JPRS ID: 10473 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050049-8
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 49
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10473
21 April 1982
Near East i~lorth Africa Re ort
p
(FOUO 17/82)
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JPRS L/10473
21 April 1982
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
c~ouo 3~/s21
CONTENTS
IRAQ
Positive War Developments Predicted
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 12-1 8 Feb 82) 1
War Pro gre as, Syrian Mediation Discussed
~ (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 15-21 Jan 82) 4
Ministe r of Industry Comments on Developr;ent
' (Tahir Tawfiq Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 12-18 Feb 82).. 9
JORDAN
Deciaion To 5end Volunteer Troops to Iraq Analyzed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 5-11 ~eb 82) 16
Army's Stre ngth, Effectiveness Evaluated
(AL'WATAN AL-'ARABI, 5-11 Feb 82) 22
~ PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
Briefs
Floads Hit Count'ry 26
~
,
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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IRAQ
POSITIVE WAR DEVELOPMENTS PREDICTED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 261, 12-18 Feb 82 pp 25-26
[Text] Arab volunteers are pouring into Iraq. The Iraqi mi~itary position is
aound.. Saddam Hus: ~.yn says that Iraq is atronger today than it was at the out-
break of the war s~,i will be stronger still in 3 months. HowevE~r, there are
still some .?7's;bs whose hands and tongues are stained with the blmod of the
Iraqis.
What is the military situation along the Iraqi-Iranian rr4nt?
The most significant development in the war is the battle that the Iraqi
forces are waging in the southern sector ~f the front to seize the al-Basatin
position. This battle follows a lightning 8ttack launched by the Iraqi
forces last Saturday. Battle reports cor.firm that the Iranian advanced posi-
tions fell to the attacking forces within a f ew hours after the attack began
while the confrontation continued with light weapons and intermittent air
support i~n an effort to gain the remaining positions.
The Iraqis assure any visitor, guest, and eager questioner that the position
is sound and that they are still there in Iranian territory despite all the
Persian counterattacks and the claims of the Western presa. They say they are
capable of advancing further at any time.
The Iraqis tell you that, for understandable reasons, the Western newspapera
want to raise the broken morale of the Iraniaae, if~only on paper. Thus, they
ascribe alleged victories and new gains to them. That is to say, the individ-
uals who are behind the control of these newspapers do not want an Arab army
of the size and importance of Iraq's army to win because a victory would raise
the morale of the Araba, thus weakening Israel and forcing it to attach
importance to a large and battle-proven army.
President Saddam Husayn says that Iraq ie stronger today than it was when it
Pritered the war and "will be stronger in 3 montha." He says that the Iraqi
- forces recently occupied new Iranian territority in the central sector and that
the Iranian leaders know thie.
- If the Iraqi military position ie sound, then why ic~ Iraq seking Arabs to fight
in support of it?
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Iraq is extremely sensitive on this point. It feels that the war is not just
Iraq's war but rather an Arab-Persian war. It is fightiag and sacrificing not
merely to defend Iraq but to defend its Arab homeland and nation against the
new Persian attack--cloaked in the � rments of religion--on the Arab character
of the Gulf and the national unity oi `ie Arab people there.
The regular Iraqi ai~my consists of nearly 300,000 troops and off icers bac~.ad
up by the nearly 400,000-strong Popular Army and special missions brigades.
There are plans to raise these numbers to a combined tota? of more than 1.5
million Iraqis under arms.
Therefore, several thousand Arabs fight alongeide the Iraqis. While these
troops may not be of much consequence, they are suff~!cient to stimulate the
Arab conscience and express the Arab sense of honor and gallantry in fighting
the common enemy and maintaining solidarity together for better or for worse,
to use the Iraqi preaident's terms. As far as the Iraqie are concerned, they
are suff icient to let them knaw that the Arabs are with them in the same
trench--the Arabs who have ne~rer f~iled to respond to the call of du~y aa any
Arab battlefield and against any Qi:smy.
On this basis, the Iraqis salute the pos3tion taken by the king, people., and
Government of Jordan. For not only has Jordan offered Iraq logistic aid, but ~
it is now hastening to ~oin the battle by sending its sons to the battlefield.
Jordan has officially taken an open stand in support of Iraq. Other Arab
officials are calling tor a similar position. It appears that other Arab
states, led by Morocco and the Yemen Ar~b Republic (North Yemen) will offer to
take practical measures to manifest their partnership with Iraq in the con-
flict.
There are currently 12,00(~ Arab recruite fighting alongside their brot':er
Iraqis or training in preparation to go to the front. The prevailing belief
here is that this number could be multiplie:? by several times in the near
future.
On the other hand, there are still some Arabs who recite slogans supporting
Arab nationalism and Arab solidarity and then backstab Iraq and attempt to
thwart every Arab effor.t to aid it. During one period, the Libyans contacted
Barazani's defeated au~porters and Qadhdhafi'~ voice was raised in support of
them while the T~aY~a were paying a blood tax on the Persian front. And on
top of this, then comes news confirming that the Syrian regime is training
Iranians in sabotage operations behind the Iraqi lines. In fact, official
Aamascus considered King Husayn's announcement opening the door f or Jordanian
volunteers tantamount to a"provocation" of it.
The funny but sad fact is that those who shoot off their mouths about Arab
nationalism are in the same camp--wittingly or unwittingly--with Israel, which
is arming Iran, and with the United States, which persists in issuing warnings
of the disintegration of Iran's unity, advises the Jordanians not to wage war
alongside the Iraqis, and pressures the Gulf countries not to offer logistical
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aid to Iraq. And then while on a tosr through the Gulf, American Secretary of
Def ense Casper Weinberger insiets on claiming that America is maintaining
"neutrality" in the war and refuses to provide any weapons to the Iraqis,
preferring to help Egypt and Sudan rather than Iraq, "which has a long history
of hostility to the United States."
The Iraqi newspaper AL-JUrIIiURIYAA responded to this American "neutrality" by
calling for a boycott of America, the destruction of its interests in the
region, the halting of oil exports to it, and the withdrawal of Arab deposits
from its coffers.
The United States expresses its hostile poeition to Iraqi practically. For
example, it has proceeded to "punish" Jordaa since Jordanian relations with
Iraq improved. Statistics provide the best indication of this. The United
States has halted its economic aid to Jordan, which used to be more than $100
- million per year, and military aid has shrunk from $110 million in 1979 to
only $42 million last year.
In any case, there is no escaping hiatory. It is the best recorder and wit-
ness. The Iraqis do not reprove the Americans for their position of hostility
toward them. America's history of hostility to the Arab nation is well known.
Rather, they reprove their "brothere," whose hands and tongues a:e atained
with the blood of Iraq--blood shed in defense of its Arabism and its nation.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WAT.9N AL-'ARABI
8591
CSO: 4404/305
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IRAQ
WAR PROGRESS, SYRIAN MEDIATION DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 257, 15-21 Jan 82 pp 21, 22
[Article: "Baghdad to Syrian 'Mediation': Stop Supporting Iran, and We'll .
Talk About Liberating Golan"]
[Text] In his speech on the eve of the celebration of the commemoration of
the establishment of the Iraqi army, Saddam Husayn dropped the veil of Arab
solidarity from the Syrian "mediation," and said with a logic not lacking
in strong argument that if anyone wants the liberation of the Golan and the
participation of Iraq in confronting Israel, he must stop assisting the
enemies of the Arab nation.
