JPRS ID: 8677 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPR~ L/8677
21 September 1979
West E u ro e R e o rt
- p p
CFOUO 53/79)
~
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/8677
21. September 1979
WEST EUROPE REPOi~T
~,1
(FOUO 53/79)
CONTENTS PAGE .
,r
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
INT.ERNATIONAL APFAIRS
L~zropean Perceptions of SALT II, TNF Issues Presented
(EUROPA ARCHN, 10 Aug 79~ 1
~ General Problems, by Gregory F. Treverton
Specific European Concerns, by Lothar Ruehl. ~ ~
ITALY
Support for U.S. Nti.ssiles in ~rope
(IL SOLE - 24 ORE, 12 Aug 79~ 19
COUNTRY SECTION
INTPRNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Irrl;ernation~zl Terrorists To Hold Secret Congress in Milan
(CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 30 Aug 79~ 21
Br ie i's
New Antiship Missile ~ 25
PEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Inflation Rate of Five Percent Projected
(sT~Rtv, 16 Aug 79) 26
Oil, Taxes, Construction, by Juergen Kurth,
Herbert Uniewski ~
Self-Regulation Urged, Otmar Emminger Interview
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO)
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' vl~ri~.icw u~~ U1VLY ~:r.:
ii
CON7'ENTS (Continued~ Pa.ge
' STERN' Reports U.S. Forces Hire Germa~ as P~,raanilita,ry
. Watchmen ~
(Juergen Roth; STERN, 30 Aug 79~ 29
I~tANC~
PCF Members Oppose New Approach To Dissident Intellectuals
(Geraxd Molina, Ives Vargas; LE NOUVE~ OBSERVATEUR,
23-29 Ju~ 79) 31
ITALY
'K Factor' Analysis: Communist Impedance o~ Government
. (Alberto R~nchey; CORRIERE DEZLA SERA, 12 Aug 79~... 35
Fina.nce Minister Malfatti on Tax Reform ll,,
(Malfatti Interview; L'EUROPEO, lg Jul 79) ' 38 '
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
'
EUROPEAN PE~'~.CEPTIONS OF SALT II, TNF ISSUES PRESENTED
t,,
- General Problems
_ Bonn EUROPA ARCHIJ .in German 10 Aug 79 pp 455-460
[Article by Gregory F. Treverton: "The SALT II Agreament-Content, Signi- ~
ficance, and Some Problems"]
[Excerpts] Agreement's Effect on. United States
There is no need to point out th~t Salt II cannot solve all strategic
problems for the United States; no SALT treaty can do that. But on some
essetltial points, SALT II nevertheless does introduce improvements as
compared to SALT I. SALT II for the first time establishes numerical _
parity between both sides; the United States Senate raised this demand
already during the ratification of SALT I when the Soviet Uriion was
allowed a larger number of missiles as compensation for the alleged
superior quality of American technology. Now the Sovie~ Union for the
first time must reduce the number of its strategic offensive weapons,
specifically, in the amount of 250 launch devices. Naturally, the Soviets
_ will select their oldest systems for scrapping; nevertheless, the mere
fact that weapons must be scrapped is significant.
SALT II does not sol�~e the problem that causes Ame~ican strategists the
biggest headache: The increasing vulnerabili_ty of their land-based
Minuteman ballistic missiles. There is hardly any doubt that large and
accurate Soviet missiles with multiple warheads will be in a position to-
ward the beginning or the middle of the eighties almost completely to
- wipe out the siloed American ICBMs in one surprise strike. Whether there
is any real threat corresponding to this theoretical possibility continued _
to be a vehemently debated subject. SALT II at any rate cannot eliminate
such a threat and that is something we have known since the 1974 Vladivostok
summit mePti.ng beteeen President Eord and Secretary-General Brezhnev.
. ,
But SI~LT II at least puts a limit on the Soviet capability for mounting a
destructive first strike. Because the Soviet sea-based missiles are not
sufficiently accurate to wipe out siloed missiles, the limitation to 820
.
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land-based MIRV-ICBMs, as agreed upon in SALT II, in combination with the
l:imita'tion to a maximum of ten war.heads per missile, has the practical
effect that the Soviet Union will have a total of no more than 9,000 war-
'1' heads available for a surprise strike againsC the American missile silos. ~
That is a limit--for the worst cast--which one can ad~ust to with one's ,
planning. Besides, the restrictive treaty provisions on the moderniza-
tion of existing systems see to it that all land-based Soviet ICBMs--
apart from the one type which both sides are allowed to develop newly-- i
in spite of all imaginable technical improvements in the final analysis
must retain the same size and the same engine characteristics as before.
~
In the area of verification, SALT II brings progress. An example here ~
is the ban on the production and introduction of the Soviet SS-16. ~
Another example consists of the counting rules that were agreed upon.
It says in the treaty that every si1o, which, depending upon its con- '
struction design, may contain one missile with multiPle warheads, basic-
ally is to be counted as a launch device for MIRVed m..~ss:iles, regardless
of what actually is in that silo. Accordingly, the Soviet Union must
accept the fact that about 100 of their ICBMs with single warheads are
to be counted as if they were MIRVed because--and so long as -they are
installed in silos suitable for MIRV. According to the counting rule,
"once a MIRV, always a MIRV," the Soviet missiles of the S~-17 and SS-18 j
types--even if they have a single warhead--are to be charged fully against i
the Soviet MIRV contingent because they were tested with multiple war- '
heads. ~
Undoubtedly, verification will become increasingly difficult, the more '
the SALT process moves out of the sphere of purely quantitative arms ~
limitations into the sphere of qualitative arms limitations. But in (
SALT II it was possible at any rate to subject individual sectors of ~
missile technology--of which a few years ago it was still believed that ~
they are not verifiable, in other words, multiple warheads--to control.
SALT II openly accepts a truth which actually was al~rays obvious and that ~
is that verification is in the interest of both sides and thaC both sides ~
therefore to a certain extent must depend on cooperation. SALT II up- i
gxades the role of the permanent advisory commission which will serve i
as a forum Eor the continuing exchange of arms data and for the purpose
of raising doubts as to whether the partner's behavior is in keeping j
with treaty provisions.
Rea1 and Apparent Problems of the SALT Agreement
, '
The SALT debate in the United States unfortunately has less substance i
than it seems on some important points. One amendment clause, which the i
Senate might possibly add to the treaty text, concerns the only obviously ~
"asymmetrical" provision of the treaty according to which the SovieC Union i
may retain its 308 "heavy missiles" while the United States does not have i
~ such huge missiles and according to the treaty is no longer allowed to ;
build.them. Indeed, the United States never placed any value on having ;
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such missi'.'~s; the United States would not build any, either, even if it
were allowed to do so. The problem of the Soviet "heavy" missiles instead
consists in the fact that the Soviet Union--if there were no SALT limit
on "fractionation"--could'3istribute the throw weight of every missile
over several dozen warheads.
Ti1e current debate presumably assigns too much weight to the verification
problem3. There is hardly any doubt that, even in the best of all worlds,
the United States would not be in a position to discover every Soviet
vio?ation--even the smallest one--of the treaty. Presumahly however the
- United States will in any case be in a position to reco~ize a treaty
violation by the Soviet Union which is of military significance. The
fact that concepts such as "presumably" have to he used naturally tells
us how problematical the whole affair is. It is and remains far more a
matter of opinion rather than a question of physical capabilities, Un-
doubtedly, the loss of the observation stations in Iran is mak~n g it
more difiicult For the United States to ver ify the SALT agreements; but
this loss undoubtedly can be extensively compensated by means of other,
ahundantly available systems or it can be made up again in the longer run.
