JPRS ID: 8643 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090002-9
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~'Ult nFNI~'IAI. USN: ONl.l' -
JPRS L/8643
4 September 1979
~
Near East North ~~ric~ Re e~rt
~
(FOUO 33/79~
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JPRS L/8693
4 September 1979
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRI CA REP'aRT
~ (FOUO 33/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
IlV~1.'Eft-ARAB AFF'A~S
Potential for Egyptian Attack on Libya A~sessed, Discussed
( Omar S ~ Habou; J'EUNE AFRIQUE, 22 Jul. 79 ) . . . . . . . . . . . 1
NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Increasingly Militant Flxndau~entalists in Nlaghreb Criticized
(Ali Gharbi; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jul-5 Aug 79) 3
AFGHANISTAN
Japa.nese Interview With Isla,u~i.c Party I,eader
(Fusayn Interview; TOKYO SHIMBUN, 29 Jul 79) 5
~II,GF~tIA
Chadli's Regime: Change or Continuity
(Jean-Louis Buchet; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Jul 79) 7
The Rise and Fall of Abdelaziz Bouteflika
( I~a.mid Baxrada; JEUNE AFRIQi7E, 18 Jul 79 ) � . . . � � . . � 9
L�IBYA
Libyan Ambitions Spur Arms, Munitions Purchase~
( Hamza Kaid`. ~ JEtTNE AFRIQUE, 22 Jul 79 j . . . . . . . . . . . 22
M~tOCCO
Rep~~i;sion in Morocco Jenounced
(AF'RIQiJE-ASIF, 9-22 Jul 79) 26
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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N~UK ur~r'1(:IAL U5~ UNLY
CON'rENTS (C~ntinued) l~L~re
l V IY.LU J11
A.mnen~y C~11ed Prop~ganda Ma,neuver
(A~tzQu~-as~, g-22 Jui ?9) ~ 27 -
Souhayr Belhassen Discusses Possibi7.ities of Amnesty
(Souhayr Belhasaen; J~,~UNE AFRIQUE, 1 Aug 79) 2d
, _ b
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~ P~OR Ol~'F1C~/1L ~ ONY~Y
zNm~-t~ Arr~ms
PO'~NTIAL P'OR ~YPTIAN A'CTJICK ON L~YA A88~88~D, DIBCU88~SD
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in Frexlch 22 3u1 79 p 36
[Axticl~ by Omar S'Habou)
[Text] "1'his time, Qadhdhafi will not get away from mel" A year after
having made this pledge, which is somewhat unsuual among heads of state,
Sadat lavnched his troops on 21 July 1977 against the Libyan military
base with Che rather signifi.cant name of Gamal Abdel Nasser. That was
the Four Days' War--with armored vehicles, aircraft, tanks, dead, and
wounded. That war seemed to fit into Che logic o� things, an indication
_ of how much personal relations between the rwo presidet?Cs had deteriorated
~ and how opposing the strategic interests of the two ~ountries had becume.
- The elimination of the I,i,byan leader, guilty of a triple crime (continua-
Cion of Nasserism, "revolutionary subversion" inside Egypt, and alliance
with Moscow) after 1974 became a declared priority ob~ective of 3adat:
"Egypt will assume its responsibilities toward the Libyan people so that
, it may get rid of the deviationist dictatorial power of Qadhdhafi" (22
July 1975). But the Four Days' War did not solve aaything. Qadhdha�i
pursued his ob~ectives more openly than ever before. The roles even ,
. seem to have been reversed.
While the surprise and half-victorious war, unleashed by Sadat against
Iarael in 1973, was able to remove the essence of the complaints and
slander hurled against him by Qadhdhafi, the separate peace with Ir~rael
in 1979 on the other hand placed the Egyptian chief of state in a less
comfortable situation. This is esp~cial.ly true since his bubblin~ neigh-
bor has the benefit of the anti-Sadat consensus in the Arab World.
: Will Qadhdhati, who discreetly amassed ~ore tanks than Frauce and Great
Britain together, try to rush Sadat by declaring, for example, a jihad
(holy war)? Libyan strategists rule out this eveatuality: "The Arab '
- countries would not follow us. We would be left high and dryl"
,
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In po~,n~ o~ ~ack, i,t s~ems thaC we can J.ook forward to a ncw, even bigger
~gyptiun ~tkack. Zn s~ike o~ Che serious kxcuble which ~egin continues to
make for ths causes o~ Ch~ 26 March treaey, S~daC is trying Co give Che
process o~ peace wiCh the H~brew sCFsCe ~n irreversiblc char~cter. The
ideu is deEini.~ely ~o lay a s~rong foundation for the Tel-Aviv--WnshingCon
--Cairo "securiCy triangle," the keysCone in the American sCrategic re-
d~:ploymene in rhis region. And Qadhdhafi in this respecC is a sCumbling-
block. Hie downfall would more than ever before round the sharp corners
o~P. While it would deprive rhe Arab rejection front of its toughest
J nucleus, iC would make it poasible for the Western belt to be deployed
more securely.
For many long hours of trilaCeral discussions aC Camp David and in Wash-
ingeon, the dangeraus noCion of "living space" was fr~quently stat~d by
3adaC. Afeer all, had not the latter declared in July 1973, perhaps in
a constructive spirit: "We wi11 consider the Libyan people and their
territory as rhe natural continuation of Che Egyptian people and their
territory?" The Israeli and American conversation partners of Che
" Egyptian president ciisplayed "much ur.derstanding." That is not aston-
ishing since the Pentagon in January 1977 considered Colonel Qadhdhafi
"one of the potential enemies of the United States, right a~ter the
Soviet Union and.China."
In Tripoli ~t is believ~d rhat a new Egyptian aCtack, under any kind of
pratext, is inevitable. "The logic of geopolitics would then come out
to the �u11esC extent," it was explained to us by a close collaborator
of Colcne7. Qadhdhafi. "Algeria, 'Syrak'(Syria plus Iraq), and Ethiopia,
with GovieC logis~ic support, would not simply stand by. We even expecC
that the spixi~ of Che Baghdad Conference wi11 persuade the entire Ar.ab
Wox].d actively to side with us." Is thaC so sure? Could one imagine
Morocco, Tunis3a, and Saudi Arabia hurrying to the aid of Qadhdhafi?
And can the new Algerian president Chadli Bendjedid, who received
~adhdhafi in May, repeat the demand addressed by Boumedienne to Sadat
in July 1977, "to put an end to his aggression against Tripoli?" Is
the resumption of tension to the west not liable to neutralize this in
part?
As for "Syrak," the new and powerful ally of Egypt--Israel--will probably
take care o� that. Carter's support was obtained a long time ago:
"America appreciaCes the role which Egypt plays in world affai.rs," he
declared just 20 days prior to the Egyptian attack against Libya on 21
July 1977.
3imple assumptions? These scenarios in any case corroborate one certain
and verifiable fact: The presence of something like 100,000 Egyptian
goldiers along the border with Libya.
, COPYRIGI~: Jeune Afrique GRUPJU 197g
5058
C30: 1+800
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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIItS
INCRE~t1SINGLY MILITANT FUNDAMENTALISTS IN MAGHREB CRITICIZED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jul-5 Aug 79 p 13
[Article by Ali Gharbi: "Islam, They Claim!"]
[Text] The appearance of the fundamentalist phenomenon in the countries of
the Maghreb is not a fad from the East, as people originally tended to believe.
In Morocco and Tunisia, mainly, but in Algeria as well, the Moslem Brotherhood
increasingly constiCute a particularly militant and aggressive fnction of
the Maghrebian societies.
~
In Morocco, the "Ikhwan," the brotherhood, have essentially organized within
the lycees and universities in the kingdom, where the government can use
them, i.� need be, to put down the young "Marxists" or persons so desiti;nated.
They have seC up headquarters and publish and distributc their tracts with
complete freedom. They en~oy a kind c~f immunity, even when they engage in
attacks on leftist militants, one of whom now imprisoned in Kenitra
had his arm broken by the Brothers. During a period of crisis, one must say
that they know how to turn into zealots of the Moroccan police!
Moreover, in the name of an "Islamic Republic" which they are fervently
calling for, the movement's speakers do not hesitate to denounce the corrup-
tion of the working class. The result of this contradiction can be summed up '
in an ambiguous image: that of the two Moslem Brotherhood who spent 2 years
in prison in the same cell as their "Marxist" classmates from the Mohamed V
Lycee in Casablanca!
The same contradiction exists in Tunisia, where the movement has been given
free rein. Occupying the vacuum created by the government, which has banned
all opposition and put all its detractors and union J,eaders in prison, the
brotherhood has well known sports, cultural and military organizations, pub-
lishing houses and bookstores.... Their messengers: the "princes," the
"guides" and the "speakers," crisscross the country and preach in public
squares and the mosques. Their leaders are equally well-known and the most
famous of them: Shaykh Moro, frequently travels to Ryad.