What is the real military position on the front?
The war began with an Iraqi thrust all along the border line, content with
entering al-Muhammara without occupying the mriin cities. This ~~as followed
by a war of battles lasting about a year, including an Iranian attack last
February in Susangard (Khafa3iyya), which ended in disaster for the Iranian
forces.
In September the Iraqis.reorganized their lines and took up positions beyond
the Karnn river in the southern region on the hills of "Abadan.
In the latter part of last November the Iranians tried to carry the battles
to the middle area of the front. They launched a wide attack on the region
of Basitin for propaganda purposes, since it is the Iranian area occupied "oy
Iraw that is closest to the common borders of the two countries.
Lieutenant General 'Abd al-Jabbar Shanshal, Iraqi chief of staff, talked
about the battle of Khafajiyya-Basatin at the time, and said that the
Iranians poured huge numbers of inen into the battle and f~looded some of the
road ~unctions with river water to prevent the advance of the Iraqi forces,
and plunged headlong along six axes. But the Iranian raids crumbled, and
there reaaained only one remaining access for the Iranians to get to Basatin.
The Iraqi leader estimated their loases in that battle at 6,000 dead and
260 tanks.
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With the beginning of the new year, the Iranians launched a masaive attack
on the region of West Kaylan and Sumar in the proviace of Kermanshah, with
the goal of regaining control of the Iranian border city of Qasr-e Shirin,
situated on the Tehran-Baghdad road. This was the third Iranian attempt
in this region; it was preceded by two similar failures lxst April ~nd
September.
In the first 2 days of the attack the Iranians were able to occupy two small
areas, though the Iraqis launched a counterattack on 5 January in which they
recovered them, after surrounding the Iranian forces and cutting off their
supply line in that rugged mountainous region. Iran.ian losses in that failed
attack were estimated at 1800 dead, while their loases since the intensif i-
cation of f ighting on 7 Dece;nber were estimated at 20,000 dead all along the
front.
It is obvious that the Iranians are relying on their numerical superiority
(3:1) by pouring large numbers of th~ir reaerves in the attacks which they
launch. Iraqi television continued for several days to show scenes of the
large numbers of Iranian dead and prisonera in the vari~us parts of the
front.
Iraqi President~Saddam Husayn affirmed that Iraq will never allow Iran to
~ cross into its territory. He said that the outcome of the war will remain
in the hands of the Iraqis.
The large celebrations commemorating the sixty-f irst anniversary of the
founding of the Iraqi army was an occasion fox the Iraqis to express their
attachment to their president, their army, and their fighting forces. After
Sadda:n Husayn's speech on this occasion, Baghdad and other Iraq,i cities
witnessed spontaneous rallies in which citizens shouted their request to
enlist for the fignt with their brothers.
It is well known that the Iraqi army is one of the oldest modern Arab armies.
It was founded with the founding of the modern Iraqi state in 1920, and its
history contains radiant and nuble pages testifying to the Arabness of Iraq
and its national aspirations. The revolution of July 1957 worked to recover
its evolution, support and construction in such a way that it played gigantic
roles on the Syrian front in 1973 and in eliminating the Irani^.~-supported
Barzani revolt in a mountainc�is.region of rugged roada. Today in battle
it gives proof of the sacri~~icial Arab spirit in the Iraq of Saddam Husayn.
It is worthy of note that with the intensification of fighting on the Iraqi-
Iranian front, Israeli planes resumed their activities and attempts to vio-
late Iraqi skies. Zn less than a week, Israeli plan~s attempted to violate
Iraqi air space in the region of Makr al-Na'am (note the name--"The Cunning
of the Ostrich"), a stormy desert region 65 kilometers from the western
borders. The second attempt took place on Sunday, 3 January, i.e. during
the Iranian attack in West Kaylan and Sumar. It appears that the Israelis
wanted to divert Iraqi planes from resisting the Iranians.
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In any case, radar surveillance played its role in detecting the Israeli
penetration in both attempts; Iraqi jets soared into the air, but the Israeli
jets chose to witb~raw to where they came from as aoon as their penetration
was detected. The incident conf irms that the Iraqis have backed up their
air surveillance network with force following the Israeli raid on tt~e Iraqi
nuclear plant last 7 June.
If the Iraniana were able to pour large numbers of forces into the battle,
relying on their numerical superiority over Iraq, the Iraqis~also aff irta
that they have no lack in that area. The most recent thrust from the forces
of the people's army which reached the front in the first days of the year
contained Arab f ighters from Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Tunis, the Sudan, and Eritrea. Mr Taha Yasin Ramadan, deputy prime minister
and leader of the people's army, said in his fgrewell to these forces that
the Arab forces are alwa~s able to conclude the battle in their favor "what-
ever force the opposing enemy throws at us."
Whatever the case, Iranian attempts at confusion, ~upported by attempts to
disregard Iraqi military strength in the Western press, do not meet any
interest here on t:~e popular level, and the Iraqis in the sixteenth month
of the war appear confident of the ability of their armed forces and their
political leadership, and of the truth of its statements, especially when
Saddam Husayn said to them on the eve of the anniversary celebration of the
founding of the army that Iraq is close to a decisive victory. ,
At the same time as the Iraqis affirmed thefr readiness to pursue the war
if Iran did not respond to their demands, they also affirm their determina-
tion to continue the battle of construction and increased population. The
Iraqi president urged this in a manner that arouaed '.nterest in all the words
that he spoke in the last few weeks, as an embodiment of Iraq's dual goal
wi~h which the military proceeda.
From here also observers estimate how much effort the enemy has expended to
impede the production battle in Iraq. Classif ied in the framework of these
hostile efforts is the demolition of the pipeline which conveya Iraqi oil
to the harbor for transport to Tripoli in Lebanon within a few days of its
re-opening following an interruption of about 6 years. Then the explosion
of the pipe which carries Iraqi oil through turkish lands to the Mediterran-
ean. It has also been noted in both demolition efforts that they took place
in close proximity to the Syrian border: the f irat in the village of Tel
'Abbas, which is only 3 kilometers from the Syrian-Lebanese border, and the
second in the Mardin region, facing the Turkish-Syrian border.
Iraq's affinaation of its determination to pursue the fighting does not
mean that it is not ready to accept initiatives toward peace, but the
Syrian initiat�ve circul~ted in the Arab media in the last two weeks does
not meer, any serious interest here on either the popular or off icial level,
due to the lack of confidence in the truth of Syria's official intentiona
toward Iraq.
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Then he added in a significant allusion that "some quarters say a lot about
what is called national mobilization and Arab solidarity against the Zionist
enemy, and praise Iraq for its share in this solidarity. Iraq did not discuss
Arab solidarity with words, for the Iraqis were always at the forefront of
those who fought for Palestine and supported their brother Arabs in their
liberation battles in the East and West, and it has always beea a true con-
frontation state."
Saddam Husayn picked up on the weak point in the Syrian "mediation," ;ahich
is Damascus' official partiality toward the Persian side against Iraq.
He said, "Whoever talks about the Zionist entity's annexation of Golan and
- wants to truly liberate it and wants Iraq and the Arabs to participate in
resisting the Zionist aggression, must first of all stop supporting the
enemies of the Arab nation, and liberate itself from the designs to which
Iraq and the Arab nation are exposed...Arab territory is equal in value."
