JPRS ID: 8404 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040040-2
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• Document Page Count: 36
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JPRS z/saoa . E
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1 17 April 1979
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TRA~ISLATIONS ON W~STERN EUROPE
_ (FOUO 23/79) . ~ .
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- NOTE -
_ JPRS publications contain informaCion primarily fzom foreign
newspapers,~per4odicals and books, but als~ from news agency
- transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are Cranslated; those from Engliah-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
= other characCeristica retained.
_ Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets -
_ are aupplied by JPRS. Processing inc~icators such as [Text]
~ or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original informaCion was ~
proceased. Where no processiYig indicator is given, the infor-
~ cnation was summarized or extracted.
~
= Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
= enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- _
= tion mark and enclo~ed in parentheaes were not clear in the
= original but have been suppl:ed as appropriate in context. -
- Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
_ item originate with the source. Times within items.a~re as
- given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GO'VEFrNING 0'WNERS~IIP OF
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- JPRS L/8a04 -
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~ 17 April 1979
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TRANSLATIOfVS QN WESTERN EUROPE `
(FOUO 23/79)
CONTENTS PAGE _
~ THEATER NUCLEAR FURCES
BELGIUM
Air Force Chirtf of Staff De Smet on Alpha Jet Performance
(De Smet Interview; AIR & COSMOS, 10 Mar 79)........... 1
COUNTRY SECTION
_ FEDERAI, REPUBLIC OZ GERMANY r
Contiauiag Neo-Nazi Activity in FRG Reported
(Wolfgang Barthel~ ~larner Poelchau; STERN, 15 Feb 79).. 4
FRANCL -
DiAT'S Functions, Reaponaibilities Outlined
(Claude Engerand Interview; .~RMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI,
Mar 79) 9 `
_ Navy's 1978 Accompliahments Reviewed
(Jean Lannuzel; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HIiI, Mar 79).......... 15
COTAM Miseion, Strength Outlined
_ (Philippe Englinger; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Mar 79)..... 18 -
GREECE .
Briefe -
- Tanker Orders Noted 23
- a - [III - WE. - 150 FOUO~
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CONT~;NTS (Co+~tinued) Page -
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ITALY -
Constructior.. Sector Tfl Create 139,000 ~.Tob Openinga
(Demetrip,De Stefano; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 28 Feb 79).. 24
- PCI's Barca Interviewed on Purty's Economic Policy
(LA STAMPA, 3 Mar 79) 27 -
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BELCZUM _
_ AIR FORC~ CFiIEF STA~'F DE SMET ON ALPHA JET PERk'ORMANCE
Paris AIR b COSMOS in French 10 Me.r 79 p 27 '
[Interview with Lieutenant General De Smet, chief o~ staff of the Belgian `
- Air Force, at Saint-Trond: "An L~cclusive Interview With Air Force Lieutenant -
_ General De Sme~, Chief of Staff of the Belgian Air Force"; date not given] -
_ [Text] Air Force Lieuteneait General De ~net, nemed chief -
_ of staff of t~e Belgian Air Force on 1 July 1977, knows
. Well the problema related to the training and instruction =
- of fl,tture combat pilots. Since 19~5, he has been, succes-
- sively, a pilot coach, director of training, chief of the
_ "Plans" section in SHAPE [Supreme Headc~uarters Allied PoWers
in E~rope), ca~nmander of the Air Force Advanced Training
- Center, co~arider of the lOth Fighter-Bomrier Squadron,
chief of staff nf the Tactical Air Force command, assistant "
chief of sta~'P of the Air Force, and coamiander of the -
Tactical Air Force. On the occasion of the pre~entation
of the Alpha Jet at Saint-Trond, General De Smet kindl,y
- answered the questions of AIR ET C08M06.
_ ~
(Queation) You have ~uat flown in the Alpha Jet for half an hour. What are
your impressione?
- [Answer] It was not m~r first flight in this type of airplan~. In my first ~
flight, at Mont-de-Mexesn in December 1978, I had already been sble to ap-
= praise all ita quslities. This second flight has confirmed by firat impres- ~
sions~ and I noted with eatis~action the plane's good behavior in all the
maneuvers which I executed; loo~, reversement, alox roll and snap roll, then
teil spins to lePt and right at 15~000 Peet once the ~aing tanks tit+ere empty,
and dive. In addition, the ahort time ~'or climbing to 15,000 feet indicates _
_ , the good performance characteristics ot the Larzac engine. ~ing ~r career,
I have ~iloted some 20 training planes, some of vhich have never been mass-
produced. I would say of the Alpha Jet thet it is a remarkable training
plane, both for the student and for the coach. In particular, it oPfers a
1
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' douhle advantage; its Qer~ormance characterist~ca are close to those of a =
_ combat plane, xhich makes it easier to train the student in executi~~~ of the -
procedures a~~licQble to combat ~lanes; and begides, thanks to its Excellent
flyicig qualities~ it is a reliable airplane, one on orhich the student can `
permit himself tu make some mistakes. a
_ [Question) What is the ma,~or advantage which the arrival of the Alpha Jet
- brings to the Belgian Air ~orce? _
[Answer] For a small country with a n~cessarily limited budget, being able to
eliminate one airplane from ~ training "syllabus" which included three repre-
. ~ents ~ co:~cjid~~rable eavings. This is precisely what we will be able to do
_ with the arriv,,l of the Alpha Jet, since the only plane we will need before
we get to it will be the SF-260M, from now on. Moreover, this reduction in
, the number of types of airplane, with its advantages on the level of main- �
tenance and replacement parts, will be accompanied by a decrease in the total
- number of flying hours for training the young student pilots: 275 hours in- -
_ stead of 350, which is also considerable on the economic level. -
I note, however, that although we certair.ly owe to the airplane we have chosen '
_ this considerable reduction in the number of flying hours, we also owe it in
_ large part to intensive use of the simulator, which we will make extensive use
of for training our students. -
_ [Question] Do the problems recently cited by the Luftwaffe--those relating
- to the functioning of the engine, and the problem of the fragilization of the
canopy--have the same importance for the Belgian Air Force?
[Answer) A.~y newly developed piece of equipment goes through what must be -
ealled "childhood diseases." We are watchfl.il, but we remain very confident.
_ It should shortly be poesible to solve the engine problems which you mention.
The fragilization of the canopy is a fortunate innovation on the operational
_ level; for the Belgian Air Force, tr.e problem is not posed in tne same terms
_ as for the Luftwaffe, since it is not planned t~ exceed the speed of 400 knot~
in training. -
_ [Ruestion) Flow iong will you "hold out" with the 33 Alpha Jets ordered?
_ [Answer) We received our first Fouga Magisters in 1960; we will retire the
last of them from service in 1980, 20 years later. We expect to last 20 years -
with our Alpha J'ets. _
_ [Question] The ~rench Air k'oxce has also ordered Alpha Jets for the training =
of its ~'ighter ~ilot$; does the Belgian Air ~orce have close contacts with it -
as a user oi' the satae plane?
[Answer] The contacts between the two ai.r forces have alKays been frequent,
_ both as regarda exercisea or maneuvers and in specific firing programs, during
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- which the Solenz~,ra base in Coi�sica houaea our pilots, our mechanics, our -
- airplanea. The placing in aervice of the Alpha Jet ~r311 doubtless~.y be an
occseion for even cloeer contacta. I ~tdd that 1' wna ~he peraonc~7, gueat o:f
~eneral. Saint Cricc~~ chieS o~' etai't' nf trie Frcnch Air Force, a very ehort -
- time ago. I ~tas very interested by c~verything Khich I had hop~d to viait -
and whiah I saK~ ~ust as T kas very~ conscious of the warm w~elcome `rhtch he' -
~ gave me. -
[Q~eation] 'What, in March 1979, are the ma~or concerns of the chief of staff
of the Belgian Air Force? -
[Answer] They are of two kinde. Like any chief of staff of an air force in -
_ a western country, I am disturbed by the constant decrease in the to~al funds
appropriated to defense. F~rthermore- the evolution of the social climRte
among military men is a concern to me; I am in favor of a realistic social ,
= evolution, but unfortuna~ely, taught by the experience ~f ps.st conflicta, I
must also remind m~yself that in order to be better ~?ble to defend his country,
every military man must train himself ~nd be trained to carry out war operations. -
COPYRIGHT: AIR ET COSMOSa Paris 1979 -
11267 -
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
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CONTINUING NEO-NAZI ACTIVITY IN FRG REPORTED
- Hamburg STERN in German 15 Feb 79 pp 126-131 `
[Article by Wolfgang Barthel and Wa~ner Paelchau: "The Friendlp Nazia tlext -
Door"] -
[Text] Stahle on the Weser. is a very ordinary village: a church, a cemetery,
a few dozen farms, a sportaclub, a bowl~ng club, a volu~nteer fire department, -
and a choir--the youth band was a champ~ion uf Europe once. Many of the
2,700 inhabita:~ts drive to work daily to Hoexter and Holzminden; in the
- evening they meet at one of the four restaurants. If ahots were occasionally -
hea.rd in and around Stahle they came mosCly from members of the rif.lemen's
_ asa,ociation or the tenants hunting Qn the nearby mountain "Riese."
