JPRS ID: 8741 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010010-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8741 -
- 30 O~ctober 1979
.
- Sub-~~aharan Afric~ R~ ort
p
~ FOUn No. 653
.
- FB1~ FOREICN BROADCAST INFORMATIOI~ SE'.RVICE
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?7~RS L/8741 -
30 October. 1979
SUB-SAI~ARAN AFRI CA REPORT
- FOUO No. 653 _
CONTENTS PAGE
- INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Malian Dissident on 'Islamic United States of Sahel'
(Didi Demba Medina Soumbounou Interview;
JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Sep 79), 1
- Briefs
Kenyan Aid to Zaire ~
Benguela Railroad Reope~ling ~
_ ANGOLA
Briefs
Cabinda Pipeline Damaged g
CAM~.ROQ~~
UCCAO Experiences Satisfactory Coffee Year
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Sep 79) 9
Briefs . .
Aid From British Bank 11
Cacao Price Increase 11
Offshore Oil Discovery 11
~ New Merchant Ships 12
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Briefs
Population Data 13
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUOJ
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CONTL'NTS (Continued) Page
COMORO ISLANllS
B~iefs
Government Position on Mayotte 14
Proposal for Special Court 14
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Briefs
Spain Backing New Currency 15
GUINEA
Election of New Central Committee Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Sep 79) 16
_ ,KENYA
Petroleum Price Increases Cause Critical Economic Situation
(MARCHES T.ROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Sep 79) 17
MADAGAS CAR
Briefs
- Innovati.ons Institute 19
Tamatave: Harbor Silo Construction 19
- Energy: Gas Consumption 19
Rice Cultivation Zp
NIGER
Briefs
Solar Pump Used for Irrigation 21
SENEGAL
President on Allahou Akhbar Seizure
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Sep 79) 22
Cinemat~graphist Discusses Policy on Wolof Language, Islam
(Sembene Ousmane Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE,
19 Sep 79) 23
Dakar Fishing Wharf To Be Comp~eted in December i980
~ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Sep 79) 31
Harvesting Campaigns' Success Varies With Regions
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.ANEENS, 14 Sep 79) 32
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
- Briefs =
Senghor Gets Ultimatum 34 _
BOAD Loan 34
_ ReForestation Goals Revised 34
_ TANZANIA
Brief s
France Aiding Airport Expansion 35
' Bulgarian Aid Agreement 35
Canadian Agricultu~"`~'`~; Aid ` 35 -
,yd;~
TOGO
Speculation on Ramifications of Plot Against Eyadema
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Sep 79) 36
UGANDA
- Binaisa Having Economic, Social, Military Difficulties
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Sep 79) 38
Political Movements Protest 'Dictatorship'
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 31 Aug 79) 40
Appeal Issued to Foreign Investors
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 31 Aug 79) 41
_ Briefs ~
Aid Goods in Black Market 42
7.AIRC ~
Consequen~es of Devaluation Outlined
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Sep 79) 43
Progress of Za~rian National Railroad Company Outlined
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 5 Sep 79) 45
Market Prices of Construction Materials, June 1979
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 31 Aug 79) 48 _
Zairian=ltalian Refining Company To Acquire Desalinator
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Sep 79) 49 `
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CONTrNTS (Cor.tj.nued) pag~
Bxiefs
_ Financial Audits 50
- Anticorruption Efforts SO
Covernment Participants in 131 Companies 51
French Troops in Shaba S1.
Foreign Company Cessions S1
- . Frerich Cooperation for Tin 51
ZAMBIA -
Econom:ic Recovery Conditions Examined
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Sep 79) 52
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INTER-t1FRICAN AFFAIRS
~fALIAN DISSIDENT ON 'I~LAMIC UNITED Si'ATES OF SAHEL'
Paris JEUNE AFRIQIJE in French No 975, 12 Sep 79 pp 31-33
[Interview with Dr Didi Demba Medina Soumbounou by Mohamed Selhami in Tripoli
at the Palace Hotel, 1 September 1979: "'J-Day' Has Already Been Chosen"]
[Text:] When JEUNE AFRIQUE (No 963) [See JPRS L/8564 10 Jul,y 1979, Sub-~Saharan
Africa] announced in its "Confidential" column the creation of a movement for
the liberation of riali supported by Li~ya,Qadhdhafi's ambassador in Bamako felt
obliged to deny it (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 966) [See JPRS 73988 9 August 1979, Sub-
Saharan Africa]. Now we are in a position not only of confirming the exis-
tence of that movement but also of publishing an interview with its chairman,
Dr Didi Demba Medina Soumbounou. The meeting took place on Saturday, 1 Sep-
tember, at the Palace Hotel in Tripoli where Dr Medina has been living for
almost a year.
His movement is the UDRM [Democratic Republican Union of Mali] (organ of the
late Modibo Keita's Sudanese Union-RDA [African Democratic Rally]). According
to him, he has strong army of 7,000 men trained and ready to go into action
and the JDRM allegedly has operational equipment available right now:
17,OU0 Kalachnikov automatic rifles, 17,000 M-16 automatic weapons, 6 tons
of gr.enades, 47 long-range canon-carrying Toyota vehicles, three Fiat trucks, -
6 tons each, two King Air-200 planes, 52 motorcycles equipped with radios, _
one vehicle-mounted transmitting center and 12 ambulances.
This materiel was for the most part furnished by Libya. But other countries
are providing financial and military support to Dr Medina, e.g., Iraq, which
has ensured the training of about 2,000 fighting men. Dr Medina asserted
that he was in touch with Benin and Togo. He even added that the Benin
Government has anparently authorized him to utilize its section of the Niger r
River to send arms to Mali. Dr Median--who is assisted by Toure Tapa, a
professor at the University of Tripoli, and Amadou Traore who has a doctorate
in law, both Malians and members of the UDRM's executive bureau--even an-
nounced that he has already selected the day on which he is to unleash his
"war against the regi.me of Malian president, Moussa Traore." ~
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_ lir Medina's statement are simply astounding. But the one who is believed to
be the leader oF the ~;uerrilla war in Mali resides in Tripoli. He received ~
us on the recomm~ndati.on of one of the leaders of the Libyan Popular Committee ~
(th~~ c�~untry's ~uprem~~ authority). In the suite he occupies at the PalacEr
Ilotc~t, we nnt~~cl n few submi~chine guns and even a colon~l's uniform, ~ unifarm
Ur ric~dina i~ hoping t~~ wcar the day he returns as conqueror to his native
town, Bamako, He was born there 38 years ago to a poor family of seven
children. Today, aside from his Tripolitan "pied a'terre," Dr Median admits
- to woning a 12,Ob0 square meter residence wiht 13 rooms and a swimming pool
at Ct~ateau d'Ex in the Lausanne (Switzerland) area. He also owns two apart-
ments, one in Rome, the other in Geneva, I had a rambling conversation with
Didi Demba rfedina Soumbounou.
(Question] Why did you decide to settle in Libya?
[Answer] First, Libya is a socialist, democratic and popular country. And
then our two countrie~ are part of Islam's great family and of the Sahara,
that vast ocean oP~sand.
[Question] Of what does Libyan aid consist?
[AnswrrJ It is a rather delicate matter to giva precise information on that. -
We are in Libya, hencc> at home. Libyan aid has made it possible for us to
liave a military and political striking force which is proving to be effective ~
_ right now. But we particularly do not wish to be identified in Chad. We do
- not wish to wage a war that will dr.ag on for 10 or 20 years. "
[~~uestion] You think Mali may experience the same fate as~Chad?
~Answer] Yes. Traore has been in po~aer for 10 years and nothing worthwhile r
has been achieved.
' [Question) Are you t}iinking of acting in the same way as the FROLINAT, that
is, by taking up arms'?
[~nswer] tde are no longer at the stage of thinkir~~. Right now we are in the
midst of armed struggle. Moussa Traore came to power by force; he will leave
by force. We will act at a time of our choosing and unflinchingly.
[Question] Who gave you the w~apons?
~ (AnswerJ Libya, of course! And other friendly countries...
[Question] Which ones?
[Answer] Well... Iraq and Benin. But our organization, the UDRM, has very
solid financial means available to procure arms for itself.
[Question] And aid from the Soviet Union? ~
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[AnswerJ jJe have nothing to do with that country.'jde are anti-Soviet and
anti-American. We do not wish to have anything to do with those two imperial-
isms. Once rlali has been liberated, we will chase them out of the country,
[Question] And France?
� [Answerj That is a matter requiring some thought. We have nothing against
that country a priori. It is up to it to accept us or reject us. I will
simply say that we are prepared to cooperate with France. In the meantime,
however, let it keep still and not get involved in our problems.
(QuestionJ Are you sure of winning out?
[AnswerJ We know the strength of Mali's armP~i forces, a?.1 of whose elements
do not support the regime. We also know our strength. So we are certain to
get our hands on Moussa.
[Question] How many are there of you?
[Answerj We have 7,000 well-trained, well-armed men.
[Question] Where ~oere they trained?
[AnswerJ In Libya and in Iraq, among ~~thers...
[Question] How do you manage to keep informed as to what is going on in Mali?
[Answer] We have a solid network, informers inside the presidential palace
itself, among the ministers and among the army officers and the gendarmerie.
Our party has 30,000 active members in Mali.
[Question] But President Traore was nonetheless elected just the same by the
Malians last June.,, ~
[Answer) That is ridiculous. A president elected b
usurper. A fortiori, a singl2 candidate who has theyarm�9andercent is a
his banner... Be serious with your questions, sir.., y Police under
[Question) It is said that you are for dividing Mali into two states, one
made up of the north and one of the south.
[Answer] That is not true. It was our
not a secessionary movement. We stand foraone Mali with itsSpresent borders
in the north as in the south. JEUNE AFRI UE
orientation to our party. We demand the 4otalaliberatgon of Mali'seentirean
territory,
[Question] If you seize power in Piali, what will you do witr, Moussa Traore
and his friends?
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[Answer] Moussa threw out Modibo. I will kill him with my own hands.
[Question] How long has it been since you left Mali?
[Answer) Back in 1971.
(Que~tion] You have never gone back there?
[Answer] Yes, several times. Along with my men, I have often held secret
meetings in Bamako and in other Cowns of the country.
[Question] Do you enter weapons in hand?
[Answer] We are rather well protected. We have listening posts throughout
Mali.
[QuestionJ What weapons do you use?
[AnswerJ No, sir, I am not going to tell you!
have the green light from a friendly country. And Moussatwill notsbe~ableWe
to resist us more than 2 hours.
[Question) Which country is that?
[Answer] I~oill not tell you. You may know only that it is an African one
and rioslem,
[Question] Are you to Mali what Goukouni was to Chad?
(Answer) Not at all. But Goukouni is a friend. We often correspond with
each other. Goukouni is Medina and Medina is Goukouni. We have the same
~oals. We are going to create the United States of Sahe1. That is our
_ objt~ctive.
[Questian] You will be lacking Niger..,
- [Answer] I see that JEUNE AFRIQUE does not know everything... There is a
Nigerian movement whose executive committee is located in Tripoli. A Nigerian
Goukouni does exist.
[Question] Who is it?
[AnswerJ I won't tell you. It would be premature. When we have finished
with Mali, Kountche who is currently governing Niger will need to know where
to lay his head.
(Question] Goukouni agrees with you on creating the United States of Sahel?
" [Answer) .Absolutely. It will be the Islamic United States of Sahel. Goukouni
is not helping us, He is participating.
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[Question] Libya agrees to it?
[Answer] Absolutely.
~ [Question] Will Libya be p art of those United States?
[Answer] Libya is already totally committed to this process. It will be '
part of the Sahel.
[Question] And Tfauritania?
[Ans~aer] Now at last you a re getting down to it! Give us some time for
that...
[QuestionJ It will be thanks to the Polisario?
[Answer] Perhaps. But we will proceed by stages.