Anybody *~ho insists rhat each individual SALT provision must be totally
verifiable according to certain technical procedures turns an apparent
prob7.em into a real problem. This approach would be understandable if
~ ver:~fication were so unambiguoirs a matter that one could say: Either we ~
know whether the Russians are cheating or we do not know. But things are
not as sjmple as all that and the problem is further complicated by the
~act that most verification systems are secret for good reasons. Verifi-
cation is simply a pretext for some senators to stop SALT II which they
do not 1ike; for o~hers, it is a way out to get around problems which are
inherent in the treaty itself; and for still others it is an argument that
enables them to tie tactical flexibility in with the great demand for the
preservation of national interests in the course of the ratification de-
bate. But just as a bad treaty should not be approved only because it is
verifiable, so should a go~d treaty not be discarded only because it does
not meet an unrealistic--and unnecessary--ideal standard of verification.
Naturally, SALT contains problems that cause worry for the Europeans. They
are significant but this is not the place for discussing them in detail~.
But even these problems often are not viewed correctly or are being mis-
re~resented. SALT II covers not only the Soviet "grey-area weapons," such
as the SS-20, which do not threaten the United States but which do threaten
Western Europe. Some of those weapons systems could play a role in fut~ire
arms control negotiations; there is much to indicate that they should be
included in SALT III. The failure to take those weapons into considera-
tion however goes back to SALT I and at that time that was a requirement
_ put up by the ~estern, not by the eastern side. It was the United States
who--in full agreement with its allies--resisted the Soviet demand that
SALT shoul3 also include the so-called "forward bused systems"--in other
words, the air forces of the United States and other NATO countries that
can reach the territory of the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons.
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_ The worry about the protocol for SALT II likewise extensively misses the
point. It is feared in Europe that the United States is allowing itself
to be pushed by the Soviet Union into continuing to abide by the limita-
tions on sea-based and land-based cruise miss3.les even after the expira-
tion of the official period of validity oF the Frotocol. The Soviets
will certainly try to 3o that; the protocol after all in combination
with the "joint declaration" provides that "cruise missiles" are to be
placed on rhe agenda for SALT III. But the question as to what is to
be done with the above-mentioned ag.reements on cruise missiles will not
be decided in the course of the SAL'r negotiations but elsewhere. If
NATO should decide, i.n the context,~of modernizing its European-earmarked
nuclear forces, also to introduce land-based and sea-based cruise missiles
with greater range, the~ the United States SALT delegation will be bound
by that decision. At any rate, it is to be expected that the United States
Senate will insist on.making any extension of the protocnl's period of
validity dependant on its approval. If we then also take into considera-
tion the general public opinion clunate in the West, it seems impossible
that the United States could, in SALT II�, be ready to enter into an
agreement on cruise missiles that would not be backed up by the allies.
SALT and the Strategy of Deterrence
There is much confusion in the American SALT debate. First of all it
deals with enCirely minor and then again with quite general questions;
sometimes it involves special tecir;~~:ical problems and then again it re-
lates to Sovi,~t Ai~xican poli,cy, to atmospheric things, such as the ques-
tion as to wh~ther one could afford to trust Moscow at all. In between
there is certainly also a discu~sion as to what strategic deterrence is
. based on and how it works; but thai: part of the debate is much too short.
The unrestrained tempo of the Soviet armament drive undoubtedly is.cause
for concern. SAI,T was by no means able to attenuate the Soviet arms ef-
fort to the extent that had been .hoped for on~e upon a ti.me. Nevertheless,
one will hardly be able to say that things will go better in the future
without SALT. Greater United States expendi.tures in the field of stra--
tegic armament are inevitable. One essential step in tha~ direction is
~resident Carter's decision in favor of Lhe MX missile which is to correct
the vulnerability of the Minuteman system.
But it so happens that the MX perhaps--to paraphrase a statement by de
Gau1le--is the solution of a problem but at the same time it self consti-
tutes a problem. Somehow deployed in a mobile manner, the system cannot
be reached by a Soviet surprise attack. At the same time however the
MX will be a highly efficient and accurate missile whi,ch, in turn~ could
: threaten the Soviet land-based ICBMs with a surprise first strike. The
problem arising from the ~~ul.nerability of the ICBMs however is incompar-
ably worse for the Soviet Union than it is for the Americans: About 70
percent of the Soviet strategic warheads are installed on fixed, siloed
missiles whereas on the Americ~n side that would come to only about one
quar~er.
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Possibl.y, the Sovie~ Union, if it finds itself facing this dilemma, will
follow the American exam~le and likewise establish a mobile--and therefore
~ survivable--system of launch devices. This means higher arms expenditures
Eor bot}i sides but also more stability. In the meantime, historical exper-
ience hardly provides any cause For the optimistic expectation that the
Soviets would c~illingly follow the .Aniericans in their interpretation as
to what stability really means. Precisely if a SALT agreement were not to
materialize, the Soviet Union could find itself forced to increase the num -
ber of warheads in its missiles or also to seek its salvation in an ABM sys-
tem. At any rate, a situation might arise during the late.eighties in
which the Soviet land-based ICBMs are vulnerable whi7.e the American ones
are no longer vulnerable; and it is not at all certa3.n whether that would
serve the cause of stability. Besides, verification remains a problem:
The United States may be convinced that the deployment system for the MX
is not verifiable �or the Soviet Union; whether a similar system, applied
to a Soviet "rIX" on Soviet territory, would likewise be verifiable is some-
thing that remains to be seen.
The problem consists not so much in the incongruency of the weapons b'ut
rather in their concept. When the idea of cooperative arms control by the
superpowers was stz.],1 hotly disputed--in other words, at the time of the
conclusion of SALT I and beyond--there was sufficient coincidence between
the Grrategic concept of the United States and the practice of arms control.
The treaty on the limitation of missile defense systems (ABM treaty) was
the clearest example here. Defending cities against a nuclear attack
was considered undesirable because it seemed suitable ta undermine L�he
enemy's confidence in his own ability to achieve deterrence by threatening
a massive retaliatory blow. Today there is far less consensus of the goals
and the means of deterrence; there are hardly any generally recognized
strategic criteria for arms policy decisions; and the concept of arms con-
trol is even exposed to the charge that it has lost its orientation and
long ago ceased to be consumate with security-policy goals which it is sup-
posed to serve.
Resistance against SALT II is to a good extent aimed against the premises
- of strategic arms control which claimed validity for a decade. The treaty's
opponents argue, looking at it quite specifically, not against SALT II but
in favor of strategic superiority5. They contradict the thesis to the ef-
fect that strategic parity also means stability. Tnstead, they stick to the
idea'that strategic superiority provides political influence and could be
decisive in the outcome of a crisis between the superpowers.
There is a whole series of problems which would have to be thought out more
thoroughly than is being done currently in the debate on SALT II. That in-
cludes for example the fundamental question as to the role~;~~hich negotia-
tions on strategic arms limitations should play in wester~i defense planning
and in East-West relations. That also includes the very ;:lifficult issue,.as
to the future development trends in strategic arms contri~l.s. Above all one
would have to figure out whether it is wise to move on ~~rom SALT TT, such as
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ir is now, directly toward SALT III, especially if the American negotia-
~ton concept were Co be aimed primarily at drastically rediicing ~he permis-
sible totals. That would increasingly aggravate the nuclear strategy pro-
blema which NATO faces in Europe.
_ At any rate, it would be a sliame if the SALT debate were to get stuck on
secondary detail questions or if the treaty were to fail only because it
naturally cannot come up to the excessive expectations to the effect that
it supposed7.y should solve all of America's strategic problems.
FOOTTtOTES
3. This view would probably also be approved by the more thoughtful critics
of SALT II, such as, for example, Paul Nitze.
4. See Lothar Ruehl, "The SALT II Agreement and European Interests," on
pp 461 ff in this issue. A good analysis of European pxoblems connected
with SAI,T can also be found in Christopher Makins, "Bringing in the
A11ies," FOREIGN POLICY, No 35, Summer 1979. The author has published
an investigation of the problems of the "grey area" and the options for
NATO in E~RETGN AFF~IRS, Summer 1979, entitled "Nuclear Weapons and the
'Grey Are'a,"' pp 1075 ff.