= Son~etimes, however, shotg whizzed through the adjacent forest which did not
come Either from the rifles of the sportsmen or the hunters, the forester -
= Krato was aure. The shooting was part of the training program of the
= "National-Socialist Combat Group Ostwestfalen-Lippe."
- ~ii~en the 18-;~an combat group was raided recently the police found 5 machine -
- guns, 5 carb{aes, a NATO automatic rifle G 3, 8 pistols and r.evolvers, 2
_ aix rifles, 8 kgs of explosives~ one grenade and 650 rounds of ammunition. -
- In addition the officials aeized N~zi literature, pictures of Hitler, _
- brochures and posters of the American NSDAP/AO (reconstruction organization)
~ and a pamphlet composed by themselves stating among other things: "Democracy
- is international domination by Jews...it is the end of one's own culture... -
. the ending of one's own el{te, domination by inferiors, those who can be -
- bought...destroys the unity of the peopl~ with parties...doea not allow a
real national leadership stratum."
The 26-year old Rolf Gebser, the leader of the "combat group," considers
himaelf above all as belonging to the "national leadership straCuma" This
= worker, who liked to be called "little Adolf" in the village, is the only -
- one of the group who is still under arrest. Nevertheless the people ~f
Stahle do not want to say anything against their "Fuehrer Rolli." The
barber and mailman, the grocer and~the restaurant owner, all are united:
_ "We will na~t eay anything." At most they minimize the role of the warriors
among them: "That was just children's fooliehness. At most they made camp
firea and baked potatoea."
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= Nothing can change the mind of a man like the former mAyor of Stahle, Hans -
= Moenckemeier~ about Gebser, neither veneration of Hitler, nor the finding of =
- weapons, nor even the smears on the church, "DeaCh to Jewe--Holocaust." He -
_ says, "HQ ie an energetic kid~ a ni~e guy."
~ The people of SCahle will not abandon someone like Rolli Gebaer, who is a
- member ~~f the choir~ "worked hard" on the construction of the club, whoae _
- fa[hex ~ie Che standard bearer for the riflemen's asaociation and was once
- the kir,ig of the ~unior riflemen himself. Everyone knew, of course, that
_ the "r,ombat group" celebrated the "Fuehrer's birthday" every year in a
- hidd~m place on Gebaer's property, camouflaged by NATO neta. But if only =
thete was enough beer~ his old school friends helped celebrate and sang
- the "Weaterwald" or the SA song "Raise the Flag." MosC of the people of ~
' SCahle consider the one Communist in the village to be mentally sick; they are =
very liberal, however, with the Nazis: "Surely, everyone can have his own -
political opinion."
_ The idea of one's own pulitical opinion did not go very deep in the combat
group itself; the members had rules prescribing even their looka: "Hair and -
bearde are~to be kept in such ~ way that they do not interfere in sport and
militAry training." They themselves said that training served �or the -
- preparation of "Day X," when an end would be put to "international Jewry"
_ and the "slimy Democrats." Gebser's men copied combat methods from the _
_ "Red Army Fraction": "We want the opposite, but we are not so stupid, thal: `
we cannot take over their methods and strategies." _
�For Burkhard Hirsch (FDP), the minister of the interior of Nordrhein-
_ Westfalen, who will confiscate even car ~acks and nosedrops from leftist
_ nuclear power opponents, Gebser and his consorts are small fish. In the _
Duesseldorf Landtag he called the discovery of weapons "relatively un-
. impo rtant"--a aymptom of the tendency of many politicians to play down the -
danger coming �rom the right. Meanwhile Naais are stocking up weapans all
_ over the FRG.
In Karlsruhe the 27-year old Werner Braun, the leader of the "German -
National Society" (DVG), was arrested because he had tried to buy four mach.ine -
guns and 2,000 rounds of ammunition--from a plain-clothes member of the -
criminal police: Three weeks later the p~lice arrested three ffiore DVG
members; at their place they found hand grenades, pistol ammunition, and
_ explosives. The judges considered the buying attempt as a"less serious =
_ case" and imposed a fine of DM 14,000. They did not speak of a criminal
conspiracy.
In Bonn police seized a m~chine gun from a 19-year old, a gun, homemade -
- bombs, and a large amount of ammunition. The young man had built a kind =
of place of worship at his home with a picture of Hitler and other Nazi holy
relics and called himself a fol.lower of the NSDAP. The police let him go -
after an inveatigation.
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_ In Berlin A 17-year old had an accident on New YeAr's Cve wt~ile consCructing
bomUs. 1'wo monttis before that two bombing attempts on a Jewieh atore and Che
Jewiah ~ommunity Center were stopped at the 1asC minute. The detonating
dev~cea were filled with 400 grams of TNT and stee]. nails. -
In Kiel Frnnk Stubbemann, the 23-year old student and "Gaufuehrer"
- [district leader] of the Action Front of the National Socialiats (ANS), -
and two friende were arrested. A sizeable collecCion of weapons was found
- at their place and "accdmpanying conditione Chat could point to the eatablish-
ment of a terrorist organization" (according to the Schleswig-Holstein -
Verfassungaschutz [constitutional protection)). All three are meanwhile
free again and active.
In Hanau an "NS group Hanau" was discovered and police seized among oCher
_ things a hand grenade and 750 rounda of ammunition, In Braunschweig the 51- ~
year old Paul Otte wns arrested; he hae a previous record for bank robbery �
_ and is underetood to be ttre coordinator of the West German NSDAP groups.
This time police discovered "only" a tube bomb--a year before thia they had
_ found two detonating devices and a loaded gun.
- In Hanover members of th:: "combat group freedom for Rudolf Heas" threatened
a passer-by with guns. ~Jitnesses testified later in court that the "combat
_ group members" had br~gged that each of them owns a gun.
In Koblenz and near Muenster unknown righCist radicals blew up television
transmitters to protest the documentary film "Finrl SoluCion" thaC was
intended to prepare viewers for the "Holocaust" series. More and more often
leftist bars and bookstores are attacked and destroyed; one bookstore alone
= in Mainz was attacked four times.
_ Nevertheless rightist radicals are able to continue their harassments
almost withou~ being disturbed. The "military-sport group Hoffmann" of
- Nuernberg, for example, which goes on maneuvers with worn-out vehicles from -
the Bundeawehr, was allowed to put up its n~ain quarters in the f~rmer
Gaufuehrer school of the NSDAP in Ermreuth Castle. The 20 Hoffmann followers -
_ � met in January in Ermreuth Castle for "winter combat training." The Bamberg -
police directorate simply had the exercise "properly observed" but saw "no ~
poasibility for intervention," since it took place on private property. -
In 1976 authorities dealt with 319 excesses of the rightist radicals, in ~ -
_ 1977 it was already 616 and in Che first half-year of 1978 379 crimes. The ~
handwritten notes of Lothar Harald Schulte, 25, a former Bundeswehr
nomcommissioned officer, ver3fy to STERN that the new Nazis are acting in
_ an increasingly conspiratorial manner and have an ever greater tendency to =
use criminal means of force. -
Schulte describes how he found contact with Che Hamburg Action Front of
- National Socialists (ANS): "End of 1977, Hamburg train station: Just now
a guy in black is running by me. I can ~ust recognize the Odalsrune of the ~
youth movement 'Viking Youth.' Since I have belonged to the rightist scene
since my 16th year, I address him."
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The perepn addresaed was Lutz Wegener, 22~ at thak time the deputy chairman =
- of the Hamburg "5A-SCurm 8 May." Wegener introduced Schulte to the Hamburger ~
"Senior Nazi" and ANS leader Michael Kuehnen~ who is now being tried in -
- Ilumburg becauee nE NS propagandn. Scftulte write~: "I t,od a lively _
_ diecusdion with Kuel~nen, at wliich time lie epoke the name NSDAP/AO for the
firat time. He set the task that everyone who wants to become a member of
the NS~AI' muat carry out to prove himself for the movement. The type of
proof rt~ust include a criminal political act." _
- Schult~ and Wegen~r carried out their criminal act with an attack on the
Biamarck caserne in Wentorf near Hamburg, where Schulte at that time was -
- himself aerving and had already celebrated Che Fuehrer's birthday with other
soldiers. Schulte writes: "The attack began at 0030. I woke up the privare
_ first class who was sleeping and demanded his automatic rifle G3. Since I
was alone he attacked me. With a punch in the mouth I knocked him out.
