obtain their approval."
On several occasions prior to that statement, A~ Zawawi had asserted that the
Sultanate of Oman had not established and would not establish Atnerican
military bases on its territory.
According to the agreement, American forces will use the naval base at
Jazirah Masirah on the Omani coast, as well as the Tamrit airbase located
south of Oman. New fuel storage tanks, new runways and other facilities
will be constructed at a total cost of around $300 million.
Observers feel that this step is part of a new American strategy to gain a
military presence in the Indian Ocean in Oman, Somalia and Kenya. They see
this move as a response to developments in the internati~nal situation
following the events in Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
_ 68
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
Moreover, the American plan has been described as an effort to put some
teeth into the "Ca.rter doctrine." Z'his doctrine, announced earlier by the
American president, contained a threat to the Soviets that any attempt on
their part to gain control over the Gulf would be met with every possible
means, including military means.
The fact is that most Arab reactions to the agreement were negative, although
they varied in intensity. Some felt that the agreement serves American
designs aimed at gaining control over the Gulf countries on the pretext of
what has occurred in Iran and Afghanistan. Others, however, saw a link
between the Camp David agreements and an attempt to impose a blockade and
- intimidate the Gulf states. Those who hold the latter viewpoint to the
strong relations between President Sadat and Sultan Qabus and to the recent
statements made by Egyptian deputy prime minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali, in which
he said: "Egypt is offering military facilities to the United States so
that it can intervene and help the Arab states in case of need."
An official Iraqi statement rejected the Omani-American agreement. The
statement said: "The official statements issued in Waghington conflict
with the assertion made by Omani minieter nf atate for foreign affaire Qays
Al Zawawi during his recent visit to Baghdad to the effect that his govern- !
ment doea not intend to offer any facilities to the Americans."
Some Gulf states expressed irritation at recent Omani actions, while
affirming the right of every state to choose whatever method it deems
appropriate to protect itself.
Sultan Qabus feels that the danger which threatens the Gulf and the oil
wells emanates from the Soviet Union. Ae applauds the Americans' initiative
in drawing a strong line of defense to confront the communist threat, which
is represented by Ethiopia and South Yemen as well as the presence of
100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan just 550 kilometers away from his
country. �
Qabus' Strategic Position
Oman's strategic position has certainly attracted the attention of the two
superpowers. The sultanate, which has a population under one million, is
located directly south of the Strait of Hormuz, the gateway from the Gulf
into the Indian Ocean and a point of extreme importance on the oil route to
the West.
Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id (39 years old) actually prefzrs to cooperate with
the West and strengthen his ties with it. He studied in Britain and graduated
from Sandhurst military college, and there are 650 British troops in his
11,500-man sultanate forces. These British soldiers helped him considerably
in putting down the Omani revolution.
69
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
FOR OrFTCTAL T1ST: ~NLY ~
In 1975, Sultan Qabus proposed that the Gulf states cooperate with the West
to protect the Strait of Hormuz, which is used by 77 ships a day. The
purpose of this cooperation was to confront any Soviet move or terrorist
operation in which a ship could be blown up in the middle of the strait.
Most of the Gulf states refused to respond to the sultanate's call, leading
Qays A1 Zawawi to the remark: "We will protect the strait through cooperation
with the Western states, and in practical te~s this means that the area will
be thrust into the furnace of competition between the Soviets and the
Americans."
It can be said that the "time of the Indian Ocean as a region of peace" has
begun to vanish, as the United Nations declared a few years ago. Moreover,
the call for an end to the arms race in the area issued by President Carter
3 years ago has come to nothing.
Ar�.?erican-Soviet Competition
'I'he Amer.ican military presence there consists of 21 warships, including two
aircraft carriers and six support ships. There is also the Diego Garcia `
base located on the British-occupied island in the Indian Ocean. An
operation to expand this base is expected to get underway soon, making it
capable of receiving B-52 strategic aircraft. Fuel tanks with a capacity
of some 640,000 barrels will also be erected.
The Soviet military presence, on the other hand, cons~sts of 12 warships
and 15 support ships. South Ye~en is considered the cornerstone of the
Soviet strategy in the area, providing a base for a number of nuclear sub-
marines which can pursue the American aircraft carriers if necessary.
The United States` loss of its bases in Bandar 'Abbas in Iran was a heavy
blow, and it was this loss which prompted it to hurriedly seek negotiations
with Omani, Somali and Kenyan officials.
