JPRS ID: 10573 WORLDWIDE REPORT TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 19
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/10573
8 June 1982
Worldwid~~ Re ort
p
TERRORISM
FOUO 1 /82
- FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFF[C[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500074419-9
NOTE
JPRS publication.s contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-Ianguage sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with tr~e original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and iaaterial enclosed in brackets
' are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [TextJ
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
las4: line of a brief, indicate how the originaivenf~thetinforag
proces,ed. Where no processing indicator is g' ~
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or recededtbraaedu Se ;
anclosed innaaenclosedsin parentheses~were not clear in~ the
tion mark a ro riate in context.
original but have been supplied as app p
Other unattribuWithpthe~sourceal Times wi hin ~ ems~are asan
item originaCe
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
c ies, viPws or at.titudes of the U.S. Government.
' COPYRIGH~ I.AWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPROD IC~N B E~STRICTEDRFOR OFFICIAL US ETONLY.
OF THIS PUBLICAT
_
~
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540070019-9
NOTICE
This new JPRS serial~ WORLDWIDE REPORT: TERRORISI~, is
- devoted to international terrorism and ~ntigovernment.
revolutionary violence. It is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX and
includes material on the organization, ob~ectiv~es and
methods of terrorists and the consequences of terrorist
actions. Items on terrorism formerly published in other
JPRS reports will henceforth appear in this report. It
is expected that the report will be published weekly.
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- JPR~ L/10573
8 June 1982
WORLDWIDE REPO RT
- TERRORISM
FOUO 1/82
CONTENTS ~
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
CENTftAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
- Briefs
Forthcoming Trial of Terrorists 1
ZAMBIA
Blast Wrecks Court Administration ~uildings in Kitwe
(TIl~IES OF ZANIBIA, 11 May~ 82) 2
- WEST EUROPE
GREECE
- Coirmien�ts on Bombing Incidents
(RIZOSPASTIS, 3 Apr 82) 3
ITALY
Red Brigr~des Terrorist Cianfane:;?i Implicates PLO
(1~INSA, 20 May 82) L~
SPAIN
a Better Equipped ETA-1~ Still Effective Despite Isolation
(CAMBIO 16, LJ Apr 82) 5
Des;peration Offensive
ETA�-M~s International Connections Surrunarized, by
Jose Diaz Herrera et al.
ETA Tactics Deplored, by Ander Landaburu
a - [III - Wh~ - 133]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500470019-9
r'UK urr~~~wL u~~ uiv~r
Terrorism in Spain
(Ale~andro Munoz Alonso; EL TERRORISMO EN ESPANA, 1982) 17
- b -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070019-9
FOR (iFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
' BRIEFS
FORTHCOMING TRIAI, OF TERRORISTS--ThP presumed authors of the bomb attempt
againsr. a cinema in Bangui, on 14 July 1981, which had caused three deaths
and the wounding of 32 people, will be tried by a speciai triuunal "in
the next few days." This trial will be held shortly after the senrencing to
death Saturday in Bangui, of Central Africans, members cf the Cen~ral African
Movement of National Liberation [MCLN], admittedly guilty "~f making an
attempt on the intPrnal security of the state and the depot for ~xplosive
.devices." Two of the f ive defendants, including Idi Lala, chief of tI~.e MCLN,
wer~ sentenced to capital punishment in absentt~. [Text] [Brazzaville
BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'ACI in French 19 May 82 p A 5]
CSO: 6133/0004
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070019-9
FnR OFFIC'IAI. UtiH; OVI.Y .
. Zr~MB IA
BLAST WItECKS COURT P_DMINISTRATION BUILDINGS IN KITWE
Lusaka TIMES OF ZA1~IA in English 11 May 82 p 5
~Text~
CHIMWEMWE locoC court administrotion ofFices in
Kitwe were on Sunday blowr~.up by unknown
peo~le causing extensive damage to the ~
building.
The oft'ices were blown up in a pre-dawn blast in
which the rooP and doors were ripped off and window
pAnes shattered.
~ Mr Noble Dickson Kaminda. the court clerk totd the Times of
Zambi~ yescerday that cases for the day had to be suspended
because alt the case records were stiU insidt the damaged building
. awaiting. invescigations. , . , ~ .
It wns not immediatel. cic~r.
wtiat had raused he blast and
cfforts to get a police comment
'by yesterda~~ afternoon proved
fruitless.
Thete wa9 ne indicatioo
cither whether polire hud bcen
to thc blow�n up c~urt.
No one H~as nlluwed into thc
huildinK foc icar of dcstro~~inq
cviJencr ��hich miKht help �Sunday mormnK. I he bnng
palicc invcstiRations. � w a9 so lou~ it shuuk the bcd he
~ I~n?m hi~ assetism~nt Mr ~~hs slecping on.
KLmindu tiaid nuthi~g had At frst hc thought it ��as a
hcrn takcn fr~m thc ruined Wrocerv shop beina attacked
- nl'tice. b~� Kuiimrn hut ~rhen he ~~�ent~
Hc hud rr{~ortcd thc maltcr uu~.r�ide to nc~rk hr found thc
iu police immedintelv hc wag rauf uf thc ruurt'+ admini~tr;~~
~old of' the incidence. ti~in office, h1oH~n up os ~~~c~~ ~s
Stuti~~n hcedmnn Mr d~K~~s nnd winduw~ pa~cs.
EdN urd Muhang~ wha livcs in Thc blast N~oke uP residcnts
a ncurby cuurt tuw�nship aaid uf Burhi to~vnship who als~
hc ~vus awokened b~~ a loud ~us~tcd to thc raurt to find out
bWna around OS hours on. ~~hathnd happcned.
C:SO ~ 6133/0001.
2
- FOR OFFICIAI.. USE ONI.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL LSE ONLY
GREECE
CON4IENTS ON BOMBING INCIDENTS
Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 3 Apr 82 p 16
[Text] For the second time in three days U.S. Ambassador Stearns became the
target of "unknown bombers." Despite the strict security measures that were
taken, the bombers succeeded in placing a sec:ond bomb in the ambassador's re-
sidence. The responsibility for the bombing attacks was claimed by the ELA
' [Revalutionary People's Struggle] "th~t appears on the scene from time to time."
The terrorist activity of the illegal state is not something new on the Greek
scene where it often assumes criminal proportions. It is enough for us to
remember the incidents of arson of the summer that were stopped only by the
mass mobilization of the ~,eople. The culprits, however, were not arrested,
just as those others were not arrested who evened up their accounts with
� Bambalis, Mallios, Welch, Petrou and Stamoulis. It is the same wasps' nest,
the same centers of trouble that intervene in the political life of the country
_ with acts of terrorism and every kind of provocation to serve the current
objectives of local and foreign reaction. Of course, the government of the
kight that fostered all these vipers for all the~e years, did not permit the
correct direction of the police investigation to discover the "unknowns". The
present government, however, can do it if it wants to. And it has an obligation
to take all the measures necessary to quash the illegal state.
9346
CSO: 4621/299
:i
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070019-9
FOR OFNI('IA1, l1SM: ONI.Y
, ITALY
RED BRIGADES TERRORIST CIANFANELLI IMPLICATES PLO
AL'201959 Rome ANSA in English 1947 GMT 20 May 82
[Taxt] Rome, 20 May (ANSA)--A Red Brigades terrorist who turned states
evidence after his arrest last year, Massimo Cianfanelli, told Rome judges
today that an~ther Brigades member on trial had often travelled to France
to contact the Palestinian al-Fatah Organization.
Cianfanelli's testimony on a Brigades-Palestinian connection came at the
end of the sixth week of the super trial of 64 terrorist suspects facing
charges connected to the 1978 kidnapping and killing of the Christian
Democrat Party chairman, Aldo Moro, and 18 additional homicides.
Cianfanelli was the third self-confessed terrorist to zake the stand as
states witness.
In today's testimony, he confirmed in large part the statements made earlier
by the other two "penitent" Brigades terrorists, Antonio Savasta and Emilia
Liberal, in the area of links between Italy's most ruthless terrorist band
and foreign organizations.
He identified the defendent who maintained contact with al-Fatah in France
as Valerio Morucci but said that he could not give information on any
Palestinian shipments of arms earmarked for the Red Brigades.
He said, however, that he had heard of sea voyages to the Middle East for
picking up weapons and referred to another defendent on trial here in this
connection. The same suspect, Maurizio Folini, had marginal ties with
members of Soviet security organs who paved the way for the Palestinian
contact, according to Cianfanelli.
The trial continues on Monday.
CSO: 6131/503
4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SPAIN
BETTER EQUIPPID ETA-M STILL EFFECTIVE DESPITE ISOLATION
Desperation Off ensive
Madzid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 26 A~r 82 pp 32-38
[Text] Armed to the teeth, the terrorists are gambling
everything.
Coinciding with the possible def~itive entry of Spain into
NATO, with the end of the trial of the 23 February coupists,
with the situation of the international crieis and with the
call for general electiona in the near future, following
the Andalucia elections on 23 May, the ETA-M [Basque Father-
land and Liberty Group Military Aasembly] seems to have
� launched what could be a desperation offensive to force the
Madrid government to negotiate. While police experts are
saying that theae are the final death throes of an organiza-
tion of gunmen on the way to eattinction, other observers
point out that we are far from being in that final phase of
indiscriminate violence which puts an end to alienated groups
of that kind.
On Saturday, 17 April 1982, an hour after many Spaniards who had watched
Vincent Minelli's "Designing Woman" on television had gone to bed, f our men
dressed in sports clothes and leather hunting ~ackets approached the Rioa
Rosas telephone central, in the heart of Madrid, and knocked on the door.
The security guard of the building, in which all the telephone monitoring
services of Basque Country appear to be centralized, saw them through the
grilled window. He thought it unusual for anyone to knock on the door at
such an hour; howeve.r, one of the visitors said:
"Let us in. We are police officers. We have come here to set up a stakeout in
this central."
A moment later the guard and the caretaker, who had failed to confirm the
identity of the strange visitors, were staring into the muzzle of a 14-shot
"Bruwning" machine pistol.
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500470019-9
HUR OFF(('!Al. USE ONLY
_ The unexpected visitors, members of an ETA-m commando ~roup, deactivated the
building's alarm systems and fanned out on all f loors until they had located
and assembled the 13-man guard force.
One quarter of an hour later, when everything was under control, one of the
terrorists made a mysterious phone ca11; and f ive men, members of the same
commando group, showed up at the building.
- The nine terrorists then brought about 10 packets of a nitrogenous [exog~eno]
plastic explosive into the building. This exploaive is similar to Plastic
No 2 but does not present the same handling dangers and deteriorates less.
The packets were distributed cn all floors and several electric detonators
were attached to each of them, along with an alartn clock 3nd a 4.5-volt
battery. When they had completed this operatian, they lef t the building
quickly.
_ Five minutes later, the telephone installations were a heap ~f rubble, twisted
steel beams, sheaves of wires and transietors, having been blown up in an
- impressive cloud of smoke and dust.
ETA-m had attained its most imp~rtant strategic ob~ective since the death of
Carrero Blanco. ~ Some 700,000 Madr3d telephone subscribers were affected by
the explosion; and telephone communications with Avila, Caceres, Ciudad Real,
Guadalajara, Salamanca, Segovia, Soria, Toledo, ~.as Palmas de Gran Canaria,
Santa Cruz de Tenerife and f oreign countries lost much of their quality.
The following day, thousands of Madrilenians had to wait long hours at bank
windows to cash a check or verify a tranafer. The data terminal which was
housed in the central had also been affected, and 6,000 banking institutions
- were deprived of this fundamental service.