Meanwhile Lutz Wegener had entered ~he noncommissioned officers' area. ~
After thie the opposition of the soldiera collapsed. With the captured -
weapon we disappeared from the military area. In the morning we drove with =
the weapon to Michael Kuehnen in Hamburg-Wandsbek. In Keuhnen's apartment
the ahoulder support was sawed off. Kuehnen was very happy. With thia =
action I belonged to the hard nucleua of the "right."
5oon he also belonged to the "Military-Sports-Group Nordland" which was
glanned as an "organizational cadre for the reconatruction of 'Werwolf
Schulte writes: " The training camp was in Doerpstedt/Holstein. The -
- Military Sports Group Nordland was the only such group in the FRG where all
lower officers were at least noncommissioned officers in combat unita (of
_ the Bundeawehr, ed.)"
- But the Doergsted4:ers soon were not satisfied wiCh ~ust exercises. Schulte -
- writes: "Uwe ~,ot?we~; the Gaufuehrer of the Viking Youth, executed with me -
and the hard nucleus of the Military Sports Group Nordland the attack on
Bergen-Hohne, the bivouac 'Landsberg' of the Dutch suppl~ unit. Four -
machine guns and six magazines were captured in this action which were to
= serve the armament of the military group and its training." -
The "military sportsmen" are also responsible for attacks on banks and -
_ other thefts. Besides this plans had been made to blow up the memorial in
the former concentration camp of Bergen-Belsen. Rohwer had already found
out how many explosives were needed. The military "sportsman" Puls had in-
cited the "liquidation" of the Klarsfeld couple, Schulte dreamed of the free-
ing of Rudolf Hesa. They all agreed that "attacks on the line of demarcation"
(the GDR border) ahould be carried out and "occupation officers captured." -
- � It did not come to that any more; pol~ce arreated the Rohwer gang
(STERN No 15/1978: "Germany, awake"). _
This hardly weakens the rightist radicals, Federal Attorney Friedrich -
- Hecking said to STERN: "We hardly make any house searches of rightist
_ extremi.3ts where we do not find masaes of weapons, explosives, and ammunition."
- Ministec of the Interior Ba~im estimates the number of violent rightist
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- radicals at about 1,000. The number is probably much higher. Baum ndmits:
_ "The Increr~Hingly cnnHp(r;;toriul b~huvior makeH ir difEicult to know." -
- No wonder. Becauae for the neo-Nazis treason is dangerous. Kuehnen explained: -
"Ttie Lueneburger Heide ig big; a person can easily be burie~~ there.
= COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co -
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DTAT'S FUNr,~IONS, RESPONSIBILITIES OUTLINED
= Yaris ARML:ES U'AUJOURD'NUI in French Mrir 79 pp 16-17 ~
~Interview with Gen Claude Engerand, chief aruiaments engincer~ t~chnical
director of ground armamente, by Lt Col (sir) Claude Legraad: "To Ptan
and ~3uild"; place and date not given~
~Text~ A"government agency" charged with meeting the
weapAns needs formulated by the armed forces and mare
particularly the arnry, the DTAT ~Technical Directorate of
Ground Armamenta~ preparee and directs the arms programa
_ falling ?lnder its ~urisdicCion by calling on the resourcea
of private induetry or iCs oWn induatrial faciliCiee.
In its position as "supplier" the UTAT plans, develops,
and produce~ the equipment and weapons aystems by using
ita technical and hwman potential as well as possible.
Heir of the iron works opEration established by Gribeauval
and then of the artillery courmittee, the DTAT has knos+a how
to use its time and reaort to uaeful and fruitful intema-
Cional cooperation.
The review ARMEES D'AUJOURD~HUI asked engineer general -
Engerand, head of the DTAT, to be kind enough to explain
' hia agency to ita readers.
- Question: Mr engineer general, cauld you briefly remind us ahat ie the
miasion of the DTAT?
- Answer: The mission--and I would be inclined to say miasions--of the DTAT
are focused around two major poles: That of the so-called goveramental
assignments and that of the so-called tadustrial assignmeats. This
dietinction--rather than separation in the sense that this term can convey -
the image of a wall--appeare fundamental to me, for the endeavore in these
Cwo fields are eESeaCially different and it is necessary, specifically as
regarde our foreign partners, that they be clearly differentiated. But
_ let us return to the two ma~or types of assigUmenCs. :
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_ f~or the exrrciee of its asaignmettts of a governmenCal n~ture the DT'AT ia
- in a way the ag~nt for needa relating to ground combttC as expressed by tl~e
= armed forceg r~nd more particularly by the unny. W1~nC i~ involved Chen is
- tn con~ider theae neede expre~eed in terme of uoe nnd to convert them into -
technical~ economic, and industrial language. Also, to take the mer~aures
that are neceasary to realize the system~. A~cting as a"partner" of general
etaffa rather rhr.n ea "supplier" at that point, the bTAT hae a twofold rule
to play: Fir,gt, to dxafC future ecientific and technical plans (notaLly, _
by the initiaCion of exploratory studiea on the organization of future r
syatema or the principle of new constituente of Cheae system3), but also at
the level of industrial atructures in order Co enable the latter Co plan and
turn ouC future producta. ~'hen~ in the evolution of the programs proper, iC
_ is up to Clie DTAT Co apell out the expecCed performance characterisrics, to ~
dzaw up eCudy and production contracts in due form, ar~d to evaluate Che
= resulta obtained in the framework of a national industrial organization or ~
in cooperation.
- As for the DTAT's in~lustrial function, this involves planning and realization
- which is that of a"supplier" of the same kind as any national or privAte
industrial company working in the field of arn~aments. This is an inatrument
_ which must be managed as such, with the sim of being productive, viable, _
- under competitive conditione. Ita originaliCy residea in being organically -
connected with the government, but thie does not affect iCs fundamental
indvstrial miasion. I am referring to the GIAT ~Industrial Group of Ground
f.rmamentsl whose legul identity ie incidentally not dietinct from that of
the DTAT. _
Question: Whst are the reTiations that exist between the DTAT and the various
- ~eneral staffs for specifying the characteristics and chooaing a new weapon?
Who decidea whether to produce?
Answer: Very much upstream at the stage of general studies, notably ~f those
- of the components, there is an initial dialog between engineers a~d cniliCary
personnel to organize a studies program anticipating the future which it is -
up to the DTAT to propose. Then or at the same time there is what I would
cull the crucible in which military thinking on a given ar~s system ia
elaborated. This ie made up of standing consulCative co~nittees which are
eaeentially military argans but with which the DT.'~T is associated. It is
_ there that the military characteristics of the prospective a~ored vshicle
are planned in operatinnal terms, taking into account the nature of the ~
threat and foreseeable technical possibilittes.
= As soon ns the military characteristica of the weupon are establishcd, the
truly developmental etage headed by a program director falling under the
jurisdiction of the DTAT gets under way. This program dfrector iniCiates
a discussion fram~work between the army snd the DTAT, namely, the coasultative
working group (or GTC). This struc~ure brings together government officials
of the DTAT (representatives of technical departments involved from the
central administration and the competent technical centers) and officers of
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.
~ the general atr~ff, of the Central EquipmenC Uirectorate~ the technical
section of the army~ the Inspectorate of Armored Vehicles nnd the Cnvalry
if un armored vehicle is involved connidering that I have ueed that examplc.
This ie really a di~cussion ~nd dialog structure wt~ere @gCtl one offers hia -
- ideae, and voicea hia criticisms, and his obFr.+rvations. Naturally, the -
- di~cuseion continues outeide the framework of the conaulCntive workin~
group which nevertholesa continuee to be the privileged dialog structure.
' Then~ in Che final developmental atage, a coordinaeed pro~ram of technical
_ a~d milltary evaluation is dra~?n up and then executed ~oinCly by the DTAT =
and the arnry. The reaulC of thi6 lateet atage of cooperntion ia the drafting
_ of an Bvaluation report which makes it possible for the general staff involved
to decide whether to adopt rhe a~~stem or noC in the laet analyeis.
Question: When a deciaion rep,arding adoption aro~l Chen production ie taken,
_ how is the choice mr~de regarding one or more producere of Che new system
(whether the builders ahould be arsenals or the private eector)?
_ Aaswer: Adoption doea not mandatorily (nor necessarily) entail an ima~ediate -
- decision to put a eyatem into production. Indeed~ several different types -
- of equipment meeting the eame need can be approved but in thQ la6C analysis
only one of them will be produced; The one which ia most favorable econo-
_ ~ically evAn if all are technically equivalent. This being done, a88uming
that it ia decided to adopt a weapon and then to put it into production,
how is the choice mgde regarding ane or more manufacturer3?
- The rules of "induaCrial policy" which I shall sumomarize briefly a16o aj~ply,
incidentally, further upetresm in the choice of the induetrialiets to whom
_ the authoritiee c~ill turn far developmPnt. This probl~em ef disKdi~g
activities can in numerous caees be handled by applying without restriction
- the prfnciple of making it as cam~etitive as possible and thfs is then the
best solutioa, for competition is atimulating while monopoly is deadeaing.