_ From a national standpoint the Iraqis do not understand Syria's off icial
position of supporting Iran in its aggression on Iraqi land.and waters.
Saddam Husayn says in this regard, "Whoever agrees to assist foreign occupa-
_ tion of any part of Arab soil cannot be a defender and propagator of the
protection of another part against other foreign ambitions..."
Iraq's bitterness at the Syrian attitude reached its peak in the Iraqi
president's words: "The Arab brothers lmow who has helped Iran against Iraq,
and who has worked in collusion with it and placed its lands and its skies
at the disposal of the lranian air force to bomb specific targets within
Iraqi territory, and who has concentrated its army with Iran at the beginning
of the war on the borders of Iraq, treu after that amassed it on the Jordan-
ian border."
Iraqi doubts in the Syrian "mediation" *_o end the war, then Damascus'
initiative to raise the banner of Arab solidarity after Israel's annexation
of the Golan while it is up to its neck in supporting Iran...does not mean
that Iraq is against any hcnest and sincere effort to achieve peace.
As Saddam Husayn said, Iraq is not imposing any illegal conditions and has
no ambitions in Iranian territories; all iti wanta is an explicit and legal
acknowledgement of its historic rights in its territory and waters. Baghdad
has confirmed by decisive proof that Iran is the one who is obstruct~ng
arrival at a ~ust solution.
Some observers here attribute the Iranians' desperate efforts in launching
attacks on the front line to the deterioration of the domestic situation in
Iran. Whenever the domestic situation deteriorates further, the Iranian
leadership pushes new forces into the oven of battle. It wants to continue
to occupy the army in the war with Iraq, and it secondarily wants the war
to be a justification to suppress the people and deprive them of their basic
needs.
Teheran news coming to Baghdad reports that off icial terrorism has reached
its peak, and the Iranians exchange frightful tales of terrible, barbaric
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torture in the prisons, where the eyes of prisoners have been plucked out and
their tongues cut out before driving them to execution courts. Hoseyn 'Ali
Montazeri, Khomeyni's deputy, admitted to the torture of prisoners, and called
for its "mitigation" in order to preserve Iran's international reputation.
The latest development in Iran is the attack on the Tudeh Communist par~y,
a client of. Moscow, after a 3 year cooperation and alliance with the regi.me
of the Ayatollahs. The authorities launched a sudden purge in the govern-
ment administration which dealt with about 1,000 upper-level functionaries
and managers of the public sector, especially in the area of industrial plants
and wire and wireless communications. They are all members or supporters
of the Communist party.
Hoseyn Musavi, president of the government, paved the way for the purge with
a propaganda campaign in which he said that 111 Marxists must be brought down.
It is believed that the campaign will contiiiue, so that it will deal with
thousands of Communists who have penetrated the body of the administratio~i
since the establishment of the Khomeyni revolution under an unwritten m~,tto
of alliance between the Ayatollahs and the Tudeh party.
The prevailing belief is that the goal of the campaign against the Commun ists
is rapprochement with the West to obtain arms and loans, in spite of the
fact that that will expose the regime of the Ayatollahs to the wrath of
Moscow, which still gives a show of official love for the Iran of Khomeyni.
If the Ayatollahs' goal of pleasing the U.S. behind tHeir campaign against
the Tudeh party is not achieved, Iran's isolation will increase its loneli-
ness, after Moscow is added to the list of "the enemies of Islam."
COPYRIGHT: 1981 A1-Watan A1-'Arabic
9397
CSO: 4404/250
r
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IRAQ
MINISTER OF INDUSTRY COriMENTS ON DEVELOPMENT
Paris A1-WATAN AL-'ARABI i.n Arabic No 261, 12-18 Feb 82 pp 55-57
[Interview with Iraqi Minister of Industry and Minerals Tahir Tawfiq: "Tahir
Tawfiq: Development Accomplishments Compete With War Victoriea"; date and
place not specified]
[TextJ The Iraqi-Iranian war was, in raality, two wars: a
military confrontation on the field of battle and a develop-
mental confrontation in the interior. Both of these are
inseparable. Those who have accompanied Iraq in its develop-
mental explosion before and during the war and have followed the
reports of the war day by day have come to realize how the
internal front supports the battlefront with a continuous and
heroic produ~tion impetus. This is a race between development
and steadfastness in an experience never before kaown by Arabs.
The following interview with Tahir Tawfiq, Iraqi Minister of
Industry and Minerals and member of the Revolution Command
Council, revealed the development victories and pramised
more. In the language of statistics, the Iraqi miaister
e~cplains the rates of technical and technological progress ~
and traces the horizons of the new phases that wil~, achieve
Arab economic integration in interaction with the Iraqi and
Arab needs of the future.
[Question] We would like you to sketch a picture of the industrial progress
that Iraq has achieved under the 17 July national socialist revolution. What
is Iraq's position among the developing states and when will self-sufficiency
be achieved in a number of strategic in3ustries?
[Answer] I would like to say that prior to the blessed 17 July revolution,
the induatrial aector was a neglected sector. It was in the eame ehape as
the rest of the national economic sectors at that time. There are actually
specific indicators and figurea that show the extent of the development that
occurred after the revo~ution. While the accumulated capital totaled no more
than 185 ~illion dinars on eve of the revolution in 1968, the revolution in-
vested more than 4 billion dinars from 1970 to 1981. On this basis, you can
see the tremendous difference in this category and a comparison is basically
inconceivable.
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The Iraqi industries were insignificant and peripheral and were incompatible
with the potentials of our country and our resources, which the corrupt
regimes were unable to exploit nationally.
With regard to the second part of the question, Iraq belonge to the group of
developing countries, ~`.~t there are differences among these countries. They
differ. fro~ one ar_~~..er considerably with respect to their political regimes,
their natural ec~~nomic resources, their financial and human resources, and so
forth. Iraq is conaidered one of the front-ranking of these countries that
liberated their aatural wealth from the foreign monopolies and followed an
independent political path which serves the national interest of the country.
The revolution adopted a series of integrated policies to achieve a rapid
industrfal res.urgence based on the exploitation of the abundant natural re-
sources in the country. The industrial map was changed during the yeare of
the revolution. The industrial products were extended to all governorates
of the country. We began establishing industries that rely on advanced
industrial technology. Because of this, the country bec~ame one of the fore-
most among the developing states in which the industrial sector plays a
prominent role and a role that is beginning to expand and develop as time
goes on.
With regard to the part of your question pertaining to the achievement of self-
suff iciency, the material resources of the country and~the capacity of its
market does not permit it to achieve self-sufficiency except with respect to
a limited number of goods, taking into account the traditional economic ~
calculations for evaluating costs and benefits. Among the most important of
these goods are certain construct3on materials such as cement and oil
derivatives, certain basic petro-chemicals, fertilizers, and a number of food
and textile products. Actually, the country achieved self-sufficiency with
respect to most of these goods within the recent past or will do so within
- the near future. However, Iraq's policy calls for national self-suff iciency
in a number of goods, especially those that are strategic in nature or have
a relationship to Arab national security. This is out of keeping with the
methods of some foreign agencies which, by circulating the slogan of complete
self-sufficiency in all the industries within the developing countries, are
seeking to waste time, cause the developing countries to lose opportunities,
and block their way toward progress by forcing them into a many-branched maze.