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Not only are tliey acCive in the field of mor~ls, where they hnve mainly
succeeded in forcing m~ny girls to wear Islamic dress, thereby creating ~
sCy1e that is still wreaking h~voc, b~t they mainly clusCer in the univer-
siCy in or~ler Co track down the "agents of ~theistic communism."
Having peneCr~ted even the hi~hest circles, ehey liave managed Co cottverC
m~ny upper-level government employees and officials from among those having
sraduaCed from th~ most famous European schoolsl Several years ago, in Che
name of Islam, Chey even destroyed the laboratories of Che School of Medi-
- cine, wtiere the students were accused of engaging in experiments contrary
to rhe spirir ~f the Koran.
COPYRICHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
_ 11, 46~~
C50: 440U
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AFGHANI5TAN
JAPANESE INTERVIEW WITH ISLAMIC PARTY LEADER
Tokyo TOKYO SEIIMBUN in Japanese 29 Jul 79 Morn~ng Edition p 9 OW
[Interview with Mr Fusayn, chairman of the Afghanistan Islamic Party (HIA)
Culture and Public Information Committee, by correspondent Shigeo Hayashi,
at a restaurant in Peshawar, Pakistan--date not given]
[TextJ [Question~ When was HIA organized and what kind of organization
is it?
[Answer] It was organized at Kabul University in 1969 by pro�essors and
studenCs burning with Islamic pride. Its purpose was to overthrow the
corrupt bureaucracy under King Zahir Shah and also to safeguard Islamiem
against leftist imperialism which wae then infiltrating Afghanistan. At
first, Che organization was merely called "Mu3ahedin" ~martyr). However,
as it later developed into a political party the title "Mujahedin" began
to be used to designate the armed personnel under the control of the
party's military committee.
[Question] When did it begin its antigovernment armed struggle?
[Answer] The struggle began in 1975 when Mr (Hakmachial) was reelecCed
as party head. It wa~ waged to oppose Che Daoud regime supported by the
Soviet Union. However, the ~truggle earnestly began in April 1978, when
the Soviet puppet Taraki regima was formed and began repressing Moslems.
[Question] What is the actual armed strength of your party?
[AnswerJ The organized "Muha~edin" force under the NIA's command numbers
between 5,000 and 6,000. In addition, whenever those soldiers fight they
are supported by tribescren in various places.
[Question] Where and how are they fighCing?
[Answer~ They are now fighting the Taraki government troops in mountain
areas in Kunar, Nangarhar and Paktia provinces. Thev are wholly engaged -
in "hit-and-run" guerrilla warfare. Taraki's army ca~.nnot bring their tanks
and armored cars into the mountainous area, enabling us to fight with our
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liglle weapons. 5om~ 5oviet ~ervicemen are aseigned Co Tar~7ki's military.
lJe have confir.med Chis by d~scovering some bodieg.
[QuesCion] Could you talk abouC any ma~or recent battles?
[Answer] There wns a big battle in Paktia Province on .l8 May. In this
fight "Mujahedin" destroyed 17 armored cars and killed 150 governmenti
troops. Uur side also captured 200 Kalashnikov machineguns, 4 bazookas,
2 antiaircrafC machineguns and 8 Crench morCars. In nnoCher baCtle fought
Che samQ day in ehe same province, we demolished 14 armored cars and
8 bazookas, and many of our soldiers were "martyred."
[Question] Some say rhat you have the assistance of neighboring countries.
Is this true?
[Answer] NoChing of the kind. We are absolutely fighring Eor ourselves.
~de are supporCed only by AEghan people who help us wage this holy war
to safeguard Islamism. Taraki's army is our source for weapons and
ammunition. Taraki's troops have often surrendered to our side in groups,
giving up their attack plans. The mora Che Taraki force attacks us,
the greaCer our supply of arms becomes.
[Question] What is your present straregic goal?
[Answer] It is to completely liberate Jalalabad (a major city on a main
route connecting Kabul and the Khyber Pass) and thereby cut off a principal �
supply line for the Taraki regime. Toward this goal, some operations are
now being carried out by our colleagues hiding in Kabul and Jalalabad.
[QucstionJ What is your ma~or bottleneck now?
[Answer) There are many other Moslems fighting the Taraki troops, besides
HIA menbers. Virtually, the Taraki force has no control over the
mountainous area. Equally, antigovernment forces in various mounCain
positions have failed to establish mutual links for combined action. HIA
i~ calling on other rebel groups to send it their liaison personnel. _
[Question] Wha~ relationship is there between HIA and Pakistan?
(Answer] We have refugee visas and I am sure that the Pakistani Government
is annoyed by our political activities. This is why we are avoiding open
political action in Pakistan. HIA is now headquartered in Peshawar because
of its geographic proximity to the three border provinces. However, we
would like to move the headquarters into Afghan territory as soon as possible.
[Question] riy last question is where party head (Hakmachial) is now.
[AnswerJ I cannot ans~aer that question. He is sometimes in towns, some-
times in the mountains. We are not afraid of Taraki's intelligence agency,
but we know the KGB (the Soviet intelligence agency) is to be feared.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Chu-Nichi Shimbun Tokyo Honsha
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ALGERIA _
CHADLI'S REGIME; CHANGE OR CONTINUITY
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Jul 79 pp 28, 29
(Article by Jean-Louis Buchet: "The Chadli Syatem"]
[Text] Strange Algeria, who makes ~udgment without passion so difficult.
For the past 6 months a new team under the direction of President Chadli
Bend3edid has been governing it. How is it doing? For some, there has
been profound change under an apparent continuity. For others, the essence
has been maintained behind surface modifications.
Supporting the first hypothesis is the release of Ahmed Ben Bella after
that of other less celebrated political prisoners. Too, promised rectifica-
tions in the economic domain seem to announcE the return to a certain ~
liberalism and the progressive abandonment of the socialist option. In
the same way, some moderation on the diplomatic front can be observed and
there are those who do not hesitate to predict that Algeria is looking for
an honorable way out of the Saharan affair and might even go so far as to
drop POLISARIO.
Partisans of the second hypothesis do not lack supporting arguments either.
It can be said that clemency towards the opposition simply shows that the
powers that be are no longer afraid of them. All the same, a number of
signs show that before his illness the deceased president himself wanted to
em~ark upon this route. Boumediene too had recognized that the economic
system needed reforms and touching up, and that an active diplomacy should
not exclude realism. That said, it must be added that the fundamentr~l re-
mains: There is no question of renouncing the one-party system, the socialist
option, or militant third-worldism.
So, is Chadli's Algeria already one of apostasy or fidelity? The two
concepts contain elements of truth. But neither the will to rupture or
devotion to continuity are hallmarks of the Chadli "system." Those who
command today have built their careers under Boumediene, in a rigid framework
of state, army and party. It is inconceivable that they could embark upon
a true breach, or even have a clear wish to do so. However, they all act
as though, beginning with President Chadli, they had been finally 'liberated' `
- 6 months ago. They do not challenge their heritage, but they act as if they
had been born--politically--after Boumediene.
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It is in rhis sense ChaC it can be said that a new team is in power~ even,
wl~tch wi11 doubtless appear later, thaC a new Algerian Republlc is b~ing
born. Abdelaziz BouCeflikn's fading star (see �ollowing pnges) is Che moyt
tangible proof of a real change. Considered as second in command Co Che
preceding government, Houari Boumediene's closest companion, he wus above _
all, which htts perhaps been forgoCCen, Che true archiCecC of Ben Be11a's
fa11. Aud it is not coincidence, though a bit farfetched, that the former
president should reappear, discreetly to be sure, at a moment when BouCefllk~
is on his way out.
I~ue the change need not become a break. IC takes mure than a day, or even
several m~nttis, to get rid of the referents, the acts, and the cusComs of
a system c~s constraining as that bui1C by Boumediene. This is why Chadli
and his companions give the impression o� hesitating to make changes in .
full view. For the past weighs on the decisions of today--to the point that
Bouteflika is not (yet) entirely dismissed and Ben Bella is not yet complete-
- ly freed.
Though ir can be said that Presidenr Chadli, father of Che new Algerian
pragmatism, is Rtill learning hi.s Crade, it must also be said that he's doing
pretty well. Those who claimed several months ago thar he was only quali-
fied to be a military leader have been gainsaid today by foreign leaders
wtio have approached the new president. The portrait sketched is that of a
man speaking lirtle, but to the point; up to date on his portfolios, re-
laxed enough to be agreeable." In any case, a man sure of himself, a man
who has shown himself adroit enough to concentrate his essential powers
and who has shown he intends to exercise them.