Indeed, I believe (to broaden the discuasion) tl:at the development of -
French industry truly begaa on the day when the Cmrmon Market Was eatablished _
_ becauae the latter involved the breaking down of ~uatoms barriers and
_ constrained French industry to adjust itaelf to the etreas of competition.
Many were frightened, but the experiment indicates that extraordinary
progress h~s "beem m~de from that time.
This being said, totally unre8tricted campetition is now always poseible,
at least at the national level, notably because of the cost for the govern-
ment cuatomer of the upkeep of diversified planning or production capabil-
ities to satiefy some needs. ~rnus, in the field of combat tanka, while a
new system is produced every 15 years, it vould not be posaible for us to -
support two or three barely used industrial facilities. Oa~ is thus prompCed
_ co delibprately restrain the field of competition While the distribution
of induatrial activity posea a tw~ofold problem:
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_ 1. Th$t of Che aelection of one (or severul) gupplier(s) to eaCiefy fuCure ~
anticipaCed needs. This selecCion of "industari.al centerg" is rremioed on
en examina~:ion of a certain number of crit~ria (canpetence, a comparison of ~
capnbilities nnd needa, etc.) which are carefully evaluated;
2. That of ttie disCribution of real activiCy which is prittcipally guided by
economic, rechnical, or employment conaiderutions with the concern of
avoidin~ the syetematic saturation of eom~e centers (even if it is the
GIAT) completed by a distribution of the "reaC" among the other facilitiea
which would destroy all competition and all motivaCion. In case of a
- dEli~eratedly accap~,ted monopoly~ we ~pply n certain number of rules which -
notably oblige the prime contracto~ to have gubconCractors compete so ae
, to limit the drawbacke of this monopoly. Fur~hermore, the adminietration
has available means of control to ~!neure ChaC even if there ia no invitation ~
Co bid, pricQe wil.l be fai~ and rea8onable. �
In the laet analyDis the line of demarc~tio*a ie the reault of a compromiae
= aroong different requiremente which inv~lve mninly tha maintenance of minimr~l
activiCies for each firm, concern for an economic optimum, and khut of m~?in-
taining a certain degree of balance between activity aud avsilable capabil-
ities, In fact thie is negotiated and diacusaed step by step, too, as a.
function of the employment aituation.
~ Question: What are the advantages and drawbacka of cooperation with foreign
arms induetric8?
Answer: The iaitial advantage--and thia is often the one whic}~, is placed in
the forefront--is to reduce the costs of development borne by each of the
partners. This is true if the requirement is expressed in identfcal or very
aimilar terms. To be aure, the total cost of development in cooperaCion will
be slightl~~ higher than for national development, but aince the total "bill"
is divided into two or three shares, on the whole each partner does well.
_ Sch~matically, 1t can be suid that if the development of a program ia slated
to cost 100 units in a national seCting it will cost 120 unita under a
cooperative arrangement. However, dividing the cost between two or three
_ partners will reduce the share of each to 60 or even to 40 units. The gain
- is thus very aubstaatial but on coridition--I atress--that the needs of the
partners be sufficiently similar. For if the premise is faulty, that is,
if there are miaunderstandings, the aggregate co$t will grow excessively.
_ Let me elaborate: If one of the partnera has in mind to build an intermediate-
_ sized tank and the other a heavy taak, two different products will be involved
and the total will be much more costly th$n originally planned. Even if the
"bill" Were divided into two it is not certain that the quotient would not
be more onerous for each partner. Henc,e the extreme importaace of a aound
consensus about goals at the start.
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Thc! ec:cond ndvantugc involvc~ production. Cooperation mukce poseiblc un ~
econoary of scale tliat ie much more significant with an obvioue benefit
under induetrial producCion conditione. And tha growing coBt of aome
complex syetams even leuds one to wonder abouC our financinl capnbiliCy to
realiz~ them witfiin a etrictly national frnm~ework in Che future,
= In addition, cooperation ofCen has the advanCagn of allowing the uee of -
improved technologies or better componenCa. Finnlly, it makes poesihle -
(aubjecr to reaervatiot~a of political conetrainCa) the coordinc:ted promotion
of theae materials in third countries instead of separate efforte for the
- conqueat of the8e marketa. -
As reg~rds interdependence it is neceasary ta m~nCion, beaidea the probleme =
of coat of which I apoke earlier, the riek that none of th~ p~rtners may be -
- co~leCely satisfied with the finnl producC Co the exCent thaC comproanises
are struck. To be eure, it is poasible to conceive of producing separate
veraions of a oreapon, but then what ie the purpase of cooperation? AnoCher
difficulty eteme from Che onerousnusa of governmental and induetrial
atruc~ture~ aad of the dccieion-making procees. Significant progreas has
neverthelesa been made in light of the initial efforta. The difficulty is
to find an acceptable compromiee which ahould take account of the concern
- for syzmnetry and balance among the partners but vhich does not s~crifice the
neceasary unity of reeponeibility, both at the governmentaY and the industrial
_ level. I ahall also mention the problem of finding solutiona making it
possible Co retain aufficient deciaion-makiag autonomy far each partner.
_ Finally one last important con8traint, that of deadlines. inaemuch as
= programa drawn up in cooperation take longer than thoae involving nationul
development.
Queation: Are French ground az~amenta industries competitive at the inter-
national level?
Answer: I shall anawer yaur queation v~ry si~aply and very briefly by
specifying that u sizable part of the producta of the GIAT is exported.
The same is true for some induatrialista associated with our a~s paroduction.
In Chie cotmection I shall note a more specific but very aignlficant indi-
cator: 'I1~c United Stntea hae bought the licen8e of our Rolanc~ anCiaircraft
defense syatem. I believe that Chis is a good example of our technical apd
merketing competitivenesa.
~Biographical note]
Born on 11 August 1926 at Remiremont, Vosges Department, Claude Engeraad,
engineer general of anaameats, is a~raduate of the "Ecole Polytechnique"
(Polytechnic Institute] and the Advanced National Armaments School.
Assigned in 1954 to organize the TechnLcal Directorate of Ground Armamenta
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. aC the Tarbes facility, in 1965 Claud~ E:ngernnd wus appointed technicul.
adviaer in the office of lthe Minieterial UelegaCe for ArmumenCa. In 1970 ~
- Enger~nd became depury Co the chief of technical servi.ces in rhe central =
adminietrution of Che Technicul DirectoraCc of Ground Armnmenta. In
OcCober 1974 hcs wa8 on loan to Che Minietry ot IndusCry und Reeearch where
t~c was nppointed Director of ht~tallurgic~l, Mechanical, and ElecCronic
Industriea. Then, in July 1977 ~ngerand was appoinred Director General of -
Induatry, replacing Mr de L'Estoile. On 1 September 1978 Claude E~erand -
returned tio the Minisrry of Defense and assumed the poaition of Technical
~ Director of Ground Armamente.
- COPYRIGNT: 1979 - Revue dee torcea armeea francalses "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
- 2662
CSO: 3100 -
a
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
NAVY~S 1978 ACCOMPLISHMENTS REVIEWED
- Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD~HUI in French M~r 79 pp 8-9 ~
- ~Article by Adm Jean Lannuzel~ navy chief of staff: "The Navy's 1978
- Survey"]
~Tex~~ In 1977 and 1978 the French navy published in ARM~ES D'AUJOURD'HUI
. a survey fox the year that had elapsed in the form of interviewa with the
deputy chief of staff and the deputy chief of operationa. It is Chus with -
tt~e idea of following a tradition that I exprQSS theae few thoughts on the -
yeur ~ust past. This wae a year which for ua sailois was very eventful and
important on more than one count. To draw up thi.~ survey I shall deal in
turn with the operational activity and public aervice mis~iona and then the
organizational problems connected with the reduction in the number of craft
and shall finally conclude with budgetary ~questiona, promf.aea for the future. -
In 1978 operational activity was slightly greMter than in 1977 since the
average number of days spent by a craft at seu was nearly 94 compared to
92.4 in 1977 and considering that the fleet air arn~ clearly exceeded 100,000
- hours of flying time. `
- Under water the navy's deterrent miseion has continued without letup. The
discreetness with which it has been implemented for nearly 7 years now should -
- not malce one forget the total amount of effort on the part o~f both crews and
arsenals. This makes it possible to aecure the steady and effortless linkage
of operational patrols.
In surface operationa Che increase in the number of days spent by craft at
seu, outside of the number represented by public service missiona, has
especially made possible the improvement of the group training of squadrons.