[Question] Is Algeria invo lved?
[Answer] It will rally to it necessarily. It will not want to be isolated.
It needs the countries of the Sahel, it is a natural ally.
[Question] You will still have Morocco and Tunisia.
[Answer] They will not be in it. They have no connection with our problems.
. The lslamic United States of Sahel will include Mali, Chad, Niger, Piauritan ia,
Algei-ia and Libya: The sta tes making up Greater Sahel.
[Question] And the jdest Saharan Republic?
[Answer) It must exist. P erhaps, I don't know...
[Question] Do the West Sah arans have a right to independence?
[Ans~~~er] I think so. We s upport the Polisario. We have supplied it with
fighting men, about 1,700, who were trained in Libya and Algeria.
[Question) While you are a t it, why not also liberate Morocco and Tunisia?
[Answer] That is too much. What we are interested in �irst of all is the
liberation of Mali, then th at of Niger. Since in Chad it has already been
accomplished...
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FOR OFr IC ~AL I1ti1: C~[VL~
REPU9lIQUE DU MA~J
U. f1. R. M11.
- S urna ~
G iven name
Nationality
Born on
Noti+ A t
PRENOM O CC UPB. t 10I1
NATIONAl1T~ ~ , C1V11. StBtllS
NE LE DOIf11C112
A City, Country
fUNCTION
ETAT CNIL
DOMIC~LE
E
VILLE � PAYS
N" -
In any case, the passports are printed.
COPYRIGEIT: Jeune AErique GRUPJIA 1979
8094
CSO: 440~ -
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
KE~IYAN AID TO ZAIRE--The Ker_yan Government has acceded to the request or the
Kinshasa authorities to evacuate by air, from Zaire to Mombasa, some 7,275
tons of coffee that have remained blocked in the eastern part of the country
since the closing of the Ugandan border, according to information obtained
from an official source in the Zairian capital on 25 August. The same source
has indicated that the Kenyan Government has insisted that the evacuation be
effected exclusively aboard Air Zaire cargo planes "for reasons of security."
[TextJ [Marches TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2397]
9238
BENGUELA RAILROAD REOPENING--Mr Bandour, d~rector of operations of the
Zairian National Railroad Company, announced that railway traffic between
Zaire and Angola was to resume on September with the opening of the
Benguela railroad. Recalling the meeting wfiich recently brought together
~ at Luao on the Angolan frontier delegates fram the railroads of Angola,
- Zaire and 'Lambia, Mr Baudour also annonnced that Zaire and Angola had
reached an agreement "to return to each other on a reciprocal basis the
rolling stock held in each of the two countries" since the closing of the
Benguela railroad in 1975. This railroad is a low-cost export route for
_ the mining products of Shaba, in particular copper. [ExcerptJ [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 7 Sep 79 p 2466] 9434
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run vrrtl,lt~l., UJC, U1VLY
- ANGOLA =
BRIEFS
- CABINDA PIYELINE DAMAGED--A break the causes of which are still unknown
= brought a~out the closing of the pipeline wfi~ch transports petroleum from
Yabe to the Xalongo installations in Cabinda Province. The ANGOP PRESS
AGENCY, which cites sonrces close to Sonangol, the oil company, states that
the accident o~~urred 29 Angnst and adds that repairs are underway.
[Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 7 Sep 79 p 2466] 9434 -
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CAMEROON
UCCAO EXPERIENCES SATISFACTORY COFFEE YEAR
_ Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2453
_ [Text] The board of directors of ~he Central Union of Agricultural Coopera-
tives of the West (UCCAO) met in Bafoussam on 10 August 1979 under the chair-
_ manship of Jean Teinkela, chairman of the union.
The ayenda included the following points: approval of the minutes of the
preceding meeting, a first meeting with the new governor of the West, exaat~i-
nation of the balance sheet, the union's participation in construction of
' the building that will house the ~third regular congress of the UNC [Cameroon-
ian National Union] in February 1980 in Bafoussam, personnel probleqns, and
other questions.
During fiscal 1978 the UCCAO's factory processed 3,090 tons of coffee.
Sorting operations began late due to the lack of spare parts. This year the
' factory's production will improve thanks to the installation of a second line
of sorting machines.
Production up 34 Percent -
As of 31 December 1978 the union had produced 13,624 tons. Compared to 1977's
production, that represents a leap.of 3,451 tons or 34 percent. The increase _
- in production results from renewed upkeep of the plantations and a greater
use of fertilizer owing to higher producer prices. All of those,positive
factors had already made it possible to foresee increased production in the
years to come.
During the past fiscal year the union extended its activities to include
_ Robusta coff ee. Several tons were collected by the cooperatives ir, Dschang,
Bafang, Bangangte, and Foumban.
The 1978 coffee season was calmer than the preceding one. There was no need
to deal with aggressive price forcing, market prices being such that specu-
lators were unable to make incursions into the UCCAO zone.
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At the level~of the coc~peratives, the collecti.ng was organized in accordance
with the decentralized structures which have been set up and which wi11 be _
strengthened and improved in the future as part of the "High Plateaus of the
West" project.
Production figures by cooperative were as follows: Caplame (Dschang): 4,076.7
tons; Caplabam (Mbouda) : 3,244.4 tons; Caplaba (Foumban) : 2,893 tons; Caplami
(Bafoussam) : 3,176.3 tons; Caplahn (Bafang) : 119.4 tons; and Caplande
(Bangangte) : 113.9 tons.
Domestic sales rose by 37.11 percent in 1978. The new roasting unit that be-
gan operating during the year made it possible to supply the national marke.t
for ground coffee.
The coffee revival, which has already entered its operational phase, is ex-
periencing outstanding success. In April 1978 trore than 2.7 million saplings
produced in cooperative nurseries were distributed to planters.
As was true the year before, the union subsidized complex fertilizers at
- 6,000 CFA francs per ton, not including transportation and distribution costs.
Coffee pests cause more than 20 percent of the UCCAO's production to be l~st
every year. In order to ccenbat those pests, the union joined with the tech-
nical departrnents in the struggle for plant health by buying spraying equip-
ment and bearing the oost of wages for machine operators. The objective is
to cover all of the UCCAO's coffee plantations with regular and effective
treatments.
The union's budget for the fiscal year called for revenues of 199,938~,089 CFA
francs and expenditures of 188,962,768 CFA francs, leavinq an expected sur-
plus of 10,975,000 CFA francs.
The year 1978 was also one of reorganization. The names of the union and of
the cooperatives were changed, with the result that while it has retained
its ~cronym, the UCCAO is now the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives
of the West and no longer the Union of Arabica Coffee Cooperatives of the
West. In addition, the Arabica and Robusta coffee cooperatives in the de-
~ partments of Bamoun, Haut-Nkam, and Nde were merged to form one cooperative
in each department.
The above changes resulted in modifications to registered capital and manage-
ment structures. For example, the union's registered capital was increased
from 100 million to 140 million CFA francs.
. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1979 ~ -
11798
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CAMEROON
BRIEFS
AID FROM BRITISH BANK--On 1 August 1979 in London, the Cameroon Sugar Oompany
_ (Mbandjock) and a banking consortium headed by the Chase Merchant Banking -
Group (London) s~gned a$50-million loan agreement. In addition to the
Chase Merchant Banking Group, the banking consortium includes the DG Bank
(Germany), the Standard Chartered Bank, Limited, the American Express Bank,
the Bank of Montreal, the European Bank of Tokyo, the General Bank of the
Netherlands, and Barclays Ir,ternational. This Eurodollar loan will run for
10 years with a 4-year grace period and a floating interest rate equal to
the ].ibor plus 1.5 percent annually. Guaranteed by the state, it is intended
for the financing of various supplementary investment programs of CAMSUCO -
[Cameroon Sugar Company], whose producLion capacity when in full operation
will total 50,000 tons of sugar annually. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2393] 11798
CACAU PRICE INCREASE--Cacao producer prices for the upcoming season have been
set by a presidential decree signed on 1 September. The new prices, which
are hi~her than those for the preceding season, are as follows; grades 1 and
2: 290 CFA francs per kilogram, compared to 260j and nonstandard: 1a0 CFA
francs per kilogram, compared to 90. Another decree, this one issued by
Cameroon's minister of economy and plan, sets the start of the cacao season
at 17 September. The Basic Products Marketing Office remains Cameroon's
only registered exporter of cacao. It purchases the product from the planters
through registered middlemen. [Text] [Paris MARCI~ S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 7 Sep 79 p 2453] 11798
OFFSHORE OIL DISCOVERY--A oommunique dated 28 August 1979 from the French
Petroletun Company announces that Total Exploration and Production of Cameroon,
operating on behalf of a partnership with Nbbil E~ploration Equatorial Africa,
has just discovered signs of petroleum in the course of its "Victori.a Ea~t"
drilling, on Permit H-17, in Cameroonian waters. The drilling was carried
out from the Pentagone 81 platform 80 kilometers offshore from Victoria and
in 45 meters of water. A final depth of 1,835 meters was reached. The
drilling showed evidence of a high-quality sandy reservoir at a. depth of
1,500 meters. Tes ts have given pnsitive results. The oil produced is
light (42�API) and of good quality. Further drilling will be necessary in
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y order to evaluate the size of the discovery. Zbtal bcploration and Produc-
tion of Cameroon �(a subsidiary of the French Petroleum Company) and I~Sobil
Exploration Equatorial Africa each have a 50-percent interest in the permit.
We recall that the French firm of Elf-Aquitaine recently discovered two small
petroleum deposits in the same country (see MARCI~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
17 Aug 79, p 2280). They are in the Ek~undou concession and north of the
- Rio del Rey concession. [Text] [Paris MARCFiE5 TROPICAUX ET. MEDITERRANEENS -
in French 7 Sep 79 p 2453] 11798
NE[V MERCHANT SHIPS--With further reference to the report published in our
issue for last 3 August (p 2167), we can state that the freighter Cam-Ilomba,
built in Bremerhaven for the Cameroon Shipping Lines [CAMSHIPLIII~S~, has not
yet been delivered. It was launched and christened on 10 July and will be
delivered to the Cameroonian company this 26 October. The second partial
container ship on order--the Cam-Iroko--will be launched and christened on _
14 Septesuber and delivered to CAMSHIPLINES on 21 December. The christener
� of the Cam-Iroko will be Mrs Beleoken, wife of the Cameroonian ambassador
to the FRG. [Text) [Paris MARCI~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
7 Sep 79 p 2453] 11798
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~
. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
BRIEFS
POPULATICN DATA--2,305,OQ0 inhahitants in 1979. In the course of the meeting
of the Council of Ministers on 25 July, 1979, the Central African Government
recognized as the most probably correct the estimate of the general census
of 1975 which recorded 2,305,000 inhabitants as of 31 December 1975. Hitherto
the Central African authorities held to the figure of 3,055,000 inhabita.^.ts,
an estimate disputed by the United Nations. Taking into account a population _
increase figured at 2.5 percent per year, the Central African population would
- be approxima~ely 2,305,000 as of 31 December 1979. Moreover the government
decided to ask the United Nations Fund for Population [FNUAP] for a grant
to conduct an investigation in 1980-1981 for the purpose of estimating tt~e
total population and determining various rates of population growth. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79 p 25I9] 2750 -
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COMORO ISLANDS
BRIEFS ~
GOVERNMENT POSITION ON MAYOTTE--Since the problem of the island of Mayotte
in the ~.:omoros "has not evolved " since the unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence by the Comoro Islands on 6 July 1979, it should be "revitalized
so as to find a strategy for defusing the situation" declared M. Ali
Mroud~ae, Comoran minister for foreign affairs and cooperation, to the AFP
on 25 August. Mr Mroud~ae, who is to participate in the Council of Minis-
ters of nonalined countries, in Havana from 28 Auguet to l September,
added that as the problem of Mayotte remains unchanged in spite of the
"resolutions taken" a solution ought to be found "with the normalization
of our rel~tions with France." Nevertheless, "It is not our intenti~n to
take th~ OAU and the UN out of the Mahoran affair...we simply want to gene-
rate th~ sort of dynamics that will move the problem forward," said M.