This is shown by the entry of some of the developing countries into many fields
of industry under the slogan of "self-sufficiency" when they really do not
have either the sub~ective or the objective conditions neceseary for this.
Foundations of the Mining.Industry
[QuestionJ What about minerals in Iraq? What is the miniatry's plan to
stimulate exploration for minerals?
[Answer] It is a well known tha.t the mining induatry in Iraq, in the modern
sense of the word, is based on the revolution of July 1968. Prior to the
revolution, thia industry consiated merely of quarries for raw materiale for
construction exploited by the private sector. Then we initiated scienti:fic
work in this industry. A specialized state organization was established and
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charged with this task. Thia iadustry went through different phases that
ranged from gen~ral and on-site geological surveys and mineral exploration to
extraction and conversion industries in the field of minerals.
Despite Iraq's lack of experience in the mining industry, this industry has
become an actual and advanced reality. This industry has been built with the
efforts.snd sweat of Iraqis and they have succeeded in making it an experience
to be proud of. Our mining industry hae gained expertiae that has enabled us
to provide benefits to our brother ArPbs.
Iraq has many mining pro3ects at the present time. O~P such plcJiect is the
sulfur pro~ect ~hich produces purified sulfur, sulfuric acid, agricultural
sulfur, alum, and filtration clays. Another example is the saltworks pro~ect
which produces salt for industrial purposes and human and animal coneumption.
There are also many pro3ects that produce raw constructioa materials according
to established technical specificatioas. These projects, which are distributed
throughout all areas of the country, produce products such as graded gravel,
building sand, building stone, marble, and marble slabs as well as supplying
the glass, ceramic, and white cement industries with their mineral product
needs. As for the phoaphate and phosphate fertilizer pro~ect, it will produce
crude phoaphate, phosphate fertilizers, comp und fertilizers, and a number of
other products as by-products of phosphate proceasing.
In the f ield of mineral exploration, the ministry has puraued two parallel
courses through its specialized organization. The f irst of these i,s detailed
exploration for mineral ores discovered in the geological surveys a~id the
second is the implementation of a general geological survey pro~ect for the
country, which we hope will be completed in 1983. One of the effects of this
survey will be a complete evaluation of sources of mineral wealth by type and
site.
I would also like to say that the ministry is providing geological and mining
services to meet the purposes of other development sectors. These sexvices
include the evaluation of groundwater sources for a number of areas, i:he
provision of studies pertaining to uses of land for agricultural purpo~ses,
forests, and irrigation, and the preparation of maps and geological information
for construction purposes. These functions are being carried out by tTze
specialized organizations in the General Organization for Minerals.
Development and War Together

- [Question] The Persian aggression against Iraq ia aimed primarily at destroy-
ing the booming economic development no~~ being achieved in Iraq. Hae this
aggression succeeded in having a real effect on the continued implementa~ion
of theae plans, particularly those pertaining to industry?
[Answer] The leadershi~ realized this matter regarding the purpose of the
Persian aggreasion. Therefore, Iraq drafted plans and decision aimed at
continuing the development plane under the circumatancea of this aggression.
But this is not.all. We achieved inc~eases in growth for funds allocated in
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the investment program from 1980 to 1981. This rate of growth was 29 percent
and a total of 5.24 billion dinars was allocated for the development plans in
all sectors combined for 1981. Our country is now in the process of announcing
the plan and allocations for 1982. These allocations will be calculated on
the basis of development and actual need within the framework of the central
goals of the 1981-1985 five-year plan.
[Question~ What is the ministry's plan for the coming phase?
[Answer] Before discussing the ministry's plan for the coming phase, which
falls within the scope of the national development plan for 1981 through 1985,
one must explain some of the special considerations we applied in implementing
the general structure of this plan. These coneiderations and the ob~ective
circumstances that our country is experiencing had to be taken into account in
the overall development process along with ensuring the requirements necessary
to implement the industrial projects. For this reason, priority in implementa-
tion was placed on those pro~ects that rely on domestic raw materials for their
pro~luction with the aim of exploiting the national resources and utilizing
them in the optimum fashion. Those proJects related to the urgent consumption
needs of the citizens are sharing these resources equally in the implementa-
. tion process.
The trend in the industrial plan for the coming phase was toward eliminating
the bottlenecks, adding certain units to existing proJects with the aim of
ac.hieving better utilization of them, and acquiring and accumulating technical
expe~tise in~operating the projects. In addition, we have employed the
vertical expansion process in the existing pro~ects and have introduced modern
mechanization with the aim of saving manpower, because we are presently
suffering from a shortage of manpower in our pro~ects despite the fact that
our projects have employed and accomodated a large number of Arab and foreign
workers who have come into the country.
In the coming phase, there will be a real transformation in our entry into
many strategic industries which will form the material base af our national
industry and the balanced economy of our country. The f irst step in this
phase will be the manufacture of motor vehicles and agricultural machines.
Perhaps the distinguishing feature of our plan in the coming phase consists
of the processes of transferring and nationalizing modern technology and our
goal of building men who are capable of absorbing and developing this
technology. The latter will be accomplished by establiahing centers for study
and research and cooperating with the specialized organizations in the Iraqi
universitiea and institutes, as well as by emphasizing the establishment of
training courses inside and outaide the country, the establishment of training
centers for the various industries, aad the utilization of international
sources of expertise that have preceded us in technical development.
Industry of the Arabs
[Question] How do you assess industrial relations between Iraq and the
countries of the Arab homeland? Are there ~oint induetrial pro~ects between
Iraq and some other Arab countries? What resources and efforts is Iraq de-
voting to Arab industrial integration as one of the main pillars in the
building of unity among the Araba?
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[Answer] In its dealings in this area, Iraq proceeds from its fundamental
belie~ in the necessity of Arab unity in the future. Based on this principle,
we are moving in the direction that will lead to unity. We are acting within
the scope of two principles: bilateral cooperation and cooperation through
,joint Arab organizations. Without a doubt, industrial integration is a
significant goal which will achieve for us the firm material base for the
larger g~al. The importance of this integration becomes clear when we consider
the tremendous resources that God has given us, since these resources are
depletable. For this reason, thi.:, particular Arab generation has a big
responsibility that makes it inc~imbent on us to utilize theae resources as a
means to achieve industrialization and other economic activities so that we
can ensure the future of our countries and our coming generations. This is
our view on the matter of industrial integration, which will raise the level
of Arab industrialization and help eliminate the disparities in resources
and devel.opment processes among the Arab countries.
For our part, we say that the current state of industrial relations with the
other Arab countries gives evidence of some basic steps, but it does not
measure up to our ambitions. Therefore, the Arabs are in need of greater
efforts and more extensive steps. Our hope may lie in the specialized Arab
organizations--such as the Gulf Organization, for example--to achieve the
basic and important steps to build Arab industrial integration.