It can be said that up until the end of the 1960's, the military buildup in
the Indian Ocean area remained in favor of the West. But the situation
started to change with the onset of the 1970's when the Soviets began to
dominate the area. Their presence began initially as a political presence
when the wave of hostility toward Western colonialism swept through the
peoples. Then this presence gradually began to develop into a military
force, which made the West anxious about its vital interests in the oil we11s.
In a aeminar on the Gulf area recently held by the Harvard Institute for
Political Studies, the participating experts arrived at a slogan which said
in effect: "If you had believed tha.t things will get bad in the Gulf area,
than you won't have to wait long, because they will tend to get worse."
70
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
O
Some participants expressed extreme concern over the Soviet role while
calling for the necessity of effective Amexican action in the area. They
pointed to the fact that the Soviets could gain control over the oil wells
without a war, and suggested that Washington's hesitancy could compel the
area statea to cooperate with Moscow, considering it to hold the stronger
- hand.
Some pointed out that while Iraq opposes Soviet i.ntervention in the affairs
of the area, it also rejects any attempt to transform the area into an
American sphere of influence. In this connection, Herma.nn Eilts, former
U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Egypt and presently a professor at the
University of Washington, said: "Iraq is attempting to lead a Gulf bloc
calling for independence from the superpowers and the keeping of the area
outside the arena of conflict."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARAf3I
8591
CSO: 4802 ~
I
;
71
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SYRU
_ BRIBFS
OIL OUTPUT DROP--Syrian oil production has dropped in the last 2 years,
but Syria's oil export revenues have riaen from $646 million in 1978 to
$1 billion last qear. Syria is r~lying on Amnrican oil companiea in the
oil exploration and development finld. A~ong the companies now drilling
for oil are the Marathon 011, Shell Oil, Coastal States Gas and Sta~ard
Oil of Calif~arnia companies. Senior experts in the Syrian Oil Miniatry
atate that Syria has oil reservea of 2.5 billion barrels, enough for 40
yeare, in addition to gas re~ervea of 700 trillion /sic/eubic feet.
Mr 'Abd-al-Jabbar al-Dahhak, 3yriaa minister of oil and minerals, point~
out that his government welcomes these companies and he recently informed
American journalists who visitad Damaecus "We are not politicians when the
matter concerne oil." It is well kna~m that Syria says it is now follow-
ing a"ra~dical" policy and accusing the "trinity" of American imperialism,
Zioniem and reaction of provoking groups of armed religious violence to
overthrow President Hafiz al-Aead's regime. Syria aspires to exploir ita
mineral resources and hae a plan to triple phosphate production in 3
i yeara. Syria's Baniyas Aefinery ia also nearing completion. Total daily
~ refining, after thie refinery joins the one in Huma, will come to 220,000
barrels of oil a day. Syria will miz ita heavy oil with Iraqi Light crude
to obtain a blend suitable for its consumption and the output of its re-
fineriea. In spite of the circumstancea thro~gh which relatione between
the two fraternal cauntriea (Syria snd Iraq) are now passing, Iraq ia
pumping a volume rangiag from 220,000 tc+ 300,000 barrels a day through the
oil pipeline crossing Syrian tanitory to the Mediterranean; this ie one-
quarter the line's capacity. Sqria receives advantageous compensation for
this from Iraq, in addition to Iraq's.financial share which it pays S~rria
annually in accordance with the resolutiona of the Baghdad summit confer-
ences. %Text/ /Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARASI in Arabic 14-20 Jun 80 p 49/ 11887
CSO: 4802
72
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300034427-6
t~Ui: c~t~Flctn~. ust: c~tvi,Y
TUNISIA
BOURGUIBA, WIFE'S DOMINATION CRITICIZED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 May 80 p 14
[Article by Adel Wahid] -
[Text] "Bourguiba has definitely not stopped using trickery. His whole
strategy is based on reversals and denials. After 10 years of almost total
seclusion under the pretext of illness, there he is up and around again,
more active than ever. Today he is stepping up his meetings and interviews
, and intends to be the only captain on board. He has ~ust quietly ended
the Nouira period, but what is he preparing for tomorrow? Al1 these changes
- at party and government levels express the concern of the chief of state
to dissociate himself from "Nouiraism," at least from its most glaring abuses.
Are we thus heading toward a revision of political, economic and cultural
choices? I think that the same policy will continue--with the risk of lead-
ing Tunisia into troubled tomorrows--by simply modifying the style used
- thus far. At any rate, Tunisians will not be satisfied with fragmentary
measures. We are aware that the seeds of other Gafsas still exist."