5. See, for instance, the article by Colin Gray in the issue of THE WASH-
- INGTON QUARTERLY, ~einter 197 devoted to SALT.
Specif ic T
uxopean Concerns
�
Bonn EUROPA ARCHIV in German �i0 Aug 79 pp 461-472
[Article by Dr Lvthar Ruehl, correspondent, Second German Television
Channel, Brussels: "The SALT. II Agreement and European Zntere~ts"]
[Text] The Vienna agreement on the "limitation of strategic offensive
weapons"1 is not aimed at a limitation of strategic armaments as such but
rather at a limitation of arms increases in the strategic nuclear weapons
arsenals. It is marginal in terms of its design and effect. The hard
core remains untouched~ ~
Development Tendencies in the Strategic Force Ratio Under SALT II
In the context of SALT II, the United States--provided it is'able to do
that in accordance with the status and objectives of its armament program--
could have about 17,000 targetable nuclear attack warheads ("force loading")
for strategic delivery systems while the Soviet Union could have about
14,0002. This margin for incr~ase, on the basis of the status as of the
beginning of 1979, leaves the United States room for about 8,000 nuclear
force l.oadings that could he aimed at various targets (status as of 1. Jan-
uary 1979: 9,200, extreme limit according to~SALT II 1985: about 17,300)
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--in other words, a pex~mi,tted growth rate of about 87.5 percent. For the
Soviet Union, the increase margin in conformity with SALT II comes to about
_ 9,000 nuclear force loadings, that is to say, 280 percent on the same
basis (~tatus as of 1 January 1979: 5,000, extreme limit in 1985: about
14,300) .
. This option for an increase in the targetable attack potential using
central straregic systems is asymmetrical on both sides because, on the
one hand, the MIRV technology in American armament still is ahead of the
Soviet one whereas, on the other hand, the Soviet armament ef~ort develops
its modern MIRV warheads with a larger number of individual warheads on
, the newer missile weapons. From about 2:1 in 1979, the American super-
iority in targetable strategic force loadings will shrink to about 1.2:1
in 1985, if American plans are,,carried out and if American estimates on
Soviet arms increases prove to be correct. The numeric~l ratio would
then be r~oughly 11,500: 9,500, plus or minus 5 percent . The ratio
in Lhe target a~tack optinns of both SALT partners, related to the num--.,
ber of operational and targetable individual weapons for strategic de~
livery vehicles would accordingly, at the end of the period of validity
of SALT IT, would be on the American side in the form of a rough parity
with a marginal advantage in terms of numbers.
n
- The question therefore cannot be whether SALT II, related to the subject
of the treaty, creates a recognizable disadvantage for the United States;
~ instead, the question should be whether the concept of quantitative par-
ity of central strategic weapons in the bilateral ratio is in keeping
~a~th the security need of the United States and th e interests of the
European NATO partners. In connection with SALT II it is furthermore
necessary to analyze the broader strategic environment with the dynamics
of the strategic competition between the two world powers and the changes
which might develop by 1985 or immediately thereafter in the international
; conflict structure between East and West. In practical terms, the ques- ~
_ tion is this: Does SALT II leave the United States sufficient strategic -
weapons to preserve its security and effectively to screen its allies or
other protected countries?
This question, to be sure, must be projected against the geopolitical and
strategic reality, not against the background of abstract assumptions
about nuclear war which one side could start with a sudden raid-like
attack against a thousand missiles in silos and which for this purpose,
in one ~hrow, wnuld cause at least 2,000 thermonuclear detonations, �
continent-wide, as the first strike against the sovereign territory of
the enemy.
The Vienna SALT II texts by themselves caunot supply a valid answer and
that is already indicated by the extreme margins for the increase in bi-
lateral strategic armament efforts. An agreement which permits theor-
- etically to make up to 17,000 weapons operational, when only ahout 11,000
ore planned, cannot give us any information about the actual force ratio
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at the end of its period o~ validity, not to mention its �urther effects on
the distr~,bution of strategic power during the decade after the next. The
American treaty negotiators in Vienna pointed to the "SALT process" (Brze-
zinski5~ a1QO because of this obvious lack of instrumental value, in tern?s
_ of stabilization, deriving ~rom a strategic balance--no matter how care-
fu11y adjusted--between the two SALT partnexs.
, The American SALT negotiators (Earle) consider th~ clause on the limita-
tion of launch weight and throw weight for new ICBMs to the heaviest figures
actually deployed upon the conclusian of the treaty (Article IV, Paragraph
7) to be one of the key provisions6. All Vienna agreements in this area
are to work in the same diraction: To limit the increase in the ta,rgetable
w~[rheads. Soviet interest in an opti.mum increase in the number of ~missiles
and launch devices by means of ~the MIRV technology was evident since 1972.
,
~ Only for SALT III di.d Foreign Minister Gromyko in 1978, in addressing
the Special United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament in New York,
hint at a"substantial reduction" in strategic weapons although there
was no indication as to whethez the Soviet foreign minister was talking
about launch devices or force loadings. Within this broader prospective,
we come to the practical queation as to the targetable attack potential
of the strategic nuclear forces and the reserve potential in the central
U. S. arsenal which can be held in readiness foY NATO purposes in Europe,
that is to say, for pa.rticipation in the SACEt3R strike against Soviet and
- Eastern European territories.
_ Once again the Vienna agreement by itself cannot give us any adequate
information but it does leave relatively broad leeway for each of the
two partners until the end of 1958 for each partner's planning of strat-
egic forces and their conversion to modern weapons sy~tems--a leeway
which each side can fill out or leave open. That also applies to the
decision to deploy ICBM systems in a land-ymobile mode, in other words,
for rhe armament option which is most i.mportant in strategic an3 security-
policy terms and which wi11 become available during the period of validity
of SALT II.
The ceiling for strategic delivery vehicles and their launch systems or _
platforms at 2,250 however is higher than the ceiling which Henry Kiss-
inger tried to get in SALT II in 1974-1976 and which was 2,160; neverthe-
1ess, in terms of its effect on the bilateral armed foxces, it hardly
differs from the lower one (the difference relates to the compensation
for the Sov iet "$ackfire" bombers which were exempted from the SAL~ limi-
tations and for which the Americans expected 240 in the strategic config- -
. uration by 1985). The reduction ot this ceiling o� 2,250, as specified
for 1982, in SALT III, by means of the "considerable and essential reduc~
tion in th.e number of stra~egic offensive weapons" (third chagter of the
declaration in SALT II)--which is provided for as negotiating goals in
the "Joint Declaration"--b~y about 25-30 percent and the reduction of MIRV- -
ICBM from 820 'by a similar percentage would considerably �reduce the target
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atr~ck capabiiity For military attack planning aglinst sma11 and hard
Cargets (such as rockeC silos) especially if this were to be connected
with a reduc~ion in the number of single warheads in the MTRV systems.
Would th~r critically impaix the American capability of coverinb mili-
tarily relevant targers in the Soviet Union in order to strengthen NATO
deLenses in Europe? -
The answer. is directly related to the target accuracy of the American
systems and Che survivability of the ICBMs of those that are installed
in .Eixed sil.os. This survivability of the "Minuteman" (1,000, including
550 tripl.e riIRV Minuteman III and 450 Minuteman TI [Missiles]) will
presumably be heavily reduced starting in 1982-1983 if Che hypothesis
of the threat assumes a strike against the silos without adequate ~
warning and launch preparations. The realism behind such an assumption
is not a subject for debate here. Arithmetically, up to 100 percent
oF the 1,000 silos could be hit and destroyed. The threat springs
- above al1 from the Snviet SS-19 and also from the heavier SS-18. The
SS-18 is recorded in the SALT II agreement with ten warheads and the
SS-1.9 wirtt six warheads (entered as "RS-20" and "RS-18" in the stipu-
lated agreement on Paragraph 10, Article IV, ot the treaty).