In the context of ~oint industrial pro~ects, there are in fact several.
important projects undertaken through the specialized organizationa, including
the aluminum plate bending pro~ect in Bahrain, the railroad car manuf acturing
pro~ect, the plate glass project, etc. With regard to what Iraq pr.ovides in
this area, our country is an active member in the organizations I have already
mentioned as well as the Arab Organization for Mineral Wealth, the Arab
Mining Company, the Arab Iron and Steel Company in Bahrain, and other Ara~
mining companies.. The resources that Iraq has provided to many of the
specialized Arab federations provide confirmation of our belief in t~e
importance of all forms and types of Arab cooperation. Baghdad is presently
the headquarters for the Arab Industrial Development Organizatio.n, the Arab
Industrial Investments Company, and several specialized Arab federations such
as the Arab Food Industries Federation, the Arab Federation of Engineering
Industries, and the Arab Federation of Paper Industries. We provide 50
percent of the budgets of these organizations.
Support of the Private Sector
- [Question] The private aector in Iraq has begun a new revival and is he~.ping
the socialist sector with many of its taeks. What bounde has the ministry
placed on the private sector and what is the role of the private sector in
the ministry's plan?
[Answer] In actuality, Iraq gives private industrial activity--which we call
it here because it is not linked directly with the official organizations--a
specific importance and a well defined role so that it is one tributary in
the development plan. Therefore, we in the Miniatry of Industry and Mines--
through the General Organization for Industrial Development, which is directly
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F'~R ~FF'lCIAL ~5~ :)ti;,Y
conc~~rned in this tnatter--formulate the investment plan for this activity.
The .~mended plan for 1981 included new pro~ects involving this sector based
on a:~ important fact, n>illion in t~~tal investmEnt volume as opposed to only 62 million dinars in
the ~~ast. The tc~tal investmEnt volume was distributed among 989 projects.
These projects were extremely diverse, including construction industries pro-
ducing producte such as tile, brick, ready-mixed concrete, and concrete blocks,
as well as food industriea, textile industries, and chemical industries.
Through the industrial bank belonging to our ministry, the state provides
loans and incentives to private sector industrialists ranging from 40 to 60
percent of the si.ze of the investment. An exception to this is the brick
industry, which is given special attention and therefore receives loans
amou~iting to 80 percent of the investment.
We Are a Rich State
[Que~tionJ With regard to the role that the private sector will play in the
future of Iraqi industry and the incentives that the Iraqi leadership will
provide in this field, the minister of industry said:
[Ans~~er] On more than one occasion, President Saddam Husayn has stated that
the private sector is the eternal traveling companion of the socialist sector.
We cannot conceive of building an imposing and prosperous country without the
parricipation of tt~e private sector.
We t?ave taken earnest st~ps toward the d~velopment of laws and regulations to
supF~ort and encourage tl~e private sector and expand the scope of its responsi-
bility. The coming period will bring ne~ laws to support this sector and
enable i~~ to achieve grc:at pr ogress . .
As you knc,w, we are a ri.ch state. No ma:ter how much the socialist sector
expands, it will not tale up more than a small and limited area compared to
the big investments that the state ensur s in the strategic industries.
[Question] Concerning the expanded conf~rence wliich Saddam Husayn called for
to discuss the role of the private sector, the minister said:
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[Answer] This big meeting will take place next week and will include
officials in the political leadership and representatives of the private
sector. We will discues with them the possibility of their participation in �
the building of Iraq and possible methods of providing meaas of support for
them.
This conference will be a real takeoff point for the private sector in Iraq.
The minister praised the foreiga companies workiag in Iraq, which have
continued their activities without a break, even at the beginning of the war.
He stated that the Arab private sector has the same privileges and rights as
those the Iraqi Government provides to the Iraqi private sector.
Collapse of the Persian Dream
[Question] What pro~ects has the ministry approved during the war and what
is their total final coat?
[Answer] When we say that Iraq has not been affected negatively by the war,
the figures and the measures taken in this ministry and the othar ministries
are the practical proof of the correctness of our alogan which was raised
during the war. This slogan was, Continued development side by side with the
operations to defend the eastern fl.ank of our nation." During the period of
the war, the ministry authorized more than 60 pro~ects encompasaing many
industries, particularly in the fields of construction and the generation,
distribution, and transmission of electric power.and in certain pro~ects in
the engineering and food industries. The cost of these p~o~ects totals over
1.18 billion dinars, which is equivalant to $3.894 billion. I think that
these figures demonstrate the great responsibility of our revolution with
regard to the industrialization of our country. They also indicate our rapid
pace in the proceas ~f development and ehow that we are beyond the reach of
the aggreasion and wars contemplated by Peraian raciem in an effort to destroy
our country. While we were preparing plana for the purpose of developing
and advancing our country, the Ithomeyai regime was contriving a war for our
people aimed, among other things, at destroying our economies, our develop-
mental accomplishmenta, our traditions, our religioa, and our Arab reality.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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JORDAN
DECISION TO SEND VOLUNTEER TROOPS TO IRAQ ANALYZED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 260, 5-11 Feb 82 pp 20-22
[Article: "Jordan Enters Qadisiyah Battle"~]
In an emoti~nal tone, King Husayn announced Jordan's decision to enter the
battle at the side of Iraq. While thousa~tds of Jordanian volunteers are going
to volunteer centers to register their names, Israel is expressing its fears
about the revival of the Eastern Front. Meanwhile, Syria considers the
. Jordanian announcement to be a provocation, and America is hastening to
repeat its "advice" to Amman not to become embroiled in the fight. AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI assesses events f rom Amman and Baghdad, as a result of the Jordanian
decision, which has revived sentiments and re?n~ewed possibilities to unite
capabilities to serve the battle against all the Arab Nation's enemies. .
This report that AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI received from Amman discusses Jordan in
the afterm~th o� King Husayn's a~nouncement about entering the battle on
Iraq's side, analyzes the reasons that compelled Jordan to take this step,
and reviews the bases of the close relations that bind the two countries
together, as well as the Arab and foreign rsactions.~
Fifteen volunteer centers have opened in Jordan to register the names of
those wi~hing to fight alongside their Iraqi brothers to'stem the Persian
attack. Despite the fact that less than a week has passed since these centers
op~~ned, officials estimate the number of registered names at 30,000, including
active officers and nco's, others in the reserve, students, young men and
officials.
Jordanian officials say that the rush to volunteer exceeded expectations, since
it has exceeded the number wanted for the first batch of volunteers. The
general thinking was that this group would number some 15,000, from which the
most combat-experienced would be chosen. In any event, all Jordanians are
considered trained, as young men have been sub~ect to 2 years compulsory
training since 1976.
The forces going to Irag will be called the Yarmuk forces, after the battle
that the Arabs won against the Byz$ntine armies at the end of the 7th eentury,
fought around this river in northern Jordan, led by the hero, Khalid Ibn
al-Walid. A follow-up committee has been formed, headed by Prime Minister
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� Vf\ V~ ~ {~r~Aa. V1~L�
Mudhir Badran, to demonatrate the official interest in thie matter.
King Husayn considers himself to be the first volunteer. fle says that he will
go to Iraq at their head. The fact is that the emotional speech that the
Jordanian monarch made to his people on Thursday, 28 January, had a far-reaching
impact on the Jordania a people.
The king said that Jordanians had been with Iraq from the outset. He extolled
the Iraq~i sacrifices in defense of the Arab Nation against the Persian foe.
He stressed that the Arabs were oae nation, and said that if a part of it was
threatened, all of it was threatened, especially when the challenge was against
the Arab identity and people. He refexred to the fact that Jordanians are not
like those who told their partner: "Go thou and thy lord, and fight ye two,
while we sit."