Mroudjae before concluding: "The problem of Mayotte should be reaolved in
concert and mutual truat." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
RANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2462] 9291 .
PROPOSAL FOR SPECIAL COURT--The Federal Islamic Assembly of the Camoros
opened its first extraordinary seasion, which was called by the president
of the republic, M. Ahmed Abdallah. Under the pres3dency of M. Mohamed Taki
the deputies will examine a law to create a apecial Court of Justice to
_ judge crimes and offenses committed on 3 Auguat 1975, date of the seizure
of power that led to President Abdallah taking over the government on _
12 Ma.y 1979, at Moroni. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDTTERRANEENS
in French 7 Sep 79 p 2462] 9291
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r
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
BRIEFS
SPAIN BACKING NEW CURRENCY--A coimnittee from the Spanish Bank of Foreign
- CoBUnerce will arrive on 20 September at Malabo to negotiate with the author-
ities of Equatoxial Guinea for the issuance of new paper currency that will
keep the designation ekuele and will be backed by the Spanish peseta. This
committee's mission was announced by the new Spanish Ambassador to Equatorial
Guinea, Mr Juan Antonio de Andrada, soon after his arrival in Malabo on
2 September. In another connection, a source close to Sganish economic cir-
eles reports that Spain is presently prepared to make ~nvestments in Equa-
torial Guinea to a total of 10 billion pesetas ($150 million U.S.). These
investments will specifically permit joint ownership enterprises, particularly
in the fishing industry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 14 Sep 79 p 2518] 2750
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_ _
GUINEA
_ ELECTION OF NEW CENTRAL CONINIITTEE REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 7 Sep 79 p 2447
[Excerpt] Radio-Conakry announced on 31 Augnst the elect~on of a new Central
Committee by the National Connc~l of the revr~lution, the supreme aatFiortty
between two congresses of the Democrat~c Party of Gninea (DPG).
This Central Committee, which numUers 75 members (as against 25 tn the
previous one, elected in Apr~l 1972~, includes 22 ministers, 20 regional
governors, 7"comm~ssioners general of the ~revolution" (assinning tfie Fiighest
functions of the DPG at tfie regional level~, 4 super~or officers and several
regional political personal~ties. The 15 members of the Pol~tical Committee
all belong to the Central Comm~ttee. Five members of the ~crrmer Central
Committee were noe reelected. Among them is ~'!r Leon M..aka, former p~resident -
- of the National Assembly.
~1ine ministexs are making theix ent~rance into the new Central Committee:
Messrs Senainon Befianz~n (Tnformation), Abraham Kabassan Keita (PnBlic Works),
Alafe Konroizma (At~ricnlture~ , Ialamady Kaiia (Industry) , Gualema Gnilavogui
(Preuniversity Edncation), Mamadou Sy (Labor~, Sikiie Camara (.7nstice), Fode
Mamadou Tonre (Finance) and Nfaly Sangara (delegate to tTie EEC). -
Other outstanding entrances tnto the new Central Ccnnmittee--those of four
officers: ~en Toya Conde, chief of combined general staff; Col Soumafi
Kourouma, deputy cfiief og staff; Commander Toure, "commissioner general of
the revolution" in Conakry, and Commander Diarra Traore, governor of the
Pita region. _
_ Incidentally, the secretary general of tfie alomen's Union, Mrs Sopfiie Maka,
and the secretary~ general of the GTorkers' Union of Gninea, Mr Kandas Konde,
also belong, as well as T~fr Mamonna Tonre, director general of the Kindia
Bauxite Ofgice.
COPYRTGHT: Rene Pioreux et Cte., Pa�ris, ]:979.
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KENYA
PETROLEUM PRICE INCREASES CAUSE CRITICAL ECONOMTC SIT[TATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET N~DITERRAP:EENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2652
[TextJ The latest oil price rises constitute a new handicap for K~nya~s
economy as well as for that of the other developing countries that do not
produce petroleum. The country must henceforth devote one-third of its
foreign exchange earnings to the purchase of petroleum products as against
one-quarter a year ago; this entails the risk of having aerious repercus-
aions on development projects and especially on agricultural pro~ects or
thoee pertaining to transportation or energy infrastructures.
According to certain economists, summarized by the New York TIMES, Keny.a~~
budget deficit sAould come to $2.5 b illion during the next f ive years and
the per-capita income ahould go down. The 1979-1983 development plan
would already be outdated. This plan, the fourth launched since indepen-
dence in 1963, is particularly aimed at resettiing A~rican farmers on re-
cently cleared or poorlq utilized land and to develop water power-aupported
agricultural improvemen~ pro~ects. Kenya remains an essentially agricul-
_ tural country bur only ten percent of its land have a high production
potential and five percent on the othex hand are suitable only for aaimal
husbandry.
These same economists feel that this fourth plan should have 30 perceat
of ita programs cut off but nobody knows which sectors could be sacri-
ficed. The third five-year plan, published in 1973, at the time the OPEC
announced the quadrupling of its petroleum prices, fell far short of at-
taining its target and only 40 percent of the programs were properly con-
cluded.
We must recall that, like most of the other African countries, Kenya ie
forced to import a11 of the petroleum it needs and tha~ represents 80
percent of the energy produced 3n the country. This year, Kenya wi11 need
12 million barrels of petroleum or 6 percent more than last year.
Like many other African countriea, Kenya also spends more than 3t earns;
thia year, weather conditions and world prices caused a noticeable drop
in earnings deriving from coffe~ and tea, xeducing foreign exchange
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I
1'Vl\ Vl'1'1lr1LfL UJL' VLYLl
rec:eipts by 40 percent, whereas expenditures for defense and energy went
o~ up. Kenya~s balance of payments within one year tilted from a surplus
of $286 million to a deficit of $210 million and there is reaeon to fear
that the situation will get even worse.
A Canadian advisor to the Kenyan government on energy questions thinks
that, for every dollar of increase in the price of each barrel o� oil,
Kenya would have to increase its exports by 1.5 percent merely to com-
pensafie for Chis rise. As a matter of fact, it would be necessary to
- increase the tea and coffee output (60 percent of the foreign currency
~ earnings) by something like 30 percent; but, because of this year's
_ weather conditiona, the producers would be happy if they could merely
hold on to last year's low output level.
We can hardly count on that other source of foreign exchange repres~nred
by tourism which in turn has been very heavily hit by the oil price rj�3e
since that resulted in an increase in air travel costs and safari pric.e
tags.
Having nei~her coa1, nor petroleum, Kenya must impoxt 90 percent of its
energy, including electricity from Uganda. Economizing steps have been
taken 'but their influence remains marginal, especially since petroleum
price risea had only very partial repercussions on retail prices for
petroleum products.
More than ever before Kenya therefore needs the support of foreign coun-
tries, especially Western countries. Whether we have a good year or a
had year, the World Bank, the United States, Great Britain, Weat Germany,
and the Scandinavian countries supply Kenya with approximately $200 mil-
lion in aid; but last Ju1y Kenya was forced fio borrow $200 million at 14
percent from a consortium of European and Japanese banks and President
Daniel Arap Moi has just gone to Saudi Arabia to ask for that country's
cooperation.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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MADAGASCAR '
BRIEFS
INNOVATIONS INSTITUTE--The Madagascan Government will Pstablish a Madagascan
Innovation Institute by decree, a public institution placed under the direct
- authority of President Didier Ratsiraka. Within the framework of its plan
for "development on all fronts," Madagascar thus expects to provide itself
with "a structure adequate to tackle all problems tied to the econom~r in an
innovative and unconventional manner," The explanation of the mot9.vea for
- the ordinance specifies that "the RDM does not want to apply the technolog-
~ ical progress of the developed countries to the letCer. It expects t~ ~~3pr_
~ them to the needs of the national development." The objective of the Mada- �
gascan Innovation Institute is to incxease the technological sutonomy of
Madagascar and to reduce the outside orientation of its economy in conform-
ity with the socialist options of the country, by research and establishment
of original technology based on the national and human resaurces of the
country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
7 Sep 79 p 2462] 9291
TAMATAVE: HARBOR SILO CONSTRUCTION--Towards October 1981 the autonomous
port Tamatave will be equipped with a round harbor silo, wh~ch will have a
capacity of 15,000 t and consist of 10 compartments, each with a diameter
of 9 m and R height of 35 m. This silo, which will store imported graina
~rice, wheat) as well ae those for export, will be built of reinforced con-
crct~. It will be independent of the flour silo which the Soviets are go-
ing to install in Tamatave. Those specifications were spelled out again
by the secretary general of the faritany of Tamatave on the occasion of a
visit by French technicians of the agroindustry, charged with the conatruc-
tion of the silo which will be connected 3irectly to all three means of
transport: Rail, highway and sea. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2462) 9291
ENERGY: GAS CONSUNIPTION--According to Solima (Solitany Malagasy, the
government agency for products and byproducts of petroleum) national con-
sumption of gas represented some 7,000 t annually of which 3,600 t are used
in the faritany (province) of Antananarivo, 1,040 t in Toamasina (Tamatave),
580 t by Toliary (Fort Dauphin), 500 t by Mahajanga (Majunga), 400 t in
Antsiranana (Diego Suarez) and 250 t by Fianarantsoa. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2462] 9291
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RICE CULTIVATION--Within the framework of the plan for cultivation of rice
~ on 100,000 ha, Korean technicians have started an exploratory mission at
- the beginning of July in the faritany af Finarantaoa. They conducted an
evaluatfon of the possibilities for planting in the plain of Betanimena,
in the firais3na of Mahasoa, and have estitrtated the yield of a dam to be
built at Menakopy, in the firaisana of Bekily, which is aupposed to irrigate
2,500 ha. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
7 Sep 79 p 2462] 9291
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NIGER
BRIEFS
SOLAR PUMP USED FOR IRRIGATION--President Senyi Kountche made a visit at the
end of August to the hydr~-agricultural facility at Karma, some 40 km from
Niamey. This trip served chiefly to enable President Kountche to acquaint
himself with the experimental solar pump, the first of its kind in weat Africa.
This solar pump, built at a cost of approximately 90 ~illion CFA francs, has
been in operation since the end of July 1979. This experimental solar pump
_ was put in place thanks to cooperation between ONERSOL [Niger National Office
of Solar Energy] and SOFRETES [French Society for Thermal and Solar Energy _
Studies]. It has an output of 400 m3/h making possible the irrigation cf
40 to 60 hectares, or one-half the Karma facility. Execution of the solar
pump project was financed by the FNI and the FED [expansions unknownJ. The
408 solar batteries of the receiving panels were designed by ONERSOL. Sti11
_ in the experimental category, another pump will be installed at Toukounouss.
_ A 150 meter well has already been dug f or this purpose. The rest of the ma-
terial is in process of bei.ng transported to the site, or being finished.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79
p 2514] 2750
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. SENEGAL
PRESIDENT ON ALLAHOU AI~iBAR SEIZURE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Freach 28 Sep 79 p 2633
[Text] Questioned by AFP [French Press Agency] on the seizure of the
nswspaper ALJ~AHOU AI~iBAR (God is Great) at Dakar on 21 September, after
its announcement on the creation of the Islamic "Hizboulahi" Party
(Party of God) and the dispersion, several days earlier, of a meeting
held by an unrecogaized asaociation of Arabic language students, the
Sene~alese chief of state conf irmed these evenLS and added: "The pro-
blem is nofi as to whether or not this is an Islam~ic party or not. The
fact is that the constitution authorizes only four already existing par-
_ ties (Conaervative, Liberal, Socialist, Marxist) and not a fifth party.
The government wi11 proceed with inflexible rigor against any attempts to
violate the 1aw, regardlesa of what text may be quoted, because thie is
nothing but a gretext; first they talk about religion and than about eco- ~
nomic proAlems and tomorrow they will start talkiag about race, etc., but
we muat know that the 1aw is the law."
Mr Senghor also revealed that prosecution will be started against Mr
Che3.kh Anta Diop, secretary g~neral of the "National Democratic Ral1y"
who in var.ious ways pursued political activities which however were not
legally recognized.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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SENEGAL
CINEMATOGRAPHIST DISCUSSES POLICY ON WOLOF LANGUAGE, ISLAt~i
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Sep 79 pp 72-75
[Interview with Sembene Ousmane, Senegalese cinematographist: "Culture
Is The Leaven of Poiitics, but Integrism Is Fascism"--date and place of _
_ interview not given]
[Text] [Question] "Ceddo" is your eighth film. Do you feel that you
have now achieved translating African reality into a cinemt~tographic lan-
guage proper?
[Answer] No, not quite. I think that I shall have comp~.eted this quest
in my next film which shall be about African women. Since I always make
in turns a historical film and a contemporary film, the next one will take
place in 1980.
- To come back to the language of my films, I am trying to translate a cer-
tain African rhythm into images. I must admit that "Ceddo" may seem dull.
- Some find it too slow. I think it is mainly because African audiences, -
especially in cities, h~ve become too used to action f ilms. And certainly
I give credit to African filmmakers who do not choose the facile way of
commercial movie-making. They could earn a lot of money...
[Question] Why is it that this film, which was made in 1976, has still
not been shown in Senegal?
[Answer] That is a long story; At first, I was asked to use the introduc- ry
tory formula: "This film has no connection with contemporary events, etc."
I did zot refuse. But then a presidential decree has prevented the film
from being releas~d. This should be made clear: "Ceddo" has not been cen-
_ sured. The decree bears only on the spelling of the film's title. Accord-
ing to the government, "Ceddo" should be spelled with only one~d. If I
agreed to cross out one d, the film would be released.
[Question] Is it really a problem, whether "Ceddo" takes one d or two?
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_ [Answer] It is a far reaching problem! At stake are African culture and
the Wolof language. At present, the Senegalese Government is trying to
integrate us into the French-speaking community. Why did we gain indepen-
dence, if we are to be uprooted within our very own culture? Wolof is spoken
by 80 percent of the Senegalese people; therefore, it could become our
national language. We must fight for our cultural nationalism. We have
founded Wolof newspapers, we have worked for years to codify this language
in writing! Faced with the extent of this movement, President Senghor has
signed this decree codifying in a different way a language which is not
- his language and which he cannot speak!
[Question] President Senghor does not speak Wolof?
[Answer] He can speak it, but very poorly. Our language has been codified
by expatriates which know it only phonetically. We feel they are the wrong
people for the job; Wolof linguists, on the other hand, have a thorough
- knowledge of their language. This situation has created internal conflicts
and "Ceddo" came at the right or at the wrong time...
[Question] Would you feel compromised if you gave up?
[Answer] Why should I compromise when I know I am right? I think govern-
ments should have the courage to acknowledge their mistakes. I think we
should outgrow the stage where one says: "the government is always right."
I assure you that on this particular point, the government is mistaken.
I refuse to cross out that d as a matter of principle. And believe me, I
am losing money. And so does the state because, since I get no returns,
I have been unable to reimburse the funds it had advanced to me...
[Question] Does the public know about this dispute?
[Answer] The public knows and is divided in opinion. I think they would
like me to give up, but I feel that the public is not always right. In
additier., Dal:ar University has just publisned a dictionary in which the
doubling of vowels and consonants is reco~nized. So I feel that I should
not back out now.
[Question] What is the present status of the transcription of languages
in Senegal?
[Answer] We are marking time. Senegal has become the capitai of the
French-speaking community and most of our officials and executives are illi-
terate when it comes to their own language. Can you imagine all.university
professors going back to school to learn their mother tongue? The African
people are also the victims of an ill-placed pride. We spend more efforts
learning French, English, Russian or Chinese than learning one of our
neighbors' language: hausa, pular or toucouleur...
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Right nour, the teaching of our national language should go beyond the
_ experimental stage since the language has been codified. Rec~ntly,
Professor Thiam gave a lecture on modern mathematics, in Wolof, at the
University of Dakar. Geography, ~ciences, medicine (one of the hardest
disciplines), even theology can be taught in Wolof. The goverrnnent should
have the courage to go on to the next step.
In a first stage, French is a valid tool, especially to give access to the
_ technique of industrialized countries. However, as the years go by, na-
tional languages shall outweigh it.
[Questionj Do you mean to say that, at the government level, there is ~
some unwillingness to promote the national language in Senegal?
[Answer] Exactly. Apparently, but only apparently, they are willing to do
so. You know, in a liberal country like Senegal, we are not safe from dema-
goguery. We are told that there are literacy programs on television, but
we are not told how many people are watching them. We are told that there
are experimental classes where teaching i.s done in Wolof, but we.are not
told that these classes have been abandoned a long time ago. We are told
that many radio programs are broadcast in Wolof, but this i~~ the least we
can expect! Even merchants have understood that advertising in Wolof has
more impact than advertising in French.
[QuestionJ Do you really think that the problem of national languages
should really receive priority in Africa? �
[Answer] We must lead simultaneously our economical, political and cul-
tural struggle. I believe that culture is the leaven of politics. Cul-
ture makes it possible for people to know themselves and, therefore, to have
a better understanding of what we want. Apart from that, those who do
_ not speak French find themselves isolated from the centers of decision and
from certain aspects of our national life.
[Question] What is your opinion of the theme developed by L. S. Senghor: -
"a dialog of civilizations?"
[Answer] There is always a dialog between civilizations...But, as far as ~
I am concerned, Africa i5 the center of the world; E~rope is a borderland.
I have conducted a dialog with Greek, French, German people. They have
their culture, I have mine. Africa is the center of the world because it
is my continent. For the European, it is Europe. I stopped being de-
ceived by Europe years ago. Take the case of Great Britain. In 1914, it
was the "queen of the seas," but we forget that it was thanks to oil. To-
day it has lost its empire and its m~ritime supremacy. There are now on -
the market more products "made in India" than "made in England." Great
Britain has ruled over India for centuries. Apart from pudding, it did not
teach India anything, while all Europeans are now practicing yoga!
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In 1885, Furopean countries divided Africa among themselves and, now, it
is getting organized to better snap it up. Take the example of oil or
cocoa and you will realize that, in spite of its greatness, in spite of
ita technical advance, Europe has been freeloading on other peoples. Off
the coast of Senegal, there is a fiah which livea only on other fishes'
blood... It is a very succulent fishl
[Question] What about negritude?
[AnswerJ Negritude? What is that? I don't even want to talk about it.
My merits have nothing to da with the color of my skin. And the value of
African culture has nothing to do with fantasies or inhibitions caused by
the canons of Greek beauty. Our ancestors have created monuments and
masks oi which we are very proud. But I do not think that they were try-
ing to define themselves as negroes or anything else.
[Question] In Senegal, culture is given a large place, and a large budget. ~
- [AnswerJ Yes, 30 percent of the state's budget are devoted to culture.
But we should be given more details. For years, I have been asking
exactly how are these 30 percent spent. I would say that Senegal does not
have a cultural policy. More exactly, its cultural policy revolves around
one individual.
[Question] What do you think of the rise of Moslem integrism?
[Answer] In itself, Islam is a good thing. It is its use which is danger-
ous. The main thing is to know if Black Islam can be democratic. Will
it be able to listen to others and accept certain controversies?
[Question] The Senegalese Islam is tolerant...
[Answer] We must watch out. When an individual detains both spiritual
and temporal power, he is capable of everything. As for tolerance, I
would just remind you that one day Sheikh Ousmane Badji presumed to destroy
the sacred sites of the Diola. Why ransack what is an object of cult to
other people? This is an attack on individual liberties. I am afraid
that the development of this movement might bring us a fascist state. The
four Moslem brotherhoods--mouride, tidjane, khadria, layenne--are getting
organized again. Throug?: our neglect, or our weakness, we may find our- ~
selves faced with an accomplished fact. Each citize.n should examine the
actions of the spiritual power.
[Question] In the past, Islam has been a nationalist force. Could this
still be the same today, in the face of neocolonialism?
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[AnswerJ I do not agree. God is always on the right. At preaent, Moslems
are one of the mainstays of Senghor'e power. So much so that our repre-
~ sentatives have to be endorsed by the Sheykh Marabout before they are
invested.
- Even the opposition parties come to terms with religion. In order to
gain some amount of legitimity, they have to take cover under some reli-
tious leader's umbrella.
[Question] Do you believe the Arab expansionism south of the Sahara con-
stitutes a real threat?
[Answer] I believe, and I have nften said, that as long as Maghrebians and
Africans cannot sit around the same table and openly discuss their differ-
ences, problems will exist. It is true that some people use religion as
a means of conquering, or reconquering black Africa...
[Question] For instance, Qadhdhafi?
[Answer] He is the most obvious example, but he is not alone. He is
rich enough to undertake an economic conquest. But he knows that he
will have more followers if he starts a new Islamic crusade at the head of
his army. Arab countries are investing a lot more in building mosques
in Africa than in building schools or medical clincs. They are trying to
recolonize the minds. So that, in Senegal, people call themselves Moslems
out of self-defense. They loudly proclaim the fact that they are Moslems �
and go to the mosque every Friday. _
[Question] In your country, intellectuals define themselves with reference
to President Senghor or to Sheykh Anta Diop. You seem to be closer to
the second.
_ [Answer] I do not feel close to either one.
[Question] Do you mean that you do not agree with Sheykh Anta Diop2
[Answer] He is not in power, I have nothing to reproach him. I believe
he is an honest man, capable of leading the country. But I have chosen
culture once for all.
[Question] You do not recognize yourself in any of the Senegalese parties?
[Answer] I don't.
[Question] How do you explain that the Senegalese oppostion is still try-
ing to find itself?
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[Answer] I don't know. I think I am not in a position to discuss the
opposition since I do not belong to it. I do not think that I should tell
them what to do. If I were to speak about the Senegalese opposition, I
would first go and register as a member of this or that party.
[QuestionJ Nevertheless, you are in the opposition to Senghor, even if not
within the framework of a party...
[AnswerJ If Senghor were only a professor, we might be friend, as I am
friends with Sheykh Anta Diop or Abdoulaye Wade. But Senghor represents
a government which, in my opinion, has done nothing for us. I am not a-
gainst him as an individual. I question his authority as a leader be- -
cause, in my opinion, his politics are bad for tne country and profitable
for those who use him.
[Question] Who is using him?
[9nswer] I shall not answer this question because I do not want to cast
aspersions on anyone. .
[QuestionJ Is Senegalese multipartisanism a positive achievement?
[Answer] Yes, I do think that it is a good thing. But I would like to
make reservations, be~cause I think that the right of association should be
enlarged and Sheykh ~inta Diop's party recognized.
[Questionj What do you think of African Marxism?
[Answer] In practice, it will never be the same as in China, in the Soviet
Union or in Vietnam. Often, Marxism is thought of only in terms of the
economy. But man needs more than just his bowl of rice, his fish tails
or his drop of oil.
In Mozambique and in Angola, attempts are made to found a new kind of
Marxism. It is extremely interesting!
[Question] Do you recognize yourself in certain theoreticians of the Third
Wor?d revolution?
[Answer] Right now, we have thinkers: Sheykh Anta Diop, Pathe Diagne,
Amady Ali Dieng. I thlnk that, more and more frequently, young people
stop looking at African thinkers in terms of European or Parisian standards.
Cabral has written things which make sense. I find Nyerere fascinating.
He is the only one to move within so many contradictions and still.maintain
himself by his charismatic power which everybody respects. With his social-
ist option, he is doing something new.