He has, they add, good back-up, his principal counselors being the powerful
Lt Col Kasdi Merbah, former chief of military security, and Taleb Ibrahimi,
excounselor (he is the exception) of Houari Boumediene. Between these men, -
tt~e Prime htinister ~tohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani and the minister of foreign
affairs, Mohamed Seddik Ben Yahia,Chere is a good enough understanding that
c~iscussions would be, relatively, open. To be sure, there is some wrangling
at the heart of power. It's logical, after all, the nomination of Chadli
teing the fruit of compromise, as it were, An element that can be quali-
fied as "hardcore," meaning by this the most dogmatic and integralist,
could present problems to ~hadli, Mohamed Salah Yahaoui can be placed as
leader of this element. It it is true that there has been friction with the
FLN coordinator, it can be supposed Chat the affair has been purposely in-
flated. Some what in the same trend, but perhaps more of a problem in the
long term for the regime, is UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers].
Some even claim to see shaping on the horizon danger of an evolution
comparable to that of the Tunisian center when, under Habib Achour, it
stopped being a driving force.
Even if it seems a bit excessive, a comparison with Tunisia has symbolic
value. Doesn't it let it be understoc+d that Algeria could become a country--
almost--like the others? -
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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ALG~ttIA
~
THE RISE AND FALL OF ABDELA'LI2 BOUTEFLIKA
Paris JEUN~ A~'RIQU~ in ~rench 18 Jul 79 pp 30-37
(Article by Hamid Barrada; "When He Who Pulled Uown Ben Bella Stumbles"J
(TextJ Abdelaziz Bouteflik~, Che all-powerful foreign minister for 15
years, Coday finds himself on the outskirCs of, if not altogether ouCside,
the regime. 5ince the formation of the new government on ~ Merch, it can _
be stated that he was the pri~ncipal loser in the redistribution of power
which had followed the disappearance of President Houari Boumediene. He
who had been considered as the precediag regime's second in command, and
who seeAed to have a good chance of aucceeding the dpceased head of stAte,
is brought down to the level of a minieterial adviser to the presidency,
the same rank as br Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi whom he had hardly ever cared for,
and who had never had more than the external emblems of power.
It's true that Bouteflika has a seat, as do all the former members of the
Revolutionary Council (CR), at the FLN's Political Bureau, officially the
supreme arbiter of the country. But, in Algeria as elsewhere, the realities
of power are not to be read on the oxganization chart of parCy or atate.
At the death of Boumediene it was necessary to redistribute the exorbitant
power he hed accumulated in hia hands. The post of prime minister was
created, the single party was given a political bureau, a secretary
general, a coordinator, etc. The rivalries between Revolutionary Council
members had well defined stakes: obviously, to whom would fall the presi-
dency, the office of prime minister, the leaderehip of the party, but also
and above all that which De Gaulle called the ministries of sovereignty
(defense, interior, foreign affairs). It can even be maintained that it is
the control of these which lets us tell the winners from the losers. Col
Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic and secretary general of the
FLN as he is, would have but factitious power if he did not have a strong
hand on the Ministry of Defense. The practical prerogatives of the prime
minister in relation to the attributes of the presidence are not yet known.
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~vi~t~d
~ut ~olonel ~bdelgh~ni sCi11 hgs a ch~nce Co 'count' becguye he'g kepe
int~rior. '~he t~'I,N cndrdinatnr, Colonel Y~hi~oui, h~s ht~ word eo eay to
tt~e exe~nt rh~t he continues to direct the p~rty gpp~ratus ~nd ~bdvp ~11
if he ~lICC8Edt3 in fittding ~7 place for himself--not 3ecured yet--cla~e to
the ~rmy ~nd ehe adminigtr~tion~ '~hug, now Ch~C the cr~rd~ h~ve bp~n dealt
out ag~in, it is plan rh~t BouCeflikg i~ the only one ro h~ve been ousted
frdm his m~nor: th~ Atinisery of ~or~ign Affa~iry.
G
Fie shduld not ti~ve been surprised by hig misfortune. nuring rhe ~~bruary
con~reas he h~d muved ouC hig p~pers from the minigtry perched on Che
t~eighrs of Algcria. After the ministerial gppointment~, he had retorted
to a frtend ~~tnnighed that he would have accepted a pogt so little worrhy
of hig farmer rgnk and his ambitiong, "It's better to b~ in than out," a
w~y of admiteing that }~e is no lnnger "in." With thoge close to him he w~s
critic~l of Che regime, as if he were no longer part of it. He hgd been
relieved of the 5ahgr~ portfnlio, though he is nne of those few who know
its ins and outs. After some prolonged stays in P~ri~, he wns itt Genev~
during tt~e last few w eeks t~ h~ve an old kidney infection trexted, an
infeetinn complicated, it seems, by a diplomatic illness.
~verything indicates rhen, that for the Algerian Etep~blic Bouteflika is in
mor.l~balls, Only, here it is, thi~--which even could look like a second
deatt~ of Bnumediene to the extent that the former foreign minister
incnrnates, mure than anyone else, the legacy of the deceased president--
this spectacular event hns pa~sed unnoticed. The concern for cohesidn
which prevailed among tt~e tllgerian leaders following the death of Boum~diene
required clzat confront~rions be muffled, that the di~tribution of power be
carried out without t~ubbub or uproar and that eliminations be carefully
disguised. Bouteflika was eliminated very quietly, according to the
rules and form of the art, but has been eli~inated well and good. This gives
ri:;e to the question wt~ich faces us now; ~dill he again have a place in ~
~t~e regime, or, as ttiey say in Arabic, in Algeria's political syntax? Or
must it be admitted that at 4~ years of age he is a has been and his career
',as peaked?
Bencherif's ~tustache
Ttie circumstances in which it was decided to cold shoulder Bouteflika
could sketch an answer to these questions. Officially, it was the FLN
congress who raised Col Chadli Iiendjedid to the presidency of the republic,
to the detriment of his rivals Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Mohamed Salah
Yahiaoui. In fact, the candidature, possible or actual, of the minister
of foreign affairs, in~�ediately raa into the brutal hostility of some of his
CR colleagues. Witi:ou[ speaking of Colonel Yahiaoui, himself a candidate,
the Colonel Bencherif '_n particular saw in the designar.ion of Bouteflika
no less than an atte^~pt on his honor. "If he is president" h~ repeated to -
anyone who would listen, "you can shave off my mustachc!" The eight members
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of Cit being inCgpgble of a~reeing on a nominatic~n, and Che riaks nf ~
c~nfronCaCion b~cdming real, the army was called in to cut th~ knot~
Bout~flika'q chances ~t th~ stc~rt were good, Nad he not b~en affirmed
aq th~ r~gime'g ~econd in command (thua the heir) in being tl~~ only one to
Co go to Boumedien~'g side in Moecow and to tread with him th~ return road?
He it was who gave the funeral speech of Che d~ceaged president. ~urth~r,
to outsider~ he seems, if noe th~ natural gucc~ssor, then gt lea~t a credible
c~ndidate,
mo be sure, Col Moham~d 5alah Yahiaoui was nor a rivgl to Ue scnrned. In
a country where ~ch~ war for liberation had propelled the plebeian clasges
into political life, he seemed to presenC a more adequgte prnfile than
the d~shing minister of foreig~n affairs. He had made himself a reputaCion
as a lefCist, defender of the "opCion," (meaning sociali$t)~ and ~t the same
time he could pride himself on having the support of the Islamic element,
situated more to rhe right. Buc to be at the same time the Man of Moficow
and the Man of Mecca did not help him. Public opinion wanted to see the
rigid and authoritarian aspects of the regime disappear. And in this
respect, Bouteflika was reassuring. Between th~ two candidates the choice
of the FLN congress was not sure. But ita session only ratified a decision
taken by the army according to criteria and modalities which have remained
Cotally protecCed from the curiositv of oublic oninion.
Nevertheless. it is clear that the military did not look on the accession
of the forei~n minister to head of state with a favorable eve. And it can
be asked if they had not at first encouraged Yahiaoui's candidacy in order
to block Bouteflika's route and to open the way to Col Chadli Bendjedid.
Why this hostility to the minister of foreign affairs by the army? "He
is too subtle, too clever, he risks upsetting what is already established~"
replied a highly placed official who is in on the secrets of the gods. A
colonel enumerated reasons for the the elimination of Bouteflika like so
many pistol shots. "We didn't like someone's declaring himself a candidate,
and he declared himself a candidate. He has sympathies for the West and we
don't like the West. Eie embodies continuity and we want change."
A Poem
The adventures of Boumediene's succession shed little light, in the end,
for those questioning Bou[eflika's future. Perhaps his rocket-like
career might be more illuminating.