The act of violence against the Rios Rosas telephone central, one of the nerve
centers of Spanish telephone communications, was the latest in a series of
terrorist attacks carried out by the ETA-m in several Spanish provinces in a
synchronized combined manner.
The terrorist escalation, about which CANIBIO 16 has reported in earlier iasues,
began on 14 March 1982 when an ETA-m commando group assassinated two policemen
and one woman who were having lunch at the "Rancho Chileno" bar in Sestao, 30
km from Bilbao, and wounded two other policemen.
In that operation, one of the terrorists was wounded by a ricochet from his
- own weapon; and the ETA-m, as a result.thereof, decided to suspend the offen-
sive f or 2 weeks to give the Bilbao commando group time to reorganize.
Last Wednesday, at 0750 hours, the ETA-m gave th~ def initive "fire" order. In
the outskirts of San Sebastian, 20G meters from the Bilbao-Behovia highway,
eight terrorists unpacked an EPG-7 bazooka of Soviet make and shelled the
Inchaurrondo Civil Guard garrison, where over 600 Benemerita families reaide.
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The surprise attack, with medium-heavy weapons, prevented the civil guardsmen,
who had two helicopters and highly efficient armored vehicles in Inchaurrondo,
from reacting quickly.
For the second time, the Bar~.elona ETA-m 2 days ldter again used medium-
heavy weapons. However, in this attack, which took place in the ?~eart of
Barcelona against an army vehicle [miembra], the terrorists who used another
EPG-7 showed that they did not know how to operate it. The grenade, from
which they had failed to remove the safety pin, hit a floor above the minibus
and failed to explode.
On the same day, the ETA issued its ultimatum: "If the police and the Civil
Guard do not get out of Euzkadi [Basque Country], the ETA will attack the
garrisons with medium-heavy weapons."
The government reacted resolutely: "With that wou1R-be ultimatum, the ETA is
not telling us anything new, said Ignacio Aguirre, goveniment spok~sman.
"The government knows what the terrorists' plans are and has taken all the
necessary steps."
Qualitative Leap Forward
And yet, before the Ministry af Interior realized that a full-blown terrorist
offensive was underway and ordered a general police alert, more incidents
were to take place.
In Pamplona, a relatively peaceful city, a commandc group made up of eight
terrorists attacked a National Police armored car with machine-gun fire and
bazooka shells.
It was 1200 hours on 17 April. One of the bazooka shells hit the armored car
dead center and blew a 10-centimeter hole in it near the driver's seat. In
spite of the fact that only the penetrating charge of the shell had exploded,
~ national police officer Vicente Gareca Lopez was killed and Teodomiro Diaz
_ Fores, another national policeman and an excellent soccer player, lost his
left leg.
A few hours later, as the news of the Pamplona attack was being reported by
Basque radio broadcastin~ stations, the ETA's weapons roared again. In
BiZbao, the civil guardsmen of the La Salve garrison were attacked with anti-
tank grenades and in Algorta (Guipuzcoa) a Benemerita detachment which was
guarding the installations of a garrison felt the fragments of bazooka shel.ls
in their flesh. It was necessary to amputate the hand of one of the wounded
civil guardsmen, Antonio Guerra Fernandez.
The escalation ended on 19 :~pril, a day on which a terrorist commando group
attacked a Civil Guard garrison in the Guipuzcoa town of Eibar with hand
grenades and rifle fire.
Taking advantage of the dark of night, the co~ando group escaped; however,
during the exchange of gunfire between Civil Guard and terrorist forces, a
resident was wounded, 20-year old Felix Cid Cepeda.
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
- In the opinion c~f observers, the new terrorist escalation means an important
qualitative leap forward by the ETA--m. During this offensive, the terrorists
- not only used medium-hea.vy weapons, which are more powerful than the pistols
= and submachine guns employed up to now, but also carried out their activities
in a syr?chronized way and in accordance with a perf ectly structured plan.
In 5 days, between 14 andl9Apri1, the ETA-m carried out eight operations with
a toll of one dead and 11 wounded, with simultaneous attacks in Madrid,
Barcelona, Guipuzcoa and Navarra.
The terrorists did not use more pok~~.rfu7. and destructive weapons but increased
- the number of inemberG in each commando group from four to eight persons as a
minimum.
This emphasizes the fact thatETA-m, in order to carry out these actions, needed
at least 50 gunmen brought in from France and a support infrastructure which
ranged from 80 to 100 additional persons.
DespitethefactthatETA-m can count upon 452 liberated individuals [liberados],
the general impression is that the recent escalation means that the organiza-
tion had made an unprecedented military effort, to the point that the various
commando groups used two diffexent kinds of bazookas,assault rifles of diverse
sources and makes--many of them manufactured over 30 years ago--including
hunting shotguns.
- Specialists on the subject of the ETA also emphasize that the organiZation
~ lacks technical training in the use of inedium-heavy weapons, which almost
never hit their targets and when they did they failed to explode because the
terrorists had not activated the shells.
Analysts of terrorist activities add another factor to this lack of technical
training: the practice of abandoning weapons durtng flight~
In the opinion of specialists in terrorist activities, all these things permir
the conclusion that although the ETA has been able to plan and execute a
terrorist escalation on paper, its commando groups, perhaps because they are
made up of very young persons, lack technical training and the motivation to
take action.
What is more, police sources feel that the ETA can only carry o~it a series of
- actions of this scope through general mobilization of its forces and an
expenditure of 200 million pesetas once or twice a year.
The most recent escalation, in the opinion of the same sources, was only
possible thanks to the fact that the terrorist organization during the last
months had accumulated several million pesetas from the collection of the
"revolutionary tax," in addition to the money received from the ransom of
Bilbao industrialist Jose Liperheide.
With that money the terrorists aiso have begun to rearm themselves with
medium-he.avy weapons. Of these weapons, the most important category is the
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
EPG-7 tazooka, which is of Soviet make and which the ETA-m purchased from
Palestinian terrorist organizations a couple of months ago.
The EPG-7, a bazooka which is also used by the Italian Red Brigade and was
used in Spain previously by the ETA-pin [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Political
and Military Assembly], is a weapon that weighs 8 kilos, is a little over 1
meter long and is capable of $ending shells weighing 2 kilos 300 meters in
1 second.
Another weapon which the ETA terrorists feverishly try to get and which
probably is now in their hands is the SA-7 (SAM7) rocket, also of Soviet make.
This rocket, which weighs a little over 10 kilos and has a range of 4,500
meters, at one and one-half times the speed of sound, has in infrared
guidance system and is almost infallible. It can down low-flying airplanes.
The Palestinian terrorists frequently use this rocket in their attacks; and
ETA-m has attempted to get these rockets through Libya or Lebanon, where the
Palestinian guerrillas are playing a very important role.
A political statement made by Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi a year ago to
the eff ect that he considers the ETA and IRA as the only two liberation move-
ments in Europe demonstrates that Libya is supporting terrorism in Europe,
according to very credible sources.
- "Final Desth Throes"
While Ministry of Interior sources have told CANIBIO 16 that the most recent
terrorist escalation is the "final death throe" of the beast mortally wounded
by police action, other equally credible sources are evaluating the qualita-
tive leap forward by the Basque gunmen in quite another manner.
The basic and priority objective of the ETA, according to these sources, is
to provoke the government by using all available means with :.i view to forcing
the government to take a step backward in Basque Country. "That is the only
method they have," the same source told this magazine, "to justify the inter-
national campaign they have undertaken to show that there are oppression, lack
of freedom and democracy in Basque Country."
This campaign which is bei.ng carrie3 out by ETA official spokesmen in
Nicaragua, E1 Salvador, Venezuela, Mexico, Brussels and Denmark is going to
collapse about their ears during the World Cup playoff s when it is shown that
the information ETA is disseminating outside Spain is totally false.
In any event, specialists on terrorism are complaining of the fact that it ~_s
becoming increasingly diff icult to identify the real objectives of the ETA.
CAMBIO 16 was told: "When the politicians in the organization went over to
- Herri Batasuna [popular unity] to devote themselves to the political struggle,
they lost cflntrol of the organization which passed into the nands of tne
gunmen." A revealing point in this regard is an incident which took place a
_ month ago at the Anoeta de San Sebastian motorcycle racetrack during a
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500070019-9
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
na~ionalist rally when two members of the ETA got up on the platform and
burned a Spanish flag in public. The Herri Batasuna leaders were struck
speechless. They did not know the intentions of the ETA which ha.d used them
to organize the rally.
In its ultimatum to the Spanish state, the ETA, which is thrsatening to go
back into action with a fury on 15 May 1982, 20 days before the World Cup
playoff s, is making a maximal demand that even the terrorists know is
impossible to grant. Madrid is not going to withdraw its police from Basque
- Country nor is it going to transfer the functions of the Civil Guard and
National Police to the Basque government at this time.
Therefore, it is probable that by means of such an exhorbitant and outlandish
demand the terrorists are trying to f ind a way to negotiate with the Madrid
government with a view to receiving lesser concessions, such as a new amnesty
which could benef it both the terrorists and the "23 February" coupists.
This possibility which is being offere~3 in Abertzale [patriotic] quarters as
very viable is being rejected outright by the central government. "There will
be no negotiations with the terrorists," CAMBIO 16 was told by a Ministry of
Inter~or spokesman, "so long as Juan Jose Roson Perez is head of the ministry."
"Not only have they lost popular support but no longer have that support and
information infrastructure which the terrorists had 2 years ago and which the
police dismantled," the spokesman added to justify the so-called "rounding up"
of the terrorists.
It is true that the Basque terrorists are now mcre isolated than ever, that
there are over 500 activists in prison charged with being part of information
commando groups and another 600 charged with crimes of violence and that the
Basque society, principally that segment supporting the PNV [Basque National
Party] and the "Left for Socialismt1 are turning their backs on the group of
gunmen whom for years they had supported sentimentally and aided with money,
shelter and protection.
However, it is not so clear that this is the end of the ETA. Although many
of these vermin are dying while killing, an expert told CAMBIO 16: "So long
as there is refuge in France, it will not be easy to put an end to Basque
terrorism once and for all."
ETA-~7's International Connections Summarized
Madrid CANIBIO 16 in Spanish 26 Apr 82 pp 38-41
[Article by Jose Diaz Herrera, Jose Manuel Ari~a, Xavier pomingo, Francisc.o
Caparros and Rafael Cid]
[Text] No on^_ knows more about the ETA today than the French police and
intellige:ice services. Therefore, no one knows more abaut the Basqu~ terror-
ist organization than the French Government.
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The whereabouts of the 700 ETAists--militants, politico-militants and
autonomous commandos--residing in France have been pinpointed and are
- surveiled; their telephones are "bugged"; all their movements are known,
- both inside France and outside the French borders.
However, the French police and the SDEC [Foreign Intelligence and Counter-
intelligence Service] (which has a good "intelligence apparat" in Bayonne)
are jealously guarding this information about the international contacts of
the ETAists and their movements, alleging that the communication of this
information to the Spanish police or other interested international services
would be "dangerous from the political standpoint."
The Spanish police and other interested services (Italian, German, British or
American services) feel on the other hand that knowledge of the material
information about the ETA in the possession of the French would in short
order facilitate its dismantling.
Both the Spanish minister of interior, Juan Jose Roson, and Commissioner
Manuel Ballesteros have repeatedly asked the French to communicate to them
the complete file of reports on the international network of support,
sympathies and connections available to the ETA in its French sanctuary. The
French do not deny, cannot deny, that they have such inforniation. However,
every interview has been a disappointment to the Spaniards. And the fact of
the matter is that the number one international ~TA connection is France.