The Jordanian monarch discussed what he had seen on his recent visit to Iraq
and about its steadfastness in the face of the Iranian enemy, who is supported
by Israel and other enesnies of the Arabs. He then asked: "If the Arab people
do not stand heart, soul and blood with Iraq, how can you expect the Iraqi
people to stand by the states of the Gulf and the Arabian peninsula, or any
Arab state that one day faces danger, evil and aggression on behalf of the
Arab Nation?"
He went on to say that Iraq has always sacrif iced, and that we are indebted to
Iraq, which sacrificed during the great Arab revolt and in all the Arab Nation's
battles in Palestine, Jordan, Sinai and Golan. If the Nation had adopted a
collective stance, as it should have, the fight would have ended before now.
The King said: "We have championed the right and have been with Iraq since the
beginning. However, it was Iraq's dignity that caused it not to complain
about its pain or to be a burden on anyone, taking into account our
circumstances in confrontation along the longest line. Nevertheless, can our
role only be confined to emotional participation?"
At the end of his speech, he declared the door opened to volunteer in the "Arab
Jordanian forces, the Yarmuk forces, named after the immortal name and the
heroism it symbolizes. I personally have the honor to announce that I volunteer
for these forces, as a Jordanian soldier to perform the most honorable and
sacred duty on the land of the Nation's battle."
Independence of the Jordanian Political Decision ~
Jordan's determination to enter the Qadiaiyah battle at Iraq's side ref lects
its view and analysis of the Arab situatioa. They concentrate on one principle,
shared by Iraq, that it is all one Arab battle, whether along the controntation
line againat the Zionist enemy or to stem the Persian attack against the
Arabism of Iraq and the Gulf.
The new Jordanian decision expresaed the emphatic Jordanian wish to follow a
more atrongly independent line than ever before, a line in concert with its
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Arab sisters that supported its po~ition regarding the late Egyptian President
al-Sadat's initiative and the Camp David process.
Jordan feels the frustration of a profound hope regarding the West's positions,
and especially the United States, regarding the Arabs' rights and aspirations.
For its part, it has been careful to remain aloof from these positions, to
the extent of announcing a basic dispute with the Carter administration over
the Middle East question, and it staunchly resisted all the pressures that
Washington exercised, in.order to get it to adhere to the Camp David line.
The Jordanian position became set, after King Husayn considered his analysis
of the situation to be correct from all aspects. Iie made sure that Jordan's
position was clearly in contrast to that of the American administration, and
in harmony with the general Arab position that was crystallized at the minimum
su~it in Baghdad~in 1978, which agreed to reject Camp David and al-Sadat's
actions in the pan-Arab cause.
King Husayn, in his position, has relied on his long experience and expertise
in Arab policy and issues. His apposition to the Camp David process and the
American role decreed for Jordan had a great influence on Jordan's avoidance
of the problems and pitf alls that were destined to lead to disaster.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's information indicates that just as Jordan received
American "advice not to get involved" in the Gulf war. However, today Jordan
--king, army and people--want to give praetical expression to its commitment
to its Arab loyalty, which goes beyond the sentiments of solidarity and enters
into the fateful battle itself.
While concentrating on the "Jordanian entity" and the "Jordanian family" in
the 50's and 60's, it has now accepted in the 70's and will accept in the 80's
an emphasis on the Arab affiliation. Arabism today, in Amman's view, is a
strong, unifying deterrent against all enemies., and in meeting all circum-
stances, diff.iculties and challenges.
There is a Jordanian connection with the Arab Gulf, represented by some 300,000
Jordanians who work there, including hundreds of officers and military and
security advisers spread throughout the Gulf states. They are trusted by
the Gulf rulers and officials. Consequently, Jordan has a self and pan-Arab
interest in the continuation of the Gulf's security and in protecting its
Arabism. Its military participation in the war there embodies this concern
and is in direct defense of this identity. It is a reaction to the Iranian
plots recently uncovered in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and elsewhere.
Therefore, Jordan ~oins with Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states in an
unwritten alliance to defend the security, Arabism and independence of the
Gulf, or a"silent alliance" as a senior Jordanian official told AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI. Jordan's participation in the battle is only an embodiment of this
alliance and a statement of it.
Jordanians who know that war is not all bad, say that the confrontation with
Iran will ultimately be one factor in unification, sharpening resolution and
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rw. vrr~a..~na, u.:~~ vi~~,Y
spreading the spirit of Arab steadfastness in opposing outside challenges.
The significant point here is that the Palestinians, who constitute nearly
half of the Jordanian population, have begun to better understand the Jordanian
pasition supporting Iraq, and the need to repel the Persian attack against
Gulf Arabism. The reason for that is the increasingly frustrated Pa3estinian
hopes for the Khomeyni regime and the belief that he is openly hostile to the
Arab Gulf states, especially Iraq, which is diverting the Arabs from their
fundamental confrontation with the Zionist enemy, exhausting their energies,
squandering their material resources and fragmenting thair unity. Moreover,
his revival of sectarian feelings among Muslims is increasing the Arabs'
fragmentation and tearing them apart, with the claim that the Arab call is
incompatible with Islam.
The Jordanian decision reflects the close ties whict? bind Jordan to Iraq, and
the support that Iraq receives from Amman in its opposition to the Persian
attack. Jordan has thrown all of its weight behind Iraq since the first days
of the c:,nfrontation. King Husayn has repeatedly visited Iraq since that time
and has bluntly announced Jordan's support for its brother state, declaring
its readiness to militarily participate when Baghdad requests that.
It is rumored here that a joint, supreme military command was formed during
the first months of the war, which includes President Saddam Husayn, the
Jordanian monarch Lt Gen Zayd Ibn Shakir, commander in chief of the Jordanian
armed forces, and Lt Gen 'Adnan Khayrullah, the Iraqi minister of defense.
This has not been officially announced.
The fact is that the disturbed relations between the two nations in 1958 began
to stabilize during the early 70's. When the fighting broke out between the
Jordanian forces and the Palestinian organizations in 1970 and 1971, Iraq had
a military force in Jordan, estimated at 14,000 troops, stationed there since
the 1967 war. However, Iraq condemned the fighting between brothers, and did
not become embroiled in it at all.
Iraq welcomed King Husayn's recognition of the PLO, at the 1974 Rabat summit,
as the sole legal representative of the Palestintan people. The Jordanian
position opposing Camp David was also received with a great deal of support
in Baghdad.
Nevertheless, bilateral relations were greatly improved w~ien President Saddam
Husayn assurned full powers in Iraq in 1979. He hastened to offer aid and
substantial financial assistance to Jordan, since the Jordanians were in
extremely difficult financial circumstances. This assistance was given
directly through bilateral relations or within the framework of Arab support
for the Confrontation States.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is able to state that Iraq pays Jordan $186 million annually
of the original $1.25 billion that was decided on at the minimum summit in
Baghdad in 1978 as Jordan's annual subsidy. Iraq pays this regularly, while
a state like Libya has defaulted on paying its share, despite the fact that
is was the most v~~cal both withiii and outside the conference.
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In 1979, Jordan received from Iraq finaneial assistance estimated at $700
million, permitting it to eliminate the shortfalls in its balance of payments
and cover the deficit in the budget, which at that time amounted $1.75 billion.