Abdelaziz Bouteflika was born in 1937 (some biographers make him older
by 2 years) at Oujda, Morocco. While taking a French baccalauret he also
did a degree in Classical Arab, giving him a solid foundation. His
political classes were more in the Moroccan Istiqlal, than in the
Algerian FLN. August 20, 1953 (Mohame~ V deposed) had more effect on
him than November 1, 1954 (insurrection unleashed in Algeria). One of
his friends at Oujda remembers Abdelaziz reciting a poem he had written
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him~elf in which he lambasC~g Che colonial authuririeg who had d~ported
Sult~n I3cn Yo~isgef. Nothiag ~o astoniehing in rh~t.
'I'I~~~ Il~ncly Sin~~ll c~f rnwdcr
Ae rh~ Cime, the "M~ghreL of Che peopl~" was noC a propagandn themE bur ~
reality. Afeer rh~ g~neral strike launched in 1956 by UG~MA (C~nergl
Union of Mo~1~m StudenC~ of Algeria~ he rejoined ALN [Ngrinnal Liber~Cion
ArmyJ whose western command post, as it happened, wgs ae Ou~da. There
Si Abdclk~der (Bouteflikn's pgeudonym) ~ncountered Cho~e who would be
c~lled the Oujd~ group: Si Ujamal (Cherif B~lkacem, Si. Houcitte (Ahm~d
Medeghri) ~nd above all Houari Boumediene. LaCer~ wh~n Bouteflika recnlled
t~ n~rench minister "the heady smell of powder" he laid himsel� open Co
s~rcasm: he hgd hardly breathed in muCh of the odor in qu~gtion. It wgs
ndt by hia military feats that he distinguished himself but by his organiza-
tional werk, tl~nug}i this was not something to be ashamed of, at general
staff headquarters in Oujda or Ghardimaou (in Tunisia). Buc thet which
s~~t ics seal on tiis destiny was a completely diplomatic mission. It was
1962. A serious crisis had burst out at the heart of the Algerian revolu-
tion. The GPRA had disbanded the general staff of the ALN who, because
of this, found itself in a delicate position. It would be in a better
position if it could obtain the supporC of the historic leaders imprisotted
in the Chateau d'Aulnoy in France. Boute�lika was charged with this mission.
Boumediene felr. that M~hamed Boudiaf was the man for the situation.
$outeflika leaned towards Ben Bella. He won out. The future president _
of the republic was won over by the young man. At the end of the meeting,
he put thig qu~:stion: "Tell me, Abdelaziz, how many like you are there
in the ALN?" "They are all better than I," Bouteflika responded.
Thc alliance between the general staff (EM) and Ben Bella sealed at Aulnoy
was a determining weight on the events to come. It was not based only on
the co;vmon I~ostility to GPRA. Each of the Cwa partners nPeded the oCher:
Ben ~ella, vice president of GPRA, brought, outside of his popularity, a
'providential legitimacy,' to use the phrase of an Algerian historian.
In turn, he found in the EM's units the decisive instrument that enabled
nim to seize power. Strengthened by his success at d'Aulnoy, Bouteflika
is still the artisan of the collaboration b~tween Ben Bella and Boumediene
after the entry into Algiers. In the eyes of other,EM members, such as
commanders Ali Kendjili and Slimane (Kaid Ahmed), President Sen Bella is
a'politician' like the others and the army should hold itself at a dis-
tance from political confrontations. Therefore, it is not a question of
whether Colonel Boumediene would accept the Ministry of Defense proposed
by Ben Bella. His place was at EM where he was to continue consolidation
of the army. Bouteflika felt that times had changed and the army should
be represented in the government, just for Chis consolidation. Boumediene
also took this point of vieW whose rightness the future would show. In
effect, he would control and reinforce the army from within the walls of
the Ministry of Defense.
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A V~canC poqe
During the digcus~iong bptw~en Ben ge11a and Boum~diene eo fdrm tt~e govern~
ment, the latter ~lnimed th~ Minigtry of ehe Interior for the Army and put
fnrward eh~e nam~ of Bouteflika. The candi.daee for pr~~ident wag Bgehir
Boumagza. tiis ~hoice finally lighCed on Ahmed Med~ghri wha, it ~hould be
s~id in pgssing, was then closer to the presidenC than the defense minisrer.
And ie wgs Ben Bell~'s lack of adroienese which led him to collaborate
closely witti Boumediene. To Abdelaziz 9ouCeflika fell the Minigery of
Youtti, Sports and Tourism, This lesC secCor encompnssed t}~e management of
narionnlized hotels, which would be disestrous and limiCpd Co pillgge.
liappily, h~ did not stay wirh it long. For he was called to replace Che
foreign minister, Mohamed Khemisti, who was assassinated in April of 1963.
Kaid Ahmed, Che lively commander Slimane, felt Che vacant post should by
rights come to him. Was he not presidenC of Che commission on foreign
affairs of the assembly? He was so sure of his appointment that he in-
stalled himself in Che ministry and summoned the staff to give them their
orders.
~ In preferring Bouteflika, Ben Bella prov~ked ~ general surprise. Nad~
Ben Alla, the president of the assembly and ~ne of the closest collaborutors
of the head of state ar the time, gave his opinion openly that Bo~teflika
"is not worthy to occupy so important a post." The former underground
leaders~ Zbiri, Yahiaoui, Chadli, Ben Salem, did not hide thely disapproval.
The men of GPRA such as 5aad Dahlab, M'Hamed Yazid, ~eered openly. For
all that, Ben Bella was noC shaken. He invariably replied to his critics:
"You'lt see. In 6 months he will be better than Saad Dahlab!" He was
alluding to GPRA's foreign minister who had perked up Algerian diplomacy
and whose savoir faire and dynamism had won him esteem and admiration.
Bouteflika's debut was laborious. Diplomats who had begun their careers
in CPRA could be }~eard saying "the boss is embarrassing us." e~ former
Tunisian minister who had met Bouteflika at a meeting of the Arab League
in Cniro in 1964, said that he was obviously out of place. In this place
where everyone knew everyone else, he was an intruder. Ke read his state-
ments painfully, as if he didn't know Arabic, yet he knew it perfectly
well. He did not lose a centimeter of his modest height, but visibly he
did not have the stature of a minister of foreign affairs.
Neutrality
A change of scene: from Cairo let's go to Moscow. Bouteflika was a
member of the delegation which in May 1964 accompanied President Ben Bella
on an official visit. The talks proceeded under excellent conditions.
Then came the moment to put together the joint news release, a task
assigned to Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Boris Ponomarev (responsible for
liaison with the foreign party). What should not have been more than a
rou[ine exercise provoked insurr.:ountable differences. In effect, the
Algerian had a concept of neutrality which scandalized the Soviets. He
demanded that the party of Lenin be treated in the same way as the United
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5CaCes1 And this in regnrd~ ro Vietnamt Noe only h~d he ehe guts Co put
forward SUCI1 ~n ~normity, but he wouldn't back down. I~ wag 0200. In-
form~d of this, Kruahchev flew ittCo a rage. 'Then h~ w~k~d Ilen 33elyn~ who
immediaCely ordered his minigt~r to give iC up. 'The next day the Algetian
pr~sid~ne made a poinr of showing his hosC ChaC he kepC gll his confidenc~
in hig minisCer. During a meeting at ChP Univeraity of Lumumba h~ acclaimed
- Bnueeflika lengthily in presenting him as "a model for revoluCiongry youeh."
A yenr later gen Belld, Co his misfortune, decided to take him out of foreign
~�fairs. tn doin~ this he prnvoked a conflict with the army wtiich climaxed
in hia own removal 19 June 19~5~ The milxtary had considered B~uteflika's 4
dismissal, which occurred gfCer ehat of two of their own repreaenCa~ives
in the government (Medeghri and Kaid Ahmed) as a breacii in the balance
favoring Ben Bella.
But why would he want to get rid of the minister he had i.mposed on everyone
2 years earlier? Several complainCs were formulated by the president.
I3outeflika did noC support the miliCant policy of the chief of state in
the Arab world and in Africa. In particular, he did not see the utility
of defeloping relations with sub-Sahnra Africa and was convinced that Egypt
was more a rival than an ally. For the rest some chiefs of state such
gs Nasser and Modibo Keita had complained about him. And further, he orga-
nozed a meeting of ambassadors without getting clearance from the president
im advance, or from the Polttical Bureau of whicl~ he was a member. "He
does what he wants," said Ben Bella~ "while for me to see an ambassador
I have to go through him." In a word, the president felt that diplomacy
was hfs domain and found himself affronted by his minister's lack of
docility.