According to a Secret Police detective assigned to Bordeaux, the ru~son for
this siience is that the French Government does not wish to see the French
Basque Country converted into a battlefield between ETAists and organizations
such as the Spanish Basque Battalion or others. Another French police source,
a supporter of greater cooperation with the Spaniards, gave us another story:
certain revelations about the international contacts of the ETA on French
soil could be a harsh blow to the foreign policy of Paris.
There is not contradiction between the two versions; and both sources agree
in washing their hands of the affair, saying that orders to communicate
nothing had come from very high up. In this regard, there has not been the
slightest change in policy with the change in presidents.
ETAist Sympathies
In fact the continuation of the French government's complicity and its
reasons therefor have brought the ETA an entire gamut of more or less declared
sympathies and support which range from militants and elected representatives
of the Socialist Party (and now also of tYee French Communist Party) tco
Matignon.
For this entire "Lef t," the Spanish Basque Country is a kind of oppressed
colony; ETA is a national liberation movement; and Spanish democracy is the
mask of fascism. Such thoughts were expressed to us very recently at the
headquarters of the French Socialist Party in Paris, Rue Solferino, by a high
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540070019-9
FUR UN'N'1(.'lAL U~~ UNLY
official of the ma.jority. Gaston Defferre, minister of interior, had himself
spoken in very similar terms in an interview with LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR.
~ With respect to the request for asylum of the deputy from IiB [Herri Batastma],
Francisco Letamendia, his attorney, Michel Prat, t~ld Miguel Ramos of CAI~IDIO
16: "Mitterrand's attitude will depend upon normalization in Spain. The
French Government cannot fail to take into account the political analysis of
the refugees from West European democracies in which there is also persecution.~~
The ETA presence in France is large and strong. The history of the
organization is linked with the border relationship, and from the very f irst
moment the French sanctuary has been increasingly plagued by nationalist
groups, some of whicli, such as Iparraterrak, are also terrorist and separa-~
tist groups. Compared with French support, aid and complicity, all the other
ETA international contacts are secondary. All of them in fact originate and
develop on French soil and involve activities ranging from political relations
to arms trafficking.
What, is certain is that the ETA is very selective in its international
_ contacts--we are speaking here about the ETA. It trusts no on~ and in order
for there to be a connection an essential condition is that there be some
kind of parallelism between the ETA and the other groups; and above all an
essential condition for understanding one another is that the other groups
share separatist feelings.
The Irish Brothers
Therefore, the ETA has relations with members of the Baader-Meinhoff ring and
~ other groups which do not have a God, master or country to call their own,
such as the Red Brigades.
_ The ETA's best contacts ~aere and are with similar separatist organizations
- such as the FLQ (Quebec Liberation Front), the Corsican Liberation Front,and
above all the IRA. In this case, what is involved are old, solid and privi-
leged relations. An authentic collaboration which endures and intensif ies.
Quite rightly we can say in this case of parallel histories that the ETA is
acting like the younger bro~ner and favored disciple of the IRA. They have
the same Catholic origin, the same ecclesiastic and above all Jesuit support,
similar splits, similar languages and simultaneous movement to:aard pro-Soviet
Marxism. They have the same bloody tactics and close cooperation in arms
trafficking. There is no difference between them regards the "military"
prioritv. The "iJlsterization" of the Basque Country is a concept which comes
to mtr.~d and which has often been espot�sed by theoreticians such as Herri
Batasuna. This is a trap which has been avoided up to now in Spain.
It seems that the first contacts between the ETA and IRA were made in 1971 in
Algeria and continued in Ireland with the head of the Irish organization,
Sean Ma.cstiofain. A report from the Spanish secret service concludes that a
mutual aid pact was signed in 1972.
12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540070019-9
H'OR OFFI('IA1. USF, ONLY
A;; nu~c~er of f~ct, the L`l'Aista aiid th~ lll~ll of the 1ltA hacl already had the
opportunity to talk with one another at the Tricontinental Conference in
Havana in 1966, from which develoged the two con~rete positions and applica-
tions of the "internationalist" doctrines endorsed by Moscow in 1969 at the
WorZ3 Conference of the Communist Parties that are still in force, according
to a recent statement by Georges Marchais during the last congress of the
~ French Communist Party.
- Since then, the paths taken by the IRA and ETA have been parallel in their
"ideological" aspects and Moscow-oriented and have not ceased intersecting
one another in arms supply activities. Not long ago, many ETAists arrested
in France were transporting arms for the IRA. Similar incidents had already
- occurred in 1972 when Jose Luis Larranaga was arrested~-he was working with
the German trafficker, Gunther Leinhausser--and in 1975 when customs officia~s
intercepted Jose Mendizabal on the Paris-Brussels highway.
The Algerian FLN [National Liberation Fro~ZtJ owed a debt to the ETA which was
repaid when it won its independence. Before that, during the war with France,
the Algerian terrorists had benefited from the skill and knowledge of the ETA
border crossers when they were fleeing from the French police and took
refuge in Spain.
The Moslem Brothers
Afterward, Algeria made instructors and training camps available to the ETA
and also facilitated its relations with other Moslem nationalist groups,
particularly with the Palestinians, who in turn opened the Libyan door to the
ETAists.
In specialized q;sarters it is estimated that the information held by the
Spanish secret :~ervices on the presence of ETAists in Algeria and other coun-
tries of the Moslem world is accurate. What is more, as with the IRA, there
was a certain amount of ide~logical parallelism between the ETA and the FLN
which for a time was reflected in ETA "doctrine." For a period of time, its
- "literature" was very much influenced by the Third World social-nationalism
of Franz Fanon and by Algerian p~copaganda.
Relations with Libya and Qadhdh,~fi, which were arranged principally through
the intermediary of the IRA, ar�e said to have been less intense, although a
reliable source reported the presence of Apala in Tripoli last year. We are
still talking about the ETA-m. TY:.e ETA-pm had more intense relations with the
Moslem organizations, particularly Palestinian or Yemeni organizations; but
that is another stozy.
Today the relations of ETA-m with Arab terrorism have more to do with the
tangled c~mplex of arms trafficking than with its physical presence in
Islamic lands. However, the contacts are continuing, although ~hey are made
principally in the "international brigades" on the Salvadoran. battlefields or
in training bases of the "red mercenaries" in Nicaragua.
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
F~R OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The Latin American Bxothers
The ERP [Peopl~'s Revolutionaxy Army], MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left]
and Montoneros in their day had close relations with the ETA; however, today,
via Paris (Regis Debray) and &avana, the "diplomacy" of the Basque terrorists ~
and separatist organization is being conducted on the ill-fated Central
American chessboard, with its capital in Managua.
For a long time the top ETA foreign relations official, Jose Antonio
Urruticoechea Bengoechea, alias "Josu Ternera," was there with an office,
telephone and almost legal representation and may still b e there. The man in
the Sandinist ca~ita'. is his second in command, Jose Larrategui Cuadra, alias
- "Antxulo." Other terrorists who have passed through Sandinist camps located
between Esteli, Matagalpa and Grinatega are Tomas Linaza Echeverria and Justo
Ortego Ezquerra. The "mission" also has four or five more representatives
whose names have not been determined. Recently, HB representatives, including
Castell, paid a visit, which was fully reported by the newspaper EGUIN, to
Latin American countries in which the ETA has "colonies": Co~ta Rica,
Nicaragua, Venezuela and Mexico.
It is also known that a group of ETAists up until recently was receiving
training in Cuba as medical corpsmen. The Cubans, because of their more or
less good relations with the Spanish Governm~nt, are reducing as uiuch as
possible their visible contacts with the ETA which are conducted t'nrough
several Spanish persons or groups friendly to Havana or now, more simply,
~ thraugh the French conduit.
The same could be said of ETA relations wi~th the KGB and the Soviets. Up
until 3 or 4 years ago, KGBers in the USSR Embassy in Madrid made frequent
~ trips to the Basque Country and personal contacts with ETAists in San Juan
- and Biarritz were detected.
~ Those who surveil the movements of such personalities say: "Today they are
traveling much less" and the Soviets "are afraid that it can be proved they
have some contact with the ETA" which doubtless would prompt the immediate
closure of their embassy in Madrid. Nevertheleas, the anti-Sovietism of the
leftist kind which characterized the ETA's "literature" for years has
disappeared. For example, the ETA has not condemned the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan nor has it demonstrated the slightest solidarity with Polish
Solidarity.
As a matter of fact, both the IRA and ETA are in the line of "anti-imperialist
movements" that accepts and agrees with Moscow's "internationalism," which was
defined at the World Conference of the Communist Parties in 1969 and recently
redefined by Marchais in Paris.
~TA Tactics Deplored
Madrid CANIBIO 16 in Spanish 26 Apr 82 p 39
[News commentary by Ander Landaburu: "From Shot to Grenade"]
[Text] To what level of insanity and irrationality has the ETA gone to make
public its most recent document, an ultima.tum which contains a threat to the
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
families living in garrison houses or in their vicinity? It is not enough for
them ta kill a doctor or engineer and to extort [money] from hundreds of
citizens or cause them to flee from the Basque Country in terror; now they
want to show us their "revolutionary Abertzale spirit" by killing families,
women and children. From a shot in the neek they a.r~ moving up to a gr.enade
through the window:
tn this leap forward, as a poseible desperate ~ffort to seek negotiation
through an insane and wrong strategy and to replace their loss of popular
support with spectacular actions including the use for the first time of
medium-heavy weapons, we do not know whether the ETA is engaged in a
"desperation" off ensive or, as some sources maintain, whether this is the
beginnir~g of the end of the organization.
However, what is b eing demonstrated is the lack of ethical policy, dehuman-
ization, barbarity, fascism and the messianic and sick minds of the current
leaders of the ETA who have absolutely nothing to do with that group of
- idealists who took part in the fifth assembly back in the year 1967, under
the dictatorship.
Leaders who have become skilled in the handling of a pistol instead of ideas,
who have no scruples about recruiting beardless youths from high schools,
youths who barely knew about and much less suff ered under Francoism. Young
. men who call themselves by the mandatory catchwords "sociali~ts or Marxists"
but have not rea.d two books and always substitute training or armed action
for intellectual education. Young men who are only motivated by simplistic
and at times racist "slogans" and who in many cases unfortunatel�y wind up as
cannon fodder or prison inmates a few months after beginning their "revolu-
tionary ad~enture. Young men, in short, who are promised an idyllic,
independent, socialist, etc. Basque Country but who with the dynamism of
pistols will only get to know a count~.y in stagnation and ruins and immersed
in a wave of madness.
Some time ago the ETA lost the political battle. In Basque Country we are
not ready to accede to conditions imposed by force of arms; and ETA cannot
set itself up as the representative of our people and much less of thc worker~
because doctors, guards, cab drivers, engineers, merchants and newsma.n Portell
were assassinated by it.
There is no doubt that at this time the ETAists--or those mar:ipulating them--
objectively are the allies of Tejero. They have be~ome his b.st: defenders and
pref er a coup because they know that sooner or later democracy and the regime
of f reedom, which is increasingly consolidated, will f inally smcther them.
In the meantime, the ETA will seek its own justification through the dictator-
ship which some 3re longing for and will continue to encourage the climate o1
a fascist coup. In this way they will be able to present themselves as the
saviors of the fatherland in a Basque society anesthetized by the blood which
they themselves have spilled. Who will help them then?