_ Such trainingr easily reduced at a time of fewer activitieFj, continues to
be ind~.spensable so that combat units may be effectively able to become =
integrated in a naval force. The contribution of overseas France in this
activity is important since 30 percent of the total hours of naval craft
at sea is spent outside France's metropolitan waters. This represents
~ considerable effort whose most significant aspect continues to be the -
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permanent detuchment from Brest and Toulon of two escort vessels in Ch~
Indi~n Oceun. In 1978 more discreet buC aignificant all the same were
_ tranaportation missi~ns in the interest of the FIN11L [Nttval Task Force~
effected by the IIDC, the Decan III operation for the verificaCion of mine
_ clearance of a new uccees chucmel to the Suez Canal, and very recently the -
Oruge misaion in Guinea to aerve ns logist~cal aupport for Che viait of the
French president.
In Che uir the essential activiCy (38 percent) involved aircraft and heli-
coptera on board veasels. The difficulties of Cake-off from naval platforms -
- jusCify conetant refresher courses und more advanced truining. But with _
nearly 22,000 hourE oE flying time of which one-quar~ter was effected abroud,
the year 1978 was thaC of the maritime putrol. ICs plunes, characterized
- by their power of observation and by their capacity to remain in Che air �o~
many hours, have proved to be the only means auitable for Che surveillance
- of desert areas. In Mauritania and Chad their asaisCance was easential. -
The public aervice missions occupied front stage in 1978. The "Amoco-Cadiz" -
- disaster, the "Rhum Route" race [?antiamuggling drive~, and the exceptional ~
atorm early in December 1978 in the AtYantic have senaitized public opinion -
to Che need of surveillance, police, and civilian task forcea aC sea. The
French navy hae faced the growth of these tasks with its own means. Some
7,000 hours at sea were apent in the struggle against the pollution of the
_ tanker "Amoco-Cadiz." This represents a little more than three times the
- annual activity of a"Foch" or "Clemenceau." Since early April 1978 the -
navy has inaured on a permanent basis the surveillance of navigation offshore
- from Oueasant. Let ue note in passing that the mainrenance for a year of a
presence at the three crucial points of Oueasant, Casquets, and the Pas-de-
= Calais represents one-tenth of the activity of the navy'8 surface craft.
The increase in tasks raiaes the problem of the adapted means. At Oueasant
the navy's preaen~e is represented by one-quarter of its escort vessels,
even frigates, craft that are too large for th~.s kind of work, and half of -
- it by minesweepers or tugboata whose maximum speed is much lower than that
- of intruders which they would have to pursue. Onl.y dispatch boats, even
though a little too well armed in this :Lnstance, are suitable for this kind _
of mission. The shure of public service missions, which represented 16
percent of the navy's activity in 1976, now reaches some 21 percent. This -
is a figure not equal~d by other Western navies. -
Less involved than the surface navy, the fleet air arm also participates in
these missions. First of all the maritime patrol, whose poasibilities as
_ well as limitations were clQarly evidenced in connection with the search
- undertaken to find participants in the "Rhum Route" race, but also the
- Super Frelon aircraft of Squadron 32-F based at Lanveoc-Poulmic. In
- addition to its own activity of anti-submarine operations, t?.iis squadron -
_ realized in the course of the last few years, most often un%ler periloua
conditions, a number of rescue operations involving human lives which
certai.nly is not paralleled elsewhere. Very recently this was illustrated
by organiziag in the midst of a storm a rescue team on a dock which was
- adrift off Brittany.
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The consCant increase in public aervice missiona and the neceasary mainte~
~ nance of miliCary capabilitiea thr~t~ we are entiCled to expect from a
- miliCar~ navy raiae the problem of cr~ft availability. The addition of
numerottg vesaels in the coming yeur~, deapite Che planned ce~mpensaCion and -
purtic~I~nrly Che naval plan, does not mitigare the problem. Tk~at ~e why
iC is necessary Co enviaion mandating thaC craft in aervice spend more days ~
at sea. For this purpoae diapatch vESaels have been endowed with one-third
more crewmen and rapid patrol boats (PATEtA) with twice the number of crewmen.
The gQal ie to reach 180 tu 200 days at sea a year for theae unfta. 'While ~
' auch a aystem was already in effect on the SNLEe ~Nuclear Misaile-Launching `
- Submarines~ and some auxiliary vesaels, this ie the first time that it has
been tried on 8~+*'fBCe combat vesaels for which conditions are aignificantly
diffexent, eapecially in the field of equipment maintenance. This experimanr
will be ane~lyzed in gxeaC detail because on the bae~s of the evid~nce it may
provide a aoluCion to the problema raised by the foreseeable drop in the ~
- navy's tonnage in the 1980's. Our eurvey of 1978 would not be complete
withuut mention of the budget. It can be said that this was a good budget
for two reaeone. The first ia that for the third time it was slightly higher -
than the figure which had been projected by Che program-law (17.63 per~ent -
insfiead of 17.34 percent of the armed forces budget). The second reason is -
Che twofold increase compared to 1977 of program authorizationa for new naval
_ construction. This is the atart of a movement to accelerate the rate of -
auch conatruction, which reverses the trend evidenced in the past few years.
Accordingly, 1979 opened on an optimistic note whi~h will be characterized
by some important realizations: The entry into service ot the "Georges
Leygues" ~nd of two dispatch vesaels; the launching of the first nuclear
attack aubmarine and the sCart of construction on the sixth nuclear missile- -
launching auba~arine; and the putting into operational service of the Super -
Etendard aircraft and Lynx helicopters, initial atage in the organization
of our navy for the year 2000.
- C~PYRIGHT: 1979 - Rewe dea forcea armees francaiaes "Armees d'Aujourd'hui" -
2662
- CSO : 3100
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~ COTAM MISSION, STRENGTH OUTLINED
- Paris ARMEE5 D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Mar 79 pp 30-31
(Article by Lt Col (air) Philippe Englinger: "The Transpo~ct and Liaison `
Fleet of Che Air Force and Ita Maintenance"~
~Text~ The missi.on assigned to COTAM ~MiliCary Air
- Tranaporx Command~ prompts it already in peacetime Co
carry out susCaiaed training of its crews, to execute
logistical traneportation missions for ~he armed forces, -
and to undertake misaions of general interest. In
- operations, its principal miasions consist of assuring
the logistical support of the armed forces and in parti- _
cipating in ~he operations of surface forces through air
_ transportation of sir dropa. The accomplishmen~ of theae ~
missions muet be secured by excellent availability and a
high level of sound operations of the equipment which often =
has to move far from its support base. In part, the success
ot COTAM's mission depends on the caliber of the mainCenance
- in effect.
COTAM's flying equipment c~naiste of tranaporC aircraft (C-160 Transalls, _
Nord 2501's, DC-8's, Caravelles, Noxd 262's), liaison aircraft (Mysters
20's, MS-760 Paris planes, Broussards), and helicopters.
- The operating and maintenance of this equipment are assured for most of =
- the fleet by specialized air force personnel.
Only the DC-8~s, Caravelles, and MysCers 20's owned by ~OTAM in small number
as well ae the sircraft of the GLAM (miuisterial Air Li~sison Group~ are
_ maintained by civilian companies (UTA ~Air Transport Union~ SOGERMA
~Specialized Equipment Maintenance and Repair Group Campany~, Air France,
SECA [Air Studies and Construction Cou~any~, and so forth) on the strength
of contracts for operations and maintenance.
~ _
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I~'inally, general overhaula which are in�requent but cull for a ai.zable
= amounC of work are ulso enCruaCed Co Che civilian companies mentioned above -
or the AIA (Industrial Air Workahop~ aC Clermont Ferrand (for the C-160
aircrAft und AlouetCe II helicopters). ,
Main tenance Organization in COTAM
To inaure mainrenance, that ie, the periodic upkeep and reconditioning of -
the equipment for which it is responsible, COTAM has available four Cechnic~~l
units known as GERMAS ~Specialized Equipment Maintenanc~ and Repair Groups~~
In contrast to the practice in the other :aajor commands of the air force
- (CAFDA [t~.r Coimnand of Air De�enseForces ATAC (TacCical Air Force~ , CEAA
~Ai.r Force Schools Command~) where each aquadron has its own GERMAS availabl,e `
- at ite hawe base, COTAM has adopted the centralized arrangement by means of _
its faur large, specialized technical unita. -
_ Accordingly, GERMAS are found -
- 1. At Orleans for the C-160's;
' 2. AC Toulouse tor the Nord 2501's;
3. At Villacoublay for the Nord 262's, Paris planes, and Broussards;
. 4. Finally at Chambery for the helicopters.
- This alCernative arrangement has advantages in terms of econoary in personnel, -
equipment, and infrastructural facilities. But it is especially ~ustified by -
the scattering of the aggregate flee~ in small units or deCaclunents.