SALT II entitles the Soviets by the end of 1985 to deploy 300 ICBMs it~
the RS--2U weight category (American designation: SS-18) and along with ,
that 520 RS-18 (SS-1R). In other words: 3,000 Plus 3,100 would equal
6,100 ICBr1-MIRV warheads in fixed mis~ile systems. If, along with
American experts (for example, Lodal) , we assume that rhere are two
such accurate warheads for the neutralization of ea~:h missile s~ilo,
then the Soviet forces with t~ao-thirds of their SS-19 potential could
doubly cover all Minuteman silos in North America wi4hout having to use
the less accurate SS-18 missiles which are suitable for massive thermo- 't;
nuclear multiple attacks against vast target areas.
The rlinuteman force, which so far is the only accurate and fast--reponse
' component, in keeping with the requirements of a flexible escalation
strategy, for. the external support of the European detex'rence potential
o~ NATO, thus is faced with a ma.the~:tatically heavy risk already during
the running time of SALT II. SALT II was unable to remove this objective
(technical) threat from the valuable "Minuteman" because it does not
provide any radical and verifiable reductions of MIRV systems. (In this
connection, of course, the one-sided American renunciation of an in-
crease in the number of warheads in Minuteman III from the present three
to seven, which would be fundamentally possible according to the wording
of the agreement, is relativized.)
The right of the SALT partners to one, each, new modern ICMB type, in
combination with the upper MIRV-ICBM limit of 820 launch units, is es-
sential �or the strategic balance and the preservation of the options
with MIRV-ICBri also for the NATO partners in Europe. Prior to 18 June
,
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1979, President Carter gave the go-ahead for the procurement of~ initially,
200 MX-ICBMs which could be deployed with a total of 2,000 thermonuclear
w~rheads of greater ac~uracy and which could also be stationed in a land-
mobile manner. They can partly compensate for the threaCened Minuteman
III potential of 1,650 warheads.
_ But according ro SALT II the United States also has the right to replace
a11 550 Minuteman III missiles with MX by the end of 1985--in other words,
America can replace 1,650 warheads on 550 fixed ICBMs with 5,500 warheads
on 550 land-mobile and accordingly relatively well-protected ICBM.systems.
- This example shows that the Vienna texts by themselves do not yet~have
any relevance in armament policy and strategic terms but that they be-
come relevant only in combination with the one-sided decisions on options
which are availablP within the SALT II framework. To be sure, Article I _
' of the "Protocol" stipulates that, by the end of 1981, mobile ICBM launch
devices may be neither deployed, nor may they be used for flight testing .
of missiles; but, as of 1982, they are again available for these purposes
according to the Vienna agreement.
Because the MX also makes new warheads of greater accuracy and target
reliability in the terminal f light phase, the United States can provide
safety for its ICBMs against silo-accurate enemy warheads and moreover
can incraase i~s attack capability by a larger number of more targetable
and accurate waxheads. Converted to MX, the permitted number of 820 MIRV
" ICBMs wiCh 8,200 individual attack force loadings and with a CEP reduced
as campared to Minuteman III, could, even increase of a reduced detonation
value, combine greater target attack capability with a greater weapons '
reserve and practically secured survivability of launch systems.
Within the framework of SALT, the United Sta~es after 1985 could have more
targetable and more ac~urate thermonuclear warheads in its ICBM fo~ces than
_ has been the case so far with the Minuteman class. The United States could
keep more weapons ready, than has been the case so far, in its central tar-
get planning for speci~l purposes of screening Western Europe by covering
more suitable targets in the Soviet Union. Whether the Un~ted States~can
- do that does not depend on SALT II but on the American armament progratn,
on the production capacity, on the financial expenditure, and on political
factors in America itself: Does America, the world power, want to take
the step across the armament threshold to the field of land-mobile ICBMs
on a broad front and, in so doing, fill outthe extreme limits, set by SALT
II, down to the very last nook or does it not? What limitation goals does
it contemplate for SALT III?
Here we come to the question which the American negotiators raised in 1972
in Moscow in their unilateral declaration8 as to whether a deployment of
land~obile ICBrI launch systems would "not be compatible with the agree-
ment's goals." A~ that time, the U. S. delegation for SALT I withdrew its
suggestion as to a ban on the deployment of such ICBM systems and postponed
the prob].em to the SALT II negotiations. The assertion that such systems
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would be incompatib'le witti the purpose oF the interim agreement running
until 1977 need not by itself be applicable to the SALT II a~reement
which is to rua until 1985. ~
The 1979 Vienna treaty only bans "mob i1e launch devices for heavy ICBMs"
(Article IX/l.d) on the ground (so-cal.led air-based ICBMs on aircraft are
permissiUle but, in the treaty category of ASBMs wi~h a range of more than
600 kilomeLers, would fall within tre SALT II limitation so that they
wauld reduce the number o� land-based ICBSs including the MIRV-TCBMs,
piece by piece; see Ar~icle TT, Article V/1 and 2, and Article IV/13).
The supplementary agreements in the "Second Stipulated Declaration" for
Article IT/1 of the treaty says that, after the protocol is no longer in _
force (that is to say, the protocol which bans land-~nobile I.CBM launch
systems until the end of 1981), "mobile ICBM launch systems" are subjected
"to the pertinent limitations which are provided for in the treaty and
which apply to ICBri launch systems unless the contracting parties agree
that mobile ICBM launch systems may no longer be deployed aft?r that
time." }3ecause mobile launch systems for "light" ICBMs are no~ a subject
of ~he Vienna treaty, both partners have a free hand in deploying such -
land-mobile systems as of 1982.
Disagreement on the treaty content and the treaty purpose regarding this
point however cannot be ruled out, depending upon how Soviet Union deter-
~ mines its own interests in grand -mobile ICBMs. American interest was
reversed a~ter 1972, when the silo-ICBMs became highly vulnerable. But
MX, according to the treaty de~inition characteristic far "heavy" ICBMs--
greater launch weight or greater throw weight than that of the heaviest
of the "light" ICBMs which each side has deployed upon the conclusion of
the treaty (Article II/7)--is definitely a"light" and not a"heavy" ICBM.
It is thus not covered by the ban in Article IX. According to initial
Soviet semiofficial declarations and also according to official hints in
Vienna itselF9, th.is disagreement of course could also relate to the plan-
ndd launch systems for the MX because the treaty (in Article IV/1 and 2)
bars the new construction of additional "fixed ICBM launch systems" (�ixed
ICBM la~inchers), as we11 as any change in the position of such launchers.
Several supplementary agr_eements were recorded for Article IV in Vienna
but none were introduced for Paragraphs 1 and 2. The Soviets could main-
rain that a land-mobile deployment of MX launchers, according to American
plans for a MAP launch organization, with up to 45 different launch points
for each launch system in tunnels, would be incompatible with the provi-
sions of Article II/1 and 2. This raises a question of definition between
"fixed" and "mobile" as related to "launcher" ancl to the technical con-
cept of "cantainer" which is not relucant to the treaty test. Accordingly,
in case of riAP, it would not be the number of "fixed launchers" that would
be increased bur only the number of "containers" which are not covered by
the treaty; there would be no change in the precise position of launch
systems but only in tYtat of missiles in their transport confiainers which
at the same time are the firing containers for the launch. The MX would
not be a"mobile" deployed ICBM.
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A controversy on that scoxe would be bound to lead to a political conflict
as to compl~.ance with or circumvention o� the treaty obligations by the
UiiiCed Stat~s. The alternat3ve on the Sov3et side would be the deployment
' of land-mobile light ICBMs in a weight category which would correspond eo
thar of the SS-19 (RS-18) ICBM. In SALT II, in one specific agreement (con-
Ference on Article IV/8), for the duration of the trea~y, renounced the
production, flight testing, and deployment of SS-16 ICBMs (Soviet designa-
tion RS-14); in that renunciation they in particular included the third
powered stage of the missile, the re-en~ry vehicle, and the target system.