It is uecessary to isolate the ETA, respond to its challenge, destroy the
rny~.}~ of its power with valor and courage and convince ~urselves that the
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
struggle is every day. Only in this way will we be able to come out of this
situation of stagnation, semiruin and terror. And if the ETA wishes to
negotiate let it say so openly but only after it has def initely stopped its
t~rrorist activities.
As for Madrid, it is not ezough to finally recognize and applaud the efforts
of Euskadiko Esquerra [Basque Left], the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] and ita
its govern~ent in this struggle; it is necessary--forgetting party electoral
pettiness--to help the Basque president to assume his constitutional duties
- and responsibilities in police matters as soon as possible. We should forget
about LOAPAS [crganic and harmonization law of the autonomous process] and
other gimmicks so '-or.g as the priority sub~ect is the struggle for democracy
and the status of the autonomies which are today threatened by the ETA and
coupism. The rest of the country should understand that here--as Arzallus
stated recently--we do not want dictators, not even Basque dictators.
COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8143
CSO: 3110/139
16
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y
' � SPAIN
TERRORISM IN SPAIN
Barcelona EL TERRORISMO EN ESPANA in Spanish 1982 pp 217-272 and Table of
Contents
[Book by Ale~andro Munoz Alonso: "Terroriam in Spain," Terror Versus
Pluralistic Coexistence in Freedom. TablE~ro Collection.]
(Text] Tablero Collection
Board of Directors: Ra.fael Borras, Victor Mendoza and Baltasar Porcel
Editorial Board: Maria Teresa Arbo, Marcel Plans and Carlos Pu~ol
Copyright Ale~andro Munoz Alonso, 1982
Planeta Publishers, Inc, 273-277 Corcega, Barcelona 8(Spain)
Collection design and cover by Hans Romberg (Flash Press photo and production
~by Jordi Royo)
First edition: March 1982
Legal deposit: B. 10041-1982
. ISBN 84-320-7314-8
Printed in Spain
"Duplex, Inc" Printing Shops, Ciudad de la Asuncion, 26-D, Barcelona 30
Index
I. The Shadow of Cain ~
Concept and significance of terrorism 9
Terrorism in contemporary Spain 11
Terrorism at the end of Francoism 14
The Burgos trial 1~
The origins of ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] 22
From the assassination of Carrero Blanco to the attack on Correo Street 30
The other kinds of terrorism 34
The terrorism of the extreme ri~ht 37
The terrorism during the final months of Francoism 40
17
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY
II. The Challenge 49
The Arias-Fraga phase (December 1975-July 1976) 51
Rebirth and christening of GRAPO [First of October Arued
Revolutionary Group] 63
- ETA: between the truce and internal problems. ~he "Pertur" case 65
GRAPO and the extreme right against reform: the winter of 1977-T978 74
The tragic week: the Atocha slaughter 79
Fram provocation to amnesty 87
A case of marginal terrorism: 1~AIAC [Sovereignty and Independence
~Iovement of the C~ nary Islanas] 96
III. The Eacalation 99
The strategy of destabilization 101
The "normalization" o~ terroriam ~ 111
Negotiating with ETA 120
The provocation of the Armed Forces 125
When ETA. acts, GRAPO falls 129
ETA: kill more to negotiate better 136
~ IV. The Response 143
The great maneuvers against terror 145
The struggle for the Statute 147
The French front 156
Second general elections 158
New government, old problems 163
General nffensive of terror 167
_ A bloody week in May 169
The Statute of Guernica 176
ETA (p-m) [political-military] against tourism 179
A blow to ~RAPO 185
ETA and the Basque referendum 188
- Violence after the Statute. The Autonomous Commandos 193
ETA (p-m) strategy. The Ruperez kidnapping 197
ETA against Basque autonomy 207
V. The Retreat 215
The failure of the �tETA-State" 21~
The incoherence of ETA (p-m) 221
The campaign agai.nst UCD [Democratic Center Union] 223
ETA loses nerve 225
The Front for Peace 228
The Madrid-Basque ~overnment tension 231
The eternal French problem 234
The Suarez resignation and the king's visit to the Basque Country 237
The extreme right against democracy: from terrorism to coupism 241
The ETA attrition: the truces 24~
18 �
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The ETA (m) final escalation. The government against terror. the
international dimension ~ 251
Tt~e tragic week in May 1981. Blow to GRAPO 255"~
ETA and Socialist France 258
The great ETA (m) truce 260
~ A blow to ETA 262
The internal debate in ETA (p-~m) on "armed struggle" 263
The end of the truce 267
- ETA (m): the return to the attack 269
The Failure of the "ETA-State"
~ When one studies the topic of contemporary Spanish terr.orism, what is most
striking is the lasting nature of the ETA phenomenon. While the other terrorist
groups, particularly GRAPO (its leading competitor in persistence) are marked by
their intermittency, taking action, being broken up and disappearing for months,
ETA has always shown signs of an extremely noticeable co~ntinuity, interruptecl
only by truces the occasion and duration of which have depended solely on the
decision of the terrorist organization. But, in addition, ETA has distinguished
itself from the other terrorist organizations for its consistency and entrenchment.
Even though on the occasion of the burial of certain GRAPO members, such as
Collazo Arau~o or Cerdan Calixto, there have been small groups of individuals
favoring that terrorist group, these have always been very localized phenomena.
Only a very small part of the populace has felt associated with GRAPO throughout
that strange organization's 6-year history.
ETA, on the other hand, has always en~oyed enormous popular support, which has
fluctuated during the various phases of recent political evolution, but which
has been evident from the late 1960's until the present, and might even be
' described as massive on occasion. Mass mobilizations of large scope have taken
place in the name of ETA, and among them there have been ~"~demonstrations by many
thousands of persons who have hailed ETA, and shouted "ETA Herria ?urekin" (ETA,
~ the people are with you), or that other terrifying slogan regarding rhe State
Security Forces and against all "collaborators" with the "Spanish occupier" in
general, "ETA, kill them." The opinion polls taken during recent years in the
Basque Country have always reflected large percentages in favor of "armed strug-
' gle" among those associat,e~ with the ones who back and ~ustify the existence of
_ ETA a~ a"mflit3ry organization," in other words, those who view Basque terrorism
as an acceptable "national liberation struggle."
During the recent phase, wherein ETA-military and ETA politico-military have
appeared quite distinct from one another, there has been little �~oubt that the
popular entrenchment of these two different brancaes is�very closely reflected
in the backing given to the two political coalitions, Herri Batasuna [Popular
Unity] and Euskadiko Eskerra [Basque Left]. Nevertheless, it is true that since
late 1979 or early 1980, this latter organization has shown c~ertain signs tnde-
pendence frorn ETA (p-m), at whose SevenCh Assembly (1976) its leading component,
EIA [Basque Revolutionary Party] had its origin.
t
19
; FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
This indisputable popular support will lend ETA some of what most of the terrorist
groups usually lack: a legitimacy. We are interpreting this term here in the
sense given it by political science, that is, a quality en~oyed by certain powers
whereby their ambition to impose themselves and to exercise authority is accepted
by a populace which ~ustifies it because that ambition coincides with the sociolo-
gical aspirations or beliefs of that populace. This is the type of legitimacy
that the IRA enjoys for the Catholics of Ulster, the Algerian FLN for the Arabs
of Algeria, the Mau-Mau for the autochthonous population of Kenya or the EORA for
- the Greek Cypriots.
Without that "legitimacy" accepted by a sizable portion of the Basque population
the persistence of the ETA phenomenon would have been impossible. Thus, the Basque
conflict is presented to us as a"conflict of legitimacies," because within the
Basque society there coexist, at least, one sector which has attributed that funda-
mental political quality ("the temperament of the city" as Guillermo Ferrero called
it) to the central authorities of Spain, considering anything that would entail a
break with them to be "illegitimate," and another sector which attributes "legiti-
macy to those who represent the radical ambition for a break with the Spanish
State, E,:~�-~ by armed struggle, in other words, ETA. There is still a third sector
which would base the legitimacy on a pact between two sovereign and irreducible
elements: the Spanish State and the original sovereignty of the Basque people.
This contractualist concept constantly crops up in the political literature of
the so-called moclerate nationalism, the most perfect representative of which is
the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party].
Thi.s attribute of legitimacy is considered by political science as the foundation
of the state. And this explains why a statist aspiration is quite perceptible
in the evolution of ETA. In fact, ETA has acted as an embryonic state, particu-
larly since the early 1970's. This ambition to be a state, and to display the
authority and powers with which states appear to be endowed, has been fostered
by the fact that, especially between 1976 and 1980, the State, the Spanish State,
appeared to be relinquishing its power in the Basque Country. The distinguishing
traits of the state and ~he exercise of its authority, ceased to be apparent.
There was constant mention of an "absence of the state." And thus there occurred
- a power vacuum which has been filled to a large extent by ETA. The very legiti-
n~acy of the Basque autonomous institutions seems to depend on the ETA's definitive
endorsement. A head-on clash with ETA has been avoided and, when violence or
terrorism is condemned, it is done in general terms, without alluding specifically
to ETA, or else the condemnation of ETA violence is offset by a condemnation of
institutional violence or of the FSE's repression.
The first attribute derived from this "ETA legitimacy", from this concept of ETA
as an smbryonic state, is precisely that of legitimizing its violence. It is we11
known that the classic theory of the state affirms that the state has the monopoly
on coercion, only the state can exercise force, and the violence used by it is
legitimized and justified accordingly. Hence, the ETA`s violence is "legitimized"
for those who back the organization directly or indirectly. In fact, ETA is
- viewed as a holder of that monopoly on coercion, and this explains, for example,
why when a labor dispute is not resolved through the ordinary expedients of nego-
tiation, ETA attributes to itself the "last resort," the use of coercion on
behalf of the side considered weakest. This situation, which appears quite
evident, particularly in ETA (p-m), means that ETA assumes authority belonging
to the army and .the police.
20
FOR ~FFICTAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070019-9
. t OFFICI~ .
The second state attribute exercised by ETA is that of creating a certain tax
system which takes the form of extortion of businessmen, professional people and
citizens who are forced to pay the so-called "revolutionary tax." Although ETA
has never lacked voluntary contributions and assistance from sympathizers, at
first ETA resorted to holdups in order to "recover" the funds that it needed to
keep the organization operating. But gradually, as it felt more "legitimized,"
' it replaced this procedure, which unquestionably entails risks, wlth the coercive
"levying" of the "revolutionary tax" which, moreover, afforded far greater income.
At the outset, it was the "Hispanist" oligarchy often established in the residen-
tial district of Neguri which was the victim of the ETA extortion. MM~r.y of them
left the Basque Country and settled in Andalucia or Madrid. But on some occasions
ETA pursued them to their new residences. The letter received by the individuals
selected by the terrorist organization as forced taxpayers usually began in this
manner: "The Basque bourgeoisie, that social class to which you belong, cooperated
in the annexation of part of our country to the Spanish State, forgetting its
national origin and its culture, for the sake of its economic inter~ests; a nation
and a culture which belonged not only to it, but to a11 our people as well."
Gradually, however, the "census" of the forced taxpayers was expanded, first in
about 1978, to include medium and sma~l-sized business owners and, since early
198d, to include professionals of various types or merchants.
When ETA was divided into two branches, both used the same procedure to collect
funds, thereby causing great confusion. Later, the autonomous commandos used
extortion as well. And opportunistic elements and criminals, even in other sec-
- tions of Spain, pretended to be from ETA, almost always unsuccessfully, in search
of money from others.