Practiced Maintenance -
- COTAM's flying equipment consiats of planes which are old by now (Nord -
2501's, MS-760 Paris, Broussards) or more recent models (Nord 262's, C-160's,
_ Pumas) to which modern maintenance concepts are constantly applied. The -
policy of maintenance pursued by COTAM has consisted notably in seekina -
lower coats by a simplifaction or expaneion of the maintenance cycles while
_ guaranteeing the level of maximum security and great operational availabilit~y.
Each GERMAS is organized on the basis of one maintenance and repair aquadi�on
which is itself iuade up of an "aircraft" werkahop for planned maintenance
and reconditioning operations and a group of ~other~ workshops (power plant,
equipment, electric system, radio radar, security and salvaging, etc.). -
_ A technical office charged wirh the initiati~n and follow-up of work =
cons titutes the "administxative" part of the GERMA.S.
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~ Aa a funcrion of the limita set (hours of Flight ox~ calendar datea), the =
aircrr~ft have ~o undergo on u regulur basia plunned peri.od viaira (or VY)
_ during which deCailed inepections of the systems, etrucCures, accesaories,
_ und equipment, compleCed by resta, furChex repairs, or replacemeitt if
necessary, take place. _
_ Modern meana of diagnosis are uaed such as bench tes~s, specCrometric
_ analyais of oils, undif~erenCiated checks by endoscopy or ulCrasonic waves.
_ All Che operaCions effected are carefully recorded in reports which make it
_ possible to dete nnine at each point� Che history of Che sircraft down to iCa
_ most minute details. Finally, quality-contro~, service insurea the perFect
execution of mainCenance work and guarantees Che use of the equipment in
- complete safety. For Che repair of the aircraft away from the home base use =
is made of GERMAS aupporC crewa who are kept nn permanenC alerr. It is
- through the intermediary of the Operational Center of COTAM located aC =
_ Villacoublay and linked by HF/BLU ~High FrequeMCy/BLU~ to the aircra~t
- involved (mainly Nord 2501's and C-160's) ChaC Chese operations are initiated.
- Some uniCs located overseas provide on the spot the planned maiatenance of -
their helicopters. For that purpose they use an original methoci which
- consists in breaking down the visit into 10 sections so as to avoid an -
extended grounding of Che equipment.
_ Personnel Charged with Maintenance
- This personnel axe trained initially at the technicians' noncommissioned
- officers school at Rochefort. When they leave this school the young certified
_ servicemen opting to serve in "transportat~on" attend training internships
relaCing to the equipment on which they will be called upon to work. These
talce place at the ETIS ~Specialized Technical Instiruction Complex~ included
- in each GERMAS, the latest being that for the C-160 sircraft at Orleans. -
~ The GERMAS is the necessary place of transit for these young specialists who
- complete their training on the job with their already proficient seniors
serving as their cadres. -
The strictness put into the offering and follow-up of this training conditions
Che safe use of the maintained equipment. -
Of the 3,000 noncouanissioned officers serving in COTAM 1,850 are technical
ground personnel whose job is the maintenance of the air force's transport
fleet. -
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Technical Maintenance Unita -
1. The GCRMAS at Orleans -
ICs ~ob ~e the operaCion and maintenance of rhe C-160 aircraf t wiCh more
than 400 mechanic noncommi$aioned officera. Periodic visirs are made every
- 720 houre of flight (or 1G montha). These visite ground the aircraft for ~
_ one month and ca11 for aome 3,000 houra of work each. =
Between rwo periodic vieiCa an intermediate check repreaenting 300 houra o�
work grounds th~ plane for 3 or 4 days. Finally, ma~or checks whose 16-year =
- cyc].e ia br~ken down inCo four blocks 4 yeara apart are the reoponaibility -
- of the AIA at Clez~ont Ferrand. A cen~ral maintenance office near the GERMAS _
does the following:
a. It handlea critical eupply problems;
- b. It investigatea technical facts; and =
c. IC updatea the maintenance procesa.
2. The GERMAS at Toulouse
It is reaporiaible for the maintenance and reconditioning af the Nord-2501 -
= aircraft fleet. Periodic visita occur every 360 hours of flight or every
18 months while general overhauls, now definitively phased out, used to be
entrusted Co the AIA at Cle nnont Ferraad and took place after 3,600 hours
- of flight or 10 yeara.
- Each periodic visit represents approa imately Y,300 hours oF wiork. Th~ =
; flying equipment, whose phasing out began in 1976, ahould be reduced to _
- nil by 1985 or 1986. Until then, this remarkable organization will still
= ~ provide innumerable servicea to the air force.
� 3. The GERMA.S at Villacoublay -
This faciliCy handles three typea of aircraft whose minor maintenance cycles
are as follows :
a. 600 houra of flight or 19 months for the Nord 262's; -
b. 360 hours of flighC or 14 months for the MS-760's; and
c. 180 hours of flight or 1.5 months for the MH-1521's.
= 21
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- 4. The GERMAS at Chambery -
This fACiliCy is specialized in the maintenance of A1oue~te II, Alouette III,
and Pumu helicopCers winose minor maintenance cyclea are 400 and 300 houra
(or 1S monthe) reopecCively. Their general overhauls occur after 2,400 -
- hours of oper8tions.
Thanka to its �lying equipment COTAM constitutes an imposing air ~ransport -
comnany, but Che particular nature of its ~iasion does nor make it possible =
to compare iC wi.th an equ3valent civilian transportation company. COTAM's
- flee~ thus repreaents, thanks Co irs transrortation capabilities, its flexi-
bility of use, and its operational eff~.c4ency, a remarkable mobile asaeC
- for the armed forces. The success of the numerous outside missions entrusted
to COTAM testify to Chis. The excellent perfoxvnance of equipment sub~ected =
to harsh conditions in all parts of the world under at times extreme weather `
- conditiona evidences the quality of the uesintenance which it recsives.
- ~Biographical noCe]
Lt Col Philippe Englinger is a graduaCe of the air force academy's class of
1956. Licensed in technology in 1973, he cocWnanded in~ succession the mainte-
- nanca and repair group of the Nord 2501 aircrttf t staCioned at the Rheims and =
- Toulouse air bases. After a 2-year stint at ~he technical inspectorate of
- the air force, Colonel Englinger is now s~atianed at the Advanced School of '
- Air Warfare. -
COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revue des forces armees fruncaises "Armees d~Aujourd~hui"
2662
CSO: 3100
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= COUNTItY 5I;CTION GREECE
= BRIEFS
TANI~R ORDERS NOTED--The Livenos compeny is reported to have ordered two
80,000-ton oil tank~re Prom the $outh Korean Hyundai ahipyards. The
tankere are woth 23 million dollars each. In addition, the Goulandris
- company is negociating with Hitachi oP Ja n for the delivery oP a ship
,~te.nker~ of the same tonnage .~extJ ~Pa�ris YALEIktB AGTUEI,I,FS in F4~ench
z6 Mar 79 P ~J
c~0: 4800
23
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NOR Oh'F'ICLAI. US~ ONLY
COUNIRY 5ECTION ITALY
- CONSTRUCTION SECTOR TO CREATE 139,000 JOB OPENINGS
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SLRA in Italian 28 Feb 79 p g
[Article by nemetrio De Stefano: "CRESME Porecasta to Chamber of Deputies
Public Worke Commiesion: ConeCruction Induatry Will Create 139,000 Job
Openinga in 3 Years"] _
[TextJ Rome--The Public Worke Commieaion of the Chamber of Deputies reouested
CRLSM~ (Center for F.conomic. Socia3cgical and Market Reaearch in Canstruction]
to provide A detailed realiatic forecast of realizable investmenta for new
housing and public worke baeed on the apecifice of the 3-year plan for 1979-
- 1981. CRESME's findinga nre su~arized in the following table:
= Key: - - - _ `
1.A) Italy ,
_ B) Southem Italy -
2. ,1obs Z~ All~ella 18.000 ~4.900 ~a.eoo -
(annual incre~nenta) ~~euogbmo 6.oO0 7.000 t.000
3. Public Works 2) ~us~az~on~
pncrom~ntl ~nnu~):
4. Investments A) ~e11a 3~.000 24�5f10 ~9�500 62�000
(billione of cur- 1j ��IIO9~"O
rent lire) 3~ OPLItE � ~ _
5. Residential PUBHUCHE ~
1{ousing Units Inv~~timent~ ~ ~
- 6. Total Jobs 4~(mi~te~dl di lin corrondr
Increment 5) A~~AZIONI
RE510ENZIAU 1079 10s0 19~1 Totall
Inveetlrt:o~ril
: 41 (mlile?di df Uro com~t~): '
A) ttall~ 1.800 2300 2.60t7
' 1) 8) t~uoylomo 1.000 1,00 t.AOo
Oaupulon~ ~
- ~ 2 ) (Incremend ~nnul):
A) Rrlia 1~.000 21.Q00 1a.500 Sb.'S00
1) 9) f+kaopiorr~o 10.500 13.500 11.500 35.500
TOTALE INCREb1ENT0
6 ~ OCCUPAZtCNE
1) A) ilt~1le 67.000 45.500 78.000 1~8.500 -
B) W.~uoylomo 28.000 25-000 21.000 74.000
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Thc chairman of Che Chc?mber a~ Deputiee ~ublic Worke Camin~eeion, Eueenio
Peggio (PCI), poinee out that the eetimate o~ 138,500 new ~ob~ in hdusing
_ and public w~orke con~truction over the next 3 yeare-~74,000 of t+hicli in
~ southern Italy (115~000~120~000 includin~ inducc~d nes+ cmployma~et)--"appenre
le~e vptimietic than othero that have been preeented ta the gov~rnmen~t, t,ut
ia certain to be more in line with the actual r~aulte the inveetmente can
~ generate."