The Soviet Union thus could also consider this additional obligation a5
irrelPVant if MX ~vere to be deployed in a land-mobile manner prior to 1985
or if Minuteman III were to be provided with a mobile launch system. This .
question will become acute between 1982 and 1985, if agreement is not ac-
I~ieved before that on th~ permissibility of MAP deployment (8,000-9,000
difFerent launch points, that is to say, also systems, for 200 MX launch
units according to the current American pl.an) and/or on the continuing ban
on land-mobile light ICBM systems. It would seem that the MX would be
operational as of 1986, in other words, after the end of the Vienna
treaty's period of validity.
This complex i.s of tremendous i,nterest for the Euxopean NATO countries.
The advantage of a secured M; RV..ICBM attack .capability on the par. t of the
Unired Stat~s armed forces against Soviet targets and a large reserve of
targetable warheads in the SALT-committed strategic arsenal would be counter-
balanced by the disadvantage of land-mobile ICBMs in the Soviet Union wh3.ch
would make a meaningful limitation of the number and stationing areas for
the Soviet IRBMs, especially the SS-20, even more difficult than iC already
is. The Soviet ohligation not to produce and deploy the SS-16 (RS-14) here
relates not only to land-mobile launchers (which are not expressly mentioned
in the stipulated agreement) but above all to a weapons system which can
be exchanged and confused with the SS-20 IRBM, Thus, this renunciation
serves the verifiability of SALT II in that the possibility of converting
SALT-free SS-20 IRBMs into SALT-restricted SS-16 TCBMs by inserting a third
powered stage, is considerably hindered and formally barred. But in this
,
way the technology of the SS-20 IRBM class--which just about touches the
outer limits of SALT according to various characteristics (range, powered
stages, launch weight, throw weight, launcher)--be kept free of SALT II
through a specific agreement. In terms of the stability of deterrence and
arms control it would also have been conceivable that the Soviet Union
might have renounced the production and deployment of the SS-20 for rhe
sake of external backup upport for the SALT II agreement and the restric�-
tion of the "grey areai1~ around SALT, although the currently flight-tested
- range of this IRBM with three warheads, amounting to 4,600 kilometers, is
below the lower range limits for SALT~II-restricted ICBris which is 5,500
kilometer.s (Article IT/1). ~
Soviet behavior with relation to the SS-16 points to the priority concern
with keeping the SS-20 beyond suspicion under SALT and introducing it into
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the Soviet roclcet .Eorces as an essential component. The Amerlcan SAL`T
partner WAS able neither to force nor to purchase such a Soviet renuncia-
~ion :in SALT TT.
Parity, Disparities, and Effects on Europe
The SALT TI agreement accentuated andlupdated some critical problems Eor
European security interests and Che sticategic unity of the Noxth Atlantic
alliance terri~ory with respect to the',Soviet Union, which cannoC be re-
nounced for the sake of Western Europe~in sec.urity in the shadow of Soviet
militarp might and the latter's mediun:=range attack weapons that cover the
en~ire Western European periphery: These problems ex.isted prior to SALT II
and prior to the modernization of the Soviet medium-range systems. They
could not be invol.ved by the Vienna agreement, the way the negotiations
had been laid out since the conclusion of the Moscow SALT T agreement.
They were left to future n.egotiations, perhaps under SALT III. But the
SALT TI agreemenfi must be interpreted also in the light of these special
European problems because the United States cannot separaCe its own sec~
_ urity, as the protect3.ve and leading power of an alliance with countries
on the o~her side of the Atlantic from the securitq of Europe and because
arms control in bilateral American-Soviet relationships also have an ef-
fect on Europe--in a manner different from the ef~ect on North America.
The points of contact between SALT II and Western European security are
Found on various levels: The higher levels of Westezn security policy and
strategy and the subordinate levels of deterrence on th ~ European contin-
ent and the defense of Western Europe by NATO. Apart from the (above
covered) problem of the ceiling for central strategic weapons systems and
their survivability, especially the silo ICBMs, the critical coutact points
involve the FolloWing: ~
The Sovi.et concept of strategic weapons, that is to say, practicaliy, SALT
and the longer-range American nuclear weapons systems which are stationed
in Europe and which can hit Soviet territory from their launch bases;
The noncircumvention clause according to Article XII of the Vienna treaty
in relation to the armament options oF NATO in Europe;
The effect of the treaty protocol on these options for the modernization of
the long-range systems of regi,onally committed nuclear weapons of NATO in
Europe (LRTNF--Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces);
The basic principles and goals which were contemplated in the Vienna "Joint
Declaration" on the agreed-upon follow-up negotiations for SALT TII:
The disparity which is being accentuated between East and West by medium-
range Soviet nuclear weapons below the SALT limit (5,500 kilometers);
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The treaty e�~ect beyond the bilaCeral relationsh3.p between the two SALT ,
partners, paz~~.cularly ~ri~h regard Co weapons systems that can be used
in r~ non-nuclear mode, such as, cruise missiles with a range of more than i
600 kilome~exs and similar ~vehicles. I
All of ehese contact points are in a multiple interrelationship with NAT~'s
ability to manage con~rolled, target-effective,escalations and conseq~aently
to carry out the deterrence �unetion of the~~;_^.'~0 strategy of flexible de-
_ fense response. i
Since the start of the St1LT process it has become clear that the Soviet I
Union considers a11 nuclear weapons systems to be "s~rategic" which can ~
hit Sov~.et Cerritory from any launch bases. This concept is asymmeCrical '
so long as ~he Soviet Union negotiates exclusively with the United States ~
whose ~erritory cannot be reached by comparable Soviet systems. To be ~
sure, the United States since 1969, in SALT I and SALT II, was able to ~
reject ~he Soviet demand that American FBS be charged against American I
"strategic weapons"; but the problem remains for SALT III. At any rate, '
the modernization of the Soviet nuclear medium-range a.~tack potent~.al I
hy SS-20 and the "Backfire" bomber (TU-22M) dramatized`this entire topic I
compl.ex and thus began ro alter the internat;.ona1 discussion base on the
asymmetrical Soviet concept of security and arms controls, presumably to ~
the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. But it remains to be seen in SALT
III whether the SALT process will lead to a generally bal.anced strategic
East-Wes~ reJ.ationship. SALT II does not reveal any ~angible approaches
here, except for the parity principle itself which, in turn, is penetrated I
by the indirec~ly recognized right of the Soviet Un3on to its own ICBM
heavy-weight class for the 308 existing SS-18 (RS-20) missiles. The ~
principles of "equality and equal security" of both SALT partners--taken ~
over from the Moscow SALT T agreement and included in the preamble of the ~
Vienna treaty--do not provide any clear indication as to the quality of
the strategic interest balance which is supposed ~o resu.lt from the con-
tinuation o� the SALT process, initially on the basis of SALT II. `
These principles, which the Soviets demanded in 1972, via the legitimate
politi.cal claim to equality with America, as a world power, point Co a
strong Soviet interest in preserving a suf,-Licient nucJ.ear attack poten-
tial of strategic effect in the SALT ~ramework with respect to the United
States in order to safeguard the Soviet need for security against all
imaginable opponents and opposing alliances 3.n the manner of a strategic
~ allaround defense. Such a claim, which is pointed up by individual Soviet
negotiation moves under SALT I and again under SALT II, would either lead
to a permanent release of Soviet nuclear weapons systems with a range
of less than 5,500 kilometers in a continental deployment or to additional
Soviet contingents of nuclear weapons with greater range within the frame-
work of a future arms control agzeement. During the SALT I negotiations
already the Soviets until 1972 had demanded that the strategic bases of
the American SLBM forces overseas be taken into consideration and that the
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BriCish and Frcnch SLBM :Eorces be compensated for, by means of an add:i-
tional contingent of SLBrI and missile boats, in the same number, on the
Sovie~ side. The demand :Eor a treaty ban on technology transfer invol-~
ving cruise missile systems to other countries, ra:Lsed under SAI,T TI,
points in the same direcrion.