Using chis procedure, ETA has. managed to collect billions of pesetas. According
to certain statistics, in 1979 alone ETA collected 20 billion pesetas. The
- figure may seem exaggerated when one considers the fact that, in 1977, ETA sent
nearly 100 letters (another item of information impossible to check) demanding
the "tax" from Basque businessmen, and that the amounts demanded of the business-
men usually ranged between 5 and 20 million, and for professional people between
half a million and 5 million. But any estimate in this area is risky and arbi-
trary.
For some tiine ETA made use of middlemen to collect the "revolutionary tax," but
it gave up the mediaCion when the Legasa incident occurred in late 1978. The
protagonist in the incident was a builder, Jose Legasa Uburia, who ref.used to
pay the "tax" and reported the situation to the French police, who arrested three
ETA (m) leaders, including the notorious "Trepa," Javier Aya Zulaica.
; In all instances, the ETA letter demanding payment of the revolutionary tax
threatened the"capitalists unwilling to contribute" with execution. And, in
several cases, the threat was carried out. For example, the assassination of
Modesto Carriega Perez, director of the Hispano-American Bank of Baracaldo, on
12 September 1979, was due to his refusal to pay the "tax." And the same motive.
was involved in the assassination of the Count of Aresti on 25 March 1980.
' 21
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444544474419-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Many of those required to pay Che ETA extortion have resorted to the professional
- services of lawyers who are "abertzale~" [patriots] or close to "abertzalism," and
who have negotiated for some reduction. It is claimed that at times their fees
have been on the order of half a million pesetas.
~ The information which ETA has on the financial status of its forced taxpayers is
usually quite accurate, and there is no doubt that it uses the services of indivi-
duals who have infiltrated banking establishments, business firms or government
agencies. Sometimes this information has been wrong, and ETA has been willing to
reduce the amount of the extortion and, it is claimed, even to "exempt" completely
from the payment when its v3:ctims have been able to prove the real state of their
- assets.
In early 1980, ETA launched a new campaign for the tax pa~~ment, sending letters to
certain recipients, as we have noted previously. The front pages of the newspapers
featured the case of Juan Alcorta Maiz, a Guipuzcoan businessman wh~, after having
received the ETA extortion letter, refused to pay and sent the entire press a
letter reporting the incident and explaining his refusal to pay. It is noteworthy
that the entire press published the letter prominently, except for EGIN, another
component of the "ETA-State" which printed it as contributed advertising.
In the Alcorta case, there was the fact that one of his sons had belonged to ETA
(p-m) and was married to a sister of "Pertur"; while a niece of his was the widow
of an ETA member, Miguel Gardogui, who was killed in a confrontation with the
police.
In his ~:tter, Alcorta cited the "blackmail which is destroying my country, my
town and my people"; and asserted: "It is difficult for me to understand the inhi-
bition of an entire community faced with such a serious and increasingly spreading
problem." With a courage praised on all sides, Alcorta confronted the ETA members'
death threat. Viana, the UCD secretary general in Euskadi, described Alcorta's act
as a first major seed-planting for a brave collective reaction." But the fact is
that it was like a cry in the wilderness. Garaicoechea had called upon his fellow
- citizens saying that it was necessary to take risks, but the atmosphere for assum-
ing that kind of position was lacking.
What Alcorta's action represented individually was matched corporatively by the~
note made public on 1 April 1980 by the Vizcaya Physicians Association, also refus-
ing, in the name of its mer~bers, to pay the tax "that runs counter to our human
condition and to the dignity and good name of this Ba~que people, who can neither
accept nor be resigned to such a state of savagery." A fzw months later, in Septem-
ber, the mayor of Usurbil and PNV militant Andres Bueno gublicly read in the town
hall plenum the ETA extortion letter asking him for "2 million pesetas in the form
of a revolutionary tax. Bueno decided not to pay, announcing this at another
municipal session at which all the parties except Herri Lan, a local version of
Herri Batasuna, backed a motion to conde~ the action."
* CAMBIO 16, No 440, 11 May 1980, "Alone Against ETA," pp 22 ff, and No 461, 5
October 1980, "I Will Not Pay Either," pp 27 ff.
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
, ~
The "~TA-State" was beginning to totter, an~. the explanation was relatively
simple. T;ie refusal of the "milis" to accept the autonomous system represented
' by the Statute of Guernika even as a platform for continuing to progress, as the
' "poli-milis" had done, was causing it to lose the popular support that it had
~ enjoyed ~n other times. Its "legitimacy" iiecl~rled, because in the minds of
! increasingly larger sectors of people weary of the struggle, bloodshed and
terror, the true legitimac~ was that of the Statute. This explains why the
"political program" of ETA (m), represented by the so-called "KAS [Patriotic
Socialist Coordination] alternative," has increasingly lost its mobilizing
; capacity, because its maximalist nature is no longer tempting to virtually
, anyone. As opposed to the "KAS alternative" the Basque people have unequivocal-
- ly chosen the Statute of Guernina.
i
ETA is being left alone, without "legitimacy," and has embarked upon the insane
i path of blind terrorism. Its theory.of the national, social revolution has
declined but, like a machine without controls, ETA continues to kill, because
its members do not know how to do anything else.
And when an armed organization is removed from the political area, the inertia
of clandestinity and violence as a way of life inevitably prompt it to become
a"Mafia." Hence it is not surprising that, since 1980, the Mafia-like
~ features of ETA have become increasingly evident. In this way one can inter-
~ pret its implication in the world of drugs and a series of assassinations
which have all the features of a settling of accounts; such as the assassina-
tion in November 1980 of Jose Maria Perez de Urreta, charged with being one of
; the leading individuals responsible for the distribution of drugs in the
Basque Country. But it was not social morality which prompted ETA, but rather
a typical problem of market distribution. This also explains why several
i ETA (m) militants in jail have drug trafficking charges against them.
~ The rncoherence of ETA (p-m)
i
, ETA (p-m), which appeared to have some more solid and coherent ideological
~ pl.ans, has also experienced the same process of deterioration owing to its
inability to extract from its political premises their logical consequences
that would have prompted it to give up the "armed struggle." Hence the inco-
herent features of the "poli-milis" action during 1980.
In June of that year, as during the previous year, ETA (p-m) began a campaign
against tourism. The nightmare of the telephoned warnings and the ousters
from hotels started on St Jotin's night, 24 June, in Alicante, which was holding
its celebrations; and it continued later in other Mediterranean locations.
E'i'A (p-m) had announced its plan on 20 June in San Sebastian, calling for the
release of 19 L;TA members, the expulsion of the director of the Soria jail and
the setting of a definitive date for the Navarra referendum.
~ 'The ETA (p-m)'s goals (announced at a press coriference marked by the "riCual"
su well liked by the "poli-milis", wearing hoods, with a secret movement of .
~ the newsmen (...),�etc.) were palpable proof of that process of deterioration
- which we cited previously.
i
I 23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
In an editorial entitled "Terrorist Blackmail and Political Incoherence," EL
PAIS described the terrorist threat "in addition to a sinister provocation," as
"a notable monument to foolishness and inconsistency, erected, unfortunately,
upon an indiscriminate and rnassive death threat It went on to say:
"The desire that, once the bloody series of incidents began, the responsibility
for the deaths would be borne by the Ministry of Interior is a macabre joke,
cynically mentioned by Bandres himself a year ago, when he commented that the
surest procedure to prevent a bomb ~rom exploding was not to set it." The
Madrid newspaper emphasized the "contradictions in the communique (which)
attest to the bounds of inconsistency and inability to reason reached by the
terrorists ; such as that of considering the lack of "support from the left"
a xeason not to back a strike or that of considering the strategy of the
"milis" to be "aberrant," as if their own actions did not lack the same support
from the left and were not as aberranr_ as those of ETA (m). *
Butthis time the "campaign" did not catch the government unawares and, through
an ETA member arrested in early June, it found out about the ETA (p-m) plan.
An unusual deployment of police along the Mediterranean coast prevented the
terrorists from moving about easily. The Congress of Deputies joined the
antiterrorist battle, passing a non-1aw bill whereby the state pledged not
to agree, in any instance, to the initiation of negotiations with ETA, and
the government and citizens were required to adopt all the measures allowed
by law to halt the terrorist action. The bill had only one abstention, that of
Bandres, according to whom "the one which is the cause of the cause, is the
cause of the evil that has been caused"; which was equivalent to accusing the
government, as well as ETA (p-m), of the excesses of the terrorists, based on
the very odd interpretation by the Basque deputy which contradicted his remarks
of a year before.
The ETA (p-m) attacks in various locations on the Mediterranean coast (Alicante,
Mijas, Puerto Banus) did nat cause any victims, but did bring on an atmosphere
of terror which was highly detrimental for tourism. The new interior minister,
Juan Jose Roson, showed a determined and by no means compromising attitude
toward terrorism. The ETA members held in Soria were transferred to the
maximum security jail at Herrera de la Mancha. At the same time, three of the
most prominent leaders o~ Euskadiko Eskerra (Garayalde, Ignacio Mugica Arregui
and Ruiz de Apodaca) were arrested.
The loquacious ETA (p-m) terrorists again explained their "reasons" to news-
men. They justified their action claiming that the progress of the statute
had been blocked and UCD had not kept its promises to the Basque Country.
They also aimed their attacks at PNV, "which will have to count on the armed
organizations in order to govern"; reiterating their desire to continue their
"armed struggle."
The deterioration of ETA (p-m), and its definitely criminal nature, which
belied its status as a"good ETA" with which some attempted to depict it,
was proven not only by this sens.eless "campaign against tourism" which already
*EL PAIS, 22 June 1980, Editorial: "Terrorist Blackmail and Political
Incoherence," p 10.
CAMBIO 16, No 449, 13 July 1980, "The 'Boom' of the Bombs," pp 14 Ef. ~nd
No 450, 20 July 1980, "ETA (p-m) Speaks: Let Us Tell Lies," pp 14 fif.
. 24
, ,Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500074419-9
s~~~ke with sufficient eloquence of its true nature, but also by another gory
incident: the assassination, on 25 June, of the board member of the Michelin
agency in Vitoria, Luis Hergueta Guinea. The myth of ETA (p-m) as a kind of
"generous bandit" which never did more than shoot at the legs of the "exploiters"
or "collaborationists" that it held in custody, was resoundingly dispelled.
Those who had considered the deathdealing bombs in Madrid during July 1980 a
regrettable accident were left definitely without arguments to defend "soft"
terrorists whom the implacabie logic of violence had led to criminal madness.
The Campaign Against UCD
One of the most significant features of ETA (p-m) is its anti-UCD fixation.',.
In its statements, it is strange how it often attributes the government's
complete action to UCD as a party. UCD is assigned the blame and the liability.
This also ~xplains why ETA (p-m) has on several occasions aimed its action
at UCD deputies. We are already familiar with the Cisneros and Ruperez cases.
The consolidation of UCD as a target to be destroyed had been made explicit
during July in a communique i~sued by the ETA (p-m) pY�isoners in Soria in
which, after claiming that UCD was treating them as prisoners of war, they
added: "We hold UCD as a whole, cadres, militants and members, responsible,
and we call upon ETA to consider this so, making the entire weight of revolu-
tionary justice fall upon that party in its entirety. We urge ETA to respond
overwhelmingly to any action by UCD.1�
The ETA (p-m) "summer campaign" was preceded in 1980 by an abortive kidnapping,
that of Gabriel Cisneros. In 1981 also, ETA (p-m) made an unsuccessful attempt
to kidnap another Centrist deputy. In the latter instance, it was the Galician
deputy, Gomez Franqueira, whose presence of mind thwarted the ETA members'
attempt. Franqueira pe~t out the light in the room where he was located,
grabbed a pistol from the criminals and fired, wounding one of them.