As a result of this aid, officials' salaries were increased by 20 percent, and
the development plan was financed.
The Iraqi support included financing Jordan's rearmament program. Informed
Jordanian sources say that Iraq has paid $1 billion within this context,
including a Chieftain tank deal with Britain for some 200 tanks, and an
aircraft deal with France for 36 F-1 Mirages.
In addition, $120 million was also allocated for v~ariAUS ~oint pro~ects, and
$130 million to develop the Jordanian port of al-'Aqabah and to improve the
road network that connects this port with Amman and Baghdad. A 3oint
transportation company was established, with a capital of some $25 million.
The total value of this assistance had reached $1.5 billion by the end of 1980,
and by means of it, Jordan has been able to reduce its dependence of Western
aid, in terms of financing and armaments, and has helped it to pursue its
independent Arab policy.
The most important point is that this assistance has enabled Jordan to develop
its public amenities, and to offer Iraq extremely important logistical
assistance following the outbreak of the armed conflict urith Iran.
The port of al-'Aqabah is considered a vital example of the value and
importance of this assistance. Iraq has become greatly dependent upon it,
since the closure of its ports along the Arab Gulf due to the war. There are
estimates that 3ndicate that Iraq, this year alone, will import through
al-'Aqabah 2 million tons of material, goods and equipment, i.e., one-third of
its total imports, while the total weight of its imports in 1981 was 1.5
million tons and about 300,000 tons in 1980.
The closeness and stability of the bilateral relations reached a point that
encoux~aged the Jordanians to prepare a project to bri.nl~ the waters of the
Euphrates into the~.r country across the Iragi border. The Iraqis warmly
welcomed this pro~ect and expressed their willingness to participate in it.
This will help to solve the water crisis in Jordan up to the end of the
present century. ~ . .
In the Jordani.an concept, a pipeline can transport the water from the
Euphrates, after it crosses the Iraqi border, to the Jordanian city of
al-Mafraq, a distance of 600 kms. Pumping, water treatment and storage
stations will be built along this line.
The Negative Syrian Position
The cou~ageous Jordanian decision to ~oin Iraq in resisting the Persian
attar.k had dissimilar effects and reactions. On the Arab level, it helped
to revive feelings of Arab unity and solidarity. It emphasized the Arabism
and independence of the Jordanian position, uninfluenced by traditional
Western pressures.
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It goes without saying that the Jordanian decision cau,sed alarm and anger in
Israel, which considers it a practical revival of the Arab eastern front,
after the suspension of.the disengagement agreements in the Golan. Ariel
Sharon, the Israeli minister of defense, expressed his govemment's fear of
any military coordin~tion taking place between Iraq and Jordan, even to the
point of considering the presence of Iraqi troops in Jordan or Syria as being
tantamount to a declaration of war, which would compel Israel to intervene
rapidly.
Nevertheless, the Jordanian decision met ~aith a clear understanding in the
Gulf states, which have recently intensified their media campaigns against
Iran, following the exposure of Iranian espionage plots in Bahrain and
elsewhere. It was received negatively by both Syria and Libya.
The Jordanians say that the opposition of the Syrian aud Libyan regimes to
the Jordanian decision to enter the battle goes hand in hand with the military
and material assistance that they are giving to Iran aga3nst Iraq. The
Jordanians rccall that President Hafiz al-Asad mobil.ized his forces on the
Jordanian border last year in an attempt to pressure Amman to reduce its
aid to Iraq. Perhaps he intends to repeat that, especially since signs point
to a desire to fabricate a crisis with Jordan, be,ginning with armed clashes
on the borders, and the explosion of a series of bombs in supermarkets in
Amman, with the knowledge and planning of Syrian Intelligence. The Syrian
regime considered the recent Jordanian decision as tantamount to provocation
against it.
It is clear here that the Jordanians are determined to ignore any attempts
by Syria to lure them into side battles. They regret that President al-Asad
did not listen to the advice of the Gulf states, which he visited recently,
to improve his relations with Jordan, cease his support and assistance to
Iran, and ta stop~his harassment of Iraq.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL WATAN AL-'ARABI
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JORDAN
ARMY'S STRENGTH, EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 2F0, 5-11 Feb 82 pp 2?-24
[Article: "Jordanian Arcnv Leads the Arab Armies in Effe~tiveness and
Training"]
[Tex~:] Jordanian volunteers are going to Iraq, but what do the Arabs know
abo:~t these troops? What is their armament, training and history? This is
the sub~ect of this report, which AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI received last week from
Amman.
The Jordanian armed forces are considered the most efficient of the Arab
armed forces, despite their small number and armament. They have a strong
military tradition, excellent training and discipline, and their combat morale
is high. Their officers and leadership stay clear of political activity,
which convulses other Arab armies, and concentrate their skills on their basic
mission.
Semi-official information estimates the armed forces at 75,000 officers and
men, distributed among five divisions, and possessing 1,.~00 tanks, 700 artil-
lery pieces and about 100 aircraft, in addition to about 35,000 officers and
men in the reserves, who can be called up very quickly.
The Jordaciian forces did use a volunteer selection system for years, but it
began to apply a conscription system in 1976. Young men are sub~ect to 2
years compulsory service. The normal armed services' budget is estimated at
$350 million annually (25 percent of the nation's budget), in addition to
a rearmament and training program that at times is financed through Arab and
foreign assistance.
~The Jordanian army is a harmonious mix of Jordanian Arab and Palestinan
officers, both Muslim and Christain. Some of the officers are from the vig-
orous Circassian stock, who have been settled in Jordan for scores of years,
as a result of their flight from Russia in the early part of this century,
due to religious persecution. However, the majority of the enlisted men are
from the desert Bedouin tribes, whose Arab roots are deep in the past, and
who are scattered around the deserts surrounding Jordan.
The bedouin were the backbone of the Arab arary that formed the first nucleus
- of the present-day Jordanian army. They were famous for their bravery and
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rva vrr~~.~~.... ~..~c. vivi,~
tribal loyalty, and then exchanged their loyalty for the Hashemite throne.
They proved that during the fighting against the armed Palestinian groups in
1970 and 1971. They have always been less influenced by political movements
and trends than city dwellers.
The Jordanian army could be described as a land army, adapt~u and suitable
for Jordan's desert conditions and security. The land forces are composed of
about 60,000 officers and men, distributed among four military divisions,
two of them armored and the other two mechanized infantry. In addition, there
at-e ~everal special forces battalions, well-trained for city combat. There
are also two artillery brigades.
_ Nevertheless, Jordan stands on a confrontation line with Israel, extending
sc~me 700 lans. Its limited manpo~aer and meagPr material resources has preven*_ed
er~uipping a greater number of troops. Moreover, Arab assistance has not been
of the size or consistent enough to permit recruiting young men in this small
Arab country, whose population does not exceed 3 million people. At the
same time, the active Israel army numbers close to 175,000 troops, and can
be raised to 450,000 troops during the first days of the outbreak of war.