:Cn this connection, the noncircumvention clause in the Vienna treaty like-
wise lssumes a political signficancce which goes byonrld its limited although
= not yet cl.early tech~nical effect. It is aimed at the noncixcumvention of
~he treaty obligations "by means ot another state or other states or in
some other way" (Article XIT). Does it follow from this that th.e United
5ta~es perhaps is not allowed to transfer any more SLBris to Great Br.ita9.n~
t:nless the number o:C those systems were to be charged against the Ameri-
can SAI,T contingent for 2,250 and 1,200? The treaty provides no answer
and supplementary agr~ements were not recorded in protocol on that in
Vienna. This question can assume practical significance only i� Great
Britain want~d to replace its 64 American Polaris SLBMs and to increase
the number while the United States would be exploiting not oz11y its free-
dom I:o inc.rease its weapons to 820 MIRV-ICBMs but would also want to de-
ploy the then sCi11 available peak of 380 MIRV-SLBMs (up to a total of
1,200 MIRV m~,ssiles). This assumption is improbable but it po~.nts up
the problem complex involved in the bilateral natuxe of SfLLT.
,i
The noncizcumvention clause clearly covers the Vienna protocol w1~ic:h, by
ehe end of 1981, forbids the deployment land-based and sea-based cruise
missiles with a range of "more than 600 kilometers" (but which doe~ allocv
development and flight testing). But it so happens that it does not con--
tain any ban on technology transfer and this is important in view of the
Soviet demand advanced for that in the SALT II negotiations because Che
Soviets now cannot assert that such a ban would be i.n keeping with the
sense o� the treaty. We may assume that the Soviet Union will i.ntergret
the noncircu~nvention clause extensively in order to hinder, if at all
possible, any outward [foreign] deployment of American systems with a
range of more than 600 kilometers.
Premier Kosygin in Moscow�on a certain occasion seems to have asserted
that the United States intends to get around the SAI,T limits by means of
the deployment of nuclear weapons systems with greater range in Europe
wirh the help of NATO and he thus seems to have indicated Soviet treaty
policy against "Pershing II" with a range of 1,800 kilometers and cru~s
missiles with a range o� up to about 2,500 kilometers in Western Europe~l.
If this impression would be confirmed, then a conflict over SALT II would
be the consequence. It would test the readiness of the United States to
- engage in a conflict. But it would also be capable of blocking the inten-
ded armament control offer of NATO to the Warsaw Paci:; how should the NATO
countries be able to negotiate with the Soviet Union on bilateral 1.imita-
tions on the deployment of nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union maintained
that such weapons of American origin may not be stationed in Europe because
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L-hey wou~,d there have th~ e�~ect ot gettxng axound the SALT TI agreement
since th~y woul.d be "strategic" weapons aimed againsC Soviet territor.y? -
7'httr nucleax wPapons with a range of "more thAn 600 kilomeCers," according
to tlt~ logic ai Che Vienna agreement, can he considered to be "strategic"
regardless o~ the protocol ar~d ~hus for the entire duration of the treaty,
that is som~thing that can be justified with the provisions which, for
example, place ASBris with a range of more than 600 ki],ometers in the
strategic category and the SA,LT 1imi.tations (TI/4).
Here there is one thing that might have a disadvantageous effect for ~he ~
West and ~hat is that the protc~col outlaws the use of a11 cruise missiles ~
with a range of "more than 600 kilometers" on ships and land bases,~re- ~
gardles~s o~ whether or not they carry nuclear arms, until 1981, and that
. Ar~icle II/8 of the treaty defines cruise missiles as delivery vehicles
.Eor weapons employment without any reference as to nuclear warheads.
Bven after the protocol is no longer ~.n force, the "cruise missile" as
such is sti11 :Lncluded in the treaty in terms:of de~inition. SALT II
therefore, iildependently of the significant and aftere~fec~ of the pro- ~
- tocol, contains a treaty approach towax~d the recording and limitation of
a11 cruise missiles (from wh~ch the unarmed RPV systems for.reconnaissance
and air target illustration cannot be distinguished externally--Third
Conference on Article II/8).
But would it really be in the interest of the Soviet Union ~o advocat,e
such a thesis and thus generally to make a1l.nuclear systems of such
range automatically a subject of fuxther SALT discussions with a view to
SALT III? This question could be answered positively in the Soviet sense
if Moscow were to propose a deploymenC ban for systems of that kind which
have not yet been stationed, until some negotiation result has been ach- '
ieved, in other words, a"freeze" which would preserve the status quo of ,
deployment. The entire LRTNF modernization planning of NATO would thus
be Frozen in the shadow of SALT or it would become an object of inter- ,
national arms control propaganda which could be offensively pushed against
the NATO countries. ,
,
Whether the Soviet govex'nment will or wi11 not undextake such ~i political
move on the SALT chessboard wi11 probably also partly be determined by _
the Soviet deployment plans concerning the SS-20 IRBM and the "Backfire"
bomber. There is hardly any doubt that the SS-20 is a weapons system of
highly continental-strategic value for the Soviets in covering their
Eurasian periphery to the West and East and thus a weapon to be used in
- achieving predominance of the forefield [approaches].
The numbex of SS,20 launch systems in the S~}~iet Union at the beginning
of 1979 according to official NATO analysis was 108 in 12 position
complexes of nine, each, deployed on vehicles; 63 of those systems were
aimed against Europe in a Western deployment, including one third in
position from which the missiles could have reached both European terri-
tory and the Near and Middle East. NATO assumes that ev~ry launcher will
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be equipped with two or thxee missiles so that it wi11 be able'to fire -
several salvos in case of position change and rapid reloading. This means
tha~, during the first half of 1979~ up to 189 SS-20 misgiles, with up to
567 nuclear warheads (triple MIRV system~ may have been ready for use
against Europe. The existing number of missiles fc~r reloading the launchers
3n the position areas howev~r: cannot be recognized. ~
For 1982, by which time the SALT'~iT. protocol is no longer to be in effect,
NATO assumes that there will be a total of 254 deployed SS-20 launch
systems in the Sovie~ Union, including 171 in a w~stern deployment against
' Europe; in casa ~f one, each, missile with a triple MTRV, that would mean ~
~ 513 warheads and in case of three missiles per launcher, that would give
us moxe than 1,500.
What a"�reeze" of deployed nuclear attack weapons systems would mean to
the operational balance of forces involving the~:e units in Europe is il-
lustrated by the current numerical ratio between~ti~e roughly comparable
systems13: ~
~
Soviet Union in Europe NA"'0"in Europe
LRTNF vehicles Approximately 1,400 Approx3.me'tely 590
Warheads Approximately 2,440 Approximately 1,260
Here, sys~ems axe included on th~ NATO s3.de wh3.ch actually would be com -
mitted for SACEUR stxike only conditionally b~cause th~y ars components
of national srrategic forces, such as the 40 Poseidon-SLBI~S w~.th 400 war-
heads on five American SLBM boats (which are already covered under SALT
II and which moreover reserve their remaining 40 SLSMs w~.th anoCher 400
waxheads for the central U.S. target plan for strategic waxfare). That
also includes the 64 British SLBMs with Polaris A-3 with a total o~ 192
warheads which constitute the nucleus of Great Britain~s strategic deter-
rence and which can be held back as the weapon o~ last resort. Finally
this includes 118 French systems which are reserved fox the same purpose
- and which are not available to NATO. Rea1 LRTNF systems are only the 156
U.S. r-111 bombers and the attack aircraft on American aircraft carriers
as well as the 35 French Mirage-IV bombers.