A Misunderstanding
And in dealing with the problem, he worsened matters, for in raising the
young Abdelaziz to the head of the diplomatic element he had hoped to de-
r~ch him from Boumediene and then made the bitter discovery that the Oujda
clan was m~re solid than ever. It should be noted, however, that without
rt~e determination of the foreign minister the conflict would not have come
to a test of power. All the witnesses agree: Bouteflika is well and good
the architect of Ben Bella's fall. Boumediene took a waiting posture,
certainly so by temperament, but also because he w~as not sure of coming
out the winner in a confrontation. He even Chought of resigning. Contrary
to what one may believe today, the die was not cast on the eve of 19 June
1965. The relationship of iorces between the two camps gave rise to a -
sort of mutual misunderstanding: each erred to begin with by an excess
of prudence in exaggerating the power of the adversary. The historian
;Iohamed Harbi, who F!as an active witness of these ups and downs, cites
with humor a southern proverb to illustrate Chis reciproc~l overestimation:
"Bousadia*fears the dogs, and the dogs fear Bousaadia." That is to say
that the spirit of decision, the audacity which Abdelaziz BouCeflika in
particular had shown, had been the determinants.
*A dancer with cymbals, originating in the southern Sahara region, known in
Horocco under the n3me "Gnaoua." 1~
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After Che coup d'etae of 1965~ th~ f~reign minister, naturally regtored
to his post, would come inro his oc~m as rhe darling of Che internaCional
diplomatic community. His finely drawn features, sparkling eyea~ Coothy
smile, luxurianC musrache, lend spriousness to hie youthful face. Pre-
mnrure baldness is hidden, more or 1esa, by long locks combed across Che
crown of his head. His voice is soft. Uapper, he affects waietcogts,
likes good c3gars and pretty girls. From a disCance the man is irritaeing,
bur he charms Chose who are near to him. He skirts confrontations and
willingly proclaims rhat he has no enemies. BuC watch out, thie playboy
is conning his world: behind the nonchalence lies a formidable intransi-
geAnce; his eleganC, almost frivolous style, hides a sharp conacioueness
of representing his country; he is sure of himself, and for those not on
guard, a personality that dominaCes.
In any case, political leaders charmed by BouCeflika are countless. The
paeans of praise mounting from the various frontiers is without doubt
proof of his success.
President Senghor, otherwise reserved regarding Algerian diplomacy, ad-
mitted one day that he much en~oyed conversing with Bouteflika "for it was
an intellectual pleasure." PresidenC Bourgiba was soon charmed by Che
young minister, one of the rare Algerians who knew how to talk to him.
Sidna
As concerns the two countries dispute over Che border (the famous milestone
233), Bouteflika had thrown at the Supreme Combattant: "We are all outsiders.
Only you have the suthority over your people necessary to take a Chance
on the future and give up a piece of desert ea~th." With Mrs Wassila
Bourguiba, who plays a real role in politics ("She is the only true man of
politics in Tunisia" said a humorist), he maintained an affectionate re-
lationsliip and she was prodigally free with advice. The friendship be-
tween Bouteflika and Masmoudi had survived the Jerba episode (Tunisia-
Libya Union in January 1974). This capacity to keep the friendship of inen
with whom he had been in confrontation, an inseparable part of the diplo-
matic art, is one of the keys to Bouteflika's success. Maintaining relations
with an adversary is certainly another. Thus, in full Sahara crisis,
he contrived to send a gift to Hassan II, whom he addressed only as "Sidna"
(our Lord). Every New Year's he received greetings from the Algerian
minister...from Madrid. From this it was not surprising to hear a former
Moroccan diplomat say to us "Bouteflika was a great minister of foreign
affairs. True, he enjoyed the prestige of Algeria, but he played his own
part in it." And he added with some bitterness, "He had the chance to last
a long time!" To our knowledge, Abderrahim Bouabid, the leader of the
Moroccan left, is one of the rare few who did not succumb to his spell.
Talleyrand
From this it is not far to suppose that Bouteflika represented the proto-
. type of the "gangocracy" which rules in Algeria, in his eyes. The man
~ ~5
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seung them a11 ehe more as he �elt personally humiliated by the indolence
of Rabat diplomacy. A part of the Moroccan delegation Co the 1974 con�erencp
of nnnaligned ataCes ar Colombo, he abandoned his habirual courtesy eo
buttonhole BouC~flik~ ~usC before the session on Sahara and teLl him "I'11
scr~w you." The Algerian kepC his poise and riposted wi~h rhis proverb:
"The sCone thrown by a friend is an applel"
Abdelaziz Bouteflika idenCified himself so with Algerian diplomacy, dominated
it so �or so many years, thae it looks like he creaCed it. The tir.uth is,
it was under GPRA and around Krim Belkacem, and after that Saad Dahlab
(secretary general of Che department and then minisCer) and a team of
inCellectuals, ehat diplomacy got underway and esCablished iCs network ChaC
i~ sCill funcCioning. Bouteflika's merit lies in having conserved the
structure and developed it. He knew how to use the help of inen he didn't
like and who returc~ed the senCimenC. He blamed Ben Bella for promoting
diplomacy ae all points of the compass, which indeed was what he was doix~g
once the regime born of Che 1965 coup d'etat was consolidaCed. It goes
without saying that Algeria's efforts to seat its economic independance
and install a new world order as well as the aid it was giving to liberation
movements made the task of the foreign minister easier. He was showing
himself more as an entrepreneur with a sharp sense of strategy, than as
a statescnan haunCed by a noble plan, "more Talleyrand than Metternich."
The place of Algeria in the world and an active diplomacy were never too
muct~ to hold out against France and to bring it around to a more positive
attitude after the nationalization of oil decided upon by PresidenC
Boumediene in February 1971. It was not easy, and for a long time Pierre
Giullaumoe, president of ELF-ERAP would repeat this phrase, which says much
about the resentment Bouteflika inspired in him: "That oil, he stole
it from me!" Generally speaking, the leader of Algerian diplomacy knew
perfectly well how to 'ay the game so that his country remained a confusing
element in domestic Fr .ch politics. The majoriCy in power could not
totally re~ect the heritage of General de Gaulle who had established
'privileged relations' with Algeria and the left, all factions indiscriminant-
ly, and was not through harking back to the bad conscience twinged by its
not very creditable position during the war and continues to be almost
as benevolenC towards Algeria as it is towards....Israel.
Relations with Washington were broken during the 6-Day War and were not
renewed until 1974, buC cooperation had not stopped developing as shown
by the gas contracts. 1'he prudence of the Americans in the Sahara affair ~
is not unrelated to this economic cooperation. It is true that the U.S.
is handling Algeria as well for at heart they do want to see the Soviets
reinforce their position in North Africa.
Pro-West2
However that may be, it is considerations of this sort that have won for
Bouteflika his reputation of being pro-West. But it is significant that
a man as well up on things as Michel Jobert should be much surprised by it.
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Tt~e real~.Cy is doubtlessly more cc:7plex, To wtiat degree wns sucti n
repuCaeion sustained by Ar~b and European ambassadors posted to Algiers
and with whom Bouteflika dealt with easy, oEfhand manners? The Wese has
no~, after d11, retained a very pleasant memory of rhe year 1974 when
Bouteflikn presided over the United Nations General Assembly in whaC
seemed the crowning poinC of his career. As a11 know, he used the authority
_ conferred on him by his office to welcome Yasir Arafat, ehe president
of ehe PLO as a head of state and to expel as unsavory the representatives
of SouCh AErica.
But perhnps the Sahara ~ffair best expresses the ideas and style af the
former �oreign minisCer, his audacious coups, the limiCs and aftertaste
of his actions. In the beginning (1966) Bouteflika threw out a little
phrase: his country is 'concerned' by the decolonizarion of Saguia el-
Hamra and Rio de Oro. Later on President Boumediene declared thaC his
couiiCry had no terriCorial claim to puC forward as did Morocco and Mauritania
and that his ob~ective was simply Co speed the departure of the Spanish.
Therefore, it was a question of organizing a referendum so that the people
of the Spanish colony could choose their desCiny. But BouCeflika provided
before a Moroccan leader a rather sinuous inCerpretation of the Algertan
position: "The referendum question should bear on several possibilities:
continued Spanish pres~,:,ce, or independence, but a~so the ties ttiaC bind
to Morocco, Mauritania, and, not least, Algeria."
In e�fect, Morocco must be prevented by any means �rom recovering the
territory claimed. Moreover, did not Bouteflika confide to a friend while
pointing it out on a map of Western Sahara: If Morocco installs itself
in this region, Africa will be deFinitively closed to us!" Thus the head
of Algerian diplomacy did not hesitaCe to make a deal wiCh Spain. The
multiplicity of claims to the Spanish colony suited Madrid very well.
Nerve
Only during early times, when the Spanish could no longer prolong their
occupation of Sahara and while they were packing up, that area fell more
or less directly under the influence of Algeria. This ~udicious calcula-
tion was encouraged by a series of facCors which, in Bouteflika's eyes,
paralyzed Morocco: The gulf separating the opposition from those in
power didn't allow the country to be mobilized and the purging of the army
after two putsch attempts (1971 and 1972) hardly made it operational
before a long period had passed; the historic distrust between Morocco
and Mauritania insured that no compromise between the two was conceivable.