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[QuestionJ How ahout Sekou Toure?
[AnswerJ I found him interesting at firet; not anymore. You have to go
to Guinea to underetand. You know, there is such a thing as a false
pregnancy...
. [Question] As a long-time expatriate, what do you think of the new French
immigration policy?
[Answer] Mainly, I think that African heads of state do not protect their
nationals. Expatriates have done a lot for their countries. They have
invested, built hospitals, medical clinics which they are supplying with
medicines, instead of the state doing so. Their contribution is often
more beneficial to the African countries than to themselves or their
families.
[Question] How are you doing in the field of litErature?
[Answer] I have just finished a book on the history of the Senegalese
_ bourgeoisie between 19~4 and 1980, this bureaucratic, compradore bourgeoisie
who has made money mainly in real estate, but has not done anything in the
industrial field. It plays the role of a gendarme for the West which lets
them have the buildings, the fronts, the taxis, control over the workers...
Thus, the Senegalese bourgeoisie guarantees the stability of the country.
[Question] Would you agree to other filmmakers adapting your novels?
[Answer] I have had several proposals. But ofren, these are from young
filmmakers and I tell them to first finish their studies. On the other
hand, Paulin Soumayou Vyera made me an offer and I have accepted it.
[Question] The creation of inter-African film production and distribution
consortiums, which had been proposed at the Ouagadougou Festival, was
supposed to have been approved by the heads of states at the OCAM summit
in June. However, the subject has hardly been mentioned.
~ [Answer] On paper, Africa is wonderful! The idea is good, but how can
it be implemented in an interstate framework when the states have no
cultural policy? My opinion is that heads of states are still afraid
of the cinema and of filmmakers...
[Question] To the point of blocking the implementation of such consortiums?
[Answer] That is possible. They do realize that the African people love
the movies. At the Ouagadougou Festival, you could see people rushing in-
to the theaters. The image has more impact than speech. Government
officials are aware, and afraid of this. They feel that movies like
"Django" and "Bruce Lee" are less dangerous than American movies.
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[Question] You. consider them as accomplices of the alienation of the -
African audiences?
[Answer] Not accomplices, they are responsible for it.
[Question] Can you speak of an African cinema, as you would speak of an
American or an Italian cinema?
[Answer] Not yet, but the day will come. We have not yet found our own
style of filmmaking. In the early 1960's, European critics began to speak
of the "African cinema," because the action took place in African land-
scapes. At that time, in most films, the camera was fixed. The characters
- moved into and out of the field. Nowadays, we have achieved a greater
mastery of technique and the result has been original research in form,
lighting. There exists a purely Senegalese approach which may some day
influence filmmakers in other black African countries. I could not say
whether this is desirable or not. But I think that a different style for
each country or each region is likely to emerge. This is a vast continent.
[Question] Are you embarrassed when you hear, or read that you are the
greatest filmmakers in black Africa? F
- [Answer) It does not bother me. However, I have made it a rule never to _
read anything that has been written about me. Because, if it is flattering
it makes me feel important, and if someone is panning me, I consider him
as an enemy. And often, in both situation, these people are sincere.
[Question] Do you mean that film critic is of interest only for the spec-
tator, not for the author?
[Answer] I did not say that! A man who creates must accept criticism.
If someone flatters me, I am delighted. I choose to leave to my wife the
task of reading, cutting and filing. This is how I am!
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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SENEGAL _
DAKAR FISHING WHARF TO BE COMPLETED IN DECII~BER 1980
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79 p 2508
[TextJ Mr Chaufournier, vice president for Africa of the World Bank, at the
end of his stay in Senegal from 31 August to 3 September, 1979, (see MTM,
7 Sep p 2446) visited the construction site of Whart 10 of the 4utonomous
port of Dakar, accompanied by the port director. This wharf, 90 percent
completed, was financed with the assistance of the World Bank.
The autonomous port of Dakar will in fact have by December 1980 a tenth wharf
which will make possible clearing up the bottleneck in the co~ercial port by ~
accommodating all the fishing boats. Its financing amounts to 4.7 billion
CFA francs, the World Bank participation being one-quarter. It will be com-
pleted in December 1980 and will include an embanl~ent of 10.5 hectares and ~
1500 meters of wharves with financing by BADEA [Arab Bank for Economic De-
velopment], the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique [Central Treasury
of Fconomic Cooperation] the autonomous port of Dakar and the Senegalese
Government.
Wharf 10 is made up of S sections: three main sections and two annexes, the
latter two being involved with the construction of sand barriers and sea-walls,
the opening of a canal on the one hand and on the other, the highway communi-
- cation between the north and south wharves, and the servicing of the terrace
[terre-plein] completed in October 1978.
For the three main sections, construction of the wharf is 81 percent finished,
the 800,000 cubic meter embankment (12 percent) and main highway and various
road-systems (4 percent).
The purposes of the wharf 10 project are aimed at giving the port of Dakar
modern infrastructures that will permit the full development of the fishing
industry, taking advantage of the geographic location of t~e country as well
as the abundance in fishery resources of the adjacent waters.
It will enable the assembling of all fishing vessels in a single sector and
the maximum realization of catches unloaded and exported, as well as the
effective control of the movements of fishing vessels.
COPYRIGHT: Re:~e Moreux et Cie , Paris, 1979
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SENEGAL
HARVESTING CAMPAIGNS' SUCCESS VARIES WITH REGIONS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79 pp 2508-2.~09
[Text] The Senegalese minister of rural development left on 7 September for
a 30-day tour spread out until the beginning of December to visit regions
where he must take note on the spot of the progress of the harvest campaign
throughout the territory.
The harvesting campaign presents different situations according to the dif-
ferent regions. Added to the drought that occurred in many areas in the
Diourbel and Sine-Saloum regions there is the effect of parasites and defec-
tive fungicides sold on the para11e1 market. Only in the peanut basin, the
Thies region, are there satisfactory crops.
As for millet, except for the drought pockets and the areas that felt the
effect of coleoptera, the crop does fairly well in the three regions.
In the Department of Louga rainfall was especially deficient in comparison
~ with the previous season, and even more so in relation to a normal year.
Only one precipitation was recorded on 18 July within the entire depart-
- ment. It will be followed by a period of drought of approximately 1 month.
This has dangerously compromised the germination and growth of seedlings.
The Department of Lauga is very likely to harvest not a single grain of
millet.
In another connection, the chief of the livestock department has emphasized
that pastures are nonexistent or sparse. This situation is grave and con- _
stitutes a serious threat to the livestock. However, the rain fallen in the
past few days can change the situation. .
There is all the same one note of satisfaction for this department. The niebe -
and beref crops are doing well together. Moreover it appears that these two
varieties adapt themselves perfectly to the climatic conditions of'this de-
partment. For this reason it would be opportune to accentuate the effort of
extending the farming area reserved for them each year.
For the Department of Kaolack, Gandiaye remains the principal source of con-
cern: the situation there is unfavorable for peanuts as well as for millet.
It is the edible peanut crop, however, that preponderantly shows poor results.
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There were numerous pockets of drought, and catastrophic conditions prevail
in many areas. Forecasts already announce a drop in production, especially
_ for edible peanuts, whose situation has been characterized as "catastrophic"
on the level of D,jilor, and the same for millet.
' Wheras the normal average is 100,C~00 vines per hectare, in the case of the
peanut crop in many areas of Sine-Saloum for example, the average is between
40,000 and 50,000 vines per hectare.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie , Paris, 1979
2750
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- SENEGAL
- BRIEFS ,
SENGHOR GETS ULTIMATUM--Sheikh Ahmed Khalifa Niasse,.religious leader of
_ the 80 percent of Senegal's population that is Moslem, has given President
Senghor, a Roman Catholic, 3 months to renounce his French citizenship and
fire Minister of the Interior Jezn Collin, a Frenchman. [Text] [Paris
VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 15 Oct 79 p 43) ~
BO.AD LOAN--The West African Development Bank [BOAD] on 4 September granted
a loan of 160 million CFA francs as partial financing for investments in the
industrial doma.in of Kaolack. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
RANrENS in French 14 Sep 79 p 2509] 2750 ,
REFORESTATION GOALS REVISED--By reason of the inadequacy of human and finan-
cial means available the areas due for reforestation in Senegal are currently
fixed at 3000 hectares, whereas the initial plans were for 7500 hectares per
year. In fact, of the 12 billion CFA francs set aside for local projects
and national forest projects, it is necessary to deduct the expenses of ad-
ministration overhead, eqtiipment and training of personnel. Moreover, 30Q
individuals are charged with the supervision of 10.5 million hectares. One
engineer controls the reforestation of 187,000 hectares, while the normal
permitted assignment load is only 50,000 hectares. [Text] [Paris MARCHES _
_ TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79 p 2509] 2750
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TANZANIA
BRIEFS
FRANCE ATDING AIRPORT EXPANSION--Under the terms o~ a f3.nanc3al agreement
signed on 22 September in Aar es Salaam, involving a total of F125 million,
including a portion of gifts taken from public funds and another one in
commercial credits guaranteed by COFACE (Freneh Foreign Trade Insurance
- f Co~pany), France pledged to facilitate the improvement and extension of
the airport in the Tanzanian capital. This is the firs~t time that an -
agreement of this kind was signed between France and Tanzania. It ex-
presses the desire of both countries to promote economic cnoperation be-
tween each other. [Text] [Paris.MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in ;
French 28 Sep 79 p 2653] 5058 `
BULGARIAN AID AGREEMENT--At the end of h3s visit to Sofia by President
Nyerere (see this publication, 15 September 1979, p 2585), Bulgaria and
Tanzania signed a j oint agreement laying the foundations for long-term
- coopexation in the economic, scientific, technical, and cultural fields. ~
Under the terms of this document, Bulgaria wi11 grant loans to Tan~ania,
~or the construction of factories. The two chairmen of the mixed
Bulgarian-Taazanian commission on econam3c, scientific, aad technical
cooperation--the Tanzanian industxy minister Cleopa Msuya and Mr P. Kub-
adinsky for Bulgaria--signed this joint statement. [Te~t] [Paris C~fARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 3n French 28 Sep 79 p 2653.] 5058
CANADIAN AG~2ICULTURAL AID--The ACDI (Canadian International Development
Agency) decided to grant Tanzania $150,000 for the execution of a pilot
rice cultivation project on Zanzibar Island, at Che3u. We recall that
Zanzibar has for several years been trying to increase,its rice output,
- both in terms of cultivated area and better yield. To attain this ob~ec-
_ tive, the island's government received aid from the FA0 which thinks that
initial results are ~ncouraging although $3 million would be needed to
attain ~he pro~ect's target which is two annual harvests of selected rice. .
A Tanzanian source indicated that Canadian aid could be released in 1980
- in the 1igh~ of the results obta:ned presently at Cheju. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRL~NEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2653] 5058 .
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- r~1 \I\�l,
SPECULATION ON RAMIFICATIONS OI~' PLOT AGAINST EYADEMA
Paris JEUivL AFRIQUE in French 12 Sep 79 pp 34-35 No 975
[Arti.cle by Abdelaziz Dah~~dani: "A New Apeal from Palime"]
[Exce.rpts] Presi.dent Gnassingbe Eyadema arrived at Palime on 30 9ugust by
special train as he did in 1969. To celebratE there the lOth anniversary of
the appeal he had made and which was to create the R..pT [Rally of the Togolese -
People], the only party, a few months later.
Nestling on the palteaus in an extraordinary setting of greenery dominated by ~
Mount Agou, Palime, that cacao fiefdom very near Ghana, recently gave a rr-
sounding welcome to Eyadema. But the fete, full of color, banners, dances,
parades, music, nonetheless gave an impression of congealment. A kind of
indefinable malaise hovered over that liveliness: Economic recovery is slow
in coming and the political trial which took place in Lome on 23 and 24 August
� (See No 974 of JEUNE AFRIQUE) was still troubling people's minds. The result
- of a huge plot with broad ramifications, this trial led the state's security
courr to impose the death penalty on 10 individuals--eight of the accused, it
is true, being convicted in absentia...