These remarks of a bitter and disillusioned young Tunisian, like thousands
of others wandering through the streets of the capital or sitting at outdoor
cares, reflect the mood of a good part of Tunisian public opinion. The
~ Mzali government claims to be one of "efficiency and credibility." It says,
discreetly it j,s true, that it wants to initiate a process of detente and
harmonization.
What kind of detente, under whose leadership and in what form? Once again,
everything indicates that it is the political style which is involved without
getting to the heart of the problem.
One thing is certain--the Mzali government has to deal with the social pro-
test movement. Workers' demands and campaigns were taken up energetically
soon after the climate of false national unity which emerged following the
Gafsa uprising of 26 January. March and April were marked by several dozen
strikes: Sogitex in Moknine, STIA [exgansion unknown] and STS [expansion
unknownJ in Sousse, phosphate mines in Metlaoui, synthetic cement in Tunis,
as well as others. In certain parts of the country, the strikes were very
severe and management personnel were held illegally in certain cases.
73
FOR OFFICI~+; USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030027-6
~ ~ ~~,,i~ ~r ~
~ll 311 :i) C('fll'~L l~~ l'B~ID L~1C C~I ~CI~R~EIl~ l)~ WUC~CI�I'::, L~ll' }:~)Vl'I'llllll il[ ~I~1:; ~I(IIIi~U11~'~'~~
a e:ertain number oC measures, including the cunciit ionril re le;i5e ~~f fui~r t r,~cl~~
union leader.s convicl~d soon al-ter Lhe rio~s of 26 Jan~iriry 1978, r;iisin~, thc
mi.nimum wage by 10 ~ercent--thus bringing the interoccupati~~nal minimi~m ~;rr~:all~
wage l:0 45. 5 dinars per month--and general ap~ l icat ic~n of s i ngl c~- ii~rc~m~~ ~�~~u~ -
pensation. In vie~a of the high rise of prices, these :incrrases rirt~ st i 1 I
very inadequate.
Wil] there soon be some new development on the part of l hc~ Ut,'I"1' ~'I~UR1:; i:.~n
Ceneral Federation of Labor], whose upcoming special congreti~ has hc~~~n r?n-
nounced? It scems that the leadership wants to terminate the duC.ie� ol'
Ti.jani Abid, catapulted by the Destour Party into the role of lea~lcr uf
the trade union federation. 'Phis dec:ision probab]y means a wiLli_ngn~~~~:
to compromise. But no lasting compromise is foreseeable wilhout thc .~};rc~~~
ment and parti.cipation oE the UGTT's Executive Committee, demc~crc~Lic~lly
el.ected during the con,;ress of March 1977.
'The "Cleanup"
The declaration signed by the IIGTT's .tegitimate Execul ivc~ Cuminit.le~�, r,n~{
~ubl.ished on 1 May, is clear. It reaffirms the deter?nina~ic~n u1 ~h~~ c�~~~nr~i~.t~~c�
members to continue the fight and to defend the i.deal~ C~~r wl~ic~.l~ i_h~~y w~~~~� ~
convi.cted. ~
i
For the Cime being, changes in the country's icey ~ost~ .ir.e ~~ccurri~~k; in
rapid ~uccession: almost all governors ([equiva]ent of l~re.nc~ti~ ~~r~~te~~t:~l
have been r.eplaced or switched, particularly those uF 'CuniS and (,;iti s,:~.
Several departments, including the national bureai~ of investi~ation, ha~~~�
been reorganized; its former director, Gen 'I,ine al.-~bi.dine Ben A] i, r.l~~�
"eyes" of Washington, has been appointed ambassador ~o Pol.and. 'i'lic~
manap,erial heads of the most important corporations have hc~ei~ ~:hr:~n~;~~.1.
Bourguiba personally conducted this extensive "cleanup," dir~>ctl.y ~~cirl. ir i- ~
patin~ i.n all appointmerits, even those norma]ly reserved for ini.nitit~~rs.
Mzali's powers thus appear very limited and i~e seems hound tc~ be srconci
in command to the chiel of. state, unless Tahar BeLkhodja, ctirrentLy ~imb.~~,:,r~~l~~r
to the FRC, is stiL] among the top few by tht: grace oE Mrs Bour~uib~i
'I'he 'I'un:isi.an ambassador to Sonn also recenCl}~ met with Tunisian cit i.�r.en~
residing in the ERG. In the face of harsh criticism of Che governmen~ 1,~;
those in attendance, Mokhtar Ben ismail, a pseudostudent and the DE?StUUC '
Party's press corresponrient in ttle I'R(~, made threats againsc one critic~.
And there is some question of Mr Ben Ismail being appoin~cd 'l'ui~isi.~n c~~~n: