JPRS ID: 10470 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050046-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 84
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 46
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10476
20 April 1982
Ja ar~ Re ort
p ~
(FOUO 23/8~)
~ Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/10470
20 April 1982
JAPAN REPORT
t~'ouo 23/s 2 )
~ CONTENTS
POLITIGAL AN~ SOCIOLOGICAL
'ASAHI' on Possible Abe Presidential Candidacy ~
(Michisada Hirose; ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 26 Mar 82)........... 1
Suzuki, Ito Comment on Defense Spending
(JIJI, 5 Apr 82) 4
Premier Suzuki's Military ~inking Analyzed ~
(Tatsuro Nakajima; ASAHI JANARU, 5 Peb 82) 5
MIL ITARY
Missiles Proposed as Core of Self Defense Forces ~
(:Catsuichi Tsukamo to; KOKUBO, Jan 82) 11
ECONOMIC
Japan's Aircraf t Indus try Tb En~oy Buoyancy in Buainesa
(N IliON KOGYO SHIMBUN, 6-8 Jan 82) 22
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Semiconductor Trade Friction With United States Mscussed,
Part i
(NIliON KEIZAI SSIMBUN, various dates, DENSHI GIJUTSU,
Jan 82) 29
U.S. Import Regulation Request
Standardization of 256 K Issue
Effect of U.S. Recession
Reciprocal Plant Construction
Comparison of Induatries, by Hiroshi Semi
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUOj
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Semiconductor Trade Friction With United States Diacussed,
Part II
(NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN, 24 Feb 82, DENPA SHIl~IDUN,
6, 10 Mar 82) 42
. Japanese IC Indus try's View
NEC President's View
MITI's View
Trade Activities With Bulgaria, East Germany Reported
(Various sourcea, var.ious dates) 48
Bulgarian Magnetic Grinding Technology
East German Machine Zbols
Robot Exhibit at Leipzig Fair
Bid on East German Plant
Military Technology Cooperation With United States Discussed
(Shogo Imoto; DTIKKEI BUSINESS, 8 Feb 82) 52
'NIIiON KEIZAI' Hai.;_= Toyota-General I~btors Tie-up
(Editorial; NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 10 Mar 82) 62
Japan Tb Propoae Joint Reaearch Pro3ects
(MAINICHI IIAILY NEW3, 31 Mar 82) 64
Japan Eyes Satellite Broadcasting in ~990's
(ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 22 Mar 82) 65~
Electronics Firms To. Boost Plant Expenditures
(LIAILY YOMIURI, 26 Mar 82) 66
Division of Super Computer R&D Effort Decided
(NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN, 9 Feb 82) 68
Researchers Develop Antineutron Fiber
(ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 3 Apr 82) 70
New Developmenta in Variouia Kinda of Sensors Described
(Varioua sourcea, various dates) 72
Intelligent Senaor
Thermal Sensor
Visual Senso r
Recent Activities of Komatau Forklift, Komatsu Ltd Reported
(NIKKAN KOGYO SHII~UN, variw~s dates) ..................e. 76
Development of New Forklif t
Strong Business Performance
Expansion of Machinery Production
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'ASAHI' ON PO~SIBLE ABE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY
OW271225 Tokyo A.SAHI n~'~iING NEWS in English 26 Mar 82 p 3
[Column by ASAHI SHIMBUN editorial writer Michisada Hirose under the rubric
"Politics and Politicians": "Next LDP Presidential Poll--Should Abe Run or
Not?"J
[Text] Last week's articles about an ASAHI SflIMBUN public opinion poll, which
found that the popularity of Prime Minister Suzuki had dropped, were presunr
ably read with the keenest interest by the younger leaders of the ruling
Liberal-Democratic Party, who asgire aft..er the pos~ of prime minister.
The findings of the survey have given the so-called "new leaders" s new fac-
tor to consider in analyzing the situation and deciding whether or not they
should run in the LDP presidential election in November.
The things that have to be taken into account are extremely complex. Even if
a few o� them decide to run, it does not necessarily mean that they are con-
fident of mustering sufficient intraparty support to defeat Suzuki in the
election. The~ may run ~ust to establish a lead over their rivals. Let's
look at the calculations being made by Minister of International Trade and
Industry Shintaro Abe and his aides in their attempt to chart Abe's f uture
r.~urse .
Abe and his aides naturally regard Suzuki's moves as the most important ele-
ment in their calculations. Suzuki has two alternatives--(1) seeking reelec-
tion in November and (2) resigning from office without running for reelection
--and he is generally believed certain to choose the former. Nevertheless,
Abe and his aides feel that the odda are 50-50.
What are the grounds for expecting that Suzuki may resign? Abe and his
aides give two reasons. First, they say, as his political difficulties
mount from summer to fall, Suzuki may have to announce his ~^.~~^.*.ion of
resigning ~s a last reaort so that he can aecure intra~�~.DP cooperation.
The difficulties he faces are a revenue shortfall, the worsening trade fric-
tion with the TJnited States and Europe, and the Lockheed scandal trial.
Secondly, they suspect that Suzuki may have no intention of running for
reelection. "Mr. Suzuki goes golfing every Sunday," an aide to Abe points
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out, "but he always goes to the same course, the Narashino Country Club
course in Chiba Prefecture, and he always plays with the same partners."
"As for his partying at night, no desire to widen his circle of friends in
the business community is in evidence," he adds. "This is completely dif-
ferent from what his predecessors did. They tried to consolidate their
position by widening their circle of friends."
The aides to Abe have other things to consider. How will other aspirants,
particularly Yasuhiro Nakasone, director-general of the Administrative
Management Agency, and Toshio Komoto, director-general of the Economic Plan-
ning Agency, act if Suzuki runs in the presidential election? In their view,
Komoto will run, but Nakasone is not likely to run.
By helping Suzuki's reelection, they feel, Nakasone wi11 try to assure him-
self of the support of the factions led by Suzuki and former Prime Minister
Kakue? Tanaka in the 1984 LDP presidential contest.
If he is pitted against Komoto and Abe in the coming election, Suzuki would
win an overwhelming victory.
But if he runs in the election, A'~e would have the advantage of becoming
known to the public as ~ presidential figure ahead of such rivals as: Chief
Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa; Rpkusuke Tanaka, the party's chief policy
maker; acting Secretary-General Noboru Takeshita; Masumi Esaki, chairman of
the special LDP committee on international economic affairs; and Ichiro
Nakagawa, director-general of the Science and Technology Agency.
There would also be a drawback, since running against Suzuki could help
Nakasone secure the support of the Suzuki and Tanaka factions, which are
numerically of crucial im~portance. Views are split among Abe's strategists
as to whether he has more to gain or more to lose from running in the coming
election.
What would happen if Suzuki does not run? In that case, Nakasone, Komoto ax~d
Abe would all join in the contest. Abe's aides expected that his toughest
opponent would be a candidate fxom the Tanaka faction, which is by far the
largest LBP group.
Whom would that group put ~sp? Abe's strategists feel that since Secretary-
General Susumu Nikaido, who would be the natural choice, bears the stigma of
a"gray official" in the I,ockheed scandal (a politician who allegedly took
~ney of Lockheed origin, but was spared prosecution because of technical
difficulties), Esaki would probably be chosen. They suspect that the dis-
patch of Esaki to the Unitc~d States and Western Europe as the head of an LDP
_ trade mission to see President Ronald Reagan, Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher and other Western leaders may be a move to groom him as a presi-
dential candidate.
They feel that Abe can afford to wait until after this summer to make the
final decision on whether or not to run. At the same time, they feel that
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preparatians for his candidacy should be started at an early date. The
, question zor tliem is the wishes of Abe's boss, former Prime Minister Fukuda.
Fukuda scys t~ Abe: "For the time being, you should not make a move (for the
presiden~ial contest). If qou don't make a move, others will. You should
wait for that."
"For a long time, you have been called the crown prince of the Fukuda fac-
tion," he also says, "but you have come to be known as the crown prince of
the LDP. Don't let haste bring you down."
Does Fukuda really feel this way? He may be afraid that if Abe runs for the
presidency, he will lose control of the Fukuda faction and lose his political
power rapidly, ~ust as the faction led by foz~mer Prime Minister Takeo Miki
came to be known as the Komoto faction after Komoto ran in a presidential
race.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Evening News 1982
CSO: 4120/224
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P~~LITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
SUZUKI, ITO CO1rIl~IENT ON DEFENSE SPENDING
OW051343 Tokyo JIJI in English 1310 GMT 5 Apr 82
[Text] Tokyo, April 5(JIJI PRESS)--Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and Defense
Agency Director-General Soichiro Ito Monday kept away from making any speci-
fic commitment to hold defense spending down to one pct or less of gross
national product (GNP) during the f iscal 1983-87 period for a new defense
program.
Questioned at the House of Councillors Budget Committee by socialist Osamu
Yatabe, Suzuki said Japan need not change its current policy of limiting
defense spending to one pct of GNP. However, he refused to make any speci-
fic commitment because he said GNP itself will change.
Ito said *_he government is making utmost efforts in line with the current
policy for the i~ediate future. But he declined to forecast whether defense
expenditure will be kept below one pct of GNP during the five-year period.
Asked by Yatabe to assess nuclear arsenals of th~ United States and the
Soviet Union, Suzuki supported the U.S. view that the Soviets now have a
nuclear superiority over the Americans.
But Director-General Akira Shioda of the Defense Agency's Defense Policy
~ureau put forward a slightly different view.
Iie said the two superpowers' nuclear arsenals are believed to be balanced
in terms of the number of nuclear warheads and their carriers. Some doubt
has been cast on the United States' superiority because Soviet missiles'
accuracy has recently been improved, he said.
CSO: 4120/224
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOIAGICAL
PREMIER SUZUKI'S MILITARY THINRIN~ ANALYZED
Tokyo ASAHI JANARU in Japanese 5 Feb 82 pp 12-16
[Article by Asahi News Political Reporter Tatsuro Nakajima: "The Military
Thinking of Mr 2enko Suzuki"]
[Text] One associates Prime Mini3ter Zenko Suzuki's grappling with the
defense question with ~he kind of toy that stands back up as soon as it is
pushed down. While we are wondering if he permitted a"boost" to defense
spending, he would suddenly gfve."dove-like instructions" to the head of the
Defense Agency, and [then at another time] strengthen efiorts for disarmament.
Even at the Japanese-American sum~it conference last year, this "zig-zag
movement" was already revealed. What is the Prime Minister's basic line of
- thought and policy on military affairs? Pointing to new developments in the
defense question, such as Japanese American Joint Study on Far East
emergencies and Japanese-American military technology cooperation, now that
parliamentary debate has started, we are trying to elucidate the Prime
Minister's military thinking and its context. (The Editbrs)
Prime Minister Suzuki can be called a dove, a pacifist. He himself wishes
to be seen as such. But, to find the right label we ought not forget the
fact that his is an "emotional" pacifist. At times the Prime Minister's dove
feelings come to the surface. When these feelings have clashed with harsh
reality, severe friction has resulted. But, the~feeling one now gets, looking
at the treatment of defense spending in the 1982 budget, makes all the more
obvious the distance between the Priffie Minister's feelings and what they
actually correspond to..
The Prime Minister's roots as a politician are in post=war democracy. At
the height of "war weariness," he ran as a Socialist Party candidate in the
general election of April 1947 and won. He was born into the not-too-
prosperous family of a fisherman on the Sanriku Coast in Iwate Prefecture.
After graduating from the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry's Fisher
Institute (currently, the Tokyo College of Fisheries), he joined ti~e fishing
cooperative movement. Thus, it is not strange that he ran for election from
the Socialist Party.
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Moreover, for 3 months, starting at the end of 1942, he underwent military
experience. Once speaking about the difficulties of those times and of his
training as a corporal in Akita prefecture: "We were made to run along the
Omono River carrqing heavy machine guns. It was very hard for an 'old soldier'
past 30."
Even though he did not actually have any combat experience, he was one of the
war victims. In addition to forming his dove nature, it is an essential part
of him that he cannot ignore.
Until becoming Prime Minister, he served ten terms, a total of 6 years and
7 months, as the Chairman of the Executive Board of the LDP. After having
been through the management of domestic politics, he had no experience when
he was thrust into the rough waters of international politics. One could only
count the painful Japanese-Soviet fishing negotiations (in Moscow) which were
entangled with the problem of northern territory when he was Minister of
Agriculture and Fisheries. All through he preserved his dove nature, never
losing it. Of course, he was perhaps also influenceti by former Prime Minister
Ikeda, of whom it was said that he only had economics on his mind.
In the summer of 1980 Prime Minister Ohira's sudden death brought Suzuki to
power. With the Soviet invasion of Afganistan at the end of the previous year
and the takeover of the American embassy in Iran, Japan's foreign policy was
already showing strong signs of pro American support, such as it had nut
shown up until then. For example, at the Japanese-American sumaait conference
in May 1980, President Carter said, "We want early implementation of plans
already in the Japanese government," and he dema.nded the moving up of the 1978
mid-term operat3on estimate (plans to procure equipment). Prime Minister
Ohira also promised "earnest efforts."
Prime Minister Suzuki, who had just assumed polifical powez, said, "I
inherit the policies of Ohira." But, actually, it seems there had been much
resistance to following the pro-American line that Ohira took. Probably he
had a need to assert his independence from Ohira. In compiling the budget for
1981, he confounded the expectations of many cabinet members and LDP defense-
related legislators, and cut to 7.6 percent their demand for a 9.7 percent
increase in defense spending. He calculated that "this much [of a cut] should
not worsen Japanese-American relations." However, voices on the American
side said "we have been betrayed"--and there arose discord between Japan and
the U.S. ~
At ~he May 1981 Japanese-American summit conference, the Prime Minister hit
President Reagan with such statements as "the peace constitution that
renounced war" "the pledge of the people that they will not become a ma~or
military power" "difficult economic conditions." The difference between what
he said and the Japanese-American joint statement that promised "greater
efforts for defense" became a problem, which in turn caused the resignation
of Foreign Minister Ito. Even ~afterwards, the Prime Minister did not hesitate
to say I have related everything to President Reagan." This can be described
as a phenomenon in which the Prime Minister's dove-nature was reflected,
though in a twisted way, in politics.
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However~ as the Prime Minieter incraased hie expnrience in the international
arena with a visit to Europe. followed by one to America~ and attending the
Ottaw~. and North-South Sumanita. The Prima Minieter's dove-posture gradually
began to retreat into the ahadowa especially in caees of weetern interna~ion$1
politice--where Preeident Reagan takee the lead raieing the idea of a eerioue
threat toward the Soviet Union. At last year's budgat planning eeeeion,
going along with the general trand in tha LDP the Prima Minister increased
defense epending 7.8 percent, inetaad of cutting the 7.5 percent budget
increase proposed. While the Finance Ministry wae frantically trying to
preserve a 7.5 percent ceiling, [he] played up to the LDP's requeet for an
increase in defense spending by drunnain8 up the idea of "the uaual 7.61 percent
percent increase as was dons before" on commercial TV. In contrast with 2
yeare ago, the U.S. eide expreesed ite "thanlca for the affort." In the final
analysis, it cannot but be eaid that the Prime Ministor put emphaeie on the
joint-atatemant he made rather than on the worde that ha threw at President
Reagan.
The Prime Miniater decided that if he drove down def~snsa apending lika a year
, ago, it would be like pouring gas on the fire of anti-Japaneae criticism in the
U.S.--which is the product of economic diecord. As that indicatea~ it muet
not be overlooked that the prime minieter ~,e bringing hie position around from
a domeatic orientation to a foreign orientation. "Taking the reina of
political power for one and a half yeare, tha Prime Minister greatly daepened
his conaciouaness of the internati~nal eituation," wae the praise of eomeone
close to the Prime Minister. Wouldn~t thia be the same as getting mired in
international politica, especially in Amarica's global etrategy? In other
words, it ie tantanaunt to being ewept away by the loud cries of insietenca.
However, giving a booet to defenee epending as hs did this time doee not mean
that the Prime Minister has the intention of abandoning the economic eup::emacy
of the conaervative mainstream which hae continued aince the days of Yoehida.
It ia an outlook tihat calls for a gradual increase in defense epending
always within the limite of the Japaneae-American Security Treaty. Even if
independent defenee efforte are eued for, indefinite expansion of defenae
apending is unthinkable. And, the poaition of an independent dsfenee theory
tied to "bilaterialization of the Security Treaty" and a"theory of nuclear
a r me is untenable. It ie probably all right to dietinguieh thoas pointe
from the defense hawke who are firn~].y rooted in the LDP.
Sympathetic Eare to the Refutation of "Domestic Battlefield Proposal"
What is moet on the Prime Minister's mind now ia the course of the 1981
mid-term operation Eatimate (forecaeting the period from 1963 to 1987). The
Defense Agency is going ahe~sd with operations based on a fundatnental aim of
achieving in the 1981 mid-term a level of defenae strength envisioned in "the
broad outline of defense plane." But, according to prellminary calculations,
it will coat a total of nearly 6 trillion yen. Becsuee equipmsnt epanding
will be about 25 percent of total coete~ the total amount of defenea epending
in the 1981 fo~ecastad mid-term period will expand :0 trillion ysn. In that
case~ defenee epending will break through the 1 percent-of~-the-GNP framework
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and will necessarily become approximately 1.3 percent of the GNP. It is said
that the Prime Minister was surprised when the report came out.
After the January 12 cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister ca~led back Defense
Minister Ito. Even Chief Secretary of the Cabinet Miyazawa had no previous
notice and at the point of ineeting with reporters was called back. Facing
the two men, the Prime Minister broached the matter, "I will hereby instruct
you in the whole pic:ure of my basic thoughts concerning the maintenance of
defense power.
At this point he clearly re~ected the threat-response theory which believes
in increasing defense strength to counterbalance the increased military
strength of neighboring countries. Also, he unprecedentedly ventured to go
into the particulars of defense theory and made a series of statements such
as a defense system suitable to a maritime nation," "obstruct landing at
water's edge" "'hedgehog-ization' relying on air-defense missiles." He
also talked about a balance of the three self-defense forces--land, sea, and
air. Together with what the Prime Minister has said up to the time, these
statements were received by everyone as his instruction to set out in the
direction of "emphasizing Air and Maritime defense" during the 1981 mid-term
operation estimate period. This is understandable.
Close to half of def ense spending (which in 1982 is 2.5861 trillion yen) is
personnel costs; moreover, the greater half is taken up by the ground
self-defense force. Balancing the land-s~a-air forces in this way, if we
are to achieve the proposed level of defense strength by 1987 (the end of the
1981 forecasted mid-term period), it will be as large a defense expenditure
as the Defense Agency predicts. Therefore, the Prime Minister's real
intention must be to cut army expenses more. One can conjecture that with
[the strategy ofJ vanquishing enemies at water's edge and not allowing the
mainland to become a battlefield one does not need that many tanks, and thus
it is unnecessary to increase the amount of army personnel.
January 7 this year. There was a contribution by a former major of the
ground self-defense forces on the editorial page of the t1SAHI SHIMBUN. His
idea was that the 1981 forecasted mid-term period is based on "the home
battleground proposition" and, criticizing the army-emphasis corps organiza-
tion, proposed that in order to attain defense capability navy and air force
personnel be strengthened and arnry personnel be reduced by a third. The
Prime Minister, seemingly impressed by the article, showed a clipping to an
associate and was reported to have said "if. only the Defense Ministry saw
things this way." Perhaps the article's emphasis corresponded exactly to the
Prime Minister's ideas. This is a story of a few days before he sent
instructions to the Defense Minister.
I am not an expert; thus, an expert thinks...
- However, the Prime Minister's instructions met a"counter-attack" from the
Defense Agency and defense specialists. A conference with the Defense
Ministry bureaucracy January 18th ended with terrible results. [The Prime
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Minister] was told that his outright rejection of the threat-response theory
contradicted his answer to Diet interpellation which stated: considering
the harsh interna;ional situation, the level proposed in the Outline will be
achieved as rapidly as possible." Also, [He was obliged] to acknowledge the
connection between the strains of the international situation and def ense-
strength preparations. When the Prime Minister's remark, "a defense
organization suitable to a maritime nation," was construed as his intention to
strengthen the defenses of the sea lane (the sea transportation route) which
he emphasized in America last May, the Prime Minister could not help but to
say "that is another story."
Concerning the "hedgehog defense" theory, a counter-argument was made saying
that "our country, surrounded by ocean on all sides and having a large shore
line, will have to spend more on making a defense plan that will prevent a
land invasion." Thereupon, the Prime Minister retreated from the question,
saying "I am not an expert. The question of what exactly is to be done is
for the experts to think about." Those around the Prime Minister defended the
"hedgehog" approach as one used as an analogy of a thorough defense-only
position without giving a military threat to its neighbors.
In addition, inviting the backlash of the ground Self-Defense Force which
may view the Prime Minister's "emphasis on sea and air" as "nt~glect of the
ground force," the Prime Minister obscured the danger by saying, "I have
no recollection of emphasizing maritime and air self-defense forces." There
was criticism that the Prime Minister's instructions lacked a viewpoint that
tied defense preparations to the Security Treaty. All of these lead to a
dubious conclusion that one does not know for what purpose the Prime Minister
instructed Defense Minister Ito. It is a very awkward position for the Prime
Minister to be in.
Thus, people are saying "The Prime Minister's defense thinking is very
rudimentary. If he does not prepare a more theoretical system..." No
matter how much he tries to check the Defense Agency's independence, apprehen-
sion increases that without a well-constructed defense theory, the pressure
to increase defense strength pro~ected for the 1981 forecasted mid-term period
cannot be resisted.
The fear that the Prime Minister has begun to cross a dangerous bridge.
Closely tied in with this is the policy of the "Comprehensive Security."
After the Prime Minister assumed power, he immediately enunciated tt,e
establishment of this policy. It is a line of thought that tries to ensure
our country's security not just by defense strength but through the power
of diplomatic efforts, economic and technical aid, and so forth--the
implementation of policies that emphasize coordination. At the end of last
year he started the Comprehensive Security Cabinet Meeting. However, what
position does defense strength hold in this policy? Discussions or
theoretical arguments in the government, beginning with those around the
Prime Minister, are getting almost nowhere.
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N'UR UFF'ICIA~. VSr: UNL'~'
The term "Comprehensive Security" comes up first at the special session of the
Diet in August 1980. Although the Prime Minister touched on the Comprehensive
Security again in a speech on his administration's policy a year later, no
significant meaning could be found about the term. One was left with the
impression that the term Comprehensive Security was simply dancing around.
Because the position of defense strength remains unclear, boosting d~fense
spending or venturing on the particulars of defense may be poasible. The
Prime Minister, unlike thz late Prime Minister Ohira, does not have his own
"brain trust" around him. That may be one reason why the Prime Minister's
thinkir_g does not have theoretical systemization.
Comprehensive Security was originally viewed as "a covering cloak that did not
allow the burning smell of the expansion of defense strength to be revealed."
If so, there is no necessity to rush a conclusion regarding what position
defense strength will take. But the way it became bogged down arouses one's
suspicion. At any rate, as time goes on the "banner" of Comprehensive Security
will fade away, if it stands as it is.
The speech and actions of the Prime Minister with regard to the defense
question are difficult to understand and are co~nfused by mixing his official
stance with real motives--a pattern is about to be set, in which the dove-like
words and actions are withdrawn under pressure. Apprehension is surrounding
the government regarding 1982 defense spending pro~ections--the fear that "the
Prime Minister has begun to cross a dangerous bridge." In an economic
situation where the incurring of additional national debt became unavoidable
due to economic doldrums, why did he approve a 7.8 percent increase in defense
- spending? The 1981 rate of expansion was in line with welfare budget, but
' this time it greatly exceeds the 2.8 percent increase of the welfare budget.
From 1983, which is the first year of the implementation of the 1981 mid-term
estimate, will defense spending continue increasing, no matter what economic
conditions are? Uncertainty weighs: heavily for the future.
The Prime Minister has for some time past given as a yardstick of defense
preparation "painful economic conditions" "the peace constitution" "a
national consensus." How were these taken in deciding the defense spending
of this time? What kind of international conditions will speed up the
achieving of the outlined level of defense strength, and will the Prime
Minister stick hereafter to the framework of a level of 1 percent of the GNP?
In the debates at thP reopening of the Diet, a satisfactory explanation for
each of the qtiestionable points will probably be called for. If the Prime
Minister, fearing the overtaking by the opposition party, confines himself
to the safE offic.i.al answer prepared by bureaucrats for the Diet, what the
Prime Minister is thinking and what he aims to do will become more blurred to
the eyes of the people.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbunsha 1982
9391
CSO: 4105/57
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MILITARY
MISSILES PROPOSED AS CORE OF SELF DEFENSE FORCES
Tokyo KOKUBO in Japanese Jan 82 pp 68-80
[Article by Katsuichi Tsukamoto: "A Proposal for Defense Power Buildup"]
[Excerpts] Introduction
When I expressed my opinion on ~he consolidation of defense power in an
article entitled "Dire~tion of the Consolidation of Japan's Defense Power--
Antiaircraft and Antiwarship Missiles Should Be the Core of the Self
Defense Forces" in the October issue of MODERN SECURITY, published b~ the
Comprehensive National Security Research Institute, unexpectedly, it
seemed to arouse some interest. I do not know whether it was positive
or negative, but evidently the article offered convenient material for
argument. However, as I have the disadvantage of lacking technical know-
ledge of missiles, I am aware that my view is actually just an opinion.
It is undeniable, however, that the way in which the present consolidation
of defense power is being carried out tends to be a mannerism, and the
situation is such that breaking away from convention by adopting new ideas
is difficult. Military men (self defense officials) tend to be conserva-
tive. Error is never allowed for those engaged in defense--a grave re-
sponsibility concerning the existence of a nation. For this reason, they
value the precedents set in the past and extend them to the future as they
are. Because they believe thia is the most reliab~e and safe direction,
such a trend may be inevitable.
An orthodox consolidation of defense power is, of course, important. At
the same time, we must not ignore the cases in which strategy surprised
the enemy, or technology superior to the enemy's accomplished its goal.
It is especially important that only tt~at side which has developed superior
technology can expect success.
My personal proposal for this new "consolidation of defense power" was
created by breaking from convention, based on the above viewpoints, and
through groping toward a system of consolidation most adequate for Japan's
defense.
I have used the word "new," but this does not mean to fundamentally reform
the direction of the present consolidation of defense power. Rather, I
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rux urriLiwL w~ un~r
would attempt to make some improvementa based on the dir~ction presently
bcing taken. The consolidation promoted by the Self Defense Agency has
been regarded as reasonable up to now, while it has been in the basic
stage of construction. At the present stage, however, it is for the first
time necessary to begin reformation toward a new direction.
Let me first give a summary of my personal proposal which appeared in
MODERN SECURITY, and then I would like to explain two or three major points
more specifically.
2. Characteristics of Japan's Security
Japan's characteristic of being an island surrounded by the sea has a great
impact on its defense. If Japan secures dominance of the air and commands
the sea, invasion by a foreign enenry would be almost impossible, and only
small-scale invasions from the Korean Peninsula and the Karafuto-Chishima
archipelagoes would be considered. On the contrary, however, if invading
forces command the sea and air, the invasion would be easily executed.
For this reason, the basic principle of Japan's defense lies in the pri-
ority given to the reinforcement of the maritime and air forces. (This
does not mean to reduce the importance of ground troops, which are the core
of the national defense.)
Since an invadin~ force must rely either on air transport (airborne troops)
or on sea transport, and the -reatest weakness exists during this trans-
portation, Japan's defense must first be directed at attacking this weak
point.
Japan's characteristics of having a high population density and scarce
resources which depend on supply from overseas show that it is not equipped
for a prolonged war and also that combat in Japan is difficult. Protec-
tion of the sea lane is crucial.
The policy of the "Japanese Self Defense Forces" designed exclusivel,~ for
defensive posture has an advantage in simplifying the consolidation of
defense power. Japan does not recognize counterattack against an enemy
base by ground forces because such an attack is considered outside the
framework of the "defense only policy." This will in effect sanctify
the enemy's invasion base and is thus unreasonable in terms of a theory
of strategy; however, in terms of the consolidation of defense power, it
has the advantage of concentrating Japan's efforts on the area of defense
alone, since offensive troops are not needed.
3. Direction of the Consolidation of Japan's Defense Power
The requisites in the direction of the consolidation of Japan's defense
power are consolidation of the various characteristics of Japan's defense
as mentioned above, utilization of its advantages, and supplementation
where it has disadvantages.
It is indicated that the "Outline of the Defense Plan" assumes the pattern
of invasion against Japan to be based on combat during World War II. Of
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course we cannot say that such combat will not take place in the future.
It is possible that a repetition may occur in local combat.
But disputes that have broken out in various areas after World War II
show that the patte~n of war has undergone radical change. This is be-
cause war is greatly restricted by politics. Every war has taken the form
of limited warfare, and political fo rces have greatly controlled combat
activities. In the future, war will take place tmder complex conditions
as a political tool and will be settled by means of comprehensive politics,
including diplomacy and the like. This is the way of thinking in "Compre-
hensive Security."
Moreover, progress in scientific technology has changed war strategies
and methods so that technological superiority has begun to control leader-
ship on the battlefield.
We must deeply discern the condition of future warfare and consolidate
our defense power in compliance with it, or our efforts for consolidation
will be meaningless. Here we strongly sense the importance of drastic
tactics and their foundation, technological development.
A basic principle of war guidance in order to win a battle (achieve a goal)
in the future will be, first o.f all, to devise the means to achieve a goal
before involvement in an actual battle (determent) and, should a fight
be unavoidable for the sake of self defense, to malce the most of one's
advantages; that is, to place the invader under the influence of its own
weakness and disadvantages alone.
When Japan's defense is considered from this basic principle, we can see
that the following should be considered: defeat invading forces while
they are being transported via air or sea when they are wlnerable; try
to avoid combat in Japan; and stand in a superior position technologically
through the use of scientific technology. Of course, it would be ideal
for us to secure a superior air force and command the sea; hope for this,
however, is dim for the time being, in Japan's present circumstances.
If we consider all this in a comprehensive manner and seek out the direc-
tion of Japan's consolidation of defense power, we will focus on a defense
plan with antiwarship and antiaircraft missiles at its core. The ob~ec-
tive of this strategy is to destroy an aggressive enemy by antiaircraft
and antiwarship missiles before they land in our country. The history
of war indicates that progress in science and technology makes such a
defense plan feasible. The war in the Middle East is one example. In
that war, invasion by aircraft in the areas where antiaircraft missiles
were installed was most difficult.
Since the task given to the missile unit can be simplified, this strategy
is more advantageous for Japan, which employs the strategy of Self Defense
Forces designed exclusively for taking a defensive posture.
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rUK Urrlt,4AL U,r. VIVLY
The essence of this proposal is an extensive buildup of sntiaircraft and
antiwarship missile units. With respect to antiaircraft missiles, the
Nike-Hawk unit cited in the "Outline of the Defense Plan" will be remodel~d
and extensively reinforced at the same time. Antiwarship missiles, on
the other hand, must be utilized and made into the core unit (ma3or force)
of the Ground Self Defense Force.
Through its buildup, the antiaircraft missile unit will become independent
of Ground and Air~Self Defense Forces and an "Antiaircraft Self Defense
Force"--a fourth self defense force--will be newly created. This measure
will be taken in order to facilitate both the development of this unit
and emergency expansion.
Up to this point I have summarized by "personal proposal." Now, let me
discuss more specifically the major problematic points of this conception.
1. Command of Sea and Air
I have already stated that the gener~'. rule in defending Japan, which is
an island country, is to maintain ~~uperior position in the air and sea,
and to destroy the invading enemy on the sea (during transportation).
At present, the Soviet Union is the only country which is capable of in-
vading Japan, and its invasion routes are via the Sea of Japan and its
adjacent sea areas. We must ~udge that to secure command of the air
(dominance of air at the necessary occasion and period) over the Sea of
Japan, etc, is difficult for now. This is because the Sea of Japan, etc,
are located within a distance which can he backed up by the Soviet Union's
Far East ground and air bases. Therefore, the Japanese air forces must
confront the Soviet Far East Air Force imder nearly equal conditions.
As a result, it is necessary to upgrade our standards regarding the per-
formance and number of aircraft and the conditions of the ai.r bases to
levels equivalent to those of the Soviet Union's Far East troops.
This, however, would necessitate an extensive buildup of the Air Self
Defense Force, and the defense budget would probably be several times
greater than the present one. Practically speaking, therefore, Japan
cannot do this for the time being. Since an increase in the number of
aircraft involves not only ma~.ntenance and operation but also consolida-
tion of air bases, it is accompanied by difficulty in terms of expenses
and other aspects (public welfare).
It has been proven in the historq of war that control of the air can
never be attained unless air superiority is anticipated.
It would be difficult for Japan to accomplieh destruction of invading
troops on the sea by co~anding the sea and the air, which is most desir-
able strategically.
The strategy expressed in this proposal places antiaircraft and antiwar-
ship missiles at its core, and is simed at destroqing an enemy attempting
to invade in the sea area in the vicinity of Japan, replacing the above
measure as an alternate choice.
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2. Missiles Versus Conventional Weapons
Missiles have many advantages compared to conventional weapons. The ma~or
points of advantage are as follaws:
1) The manufacturing facilities are relatively simple. The production
- technology of the missile itself is not simple, but the facilities to
manufacture it are simpler than those of tanks and aircraft. This is
because it does not require large machine tools and facilities.
It is possible for the majority of parts for missiles to be produced in
small and meditim-size factories if the knowhow is present. Needless to
say, sophisticated technology and an efficiently arranged facility are
needed in order to combine these parts and comple~e a missile, but for-
timately, Japan has excellent automobile plants, etc, so locating a~
facility is not a difficult problem to be solved.
The fact th~t a large facility is not needed and that many small and medium ~
size industries can be mobilized indicates the suitability for mass-pro-
duction in case of emergency. In the future, whez~ technology progresses
further, this characteristic will increasingly be encouraged.
2) The operation is simple and easy. The missile as a weapon is complex
and sophisticated, but its operation is simple, and in the future, tech-
nology will advance to the extent where a m'_ssile will hit a target by a
pushbutton operation. For this reason, the operation of missiles can be
handled by anyone once he has been trained, and in case of emergency, by
reviewing the training for a short period. By taking advantage of this
through consolidating self-defense officials, in combination with the
mass-production mentioned above, a certain degree of rapid expansion is
feasible.
Such hardware as warships, aircraft, tanks, and cannons, which are today's
major weapons, require facilities and time for production; therefore,
only those we possess in peacetime can meet an emergency. Inevitably,
we must be prepared for emergency by possessing and storing a great number
of them in peacetime. And, after a certain time has elapsed, all of them
will become obsolete and scrap iron. This is why armaments are referred
to as a mass consumption item.
Missiles can eliminate this disadvantage.
3) Antiaircraft and antiwarship mtssiles are purely defensive weapons.
Because of this, there will be less fear of criticiam from neighboring
countries that Japan is planning to become a"great military nation,"
or is creating the rebirth of militarism, etc. Since Japan must pay
maximum attention to these accusations, this characteristic is significant.
4) There is less trouble with residents. 1'his proposal refers to a missile
of small scale, so the location of its deployment is less restricted and
there will be no fear of noise pollution. As technology advances, the
mobility of missiles increases, so it will become possible to keep them
at an army post or training location ordinarily. For these reasons there
would be far less trouble with residents than there would be in the case
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MUK U~"MlI,IAL UJr, UNLY
5) In addition, anoti;Fr characteristic of the miasile is that it can take
advantage of the volunteer enlistment syatem, and an increase in the
n~ber of self defense force officials is not so greatly needed.
On the other hand, there are also disadvantages and problematic points.
1) R&D must be thorough and substantial. This could be the largest issue
of all. Small-scale taissiles have many technological problems yet to be
resolved. There are missile parts for which the supply depends on tech-
nology imports from foreign countries. Initially, imports of missiles
themselves or licensed production may be necessary.
Furthermore, since the technological progress of missiles is rapid, constant
R&D will be demanded.
For this reason, R&D expenditure must be increased steeply. At present,
the R&D budget of the Defense Agency is 31.7 bi.llion yen for FY 81. This
is one-eighth that of West Germany, one-fifteenth that of England and
France, and in comparison with that of the United States, it is less than
1/100. Under these circumstances the development of excellent missiles
is inconceivable.
It is essential to increase R&D expenditure to a level equivalent to, or
greater than, that of the West European countries by increasing the amount
to at least 10 times more than the present scale. But a sudden increase
in R&D expenditure will cause problems in the payment of researchers'
- salaries and consolidation of facilities; it should be done step-by-step,
but as soon as possible.
The lack of R&D expenditure is causing the defense technology of Japan to
fall notably behind that of private concerns. Even among the parts used
for missiles, there are some which have similar tendencies. Thus, if
we take advantage of private technology by increasing R&D expenditure,
the improvement of missile technology is feasible. ~
2) Informati~on collecting ability must be improved. Another crucial far_tor.
is to make C I, in which an information collecting ability is indispensable.
This is even more important since the invading forces would attempt a
surprise attack with technology superior to the defense's. Improvements
in ECM and ECCM are also important. The repletion of C3I is one of the
keys to realizin~ this proposal.
The control of target quota is another bottlenecl: in terms of technology.
An equal dietribution of missiles to the entirety of eneary fighters, which
will assault in several tens or several hundreds, requires a high level
of fire control techr.ology, and this is an issue to be resolved in the future.
3. Size of a Missile Unit
The size of a missile unit will be calculated by future research. The
budget and the number of personnel are restrictive requirements which
must be examined carefully.
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The Soviet Union is equipped with more than 10,000 launcher units for
fixed missiles alone, in addition to a number of mobile antiaircraft
missiles. Although it is difficult to compare Japan with the Soviet
Union, since the air defense area is far smaller, obtaining a comparable
ratio of la~mcher units would be one of the criteria. In order to meet
this, we must expand the scale to a level which would be considerably
larger than the present Nike-Hawk unit, but it is not altogether impossible.
Although the mobile antiaircraft missiles are used for self defense combat,
along with the technological progress, they can be used for strategic
purposes in the future.
The antiwarship missile unit will be organized in accordance with the
water's edge defense operation for the predicted landing spot of the in-
vading troops, but along with the improvement in the range of a missile,
the area of fire control can be expanded, and thereby the number of troops
needed can be proportionately reduced.
4. Changes in the Present Structure
The antiwarship missile unit is the original responsibility of the Ground
Self Defense Force for the purpose of mainland defense, and it will be
embodied by this division through reorganization.
The antiaircraft missile unit will be organized with the present Nike-
Hawk at its core.
The role of the Ground Se lf Defense Force as a core of national defense
will not change even in a defense based primarily on missiles. The founda-
tion of national defense lies in the spirit of the Japanese people, who
want to protect their country, and its core consists of the Ground Self
Defense Force which will organize resistance together with the people.
In addition, the ground troops are aiso the final resistance organization
in the national defense.
The Maritime and Self Defense Forces do not need a great deal of change
in the direction of the present consolidation of defense power. Rather,
they will be directed in conformity with the defense of the Japanese land
and sea lanes.
1) Security of Personnel Requirement
The security of personnel for antiwarship and antiaircraft missile units
is one of the most critical issues.
An antiwarship missile unit is designed to achieve the original tasks
of the Ground Self Defense Force. Naturally, it is most desirable to in-
crease the number of personnel by breaking through the regular co~plement
of 180,000 which has been restricting the increase of the Ground Self
Defense Force for many years. But since this is difficult in the present
circumstances, it must be worked out by reorganizing the troops.
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The antiaircraft missile unit will be extensively expanded with the per-
sonnel requirement of the present Nike-Hawk unit at its core. The security
in having a shortage of personnel of several thousand will be the major
prob lem.
It appears that an increase in the regular complement of Self Defense
Forces would resolve the problem easily; this, however, would involve
not only an increase in personnel expenses but also a great difficulty
in recruiting. Naturally, as a measure of convenience, we can consider
taking some personnel from the regular membership of the Ground Self
Defense Force. But a further cutback in the Ground Self Defense Force's
180,000 regular complement does not seem appropriate since that is the
minimum requirement.
However, at present, due to the fact that there are vacancies of more than
20,000 (limit of sufficiency rate), and personnel and provisions expense
rates are nearly 80 percent (this means the condition of a gradual decline
in equipment), we must introduce a new idea in regard to the organization
of the Ground Self Defense Force. For example, one idea would be the
formation of different organizations by dividing the present divisions,
which take a uniform organization, into a division for mobile strike and
a division mainly for defense, training, and recruiting. In this way,
we can create some personnel.
Of course this me~.surE _.'one cannot meet the requirement of the antiair-
craft missile un't. Therefore, a partial increase of the regular comple-
ment by recruiting from outside is inevitable.
2) Mar~time and Air Self Defense Forces
Although I have stated above that the Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces
require little change in the direction of their present consolidation of
defense power, in order to unite the defensive strategies of the Ground,
Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces, the direction of consolidation will
naturally be concentrated on strategies for the land of Japan and its
vicinity.
The rlaritime Self Defense Force should concentrate greater effort on the
defense of the sea lane; at the same time, it should not neglect a defense
power buildup inshore. The ma3or target of the inshore defense is not
enemy warships but a convoy transporting landing troops. In this respect,
the current condition must be corrected, since there is no base to speak
of in front of the Sea of Japan, with the exception of Maizuru.
In order to secure air dominance in strategic places by defeating the
superior enemy air forces, we must have a concept guiding an air strategy
behind the antiaircraft missile screen. Such an ~peration is difficult
for Japan, in which the vertical depth is poor, but if we fight under
equal conditions, we cannot make up for our inferiority in terms of num-
bers. Therefore, we must adopt the atrategy of destroying enemy aircraft
after they have broken through the antiaircraft missile screen.
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3) Air Defense Command
It is desirable to unify the air defense com~and. It may be a general
rule to unify air defense combat fighters and antiaircraft missiles also
(except surface-to-air missiles for self defense).
This proposal suggests an organization of the "Antiaircraft Self Defense
Force" separating the antiaircraft missile units from both Air and Ground
Self Defense Forces. Although this deviatea from the general rule, in
my judgment it is better to do so in order to expand and develop the anti-
aircraft missile units. Maaned sircraft and missilea are weapons of dif-
ferent qualities, and Cheir control in peacetime requires different systems.
The establiahment of such units within the same Self Defense Force might
cause a hindrance to the development of one by the other.
This can be seen by looking at the status of the present Nike unit within
the Air Self Defense Force. The result would be the same if the unit were
placed under the Groimd Self Defense Force, and since there is a problem
of unified command in case of emergency, this measure is unacceptable.
Consequently, it is desirable to organize an independent, fourth self
defense force. In this case, however, it must be done on the condition
that a clear policy be established on the unification of command organiza-
tion in the event of an emergency. Otherwiae, it cannot function effec-
tively should an emergency arise. Unity in peacetime trainiag is also
needed.
4) Points of Change
Expansion of R&D must take place at once. This is an urgent issue.
Development of an excellent missile, ECM and ECCM, are all pressing issues.
With respect to reorganization, we will engage in research and examination
of effective units during the period of 1981 mid-temi operation, and it
will be made concrete in the next mid-term operation period (1984 mid-
term operation). Research prior to reorganization and the stage of examina-
tion of effective units are critical. In line with the progress in the
aforementioned development of missiles, cautious programming will be planned.
At present, th~ Defense Agency has begun modemization of the BADGE syste~m;
parallel with this, it may be neceasary to plan a radical expansion of C I.
Putting all the above-mentioned accounts together, the conception of this
proposal will be realized in the 1990's.
S. Japanese Self Defenae Forces Designed Exclusively for Defensive Posture
What we must consider next is whether a defensive operation alone can
defend our nation. A defense based on missiles ie designed to appropriate
most of the ma3or force for defense of the mainland, and because of this,
the strength of a counterattack on the enemy`s base will be restricted.
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But the same weak point is found in the preaent defense conception; in
accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan expects an attack
on enemy bases from the U.S. military's war potential.
As already mentioned above, there has been a marked trend toward increased
restriction of war through politics as a political tool. Unless the
United States and the Soviet Union, the two powers, confront one another
directly with armed forces, it is most likely that a political resolution
wi11 end a war in the future by striking a significant blow to the enemy.
The movement of world opinion will greatly influence this. In the case
of Japan, we can expect a modern version of the Mongolian invaaions.
But of course, once war has broken out, the fundamental tendency of war,
that is, an appeal to unnecessary violent action, would be unavoidable,
and it is likely that this might diminish the political power to terminate
war. Here arises the necessity of a final reaistant organization with
ground troops in its core, and the people's firm resolution to defend
their country can break an enemy invasion and deter a war.
6. Relationship With the United States
The relationship with the United States is the key factor in Japan's ~
defense. Recently, however, the Japan-U.S. relation~hip has not been
altogether smooth. The United States' demand for Japan's defense power
buildup is severe, and the situation is such that it can develop into
defense frictions.
One area of U.S. discontent with Japan lies in Japan's insufficient efforts
to build up its defensive power. Thia is measured~by a low defense ex-
penditure rate compared to GNP. Japan should immediately abolish such an
uazreasonable restriction on defense expenditure as a maximum of 1 percent
of GNP, and should make an effort to ~ontribute its due share with regard
to the country Japan is allied with.
Another concern of the United States in regard to the direction of the con-
solidation of defense power is that when the U.S. Far Eastern war potential
swings to another front, especially the Middle East, Japan lacks the
ability to compensate for a gap created in the Far East. For this reason,
Japan should eliminate anxiety about its security by reinforcing its
autonomous defensive power. It ie also necessary to provide atability
in the surrounding sea areas by reinforcing antisircraft and antisubmarine
capabilities.
Of these, the latter is critical, that is, not to create anxiety about
Japan's defense when the U.S. military in the Far East shifts. We must
establish a founda*_ion wherein the U.S. military ie able to shift; this
in itself indicates that Japan's defenae muet be conducted autonomously
by Japan.
It is a general principle that a country must be defended by itself. A
collective security supplements an sutonomous defense power, and the latter
in turn renders service to a collective security.
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From this view also, this proposal attempts to achieve the goal of having
an autonomous national defense with misailes at ite core by meane of firmly
protecting the country, and will effectively contribute to the U.S.-Japan
security relationship.
7. Resolution To Protect Our Couatrq
This proposal emphasizea the aspect of attempting to achieve a goal of
national defense by aupplementing a personnel shortage with the power
of technology and money. Thie is because the proposal aims not at falling
behind the condition of a war which is predicted in the future, but rather
at taking the initiative.
I would like to streas that this propoaal does not alter the hard fact
- that the foundation of national defense lies in the resolution of the
Japanese people who wish to protect their country. This stems from the
realization that this operation will be carried out elsewhere under almost
the same conditions as those of a decisive battle taking place in our
homeland. Without a defense foundation baaed on the Japanese people,
this kind of operation cannot be realized. The Japanese people's resolu-
~ tion to protect their own nation ia the esaential requirement.
COPYRIGHT: Asagumo Shimbunsha 1982
9711
CSO: 4105/50
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ECONOMIC
JAPAN'S AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY TO ENJOY BUOYANCY IN BUSINESS
Takyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japaneae 6, 7, 8 Jan 82
[6 Jan 82 p S]
[TextJ Kawasaki Heavy Industries
The aircraft industry is about to take a very important leap forward. First
of all, in terms of private sector, production of the "Boeing 767," headed by
Kawasaki Heavy Industries Co,,Ltd, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co, Ltd, and
Fu~i Heavy Industries Co, Ltd, is a step in the right direction. And the
"BK117".helicopter, 3ointly developed by Kawasaki and West Germany's MBB
Company, is one step from acquiring model certification. Meanwhile there have
been orders for 120 of Mitsubishi's business ~et, the "MU300," and full-scale
mass production has finally etarted. As for defense orders, production has
begun on the "F15 fighter" and the "P3C sub-spotting plane;" furthP�-, the
design and production of the MTX (second generation mid-sized trainer),
produced by Kawasaki, the main contractor, in cooperation with Mitsubishi
will follow. Since these various pro~ects will all bloom together and
full-scale mass production will continue progresaing favorably in FY1982,
there are many cases contributing to business results. Japan's aircraft
industry sales of 280 billion yen in FY1980 will reach 328 billion yen in
FY1981, and sales of nearly 400 billion yen are forecast for FY1982.. E~ch
manufacturer is expecting this year to be one of great steps forward.
Total of 52 "767's"
Since 1978 Kawasaki Heavy Industriea Co, Ltd has continued with plant and
equipment inveatments amounting to 17 billion yen in order to promote the
Boeing 767, P3C sub-spotting plane, F15 fighter and BK117 he3.icopter, and will
finally complete its investments in FY1981. Since a mass production system
is in place and a pro~ect team for the MTX development has also been~set up
and has started on the basic design, 1982 is the year in which the entire
aircraft department will wrestle with these five ma~or pro~ects.
The allotted production of the 767 of Kawasaki Heavy Industrie is for the nose
and mid-sections; 27 plane sections were produced in FY1981 and finally total
salea of 4 billion yen in total contributed to business gains. The pace
during the first half of 1982 will be a monthly production of 4 aircraft and
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in the latter half, the pace will be a monthly production of 8 aircraft; so
the schedule shows favorable progress as anticipated at the time of
development. A total production of 52 aircraft sections has.been scheduled
in 1982 and a sales total of nearly 10 billion yen will add greatly to
business achievements.
It is reported that Kawasaki's technology team participated with Boeing from
the design state of the 767 and studied what could not be studied in Japan.
As stated by Masahiko Iwata, director, Kawasaki Heavy Industries Co, Ltd,
"what we did was only the designing of one section, the fuselage, but we were
exposed to the idea for designing an energy conserving ~umbo aircraft which
has become a great asset in the design of future aircraft." So much was
gained from their study abroad in terms of technology and it seems that
confidence was gained in rearing a technology staff for the future.
Model Certification This Summer ~
Even though the BK117 helicopter, another civilian airplane project, is a
joint development, it is a full-fledged twin engi.ne helicopter first developed
by Japan. At present, tests are continuing for acquisition of FAA model
certification; and ac,quisition of certification is targeted for the summer
of 1982. Together with MBB Company, there are already orders for 130
(Kawasaki has orders for 20). A mass production system has been started with
a monthly production of 6 aircraft. There are BK117 bodies lined up in the
Gifu plant, and a production of 80 is expected in~FY1982; furthermore, the
target for FY1983 is 90 aircraft. Due to changes in FAA inspection standards,
each manufacturer's model certification acquisition for new models has been
delayed. It is forecast that the BK117 certification~will be delayed for not
more than a year later than anticipated. Although it will be acquired in
the summer, nonetheless it is said that deliveries are expected by the end of
the year. This is because of the desire to complete supplementary items, _
such as examination of operation manuals and pilot training; the attitude of
wanting to spend sufficient time and deal carefully with the pro~ect can
' be inferred from this.
Corresponding to improvement in'nuclear powered submarines, Kawasaki, the main
contractor, started production of the P3C sub-spotting plane which is expected
to give a high level detection capability to Japan's coastal patrol. The
first plane came out of the hanger at the end of 1981. ~'he first flight and
tests of this plane will run from February through March; and it will be
delivered to the Defense Agency in May.
The first order in FY1981 for 5 aircraft to a total of 20 billion yen are in
the midst of production; these will be delivered during FY1982. The first
aircraft is KD production, almost completely from American made parts, but
domestic parts will gradually be used starting with the second aircraft, and
with the fifth aircraft, production will be almost entirely domestic. This
is an opportunity to show Japan's aircraft industry's high level technological
power. Moreover, the decision has already been made for orders of 10 aircraft
in the second phase. Production of a total 42 aircraft (besides these,
another 3 from FMS), will proceed in accordance with the defense plan until
the mid-80's.
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Technology Accumulated with the "F15"
In the area of allotted production, wings and rear sections of the F15
fighter for 12 aircraft were produced and delivered in FY1981, and in FY1982,
15 of the 30 aircraft in the second contract and the 1 remaining aircraft
from the first contract, for a total of 16, will ba produced and a monthly
production rate of 2 aircrafts will progress favorably. In the design which
also puts importance on air war capability in addition to the top speed of
2.4 mach, composite materials and titanium alloy were much used; and it is
said that this technology has advanced greatly in the production plants.
The construction of the main wings is of four rods of titanium alloy and the
upper outer surface is made from a thick sheet of aluminum alloy and the
underside outer surface is made from a braid of titanium alloy; the major part
of the fuselage is one solid machined piece of titanium alloy. So this
construction can be called the acme of a modern fighter plane; and perhaps it
will greatly influence the design of the MTX, a decision having been made for
its development.
Last fall, the development of the MTX was decided with Kawasaki as the main
contractor; a pro~ect team was set up within the company at the same time the
decision was made; and basic planning started with a 94 member project team
led by Masahiko Iwata as the pro,ject manager, 44 members from Kawasaki and
50 members participating from Mitsubishi and Fuji.
Targeted Sales of 100 Billion Yen
Kawasaki has a past record of producing 210 T33 jet trainers, and inasmuch as
Kawasaki was hoping to make the most of this experience someday, the design
group, saying "our hope has been fulfilled," is putting its spirit into it
all the more trying to show its ability. The trainer is said to have the
most diff icult fuselage of all aircraft, and even more so because it is the
link between the beginner trainer and the newest F15. The shape of the plane
is a dihedral angled main wing, tandem two-seater, horizontal tail plane;
and it will use the domestic XF3 twin engine (with a 1.6 ton thrust),
presently in the midst of development, and a maximum speed of 0.6 mach is
anticipated. It is hoped that the weight can be held down to under 5.5
tons, using boron composite materials as the major material. Basic design
will end in one year and it is expected that partial production will begin
in FY1983. Total orders of 200 are expected. It is a project attracting
attention as a development with the dual character of accumulation of
technology and stability of operations.
Kawasaki has almost completed its plant and equipment investments, and all is
ready in all areas, such as mastery cf the design with computers, new
technology and the like. FY1982 is the year to finally demonstrate the
past accumulation of technology in the aircraft division. A sales target of
100 billion yen has been set for the division.
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[7 Jan 82 p 7]
[Text] Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Beginning with the 767
"It is the first time since the resumption of aircraft production to have such
a large project at one time," says Shinichi Aizawa, managing director of
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co, Ltd, Nagoya plant.
~aenty-five years until the end of the war and 30 years since the end of the
war have passed since Mitsubishi's Nagoya plant started as a manufacturer of
internal combustion engines; but it seems FY1982 will be the busiest post-war
year in this history.
Not to mention production of the 767, pro~ects which Mitsubishi has lined up
are as follows: its own development, the MU300 buainess ~et, f inal assembly
of the F15 fighter, allotted production of the P3C, production of the T1
trainer and the F2 fighter, furthermore, rem~deling plans for the F4 fighter,
participation in the MTX development and, although a small part, production
of helicopters.
In terms of civilian requests, the same as other manufacturers, it is handling
allotted production of fuselage parts for the 767; it is producing the
rear section of the fuselage and doors. In FY1981, it produced 34 longeron
for fuselage, and it is expected that with a monthly production rate of
4 or S, it will produce 54 in FY1982. It is certain that production of the
767 will have a monthly production pace of 8, beginning at the end of FY1982
through FY1983. It seems that the rear fuselage section of one aircraft alone
is 200 million yen. So it seems that greater weight is being given by
civilian orders to Mitsubishi which has many government contracts.
Monthly Production of 8
However, when all is said and done, it is the Mitsubishi developed MU300 jet
in which the company places its greatest hopes from FY1982 and on. It
passed the same strict FAA inspection as the jumbo ~et on 6 November last
year, and this aircraft which successfully acquired model certificstion has
already had ord~~rs for 120, mainly f rom the U.S. The first plane was
delivered early this year. Since it will start mass production at a monthly
production rate of 8 aircraft in FY1982, fuselages are lined up at the Komaki-
minami plant. The FY1982 production target is 90 aircraft; delivery of orders
received now is expected in May 1983; so production will not catch up with
orders.
The reason orders have increased so much, primarily in the U.S. market, is
because this is the only newly developed plane in the field of business jets
in the last 10 years, and there has been great improvement in its capability;
and because Mitsubishi has a foundation for this because it manufactured
700 or so MU2 turbo prop planes, the predecessor of MU300. However, because
of technoloy with its supercritical wings, improved spoiler and full span
flaps, and decrease in fuselage resistance, it achieved a 13 percent increase
in fuel efficiency and cruising speed over other manufacturers' planes. The
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fact is that it can reach a speed of 803 kim per hour. Furthermore, it
achieved the widening of intericr space and building a more comfortable
passenger cabin. One cannot miss the fa~t that it was highly praised
because of the high desi~m technology power which resolved these
technologically contradictory conditions, high efficiency and comfort. There
will be a profit in terms of business results starting in 1982 at 2.25 million
dollars (March quarter 1981 price) per unit. Managing Director Shinichi
Aizawa comments, "Money will really come in six years after development."
Expectations are great with this aircraft.
The F15, Pillar of Defense Orders
On the other hand, the F15 fighter is the pillar of defense orders.
Preparation of this plane is being expedited not just because this company
wanted it but because it is the core of the defense of Japan's airspace. The
first plane was delivered by Mitsubishi to the Defense Agency on 11 December
last year. A contract has been concluded for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries as
the main contractor to produce 86 of the planes from now until FY1986 in
accordance with the Defense Agency's plan setting up an air defense system.
It is anticipated that in FY1981 four planes will be produced and delivered;
11 planes in FY1982. Subsequently with 13 planes in FY1983 and 7 in FY1984,
the monthly production rate will be about one plane per month, and like the
P3C, use of domestic parts in this plane will increase from the ninth plane.
This will be a great asset in absorbing new technology and production know-how.
"We have become used to construction with titanium alloy, a difficult process.
In actually making the fuselage there are many instances where we understand
the reason for such things as why one wire must be so thin." (Managing
Director Shinichi Aizawa) It can be called an important aircraft as a move
to the next generation airplane (fighter) to be developed, anticipated in
the mid 1980's.
Besides these, Mitsubishi has the allotted production of the front and rear
fuselage sections of the P3C, and although few in number, it has the production
of the HSS2 helicopter (civilian name is S61); and sales in Mitsubishi's
aviation/aerospace division were 120-130 billion yen in FY1981, and are
targeted to exceed 200 billion yen in FY1983. It is hoped that 150 billion
yen will be achieved in FY1982 as the basis for that target. This year wi11
be the year which gives vitality to a?.1 plants.
[8 Jan 82 p 7]
[TextJ Fuji Heavy Industries. Advanced FRP Process Technology
In contrast to Kawasaki Heavy Industries Co, Ltd and Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries Co, Ltd, the aircraf t division of Fuji Heavy Industries Co, Ltd,
which descended from the former Naka~ima Airplane Company achieved sales and
its share of the company's total sales of no more than 4 percent or 20
billion yen out of 520 billion yen. This is because Fu,ji stopped developing
its own planes for a while, and also its allotted production on the Boeing
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767 was limited to parts manufactured from fiber reinforced plastics, such as
the fairing of the main wing joint and the landing gear cover. Its high level
technology maintained a standard second to no other manufacturer, such as in
the licensed production of the multi-use UH1H helicopter, its greatest
masterpiece, and also assembly of the P3C wing.
Its allotted production on the 767 is for production of about 20 aircraft in
FY1981. Total sales oi 1.8 billion yen cannot help but be low with only
FRP process products. It expects to produce about 3 times that in 1982;
it will produce parts for 53 aircraft. Fuji also will have a monthly
production of 6, which is in step with the other manufacturers. Its intent
is to extend FRP process technology to other products. Fu,ji's view is that
the fairing runs a length of 20 meters in jumbo aircraft and when divided up
has 13 parts. In order to manufacture it with minimal distortion and error
in the parts, manufacture of a precise master model and inspection with a
computerized automated measuring instrument are required. .These have great
merit in terms of production control and improvement of the technology level.
In the future when the time comes to produce FRP automobile parts, this will
bring a ma~or innovation." (Yoshio Akiyama, director)
Large-scale Wing Facilities, Fu~i's Forte
Fuji, which produces helicopters in a technology tie-up with Bell Company,
the largest U.S. manufacturer of helicopters, has produced and delivered 138
UH1 helicopters ordered by the Defense Agency until now; in FY1981 it produced
5 and has decided to produce 5 in FY1982 also. The year before last it
considered a licensed production of Bell's large scale 214ST helicopter, but
that was shelved because the demand for it in Japan is small and the investment
risk would be too great. However, Fu3i's great hope for FY1982 is the AH1
anti-tank helicopter; it is supposed to produce and deliver 5~~ of them by
FY1986. And if orders come in smoothly, it is expected that there will be
orders for 22 as a first phase over the three year period beginning FY1982.
Because this helicopter is the design development which makes the most of a
power system of the UH1 helicopter which Fu3i handled, producing this kind of
aircraft fits Fu~i perfectly. In addition to the high speed and
maneuverability, this is seen as a chance to accumulate technology in terms
of its own f uture develapment, such as with sights and heavy armaments, such
as the 7.62 millimeter machine gun, 40 millimeter grenades, rocket bombs and
missiles. Fu~i is currently continuing its investigation of preparing for
licensed production with Bell, and intends to make plant and equipment
investments of about 5 billion yen.
Besides these, it will also have allott~d production of the P3C and the F15.
It will produce 3 of the P3C wings in FY1981 at 500 million yen, and 3 in
FY1982; since the parts processed will double, sales will amount to 1 billion
yen. F15 production uses titanium alloy sheet process and many hot press
parts. Although sales in FY1982 will be low at 300 million yen, the technology
they will acquire will be great.
Many of Fuji's projects are other companies' allotments; so FY1982 will be
limited to a slight increase over the previous year at about 24 billion yen,
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but since Fuji's strength, not found in other companies, is that it has
facilities for assembly of large scale wings, it seems Fuji has great hopF;
Eor ttie YXX wings for which a tie-up has been nearly concluded.
FY1982, in which numerous projects will become full-scale is the year in
which a large step forward is promised not only for the manufacturers in
charge of fuselage construction and final assembly, but also for cooperative
manufacturers which make working instruments, struts, propellers and the
like.
Favorable production has become full-scale in various f ields such as Teijin
Limited's spoiler power control parts, Sumitomo Seimitsu's struts and pro~,
propellers, Shimadzu Seisakusho, Limited's angle gear box, and Shin Meiwa
Industry Co, Ltd and Nippon Hikoki Co, Ltd, which directly cooperate on
fuselage production. The Aeronautics/Aerospace Industry Association sees
a firm production amount of 350 billion yen. Even in the engine field which
is far behind the fuselage field, Rolls Royce Company of the UK, Ishikawaji-
ma-Harims Heavy Industries Co, Ltd, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co, Ltd,
and Kawasaki Heavy Industries Co, Ltd set up a joint venture company, and
development of a new model ~et engine has started. Planning is advancing
favorably and some parts have already been completed; tests will start on the
first plane in England in February 1982 and on the second plane in Japan in
March.
Likewise, this year is the year when the YXX tie-up will be concluded. The
aircraft industry will tie-up with foreign manufacturers as equal partners,
unlike the situation with the YX. So this year will be the year in which the
aircraft industry's real ability will be questioned on all points of design
development, production and sales.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha Tokyo Honsha 1982
94.00
CSO: 4105/56
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SEMICONDUCTOR TRADE FRICTION WITH UNITED STATES DISCITSSED, PART I
U.S. Import Regulation Request
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 5 Feb 82 p 5
jArticle: "SIA's Move"]
[Text] The Japanese-American semicoaductor friction situation, which had been
in a somewhat tranquil state, has once more become shrouded ia dark clouds.
This ia manifested by the American Semicoaductor Induatry Association's
(SIA) move toward regulation of importa of Japaneae made semiconductors
which it asked the United States Department of Commerce for "goverament
handling" of the situation. The ob~ective of thie regulation is the Japanese
64 kilobit RAM (random acceas write-in and read-out memorq), which has
captured about 70 percent of the American market, and it is anticipated that
Japanese-American competition in leading products, including VLSI (large
type integrated circuite), will become even more fierce.
With regard to thia present ~one on the part of the SIA, the Japan Electronic
Equipment Industry Association said: "We do not know whq it chose the
present time to move to regulate importa" ae it probes its campetitor's
motives. This is because IC (integrated circuit) trade going to the United
States during the period January through November 1981 sho~ved a decrease of
5.5 percent over the same period of the previous year, to 63.8 billion yen, +
while imports for the same period decreased onlq 1.3 percent, to 63.3 billion
yen, and the favorable balaace was only 500 million yen (this balaace was
plus 3.4 billion yen the previous year), so the export-import ratio was
roughly equal.
At the same time, the long-standing issue of IC custams duties was alleviated
by agreement between the two governments to lower them, aad the U.S. duties
were lowered to 4.2 percent in January this year (they were previously
5.6 percent) while the Japanese duties were lowered to 4.2 percent in April
formerly 10.1 percent), and the duties are naw roughly the same. The
Japanese seem to be saying: "We are doing our utmost to avoid this trade
friction."
On the other hand, the Japaneae industrial world is showing signs of enhanced
alertness with the statement: "Theee movements are rather deep-rooted."
"The SIA is not looking for a balaace between imports and exports but is
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planning to make an issue of leading technology" (executive of Toshiba
Corporation) is the Japanese view. Japan bas already secured about a 40-
percent share of Che American market in the matter of the 16 K RAM and it
presently accounts for about 70 percent of the 64 K RAM, and SIA believes that
if this situation continues, the next generation 256 K RAM will be completely
dominated by the Japanese, so this is tfie situation which is responsible for
its attitude.
Furthermore, the American semiconductor industry recently has been severely
affected by the current depressed economic situation, and all companiea are
reflecting poor business conditions. One of the top micon malcer members of
SIA, Intel, showed a decrease in net profits for 1981 to 70 percent belaw that
of the previous year. National Semiconductor showed a roughly equal balance
between income and expenditures, and Mostec reported a net loss.
This is why the American campanies are unable to foot the bill for the vast
expenditures required for new facilities; they have been forced to suspend
their production of the 64 K RAM or pull out of the field altogether. The
situation has deteriorated.to the point that it has even been said that the
only two companies which can compete toe to toe with the Japanese makers are
Texas Instruments and Motorola.
Plant construction costs have increased sharply and large research funds have
to be expended for a company to get into the 256 K era, and this is creating
the fear that the Japanese-American gap will become even wider. It seems to
be the belief on the part of the SIA that now is the time to beat down the
Japanese influence.
In view of this situation, the Japanese makers are on guard, saying: "We
don't know what further unreasonable demanda will be forthcoming." At the
same time, they are making every effort to avoid frictional confrontations,
saying: "We will put more strength into new plant construction in the United
States and increase the output of our presently operating facilities there."
There are also many who say: "We would like to put more effort into developing
leading technology."
"Where the issue of the 64 K RAM is concerned, it is obvious that the American
makers should show more resolve" (Vice President Jungi Ouchi, Nippon Electric),
and there are some who even seek to send more encouragement to their competi-
tors. In any event, the friction revolving around leading technology alone is
expected to involve high-level government decisions and competition is ex-
pected to become more fierce, with posaible emotional oppoaition from the
American side.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982
Standardization of 256 K Issue
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 10 Feb 82 p 13
[Article: "256 K Production"]
[Text] The initiation of production (sample shipment) of the 256 K memory
(256 kilobit random access memory) has become a topic of discussion, and at
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present the Japaneae makers are taking the basic attitude of "loo1cing at
patterns." All of the companies have already ~ompleted their 256 K develop-
ment and have the technological capabilitq to came out with samples at ~ny
time, but so far rhere has been no international standardization of the
256 K itself, sa these companies are refraining from all production and
shipment until the standards are set. To be sure, there is some feeling that
the 64 K market has only ~ust developed, and there should be an effort to
avoid nipping such a development in the bud by the early introduction of the
next-generation product.
The reason the various IC companies are attaching great importance to their
sample shipmenta ia their bitter experience with the 64 K. Fu~itsu was the
first to announce a coIIanercial 64 K in the spring of 1978, but this unit
required two power sources, so it received poor acceptance. Since then, TI,
IBM, and Motorola successively announced their development of the 64 K, and
it was only after five rouads taking over 2 years that standardization was
established.
This experience has taught the makers that taking the lead and announcing
product development and production may result in the need to redesign a
modified product if standardization requires a somewhat different item, and
any such redesign will require at least a year to complete, while plans for
mass production will be greatly delayed as a result, leaving the company far
behind its competitors. This is why the makers are quietly waiting thie time;
"It may be said that the Japanese industry has become that much tougher"
(Nippon Electric top executive).
It is believed that standardization of the 256 K will not see much basic
change in pin arrangement and power source becauae of the need for flexibility
to enable interchange with the 64 K. On the other hand, the top people at
Hitachi Limited say: "There is the one point that requires atudy regarding
the user's prerogatives." At the same time, the same people said that the
standardization "market place" wil~ be the International Solid State Circuit
Conference (ISSCC) which will be convened on the lOth (local time) in San
Francisco.
The industry cansiders that the problem points in standardization include:
"Inclusion of redundancy (it is difficult to build a unit in which all
500,000 elementa are constructed flawleasly, and backup circuits are employed
in the event fuulty elements are formed); "large usera such as IBM and DEC
have not decided what their needs are"; and "what about the timing problem."
In addition, it is said in some quarters that even though standarization may
be decided by the ISSCC, this conference is "purely a conference to present
research results and not the organ to establish the atandardization. This is
a meeting where top technologiats of the world's IC induatries will gather
under one roof, and their lobbying efforta will have a strong influence on
the standardization decided upon," seems to be the general attitude. The
industry is looking on in the belief that, while not included on the agenda,
Hitachi plans to introduce a new development propoeal for the 256 K at this
conference, and reactian to this announcement will lead to the emergence of
a consensus for standardization.
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There is concern that Japanese-American semiconductor conflict will begin anew
with the 64 K problem, and what Americaa indnstry is irritated over is that
where it concedes "defeat" in the 64 K at the present stage, it finds it
almost impossible to reverse the sitt~ation for the next-generation 256 R.
In other words, it has become evident that rounds 1 and 2 of standardization--
which is instrLmnental in advantageous guiding of the market -were captured by
Nippon Electric, and round 3 will again be controlled by Japanese induatry,
so the future for American industry doea not seem too bright.
The two organs which decide on IC specifications and standardization are
JEDEC (Joint Electron Device Engineering Council) and IEC (International
Electron Committee). JEDEC is composed of more than 30 compaaies headed by
powerful American makers such as Valos, GE, and DEC, and has more than 10
committees such as the package committee, each of which studies and decides
on specifications for various themes under ito ~urisdiction.
There are no legal restrictions attached to the items that are decided upon,
but marketing of any product which does not meet apecifications is very
disadvantageous, and every company makes every effort to cowe out with pro-
ducts which meet specifications. IEC has a similar function, but it points
toward systematizing specifications oa a worldwide level. Compared to JEDEC,
it is comprised more of academic people, and it lacks clout.
In any event, standardization of the 256 K arill be determined by MEDEC, and
announcementa of sample shipments will not be forthcoming until standardiza-
tion is accomplished. JEDEC says it is presently receiving proposals from
the different companies, and it wi11 be about half a year before any decision.
is made. As a result, it is said that "sample shipments will have to wait
until the latter half of this year at the earliest; any earlier date is out of
the question" (Fu3itsu executive).
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1982
Effect of U.S. Recession
, Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 13 Feb 82 p 5
[Article: "Increasing U.S. Irritation"]
[Text] There is increasing irritatioa on the American side in the Japanese-
American semiconductor friction. Thie is indicated by the recent move on the
part of the American Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) to regulate
import of Japanese the 64 K RAM (random read-in and read-out memory) through
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) followed by the criticism by
Commerce Secretary Baldridge of the Japanese semiconductor industry and trade
policies at a public hearing.
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry at present is saying out-
wardly that "there is currently no Japanese-American semiconductor friction"
(headquarters of Bureau of Machine Information Industry) and seems to be down-
playing any statements on the part of the American side, but it is anticipating
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a further increase in friction and is secr.etly provi.ding administrative
guidance to the large semiconductor makers. About tiie end of last week, the
top ecIzelon of the Ministry of Interaational Trade and Industry even passed
on the unusual statement: "Be discreet about dumping type exports which can
lead to criticism" to the vice president and director level of tfie six large
semiconductor makers, Nippon Electric, Hitacfii Limited, Fu~itsu, Mitsuhishi
Electric, Oki Electric, and Toshiba Corporation. At the same time, the
ministry is eacouraging foreign capital semiconductor makers to set up plants
in Japan and promote mutual interchanges between Japan and the United States.
In the background of this present rekindling of the Japanese-American semi-
conductor friction are: 1) the fear on the American side that there will be
a reversal in the Japanese-American relationship in the development of leading
technology, and 2) the American semiconductor industry is in deep recesaion.
The VLSI (very large-scale integrated circuit) is not only the mainstay of the
electronics revolution, but in the United States it is a vital technological
product in the military and space development areas. The VHSI (very high-spe
speed integrated circuit) development plan initiated in the United States in
1979 was designated a primary goal by the defense department, and the govern-
ment allotted $200 million for its developmeat. At the same time, military
and sapce related funds are increasing for the American semiconductor
industrq in the midst of the entire industry being faced with a recession;
it is estimated that the 1981 funds from this source increased 23 percent
over the previous year, to $600 million; the dependence of the industry on
military and space funds ia increasing with the years.
Despite this situation, the first salvo in the VLSI conflict involving the
64K RAM saw the Japanese forces take over 70 percent of the U.S. market; the
irritation of the U.S. Government and industry is very great, and there have
been increasing warnings that "if this aituation continues, we will also lose
out to the Japanese in the matter of the 256 K RAM." At the same time, there
are active movements against Japanese regulations. "We have no means to
counter trade friction that involves military and national defense" (Ministry
of International Trade and Industry official), and the present situation is
that this ministry has already begun to worry about the situation.
At the same time, the most recent industrial performance of the American semi-
conductor industry has been anything but good. The 1981 profit performance
of Intel, which is a central member of the SIA, dropped more than 70 percent
- below the previous year's level; even Texas Instrument (TI), which professes
to support a free trade systan, has seen a sharp decline in profits, to about
half that of the previous year during 1981. There is increasing peril that
continuation of the present situation will make it difficult to assure
' development funds for the next generation VLSI.
The IC (integrated circuit) customs duties, which had been a problem, were
lowered as the result of agreement on the part of both governments, and this
year's American duties are pegged at 4.24 percent (compared to 5.6 percent the
previous year) while the Japanese duties are 4.2 (from 10.1 percent thc previous
year), so the two countries are about the same where custom duties are concerned.
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~'Vn Vl'a'l~.?nI, uvl: V~~ILI
At the same time, there was a large decrease in Japanese IC exports to the
United States during 1981: the cumulative total for January-November was
500 million yen (3.4 billion yen for the same period the previous year),
and the export-import balance is in a state of equilibrium.
In addition, four companies, Nippon Electric, Hitachi, Fujitsu and Toshiba,
have been building plants in the United States, while the American companies
TI and Motorola have built plants in Japan, and it is to be expected that
there will be other foreign capital ventures which will establish plants in
Japan. It may be stated that where semiconductors are concerned, there is a
Japanese-American mutual exchange environment. The statements from the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Japan Electronic
Equipment Association to the effect that "Japanese-American friction in the
semiconductor area does not seem likely" stem from such a background.
Be that as it may, Japanese-American semiconductor friction is heating up
despite what some Japanese quarters say. "We do not know what demands will
be coming up next" (a top industrial figure) is typical of the increasing
anxiety. Industrial people are saying: "We must put greater effort into
onsite plants and increasing onsite production vol~e" and "If there is any
leading technology that needs to be obtained, we will not spare anything to
acquire it," thereby displaying their countermeasures, but the actual situa-
tion is that neither measure possesses decisive clout.
"The fastest way to avoid friction is, above all, for the American makers
to come out with a leading product" (Hitachi executive) is also a typical
comment heard. On the other hand, it is expected that semiconductor
friction between Japan and the United States will become even more fierce,
to the extent that development in leading technology will develop to the
stage of assuring national security and even to involve~ment in high-level
administrative problems.
In su:h a situation, Vice Minister Fujiwara of the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry said on the 12th: "This is a problem that will be resolved
only with semiconductors," as he put his finger on the real difficulty in
resolving this problem.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon TCeizai Shimbunsha 1982
Reciprocal Plant Construction
Takyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 17 Feb 82 p 8
[Article: "Solution for Trade Friction"]
[Text] Efforts on the part of American semiconductor makers to locate plants
in Japan have become more active. Fairchild, which is the seventh ranking
semiconductor company in the world, formally announced its plans to construct
an IC (integrated circuit) plant in Toso city, Nagasaki Prefecture, and this
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was followed by the announcement on the part of America's number two maker,
Motorola, that it too will begin construction of a new plant. In addition,
Intel, which is the largest micon maker, heads a list of several companies
which are planning to set up plants in Japan and together with the world's
leading semiconductor company, Texas Instruments (TI), will make up a list
of large semiconductor makers which over the course of the next few years
will be putting up production strongholds in Japan. In the other direction,
Japan's semiconductor makers have already seen five of their ranks producing
IC on American soil, plans for construction of second plants are rapidly
developing, and Japanese-American production is accelerating. The Ministry
of International Trade and Industry considers that "this mutual advance in
plant construction plays an important role in easing semiconductor friction"
(Machine Industry Information Bureau) and is welcoming these most recent
developments.
The reason American semiconductor makers have become anxiously involved in
setting up plants in Japan is to be able to utilize to the fullest the
superior business practices of Japan, including productivity and quality
control. TI, which initiated semiconductor production in Japan in 1968,
has already put up three semiconductor plants in this country. Among these,
the Miura plant in Ibaraki Prefecture which was completed near the end of
1980, has been designated the production plant for the 64 K RAM (random
access memory), which is the firet-round product in the area of VLSI (very
large scale integrated circuits), from among the many TI plants distributed
around the world, and a considerable volume of this plant's products are being
exported back to the United States.
It is said that this decision was based on the high evaluation of the pro-
ductivity and strict quality control exercised in Japanese plants. E~en the
American makers that are planning to put up plants in Japan say: "The
success TI has enjoyed in Japan has been a major stimulus." Motorola plans
to start production of the 64 K RAM at its new plant, and there is very great
possibility that the Japanese plants of these various companies will be their
VLSI production plants.
At the same time, there is an appealing factor in the Japanese semiconductor
market for the American semiconductor makers. The market scale for 1981 was
estimated at about $4.5 billion, which is greater than the $4 billion for
all Europe combined and is right next to the $7 billion for the United States,
making the Japanese market the second largest in the world. Furthermore,
the rate of growth of the Japanese market for the first part of the 1980
decade is expected to continue at about a 20-percent pace, contrasting sharply
with the American rate of growth, which has leveled out.
These are the reasons why the American semiconductor makers are spotlighting
production and sales in the Japanese market, to take the strain off the
American market which is still suffering from recession.
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rvn VD[`~I.IHL a~Ja. V1~L1
President R. Skako of the lOCI-percent Fairchild-financed Fairchild Japan
(main off ice in Shibuya in Tokyo, capital more than 450 million yen)
stressed the advantages of this company's move by saying:. "Not only have
production and supply times been reduced, but products to meet the user's
requests can be developed and produced," revealing a policy of reinforced
sales efforts in Japan.
In the midst of rekindled Japanese-American semiconductor friction, there
has been increasing cr.iticism on the part of the SIA (American Semiconductor
Industry Association) with regard to the closed nature of the Japanese
market. On the other hand, these entries of American makers into Japan have
the effect of negating these criticisms, and the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry welcomes these moves. At the same time, Japanese makers
are more active in putting up plante in the United States, and some easing
in the semiconductor friction may be forthcoming.
Mutual Advances in Plant Construction on the Part
of Japanese-American Semiconductor Ma.kers
American Side Japanese Side
TI Tsurugadani, Saitama-ken, Rome (formerly Sunnyvale,
Hinode, Oita-ken, Toyo Dengu California
Miura, Ibar~.ki-ken Seisakusho)
Motorola Kaizu, Fukushima-ken Hitachi Limited Dallas, Texas
(joint with Toko)
Plans for new plant Nippon Electric Californiaiew
Fairchild Toso, Nagasaki-ken Fujitsu San Diego,
(expected to start California
operation Aug 1983)
InCel Plans to construct mass Toshiba Corpora- Sunnyvale,
production plant tion California
Advanced Plans to construct mass
Micro production plant
Devices
~AA'm)
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982
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Comparison of Industries
Tokyo DENSHI GIJUTSU in Japanese Vol 24, No 1, Jan 82 pp 94-96
[Article by Hiroshi Semi. Conclusion of article published in JPRS L/10332,
18 February 1982, of this series]
[Text] Production: The American semiconductor industry was originally
nurtured under the mission of responding to the challenges of the military
and space related industr3es. As a result, it may be said that "selective
awareness" was the controlling factor during the 1970's before the IC
production process was stabilized. In other words, it was only necessary
to select those items from the total number of IC produce3 which met the
specifications. Otherwise, there was the situat3on that no other production
process was available.
The interest of technologists working in the semiconductor industry was
initially directed at innovations or improvements to the production process.
The American, with his pioneer spirit, Ioves to work at the frontier, which
in a spirit shared nationally has his interest naturally drawn in the
direction of development of new types of IC, for example, the "design area."
As the cou�nercial market demand for IC's increased with the 197G decade, the
top interest of the American semiconductor industry was divided between two
points .
The first point was to come out on the market with an innovative IC design
one step ahead of the competitors as early as possible. The second point was
to put mass production of this YC on track as early ae possible. The estab-
lishment of mass-production technology even 1 day ahead of the competitors
would enable a cost superiority. The introduction of new products backed up
by an innovative feature strengthened the power to control the market.
These two points were the basic strategies of American industry. Any company
with these two points which entered the f ield with reasonable timing could
not be driven from the market. Proper timing meant that these two items
should not be too early or too late. There are many examples of businesses
which failed because of being on the scene too early. The Koger Company,
which cornered a number of IBM graduates and made an attempt to start off
as a memory speciality maker, is a good example.
Where Japan is concerned, it was the practice in the past that basic technology
including knowhow was introduced from American industry. Those products which
were manufactured with th e use of imported technology were first of all incor-
porated into the company's own system products to be used within the plant.
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ruK ~rr~~~AL u~~, uNLY
in other words, there was a market for the minimum quantity required for
startup. As a result, the compleCion of the built up technology, that is,
the problem of how to achieve a good product rate from a single wafer,
became the focus of attention.
It was the high quality of Japanese labor that supported the plan to improve
yield at the lowest levels, and the small variation in quality is also a
measure of this quality. This superiority in quality over the United States
is manifested in the stabilization of a manufacturing process in a compara-
tively short time. Once a process is stabilized, the introduction of
automation is not too difficulC.
- This historical difference on the part of Japanese industry is manifested
in the farm of a memory which may be considered in the light of a built-in
technology crystal. The production of I~S memory by American industry during
the June-Auguat quarter of last yea.r was an average of 4 million units per
month, or roughly 2.3 times the Japanese production.
On the .other hand, if we look at the most advanced 64 K DRAM, three companies--
Hitachi, Fujitsu and Nippon Electric--can stand up with the best five in the
world. Fujitsu and Nippon Electric also occupy the top ranks in the area of
the 16 K DRAM, which again is booming (according to informat3on from the
Dataquest Company).
Quality: It may be said that the superiority af this built-in technology that
is distinctive of Japan is founded on this difference in the basic concept of
quality.
The Japanese cons~er is known the world over for subjecting not only semi-
conductor products but all purchase iteme to a rigorous examination.
Semiconductor products are required to go through not only mechanical strength
tests but various deterior~tion tests under varying temperature conditions,
and the electrical properties tes~s are rigorous. An American industry
representative has dubbed these "tests to declare goods unacceptable."
THe basic concept of a producer in Japan is the perfection principle, in
which he makes every effort to come out with a product more perfect than his
competitors. There are many instances in which products with specifications
that are better than those indicated by the customer are produced due to
competition with other makers.
The United States is in a different world. The United States is a country of
contract companies, and seller and buyer are in a sort of antagonistic
relationship. Where the seller is at the borderline of the customer's
specifications, he pushes the contract to the limit as long as the specifica-
tions are met. To be sure, importance is placed on how low costs can be
lowered. Greater weight is placed on price competition than on quality
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competition. This was one of the points of dissatisfaction a certain top
, executive of one of Silicon Valley's top semiconductor makers displayed
when he saw the severity of the inspection on receipt of goods by Japanese
industries.
The product his company produced deviated slightly below the specif ications.
As a result, the customer, which was a Japanese company, re~ected the entire
lot. Another supplier will only ship products all of which meet specifica-
tions, so why should only this American industry m~ber ask for "sg2cial
treatment." This is how the Japanese industry countered.
When seen from the eyes of American industry, such an emphasie is beyond
comprehension. This practice is the product of a function principle which
is the relationship between the acceptance principle and the frontside-
backside unity principle. The American view is that as long as the IC
product fulfills its role as an IC, then it is a beautiful product and even
though it deviates slightly below specifications, that really should not
matter.
Competition: This difference in attitude toward quality on the part of
Japanese industry is the result of the early perfection of a production
system which came out with products of high reliability. Amer3can industry,
which until about the middle of the seventies regarded Japanese production
strength lightly, finally came to real3ze the high reliability of Japanese IC
products and began to draw a protective wall about itself.
President Spock of National Sem3conductors heads those who believe that "the
battle involving technology, productivity and quality with the Japanese forces"
has started, and he is spurring his fellow workers on.
Japan's monthly IC production volume last year was about 220 million units per
month, compared to the 500 million per month of the United States. There was
a rapid increase in Japan's linear IC production this past year. The average
monthly production from January through August was about 450 million units for
the United States, while Japan showed a rapid increase to 260 million.
It is clear that Japan is fast catching up on the numbers. Looking at the
price factor, the per-unit price of the Japanese product dropped almost
10 percent over the previous year, while the cost of the American product
is holding steady. That is why the specter of Japanese industry catching up
in the matter of numbers can be somewhat discounted. The source of this
ninnbers boom in Japan is the so-called private use items in the home enter-
tainment area. When seen from the standpoint of expansion rate, VTR type
products are the mainstay along with facsimiles reflecting the OA age and
office equipment including cameras, voice and audio equipment.
In the area of MOS memory which American industry is pushing, the overall
picture is one in which Japanese industry is not falling behind. While these
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data are limited to June-August of last year, American companies shipped
40 million units per month. The competing Japanese industry was able to
come up to slightly less than 20 million units per month. If we look into
the individual memory production as well, it seems that Japanese industry
holds a greater share in the leading product area.
The trends of Japa:zese induatry include moving from memory to logic in the
area of single IC, and from hardware to software in the systems area.
American industry is also rolling back to meet this challenge.
Products: The pattern of this rollback on the part of American industry seems
to be to avoid memory in which the built-in technology is the basic item
and to go into micon-related and custom-related IC where software service
and design capability are required. The very high speed IC is associated
with advances in the VHSIC (very high speed integrated circuit) plan under
the direction of the Pentagon, and this may turn out to be an area where
Japanese industry will not be able to contend.
Great effort is being put into the large b3t micon series, which involves
development of products close to systematization.
Micon products bedecked with software represent an area where American
industry has taken over the world market. The American forces are moving
toward establishing an even more secure foothold on the world market taking
advantage of this controlling power. Intel and ArID recently entered into a
10-year technological cooperative program. Intel will provide the
technology.
There are grounds to think that there will be even more moves toward joint
efforts between industries in the valley. This is because the top people
of the various companies in the valley have the common background of being
"Fairchild graduates."
Industry Strategy: Semiconductor products are superior worldwide products.
They possess wide applicability to all types of items in all countries of the
world. At the same Cime, these are superminiaturized 3tems ma.king it
feasible to transport them to any part of the world in short order.
On the other hand, if the share of any country's market is to be increased and
service commensurate with the purchase price is to b e provided, the production
base alone cannot keep up. This is the role of multinational corporations.
This will involve Japanese companies setting up bases in the United States
and in European countries not only as se~niconductor device makers but also as
peripheral equipment industries.
Where multinationalization is concerned, the Americans have already taken some
steps in that direction. For example, the representative semiconductor
industry of the United States, Texas Instrument;; (TI), already has production
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~
plants in mor e than 10 countries throughout the world and has long had
multinational statuL. It has four production plants in Japan. The competing
Japanese industries are only now beginn3ng to go international. Among the
Japanese companies, multinationalization on the part of Nippon Electric
seems to be the most advanced.
itole of the country: Up till now the Japaneae Goverriment hRS. ranked semi-
conductors and computer industries as strategic industries in view of their
importance and large impact, and has protected and nurtured these industries.
On the other hand, there will be a w3de reduction in IC import duties starting
in the spring of 1982 as the result of pressure from the United States to
even precede the lowering by the American aide, and the present situation is
that outside elements will b e allowed to participate even in the area of
national pro~ ects. The United 5tates is reexa~3ning its leading industries
from the viewpoint of national defense. It is very possible that this will
be followed by efforts to prop up some industries.
There are many situations in which high-level technology and leading
industries are closely interwoven with a nation's security. Private industries
in the United States have raced into technological cooperation with other
industries in the interest of preservation, and they are screaming for the
removal of Japan's so-called noncustoms barrier. Should the governments get
involved, Japanese American relations~w311 probably become more complex.
The protective trade mood which prevails in the United States will probably
strengthen this trend considerably.
The electronics industry centered on the semiconductor industries of the
United States and Japan will become the power to "control the world"
(President Sanders of ANID Company).
COPYRIGHT: Electronic Engineering 1982
2267
CSO: 4106/70
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. NUK VPNII:IAL U~r. UNLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SEMICONDUCTOR TRADE FRICTION WITH UNITED STATES DISCUSSED, PART II
Japanese IC Industry's View ~
Tokyo NIKKAN ROGYO SHIMBUN irl Japanese 24 Feb 82 p 14
[Text] There are signs that semiconductor trade friction between Japan and
the United States will be rekindled in a connection with 64 K memories, but at
a press conference in the Keidanren Building (Otema.chi, Tokyo) on the 23d,
Managing Director Toshio Takai of the Electronic Industries Association of
Japan countered U.S. criticism of Japan by saying: "IC [integrated circuit]
trade between Japan and the United States is in balance at present, and the
two countries are in a complementary relationship with an active exchange of
technology and capital investment; there are no real problems." He stressed
mutual prosperity in a statement on the argument over the 70 percent share of
the 64 K RAM market held by Japanese companies: "Dema.nd has only begun; this
is no time to discuss market shares. U.S. companies with their own production
facilities, such as IBM and Western Electric (WE), are already fully involved
in quantity production, and other tna~or semiconductor companies are improving
their production facilities; it wi11 not be possible for Japanese companies
to take over the entire market. We hope, in fact, that quantity production in
the United States will be established quickly."
The association press conference on IC trade with the United States featurec~
Takai and, as a company representative, Nippon Electric Corp Vice President
Tadayoshi Ouchi. Saying that it is first necessary to know the facts
regarding the balance of IC trade between Japan and the United States, Takai
explained that the balance of IC trade differs from trade in television sets
and automobiles in that Japanese imports exceeded exports throughout the
1970's, and although this chang.�.d to an export surplus in 1980, even that
surplus was a mere 700 million ys:~; trade is quite evenly balanced.
With regard to capital investment and exchange of technology, Takai stressed
that U.S. IC manufacturers like Texas Instruments, Motorola, Fairchild,
Intel and Analog Devices are locating production facilities in Japan, and
Japanese companies like NEC, Hitachi Ltd, Toshiba Corp, Fujitsu Ltd and ROOMA
have moved into the United States; productior. is being extended actively in
both directions, and the semiconductor industries of the two countries are
in a complementary reiationship. He went on to say that last September the
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governments of Japan and the United States agreed to accelerate implementation
of the tariff cut to 4.2 percent, the rete that is the final goal of the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. At that time both countries came to share
the perception that free trade in semiconductors should be maintained and
supported, and the basic ~udgment was made that semiconductor trade between
Japan and the United States is not a problem.
With regard to imports of Japanese 64 R dynamic RAM's, the object of
increasing criticism in the U.S., it was said that: "If we compare demand
to a marathon race, the runners have started but they have onlq gone 200 or
~ 300 meters; this is not the time to argue about the size of market shares.
The wo rld market will grow 2.90 fold, from $63 million in 1981 to $181 million
in 1982, then up 4.8-fold to $880 million by 1985. This is a sector of rapid
growth." He explained that this market cannot be monopolized by Japanese
companies; the United States has great latent dyaamism in the sector of
advanced technology and can catch up in a single spurt of enthusiasm, so Japan
is hoping for a relationship of coexistence.
NEC Vice President Ouchi said: "Trade in IC's is completely free, but trade
friction cannot be eliminated as long as overall trade is out of balance. The
need for 64 K RAM's is quite strong in the United States, and we have sold
them at a fair price. It is the U.S. user who would suffer if Japan stopped
exporting now. We can only await the beginning of quantity production in the
United States. Our position was explained by the Esaki mission." He thus
indicated that the industry does not want voluntary restraints on exports.
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha ].982
NEC President's View
Tokyo DENPA SHIMBUN in Japanese 6 Mar 82 p 1
[Text] Nippon Electric Corp Vice President Tadayoshi Ouchi recently said,
in regard to semiconductor trade friction between Japan and the United
States: "The criticism from the United States is abstract. Even the SIA
(America's Semiconductor Industry Association) has found recent moves by the
administration and Congress to be harsh and Hard to understand."
Ouchi also stated his views as a representative of the industry at a press
conference on "the Japanese understanding of semiconductdr trade friction"
held at the end of February by the Electronic Industries Association of
Japan. Since then he repeated criticism of the United States while telling
a reporter of this newspaper of recent trends in the semiconductor industry
and the trade issue.
According to Ouchi, Japanese semiconductor sales grew 10 percent in 1981,
but U.S. sales fell 4 percent. Japan experienced this strong growth because
of increased domestic demand for such things as home VTR's [videotape
recorders]; global exports remained leti�el, and exports to the United States
were down from the previous year. The poor state of the U.S. semiconductor
industry was due to the general slowdown in business; even if exports from
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Japan had increased they would not have exceeded a 4 or 5 percent share of
the U.S. market, so they would not have hurt the business of U.S.
' manufacturers.
Ouchi said that the sudden outpouring of criticism from the United Stat~s
since the beginning of 1982 was nothing but the use of Japan as a scapegoat.
He stressed that the problem is a drop in overall demand within the United
States, and unless demand improves, criticizing Japan will not really change
anything.
The 64 K RAM's, however, are another matter. The reason Japanese companies
have such a high share of that U.S. market is that Japan took the lead in
production technology and improved yield. But the 64 R RAM is a product for
which there is a growing market, and U.S. criticism of the size of the
Japanese share of the market is wide of the mark in that this is only the
beginning. According to Ouchi: "If we compare it to a marathon race of over
40 km, the runners have only gone a few hundred meters and are still in their
starting dash."
Ouchi said there will be a large market for 64 K RAM's from 1983 through
1985; the 256 K R.AM, about which Japanese newspaper accounts have excited
the United States, is expected to become dominant in 1986.
Reportedly there are those who consider the size of the Japanese share of the
U.S. market for 64 K RAM's to be a problem in terms of U.S. defense and who
want to invoke national security (to have the President prohibit imports
which threaten security). Ouchi said: "They talk about the defense problem,
but at the same time they want Japan to buy their advanced technology. When
64 K RAM's are sold to the United States, it is impossibl~e to know what
equipment they will be used in until the user installs them. There have been
cases in which 64 K RAM's sold for civilian use in telecommunications
equipment have been used in military applications, but the particular
details cannot be learned." He complained that the market for 64 K RAM's
is just getting started, and "this is not the time to take up national
security provisions" in connection with defense.
A report of the Joint Economic Cou~ittee of the U.S. Congress entitled
"InCernational Competition in Advanced Technology and Development of Trade
in the Semiconductor Industry," pointing to the issue of 64 K RAM prices,
said that with the support of the controlled do mestic market, Japan was
quickly able to ~ve into quantity production and export 64 K RAM's to the
United States. Although many experts did not expect the price to fall
below $10 until 1982, Japanese manufacturers cut the price to $5 even though
demand remained high. Ouchi denied this, saying: "I don't know about other
(Japanese) manufacturers, but dumping just isn't possible for us." He said
the price leaders in the U.S. market are the U.S. manufacturers, and Japanese
products cost 17-18 percent more in the United States than in Japan because
of tariffs and merchandising costs.
Thus Ouchi said the criticism from the United States is abstract and not in
accordance with the facts. Criticism previously came primarily from the
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SIA, but recently it has come, for unknown reasons, primarily from the
administration and Congress.
~ Ouchi repeatedly stressed the status of the semiconductor industry: (1) the
equilibrium in semiconductor trade between Japan and the United States;
(2) Japan's accelerated reduction of its higher IC *_ariffs to the same
level as those of the United States; and (3) the absence of nontariff barriers
and the resultant development of positive investment and sales activity in
Japan by U.S. manufacturers. He said that in order to avoid friction,
Japanese companies are moving in the direction of: (1) avoiding price
competition so there would be no suspicion at all of dumping, (2) increasing
the use of production facilities within the United States, and (3) persuading
the government that semiconductor trade friction is not a matter limited to
semiconductors, but part of a trend of criticism of Japan in connection with
the deficit in the U.S. trade balance.
COPYRIGHT: Denpa Shimbunsha 1982
MITI's View
Tokyo DENPA SHIMBUN in Japanese lU Mar 82 p 1
[TextJ The Japanese Government's policies to aid high-technology industries
such as semiconductors and computers have been labelled by the United States
as unfair, a nontariff barrier, and an element in the economic friction
between Japan and the United States. But according to information revealed
by an informed source on the 9th, government aid to the computer and IC
industries is much higher in the United States. The view of MITI [Ministry
of International Trade and Industry] is that, "the scope of assistance is
larger in the United States; this runs counter to American criticism." The
U.S. misunderstanding of the facts in the trade problem is obvious, but
apparently government assistance will continue to be sub~ected to unreasonable
criticism.
The Japanese-U.S. Trade Subcommittee met at the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo's
Kasumigaseki on the 9th and lOth. There were to be consultations on the
promotion of joint development pro~ects and trade in high technology products,
but for some time the United States has criticized national assistance to the
computer and IC industrie~, and has pressed to have them participate in
these projects. At the hearings on trade held by the Joint Economic Com~ittee
of the U.S. Congress on 10 February, Commerce Secretary Baldridge complained
that exports to the United States had increased rapidly because of a nontariff
barrier in the form of government research and development aid to the
Japanese semiconductor industry. On the 12th, Minister of International Trade
and Industry Abe countered that such criticism is contradictory.
The central question is whether the U.S. complaints that government assistance
is higher on the Japanese side are indeed correct. Information from an
informed source on the 9th confirmed that government assistance to the
computer and IC industries in 1981 and 1982 is much higher on the U.S. side.
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This information shows that the United States provides abundant assistance
through government organs like the NSF (the National Science Foundation), NASA
(the National Aeronautics and Space Administration) and the Defense Department;
in both years the total assistance was larger than Japan's by a factor of 10.
In the 4 fiscal years beginning in 1976, Japan completed a VLSI [very large
scale integrated circuit] development pro~ram (total resesrch cost about
70 billion yen) which has been criticized by some quarters in the U.S.
semiconductor industry, but the United States is carrying out a VHSIC [very
high speed integrated circuit] program (1980 to 1986; $225 million
committed). Even if Japan's VLSI development had been continued through 1980
and 1981, the various U.S. efforts would still have a higher total.
MITI has recognized that the U.S. Government's research and development
budget for high technology industries is much higher than Japan's, and it
intends to refute the one-sided criticism from the United States.
Government assistance in this field is not limited 3ust to the United States
and Japan; there are also strong assistance programs in European countries--
over 10 million yen per year in Britain, some 12 billion yen in France, and
over 30 billion yen in West Germany.
Japanese assistance policies focus on establishing basic technology which
can be expected to become important in the future and which must be handled
over a longer period than 1 year. Government assistance is considered
indispensable in all cases covered.
The dominant view in Japan is that the balance of government assistance to
high technology industries is tipped very much toward the United States, which
has developed its defense and aerospace industries. This is clear from
recent government budgets; U.S. criticism on the point is simply inaccurate.
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FUli UF'N7ClAL US~ UNLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
TRADE ACTIVITIES WITH BULGARIA, EAST GERMANY REPORTED
Bulgarian Magnetic Grinding Technology
Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 2 Dec 81 p 1
[Text] Toyo Kenmasai Kogyo To Engage in a Joint Venture With Bulgaria Concerning
Magnetic Grinding Technology Imports
On the lst, Toyo Kenmazai Kogyo (president, Chikara Takahata; headquartered at
1-2 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo; telephone, 03-453-2351) announced the establishment of
a join~ concern, "To-Bu MX," which will import magnetic grinding technology (MX)
join�ly developed by~�the Bulgarian Government and its Industrial Laboratory. It
ha~ already completed the procedures for obtaining a license to establish a company
i~i Japan; the company will be officially established after a license is obtained
From the Bulgarian Government, which is expected to be granted in the middle of
this month. This is the first time industrial technology will be imported fsom
Bulgaria. ~
Toyo Kenmazai Kogyo, a comprehensive grinding machines trading firm, has imported
grinding technology from the United States and has engaged in sales of grinding
machines. It considers the 1~C manufacturing technology developed by the Bulgarian
Industrial Laboratory a remarkable one, and since last year it has been negotiat-
ing with the Bulgarian public corporation. The capital of the 3oint concern is
20 million yen; the proportion of investment is 51 percent by Toyo Kenmazai Kogyo
and 49 percent by Bulgaria; the president will be Mr Takahata.
The MX technology uses a magnetic field between electromagnetic poles to create
a powerful grinding brush condition between the magnetic grinding material, a mix-
ture of ceramics and iron powder, and the grinding objects; the grinding takes
place either by vibrating or rotating the two. Conventional grinding technology
uses only nonmagnetic grinding material, not magnetic material. The secret of
this method lies in the magnetic grinding, by which the surface of odd sh~tpes can
be ground freely. It will be used for grinding auto parts, parts for home elec-
tric appliances, and precision parts such as those used for sewing machines and
watches.
As of March next year, the joint concern will begin sales of magnetic grinding
machines and magnetic grinding materials; the sales target for the first year is
200 billion yen. Sales territories will include Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Southeast
Asia, the United States, Canada, and Australia.
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C01'YRIGHT: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha Tokyo Honaha 1981
East German Machine Tools
Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHII~UN in Japanese 7 Dec 81 p 1
[Text] Toyo Kogyo and Sumitomo Corporation To Import Machine Tools From East Ger-
many; Reciprocal Import for "Familia"
Reportedly, Sumitomo Corporation (president, Mitsuo Uemura) and Toyo Kogyo Co Ltd
(president, Yoshiki Yamazaki) have decided to import machine tools for engines
from East Germany aiming at next fall. Thfs is the first cancrete measure of the
barter trade on the basis of which Sumitomo Corporation will import goods from
East Germany as a reciprocal measure for Toyo Kogyo's 10,000 compact "Familia"
automobiles, for which an export contract with East Germany was concluded by
Sumitomo in Ma.y of this year.
In addition to Toyo Kogyo, Sumitomo Corporation plans to export annually an average
of some $5 million worth of East German-made machine tools to Third World countries.
The machine tools which will be imported from East Germany jointly by Sumitomo
Corporation and Toyo Kogyo are a portal plane grinding machine by Uscher Sreiben
[phonetic] Corporation and a horizontal boring grinding machine by Union Corpora-
tion; a total of two units worth approximately 200 million yen. Toyo Kogyo will
install these grinding machines in its main plant in Hiroshima and use them for
cylinder type engines.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha Tokyo Honsha 1981
Robot Exhibit at Leipzig Fair
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 23 Jan 82 p 4
[Text] The First Japanese Robot Exhibition in Eastern Europe; Five Japanese Com-
panies Including Fujitsu To Exhibit at East German Trade Fair in March
At the spring trade fair in Leipzig, East Germany, which will last a week begin-
ning 14 March, for the first time five Japanese companies will exhibit industrial
robots and robot technology. The Leipzig Fair will be the first in the East
European bloc to include a Japanese robot exhibition, and since East Germany and
other countries are eager to import robots, this fair may be a turning point for
creating a Japanese-made robot boom.
There are five participating robot-related companies, including Fujitsu and Kawa-
saki Heavy Industries, which are participating for the first time, and Toshiba,
Dainichi Kiko, and Oa Tsuki. Fu~itsu and Toshiba intend to exhibit robots and
demonstrate operations. Kawasaki Heavy Industries plans to exhibit video, and
Dainichi Kiko and Oa Tsuki plan to introduce robot technology for a plasma cutting
machine which was jointly developed by the two.
In spite of high standards at research institutes, the actual condition of robot
technology in East European countries is such that their robots have only single
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operational capability at actual production sites, and their production volume is
also very small. But each country is anxious to import; particularly East Germany,
where the trade fair will take place. East Germany has announced a policy to re-
solve its labor shortage by introducing 45,000 robots by 1985 in line with its
5-year plan. However, it is obvious that East Germany's robot plan cannot be
achie~.' `hrough domestic production capacity alone; therefore, it is strongly
predicted that the majority of robots will be imported from Japan and the advanced
Western countries. Aside from East Germany, an interest in robots is growing in
Czechoslovakia and Romania, and their own developments are underway; however, it
is an undeniable fact that they lag behind in technology.
With this background, Japan has become the center of attention for the world's
highest robot technology, production capacity, and the number of robots at work.
Many East European countries in addition to East Germany will visit the Leipzig
trade fair, and it is most likely that this first exhibition by Japanese companies
will encourage exports to the countries of Eastern Europe.
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1982
Bid on East German Plant
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 26 Jan 82 p 8
[Text~ Nisshin Steel To Engage in Technological Cooperation With East Germany by
Offering Bid on Polished Band Steel Plant
On the 25th, Nisshin Steel Co Ltd disclosed that it plans to make a bid on the
polished band steel cool rolling plant plan by East Germany's Oranienburg [pho-
neticJ public corporation including both software and hardware. In May of last
year when Chairman Honecker of East Germany's Council of State visited Japan, he
asked Nippon Steel Corporation to cooperate in this plan. However, since the plan
concerns the area which is Nisshin Steel's specialty, the latter took over and has
since been negotiating. Nisshin Steel will submit an estimate to the East German
industrial plant import public corporation by mid-February. It is likely that
West European steel manufacturers will also bid, but Nisshin Steel seems to offer
the greatest advantage in terms of its accumulation of software, etc. Nisshin
intends to make its effort in the present negotiations with a view to making this
the first step toward cultivating the East German market.
The Oranienburg [phonetic] public corporation is a polished band steel plant lo-
cated northwest of Berlin which presently owns a French-made cold rolling facility
(annual production capacity, 60,000 tons). It imports hot rolling coils from the
Soviet Union and manufactures polished band steel by the cool rolling method. Its
actual production appears to be about 20,000 tons per annum. The demand for
polished band steel, which is used for a wide range of industrial products such
as precision machines, is growing in East Gerniany; therefore, it is planning to
install a set of rolling mills with an annual production of 36,000 tons, a cutting
machine, a packaging line, etc.
In cooperation with Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (rolling mill) and Toshiba
Corporation (electric and instrumentation-related), Nisshin Steel is aiming at a
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blanket contract for designing, machinery, and operational guidance. The total
estimated sum is approximately 4 billion yen. The plant manager and others from
the Oranienburg [phonetic] public corporation came to Japan last week and are
presently visiting Nisshin Steel, taking a tour of its 'fianshin plant.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982
9711
CSO: 4106/50
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~'Vn Vl'~'ll.lAa. ~lu~:. VI\Ll ~
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
MILITARY TECHDIOLOG~ COOPERA.TIODI WI.~H UAIITID ST,A~ES DISCUSSID
Tokyo NIKKEI BUSINESS in Japanese 8 Feb 82 Bp 66-71
[Article by Shogo Imoto]
[ Text ] The Uni,ted. S ta.tea Has Ita Eyes on, .IaBaa~. We
Want 3apanese TechnnLogy' ; Id,ea of Cteatia,g Su.bcon.tractor
Bases for Conversion to Military Appl.ications
--The United Statea is asking Japan to ptovide mi7.itary
technology.
--The ma~or objective is U.S.-Japaneae ~oi,a.t devel,opmeat
of military prod,ucta euch as el.ect.ronic pxoducts~ r�ather ~
tha.n acq,ui,ri,ng existing techaology. There is a pa~ttern.
o� attempting to make Japan a"eubcoatractor base" �oz
military technology. There ia even. an idea. o� creat3,n,g
aubcontractore for actua,l weapona.
--The reason for th3.s is the lack enough techn,iciana
- in the Uni,ted States to kees up with mili,taxy expansion.
and the impravement i.n technical ability of Japanese
industry.
Bulgiag De�ease Budget; the Un.i.ted, Statea Ls Sti11. Di,ssati.$�ied.
"When, i.t comes to m3li,tazy tecb~ac>I.ogyy Japaa ma,kes no attem}~t tc~ suBBLY
any to America. ~ i.a st~a,nge. We wan,t to aee the zestrictions removed.."
In the middle o� December ]..ast year, Undersecreta~y of the U.S. Department
o� Defense (in. charge o� technology) made thi,a statemen.t~ stzongl.y ~equesting
that the Defense Agency cZea~ the wa�y fot provislon o~ Japax~esE m3.litary
technoLogy to the Un.i,ted States and ma,ke etrucCuraL improvementa. This
occurred i,n the thixd rotind of the regul,ar U.S~~Japan armsmen,t technol,ogy
conferences,
It began with talks in June o� last year between Directoz Genezal. Omura of
the Defease Agency (his ~os3.tion a~t tiu.t time) and~ U.5, Seczetary o� Defense
Wei,nberger ~ Z'he a~~gumeat at the a~msment cou�e~ence waa an ea~tensi.on of this.
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The United Statea is purauing a chaage in Japaa.'a three pti.nciDl,es against
arans export which maintain the Dosi.ti,o~i. :"We wi11 not eaport arm.s
(technology) to any country." The Americans ate saying: "It is natural
not to export to the commuai.at bloc or to warring nations~ but why can you
not give military cooperation to an ally like the UniLed. States?"
In response to this~ the govermnent, principally the Ministry of Foseign
Af f airs, the Def ense Agency, and MITI F are working out a un,i.f i,ed governnn.ent
position. The Miniatry of~ bteign Affairs and the De�esn,e Agency are
consolidating their views along the li.ne that "on the basis of the U.S.-
Japan Mutual Security Treaty~ export o� azms (technology) to the United
States can, be handled se~arately �rom the th~ee prin~ciDles." However�
MITI sees di�ficulty in, this and tiie diacussioas are not progresaing
toward a conclusion.
The government has been strengtheaing defense, for inata,nce by ad.oDting a
budget wi,th a bulgi.ng deEense allotmen~t in 1982. However, there i.s no
end to charges by the Un,~,ted. States thst JaDan is getting a free ride
in security." The Defense Agen,cy and the Ministrq of Foreign Affairs are
both ready to go along, say3ng: "I� we do not approve even of weapons
technology ex~orts, we canrwt avoid U.S. criticism.."
So, wha.t sort of Japnaese military technology is the United States seeki.ng?
This i,s a question that ari.ses because the De�ease Ageacy's actual. research
and d.evelopmen,t expendi.tuses i,n, 1.981 were onZy 3I.7 billi,on~ yen.r Nippon
Electri.c Presid.ent Tadahi.ro Sekimoto says: "That is n,ot even. as much as
our company alone spends on reaearch aa~d develoDmeat.: In compazisoa,
the U.S. exDenditurea for military reaeazch and developmeat i.n 1980,
converted to yen~ were 3.3 trillion yen (at a rate of 230 yea to the dollar).
That is more than 100 times the amount of Japanese apending, a great
difference.
"They are far ahead of Japan in basic tecluwlogy, advanaed technology, and.
systems techn,ology �ot aircraft~ space expl,otation, and nuclear power." The
people i,nvolved in, defense at companies like Mitsub~.shi Heavy Zndustries~
Mi,tsubishi Electricy and. Nippon Eiectric all eay the same thing in
different ways. There does not seem to be any reason for America to go
out of its way to ask Japan for techaology.
However, the focus of concern ia not this very military type of techno ogy.
It is consum.et technology. A great deaL of technology has been developed
in Japan whi.ch can vetyr readi.Zy be converted to military applications. 'L'his
ie wha.t America hae i,ta eyes on.
So what aort of technology is this? Ztao or three apecifi.c. eazam~les ate
given below.
U.S. Interest i.n TDK, Hitachi, NEC
Ferrite, a Material That Absorbs Electric Waves
"We would like to sample of the ~aint containi.ng ferri.te develo~ed by you.z
company."
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rv~c vrri~.iNa. v~c viv~i
In December last year, this desi.re wa8 eaD~essed to Z'DK Flectroai.cs by the
U.S, Embassy i.n Japan, Ferti.te is an, oxide o� aJ,loys i.ncl.udixi,g iron, and
it is superior to other matezia,l.s as a radio-~wave-absorbi.ng materiaL. TDK
_ is preeminent in the world ia farrite development. It almost monopoli.zes
the field. It already ae11s electric wave-leakage-~prevention materia.l for
electronic ranges, material for preventing television wave harm, and material
to prevent unnecessary electric wave radiat3on for use in ships' radar.
However, the technology for abaorbing electric wavea has grea.t significance
for milita.ry purposes, If it were painted on missiles, they could hi,t their
targets wi.thout being discovered by enemy radar. If it were u.sed on self-
def ense shi,ps and fi.ghter planesy there would be no worry about being
disc.overed by the enemy. For thia reason, TDK hss been carryi.ng out 3oint
development of Daint contai.ni.ng ferrite wi.th Mitsubiahi Seavy Industries
missile development division.
It is not surprising that the United Statee ia interested. The development
of the "invi.aible bomber Stea,Ith" wae annouaced i.a the p1.an. �or strengthening
nuclesr capabi.I.i.ty yreaented. by U,S, President Rreagan last fall� "If we
apgLy TDK`s �e~rite, we can succ.eed in.development." We get the impression
that this i.s what the Ameri.cans are thinking.
TDK has little to say. "The patent related to 3oint development with the
Defense Agency is held by the Defense Agency, and we are not in, a position
to decid.e on suppl.yi.n$ a sam~le�" The Defense~ Agen,cy also apBears embarrassed,
The Equi.pment Bu.teau, says: "Whs,t we are doing now is Baiati~ng the aelf-
defense sh~.Ds with paint con,taiaing ferrite. This is atill at the basic
rasearch stage. It is no*. a substitute matetial that can,be apglied
im~ediately. The United. 3tates ia probably thinking of studying it litterally
as a sample."
However, informed sources in the industry point out: "Right now, there is
no material superior to ferri,te as an e1.ec.tric-wave-absorbi.~a.g materia,l. It
is certai.n that the Uni,tf~l States is high.ly interested." Of course, this
is a matter related to mii.itaty? technnlogy export, and there is no
concl.usion yet ou a su.pply of samgles.
Planar-Polarization-Maintaining OBtical Fibers
This optical �iber with the difficult naane was developed by the Hitachi Ltd
CentraL Research I.abo~atory. Optical fibers provide a path for optical
coamnunicati.on usi.ng a galss thtead the aize of a human hair. ComBared to
con~enti.onal coD~er Ii.nes� they can handle a great deal more transmitted
in�o~cmation. The glana~-~polazi.zation-~maintaining optical fiber maintains
a set di.recti.on o� the pla,ne of li.ght oscillation.. Nat only does it have
a greater volume o� transmission caDacity than existing optical fiber, it
can be used i.n the gyroscope~ which measures the position,of airplanes and
misai.les, and. reportedly qua.d.ruples the precision of conventional gyros.
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This o~ti,caL �il~ez was deveLo~ed ia, the �a,1�I, o� 1.980 by the II3.tachi. Ceatral
Resea.rch Labotato~yr a8 a w~tld ~~~at~ Natv,~a,I.].q~ i.t a.tttacted tiie attention
of many cou,utti.es au~d theze wa~ a risah a~ iaq~s.ixi.ea~ i,acLudi,n,g oae fzom the
U.S. Navsl La.boratory. San.ehito Rudo~ secoad deDa.z~t manager at the
Hitachi laboratory, saye with p~ide: "Ou~ ma,jv~ objecti.ve is appli.cations
fo~ optical. coaimunication aad oDtical IC's. O~ur techaical atandards are
second to none."
Infrared Charge-CouDl.ed Device (IR.-CCD)
IR-CCD's comb3.ne the charge-coapLed devi.ces (CCD`a) used as the "eyes" in
video cameras wi.th ia�rared. detectioa devices (IR` s) . Fxpected, aD~Li.cati.ons
for consumer use include med.ical, diaga~osis of the Iu~aa body sad detection
of defecte in ovens or kilns. If they are appl,ied to m.i].itaty eq,uipment,
they would exert power as the "eyes" of miasilea. The I8+-CCD installed in,
a miasi.le would diacrimi.nate the infrared raqs em3tted �tam aircraft, ships
or tanka as an i:nage and accurately detexmine the ta~get ao that i.t would
be di��i.c.ul.t �or the enaay to escape from the missile.
'Ehe De�ense Agency ataxted devela~meat of thia lR-CCD in 1981, commissioaing
three cc>m~s.n~.es, Toahi.ba Co~, Mitsubiahi Electric, and Fu~itau~ to do the
research. CCD's have alreadq been introduced in video camerae. The Japanese
technical 1.evel, in. thi.s f ield ia high aaad has atttacted the notice o� the
UniCed. Sta.tes and Eu~oye.
These a~e ~u.at a�ew exsm~lea. Theze are many other examples, al.though
' sca.ttered., o� advanced .TaDanese technology which i.s at the highest world
level. These i.ncl,ude VLSI's (verq I,axge-acale integrated circuits) ~
computets, oDti.cal, communic,a,tioa~ equi.ymeat~ in~dustrial, robots, ceram3ca~
carbon �i.bers, an,d sensora.
For examDle, ia, optic.al. commuaicatioas~ these wae an "i,acideat" seneatiAa-
ali.zed. i.a~, th,e newaqaDets 3,n m,id-January: "dpticat co~m~.3.cationa eq,u3.Dment
made by Ni,DDon. Flectric was used. by U.S. Axmy for mi.li.tary pur~oaes," This
demonst~ated the ~eiL~e o~ this techn,ology in an extreme �ashion.
This wa.s a case i.n. which the optical communications eq,u.ipment delivered to
a.subsid3.ary o� A.T&T (Am.ezicaa Telephone and Teleg~aph) by NEC ~ the fall
o� 1980 was used. �o~ the pu~eI.q m,iiita.zy ccra~ut,icati.vns n.etwork o� the U.S.
a~y.
NEC's aenior esecutive managi.ag directo~, Riqoahi. Rak~.ta~ sayss "That o~ti.cal
com~nunicat3.ons eq,uipRaent wae not "milaDec" (m.ili.tary sDeci,�ication,s) . Zt
was made according to apecifications for otdinary publi,c li,nea. We had. no
iciea it would be ueed for military purpooea." Some sources ia the industry
aay: "It ie not poasible that NEC did not know somethtag like that."
~ However, the problem is that even equipment made for ordinary publi.c lines
could be used for military purposes.
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rvn vrr~~.~~+a, v.ua. v~~t.i
Ordina,rily, it is n.ecessa~y tv meet military sDeci�i.ca,ti,ons tor resistance
to stron.g shocks aad sha,~y �I.uctuati.oiu irc hum,idi.ty an,d tem,p�rature whea
making military eQu~i.Dment. The zeasoa that NEC's oyti.cal commuai.cations
equipment, made accordin.g to apeci~�i.cations tot private 1i.nes~ could be
ueed for mili,tary purpose~ i,s that it had suffic.iently high reliability.
In addition, it is repo~ted that the U.S. large military eq,ui~ment company,
Rockwell International, is carryin,g out joint development on rocket engines
and electron3.c. data anal.ysis technology with Mitsubishi. Seavy Industries
and Hitachi.
Three Principlea o� Arms Export: Shackles on Joint Development
In the paet, it was a common pattern for advanced technology to flow from
military to ci.vilian aDplications. However~ recently, examDles of a reverse
�low, from ci,vi.lian to military, are growing. The dividing line between
civi.lian and mili,ta.ry has become very vague. Some reasons �or this are the
expansi.on o� the consutner masket and the de~and of users �or high q,ua,li,ty
and imDroved. pe~�otm,atice. Progress in coi~s~mer techaology is fastest in
.TaBan,.
As shown in the accompanying table, there are many instances of Japan ta,king
the I,ead in recent exchanges of advanced technology. In terms of payments
and receipts of compensation for technology in technology exchanges~ receipta
in 1980 were 26.3, with payments set at 100, so the amount of payments was
much greater. However, the amount of receipts is. growing year by year. (See
graph) Therefore, it is natural. for the U.S. Defense Department to take an
interest in Japanese consumer technology.
Another reason the United States is asicing Japan to provide military
technology is a shortage of technicians. With the end of the Vietnam war
and the Carter administration's cutbacks in the defense budget, the number
of engineers and technic.ians in the U.S. military supply industry has fallen
dramatically in the last 10 years. Subcontractora have especially decreased
in number. The 6,000 companies which subcontracted with the serospace
industry have shrunk to 3,500. Those related to the navy have decreased
by 25 percent,
Therefore, it is hard to coBe with President Reagan's great military
expansion poli.cy. The production of one extra F-15 or F-16 fighter would
require a year and a half. No matter how many technicians were hired, it
would not be enough.
Amid thia noisy debate over military technology exports, MITI is behaving
cautiously. MITI has pseviously maintained thst "exBorts of multipurpose
technology which can be used for either civilian or military purposes ia
approved even under the present three principlea for arms." It seems to
think that if that is the case, there is no need to handle it separately
from the three principles or for America to pueh for revision of the three
principles.
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Indeed, there are already several eicam~Lea~ auch as Mitsubiahi Heavy
Industries, Hitachi and Rockwell Lntes~national, carrying out "actual"
military technolo.gical collaborati.on und.er the rubri.r o� multipurpose
technology. T'hereforey the MITI position is some~ahst understanda,ble.
However, although the United Statea well underatands MITI's intentione,
it has not withdrawn ita demands for provision of weapons and technology.
And the Miniatry of Foreign Affaira and the Defense Agency are attempting
in some way to answer the demand. Why hae this eituation occurred?
Military analyst Masateru Tachibana explaina this difference as follows:
"It is difficult to use consum,er technology for military purposes as is.
Performance must be greatly improved so that it will withstand operation
under difficult conditi.ons and nc~t break down. If we go that far~ it
becomes purely military technology and this violates the three princip].es."
In other words, America is af ter more than exiating technology. It wants
~oint development or shared development of itnproved and new technology
based on existing technology.
Japan is weak in systems technology such as that required for rockets and
the BADGE syetem (sutomatic ari defense warning control system). Therefore,
even in ~oint development or shared development, Japan would mainly hxndle
subsystems such as electroni.c. parts and electronic control devices or
peripheral devices tor rockets. In any case, there would be no expectation
of great advantages for America with only existing technology under the
limitations of the three Brinciples.
This fact coincidea with the tremendous drop in U.S. military subcontractors.
"Creation of a aubcontractor base for military technology"--America wants to
use Japanese manufactureres as subcontractors ttrrough ~oint development and
shared development pro~ects.
However, will the problem end with technology exports? Voices in the
Japanese de�ense industry are asking: "Isn't America asking for actual
product (arms) exports?"