This force ratio thus only shows the presumable arms control volume in the
West, not the reduced attack capability. Because the dispazity grows with~
continued SS-20 deployment in the medium-range spread, the final conclu-
sion, in looking at SALT I, must be ehat this agreement does shield
Europe but does not give it any plus in terms of securi.ty under the global
parity ceiling. In terms of SALT III prospects, this means that SALT II
does not offer a sufficient basis for strategic stability in Europe and
that, in the course of further arms control policy, much more considera-
tion will have to be given to the strategic unity o� the North Atlan.tic
Alliance territory, the flexib'le escalation capability of the Western
powers, and thus also the practical feasibility of NATO strategy for the
protection of Western Europe than has been the case in the SALT process
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so ~ar. Th~ NAZ'0 countxies o~ course can i~egotiate on a marginal super-
iority o~ addI,ti,onal LRTNF wea~ons systems in return for a carresponding
1.im3,tati,pn on Sovi,et syst~uts but they cannot negotiate on the entire
grvwth poten~3a1.
FQOTNOTES
1. The wording of the treaty can be found on pp D 368 ff.
2. This emerges fr~m the calculation of the nllmbers of individual
strategic weapons systems permi.tted on botf~~ sides according to
SALT II and rhe number o~ warheads for eact;! MIRV system recorded
by each�side as well as the permitted maximum figures for MIRV war-~~ ~^i)
heads and the ALCM limitation on 120 heavy hombers.
3. Statistics based on the annual report of American defense secreta~ry
Harold Brown, dated 25 January, 1979 '!Annual Defense Report FX 1980",
p 71; excerpts in Gexman will be published in the next series of
EiTROPA-ARCHIV).
4. Brown's communication to the 1979 Nuclear Planning Group, in~ormation
from author. �
5. In addressing American press correspondents on 18 June 1979; see
- also the report by Jan Reifenberg in Vienna, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, 19 June 1979.
6. American chief negotiator Ralph Earle in talking to the author on
16 June 1979 in Vienna.
. 7. Jan Lodal in 1979 in a lecture in Atlantic Bridge, Hamburg;.
8. For the text, see EUROPA-ARCHIV 17, 1972, p D 402 f.
9. ALthur's information.
10. RueYil, "The Grey Area Problem," Chzistoph Bertram (ed.), "Beyond SALT
II," IISS London, Adelphi Paper 141, pp 25 ff.
11. ~luthor's information.
12. Author's information. !
13. See also the descri,ption in Richard Burt, "Reducing Strategic Arms at
SALT," Adelphi Paper 141," loc. cit., p 11, and Ruehl, ibid., pp 26-27.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Verlag fuer Internationale Politik GmbH, Bonn.
5058 .
CSO: 3103
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FUk Ol~ i'l:C f r11., USI: (1NT~Y
TIiEATPR NUCLEAR FORCES T'lALY
~ \
SI.fPPOPT lOR U.S. r1ISSILES IN EUROPE
I
Milz~i~ :Il, SOLE - 24 ORE in Italian 12 Aug 79 p 9
[~1r.ticlc by 5.A.R.: "The Deployment of 600 Missiles in~~urope Is Indispensable~
to N~~'1'0" ]
~'I'~~x~~ [L is understandable that the announcement of a U.S. plan to reinforce
Llic N~'CO nucl.e~lr potential in Europe with the deployment o.f 6Q0 medium-range
balli~t:ic mi'ssiles (MRBM) to include the Pershing II ballistic missile as
wcll as tl~e new crui.se missiles may cause concern among that public which
is noe well informed ot strategic problems. However, this is much less
undcrsCandable judgin~ by the reaction of representatives of the Italian left
wliich :is a priori hostile to Italy's being part of this plan together w:itti th~
I~RG, i:he UK, Holland and Belgium.
In fact, it is not sufficient to state vaguely that such a measure "is in re-
s~onse to American strategic interests and exposes the West to new and grave
risks" as did Senator P~cchioli, or to claim, as did Nino Pasti that a"rea-
sonal~lr~ balance" is already in existance between the Warsaw Pact (WP) and
N~TO in rhe field of long range theater nuclear weapons.
Witl~ regard to this matter, it will be useful to note that the. WP and espe-
ci~l.ly the USSR, has substantially improved its po~ition in recent years. In
Ll~e 19(i0's in fact, the USSR enjoyed a quantitative.superiority in Europe in
PIR}3M ancl intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBPi) of the SS-5 and SS-4
type wl~ich have large warheads but minimal accuracy: NATO however, globally
I~ad a much larger number of for~aard based systems (FBS): these included all
US or allied ai.rcraft based at airfields or on aircraft carriers, capable of
a nuclear strike over Soviet territory. For this reason the USSR attempted
in vain to include FBSs in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT).
Furttiermore, tlie WP was decidedly inferior in matter of short- to medium- range
theater nuc.lear forces (ranging from about 10 to several hunderd kilometers
in range) be it in number oF missiles be it in number of warheads or tactical
nuclear devices: 3,500 warheads for the USSR versus 7,000 for the United
States-Pl11T0.
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ro~: o~~t~ rcinr, ~ls~? ONl,Y
't'lii~ ~~'I'~7 supi~r~iori.ty d to past experience.
~111 llii.s reyuires something totally unrelated to neofrontism (as a counter
to tlir Cailure oF the historic compromise) or unrelated to the idea of
turning to the shady extremist subcultures to attempt to make up votes the
PCI may have lost from the left. It is not there that one will find those
dc~cisive forces capable oF changing the system of political consensus in Italy.
[6JF~a~ is necessary] is that rPali~tic approach needed to conceive that great
democrat~i.c alternative party. [Jithout it, elections every 2 or 3 years are
~iseless (whilc witnessing social disintegration), as is useless the denial of
t;hc c~xistance oE the "K Factor" without analyzing ways to obstruct it and to
r.~~movc iL.
CUPYIZICI-IT: 1979 tiditoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
9209
CSO: 3104
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_ I-
COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
FINANCE MrNISTER MALFATTI ON TAX REFORM
Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian l9 Jul 79 pP 27-28
[Interview by "E.A." with Mr Malfatti, date and place not given~
[Text] Finance Minister Malfatti has a plan . ~
to reform the bureaucracy, cut direct taxes,
and f erret out t ax dodgers :"I ~ 11 t ake c are I
of the tax evaders."
i
"It is simply not true that there is a fiscal ebbtide running j
that bids fair to wash out the very principles of the tax re-
form act, any more than it is true that government inestia is ~
a11 that stands in the way of a reform process advocated by a
handful of enlightened scholars." Italian Finance Minister
Franco Maria Malfatti got a tad hot under the collar on hear-
ing the charges lodged against the way our tax collecting ma- _
' chinery is run by Prof Marco Vitale, when they were raised in j
the ~ourse o� an interview with EUROPEO. ~
~
This is not to say, of course, that everything is fine and dandy. ~
Millions of citizens paid their taxes well ahead of the 30 June ~
deadline. Quite a few of those same citizens, sitting down to I
figure out their tax bi11s, had a nasty surprise when they'got ;
down to the bottom line. It is common knowledge that inflation i
- has brought witti it increases in cash income which push i:hose ~
who get them into a higher tax bracket. The truth of the mat-
ter is that inflation makes the already heavy tax burden sti11 ;
hard~r to bear. Then there is bureaucratic lethargy. Many i
taxpayers have been waiting for tax refunds for years. Wtiy
aren~ t ~they getting them? ;
"I ~r? not at all afraid to a�imit that the procedure~ my prede- ~
cessors devised has not worked well," says Malfatti. "I have
already drafted a proposal which would revise and simplify the
current procedures, but we need a law, and for that we shall ;
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simpl.y liave to wait unti:l Lhe new parliament i.s r~eady to sett,le
down to work a~ain."
~_Question~ lloes it do ariything about the way the already vora-
c:i.otAS ~,ax hitc; is ~;�rowing in response to in~la~ion?
L Answer In th~ 3-year p].an to up~;rade and reform t;he eritic~c
['iscal administration, which we put together last year and
which has drawn flattering commen~ ~rom a great many authorities
on the question, we stated the ministry's total commitmerit to
deal with tha~t very problem.