Peggio aseFrte Ct~at in any case, "the importan~e of the contribution which -
Ch~ investment program~ in housing and publir worke can make to the aCtenua-
tion of the unemployment problem in eouthern Italy ie evidenC. Nowever, it -
muet b~ made clear that the realization of such inveetment programe is by
no means certain, in view of the condition in which the centrnl and peri-
pheral adminiatrationa find themselve~ and of the manner in ~rhich the govern-
ment has so far behaved toward that probl~n."
But~ eccording to Peggio, there ia mare: "It mu~t be added that in regard
to poesible pro~ecte in the field of the infraetructure and environmental
- protection~ which goverrunent officiale have eo often talked about, Che Pub-
lic ~Torke Co~ni.eeion oP the Chamber~ in thc course of a visit to the EEC
commiesion early in February, l~arned during its meetinge with Comaiasionera
Ortoli, Natali, Giolitti and Davignon that until now Che Itolian Caverc~ment _
hae not presented any pro~ect, deepite repeated aeaurnnces by the EEC Com-
mieaionera that Cos~on Market financing ie available for approved pro~ects
~hich the Italian Goverrnnent might prcnent." _
But what~ in aubstance, can bc done to put the housing and public Worka pro-
grama into effect? Peggio ma~ntnins that the problem "is fundamentally one
of policy. in that a table ~f prioritiea must be laid down, and the practice -
of Crying not to make anyone unhappy abandoned~ which until no~ has been one =
of the basic c.auses of delays and procrastination." Aside from thie. the -
- chairman of the Public Worka Commission of the Chamber holds that from the
regulative and legielative viewpointe the follo~ring ateps are neceaeary:
1) immediate approval of the law modifying the regulaCions regarding renego-
tiation of contract pricee, and establishing of pr~miuma for enterpri~es that _
- complete work pro~ecte ahead of schedule;
2) isaue of a directive by the government enabling Wider use of competitive _
. bid contracting~ of contracta for etAndardized typea of projecta (above all,
in the fields of housing and achoole), and of the gyatem of "construction- -
_ only" permits (general contractor). "By these meane," Peggio explains, "it
is poesible to partly eliminate and partly combine the technical and admin-
istrative etagea--alwaqs very long--~+hich follow the decision to inveet and
which have to do with choosing the deeignera, approving the deaigns, com-
- petitive bidding based on the designa, frequent subsequent design changes
during the courae of construction, and then, after completion of construc-
tion, the final inspecrion of the finiahed work, etc. Use of these contrac-
ting pracedu~ea places reeponaibility on the builder for the very co~plex taek
25
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of preparing the lICCUril conotruction plane attd eimplifiea enormouely the -
Cinnnciel and ndmini.etrntive control pro~edt~re~";
3) approval, Within u re~sonably eliort pericxl of time~ of a new orga~nic
law on publir, works, abrogating and replacing all exieting ].awe with the
oimpl~se poa~?ible clear. ~nodern text; -
4) ndoption ~?f epecial procedures for inCervention by nppropriate organe -
(oubeCitute r~dminietrator~ or other) in place of the re~ular adminieCrationa,
iu casea of ~:erioue nonperformance or prolonged delay in the realization o� -
epecific pro~;roms of expenciiture. Providing for such forme of subetitutive
intervention will apparently be ueeful, not eo much becauee wide~pread appli-
cation af euc~h procedures ehould, in practice, be neceasary, but above all
because as pc~licy they will etimulate the regular adminietrations to avoid
falling down on their ~obs."
From the operational viewpoint, Peggio ndvocatee:
. 1) creation of n coordinatinp, body for the carrying out of expenditurea that
~
have already been dpproved in the varioue sectore of the public administra-
tion;
2) activntion of a service a~ency for the planning and execution of public
Worke and coordinnted on-eite interventions. The Pund for Southern Italy
ehould already have done this in the southern regiona based on the 1916 -
Law 183.
"In view of the Fund'e failure Co comply with this ag well ae othera of
its functione, we muat now see whnt can poasibly be done in the ahort- and -
medium-tcrm periode ahead. The shor.t-term problem can be reaolved by adop~-
ing extraordinary proceduree in cases of conflict betWeen the professional
designer sesociations and highly qualified conetruction companiea or con-
sortiume. Obviouely," concluded the chairman of the Publ~c iJorks Comcais-
sion of the Chamber. "this prdblem also presentg far-reaching policy aspects
and can only be reeolved by an approach truly befitting the critical and
urgent nature of the problem."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" e.a.s.
9399
CSO: 3104 =
2f~
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
PCI'3 B,ARCA INT~RYI~D ON PAEiTY'S ~OOI~HIC F~LICY =
Turin U1 STAMPA in Italian 3 Mar ?9 p 3
~Interview Mith ~'CI leader Lu~lano Barca by Aldo Ri~~o]
- [Text~ Z1ro di~ferent ph~loeophiee aro disca*~nible xithln -
th� Y+CI [Italian Oo~uniet A~rty] propoeal~ on the one
hand~ recognition that the ~echanie~e of d developed
capitalist ~conoNy cannot be forcedt and on the other~
the ideological n~eed for an alternative wodel. In the
interviex B~rca~ calla for genuina policy of imest-
aent, and reaponsible planning of dexand."
Ro~s--The gov~rnaontal crieia is evolving toxard the
anticipated electiona, xhere that other, aore ob~jective
_ and ~ore serious criolm--the general crieis of the nation--
is awaiting ue. Irhat e?re the viexe of the couuniatts on
this eub~ect? Their hardened attitude (toxard a DC
[Christian Deaocrstic Party~ that ia said to be guilty
of "contradic~ion~" and "nonfulfilLent") ia the baaic _
cauee of thie difficult and extreuely del~cate phaae of
It+~lian politica. lf elections are held, hoxever, the
problesa will rexain unchanged ox xill perhaps becoae
even more serious.
Me have eeen how, in epite of everything~ the PCI _
leadership ig preoccupied xith preserving the etrategy
of the "hiatoric comproa~~ao" ( if it ean in faet be pre-
served, especislly after the foreaeedble acrinony of an
election ea~peign~. Thie relateg etrietly to politica--
_ to political aligruenta and the relative etrength of
political forcee~ hoKever. Zt~ere re~ain the problaaa of
substance--the grobleas of the econo~y--xhich together
xith the problesa of public order are the ~ost draaatic
_ e~rsptoma of tha rzational crisis.
= I had a comrersaticn with Luciano Barca~ one of tho party
leadera in charRe of econo~ic affalrs. We began our
convar8ation by talking about the 3-Year Plan. Z9~ia plan
_ 27 =
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ehould put tho eo-called "greator ~~ority" to the teeti~ -
for it is on+o of thQ operati~e aepeote of the exergonoy
_ polioy. Inotead~ no one--or almoet no one--talke about
it a~}r ~ora. And yet xith sll ite strong pointe and xeak
pointe, xith a11 ths n~cosee~xy postponeRente and ad~ju~t- -
sente~ the doowa0nt will etill b~ tho baele for diacueeion
xhen the time again cowea.
[Anexer] with rospect to the qu~etion of a reduction in public exper,diturea~ ~
_ I believo thare le general agree~ent that the figures ehould bo rovised. It
i~a not a quertion of being ~ore preoiae or 1Qee preciaot it is ~uat that the -
calculatione exe ineorreot. So~e data are more peseiiiatic than reality
xarranto~ pro~ectiono xere wa~do on the baaia of increaaea that are uncertain . -
_ quantitiea~ �uch ae the incresae in public e~ploy~ent~ xhereaa publiu reve-
nuee xere probably undereetiwated. There is slso, hoxever, a groneral reali-
_ zation that precialon i.a eseenti~,l and that the oxiatenca of a goverruental
deficit doee not suto~atically reeult in incre~ed de~and and increaaed
_ develop~ont. That xould eu~ount to a pedeetrian varioty of Koynoeianies.
Labor Costa
It is an ir~dieputable fact that in the greaent aituation xagea cannot be an -
indepondent variable. Naturwlly~ it i� eeaential to eoe in xhat xay they
nay--and ehould--be dependent. Should they b~ dependent on im?eetaent in
the Sout,h. aaawing euch inveat~ent to be an ob~ectivo fact and of pri~e
- i~portance? I agree that they ahould be.