ETA (p-m) continued its emulation with ETA (m), making several attacks on
headquarters of the Civil Guard, such as those at Zubiri and Aribe, in the
area of its "Navarra campaign." It also continued its anti-UCD campaign by
assassinating Juan de Dios Doval Mateos, a law professor who was fourth on
the UCD slate in the last elections, on 31 October. The third one on that
slate, Jaime Arrese, had also been assassinated just a week earlier. on 23
October, in Elgoibar (Guipuzcoa), this time by the autonomous commandos. On
29 September, another UCD militant, Jose Ignacio Ustaran, husband of a council-
woman from the same party, had been assassinated in Vitoria.
Doval,.the fifth UCD member who was assassinated in the Basque Country since
9 November 1978, when Luis Candendo died in Anzuola (Guipuzcoa), caused an
. extensive movement of indignation prominent in which was the participation by
his students at the University of San Sebastian who, after holding an assembly,
demonstrated silently on the street. It was the first atudent demonstration
to occur in the Basque Country condemning terrorism. It was also another
- sign of the continuing loss of popular support by the formerly "legitimate"
ETA.
The Basque political parties held a joint demonstration on 9 November, includ-
� ing PNV, which had been vacillating. Nearly 30,000 people marched "for peace
25
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
and against terrorism," and (something unprecedented until then) reacted courage-
ously against a group of 200 pro-ETA individuals, forcing them to flee. Another
unusual occurrence was the fact that the demonstrators applauded the FOP [Forces
of Public Order] which withdrew at their request. All of these were obvious signs
that something was starting to change in the Basque Country, and that the "ETA~
State" was disinteg,rating. Arcording to the Socialist Benegas, it was "the begin-
ning of a people's reaction against terrorism." At the same time, in the Alava
capital's town hall, PNV s.eemed to be emerging from the ambiguity which had
surrounded it up until then, and which the speech on TVE [Spanish Television] by ~
the president of the Basque Government, Carlos Garaicoechea, after poval's death,
had not escaped. The "lendakari" condemned terrorism and cited the moral and
- economic bankrupcy threatening Euskadi, but did not mention ETA, so that he seemed
to be commenting on terrorism as a kind of nameless biblical plague. For this
reason, his remarks were received with skepticism.
This assassination also caused serious confrontations among members of the UCD
executive body in Madrid, annoyed because Suarez "would not show his face" and
because he did not even make the gesture of attending the funerals of his fellow
party members. The leaders of what, a few weeks later, was to be the "critical"
sector voiced their dissatisfaction. But Suarez kept his silence, behind which
was only a complete inability to cope decisively with the political problems; an
inability which prompted his resignation 3 months later.
'fhe discontent in the Basque UCD was enormous as well. Many militants left the
Basque Country, and others were pr~;paring to do so. The Centrist party's Basque
leaders "accused Madrid of abandoning them, of excluding them from the decisions
made concerning their region of reneging and of making a deal with PNV
behind their backs." *
The complaint was fully justified. The former minister of foreign affairs, Marce-
lino Oreja, a deputy representing Guipuzcoa, who had been appointed "governor
general" a short time earliez, privately expressed his disappointment at the
"State's absence" that was being felt in Euskadi, a power vacuum which the "ETA-
- State" had attempted to fill with guns blazing.
_ ETA Loses Nerve
The loss of popular support, the basis for ETA's "legitimacy," has been proven by
events and incidents occurring in succession, many of which serve to demonstrate
the nervousness existing among the ETA members, who have proven incapable of self-
~:~surance in the new political situation. The attack in Zarauz on 3 November
must be interpreted as such. On that day, an ETA (m) commando group shot all the
* CAMBIO 16, No 467, 10 NOvember 1980, "Weeping for a Country," pp 28 ff.
This appointment, from its formal s.tandpoint, was another sign of the govern-
ment's bungling, because the Conatitution called for the existence of a"govern-
ment delegate" and not a"governor general." With the p~ssage of time, the reac-
tion from the Basque and Catalonian nationalists and members of other regional
parties succeeded in having the name changed.
26
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
customers at a bar in Zarauz, assassinating four members of the Civil Guard
and a civilian sympathizer of the PNV, and wounding six Basque citizens. In
a special session, the town hall condemned the attack, and two councilmen
from Herri Batasuna ~oined in the motion, one suhmitting his resignation in
, protest against the violence that had fallen on the Basque Country. This wae
something highly significant. The next day, over 3,000 people attended a 1oca1
demonstration.
The PNV took note of this major change in Basque public opinion, and began
voicing its position against terrorism in a more consistent manner. In its
"batzokis" talks and lectures on terrorism were organized; but everything
- was not clearcut. For example, the CAMBIO 16 rFporters Ander and Gorka Landa-
buru an3 Ricardo Herren concluded an article on the Basque situation, citing
the anticipated assumption of an active stance against terrorism in this way:
"Few doubt that PNV has the capacity to do so. But there is, at the same time,
no assurance thaC it will have the political desire to carry it out." *
Actually, there was information to the effect that PNV did not want a complete
, break with ETA. On ?,5 Ocr_ober, when the conservative businessman Jose Garavilla
Legaza, a member of PNV, was kidnapped, this time by ETA (m), the party's reac-
tion was forceful. Members immediately began a very harsh negotiation with
ETA which included a threat of reprisals and which ended with the release of
Garavilla, 3 days later, in exchange for a sum of money "agreed upon" in the
talks. Hence, there were reasons not to make a drastic break with ETA. ~:'~he
old bonds.which had originally united ETA with PNV had not disappeared complete-
ly.
Thus far, we have discussed mainly the terrorist activity of ETA (p-m) during
the second half of 1980. But ETA (m) had also made its presence felt with the
usual methods. It was learned that heading the "milis" were two of the most
danpPro~~s ETA members: Juan Lasa Michelena, ali.as "1~xiquierdi," and Miguel
Angel Apalategui, alias "Apalf m~jor portions of the ETA infrastructure, which had obviously been weakened.
Ln recent months the police action had been highly effective, very seriously
damaging both the intelligence apparatus and the operational system of the
terrorist organization. In early September, for example, the police arrested
Ignacio Echevarria Landazabal, a member of the "Donibane" commando group; some-
thing which prevented a series of actions which this commando groun had planned.
Weapons and explosive material were also recovered.
GTA (m) was hurt by this effective disbanding activity, as proven by the document
found in the Zarauz apartment which raas taken over after the shooting which cost
the life of Inspect~r Maria Jose Sanchez on 16 June. In the document, ETA member
_ Miguel Antonio Goicoechea Elorriaga, alias "Txapela," a major member of the ETA
(m) leadership and chief of the "illegal commandos," who managed to escape,
complained of the lack of logistical backup and the meager intelligence structure
that he had at his disposal.
A third cause exol~.ining the ETA inactivity, from all indications, was the deep-
seated internal ~..~bate in which the organization was embroiled. During the summer,
in the French Basque Country, ETA (m) had held a series of ineetings on che issue
of the armed struggle, and redrafted its strategy. The example of the "poli-
milis" unquestionably carried some weight and, according to certain speculation,
there would be an attempt to replace the indiscriminate terrorism with a different
- selective type that would choose the targets carefully. It was also claimed that
- these meetings, which, contrary to what some thought, did not turn out to be the
Eighth Assembly of the ETA (m), had been concerned with the recurrent theme of
negotiations.
A four~h joint cause of what some regarded as a mere "technical truce" was, with-
out doubt, the new French position that we have discussed previously.
Despite everything, caution was the spirit of the police authorities, who feared
- a new offensive at any moment. "One cannot chant victory," remarked Roson, on
a tri~~ to the Basque Country made in September. And he added: "I believe that
major steps have been taken, but one cannot preclude further action, because
ttiere is a group of commandos in a position to carry it out, and I think that it
will tiappen in the not too distant future." *
A Blow to ETA
- /1s a result of the reports which had reached the police, according to which two
TT~ (m) commando groups intended to take action in Madrid, the Single Antiterrorist
C:ommand mounted a spectacular operation called "Scorpion" in anticipation of
attacks which, it was assumed, might be aimed against high-ranking military
_ commanders .
As a result of this operation, on 25 Sep`.~mber Juan Antonio Madariaga, head of the
GTA (m) intelligence apparatus in Ma.drid, was arrested. His co~r;~anion in the
intelligence activity, Maria Belen Gonzalez Penalba, alias "Carmen," just managed
to escape.
*On the topic of the ETA (m) truce, see DIARIO 16, 14 September 1981, "ETA Will
Kil.l Again," by Pedro Conde Zabala, pp 4 and 5; and CAMBIO 16, No 514, S October
1981, "The 100-Day Truce," pp 26 ff.
64
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500074419-9
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
While in prison, Madariaga secretly composed a self-critical document to be
sent tc the ETA (m) leadership in France, but owing to an "informer" a search
was made and the document was found. From one sentence contained in the docu-
ment regarding the insurar~ce on Madariaga's automobile, arrests were made of
several individuals who comprised ETA (m)'s ~.ogistical and intell~,gence infra-
structure in Madrid, a prominent member thereof being the feminist Jimena Alonso
~who, according to the police, had been working for ETA since 1977. *
This major action against ETA (m) was completed on 21 October when, at a check-
. point set up by the Civil Guard on the Bilbao-Behovia freeway, near Renteria,
the uccupants of a car attempted to flee, holding a shoot-out with the Civil
Guard members. t:s a result of the confrontation, two of the car's occupants
were killed, and the third was arrested. To everyone's surprise, the ones
- killed proved to be two important ETA members: Andres Izaguirre Gogorza, alias
"Gogor," chief of the "Madrid" commando group, and Jose Juaregui Altube, alias
"Josechu." The individual arrested, Carlos Martinez Bastarrica, was also an
ETA member.
_ All these police actions put ETA (m) on the defensive, and represented the
hardest blow that the terrorist organization had received since the summer of
- 1975. For the first time in 6 years, the initiative belonged to the police,
who forced the ETA members to withdraw. Hence, it is no exaggeration to speak
of retreat.
While the police were continuing to break up the intelligence commando groups
- in the Basque Country and Navarra, arresting their members, ETA (m) announred
- "harsh reprisals against those who understood on~y the language of force and
arms," an odd style of speech coming from an organization whose career was a
vast stream of bloodshed. This semantic hardness contrasted with the moderate
tone of a communique disseminated a month earlier, in which a mobilization was
called for 27 September, coinciding with the anniversary of the shooting of the
- ETA members "Txiki" and Otaegui, together with three GRAPO members. In this
communique, use was made ot phrases such as "lack of a progressive and liberal
desire," or "peaceful dialog," which were unpreceaented until that time in the
language of ETA (m). Something very serious was happening within tiie organiza-
tion that warranted the expectation that the ebbing of terrorism was beginning
to be a fact.
The Internal Debate in ETA (p-m) on 'Armed Struggle'
' In the fall of 1981, the reports attesting to the existence of a complex internal
debate, and even major differences, among the members of the two branches of ETA
were becoming increasingly abundant.
_ *The other individualsunder arrest who were eventually placed at the disposal of
the courts were Carmen Santos Fontela, Amaya Andreu Sanz, Aida Chalmeta Alonso,
daughter of Jimena, Margarita Irastorza Gogoitia, Dolores Illescas Ortiz, Victor
= Garcia-Hoz Rosales, Jose de la Paz Sanchez Montanes and Antonio Hernandez
_ Rodrigilez .