~Question] Some economists argue that, given the present econo-
mic pict ure, it would be wise to increase the price of gasoline
and to off set that price hike, at least partially, by means of.
an across-the-board cut in income taxes. What do you think of
that suggestion?
[Atiswer~ Z have already said that I am opposed i,o any cut in
t}ie ~~asoline tax. It would certainly be sheer folly to subsi-
dize a commodity which is already in short supply. Our plan,
too, calls for an inerease in gas prices so as to avoid con-
f'lictin g with any selective consumption policy. Ttiis, however,
is a policy issue the new gover~nment wi11 have to settle.
~Question~ According to Prof Vitale, though, tax reform may
_ w~11 bog down in delays in bureaucratic reforms. And Vitale
adduces as an example the possibility that there would be a
' revival of tax assessment bargaining, thus undercutting the
pr~inciple of analytical assessments conducted on the basis of
s~ar~ching inquiry. Is this a real danger, in your view?
. ~
~Answer] First 1et me say that Vitale is wrong when he says
t`liat ther~e can be no place in a sound fiscal system for one-
on-one audits an~ for negotiated settlements. The truth of the
mat;ter is that settlements are provided for, in one form or
another, in the tax legislation o� both the United States and
of France and Germany.
Zt would be more accurate to say that improper use of the ne-
' gotiate d settlement option in Italy has quite understandably
led, witY~ tax reform, to its abolition in connection with
income taxes. The idea there was to make absolutely sure that
there would be no grey areas at a11 in relations between the
tax authorities and the taxpayer. Even so, it is utterly untrue
that I plan to reinstate the negotiated settlement, and Prof
Vitale can produce not a shred of evidence to back up such an
allegation. And in fact the only proof he adduces is a propo-
sal that was submitted to me by the general tax directorate re-
lating to the poll tax, the inheritance tax, and INVIM. I for-
warded that proposal to the technical committee on ~mplementa-
tiori o� tax reform, whose members are all outstanding people
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in the tax Eie1~, so as 1;o ge~ their opinion not only on its
1e~;�ali~y, but also as to its merit and timeliness. Ttie tax .
clii~c:ctor~ate proposal ca11s �or iricreasing ~he contingency fund
limit ior� collectioris oFFices from the pr~esent 10 percent to
'LO percent, in order to give ~;llem some margin o� discretion in
assessing values in compliance cases.
~,Question~ In your victiv, ~heii, there is no deliberate plot atoot
to scuttle tax reform. Even so, your otivn bil~. on criminal pro-
secution ror~ tax off enses has drawn fire from a great many
crit,ics, wtio call it clumsil.y contrived and in fact bad enough
to block any positive steps in that direc~;ion. Is this really
so? ~
_ [Answer~ All I have to say to that is that the solicitnr general
of the Audit Off ice doesn't think so. He says that "we must hope
that ~he bi11 on criminal prosecution for tax offenses gets back
ori i;}ie ~;rack at the earliest possible moment." Now I certainly
nE;ve;i~ claimed that the bi11 was perfect, and I have on sev~:ral
occa5ions stated that I am open to any and al1 constructive sug-
~;esta.on, including the one put forward by Prof Vitale in a fine
paper drafted~~ : t Bocconi University after the introduci;ion o~
my bill. ~
~ ~1:
The system we have now does in fact make criminal prosecution for
tax offenses inoperative and hence, no mati~er how clumsy my own
proposals may have been, the fact remains that ~:hey have given
us a chance to resuscitate a de]_icate matter that has long lain
neglected, and to approach it with the utmost fairness since it
does have l;o do with civil rights and yet cannot be allowed to
languish under a taboo, precisely because we' have striven to
adhere to the principles of the reform program, and to the end
~haL we need no longer put up with a tax system which, unlike
any other in the world, makes no provision fox� cr~.minal sanctions
or penalties.
~Quc:stion~ And yet it is true, isn't it, that the bureaucratic
machinery hitherto has not proved its capacity to cope with
the ~tasks assigned it under the tax reform act? ~
~Answer] Of course there ha�ve been delays, But we must also
remember that in the past 7 years~(since the tax reform�act took
effect) we have had more than ten government crises and three
early elections. Even so, some of Prof Vitale~s allegations
about negotiated settlements and the number of audits assigned
each office as a quota as evidence of a lack of serious commit-
ment are utterly without foundation in the day-to-day operations
of the taxing authorities in other Western countries. The real ,
problem, if you will, is that of the quality of the audits, with
the need to stamp oat the pernicious practice of cautionary
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~au.d:i.ts and ~he behAVior of some of.'fi.ces tendin~� toward surrep-
~:i.t;.i.ous r~esurre:c~ion oL' inductive settlements in case5 o~th~:r
_ tt~ari Lhosc iti which such procedure is expressly authorized l~y
law. This was pr~ecisely the purpose of the bur~eau's 3-year re-
1'orm plan which, for example, called for the establishment or
"service centers" by the end of March i979. But then the poli-
tical crisis interveiled...
LQuestion~ Practically speaking, though, what is going to Ue
done about s~taff people, about salaries, and about the profes-
sional qualific�tions o~ finance ministry personnel?
[Answer] Obviously, we are going to have to have a major com-
mitment on the part of management if we are to have a system
tliai, can operate without snags and snarls in its everyday deal-
iri~;s with the public. We are meeting this requirement both by
means of reprimands to offices which fail to adhere strictly to
the principles of the reform act, and by critical review of al1
exceptioris intriduced via legislation not, of course, durin~
m,y own tcnure tu make sure thay are in harmony with the prin-
cip:les of.' t;he new tax system. We have also developed a number
of' practica'1 proposals for upgrading the staff and raising pro-
Fessional standards. On the matter of salaries we are wide open,
but firs~f; we must make it absolutely clear that the financial
bureaucracy is sui generis in government, because we dare not
risk ofPering salaries and wages incompatible with a balanced
budget. The section on personnel training is one particularly
cl,ose to my heart. And this is precisely why, for the first
time in Italian history, we have introduced as a par~t of our
plan a program for retraining and upgrading the capabilities
of the people we already have.on the payroll.
LQuestion~ In short, then, in spite of al1 the political dif-
Eiculties, you're working to improve the administration?
[Ariswer..~ Yes. Just look, �or instance, at the fact that since
t;ti~~ int;r~oduction of the obligatory bil'1 of lading with a11 ship-
menl;s of.' ~;�oods, we have run no fewer than 1$0, 000 audits in just
these first 6 months.
~QLiestion] Getting after the tax dodgers these days is primarily
a matter of beefing up the offices. And yet many citizens gat
the feel:ing that measures could be taken against tax cheaters
right now, yet nothing is being done. There has been talk of
requiring copies of cash register tapes from shopkeepers, and of
reforms in the collection of the value-added tax. Wha-t is being
done along these lines?
[Answer] To tell the truth, there are more than a few doubts as
to Lhe efFectiveness of requiring cash register tapes. Upon due
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.i.iic~u:i.ry, w~~ have a5certa:i.iied i~hat no Wester~n nt~tioii uac:ti l.he:m f'or
~uch purposes. And i;hen ther~e could be serious technical problems. _
If a re~�ister breaks down, what do you do? Shut up shop until
you can ~;�et it fixed? As ~or the value-added tax, I th:ink you
are ref'errin~; t;o the question oP the rate spread, since onl,y a
l:e:w monLtis a~;�o we revi.sed the sys~;em t-o brin~; it in~;o harmony
witt~ FEC practice. :Ln this casc I can only say t}iat, yes, t}iere
is a problem, and t}Zat the excessive riumber~ of brackets we have
.now, and, in some cases, their unreasonable level, does indeed
ericourage evasa.on. The problem is tietore us, but we can deal ~
wit;h it e~fectively only in a peaceful economic context if we ~
are L-o avoid t~ie danber of tivorsening infla~tion, which a reorder- ~
in~~ of tax brackets might we11 entail. i
COPYKIGHT: 1979 Rizzo'li Editore
6182 . :
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