_ Fveryone held his bre~th when the time came for the chief of state's address.
In grave, measured tones, President Eyadema spoke of the RPT's 10 years, of
its act~ievements, of the long way the country has come. Those who are
"nosralgic" and those who are "jealous" have nevertheless not given up as
evidenced by the most recent plot ending on 15 October 1977 in an attempt
to assassinate the chief of state.
"Elowever," Eyadema remarked, "in this affair of the mercenaries and their local
agents, we had to remain calm leaving to justice the task of doing its work
in complete independence. We have no feeling of hatred nor of revenge. We
do not wish to assume a responsibility that is not~ours. Indeed, if man pro-
poses, it is God who disposes. We have decided to pardon Chem." In their
wisdom these moderate words filled the Palime stadium with spontaneous -
enthusiasm. They were not recefived in the same way on the official tribune
where members of the political bureau, of the government, of the central
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committee, officers and other dignitaries were crowded together. For tt~em
it was a surprise, Apparently, they had no part in that decisi,on deliberately
thought out by the chief of state while on a retreat of several days in his
native villag, of Pyra 430 kilometers to the north of Lome... -
But this time tY;e plot seemed far more serious than the preceding ones and
ttie trial did not reveal everything. One has a very definite feeling that
outside of Sylvar.us Olympio's (the presidAnt assassinated in 1963) sons, some
of the plot's instigators are still running. And have perhaps even infiltrated
themselves into the system, still holding top level positions. The malaise
which all of that causes was accentuated even more by the discovery of a new
arms cache, revealed on 26 August by Emmanuel De Souza one of the two prisoners
condemned to death (along with Major Sanvee Kouao). Feeling death near at hand,
De Souza added a new bit of scandal. The cache contained automatic rifles,
gas bombs, and even small pistols containing poison capable of putting their
target to'sleep.
_ This new discovery set speculation going once again. Why did some people in
respansible positions, military men in particular, want to have those con-
demned to death to be finished off so speedily when someone like De Souza
turned out to be a real mine of information? In any event, it is certain that
the vast majority of the military reacted out of loyalty, unwilling to accept
the "treason" of a few of their own people, such as Lt Col Lawson Merlaud,
now in hiding, and Major Sanvee Kouao. The latter pleaded not guilty although
when contacted to join in it through "human ~aeakness" he did not denounce the
plot.
ln Palime 30 August, General ~yadema did not only announce that those con-
- demned to death were to be pardoned, but also his intention of �1definitively
institutionalizing the party" so as to "get the regime out of the unusual
situation" in which it has found itself for over 10 years. For that reason,
he s~iid, "I have decided to convoke an extraordinary congress this very year
in order to make an objective analysis of the situation, to define responsi-
h111I:1C?S~ weaknesses and hiatuses, ro decide upon orientation of the next
StatC'. . .~t
So Lyadema has thus decided to move up the RPT congress by 2 years. That
siirely heralds major changes in positions and responsibilities as well as
in ttie manner of running the country. Above al}., the regime has to struggle
_ ag~inst the government's erosion in an area of upheaval, specifically with
the turning over of power to civilians in neighboring Nigeria and Ghana
in t}ie near future.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique Grupjia 1979
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UGANDA
BINAISA HAVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, MILITARY DIFFICULTIES
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE iri French 12 Sep 79 p 20
[Text] Four months after his downfall, Idi An:in ?-ias declared that he "wishes
to return" to Uganda. Moreover, rumors of war with Kenya are heard in Kampala.
The government of Godfrey Binaisa is facing increasing difficulties. Severe
political tensions, started by the expulsion on 20 June of Yusufu Lule,
interim pr�esident, have undermined the trust of the international community.
At the end of July a meeting among assessors concerned with industrial pro-
~ects--meant to reestablish the economy at its 1971 level (before Amin's
- arrival)--ended with contracts barely reaching $135 million, less than 10
percent of the estimated requirements.
But Uganda has even more pressing needs. In the next 6 months, it will have
to borrow $600 million in order to import oil, parts,and raw materials to
revive current production. Bank loans will yield $300 million, but $300
mill.ion remain to be found and the IMF has expressed reservations. Without
urgent and massive assistance in the form of credit unconnected to imports,
it seems unlikely that Binaisa's government will be able to keep political
conflicts within limits compatible with democracy.
The tenacious fighting between factions created by Lule's eviction, accusa-
tions calling him an "enemy of the people," and the arrest of some of his
supporters have put a stop to the euphoria and spirit of national reconcilia-
tion of last April. Anger against the 20,000 Tanzanian soldiers still in
Uganda is increasing, but it seems that Binaisa could not stay in power
without their support. It appears that it was for the sake of ~ustifying
their presence and an increase in their numbers that Binaisa denounced on
9 August the threat of an invasion by 30,000 troops from Sudan supporting
Idi Amin Dada. The government has also announced ~the arrest of a group
training for guerrilla warfare. This group formed of Bagandese (the ethnic
majority to which Lule belongs), is said to belong to the Democratic Union
of Uganda, an underground formation whose foreign headquarters are in .
Nairobi. Consequently, relations with Sudan and Kenya have deteriorated.
This climate of insecurity has been encouraged by a crime wave, attributed
not only to prisoners liberated after the war, but also to Ugandan ~aa~d
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Tanzanian soldiers who receive no pay. The integrity of civil servants is
- alsc~ questioned while medicines and food products supplied by international
organizations are traded on the black market.
In ilganda's army, factions are becoming more and more clearly related to
ethnic allegiance. ~ao main currents appear. One is led by Oyote O~ok
and is a regrouping of Langi, a Northern ethnic group that supported
Milton Obote against the Baganda regime. The other is led by Yoweri Museveni,
current chief of the army, and is followed by southern ethnic elements.
It does not seem that distinctions between socialist and conservatives are
_ significant enough to explain the divergence between Binaisa's and Lule's
supporters. Neither group has proposed a program of social transformations
and a recent delegation from the World Bank reported that Binaisa intended
to follow Lule's policy of economic liberalism. The divergence rests on
regional representation and policies in the government, as was desired by
Lule. The opposition--both inside the country an.d in Kenya--accuses Binaisa
of imposing UPC members (Uganda's People Congress, the sole party of Milton
Obote), many..czf~whom;rdtere;~in .exile. during Idi Amin's "~eign."
Beyond people ar~d clans, there seems to be a general political orientation.
Lule and his followers accuse Binaisa of wanting to lead Uganda toward a
close political and commercial union with Tanzania. This fear seems to be
shared by Nairobi's authorities.
It is not certain that applying this policy through Tanzania's military forces
would help the cause of unity in East Africa. It could lead instead to an
aggravation of hostility among countries in that region. It could also lead
Uganda and Tanzania to disastrous economic situations, which could be
favorable to audacious initiatives from political adventurers.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
8924
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UGANDA
POLITICAL MOV~MENTS PROTEST 'DICTATORSHIP'
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2399
[Text] Ztao political groups outlawed by former President Idi Amin Dada, the
Uganda People Congress (UPC), led by former president Obote, and the Uganda
Liberation Group (ULG) sent a telegram of protest on 21 August to Binaisa,
accusing the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), which is now in power,
of imposing a dictatorship on the country. This telegram was sent one week
after Binaisa forbade activity within Uganda by opposition parties.
Both groups are also protesting the manner in which members of the Consultative
Council, whose number was increased from 30 to 110, were nominated. The groups
stated that members of the council should have been elected (and not selected)
by the other 30 councilmen, who (according to them) were not chosen by anybody.
Four representatives from these two groups, exiled in Lusaka, went to Uganda
on 24 August to meet with Binaisa and to express their concerns in person.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
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UGANDA
APPEAL ISSUED TO FOREIGN INVESTORS =
.
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 pp 2398-2399
[Text] "Uganda cannot solve xts development problems without important
participation from foreign investors," declared Uganda's President Godfrey
Binaisa on 22 August to a group of students at Makerere University.
The president added that he would soon make a speech on general social and
economic policies to be followed by his government, explaining that these
policies would be based on a combination of private and governmental capital.
In response to those who have asked for general elections or for a referendum,
Binaisa stated that "it would be useless, since we do not know who would vote,"
referring to the lack of electoral lists and districts.
Finally, Binaisa indicted that Uganda was going to look again into its
relationship with the Central African Empire. He said, "I can tell you
that I.don't get along too well with Bokassa." Binaisa has also recalled
Uganda's ambassador to Bangui.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
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UGANDA
BRIEFS
AID GOODS IN BLACK MARKET--On 21 August Ugandan authorities arrested about
one hundred people while they were selling goods on the black market supplied
by the EEC, the Catholic organization Caritas, and the International Red
Cross. These people are believed to have been supplied by dishonest
government employees who took advantage of their positions and embezzled
such goods as sugar, powdered milk and blankets. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2399] 8924
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ZAIRE
CONSEQUENCES OF DEVALUATION OUTLINED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 pp 2457, 2458
[Text] The new devaluation of the zaire, decided 17 August (.see MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 31.August, p 2396), was officially announced
by the Executive Council on 29 August.
This devaluation, amounting to 25 percent (1 zaire for 0.375 SDR [Special
Drawing Rights] as compared to 1 zaire for 0.50 SDR previously), is variously
appraised according to basis of calculation, thus giving rise to some con-
fusion. Actually, it results in a 33 percent revaluation of certain foreign
currencies with respect to the zaire.
It is expected in Kinshasa that this devaluation--the fifth since 1 November
1978 when tihe parity of the zaire was reduced from 1 SDR to 0.90 SDR--will
result in a shot in the arm for exports, which are the keystone of the IMF
[International Monetary Fund] stabilization p1an. `
On the other hand, this devaluation is expected to result in further detriment
to the more disadvantaged social strata, whose purchasing power will pro-
bably experience a substantial drop momentarily.
This operation, instigated by the IMF within the framework of its economic
recovery program, has for its immediate objectives a putting in order of the
country's economy and finances, and improving the revenues of the government
and the finances of enterprises involved in export. Its aim is to protect
the country's balance of payments by reducing the gap between the national
currency's official exchange rate and its actual market rate.
The IMF recovery program also provides for special allocations, to be granted
- periodically by the Bank of Zaire from its own funds or by drawing on the IMF,
_ for enterprises to replenish their supply stocks. The country`s authorities
must also establish controls on prices and on distribution channels.
In addition, in view of the size of Zaire's foreign debt ($3.7 billion),
negotiation~ have been undertaken with its principal creditors (France,
United States, Saudi Arabia, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Japan)
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within the "Paris Club" framework to arrange a settlement of this debt and
- to obtain $300 million of "emergency aid," on which conceptual agreement had
been reached in November in Brussels.
The AFP [French News Agency] points out that, while awaiting the positive
effects of all these measures to be felt by the Zairian economy, the majority
of the population, and especially the more disadvantaged social strata, must
face a sharp drop in their purchasing power--the more so since many merchants
, have already begun anticipatively to raise prices, thus contributing to an
inflation that is already sizeable. The large majority of the population,
~vith their meager wages barely enabling them to survive, particularly in
Kinshasa and the eastern part of the country, will undoubtedly find it dif-
ficult to accept their new living conditions, as they view the displays of ~
luxury goods and Mercedes Benz's for the wealthy.