65
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
During October, ETA (p-m) held a series of ineetings in Biarritz described by the
Political Office as "an urgent, extensive depate on the current problems," in
a lengthy document wherein, on 45 pages, the various speeches were reprinted
almost literally.
The basic issue discussed was "the future of the armed struggle both the
type of armed struggle and the type of organization which needs to be constructed."
Accordin~ to the Political Office, light was shed there "on the problems which
the class struggle will pose for us in the future."
Throughout the discussion, two positions were completely apparent: one favoring
- and the other opposing "armed struggle." The advocates of "armed struggle" were
apparently a minority sector headed by Jesus Abrisqueta Costa, chief of the Poli-
tical Office, and Jose Aulestia.Urrutia, in charge of the armed commando groups.*
The lengthy debate did not result in either an agreement or a synthesis of the
positia,~s. The :'poli-milis" cited the need to wait for events and, specifically,
' the holding in March 1982 of the constituent congress for the new united party,
Euskadiko Eskerra-Left for Socialism (EE), formed from the former coalition of
the same name, particularly its main component, EIA, and the "Lerchundi sector"
of. the Communist Party of Euskadi.
This means that, once again, within ETA (p-m) there was repeated the dynamics of
div~sion, and if the process were carried out in accordance with the old system
_ that we have mentioned so often, it could be assumed that the "hard-liners,"
that is, the advocates of "armed struggle," would take control of the apparatus.
In this case, it might be anticipated that those favoring the continuation of
the "cease-fire" would end up swelling the ranks of EE. According to others,
the opposite system might occur, with the control of the apparatus taken over
by those opposed to "armed struggle" and the "hard-liners" splitting off.
Presumably, the latter would negotiate with ETA (m) and would end up joining
that organization, as the "bereziak" [ETA special commandosJ did in their time.
This latter possibility was less likely because, in addition to the fact that a e
_ convergence between a sector ~f the "poli-milis" with ETA (m) was difficult,
owing to the abyss created between the two organi~ations, what sense would it
make for a pacifist ETA (p-m) to survive? As we shall observe shortly, this was
one of the arguments of the "hard-liners" to justify the return to "armed
struggle."
~~See CAMBIO 16, No 530, 25 January 1982, "Papa Julio Returns Home," by Jose
Diaz Herrera and Juan Madrid, pp 18 ff. According to other reports (EL PAIS,
16 February 1982, "The Break in ETA (p-m) Nearly Consummated," pp 1 and 7), the
sector favoring struggle was larger than the "pacifist" one. At the same time,
according to this information, the "hawks" were headed by Abrisqueta, and it
was the "historicals" Aulestia and Goiburu who were in favor of maintaining the ~
truce.
- 66
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444544474419-9
F(I~R OFNIGAI, USE ONLY
Let us observe, in brief, the arguments of the two positions that we have cited,
as the}~ were voiced in the Octoher debate wherein there was also a perspicacious
discussion of the problems raised by autonomous development, LOAPA (Organic Law
on Autonomous Process Harmonization], the position of PSOE (which "goes along
with the Centralists" because "it has little political strength in the autonomies
and that is a serious handicap for the time when it comes to power"), the conse-
quences of PNV's hegemonic position in Euskadi ("PNV wants only terrorism
to have a place to the left of it") etc.
Those opposed to "armed struggle" think that, "Despite LOAPA, the truce strategy
is positive because of the social development that it is affording. At the present
time (they claim) there is a political development which, if the truce were to be
broken, would be left uncertain, and this would not benefit the left nor its
political repair."
This sector also notes that, "Witli regarc~ to the 'milis' our truce has been posi-
tive (because) now there is a proposal for selectivity (in 'armed action'), as had
not been proposed before." On the other hand, "That rupture strategy (of the
'milis') has failed because the Basque parliament, the (Basque) government,
etc., cannot be erased from the map without further ado At least something
. has been settled regarding KAS."
The "hard-liners" in turn begin with the dogmatic assertion that, "Armed struggle
is needed for advancement in the political process (because), if there is mass
political action, armed struggle has a role to play, just as the general strike
has, just as the parliament has, or just as civil disobedience has."
In contrast to them, the "doves" respond that, "One cannot analyze whether or not
armed struggle has an abstract value, because that is not real. There is no armed
~ struggle apart from the concrete political connot.~.tions. When it is time for the
truth, one must analyze concrete actions which are incumbent on concrete organiza-
tions, and concrete situations." They go on to say: "The act of breaking the truce
so as to put (armed struggle) into operation again is something lacking in political
maturity on the part of the organization." ~
Tliey subsequently stress that, "The capacity for negotiation which an armed struggle
might produce does not emerge from military force; it emerges from the political
entrenchment of the revolutionary dynamics per se. There are but few strictly
military matters which have an influence of themselves, one of them being the
neutron bomb; but there are but few besides."
- These arguments did not convince the ETA "hawks" who retorted that, "The armed
struggle that is waged in a particular political context and which nurtures a
particular political strategy is proper." And they contrast "the bombs from the
Mediterranean...(which) were a ma~or contribution in the winning of the Statute
w}~en the negotiations were being held," with "the bombs from Madrid" (a reference
to tl~ose set in Barajas, Char.tartin and Atocha during the summer of 1980), which
are regarded as negative and "intolerable" because, they claim, "a different
political context" was involved.
67
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
F(jR OFFICIAI. U~E ONLY
Whc:n the opposing sector argued that "the masses" did not understand nor accept
"armed struggle," the "hawks" set forth an elitist, revolutionary proposition
of the most complete'ly Leninist nature: "If, with respect to an armed action,
we must propose for ourselves that it be hailed and approved by the majority
of the population of Euskadi, we would have to propose the same proportion to
a program of the left; but there is a programs such as that of EE, which is
rejected by the majority of the population of Euskadi, and one cannot infer
from this that the EE plan is not feasible. Insofar as armed action is concerned,
one cannot consider how many approve of it, but rather whether or not it
increases the possibilities of a revolutionary political line which will continue
to be in the minority for a long time."
On the basis of these statements, it is obvious that it makes no sense to voice
a renunciation, a priori, of "armed struggle" which is one tool, among others,
to be used if need be. In short, "Political solutions must be prov~,ied here,
the political parties must negotiate and the armed organization must be prepared
to fan the flames at a given time and to stop when there is a need to do so."
The peaceful sector thinks that, "It is contradictory to say that the truce has
been positive and to break it"; and, concerned over the process of consolidation
- of the new party, EE, it states: "The EE Congress would emerge harmed by the
breaking of the truce, and the proces of integrating people into the PC would
- be also." Moreover, with the break, "arms would be given to the 'milis' and to
HB, because there has been an end to giving the impression that there is nothing
to be accomplished here without,shoot~,ngs and that political solutions are not
viable." In a categorical and even incisive manner, they go so far as to say that,
"at the present time there is no obvious need for violence," and therefore, "if
ETA did not exist at present, there would be no reason for creating it."
As might be imagined, on the basis of this the "hard-liners" reached the conclu-
sion that, on those premises, "armed struggle will not exist in Euskadi for a
very long time," and that "this would occur only as a result of a coup d'etat
or a terrorist coup." They emphasize, "In view of this, one has to wonder what
sense it makes ta maintain this organization."
T}iis argument does not make sense to them, because "Today, the organization must
be a political organization far more than ever before, it must develop armed
struggle in the context of that left and it must have its own practice, distinct
from the party; because a large throng of people will join EE, and it would be
better if far more joined, but that very fact forces ETA to develop its own
armed policy."
As we can observe, ETA is defined as an "armed vanguard" with a clearcut elitist
concept, and it is considered even more necessary at a time when EE is in the
process of becoming a party of masses. According to the "hawks" ETA comes before
EE. The "doves" opposed to armed struggle put EE before ETA.
The interminable discussion entailed not only the division of ETA (p-m) into two
virtually unreconcilable sectors but, in fact, a break in the ETA (p-m)-EE bloc.
68
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500074419-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
This bloc had been seriously damaged at the end of 1980 when the "poli-milis"
carried out their anti-UCD campaign and since EE, under the skillful leadership
of Mario Onaindia, undertook its conversion into a united party with an ambition
to occupy all the nationalist political area to the left of PNV. The most
important move in this direction was the integration of the former secretary
general of the Basque Communists into the new party, at the cost of breaking
the structure of EPK-PCE, whose slight remains, again closely linked with Madrid
after the "Lerchundi advent~ire," are once more under the direction of Ormazabal,
Lerchundi's predecessor in the leadership of the Basque Communists.
Although the break between "hawks" and "doves" nad not been officially consummated.,
2 day.s after the Biarritz meeting, the former held a new session at which they
appointed two chiefs of commando groups with the mission to reorganize the infra-
structure on the inside. Those named were Jose Maria lza de Unamuno (aged 21),
for Pamplona and San Sebastian, a seasoned terrorist with an extensive record
(Mediterranean campaign, attack on the Berga headquarters), and Ignacio Calvo
htartin (aged 23) for Bilbao and Vitoria, considered by the police as responsible
for several assassinations, who received guerrilla training in Lebanon. The
former of the two was arrested in Pamplona soon afterwards. *
'Clte End of the Truce
It was no surprise to those who had kept up with this internal debate in ETA
(p-m) when, on 17 January, Dr Iglesias was released after a 20-day captivity, by
the GLO of the National Police, and it was reported that the kidnappers were
members of ETA (p-m).
The abduction of the father of world-famous Julio Iglesias had occurred on 29
December under strange circumstances. No one thought of ETA as a possible
perpetr~tor of the act, and at the same time the possibility of political impli-
cations was precluded. The kidnapping had all the features of a common crime.
Un 7.January, DIARIO 16 cited several possible hypotheses: a publicity stunt, a
mere vendetta with some settling of accounts, a romantic revenge, etc. In no
instance was there any mention of ETA. They went so far as to even doubt the
existence of the kidnapping.
= Several days later, it was learned that the kidnappers had asked for $2 million,
and tt~at this information was known since 8 January, but that a"pact of silence"
between the Ministry of Interior, the Iglesias family and the press had withheld
tiie information to facilitate the police action. ETA still did not appear to be
]inkt~d with the incident.
()ri Sunday, 17 January, it was learned that, at dawn on that very day, the Special
Operating Group (GEO) of the National Police had freed Dr Iglesias in a spectacu-
lar operation. From the arrest of a"courier" who was carrying a letter from the
kidnap victim to his family, the police had learned that Dr Iglesias was being
held by ETA (p-m) in a house that the organization had in the Zaragoza town of
Trasmoz, very near Navarra.
The fortunate outcome of this kidnapping, the first one resolved without paying
ransom and saving the life of the hostage, was a major gain scored by both
- Ibid.
~ 69
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070019-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Minister Roson and Ballesteros, chief of the Single Antiterrorist Command, as
well as Commissioner Joaquin Domingo Martorell, who directed the operations.
The GEO (under orders from Comdr Holgado) added new laurels to its service
record and lent more brilliance to the reputation that it had acquired by the
assault on the Central Bank of Barcelona, being held by armed men, in May 1981.
As a result of this action, not only were the ETA members guarding the kidnap
victim arrested, but also seven more presumed members of ETA (p-m) and six
"milis."
~ This abduction had some rather unclear aspects, and there was never a rejection
of the hypothesis that the action had been carried out by common criminals who,
in view of the difficulties, turned over the hostage to the Basque terrorist
organization. The attorney for the Iglesias family, Fernando Bernaldez, who
served ~s negotiator, confirmed this rumor.
~
There was also speculation that the success of the police had been made possible
by the ~itizens' cooperation. It was even claimed that both PNV and EE itself
had not~begrudged their assis.tance.