Now, once Spanish plans and Algerian plots were clarified, Morocco moved.
The political parties and the palace put their differences aside. And
it was the opposition leader who took the initiatives that reconciled the
points of view of Rabat and Nouakchott. The understanding between the two
capitals took shape during the United Nations session preceding the one
presided over by Bouteflika. No doubt about it, he felt the event as a
personal affront. For the moment he acknowl~dged the fact, then effected
a digression in Algerian policy. In July 1975, less than a year afCerwards,
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tie nrrived in ~tab~t to declare: "I bring good news." AC Che close o� his
talks with H~ssnn II, reconcili~tion UeCween Che two couneries seemed a
serious eng~gement, The kingdom would ratify ehe 19~2 treaty, delimiting
its fronCiers with Algerig. The 1aCter would support the understanding
beCween Morocco and Maurieania in order to isolaCe Spain. IC became
rapidly clear that rhe scenario laid out by ehe monarch and rhe minister
was not going eo be followed, WhaC happen~d? -
Tt~e opinion mo~t widespread in Morocco was that Bouteflika was simply
trying to con or 1u11 his interlocutors. We tend to believe tihat once the
ALgerian minisCer goC home, Boumediene did noG follow up. In any case,
two ehings are sure: Bouteflika disappeared from the polieical scene for
many long months, and from this time on the Algerian president Cook eh~
Sat~aran affair direcCly into his own hands.
If we have dwelt on ehis episode, it's because it illustrates so well
certain personaliCy traiCs of the Algerian minisCer. To agree with the
Spain of Franco, one should not be encumbered with 'principles'; and inso-
' mucti more easily if passing one's time in proclaiming them. It also shows
a lot of imagination and nerve. All things which BouCeflika, as seen
through an overview of his career, does not lack. The last trip Co Rabat
indicated a remarkable capacity for recovery, or at least to limit the
damage. Bouteflika, in contrasC Co Boumediene, knew how to distinguish
intransigeance from stubbornness. The episode is of further interest
because it was a reminder that relations between the minister and the
president had not always been idyllic. After all, thP differences appearing
the summer of 1975 were not the first. Ztao years earlier a serious conflict
brought the Algerian head of state into opposition to his friends Ahmed
Medeghri, Cherif Belkacem, but also Abdelaziz Bouteflika.
Humiliarion
Most curiously, purely political differences burst ~ut as a result of a
circumstance which was the epitome of private, not to say intimate life:
Houari Boumediene's marriage. The president's most venerable colleagues,
those who belonged to the 'Oud~a group,' and who recognized each other as
members of this 'brotherhood,' reproaching him for not respecting their
collegial aspect, of taking intemperate measures, of 'making like Ben
Bella,' according Co the revealing phrase of one of them, would not accept
that r~e marry. Was it bECause of the choice of bride (a divorcee) and the
ill-natured gossip about her--as with any self-respecting woman in a closed
society [as published]. Perhaps, but not only. Was it not because
Boumediene's censors were not altogether angelic in this respect and
hardly bothered to hide it? In effect, it seemed that the marriage of the
president disrupted aad upset the customs and laws of the clan. From then
on they could no longer spend long nights discussing things wore or less
seriously while sipping glasses of mint tea. To meet Si Boumediene, D~amal
(Cherif Belkacem) or Houcine (Ahmed Medeghri) would have to--supreme
humiliation--go through his wife. Bouteflika confided to a Tunisian friend:
"Tunisia may have a First Lady, but Algeria--never!" The marriage not
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only broughC inCo question Che group's working rules, bur Couched i~s
constituCional pr~.nciple. Everything happened ~s if th~ other clan membere
had conceded preeminenc~ to Boumediene only becguse he had imposed upon
himself an ascetigm resiatant to every test.
Endurance
The confll.ct took on such proportions that Boumediene gave in eo his
friend's inuuncCions. AC least for a period he gent his wife away and only
took her back several weeke later.
This pol3Cica1-moral crisi~ marks the time when Che Oud~a group disappeared
for all pracCical purposes. Ahmed Medeghri, the dynamic minister of the
interior, died under mysCerious circumstances (officially, a suicide).
Cherif Belkacem reCired from political life. Kaid Ahmed went into open
and virulent opposition to Boumediene before dying in exile in Morocco.
Only Tayebi Larbi, Che minister of agriculture, whose influence had never
been strong, and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, were left.
Boumediene Curned to him more than anyone else. For his part, Bouteflika
held up well. And his obstinacy and endurance seemed to be paying off.
Because he was the president's last friend, his influence grew. Thus, in
the Sahara affair, he lined himself up with Boumediene's intransigeant posi-
tion. He mobilized the diplomatic apparatus to make Polisario a credible
liberation movement. But it's ~ustified to ask to what degree he had ended
up by bringing Boumediene around to his views, as is indicated by the secret
nego tiations he conducted with Morocco.
Premonition
But how can we not see that it was Bouteflika's fidelity to Boumediene
that, in the final analysis, played him false in the battle for succession?
- The minister of foreign affairs had thought of retiring at least once
(in 1974). When he confided this to the president, the latter responded,
"Let's both of us gol"
This little phrase now seems charged with a premonitory fatality. With
Boumediene gone, Bouteflika must go in his turn. First of all, because
contrary to those who wo:i over him in the struggle for succession, he
held his power exclusi,vely by favor of the deceased president. He has
no base, either military or popular. Further it is not by chance that those
now in the forefront of the new regime have at one time or another fought
the preceding regime.
Can one conclude that Bouteflika's future lies behind him? ltao clearly
contrasting responses summarize the speculations and reflections heard
around. One is by a friend of the former leader of Algerian diplomacy
who does not disguise his admiration for him and gives him credit as a
statesman. "How can this initiator of the Euro-Arab and Arab-African
dialoge, who for many years was the spokesman for an Algeria of the
Third World, nonaligned, progressist, who figured simultaneously as a
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~~v~~ ~ri LU1C1L u~u u?r?.~a
moderaCe elem~nC open Co Ctie West, can come oue of this conflict as ~
definiCe loser in wtiich he opposed men scarcely emerged from Che shadows?"
Thus 1~ouCeElika would nor have said his last word, only taken a rain ctieck
on ie,
Now ].et's listen to an Algerian diplomat who knew the former foreign '
minister well and wtiose appreciation for him was only moderate, while he
was full of praise for the deceased president. "Bouteflika no longer has
a place. For Boumediene is dead and thoroughly dead and he came from him.
Anather scene is beginning with different actors, new rules of play. If
I3outeflika wants to play a role again some day, he musti first train himaelf,
exercise every morning, show he's noC lost his wind, Chat he can survive
a desert 3ourney. In a word, that he has what it takes."
Wh~ is right?
Ambiguity
In our opinion, both, or, if you prefer, neither. The first ~udgmenC takes
into accounC only Chose qualities of the former foreign minisCer that are
not overrated. But it ignores the changes in the political class that
were broughC abouC by the force of things after Boumediene's deaCh and which
tt~e second judgment has the merit of bringing out. But both neglect what
is most striking about BouCeflika's personality; his ambiguity. It is
e:ccessive and unfair to say he 'came out of' Boumediene. More than once
he tias given quite rhe contrary impression of 'pushing' l~is president and
friend, Didn't he put himself behind him ttie better to push?
Nevertheless, he has always sheltered behind Boumediene who, as no one will
deny, was only a c~nvenient umbrella. On the other hand, Bouteflika's
abilities are not the only thing in question. The paths to power, in
Algeria as elsewhere, are not conbested with capable men only. Above all,
the counCry has been going through a slow but real mutation since Boumediene's
leath. There is even a feeling that the battle for succession is not yet
finished. President Chadli is learning the trade and no one knows if he
.~ill be anotheroumedie�:ie, if he will be grabbing for power, or if he must
form a government. Nor is it known how long the alliances (especially
between the president, Yahiaoui or Abdelgham) which brought him to power
will hold up. And don't forget that many of the men who 'count' (such as
Col Ben Cherif, the former police chief, or Abdessalem Belaid, the 'father
of industrializaCion` ) are ouCside the decision-making center and are
reduced to presiding over party commissions.
Bouteflika's career seems to be a continual rise, irresistible. To be
sure, Lady Luck has smiled on him, but when necessary he knew how to round
his back and make the most of transforming obstacles into favorable factors,
into levers. Knowing how to get out of a bad spot, turning bad luck into
good, effect comebacks, are probably the major trumps of the political
man. In ancient times, a statesman in the twilight of his life was asked
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Che secreC o� his success. He replied: "When I was ,young I meC,, God 3n the
deserC. And God said to me: "My son, to succeed, everything is g;~eans
eo rhat end, even obstacles." There is no doubt that Abdelaziz Bouteflika
had met God somewhere between Ou~da and Ghardimaou. Will he sti11 know
how to make good use of these precepCa? Must he meet God again? More than
ever he needs ~t today.