Concept o� Uaing Subcontractors: The Japanese Axe Watching Developments
"It is essential to avoid dirt in the manufacture of IC's, so employees
have to change into sanitary clothing before they enter the work area.
However, in America there ie a strong feeling that women never take off
their shoes exc.ept in bed, so it took a year ~ust to get the female employees
to remove their ahoea." This complaint was voiced by NEC President Sekimoto
concerning the IC plant purchased in the United States.
The reduction in American productivity and the decline of modified technology
and production technology is apreading into alI fields. 'I'he American military
journal NATIONAL DEFENSE discusses this subject in almost every issue.
However, in Japan there are many examples of improving the performance of
original American Broducts, such as aircraft manufactured under license
from the United Statea, by replacing most of the oId parta. Also~ it is
reported that American IC's have miasing wires or defecta in wiring more
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often than in Japan.ese pzoducte. A, te~on for the desire to use lapenese
manufactuters as subcon.tractots i,s a scheme to obtain not ~u,st sdvaaced
technology but production technol.ogq and. ptoductian coattol, technologq.
Hajime Karatsu, executive managing director of Matsushita Com~nunications
Industry Co Ltd and an expert on production technology, eays: "What is
truly lacking in the United States, rathern than advanced technology, is
production technology, modified technology, and production control. Japan's
factories have plenty of this." This area seeme to be what the United
States has its eye on.
However, this technology is inseparably linked with the training aad
experience of workers in the factory, It ia not easy to export technology
alone. In that case, we come to the concl_usion that the simplest method
is to export produc.ts (arms) directly.
If this happens, there is a clearer conflict with the three principles,
As the United States presses for the Drovision of mil.itary Cechnol,ogy, it
may be planning a�uture sc.enario in which Japan is a subcontracting base
for both softward (technology) and hardware (arms).
How is Japan going to deal with this? Firat, let us look at pri.vate
corporations. Th.ey are very calm on the surface. They seem to be watching
deve].opments, Mankichi Tateno, chairman of the JaBan Arms Industry
Association and president of Nippon Steel Works Ltdi comments ae follows;
"I do not know what the United. States is seeking. I cannot reply while the
governmen,t is undecided about the three princiDles on.arms. Zt goes without
saying that our duty is to follow government policy. Therefore~ if arms
(technology) exports to America are allowed~ we intend to cooperate
approgriately with the United Statea. Of course, we are buainess
corporations, so we cannot do anything that ia not profitable."
The problem is the later stage of "business." Joint development of advanced
technology is attractive. From the companies' point of view, whether they
are subcontractors or aomething.else~ there is no point in not going along
as Iong as the American arias induatry is providing the development expenses.
Also, when it.cAmes to export of products (arms), much greater profits can
be expected than for technologq exporta.
MITI vs Forei~gn Ministry and Defense Agency: What Will the Nation Decide?
On the other hand, there are also disadvantages. i�ere is a danger that
the United Statee mi,ght grab Japan'e apecialty technologies, such as
computers, optical comauunications~ and sobots~ in the neme of military
cooperations and uae them �or coneumer products, thus reducing Japanese
competiti,veness.
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In addition, export o~ wea~ons (tech~ology) (ev'ea Eo~ parte) would bring
with it clearez di,stiactions between �ri,endly couatr.i.ea a.nd e~m,y covntries.
If countries opposi.ag the Uni.ted Sta~tea dec3.d.ed that '~the �si,ends(Japan)
of our enemies (the Uni.ted States) are o~.r en,em,i.es~" aad boycotted. the
consumer goods that make up the majoti,ty o� Japaa,ese eaports, there would
be aerious problema.
Because complicated factors of advantage and di.sad.vaatage are iatertwiaed,
business says: "Nothing i.s decided, so let ua watch qui.etl.y."
So what ie the governmeat going to do?
The posi.tion of the Japanese (~overrnaeat is not sim,ple. When i.t comea to
arms (techrwlogy) exports tA the United Statea, MITI~ unlike the Forei.gn
Ministry or the Detenae Agency, reportedly dislikes takiag cri.ticism in the
Diet and 3.8 unwilling to put exports to America ia a aeparate category.
However, the ei.tuation 3.8 n~ot that simple. MITI is the overaeer of iadustrial
Bolicy. It is more auaare even than industry itself of the disadvan,tages
�eared by industry which might accom~any the export of weapons(technology)
su,ch as "a boycott of Japaneee producte bq enemies of the United Statea."
In addition, there is the problea? of the position of the "natioa." Trlhile
researching this atticle, I ran, into thie view from a milita~y-related
source:
"The United Statea i,s a�raid o� Japan becomiag a ma~or military power in
Asia. If it ca~ cxeate a aubcontrar.ti,ng baee here for technology aad arms,
it will know the level. resched by Japaaese mili.ta~y techaology aad can
eaeily control it. That ia its ul.timate aim."
From the American point o� view, it would be easier to control Japan if it
makes it into a aubcontractor.
However, Japan is also a"nation", ao while it continuea to give importance
to its alliance with the United States~ it also has a desire to retain a
relative degree of independence as an independent country. "That is why
MITI is dragging its feet. Even if the Defense Agency is willing to allow
exports, it whould check each item of technology and arms for appropriateness
so that Japan is not plsced totally under U.S. control."
The same military source summed it up this way: The industrial freedom of
Japan as a nation ahould be carefully preserved. It seems that MITI~ the
Ministry of Foreign Affaire, and the Defenae Agency all concur on this
point. If this ia true, even *F the three principles were revised~ it is
difficllt to imagine that arms (technology) exports would expand very
rapidly. In any caae, tFt.e i.esue ot the export of arms (technology) presents
a difficult chcice to the nati.an.
There Are Many Instances of Japaneae LeadexshiB in Recent Exchanges of
Advanced Technolagy with Europe and the United Statea
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Examplee o� ma~or technnl.ogy ea~chax~,ges (ia,cludi.n.g items uader aegotiation)
--VTR ~oint ventu~e between Japan Victo~, T'hosn El~i. o� Gsea,t Bri.ta,ia~ and
Telefunken of West Geimany
--VTR ~oint venture between Matsu,shita Electric and Bosch o� West Germany
--Request to Mitsubishi Electric �rom Westin.ghouse fox technological
assistance in robots for use in the semiconductor industry
--Joint developmeat of new boiling water nuclear reactor between Toshiba,
Hitachi, Tokyo Electric~ and GE
--Joint development of preseuriz~d water nuclear reactor between Mitsubi,shi
Heavy Industriea and Weatinghouse
--Jet engine development (XJB Pro~ect) between Ishikawa~ima Harima Heavy
Industries and Rolls Royce of Great Britain
--Jet passenger aircraft ~evelopment (YXX Project) between ma~or American
aircraft manufacturers and Mitsubiahi Heav~,~ Industries and other companies
--Joint development of charcoal-fired boilers between Kawasaki Heavy
Industries aad Babcock o� West Ge~tnauiy
--Cooperation and commezcialization of hot water turbine between Mitsui
Shipbuildiag aad Bi�use [phoneticl o� the IInited Statea
--Information exchange on a small VTR with built-in cameta between Sony�
Hitachi, Mataushita, etc, and Kodak
--Minifax ~oint venture between Matsushita Electrical Tranamisaion
Eqtiipment and the Britiah Goverrnment
--Information exchange on com}~uter and electron exchange technology between
NTT and IBM
--Joint developm.ent o� turbo-charger for use in ahips between Ishikawaji.m,a-
Iiarima and BBC of Switzerland
--Industrial robot technological assistance from Fu~itsu France to Six
Hundred of Great Britain
--Technological asaiatance for induatrial robots and aemiconductor
technology from Hitachi to GE
--Lithium battery technological assistance from Matsuahita to Rayovac
--OCR (oDtical character reader) technological assistance from Nippon
Electric to Barrows o� t~he Untted States
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--Large com~uter a,nd Qemironductar techaolo~ical uai,4taace �rom Eu~itau
to ICL of Great Britai,n
--Technological asaietance �o~ ahiD turbo-charger from M3tsubishi Seavy
tnduetries to GEC of Great Ba~,taia
~~i[~ b Mmtt~~~~M ~t a ~[r~
1. ~ .
~�m
25(%)
20 '
2� 51 ~l~ 52 53 54 ~ 55
Expanding Trend. o� Fxport Rate �or Techn4logy ~rade
1. recei ts o� technolo �ees
payments o technology �ees
2. 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980
COPYR,IGNT: Nikkei-Mcgraw-Hi11~ Inc 1982
9651
CSO: 4106/60
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
'NIHON KEIZAI'HAILS TOYOTA-GENERAL MOTORS TIE-UP
OW121423 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 10 Mar 82 morning edition p 2
[Editorial: "The Strategic Significance of Toyota-GM Tie-Up"]
[Text] The trump card Toyota Motor Company has been holding, just in case it
decided to move into the United States, was a business tie-up with General
Motors, the world's largest automaker and its faremost rival in the global
small-car war. The top leaders of Toyota and GM, namely Presidents Toyota
and Smith, have agreed to enter into negotiations on the possibility of jointly
manufacturing small cars. Details of the ~oint venture will be worked out in
the future. But, according to the general idea, the two automakers will set
up a joint company to produce as many as 500,000 small cars by using small car
technology developed by Toyota.
GM and Toyota rank first and second, respectively, in the world's auto industry.
Judging from their size, naturally the U.S. antitrust laws will be the greatest
hurdle the two auto giants have to surmount in effecting the proposed tie-up.
Nevertheless, Toyota's decision is most opportune in view of the present acute
economic friction between Japan and the United States. Since the decision will
go a long way towards defusing tension, we support it and hope that coming
negotiations will proceed smoothly.
When realized, the tie-up will be unprecedented in industrial history in its
scale and impact. It will pose a threat to all automakers at home and abroad.
It will also have a cruc~.al impact on the reorganization of the world's auto-
mobile industry currently under way in the middle of the small car war and on
the new auto industry map which will emerge in the wake of that reorganization.
More importantly, the tie-up has great strategic significance in coping with
the Japan-U.S. automobile issue in the future. In retrospect, before Japan-U.S.
friction increased over the automobile issue, the United States had strongly
urged Toyota to build a factory on her soil. Thus how fast Toyota would re-
spond to this call was regarded as the key to settling the complicated auto
issue. Once there was an idea of ~ointly producing cars with Ford. But Toyota
maintained a cautious approach to the question of building a plant in the United
States. But now it has opted to tie-up with GM. This decision has been partly
promoted by the fact that auto exports to the United States have dropped since
the imposition of self-restraints, making it clear that there is a limit to car
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exports. Aside from this background, Toyota's decision to respond to the re-
quest for building a plant in the United States is in itself of great signifi-
cance.
It is also important that the tie-up will practically take the form of techni-
cal assistance provided by Toyota, thua being in the nature of industrial
cooperation in reviving the U.S. auto industry. At present, negotiations are
under way to limit auto exports to the United States to approximately 1.68
million in the second year of self-imposed restraint beginning in April, or
the same level as this year. Despite this and other measures, the U.S. auto
industry has not yet recovered fram its slump.
GM is no exception in this regard, despite being the first.among the big three
to embark on small car development. J-car sales are not so good either--the
J-car made its debut last year as a full rival of Japanese small cars. This
indicates that it is not so easy, even for such a giant as GM, to complete a
nroduction system in the small car field in which it has little experience. In
joint production with Toyota, GM aims at that particular class of small car
which it has never undertaken to produce. Thus the projected joint production,
as a typical mode of industrial cooperation, will be helpful in hastening GM's
recovery.
_ Some time ago, GM made capital-participation in Suzuki Motor Company in reversal
of its small car strategy and adopted a plan to receive small c3r supplies from
Suzuki. Joint auto production with Toyota is in addition to this. Emerging
from all this is a new division of labor, centering around GM, with Japanese
firms charged with the production of the class of cars smaller than the J-car.
Establishment of this kind of division points to the direction in which Japan-
U.S. auto trade will be stabilized in the future. Toyota's strategy to move
into the United States following that direction may well be said to be another
judicious decision.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1982
CSO: 4120,1213
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h'uR Ur'r'1CtAL u5~. U~LY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
JAPAN TO PROPOSE JOINT RESEARCH PROJECTS
OW011206 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 31 Mar 82 p 5
[Text] Minister of International Trade and Industry Shintaro Abe Tuesday
reported to Prime Minister Zenko Zuzuki Miti's draft plan for the Japanese
delegation's proposal at the Versailles summit in early June.
Miti's tentative plan, though broad, places the emp.hisis on a proposal for
nine joint research and development projects with other summit countries
in such high-technology areas as robotics, communications satellite launch-
ing, and integrated digital and fiber-optic communications networks.
By taking the initiative in such joint R&D pro~ects at the Versailles summit,
Miti hopes that Japan will be able to make a positive contribution to the
alleviation of the persisting friction with other industrialized countries
and fend off harsh criticism from summitteers, as well as demonstrate that
Japan is playing the role of a powerhouse of the world economy.
Miti is working on the plan so as to spare Japan from total isolation at
the Versailles meeting, since Japan alone has been running a lopsided surplus
in trade with most other summit member countries.
Minister Abe advanced a joint R&D proposal at the trilateral trade forum in
Key Biscayne, Florida, in January. The European economic community has been
asking Japan to take such initiatives for the past year or so.
Under the draf t plan, participating countries are to pool a fund for 8-to-10
year-long.~oint projects. Japan wi11, Miti envisions, make a contribution
of 50-100 billion yen to each of *_he agreed-upon projects.
In the communications satellite area, a Japan-U.S.-Europe group or a Japan-
Europe group will launch satellites primarily for broadcasting educational
programming to developing countries: The launching itself will be undertaken
by the U.S. or Europe while Japan is to provide the needed communications
system~, especially receivers a~d programming.
In the communications network area, Miti plans joint development of integrated
digital/fiber-optic networks which are similar to the information network
system (INS) being developed by the Japan Telegraph and Telephone Public
Corp (NTT).
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily Newa, 1982
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~
SCIENCE AND TECI-INOLOGY
JAPAN EYES SATELLITE BROADCASTING Ih 1990'S
OW221305 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 22 Mar 82 p 3
[Text] In the report the study and research council on the diversification of
broadcasting submitted on Friday to Posts and Telecommunications Minister
Noboru Minowa, it says that people will be able to enjoy television broadcasts
using broadcasting satallites in the 1990's.
Broadcasting satellites will make it possible for people to enjoy TV programs
that are as clear as movies, the high-fidelity reproduction of music, and to
receive, by means of a facsmile machine, hundreds of thousands of pages in
just 30 seconds, as well as still images with sound.
The report called for studies on technical developments, the establishment
of technical standards, the benefits to listeners and the economic feasibility
of such broadcasts.
The council was established within the Posts and Telecommunications Ministry
in ,Iuly 1980 and consists of 15 professors, ~ournalists, researchers and critics.
They studied demand trends, technical developments and problems connected with
future broadcasting policy.
The report submitted Friday to Minowa consisted of three parts: (1) trends
toward diversification in the broadcasting field; (2) outlook for and problems
of broadcasting policy; and (3) proposals.
Symbolic of the whole is satellite broadcasting, which will begin with the
practical broadcasting satellite (BS-2) to be launched in March 1984. There
will be color broadcasts on twa channels; both channels will be used for NHK
broadcasts to remote islands and mountainous areas, where the reception of
ordinary broadcasts is poor, and during disasters.
Later two satellites, BS-3 and BS-4, will be launched to make available eight
channels under an international agreement. Users can receive broadcasts any-
where in Japan if they turn a bowl antenna one meter in diameter toward the
point where longitude 110 ~aegrees east crosses the equator.
The problem is economic feasi:.'_lity. If the advertising charge system is
adopted, the NHK channels will compete with commercial broadcasting stations.
The report proposes that the broadcasting waves be encoded and that listeners
, buy magnetic cards each month ot insert into decoders. The proposals are, in
~ffect, for pay television. The report says that such broadcasts will be
economically feasible if 10 million people buy the pay TV receiving cards.
COPYRI(~iT: Asahi Evening News 1982
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ELECTRONICS FIRMS TO BOOST PLANT EXPENDITURES
OW271407 Tokyo the DAILY YOMIURI in English 26 Mar 82 p 4
~Text] According to latest investment forecasts made available to Kyodo news
service, six major semiconductor firms expected to spend at least re~~ord 160
billion yen ($653 million) in the new fiacal year starting 1 April.
That figure will bring to at least 430 billion yen ($1.7 billion) industry
expenditure on plant and equipment between fiscal 1980 and 1982.
"We will lose out to our rivals if we fail to make proper plant and equipment
investment," one senior company off icial said.
Nippon Electric Company, the industry leaders, will increase its investment
to 40 billion yen in the forthcoming fi;~cal year against 38 billion yen in
the current fiscal year 1981.
_ Hitachi, Ltd plans to raise investment by 7 billion yen to 35 billion yen
while Toshiba Corporation will increase investment by SO percent to 30
billion yen.
Fujitsu, Ltd and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation have refused to disclose the
amount of investment this year, although it appears certain to be more than
current spending of 34 billion yen and 14.8 billion yen, respectively.
New investment by OKI Electric Industry Company in the new fiscal year will
be limited following the completion of a huge investment program in Miyazaki,
Kyushu.
The ensuing battle over plant and investment in the Japanese semiconductor
industry is partly reflective of the country's dominance in the market of
64 kilobit ram (random access memory) components.
Current plans call for the six leading semiconductor makers to achieve a
monthly production of one million 64k rams meet strong U.S. demand.
Nippon Electric and Toshiba however, are starting construction of plants cap-
able of producing a 256k ram which can store 4 times more information.
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Hitachi and Fujitsu are considering acquiring land for similar plants.
A major feature of their new investment programs is a shift of production
sites from Kyushu to Honshu and Hokkaido.
Nippon Electric is now building a 27 billion yen plant in Kanagawa and plans
to build a 5 billion yen plant in Akita-ken starting this summer.
Toshiba also has plans to start work on a 10 billion yen plant in Kanagawa-
ken.
Fujitsu has secured a plant site in Miyagi-ken, while Hitachi is discussing
construction plans with the city of Chitose in Hokkaido.
COPYRIGHT: DAILY YOMIURI 1982
CSO: 4120/210
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
DIVISION OF SUPER COMPUTER R&D EFFORT DECIDED
Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 9 Feb 82 p 9
[Text] JJ by F~jitsu, Hitachi, and Nippon Electric
Parallel Processing System--To Be Decided in FY-83
The tectinical research association of high-speed computation systems for
science and technology (director: T. Yamamoto, president of Fujitsu)
recently set the FY-81 assignmenKs for supercomputer technical research among
the six member corporations and began research. Each corporation is focusing
on research in its respective specialized field, but the parallel processing
system was assigned as collaborative research for the six firms. According
to the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, the policy, as a rule,
is to release the research results to foreign firms as well.
Supercomputer research is the assignment for the Electrotechnical Laboratory
and for the association. The FY-81 research project for the Electrotechnical
Laboratory includes the niobium Josephson ~unction (JJ) device, the gallium
arsenide field effect transistor (GaAsFET), and the parallel processing
system; whereas the private sector association was assigned the lead JJ
device, the high-speed electron movement transistor device (HEMT), GaAsFET
integration, and the parallel processing system.
The assignments for the six firms are: the JJ device for Fu~itsu, Hitachi,
and Nippon Electric; HEMT for Fujitsu an~ Oki Electric; GaAs for Toshiba,
Nippon Elect.ric, Mitsubishi Electric, and Hitachi respectively; and the six
firms will work collaboratively on research on the parallel processing system
in which multiple basic processors are simultaneously operated. These
research projects are expected to continue through FY-82 (in :he government's
budget proposal, 117 mii.lion yen for the Electrotechnical Laboratory, and
696 million yen for the private sector, totailing 813 million yen) with the
same assignments. However, regarding GaAs, the Agency of Industrial Science
and Technology states that due to the high research level of the private
sector, the weight of the future research assignment may shift more heavily
onto the private sector.
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Ln supercomputer development, the decision for a parallel processing system
is very important, along F�ith research on a high-speed logic device and a
high-speed memory device. However, the Agency of Industrial Science and
- Technology expects that a decision on the processing system will nqt be made
until FY-83. At that stage, the six firms will be assigned arehitecture
and software development.
The research results obtained in this project up to 1989 will all revert to
the government. However, the government believes it is important that these
industrial properties and knowhow be transferred to the private sector as
much as possible and plans to popularize them through the Association for the
Promotion of Industrial Technology. The Agency of Industrial Science and
Technology states that as a rule, foreign firms are not discriminated
against; however, in that case, whether or not to treat them on the same
level as Japanese firms is an industrial policy issue.