New Zairian Exchange Rates
The Bank of Zaire has communicated to the officially recognized Zairian banks
the new exchange rates to b.~ used from 27 August 1979 for calculating the
equivalent values, in zaires, of amounts involved in ~xport licenses. They
are: _
FOREIGN CURRENCY ZAIRES
100 DM ii2.2523
100 Italian Iire 0.2512
l0U Swiss francs 124.0210
100 Danish kroner 38.9453
100 Norwegian kroner 40.7752
100 Swedish kroner 48.5953
100 schillings 15.3533
.100 French francs 48.1675
1,000 CFA francs 9.6335
100 pounds sterling 456.6030
100 guilders 102.2887
100 Portuguese escudos 4.1731
100 U.S. dollars 205.2423 -
100 Canadian dollars 175.8718
100 Belgian francs 7.0019
100 Burundi francs 2.2805
100 Rwanda francs 2.2107
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie , Paris, 1979
9238 44
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ZAI[tE
PROGRESS OF ZAIRIAN NATIONAL RAILROAD COMPANY OUTLINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French S Sep 79 p 60
[Text] Formed on 2 December 1974 by merger of the four railroads then exist-
ent in Zaire, the SNCZ [Zairian National Railroad Company] is today a unique
case in free Africa.
The company serves 90 percent of the national territory--a territory four
times the area of France, for example, half of it equatorial forest.
This successful challenge of nature has enabled it to post an impressive
balance sheet, with revenues totaling 2,724.5 million units of account in
1975, 291.8 million of which from passenger traffic and 2,432.7 million from
freight operations.
Its vast network also enables it to respond to the ob~ectives assigned to it
under the country`s development effort, which are:
--to promote interchange and economic growth within the interior of the coun-
try;
--facilitate the circulation of agricultural and mining production within
- the interior and toward the exterior of the country;
--facilitate the access of imported goods (capital equipment and consumer
products) to the interior of the country.
An impelling force in the Zairian economy, the SNCZ also fulfills a prime
social function.
Of Major Significance .
The SNCZ has 21,486 regular employees: 20,158 in operating and administra-
tive positions, and 1,157 nationals in upper management positions together
with 171 foreign nationals.
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It puts a substantial effort into the training of this personnel ttcrough:
--the technical training center in Likasi (mechanics and electricity); and
--the administrative training center in Lubumbashi (routes, passenger and
freight handling, railway police, personnel administration).
The management cadres regularly attend the meetings and conferences organized
by the UAC [United Africa Company] and by the international organizations.
In addition to this professionsl training activity, the SNCZ has created and
developed a substantial social promotion service the ramifications of which
extend throughout its network--in the form of social, cultural and sport
centers, employee commissaries, and schools for the children of employees--
and the impact of which is felt on life throughout the country.
Concrete Results
Thus, operating within the SNCZ there are 15 social centers staffed by 112
instructresses.
Their activities are centered on four principal objectives:
--education of young girls,
--domestic courses for adults,
--kindergartens and nursery schools, and
--counseling on nourishment and welfare of mothers and children.
In the cultural and sports domains, private recreations clubs have been
created in most of the urban centers. They are subsidized by the company
and run entirely by committees elected by the workers. These clubs cover
a wide range of cultural and sports activities (brass bands, orchestras,
the3trical troupes, football teams, etc.)
Through commissaries, the SNCZ endeavors to make essential consumer items
available to all its employees at the lowest possible prices; it does this
in urban centers, where possible, by establishing commissary department
stores, and at isolated posts by means of post exchange trains.
Regarding these isolated posts, it should also be pointed out that to avoid
handicapping the children of the employees stationed there, the SNCZ main-
tains an actual network of rural schools installed in 20 localities, staffed
by 56 teachers and attended by more than 3,000 pupils.
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SNC'L Social Infrastructure
--1 clinic (a second one is under construction in Lubumbashi)
--10 hospitals
--44 dispensaries, of which 3 are equipped for hospitalization
--15 social centers
--18 employee urban centers, containing:
29 workers' camps
23 cultural and recreation clubs
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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ZAIRE
r1ARKET PRICES OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, JUNE 1979
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2397
[Text]
DELIVERY REFERENCE PRICE
ITEM POINT UNIT JUNE 1979
Sand Job site 1 m3 30.025
- Quarry stone Job site 1 m3 32.106
Portland cement - normal Kinshasa East 1 ton 105.08Q
rail station
Reinforcing rod, 22 mm Job s~te 1 ton 1,498.875
- Bricks Ex-factory on 1,000 268.750
- flatbeds bricks
Corrugated galvanized iron Ex-factory 1 m2 8.426
0.47 mm 26 BG
Flat she~t iron lm x lm x 5mm Ex-factory 1 m2 10.750
Hardwood beams 7/15 Job site 1 m3 368.775
Diesel fuel (1,212 Li) Ex-storage 1 tank 290.880
Cutback R.C. 2 Ex-storage 1 tank 1,019.600
Gasoline in drums (super) 200 liters 345.000
Crushed rock 8/15 "Special" Job site 1 ton 37.018
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie , Paris, 1979
9238
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ZAIRE
ZAIRIAN-ITALIAN REFINING COMPANY TO ACQUIRE DESALINATOR '
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2458
[Text] The Zairian Executive Council has just unblocked $1 million to enable -
the SOZIR [Zairian-Italian Refining Company] to equip itself with a petrol-
eum desalinator. 'L'his equipment will enable Zaire to refine its own oil
production, which it has until now had to export "as is." -
Zaire, which has been exploiting offshore deposits in its territorial waters
on the Atlantic coast since 1975, produces some 9 million barrels of crude a
year, placing it ninth among the African oil producing countries.
The Zairian economy has nevertheless been dependent until now on the OPEC
countries for its oil supplies. The SOZIR, the sole refinery in the country
built with the participation of Italian capital, can actually only handle
l~.ght crudes imported from the Middle East. Zairian crude, which is extracted
_ by the American Gulf Oil Company, has a very high sulfur content and for this
reason represents a hazard for existing installata.ons. Being unsuitable for
use on the local market, it has until now been exported abroad.
The acquisition of a desalinator by the SOZIR has twofold interest for the
Zairian economy. First, it makes possible a resurgence of the company's
,~ctivities after having bee.. temporarily crippled by the drop in national
- imports of crude (891,5~1 tons in 1978 versus 1,062,207 tons in 1976). The
- refinery currently operates at less than 50 percent of its capacit,y, which
is normally 750,000 tons. And lastly, the putting into operation of this
desalinator will result in foreign exchange savings through a reduction in
purcha5es of foreign oil.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie , Paris, 1979
9238
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' ZAIRE
BRIEFS
FINANCIAL AUDITS--Approximately 16.5 million zaires (46.2 million francs)
have been recovered by the state in the course of financial audits conducted
between 28 July and 3 August, according to official sources in Kinshasa.
These financial audits are being conducted within the framework of the vast
moralization campaign being carried out over the past few months by the
Zairian authorities against fraud and corruption. They have enabled a close
examination of the accoun.ts of over 200 companies and commercial enterprises,
many of which are not in order with fiscal requirements and with current
comrnercial and customs legislation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDT.TFRRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2397~ 9238
ANTICORRtJPTION EFFORTS--The manager of an Italian enterprise of the Hasson
et Fr~res group, Mr Hasson Giacomo, was sentenced on 14 August by the Kin-
shasa county court to 1 year of criminal imprisonment for corruption of gov- -
- ernment officials and irregularities in his commercial activities, according
to a report by the ZAIRIAN PRESS AGENCY [AZAPJ. ~ao of his employees, Mr
Robert Ar.iel (Belgian) and Mr Franco Isaac (Italian), both commercial en-
gineers, were sentenced to 6 months of the same imprisonment. They will
moreover be expelled f.rom zaire at the completion of their sentences. The
Hasson et Freres company itself was fined 164,000 zaires (443,000 francs).
These sentences were handed down within the framework of the vast moralization
- campaign being conducted throughout the country under the initiative of
President Mobutu in a fight against fraud and corruption. Systematic audits
of numerous companies, Zairian as well as foreign, have been carried out daily
over the past 3 weeks by 18 teams of 7 members each. More than 200 estab-
lishments and enterprises have now been audited since 27 July, more than 200
cases of irregularities have been uncovered and penalized (lack of invoices,
lack of import licenses, tax fraud, lack of registration with the Commercial
and Trade Register, lack of registration of employees, etc.), and several ,
commercial firms have been put under seal. jText] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
~ ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2397] 9238
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GUVFRNMENT PARTICIPATES IN 131 COMPANIES--The Zairian Government participates
- directly in 131 companies distributed over 10 principal sectors of the
� national economy, as well as in 14 public enterprises, according to the
Zairian minister of the economy in Kinshasa. Most of its investments are
in the mining sector. The state has invested 259 million zaires (1 zaire=
2.80 French francs) in the General Quarries and Mines Company [GECAMINES],
which exploits the copper deposits in Shaba, and holds 24 million zaires of
shares (out of a capitalization of 30 million zaires) in the Bakwanga Mining
Company [MIBA], which operates the diamond mines in Kasai. State participa-
tion in the financial. sector is, on the other hand, minor. The Zairian
Government recently also purchased additional shares in foreign oil com-
panies (Shell, Fina and Mobil) and in foreign agroindustrial companies
(Lever Plantations). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 31 Aug 79 p 2397] 9238
FRENCH TROOPS IN ~HABA--President Mobutu Sese Seko, who was in Paris from 24
to ?.7 August, will personally direct the French-Zairian military maneuvers
in Shaba from 15 to 18 September. These maneuvers, which are intended to
- provide a"direct assessment of the degree of technical training and combat ~
reaciiness of the Zairian soldiers," will be carried out, for the Zairian
Armed Forces [FAZ), by two battalions of parachute troops trained by French
instructors (311th and 312th), and for the French, by two companies of the
llth Airborne Division. ~tao drops are planned during this maneuver--one
French airborne company and one Zairian company--using three FAZ C-130
transports and three French Transalls. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2457] 9238
FOREIGN COMPANY CESSIONS--Mr Umba Di Lutete, minister of information and
spokesman for the Zairian Executive Council, announced on 17 August tha~t
the Zairian Government is granting foreign companies a period of 4 monttis
~ in which to cede 40 percent of their shares of ownership to Zairian enter-
prises of their own choice, in accordance with the law of 17 November 1977
on the general measures applicable to the retrocess;on of "Zairianized"
assets. After 31 De~�mber 1979, the government will automatically impose
Zairian partners on companies that have failed to comply. As regards gov-
ernment employment, the Cour.cil of Ministers, according to the spokesman,
has decided to create immediately a"civil service code" designed to "guar-
antee job stability and security" for government employees. On the other -
hand, the council has given government employees 4 months in which to "choose
between their careers and business." Many government employees, it is pointed
out, are also owners of shops or lausiness enterprises, which is strictly for-
bidden by law. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROP.ICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
- in French 7 Sep 79 p 2458] 9238
FRENCH COOPERATION FOR TIN--The Zaire Government and the French Mining
Company [COFRAMINES] are planning to exploit jointly a tin deposit in Shaba
beginning in 1981, according to information released on 31 August by Mr
Bouvet, president and general manager of COFRAMINES. Exploitation of this
deposit, which is expected to produce 100 tons of inetallic tin a year, will
require an initial investment of 40-50 million French francs. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERt~t1NEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2458] 9238
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ZAMBIA
ECONOMIC RECOVERY CONDITIONS EXAMINID
Paxis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in F`rench 28 Sep 79 pp 2619-2621.
[Article: "The Conditions for the Recovery of the Zambian Economy"]
[Text] Still surrounded by the aura of international prestige produced by
the quality of his presidency and the success of the Commonwealth Conference -
in I,usaka last August~ President Kenneth Ka,unda, must now again tackle the
~ formidable problem of healing the Zambian economy.
And, as if these economic problems were not enough of a head.ache, he was
informed that a fire which occurred in August temporasily interrupted the
flow from the pipeline between Lax es Salaam and Ndola the center of the
copper industry vital to the country which suppl~2s petroleum to his
landlocked country.
Yet, at the time of its independence in 1964~, Zambia could look to the
future wi�th more confidence than any other African country.