COPYRIGHT; Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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' ' L~YA
L~YAN AbIDITION$ SPUR AIiA~, MUNITIONB Pt1RCAA8S~
Paris JEUNE AFRI,QUE in French 22 Jul 79 pp 34-35
[Article by Hamza Kaidi]
(Text] Misce~.laneous interventions, the invasion of Chad by a kind of
foreign leg3.on referred to as Islamic army (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 966), de-
signs on Ma1Ca, atomic ambitions added on top of a formidable arsenal
of war--Libya and its leader continue to.worry everybody. �
They arouse as many questions as worries among the neighbors of the
Jamahiriya and the faraway countries, including the big powers. In
addition Co weapons purchased in the West, Libya has bought impressive
quantities of Soviet materiel. These are quanCities which appear to be
way out of proportion when compared to the defensive requirements of a
counCry of less than 3 million inhabitants and an army estimated at
37,000 men in 1978.
According to the London InsCitute of Higher Strategic Studies, the Libyan �
army in July 1978 had 178 combat aircraft and 2,000 Soviet T-54/54 and
T-62 batCletanks. Since then it also received several squadrons of
Mig-21 and Mig-23 aircraft and, above all, half a dozen Mig-25 recd1' ~
naissance aircraft (dubbed the Foxbat B by NATO) which the Kremlin until
now had refused to turn over to any other country, excluding Algeria. On -
top of that materiel we can add a by'no means negligible number of war-
ships which, according to the wish of Colonel Qadhdhafi~ should make
Libya the third biggest naval power in the Mediterranean around 1980.
But the Libyan leader does not sCop there. A contract involving several ,
billion dollars supposedly was signed with the Italian_firm of SIA (Air-
craft Company] Marchetti. It supposedly involved the supply of 250 SF-260
trainers, the installation in Libya of an assembly line to put these air-
craft together, and the development of a new aircraft, the SIA Marchetti
211 which Tripoli has pledged to buy. Discussions were held with Yugo-
slavia for the construction of a big factory which is to turn out spare
parts for Soviet equipment. A military cooperation agreement was signed
with Turkey and, in addition to the training of Libyan troops, provides
for the construction of a joint shipyard and the production of certain
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type~ o~ milieary ~qu~.pment (shi,pg~ tzuck~, ~nunieion, ~ta.) by thpg~
two cnuneri,~~.
About. two score Miraga FM1 aircr~Pt and a dozen frtgates of the Combattante
typ~ were otidered Prom France. American ~quipmenti ~s not disdained either~
in spite of the emb~~gd ard~red by the Whiee Hou~~. Colonel~Qadhdhafi
hag thre~t~ned to cut of~ h~.g supply of peCroleum tio Che Uni.ted Stae~~
if the eight~C-130 Nercul~e and ~he Chre~ Boeing 747 eransporC aircra�C,
or~ered and patd for, aYe no~ d~livered to him.
In apite of their siz~, all of theee Western miliCary supplieg look
rather modest when compared to Che equipmene orde~red from the Soviet
Union. According to the American ~ournalist Arnaud de ~orchgrave (tdEWB-
WEEK, 9 Jul), Libya by 1980 will have 400 combat airciaft and about
10,000 Sovi~e armored vehiclea. Colonel Qadhdhafi auppos~dly admieted
to our �ellow new~man that his country would acquite more weapona from
Moscow than the shah of Iran ever purchased from th~ United StaCe~.
Theae statistics and these intenCions, with which Che Libyan leader is
credired, look raCher exaggeraCed becauae, to equal or exceed the mili-
tary expenditures of Che shah ($10 billion in 19~8), Liby~ would hc~ve
to spend almost all of its petroleum revenues ($12 billion ia 1978) for
i.ts defense.
Libyan ambiCions do not sCop with convenCional weapons; Tripali s4pposedly
has thc intention of getting nuclear arms. After having Cried to buy an
aComic bomb from China, the leaders attempted Co make one with the hclp
of Argentina. Thia cooperation was denounced by Buenog Airea. An attempt
in pakistan was supposedly more successful. 3ince the time India joined
the atrnnic club, Islamabad has spared no effort to get this ~teapon for
itself. A Pakistani physicist, who worked for a research ceater in Hol-
land, was recalled to direct the agency created for this purpose not far
~ from Islamabad. He supposedly brought back to his country the blueprints�
for a simplified uranium 235 enrichment system. But the operation con-
tinued to be too expensive for Pakistan which moreover lacked equipment.
Libya then supposedly stepped in, proposing financial supporC as well as
the equipment necessary, provided that it could benefit from Pakistani
research. Aa agreement reportedly was concluded along those lines.
During his last trip to the Middle East, early ia July, Colonel Q~dhdhafi
alluded to an exploit which would mark the tenth anniversary of the Libyan
revolution on this coming 1 September. Some people thought that this
would involve the explosion of an atomic bomb. But for the time being
one could not say so with certainty. .
In the meantime, Colonel Qadhdhafi continues to provide his country with
an impressive quantity of conventional equipment, mostly Soviet. Some
people consider this to amount to Moscow's control over Libya. " Qodhdhafi
serves the objectives of the Kremlin by intervening in numerous conflicts
where the Soviets do not want to dirty their hands," writes A. de Borchgrave
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whn b~li~v~~ ChgC there ig a Sovie~ m~chinc~ti~n, aimed ~t "utiilizing th~
tibyang to p~va th~ w~y for eh~ir own b~~~~ on Cha~ i~l~nd" b~hind Liby~n
~ finanei~l ~~ei~t~t?e~ for Ma1t~. For th~ eim~ b~in~, ehig "Sovi~e-Libyan
ho1.d on Mal,ta" bo~.ls down to th~ $upply, by Trip~li, of "�inanci~l ~ggig- ~
tance aimed aC making up fnr the loss of 2]. million pound~ eterling foi-
lowing the cloatng o� th~ $ririeh bas~s and soma sup~r-~r~1on and Aloue~te
III helieopter~ offer~d by ehe Jamahiriya." As for Libyan 'atprvention, ~
it i~ difficulr to admir rhae Mogcow'e hand ie behind a~s3stanc~ giv~n
Idi Amin D~da.
Relation~ beew~~n Tripoli and Mo~cow for the Cim~ b~ing ate thoge betw~~n
a cu~tom~r and a~upplier. In conrra~t tio moet of ehe oth~r countrieg,
the Jamahiriya pays for all ite purch~g~~ ia ca~h which giveg it privi-
leged acacus. ~
But what are the Libyan leadarg �iguring on doing with this entlre argenal?
TYreir thinking mi.ght b~ ~umm~riz~d in ~u~ti a few wordg: "A nountry of 3
million peopl~ ig nothing, ~ven with it~ p~Crodollars. With a gtrong army~
it can becom~ g r~specrable poWer."
2'he proximiry of g m~n euch es Sadat, who swore ist public to "crush Qadhd-
hafi like a fly" (se~ p 36 ~of original~~, is not dpsigned to reasgure
the Libyan leaders. They might well ask themselves questions about the
inrentions of the Egyptian leader who, in spite of hig peace trenty with
Iarael, is busy ~quipping his army, consYsting of more thAn 400,000 men,
With numerous American aircraft and tanks. Unable Co get F-16 fighters,
the ~gyptian president uag satisfied With Phantom ~4 aircraft and M-113
light tanks (sic; At'Csj. The United 5tates, as n bon~s for thc peace
treaty, promised him military aid in the amount o� $1.5 billion.
Ttse Libyans think that Egyptian numerical supremacy may be compensated
for by superiority in equipaent. But they ~rLll have Co find enough sol-
diers and technicians for using this arsenal. This is their biggest
aeakneas. Just to makc their 2,040 battlctanks operational--which can be .
used to equip six arflored divisions--they would have eo double the numer-
ical strength of their army. There is also a lack of pilots and mainten-
ance techni,cians for the aircraft. ~'orth Korea is partly filling this gap
by furnishing ~om~ 300 pilot~ and technicians. The Soviet Union and the
countries of Eastern Europe furnished advisors in all fields--Libya pre-
sently has close to 2,000 Soviet advisora.
On the other hand, the Libyan leaders try to increase the personnel
atrength of their army through a crash conscription program. In addition
to all Libyan adults, for whom ~ilitary service Would become ob,ligatory,
Arab volun[eers would also be integrated, regardless of their nationality.