In any event, it seemed clear that the police had recovered the initiative and
that the battle against terrorism was showing a very different and clearly posi-
.tive aspect, quite in contrast to what had been customary in previous years.
In a communique made public~the next day, 18 January, ETA (p-m) assumed responsi-
bility for the "arrest" of Dr Iglesias. It stated: "The arrest of a militant
from our organization last Thursday in Bilbao made the thwarting of the operation
possible."
- In the same communique, the "poli-milis" attempted to answer those who had been
surprised by the break in the truce without prior notification, and they did so
in this way: "Nevertheless, tnis does not by any means represent the breaking
of the truce that we have been maintaining since 27 February of last year. The
provision of financial resources is a constant need of the organization; it does
not imply any change in our decision for a cease-fire."
This communique had a very bad effect on the sectors close to EE, Whereas,
according to Javier Markiegui, spokesman for EE in the Basque parliament, "The
ETA (p-m) return to armed struggle has absolu*_ely no effect on us; since 15
February of last year EE has expressed radical opposition to it," another leader
of the same group made this statement: "It is a total, definitive disqualifica-
tion of armed struggle and of ETA (p-m). People who have to draw from the
tri~ger in order to eat, and who cannot live like normal persons, cannot be
called "gudaris" [Basque soldiersJ or anything of the kind. They are common
'fools."'*
Much more gently, Juan Maria Bandres, also an EE deputy in the Madrid Congress,
remarked that, "The perpetrators of the kidnapping could be ETA (p-m) dissidents
* Ibid.
70
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9
F(DR n~Fl('IAL USF. ONLY
I who were not in agreement with the organization's line." * As we can observe,
Bandres still refused to remove the myth from ETA, in contrast to the far more
realistic position of the majority sector among the very members of the terrorist
organization. As DEIA noted on 20 January, the two opposing sectors of ETA.
(p-m) had been in agreement on the kidnapping to collect funds.
; Mario Onaindia quite categorically condemned the kidnapping without any hedging,
considering the break in the truce "an event that will have more of an effect
than one could imagine at first glance on the political situation in Euskadi
and that of Spain as a whole." According to Mario Onaindia, "For ETA (p-m) to
break the truce on the eve of the trial of the military coup plotters is to offer
~ new excuses for coupism, to do little favor to those who have shown that they
uphold the Shatute and to serve to ETA military on a silver platter what would be
its only political success since the split: the transformation of ETA (p-m) into
a m~rely militaristic organization."
Just a few days after Dr Iglesias' retease and the resultant news that ETA (p-m)
was returning to action, although to the "poli-milis" this "did not represent
a break in the truce at all," a new blow was to fall on the Basque terrorist
' organization.
On 20 January the police announced the discovery of the ETA (p-m)'s largest
arsenal. The arsenal, which. was found in a settlement in the vicinity of Bilbao,
had a total of S tons of weapons, most of them shotguns, the product of thefts
of arsenals. The find was received with triumphalism, and hastily categorized
by some as the beginning of the end for ETA (p-m).
As a result of all these incidents, and particularly the kidnapping of Dr Iglesias,
the government halted the transfer of the "poli-milis" in custody from the prison
in Soria to that in Nanclares de Oca, near Vitoria. Since the truce began, a
total of 18 members of ETA (p-m) had been transferred to that prison. Neverthe-
less, Bandres, emerging from a meeting that he had~held with Roson, along with
Onaindia, claimed that the transfer of pri~oners to Nanclares would continue,
- and that the stoppage was only a temporary measure. It was thought that the
continuation of this transfer ~aould support the advocates of the truce within
ETA (p-m) and even a possible future dissolution of the terrorist organization
was predicted.
rTA (m): The Return to the Attack
As we have already remarked, the almost habitual summertime truce of ETA (m)
Lasted during the fall of 1981. Only the campaign against Iberoduero had kept
the "milis" active. Several attacks on Iberduero facilities and premises had
t~een a reminder ot- the dangerous affair involving the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant.
* llIARIO 16, 19 January 1982, p 5
CAI~IBIO 16, No 531, 1 rebruary 1982, "Truce at All Cost," by Mario Onaindia,
p Z1
' Ibid., "The Rebellion of the Victims," pp 18 ff.
~ 71
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444544474419-9
f~(yR ()HHI('IA1, 115M: ONI,Y
Qut on the very first day of 1982, there occurred an outbreak of violence in
the troubled town of Renteria which marked the end of the period of relative
peace and announced that ETA (m) was returning to the attack.
The occasion was an unauthorized demonstration called by the Negotiators for
Amnesty, on behalf of the ETA (m) prisoners on a hunger strike. Barricades,
shouting, rock throwing, intervention by the State Security Forces and two
persons slightly injured by police bullets were the elements of the incident.
The next day, the town hall approved the resolution submitted by the HB mayor
condemning the action of the Civil Guard. But that was only a warning.
The return of the "milis" to "armed action" occurred 4 days later, on 5 January,
- with the kidnapping of the Basque businessman of German origin, Jose Lipperheide,
aged 76, who had refused to pay the so-called "revolutionary tax."
The kidnapping was a show of force by ETA (m) in response to the attitude of
resistance toward the extortion which the entire Basque society was showing.
In Eact, during the final weeks of 1981 thousands of Basques from different
occupations and economic levels received letters from ETA (m) demanding of them,
in the form of a"revolutionary tax," amounts of between 2 and 10 million pesetas,
with an average of about 5 million. So many letters were received tha*_ it was
even thought that the ETA members had used the telephone directory as a guide.
Among the recip~~ents there were many PNV militants who pressured the party,
requesting an organized reaction. The PNV leaders asked the members not to pay
and did not hesitate to use a threatening and defiant tone. Xabier Arzallus,
president of PNV, stated: "Do they want to frighten us? Well, everyone will
be frightened." And the "lendakari" Garaicoechea asked them "not to let your-
selves be intimidated nor give in to the blackmail."
At the PNV headquarters, the "batzokis," the tactic of reprisals was even bandied
about�, more or less indirectly: "Beware, if something happens to one of our
friends, three of yours, with a stone at their necks, will go to the bottom of
. some estuary!" And also: "We know who you are, name by name and domicile by
domicile; it is no trouble for us to make lists." It was clear that the tar- ~
gets of these threats were the members of Herri Batasuna.
Among the recipients of the extortion letter were the PNV mayors of Guecho and
Santurce, who courageously proclaimed their intention not to pay.
'Ctiis resolute position managed to overcome the pessimism that the Lipperheide
abduction had caused and, to some extent, represented the attainment of the
goal of Txiki Benegas, secretary general of the Basque Socialists, who wrote:
"The battle against the 'revolutionary tax' must cease to be an act of solitari-
ness and abandonment by those sub~ected to extortion The resistance of
those threatened must be organized, and they must be protected by a solidary
act by the whole society." *
~ * CANIBIO 16, No 529, 18 January 1982, "Paying to Live," by Txiki Benegas, p 21.
On the topic of resistance to ETA (m) and the "revolutionary tax," see in that
same issue "Hand to Hand against ETA," by Xavier pomingo and Ander Landaburu,
pp 18 ff., and No 531, 1 February 1981, "The Rebellion of the Victims," pp 18 ff.
72
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444544474419-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Mc~anwhile, the kidnapping of the elderly businesaman, Lipperheide, which was to
a l.arge extent the detonator of this collective reaction, continued, without the
disclosure of news about possible negotiations with the kidnappers nor the
condition of the hostage.
As confirmation of the fact that violence was returning with the new year, on 27
January a municipal policeman, Benigno Garcia Diaz, whom they had accused of
being a police informer, was assassinated in Ondarroa (Vizcaya).
At the end of January, signs began to appear that the Lipperheide kidnapping
might be resolved without bloodshed. In fact, on S February, after a month of
abduction, the businessman was released, and it was learned that the family had
paid a sum of about 120 million pesetas. ETA (m) was winning, at least partially,
and Minister Roson stated that tlie police case could not be considered closed.
- Despite this resumed activity, it was thought among certain sectors that ETA (m)
would be willing for some type of negotiation. And it was claimed that the "milis"
were no longer backing the coup d'etat, as had appeared obvious at other times.
According to these reports, certain leaders would be willing to revise and mollify
some points in the "KAS alternative." *
Nevertheless, after the Lipperheide kidnapping, in Basque political circles there
- was a dissemination of the notion that, in the potential internal conflict which
was also occurring in ETA (m), this negotiating position which was chiefly that
of the "historicals" headed by Domingo Iturbe Abarolo, alias "Txomin," did not
predominate, but rather the "Y~ard" line of the younger members. According to
these reports, Eugenio Echeverte Aranguren, alias "Antxon," chief of the ETA (m)
Political Office, was the best known leader of this Cendency. "Antxon," a Guipuz-
coan from Pasajes de San Juan, slightly over 30 years of age, came from the "poli-
milis" and was one of the "bereziak" who had transferred to ETA (m) seeking direct
- action without halfway measures that the militarists were offering him. As opposed
to the compromisers who were resting in the truce, "Antxon" was calling for a
return to the times of inerciless violence.
The predominance of the "hard-liners" in ETA (m) was proven. While the Lipperti~~ici~�.
kidnapping with a relatively happy ending had prompted some to think that ther.e
was a certain amount of "humanity" among the "milis" after an assassination had
been feared, within a short time ETA (m) showed its true countenance. On 16
[~ehruary, undoubtedly based on a coldly devised plan, two almost simultaneous
cistiussinations put an end to the last hope that the truce might be extended. In
the c,ld district of San Sebastian a retired member of the Civil Guard aged 60,
Ben,jamin Fernandez Fernandez, was assassinated from behind. Shortly thereaft~~r:,
in Oyarzun-Renteria, another Civil Guard member who was returning hnme after
service, Jose Fragoso Martin, was assassinated in his own car. Every indicati.~n
pointed to ETA (m).
According to DIARIO 16 (of 17 February 1982), the two fatal attacks were the
ning of the ETA offensive associated with the court-martial against the participants
- * See the serial article by Jose Luis Gutierrez in DIARIO 16 (l, 2, 3, 4 and 6
February), "Euskadi, Between Fear, Surfeit and Hope."
73
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500070019-9
FOQ OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Cn the abartive coup d'etat of 23 February of the prevtous year. On the same
day, EL PAIS, in an editorial entitled "The Strategy of Death," also claimed
that the attacks "prove quite clearly that the terrorists are not willing to
- miss the opportunity that the trial against those accused of military rebellion
affords them." According to this newspaper=., the goal of the terrorists was "on
the one hand, to upset the basic conditions of calmness under which the court
must pass judgment and, on the other, to contribute to the agitation that the
pro-coupist sectors are attempting to implement at this time." Once again, there
appeared the coincidence of interests and objectives between coupism and terrorism.
- Both were seeking to put an end to democracy.
The curse of violence, the shadow of Cain, seemed to be spreading over Spain again
and over the Basque Countr~; speci~ically. But the perpetual return of criminally
shed blood was no longer capable of paralyzing the desire of so many Spaniards,
both Basques and non-Basques, determined to reach an understanding over and above
the differences and disputes, vehemently disposed to escape from the diabolical
merry-go-round of violence which reproduces itself.
This account concludes with the conviction that the worst has already passed, and
that neither ideas nor weapons can destroy the peaceful coexistence of all the
people of Spain who have shared a land and history for over a thousand years.
COPYRIGHT: Ale~andro Munoz Alonso, 1982
2909
CSO: 6000/0002 FND
74
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070019-9