As for firepower, armament and equipment, the two cannot be compared. Israel
has 3200 tanks, 2500 artillery peices and 600 aircraft of the most modern
types, with exceptionally qualified pilots. Suffice it to say in this regard
that the Jordanian Arab army did not exceed 4500 officers and men when the
year of disaster, 1948, approached. The British command had deliberately
reduced the number from the 8,000 officers and men in the army during World
War II. Nevertheless, its number had risen to 10,000 officers and men by
the end of the first Arab-Israieli confrontation. They were contending,
along with 15,000 Iraqi troops, 10,000 Egyptians and 3,000 Syrian troops
in Palestine, against an Israeli force of an estimated 120,000 armed men that
formed the first nucleus of the Israeli army.
Most of the Jordanian tanks are old or middleaged. There are about 200
B:itish-made Chieftain tanks, which are lightly~armored. However, in the
confrontation with Israel, they proved their effectiveness, thanks to their
highly trained crews. They are equipped with a 105 mm gun and two machine-
guns. .
There are 320 American-made M48 tanks, whose design goes back to the end of
World War II. They move at a speed of 40 lans, and are equipped with a 60 mm
c~innon. Jordan also has about 15 modern American M60 tanks, equipped with
a 105 mm cannon.
Jordan has about 900 armored personnel carriers, suitable for use in recon-
naisance operations and internal security protection, in addition to 600
amphibious personnel carriers for the same purpose.
Infantry personnel are armed with American M16 assault rifles, which are
considered superior to the Soviet-ma~e Klashnikov.
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't'I~r Artillery Corps has 88 mm cannon, with a range of 12 kms. Jordan also
has various artillery pieces of the 203 and 205 mm variety. It also has
American 81mm, 107mm and Z2(hnm mortars.
The infantry forces have a large number of American TOW anti-tank missiles,
with a range of 3.7 l~s. They can be mounted on a Jeep or fired from a tank
or hel3copter. They are also equipped with American M47 Dragon anti-tank
missiles, which are fired from the shoulder or a tank and have a range of 1 lan.
The Jordanian Air Force is limited and cannot be compared either to the air
forces in Iraq or Syria. It is composed of 6650 officers and men and about
100 aircraft, including 60 American F-5 fighter-bombers, armed with two 30mm
cannon and various missiles and bombs. There are 18 F-104 Starfighter
interceptors, armed with Sidewinder missiles.
Jordan has a Hawk missile anti-aircraft network. One of these missiles
weighs 580 kgs. Jordan also has smaller missiles, which are shoulder-fired
against aircraft, with both low and medium-range. In addition, there are
200 4Qmm anti-aircraft guns; these are American-made and operate without
radar guidance.
The naval forces are limited and basically include 10 patrol vessels, whose
mission is to protect the port of al-'Aqabah and surveillance of the
surrounding waters.
Nevertheless, Jordan has an ambitious armament and training program, and wants
to diversify its sources of weapons. It is said that it is trying to purcr.~se
250 British laser-guided Super Chieftain tanks, and also that it submitted a
bid to the United States to buy 200 M-60 tanks. However, it decided against
this when Iraq provided it with 35 tanks of this type that the Iraqi forces
had captured during battles with Iran.
It is said that Iraq is financing an aircraft deal that Jordan made with
France some time ago. It includes 36 F-1 Mirage fighter bombers. Jordan has
also submitted requests to t}ie United States for F-5 aircraft and Bell
helicopters.
It is well known that Israel always obstructs Jordanian arms deals with the
United States. Therefore it is looking to diversify its sources of weapons
and has recently bought quantities of Soviet arms.
The establ.ishment of the Jordanian army began with the establishment of the
Emirate of Transjordan in 1921, under the British mandate. At that time, it
was called "the Arab Army" or the "Arab Legion," and was commanded by the
British officer, Captain Peake. When the British General John Bagot Glubb
took over in 1939, it only had 1350 officers and men, including 1000 troops
who formed the police force in the desert emirate.
Glubb Pasha served in the Iraqi desert from 1920 to 1930, when he was
transferred to duty in the Jordanian desert, where he came to know the bedouin.
He lived among them, became proficient in their dialect and was known by the
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FUR OFFICIAL USI~: ONLl'
name of Abu Hayk, because he had a bullet wound in his neck, close to his ear,
which had left a very noticeable scar.
One of the ironies of history is that the Jordanian army, which is preparing
to enter the Arab Nation's battle against the Persian attack on Iraq, was once
compelled, under the leadership of Gen Glubb, to accompany the British forces
sent from Palestine to Iraq across Jordan to thwart the Rashid 'Ali al-Kaylani
movement in 1941. Nationalist officers in the Iraqi army took leadership away
from the martyr Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh and his colleagues. The dual force was
able to fulfill its mission, as a result of the Iraqis cleaning their own
house.
This rapid success encouraged the British to use the Arab Legion in an
operation to "liberate" Syria f rom the forces of the Vichy French government ~
loyal to Nazi Germany. T~te troops smashed their way across the desert from
Jordan to Tudmur and then to a confrontation at Homs.
In the last year of wo~id War II, the Arab Legion's forces totalled 8,000
troops, most of them tribesmen from Jordan. They were deployed in strategic
posts in Iraq, Syria, Jordan. and Palestine.
Despite the 1946 agreement that ended the British mandate over the Emirate of
Transjordan, and made it a kingdom, the British remained in control of the
Arab Legion in the person of General Glubb. At the same time, they
deliberately reduced its number. When the Palestinian war broke eut in 1948,
their strength was about 4500 officers and men, while the force that the Jews
mustered at ttie beginning of the war was 64,000 men, and cJhich reached 120,000
by the end of that year.
However, General Glubb's methods in leading the army caused the Jordanians to
resent him. In his memoirs, entitled "Soldier Among the Arabs," he personally
recounts the story about when his government advised him to accept the ~
ceasefire, King 'Abdullah, the grandfather of King Husayn, summoned him to a
meeting at the palace, attended by members of his government, headed at that
time by Tawfiq Pasha Abu al-Hadi. The king attacked him, saying: "If you are
not prepared to ].oyally serve us, then there is no need for you to remain
here."
However, General Glubb remained in his capacity as head of the army, until
King Husayn, who succeeded his father King Tallal in 1953, was able to dismiss
Glubb in 1956, and told him to leave the country within 2 hours. That was the
act that liberated the Jordanian army from the last traces of the mandate, and
restored it as an Arab army--men, officers and command.
In a few days or a few weeks, this army is going to enter the battle of honor.,
at the side of the Iraqi forces, defending the Arab Nation and it identity
against the Persian attack.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
7005
CSO: 4404/332
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PEOPLE'S DIIrIOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
BRIEFS
FLOODS HIT COUNTRY--Aden, 6 Apr (REUTER)--Nearly 500 people have died and at
least 10,000 have been made homeless in the worst rains and flooding in 40
years in South Yemen, a cabinet statement said today. It estimated the loss
to property and corps at 324 million dinars (about 950 million dollars), and
appealed for international help to ease what it called~the new heavy economic
burden on the country. The floods killed about 50,000 head of cattle and
destroyed vast agricultural areas as well as irrigation wells in the provinces
of Lahej and Abyan, north and east of the capital, Aden. Roads, telephone and
power installations in Aden were also damaged or destroyed, the statement said.
'South Yemen, with a population of about 1.9 million people, has very natural
resources and is heavily dependent on foreign aid and remittances from thou-
sands of nationals working abroad, mainly in the Gulf. [Text] [JN061713
London REUTER in English 1652 GMT 6 Apr 82]
CSO: 4400/204 E~
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