It supposedly Was a foraacion of these international units which, according
to the leaders in N'Djamena, clashed aith the troops of FROLINAT [Chadian
National Liberation Front~" ia the northern part of Chad. According ~o the
leaders in N'Dj amena, some 2,500 men from that Islamic army early in July,
2~+
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I
a V!~ ~aa~iV~aa~ yYW VaIY~
1 \
~uppoeed],y ~upported by Li,by~n ~~,xcrQ�t~ triQd to seiz~ s~vexa]. Ch~di~n
town~. "'~hay wnre interc~pted by ~le~aanCs �rom th~ ~2tOLINAT which cut
rh~ Ig],amic ~~ay to pi~ces." ,
Ie is dif�icu],~ Co deCermine Che CruCh in a11 oE the~e sCaCemenCS but
four ~oldier~ (oe?e ~~ypri~n and three Libyane), who wera members of Che
Islamic army were ghown off at N~D~amena.
COPYRYfi1iT: Jeune ;~trique aRUPJIA 1979
505$
C80: 1~800 `
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MORO~CO
- REPtt~SSION IN MORdCCO D~NOtJN~~n
Pgrig A~RIQU~-ASI~ in F~~t~~h 9-22 J~~1 79 p 63
(T~xt~ Th~ ~tott~rd~m Areg F~undatian ha~ aW~rd~d Moroce~n po~e, Abd~llatif
L~~bi, ~ palitie~l pri~~n~r in Moro~ru gine~ 1972, ~ priz~ of 10,000 florin
in rerognition nf the entirp eoll~etion of hi~ aork~ of po~try. Th~ La~bi
Commite~~ gnd the Committ~~ To Fighc ttepre~,~ion ic~ Moroced rele~eed a pr~~g
bull~rin on eh~ ne~~~ion ~t~ting thgt the ~oundgtion had ~ent I.gabi an in-
vit~tinn t~ go Co the Netherlande to receiv~ ehe priz~.
The invitation was not honored by th~ king af Morocco or prigon ~uthoritie~
~nsw~rabl~ to the palace.
In addition, there i~ ~eill no neag of ~1-Koh~n Lamchili, profe~gor at the
School of ~ee and Editor of the periodical ASSAS. rh~ publication hag not ~
been iggued sincp the profeg~or'~ kidnapping. ~he lagt edition, publiehed
in March 1979, contain~ tao articleg, one of Whirh recallg under whac eondi-
tiong the UN~M (National Unidn of :toro~can Students) Was b~nned, whil~ the
other openly criticize~ the Moroccan Army, Which coets the Moroccan people
over 6 percent of the country's gross national product, Which 3s nearly
an African record.
Finally, the trial of the persons aho murdered Omar ~enjelloun began after
a preliminary invegrigatior. layting th:~~ .?uu una-c~ai: yeare with the
disappearance (into thin air) of a key piece nf evidence from the indictment
and in the abgence of the principal defendants: Abdelkrim Moutir and
Abdela~iz Nouamani (abroadl). One can certainly eee ahat good Benjelloun's
killing accomplishedt
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Aaie
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TUNISZA
�
l1~tE5'TY CALL~D PROPAGANDA MANIEUV~~t
Pnri~ AFRIQUE-A3IE in French 9-22 Ju1 79 pp 63-64
(Texe~ In anewer to au appeal from Ch~ Tuniaian people on 26 January, two
~tt~rney~ from the P~ri~ian Court of Appeal, P. Cohen Seat and Eveline Meyer
M~nville, h~ld a pre~~ conference. Th~ two have compleCed a broad invegti-
~gCinn in ~uni~ig gponsnred by the Int~rnational Asaociation of Democratic
Jurigtg (AIJD) and the Int~rnational Movement of Catholic Juriata (MIJC).
Afeer enum~rating the many contacts they have had in Tunieia, mainly involving
th~ fxmilieg of trgde unionists arreated following the black night of 26 Jan-
uary 197~, lawyers, government circles and various opposition groupe, the
two attorneys reported a number of confirmationa.
It hus been shown that Habib Achour, now hospitalized in Tunis, was definitely
the victim of an attempted poisoning. Hie current etate of health and the
physical condition of inembers of the ~xecutive Bureau of the legitimate
UGTT (Tuniaian General FederaCion of Laborj, alao in prison, are alarming.
During the firat quarter of this year, 39 movementa started by workers and
trade union members loyal to their legitimate leadera were also registered,
confirming the total isolation of the UGTT, which is a puppet of Tijani
Abid nnd the Destourian 5ocialist Party.
In addition, the International Labor Bureau, meeting recently in Geneva,
ccndemned this "official" UGTT, thereby demonstrating that international
opinion is not ready to forget the excesses of 26 January 1978 and the blood-
bath that enabled the government to decapitate the only organization repre-
senting the Tunisian workers movement.
The two Parisian lawyers also conf~rmed, following their investigation,
that the famous presidential amnesty of 1 June was only a vulgar propaganda
taneuver. No one arrested after 26 January has been released. Nor has
~he government published any liat of thoae to whom amnesty has suppoaedly
been granted.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
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TUNISIA
SdUt~AYR B~LHASS~N DISCUSS~S pOSSIBILITIE5 OF AMN~5TY
paris J~UN~ ArItIQU~ in French 1 Aug 79 p 11
(Article by 5ouhayr Belhagaen: "Tunisia: A Birthday Unli.ke Any OCher"J
[Text] 5entenced to 10 yearg of forced labor, he will be freed only 10
months afCer having been Cried by the State Criminal CourC: Habib Achour,
66, former aecreeary general of the UGTT (Tunisian General FederaCion of
Labor), imprisoned at Bor~ Roumi, is going to be pardoned by Preaident
Bourguiba. On 3 August, on the occasion of the 76th birthday of ehe Tuni-
sian chief of atate. The former strong man of the trade unions wae Cried
~nd on the night of 9-10 October, found to be responsible for the riots of
26 January 1978 that resulted in 51 dead and 324 wounded, according to
official figures.
Since that time, various political partiea, trade union organizationa and
humanitarian groups have intensified their campaigna and petitiona demanding
the release of Habib Achour. Friendly countries let it be known that they
would w~lcome a gesture of clemency. But President Bourguiba did not intend
to act under pressure and the most friendly and discreet interventions were
not the least effective. Let us cite thoae of prominent French persons such
as Pierre Mendes France, Charles-Andre Julien and Alain Savary, who person-
ally contacted the Tunisian chief of state.
- Is the release of 1[abib Achour, which cannot fail to be favorably welcomed
in Tunisia and abroad, a humanitarian gesture or a political acC? Probably
both. It will be a humanitarian act because the age and the state of health
of the prisoner, who has suffered from the difficult conditions of his de-
tention, influenced the decision. It is obviously a political gesture, linked
to a certain African context marked by the new importance granted to human
rights (as seen in Monrovia). Or, closer to Tutiisia, in Algeria, by the
conditional release of Ben Bella, 3 years younger than Habib Achonr.
There is naturally a purely Tunisian context as well. On the eve of a
congress of the Destourian Socialist Party, at which leaders intend t~ demo-
cratize the operation of the party (JEUNE AFRIQUE, ~'0 966), Achour's pardon
appears to be the real beginnin~ of a liberalization of national political
lif e.
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guC Achour is n~C ~lon~. The princip~l defendant, he was geneenced w3th
14 oeher erade unionises. If tihe main leader is pgrddned, Chen ~he logiC o~
the pregidenei~l gegture means that the comradea o� ehe former secrerary
general of ehe UGTT should benefiC from the sgme measure.
It i~ not pngeible to stop there, If cheae 15 men senCenced foY~ the most
pginful'evettCs ~.n the aonC~mpnrnry hisCory of Tunigia gre fr~ed, nMn one
contin~e ro hold in pri~on men and women gccused af much less grievous
crimes7 There nre five "perspecCiviats" in rhe ]3or~ Roumi Penitentiary,
mogt of whdm tiave been ehere fore 10 years (JEUNE AFRIQU~, No 964); 22 per-
~ons from Che Marxist-Leninist ttl-'Amil al-Tunisi Group (GMLT), senCenced
in 1974 and 1975; 13 members of the Tunisian Progresaive LiberaCion Front
(FPLT); 22 trade unionists and demonstrators from Sfax, Be~a, Mateur and
Kasserine; 8 members of the Tuniatan Progresstve Revolutionary Party (PRPT), ~
~entenced on 30 June; and 21 defendants from the underground newepaper
AL- Sl3A' $ .
In a11, tl~ere are 106 political prisoners still tarnishing Tunisia's image.
Once the prisons are empty, the conditions will exist so that noChing can
oppose the free en~oyment of the liberties guaranteed by Che conatitution
and the governmenC will have to be credited with ita democratic intenCions.
nn 3 August 1979, will there be no more political prisoners in Tunisia? One
can answer in the affirmative. This year, the birthday of President Bour-
guiba will be the "celebration of harmony" (al-Wifaq). As for the Supreme
Commander, he will make that day figure among the greatest dates in Tunisian
history, of which he is so anxious to be one of the main artisans.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
].1, 464
CSO: 4400 IIVD
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