A supercomputer is a system for large-scale, high-speed computation such as
high-speed processing of satellite images, simulation of a nuclear fusion
reactor, meteorological analyses, etc. The goal is to develop a system with
~ the capacity of above 10 BFLOPS (10 billion floating point arithmetic per
second). The duration of the research and development is 9 years, from FY-81
(3 months) until 1989, and an R&D fund of 31 billion yen is scheduled.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha Tokyo Honsha.1982
7722
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� v~\ V~ ~ ~t.~~~? uv..~ V~~V �
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
RESEARCHERS DEVELOP ANTINEUTRON FIBER
OW051445 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 3 Apr 82 p 3
[Text] An epoch-making synthetic fiber which can effectively stop neutron
rays has been developed in joint research by Kyoto University's Nuclear
Reactor Experimental Laboratory and Toray's Fiber Research Institute.
This fiber is made by enclosing a special powder that absorbs neutrons inside
the small fibers. Cloth made from this synthetic fiber can be used to pro-
text unaffected parts when a patient is undergoing neutron ray treatment.
Also, depending on the way it is used, it can be effective to some extent as
protective clothing against neutron rays from nuclear bombs.
There is the possibility of large orders for this new synthetic fiber from
countries which are worried about nuclear attacks.
This fiber was developed by Kei~i Kanda, assis tant professor at Kyoto Univer-
sity, Shigehiro Ouchi, chief Toray researcher, and others in three years of
research and experiments. A patent has been applied for in connection with
its use in cancer therapy.
A report on the new fiber was made by Toru Furubayashi of Kyoto University's
Nuclear Reactor Experimental Laboratory Friday at the annua.l meeting of the
Japan Nuclear Energy Society in the Engineering Department of Osaka Univer-
sity.
The cloths experimentally.made by Toray are a woven white cloth and a knitted
black cloth which contain lithium floride in powder form and boron carbide in
powder form, respectively. The fact that both lithium and boron absorb
neutrons was utilized.
The lithium has been enriched so that the groportion of lithium 6, which j_~
the isotope with the highest neutron abaorption rate, contained in it has
been raised from the 7.5 percent in natural lithium to 95 or 96 percent.
The yarn used to make the cloth is 0.03 millimeter in diameter, but 40 per-
cent of the weight of the yarn consiats of neutron-absorbing powder. The
main material used in making the fiber is polyethylene, but other details
have not been revealed because they are trade secrets.
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Kanda would like to use the cloth made from fiber containing lithium to pro-
tect surrounding areas when conducting the neutron treatment of brain tumors.
Because it can be easily woven into cloth, there is the poasibility that it
can be used for protective clothing against neutron rays from nuclear bombs.
Kanda believes that such protective clothing may not be too effective against
neutron rays from neutron bombs, but may be effective to some extent against
neutron rays from atomic bombs.
But such protective clothing would b~e powerless against gamma rays, so it
would have to be worn inside buildings and sheltera.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Evening News 1982
CSO: 4120/222
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r~ux ur~h~c:tAL ~5~. uNLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN VARIOUS KINDS OF SENSORS DESCRIBED
Intelligent Sensor
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in~Japanese 18 Feb 82 p 8
[Text] Sharp has incorporated a sigaal treatment circuit in one section of
the presently available optical sensor (sensor) to develop an intelligent
sensor, and this product has been designated "OPIC" and will be produced by
the company starting this spring. The optical sensor is a vital unit
widely used with industrial robots and various NC (numerical control)
machinery, but the company, riding on the wave of the popularity of
mechatronics (electronization of machines), is sensing a sharp rise in demand
for intelligent sensors to replace the former sensors used in this area. It
is said that in the United States, GE (General Electric) and TI (Texas
Instruments) are pushing plans to develop and market intelligent sensors as
part of their coming strategic products, and Sharp's entry into this field
has spurred the development race among domestic and foreign companies.
The acronym OPIC coined by Sharp is a synthesis of optics (science of light)
and IC (integrated circuits). This is an instrument in which amplification
circuits and constant voltage circuits have been incorporated into the fo rmer
optical sensor to give it a signal treatment capability, and the various
function:: have been integrated into a single product.
An "OPIC converted photocamera," which is a pairing of an already developed
light emitting section and a light receptor section and detects the presence
and transit of items, and an "OPIC converted photointerrupter" containing logic
circuits were developed, and sample shipments to users have been initiated.
The production line at the Tenri plant (Nara Prefecture) is being expanded,
and the company plans to initiate monthly production of 50,000 units by the
middle of March. The company further plans to double production by next year
to a pace of 100,000 units per month.
The company also plans to convert multifunctional-type solid state relays,
sensors for optical fiber use, and color sensors to OPIC forna, and it plans
to introduce these products to the market successively during the next half
year.
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Expansions are also being made into areas other than optical sensors including
temperature sensors "EMIC" (provisional name) and gas sensors "GASIC"
(provisional name) in a policy intended to app~y intelligent capability to
all types of sensors presently sold under th~ name "...IC."
The intelligent sensor is a strategic product on which the large semiconductor
makers both domestic and foreign have just started research and development.
It is considered that for an industrial robot to acquire the degree of
intelligence it needs, it must be provided with sensors which have the
capability of duplicating the role of human nerves in sensing external stimuli
and transmitting the information to the brain. Where the present sensors can
only sense light or sound, the newer sensors will incorporate the capabilities
of a microcomputer and consolidate all of its functions on a single base
plate, according to pr~esent plans. In this sense, the Sharp OPIC is the first
step toward the intelligent sensor.
In Japan, Yamatake-Honeywell announced plans to engage in active development
of "intelligent sensors " together with the Honeywell company of the United
States, and there is good possibility that the frontline battles between the
various companies will quickly intensify.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha
Thermal Sensor
- Tokyo NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 6 Mar 82 p 1
[Text] Urawa--Shibaura Denshi Seisakusho (main plant, Urawa-shi, Saitama-ken;
president, Kenzo Kitamura; capitalization, 150 million yen) in cooperation
with Kyoto Ceramics has succeeded in the development of a temperature
sensor (sensor) which combines a fine (high densification) ceramic with a
semiconductor element. Mass production will be started soon. Great thermal
shock strength and a rapid thermosensitive response rate are some of its
features, and this company will continue joint research with Kyoto Ceramics to
couple this sensor with micons and engage in other application technology.
It plans to expand application to a wide market area, including industrial-use
air-conditioners, office equipment, and then response sensors for industrial-
use robots.
Development of Intelligent Robot Market
This new type sensor is called a~"neothermy" sensor, which is a combination
of the thermister (variable thermal resistance semiconductor) element which
is Shibaura Denshi's forte and fine ceramics, and the highlight of this
development is the technology to match the theru~al expansion coefficients of
the constitutent materials of the thermosensitive section. Since the
sensitive sections is sheathed in ceramic, there is great strength with regard
to both thermal and mechanical shocks. Its response speed as a sensor is
0.2-1 second, and its thermosensitive range i~ from -5 to 450�--far beyond
the capabilities of previous sensors. The company has applied for patents
in Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and
Switzerland.
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At the same time, a process has been developed to produce this sensor whereby
intrafurnace operations result in a quasifinished product. Where former
sensor production was plagued with lengthy finishing and assembly operations,
mass production advantages can be realized by this process for neothermy,
and it is said that Shibaura Denship plans to market the product at the low
price of 300-350 yen. Test production of the product is under way at the
company's main plant in Machitani, Urawa-shi; production line expansion is
under way at its daughter company, Tohoku Shibaura Denshi (main office,
Tazawako-machi, Akita-ken; president, Kenzo Kitamura; capitalization, 20
million yen); and production at the plant is expected to begin in earnest in
in April-May.
The policy will be for Shibaura Denshi to be in charge of running the business
and sales; sales of 200 million yen are anticipated for the next several
years. The patent rights with Kyoto Ceramics will be decided by coordination
between the two companies, a~d they plan to reinforce exchange in technological
areas from here on to develop applied technology and cater to customer's
needs. Kyoto Ceramics is a ceramic company and as such has been test
producing ceramic production engines, and Shibaura Denshi has been
complementing this by conducting research on sensors to be used with these
engines.
First Salvo in the Cooperative Battle
Shibaura Denshi is a master specialty maker which does a business of 3 billion
yen per year centered on temperature sensors. There is the uneasy situation
that the temperature sensor market is expected to grow at the rate of 30-40
percent each year, and this is prompting large makers such as Hitachi Limited,
N?atsushita Electronic Parts, and TDK Electronics to move into this field. In
order to cope with tfie entry of these large adversaries into this area,
Shibaura Denshi plans to "strengthen cooperative efforts with leading
industries in dissimilar areas" (President Kitamura), and the cooperative
effort with Kyoto Ceramics is the first salvo in this battle.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982
Visual Sensor
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 9 Mar 82 p 9
[TextJ Fujitsu Fanuc (Seizaemon Inaba, president) has developed a"position
adjustment sensor" with visual capabilities and will soon offer this sensor
as an option with its industrial-use robots. This unit is intended to serve
the role of "eyes" and accurately determine various work positions whose aim
is installation on machine parts assembly robots such as the "A series," or
the "S series" spray robot to prevent erratic operation of these robots. The
company is expected to use this unit for the assembly robot at the unmanned
motor plant which is expected to be completed this spring at its Yamanashiken
site and claims this will aid in completely unmanned operation at night.
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Since November last year, the company has been selling the "S series" spray
robot, which can be used to remove the turnings and other waste formed during
~ machine finishing, apply paint, and apply sealing (~oint painting). This unit
is a combination of a~oint type and a cylindrical coordinate type, and the
pbsitioning precision is a high +0.5 millimeter. Because of the need to spray
paint or oil on the intended surface or machinery with greater precision, the
company had been looking toward a robot endowed with visual capability.
In another direction, the company started sales last September of its "A
series" robot to be used for assembly purposes. This robot uses cylindrical
coordinates, and it can be combined with the "M series" robot already in use
to form an "assembly cell" which is well suited for tightening screws and
fitting parts together. Fitting operations which are difficult to perform
manually or tightening of bolts can be perforn?ed at the very high precision
of +0.05 mm, indicating the great emphasis placed on precision positioning.
However, on rare occasions when the work position may be very slightly offline
or the angle may be slightly off, a bolt cannot be started and this causes
the work to stop. During the day, working personnel can rectify the
situation, but at night it is necessary to provide the robot with "eyes" if
the work is to proceed in an unmanned operation, and the "position adjustment
sensor" was developed to fill this need. In other words, this is the same
as a so-called monitoring system for night-time use.
This sensor is made up of an ITV (industrial television camera) video sensor
installed on a robot; it accurately reads the work position as it detects
any deviation and corrects the position. The hardware for the sensor is
mostly supplied from other companies, but the software for the system was
developed independently by this company. The company plans to exhibit a robot
equipped with a"position ad~ustment sensor" at the international machine tool
exhibition to be held in Osaka about the end of October.
The company further plans to use sensor equipped assembly robots at the motor
plant presently under construction next to the Fu3i plant in Yamanashi-ken.
This plant will "produce motors with robots from fabrication to assembly"
and will be solely for the production of controller motors. The assembly
will be handled by 47 robots, and an assembly call will consist of one "M
series" finishing robot and three "A series" assembly robots to which one
sensor will be provided. A"position adjustment sensor" will be provided
for each of the roughly 20 robots which will be used to perform the most
difficult task of passing through long bolts. It appears that the production
site will come one step closer to unmanned status with this sensor
development.
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunaha 1982
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
RECENT ACTIVITIES OF KOMATSU FORKLIFT, KOMATSU LTD REPORTED
Development of New Forklift
Tokyo NIKKAN KO(3Y0 SHIMBUN in Japanese 6 Feb 82 p 7
[Text] Transport Machinery and Transportation: Uncover Forklift Demand;
Komatsu Forklift To Mobilize the Entire Group
In order to uncover the overall demand for forklifts, Komatsu Forklift Co Ltd
(president, Takesaku Wada) has consolidated a structure to positively engage in
new operations while emphasizing the development of new types of forlifts and
attachments. This measure is intended to stop the.trend of decline in domestic
demand for forklifts aince the latter half of last year. As "the diversif ica-
tion of forklifts is etill lagging," (President Wada) the company will consoli-
date the "mechatro-forklif t" and attachment, which is a bl_ind spot. In order
to do this, the entire group, including its dealers and subcontractors, has
been developing a"roller" strategy to uncover new ideas. In addition, it has
newly establiahed a Survey and Development Division which will be in charge of
launching into promising operations.
Development of New Products and Attachments: A Survey and Development Division
Established to Invite New Ideas
Last year, the domestic demand for forklifts was about 46,000 units, a decline
of about 18 percent from the previous year. This reflected an inactive domes-
tic market; however, Komatsu thinks there is no use sighing over this sluggish
demand.
According to Komatsu Forklift, forklifts still fall behind in terms of taking
carefully thought ~ut measures to meet the market demand. In other words,
"since the area of application of forklifts is broadening, we must supply prod-
ucts and attachments which are easily used in the respective areas" (President
Wada).
Eor this reason, during the month of February, Komatsu is conducting a campaign
to invite ideas involving not only its headquarters and branches but also its
dealers and subcontractors. This is a campaign in which each division will
submit opinions reflecting the normal atandpoint of the division. The princi-
ple of this is to intensively incorporate all requests from the usere into a ~
roller strategy.
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The ideas span a wide range including improvement of forklifts, shovels, and
attachments and incorporation of new technologies and materials into the cur-
rent line of products. For example, a forklift will be equipped with a micro-
computer and sensor mechanism, thereby realizing a"mechatro-forklift" which is
capable of stacking high loads, which was formerly accomplished uncertainly by
the naked eye of an operator.
In addition, the company welcomes ideas unrelated to the concept of the fork-
lifts and shovels which the company handles. In connection with the move into
this promising area, the Survey and Development Division headed by Director
Yutaka Koizumi was newly created. The company is currently constructing a
clear system in terms of organization.
This is the f irst attempt by the company to involve the entire Romatsu Forklift
in a project. The company says: "There is a great deal of potential demand,
such as the replacement of manual operation by forklifts. We can still in-
crease the number of users by uncovering areas which were formerly overlooked."
(President Wada)
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1982
Strong Business Performance
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese S Feb 82 p 12
[TextJ Indifferent to the "Construction Machinery Recession," Komatsu Demon-
strated Strong Business Performance, Again Recorded Increased Earnings and
Profits During the Previous Period, Outrivaling Pinched Fellow Companies.
There is a theory that "during receasion, the top manufacturPr of an industry
becomes strong." It seems that this has again been proven in the construction
machinery industry. Needless to say, this refers to Komatsu Ltd (president,
Ryoichi Kawa~i) .
The company;s settlement month is December. Definite figures have not been
computed for the time being, but it appears that last year's (the 112th term)
figures are nearly f irm at 567.4 billion yen for sales, 58.5 billion yen for
ordinary prof its, and 27.2 billion yen for prof its after tax. These f igures,
of course, indicate an increase in earnings and prof its by a great margin com-
pared with the business performance of FY-80, again demonstrating the strength
of the company.
Even among the lisred companies, those whose ordinary prof it in proportion to
sales exceeds 10 percent are quite rare. Approximately 90 percent of Komatsu's
total sales belong to construction machinery, for which the demand has been
sluggish since the latter half of last year. The business is in such bad shape
that the oil pressure shovel, a representative piece of equipment, demonstrated
a double-digit decl�.ne in shipments last year.
Naturally, many construction machinery manufacturers have been driven to a de-
crease in profits even though they have managed to secure sales to some extent.
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Usually, with a slowdown in demand comes a f ierce beating down of prices on the
sales front. In the case of oil pressure shovels, some sigh, "the price per
weight is lower than that of baked potatoes!"
With such a situation, the reason behind Komatsu's outstanding achievement is
found solely in the activities of its export department.
The details of sales are: domestic sales recorded about 261.5 billion yen, or
a decline of 14.4 billion yen from the previous year; exports, on the other
hand, increased by as much as some 76.9 billion yen, recording 305.9 billion
yen. It appears that the proportion of exports reached as high as 54 percent.
This has become the basis for realizing an increase in both eaYnings and prof-
its which is greatly envied by other companies of the industry.
It is true that exports and domestic demand are both wheels of the same vehicle.
- Even if domestic demand has declined, such products as bulldozers, oil pressure
shovels, and motor graders are still strong, and even with respect to oil pres-
sure shovels, which have thus far been regarded as relatively weak, "we estab-
lished a lead of 2,000 units more than the second ranking manufacturer in Japan
last year." Concerning dump trucks, it can be said that they are a monoply of
Komatsu.
Accordingly, although a bad business environment exists, Komatsu has secured a
certain quantitative market share and increased production volume through an
export drive. Thus, it has realized a cost reduction; this, however, was pos-
sible due to the enormous strength of its sales force. In fact, Komatsu has
long engaged in building up an overseas sales network in order to export bull-
dozers. It is unique in this respect because much of the construction machinery
industry has seriously begun to engage in exports only since sometime last year.
Of course in terms of a domestic network, tuo, Komatsu is far ahead of other
companies.
On the other hand, in terms of production, Komatsu boasts that "if we manufac-
ture the same product, our company is capable of manufacturing it cheaper than
others." This is the pritnary factor in producing profits. Indeed, the com-
pany's passion for total quality control (TQC) is tremendous; and this may be
the foundation of its confidence. ,
Komatsu has been running smoothly, but it is taking aim at the Caterpillar Com-
pany of the United States. Recently, everywhere in the company opinions reflect-
ing consciousness of Caterpillar have been expressed. It is also true that the
Caterpillar Comp~iny is aware of Komatsu.
It is recently acknowledged that~Caterpillar is the king of world construction
machinery, and the fact that the latter regards Komatsu as its rival in itself
speaks of the growth of Komatsu. Komatsu has shown no si.gn of letting out the
reins; it is concentrating on challenge alone.
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1982
78
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Expansion of Machinery Production
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 16 Feb �s2 p 12
[Text] Machinery and Too]s: Komatsu Ltd To Expand Industri.al Machinery Divi-
sion ~'xtensively; Aiming at 100 Billion Yen or a 2.5-fold Increase in 3 Years
Komatsu Ltd (president, Ryoichi Kawai) intends to aim at an increase in the
~ales of the Industrial Machinery Division from the present approximately ~i0
billion yen to the 100-billion-yen mark in 3 years and, further, to 130 billion
yen in 5 years. This plan is part of the company's new policy to expand its
Nonconstruction Machinery Division in order to break away from the one-sided
emphasis on its Construction Machinery Division, which is responsible for ap-
proximately 90 percent of the total sales of 567.7 billion yen. The company's
operation plannin~ room, which takes the initiative in launching into new opera-
tions, will make a maximum effort for smooth operations in industrial robots,
collection o~ sea sand, and an engine-driven air conditioning system, which have
been put on the marknt since last year. As a project of the entire Komatsu
group, it plans to expand those operations with high potential for use of amor-
phous technology, too.
Industrial Robots and Semiconductros To Be Nurtured in Order To Correct Dis-
torted Structure Stressing Construction Machinery
Last year, business was good for Komatsu Ltd, which reached the 560-billion-yen
mark in sales, a ~2-percent inerease, and which secured 58.5 billion yen in or-
dinary profit~. Of these sales, about 90 percent pertained to construction ma-
chinery such as bulldozers, oil pressure shovels, motor gradexs and dump trucks.
In addition, the company has an Industrial Machinery Division which had sales
of approximately 40 billion yen last year. It also had annual sales of approx-
imately 10 billion yen in shells and self-propelled artillery consigned to the
Defense Agency, and about a 10-billion-yen business performance in outside sales
of single-engine units. All these combined, however, amount to only about 60
billion yen, or a little over 10 percent of the total sales.
The expansion of the Industrial Machinery Division is intended to correct such
distorted stress on construction machinery. "We will of course aim at balanced
expansion while developing the Construction Machinery Division. For this rea-
son, the composition ratio of the Industrial Machinery Division, which accounts
for total sales, may not change drastically; we would like to actively engage
in this project as our policy to expand nonconstruction machinery." (Managing
Director Munemitsu Yamada)
More specifically, it plans to increase the sales of the Industrial Machinery
Division from the present approximately 40 billion yen to 100 billion yen in ~
FY-84, 3 years from now. In order to do so, along with realizing the current
major items sc?.ch as the large automobile press, the medium and small-size gen- '
eral press, and machine tools, it intends to achieve a smooth operation in in-
dustrial robots (arc welding), a sea sand collecting system, and a diesel engine-
driven air conditioning system, which were all put on the market since the end
c~f last year.
79
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h'UK UMNII:IAL U~~. UNLY
Furthermore, in 5 years the company plans to more than triple the present scale
by achieving 130 billion yen in sales. "In order to do this, however, the en-
tiLe c~:apany will be involved in the new operation."
Thig Nonconstruction Machinery Division is being expanded by the entire force
of the Komatsu group. It also intends to positively nurture amorphous technol-
ogy and metallic silicon, the development of whi.ch is underway by its aff ili-
ates.
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1982
9711 END
CSO: 4106/68
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