A humanistic and reasonable head of state, who had succeeded in bringing an
end to the sharp tribal rivalries~ was presid.ing over the destinies of a
country whose economy could rely on substantial foreign income from its
copper ind~stry, which benefited from soaring world prices. It is true
that skiiled labor was scarce, eJen in terms of the standard of the other
newly independent African countries, and the development of the substantial
poten~tial of agriculture had been neglected. However, the substantial do-
- mestic and foreign financial resources at the disposal of the government
made it possible to hope that this situa,tion would be rapidly remedied, to
the extent that during the first years of independence the government's
main concern was to find a way to spend money.
Today, 15 years later, these beautiful dreams ha,ve vanished and Za,mbia finds
itself mired in the political imbroglio of southern Africa, while at the
same time it faces a sharp crisis in its foreign trade. The financial
crisis is so serious that payments for imports are more than 18 months late
and the debt rate per capita is the highest in Africa, above even that of
either Egypt or Zaire.
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The spectacular reversal in the economic situation of the country is illus-
trated by the remaxk made by an official of a Zambian state company, who
was rec2ntly staying in Nairobi. He was wondering whether the meagre
foreign currency allowance at his disposal might not compell him to cut his -
business trip short. "When I was a student at the University of Nairobi~
15 years ago, of a11 the students from other African countries we had the
most pocket money, and we practically ran the univers3.ty. Today we have
been reduced to begging."
The inability of the Zambian economy to keep its promises is due to both
internal and external causes over which it has no control at a11, to the
combination of an unfavorable economic situation and ba.d management.
The ma,in factor remains the price of copper on the world market. For the
last several yeaxs in fact~ since the end of the Vietna,-n war the price
of copper has rema.ined depressed, in spite of a slight hike last year.
Because the sale of copper represents more than 90 percent of the exports
of Zambia, it is sufficient at any moment to take a look at the price of
the red metal on the London Meta1 Exchange to get a good idea of the economic
situation of Zambia. The attempts made by Zambia and the other copper
producing countries of the Third World through their common organiza.tion~
the ICCEC, to strengthen world prices by setting up a producers cartel
_ similax to OPEC, have generally failed.
The other constraint which weighs primarily on the development of Zambia
is its geographic situation: not only is Zambia a lancllocked country
and consequently dependent on the mood or cond3.tions of its neighbors for
access -~o the sea but in addition it has found itself more and more in-
volved in the politica~ problems of Southern Africa, specifically those of
Rhodesia.
President Kaunda's decision, true to his commitment to fight for freedom~
to close the border between Zambia and South Africa may have been popular
in the beginning. But as the price the Zambian citizens had to pay became
higher and higher with the passing years, this measure proved to be not
only disastrous economically but also politically dangerous.
Thus, last yeas's decision to restore the railroa,d links with South Africa
kas dictated not only by economic imperatives, but a~.so by the fact that
President Ka,unda and his political partners would ha.ve to face the elec-
torate.
Question of Railroad Transportation
The fact remains nonetheless that this decision was humiliating. It ha.d.
become inevitable for two reasons. The first was the closing, due to the
civil war in Angola, of the Benguela railroad which traditionally carried
a laxge shase of Zambian imports and exports. The second reason was that
the TAZARA (the Tanzania-Zambia railroad.~, built by the Chinese to link
Zambia with Dar es Salaam, never reached its expected transportation capacity. -
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f\3 fa~r. as the Ben~uela xailro~.d is concerned, efforts to get it going a~ain
have never stopped. A group of Western donor countries met in ~ussels at
~~he beginning of' this year and is to meet again very soon to examine the
finanring prob].ems of putting the railroad and essential equipment in working
- order. Western governments are also willing to participate in the financing
of this operation, which they believe is such that it might reinvigorate
the Zambian economy, the success of which is of direct interest to them.
However, the reopening of the Benguela railroad not only requires financial
cooperation from the West and from the government of Angola. It also re-
quires the approval of Jonas Savimbi the leader of UNITA [National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola~ which still controls a laxge paxt of
the Angolan territory, and specifically that through which the railroad
runs, There is little likelihood that UNITA will a11ow it to run without
demanding political compensation. This would almost certainly mean the
granting of substantial concessions to UNITA by the MFLA [Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola] and the Angolan government or, at the very
least, the departure of the Cubans. Prior to his sudden death~ Dr Agostinho
Ne~to was not in a sufficiently strong position to be able to accept such
concessions, so that the Benguela railroad will remain closed a while~longer.
- ~s for the TAZARA, problems have arisen simultaneously at the political
level~ the technical level and the mana,gement level.
rirst oi all, the transportation capacity of the railroad ne~;er reached
the level hoped for. The Chinese locomotives proved to have insufficient
nower. A-t present, the Tanzanian-Zambian Auhority, which manages the
railroad, is considering the purchase of new locomotives or the replacement
of the original engines with more powerful engines.
I~loreover, the line has recently been damaged by enormous landslides, caused
'cy torrential rains in Southern Tanzania. The repair work on the line has
neeri done, but the tra.ins must still travel at a reduced speed over some
- sectioris of the line, which reduces its capacity even further.
F'inally, the costs of TAZARA are affected by the slowness of the handling
o~erations at the port of Dar es Salaam for the exported copper and for -
the goods imported by Zambia. Numerous Zambian officials privately express
the opinion that this slowness is deliberate on the part of the Tanzanian
gove.rnment, which sees it as a means of putting pressure on Lusaka.
~~~ecLiocre Economic Performance
Another major cause for the mediocre perform~.nce of the Zambian economy
has been the quasi comple~te failure of the authorities in developing the
rich agricultural potential of the country. The abundance of financial
resources which were at the disposal of the government at the time of in-
dependence, led it to a nearly incoherent approach to the problem of agri-
culture. Massive amounts of capital were injected inta it, but the policies
- which were followed were either badly designed in the beginning, or else
badly applied.
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The mediocrity of the management and administration of the principal organi- -
zation in chaxge of maxketin agricultural products, the NANIDOARD [National
Agricultural Maxketing Boaxd~, has always been a problem for the government,
while at the same time being a source of discontent for the farmers.
These difficulties laxgely explain the dismaying results in the vast state-
controlled sector.
Nationalization and the policy of "Zambianization," aimed at replacing the
e.~patriated managers by Zambians, were applied with such speed and such a
lack of planning that the whole government machinery was more or less com-
pletely blocked~ not only within the government itself but also in the
sector of state-controlled companies. Consequently, today we are witnessing
an extraordinary phenomenon: notably through the channel of British develop-
ment aid, the government is recruiting British technicians and managers to
fill positions which were "Zambianized" a few years earlier.
Situation in Mining Sector
The current situation in the mining sector also shows how slow the govern-
ment was in becoming aware of the weaknesses of its earlier policy. Today~
the major state holding company, IN11EC0 [Industrial Development Corporation]~
is trying to reestablish a semblance of order in its affairs by separating
� itself from all the non-profitable companies. Its efforts have been sup-
ported by the government which a11 through last year insistently sought to
reduce political interference in the affairs of INDECO and which, at the
- beginning of this year, authorized the state companies to sell their products
or ser~+ices at more realistic prices.
One of the main reasons for the mediocrity of management in the government
services as well as in the sector of state companies is the low morale of
the 7ambian managers, even though many of them are competent and passionately
wish to realize the potential which the country undoubtedly possesses.
- Their discouragement is due primarily to political interference both in the
administration and in the state-controlled productive sector. One of the
most striking examples of this is the surprising speed with which the upper
cadres are transferred from one position to another and from one sector of
- activity to another. As one official in a state company stated: "The
government seems to think that if you are capable of running a bus company
this week, you could just as well head a brewery or a brickyaxd the next
week. The result of a17. these movements of the upper cadres is that a11
professionalism has practically disappeared."
Because of their economic weight and their size, the two largest mining
oups, Roan Consolidated Mines [RCM] and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines
~NCCM], have held up better in this asea. Aside from the difficulties in
foreign trade and the problems of transportation mentioned above, their
ma,in handicap lies in the disturbing reduction of the number of experts
through expatriation over these last 2 years.
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:'kie miners and white officials whose experience is vital for the country _
~�e leaving Zambia for many reasons: their wives are discouraged because
~~f tY~e shortage of essential products in the stores, the salaries and living
conditi.ons have become less attractive than those in other mining countries,
~ha h.lr;h rcLl,u ol' i,~,r:liiud r.i.t~l;ac:k:~ irt trw Co~~j>c~rbf~lt ha~ lncro~,uud ttiuiY~ fc~ux
that their personal safety is not guaxanteed, etcetera.
However, the situation in the mining sector improved last year. The flow -
of departures slowed down and the price of copper recovered. Consequently,
the financial results of the mining companies have suddenly improved. RCM, _
for example, which registered a loss of 22.16 million kwacha during the
9 months ending with March 1978, made a profit of 4~1.1 million kwacha during
the 9 months ending on 31 March 1979�
Proreover, the largest snaxe of this recovery is due less to the rise in
copper prices than to the substantial increase in cobalt production, which
is mined at the same time as copper. Today, thanks to a new processing
plant, RCrI produces approximatel~r 200 tons of cobalt a month and the price
of coba,lt is so high that it brings in about 8 million kwacha a month for
the compar.~y. In other words, without the cobalt the sale price of which
is so profital~le that the mining companies can afford to export it by air _
to Europe and to North America the mining companies would not do much
be~tter than cover their operating costs.
Perspectives for Economic Development
The perspectives for the development of the Zambian economy depend on a
certain number of imponderables.
- The country's potential in the sectors of a~riculture and mining is huge.
Zambia is relatively rich in skilled labor because, since independence, the
~overnment has invested widely and wisely in professional training. More-
over, and unlike most of the other African countries, Zambia possesses an
industrlal a.nd technological tradition. Thanks to the mining industry,
there is a veritable reservoir of workers in the country who possess a
basic ~technological qualificatior..
- Zambia is also in a rather exceptional situation in that its rate of urbani-
zation is very high. As easly as 1964~, at the time of independence, 20 per-
cent of the population which then amounted to 3.6 million inha,bitants
lived in urba.nized areas. Today, 4~0 percent of tlie 5.5 million Zambians
live in cities,
I,ike all developing countries without petroleum, Zambia will be severely
affected by -~he hike in fuel prices. For example, 18 months ago the annual
petroleum bill of the RCM amounted to approximately 9 million kwacha,. Today,
the budget estimates foresee an annual bill of approximately 20 million
kwacha.
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In spite of this, one of the most favorable factors for Zambia is its
current wea.ith and future possibilities in terms of hydroelectric energy. -
Nearly a11 the electric energy consumed by the cities along the railroad
a.nd in the Copperbelt comes from the two giant hydroelectric power stations
at Kariba and Kafue and their future expansion is entirely feasible.
Of the other two imponderables, the first is the turn of events in Rhodesia.
More than any other country, Zambia has a great deal to win or to lose de- -
pending on the development of the situation in Rhodesia. F`rom that point
of vi.ew, it was a good thing that the recent Commonwealth declaration
which represents the best chance for a settlement since 1965 was achieved
in Lusa.ka.
The second imponderable is the choice of economic policy which the govern-
ment will finally decide to apply. To tell the truth, President Kaunda
never really seems to ha,ve decided among the various possible economic
options. For yeass, he and his main collaborators have given out contra-
dictory signs. Sometimes they would denounce the possessiveness of capital-
ism and insist on the need for state control and socialism. At other times
they would stress i;he role of the private sector in flattering terms and
would emphasize the need for foreign investments. -
Zambia has the capacity to become the energy supplier for Central Africa
and a-~ the sa,me time one of the main exporters of agricultural products
and a.n important industrial base. However, it will achieve this only under
two cc~nditions: that a settlement is reached in Rhodesia and that private
comp~.nies receive clear assurances and reasonable guarantees with regard
to those sectors they will be allowed to operate in.
COPYRTGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
- 8~63 ~;ND
cso: 4~00
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