[Queation] But even if you accept ths arguaent xith reapect to the contain-
sent of l.abor eoeta you have to refer not to the eost of labor per hour but
to the cost of labor per unit of produot~on. There'a a diffarence.
[Anaxer] Indeed there is. I oia,y add that even the DC, in its day~ e~cpreased -
_ a ai~ilar viex~ together xith the labor uniona. 3'he 3-Year Plan~ hoxever,
apeaka of containing xagee in terna of hours xorked. It is a deliberate,
- abrupt turn to the rightt it ig an antilabor political statement. -
[Question~ Hox ean you believe that this xae the ob3ective of Andreotti and
Pandolfi, in an adninistration that governed b,y v irtue of your aupport?
[Ansxer] We do believe it._ The ob~ective xas to c~eaonstrate that i~
xa$ pasaible to govern xith the co~xunista included in the tta~ority and yet
_ at the eaae tlae take care of 4h� interesta of other political parties and
aocial groupe. We therefor.e told And~ceotti, Pandolfi and Norlino--and I
pereonally xrote in the 31 Deceaber iaaue of L'UNITA--thst Ke xould have been
able to rssch an agreeRent xith reespect to the cost of labor per unit of
production but thst ~e Kould have eplit over the iasue of xagea per hour of
xork. Cf courae~ not evon the quastion of xa.gas per hour of xork is taboo~
but auch a xage ecale ahould be calculated in a~oader c~ntext ~that xill
provide for dn increaent in productivity (and the labor unions are aaenable
to thia) and thereby allox a greater margin for the payxent of the xages
thesaelvea. ' -
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~Quoation] Thase are thinga that cannot ba accoAplished rapidly, hoxever~
xhereaa the need for reatoring atrength to the p~ivate enterprleee is an
iwaediate noed. Le. Malfa~ in particular~ contends tha~ public investe~ant-- _
eepocially in a country euch ae Italy~ xith the governnenta,l apparatue
available to ue--is a slox proceea, xhereaa p~ivate invest~ent ie a different -
atatter. Fbr this reaao n the PRI [Italian Republic~,n Party] hae proaoted the
ide~ of ~ biennial extension of the contracts. -
[Msxer] I agree, aa t'ar as t,he governmental apparatus ie concerned. Thia -
le, in fact~ a basic reform that muat be carried out. But where ia it -
xritten that by increaeing the eavinga of private enterpriee you auto~ati- ~
cally open the xay to nex inveetRents7 Thie xould be pre-Keyneaianie~n~
_ pure and si~mple. Another approach is neceesary.
[Question] A reatoration of profita ia not of iteelf eufficient to induoe -
new inve~toent, but it io nonetheleas a prerequi$ite for neK irneetaent.
CMeWer] Looka in 1y77 He uere genuinely arucioua to have private enter-
prisa recover a aiargin of profit aufFicient for 8elf-financing~ in order -
- tt~t its indebtednees xould not becave excesaive. ~ut 1978 Kae a different
. kind of year--a year not of decreasing but of increaeing p~ofita. There ie -
s~t`ficient liquidity~ and it hae even benefited f5com foreign aupport. I
_ do not overesti~ate the extent of the recovery that people are te~lkinq
about, ho~~ves, for it is a p~oariowa r~ao~sry and dcsa ~t~+ne~t1 the
- crLtQria of atable developa~ent--but neither do I underestisate it. I eay
this, of cfluree, in the knoxledge that there are individual "pocketa" of
_ extremely aerioue crieea~ aa for exsmple in the cheoical eector~ criaea
that are so aerioue, moreover. that xhat happens to xagea once again -
- becomea a factor of aecondary laportance. The real problen ia to canceive -
and carry out a genuine policy xith reepect to invoat~ents in other xorda,
to offor concrete guaranteee of a nasket for the product of auch invest,~ent.
Stated in another way~ the problea~ basically involves the planning of
demand.
[Questicra~ Irhat kind of planning?
- [Ansxer7 In the neantime~ it ia easential to resiet the te,ptation to -
- return to the financing of conswption: to high salaries and high Kages
and a consequent rasurgence of inflation. If discrimination ahould then
_ occur, it xould produce intolerable social tensions. Another negative
result xould be a decline in fa~aily savinga~ xhich through the instrumental-
_ ity oi the b~nks serves to finance industry. Whst xe are propoaing is the
cr~ation of a denand of a nex type and nex quality--one that xill rely on _
_ all the various articulations of the ata,te and be based on verified collec-
tive and social needs. Just think of hok ~nany--and xhat kinda--of oppor-
- tunities even for private inveetaent could be created by a serioue railxay
plan, by a serious emrironmental plan, by a serious energy coneervation
= plan, and so on.
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What Kind of Market?
- [Question~ Thio takee us to more general topics~ as for exaa~ple the
- propc~sal.n wtth reepeot to oconort?ic policy that are contained in the
_ "Pr.oposed Theaee" far your 15th Yarty Congree~. 1 Kon't conceal the fact
that whon I reaui atateraente that affirm the naod for intograting ple~nning -
xith the mArket= collectivo conswaera xith private conawaere{ the defense
= of the eQOnomic sy.,etew with the effort to auperaede capltalls~i and eo
forth~ T get the impresaion that thie is an atte~pi; to lwap together a
number of dieaimilar thinge in a eomexhat mechanical and therafore somexhat -
- abstract manner. I agreo that thess are--as you say--unexplored patha.
[Ansxer] Yes~ they are unexplored paths; but a nwnber of atagea have
already been attained along theQ. We are opposed to all forns of admini-
strative planning, in aceordance with our pluralistic concept of society
and our axaxenees that Ital~r--a country xhich, among other things, is
lacking in raK materials--must function in a xorld ~rket. What I mean is -
- that if certain reatrictions are placed on Fiat'e activitiea~ we must then
reali.ze that We are thereby giving an advantage to a foreign corporation--
- Rena.ult~ to be specific. Errery effort on our part to modify the doaeatic
~aarket mus~t inevitably take into account this free xorld market~ not only
in terms of the risk irnolved but al8o in terma of the foreign outlets it -
- provides �or our e~erprisea. Mother point that has been estahlished is the
= fact that every citizen has the xight to produce Khatever he xants to xith
his oxn money, but if he asks for money from the atate he cannot exe~pt -
_ himself from conditiona and contxole baeed on a eyatem of priorities.
- [Queation] There ramaine the fact that in your proposal one can d.iscern -
tr?o dissirailax philosophies that axe reconci.led only on papers on the one
hand, the recognition that the mechanisms of a developed capitalist economy =
cannot be forced beyond a certa.in point (that is to say~ cannot be dis-
~ torted)~ and on the other hand the ideological need for an alternative
model that is collectivist in concept, however xatered-doxn that concept u?ay
have become. Moreover, since it offir:ially abandoned the Soviet model the _
- PCI has continuously oacillated betxeen these txo polea of behaviors first,
a cautious~ and at times even benevolent, "xait and see" policy xith respect
to the reformist hypothesis of the Center-Lefti next, an endoraement of the
"xild" labor unionism of 1969-70i then once again~ concessians to the method
of conserving a capacity for accwnulation= and so on.
[Ansxer] ida axe xorking on the asaumption that the market should be pre- ~
aerved but that it should not be identified xith the market of traditiona.l
capitalism. Throughout so many centuries and in ao many different places~
_ hox many diverse forms has the market not taken? -
Serioua Danger =
- [Question' But in the period of transition betxeen the existing market and
= thia hypothetical market, there is the very serious danger of causing a _
crisis in the formsr xhile having little or no knoxledge of the latter.
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_ [An$xer] Causi.ng a crisis in it...? A worse ariaia than the preaent nne? -
We intend~ on the cx~ntrasy, to reactivate the roarket by meana of a genuine
- and effeCtive planning whieh xill make the maxket reflect the actual needs
_ of society as a whole. pn the other hand~ the immediate problem facing ue
is one of'nrodifying not the market but rather the m~de of pa,rticipation by
- the state. 3tate participation caust be f~eed f~om the apirit of xelfari~m,
_ patronage and arbitrarinees that hr~s characterized it to date and that has
= been preoieely the reaeon xhy lt haa been an uncextain and variable point -
of referance for thoee xhoee funetion it ie to inveat.
[Queation] Tt is difficult tn disagree Kith thie viex. Hoxever~ there are
so taany problens poeed by the reaaining--but not inconaiderable--ideological ,
suspicione, and by the acrimony of a political confrontation that could
_ . probably be avoided and that has only ~ust begun.
OGPYRIGHTi 1979 Dditr. LA STAMPA S. p. A. _
loy9z
= c~o : 3104
, END
'
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