JPRS ID: 8739 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200010008-0

: ~ ~ , ~ i i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200014408-4
FOR O~FICIAL USE ONI.Y
JPRS L/8739 -
30 October 1 ~979 -
- V1/est Eur~ e Re ort -
p p
~ (FOUO 58/79~
~g~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORNAATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICI.AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
_
- NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign .
~ newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources -
are transcribed or reprinted, with the origznal phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
, Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brack~ts
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
oc [Excerpt] in the first line o~ each item, or following the
- last line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was
pr.ocessed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
_ mation was summarized or extrac*ed.
Unfamiliar names rendered phoneticalty or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Wor~s or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. -
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within 2tems are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. G~vernment.
~
For further informaLion on report content
- call (703) 351-2811 or 351-2501 (Greece,
' Cyprus, Turkey).
~ COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATION3 GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION _
- OF THIS PUBLYCATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
' JPR5 L/8739
30 October 1979
WEST EUROPE REPORT =
(FOUO 58/79)
CONT~NTS PAGE
COUNTRY 5ECTION -
~ FRANCE
Giscard d'Estaing Interviewed on Society's ~.iture
(Valery Giscard d'Estaing Interview; PAftIS MATCH, '
1Lt Sep 79) 1 ~
Planning I,aw Report Cites Ti~orsening Military Balance -
(AIR & COSMOS, 15 Sep 79) 15
PCF, PS Search for Corrmlon Ground 17iscussed -
(VALEURS ACTUELLES, 2!~ Sep 79) ~5 -
ITAL~Y -
Opinio:~s on Berlinguer's ~RINASCITA' Article ~
(L'EUROF'E0, 6 5ep 79) 28
Five-Point Program
- Cicchitto Interview, Fabrizio Cicchitto Interview
Paggi Statement, by Leonardo Paggi
Boato Interview, Maxco Boato Interview
Monti Interview, Mario Monti Interview
D~Arcais Article, Paolo Flores d~Arcais
, Importance of PCI Leaders~ European Tour Weighed _
(~rane Barbieri; I.A STAMPA, 11 Oct 79) 37
PCI's Pajetta on Ties With PCP, PCE, CPSU, PRC -
(Gian Carlo Pajetta Interview; ?,A STAMPA, 3 Oct 79) . 41
Albania's Position as Last Bastion of Stalini:~m Viewed
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 17 Oct 79) 44 ~
- a - [,CII - WE - J.50 FOUO]
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY =
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE _
GISCARD D'ESTAING INTERVIEWED ON SOCIETY'S FUTURE -
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 14 Sep 79 pp 12-22
� [Interview with French president, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, by Roger Therond~
director of PARIS MATCH. Date and place of interview unknown. Passages =
. enclosed in slantlines underlined in the original ]
, [Text] For Valery Giscard d'Lstaing, this is an important mo-
ment in his "piloting" of power. After 5 years at the helm of
the French presiaency, through economic and electoral hazards, -
the straight path of the 1981 elections can already be per-
. ceived. Critics in the opposition and the majority are after
_ Raymond Barre and his government and, above them, the presi-
- dent who intends to reply on TV on 17 September. He will
make his political reentry in the pages of our magazine by
= answering the questions of our director, Roger Therond, about
the deep changes undergone by our societies. This message
wants to answer the questirn: How shall we live tomorrow?
[Author's introduction] On 11 July, at the close of the
Council of Minist?rs at the Elysee Palace, Valery Giscard
- d'Estaing made a statement which touched me. The President
announced that, for the next 2 years, "France had to devote
= its strength to adapting itself to a new state of the world." _
, He was letting us know, sort of officially, that the world
was changing and it would affect us, harshly perhaps.
I recalled a strange and alarming statement he made on
24 October 1974 at the beginning of his 7-year term: "The
world is unhappy. It is unhappy because it does not know -
� where it is going and it guesses that, if it knew, it would
- discover it is heading toward disaster." It is a statement
ati variance with his practice of a suited-to-the-occasion
optimism for which he is being currently blamed.
The President was soberly considering, and is considering,
, the future of our world. In December 1977, in a new edition
~
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
of "French Democracy," he wrote: vouch that, on the day
the light of a new civilizing concept igaites somewhere, we
_ will be the first to recognize it." This does prove that he
was searching for that light. He had not yet found it. In
the ang~itshed climate.of this fall reassembly, these sen-
tences seemed to me to express a fundamental question: Where
are cae going? Where are our civiliz3tions going? -
To be Q1~rp~ PARIS MATCH's readers have pressing worries and .
irritations, but it seemed to me that we were being weighted
down by a prophecy of doom, as though we were all expecting
an apocalypse. I asked Valery Giscard d'F.staing if he could -
enligthen us on those difficult themes. He agreed.
[Gisc~ird d'Estaing] In your presentation, you quoted three of my statements
which express serious concerns. You contrasted them to what you ca11 "my
- optimism," an optimism which some people hold against me, especially in political
circlc~s. One word on optimism: _I must inspire and, to a degree, conduct a plan
of action which, in a democratic regime, assumes the adherence of the majority.
This means that, to obtain the adherence of our target audience, this plan of
action must concur with their self-interest or, even, their willingness to act.
They need to be told that their efforts will produce results. It would be in-
conceivable to invite someone tc make an effort and tell that person his effort
wi11 serve no purpose or, what wo:~1d be worse, that it would aggrevate his
situation. Consequently, it is. not /an optimism of illusion, but an opt~.mism
of proposition/ which is, moreover, in the nature of the office I hold.
Ny f.irst concern relates to the deep change taking place in mankind and our
universe at the end of this millenium. In my opinion, it can be summarized in
a sir~~le concept: the incredible growth of world population. -
. During the combined Assyrian, Jewish and Roman antiquity, the total population
~ of the world was less than 200 million. Until the 15th century, it never ex-
ceeded 450 million. At the beginning of the 19th century, it was less than one
hillion, a figure reached in 1830. Suddenly, an evolution took place and an- ~
" other world was born. In the year 2000, 20 years from now, the world population
will amount to nearly 6 billion human beings, with the maintenance of an upward
~urve over the following years. Moreover, the old world was a world in which ~
sci.ence was under control. At the beginning, it involved manual techniques for
the ma.nuf acture of tools, followed by related activities: factories had human
dimensions. A scientific power of a different nature was reached with the ap-
pearance of nuclear energy, the development of biochemistry and its related
br.anches and data processing.
_ In other words, mankind is experiencing--and will experience--a period of change
which is objectively quite extraordinary when compared to what had been experi- `
enced in the past and, unfortunately, the problems appear extremely difficult
to solve. In any case, they are entirely new and traditional means oc solving `
them do not measure up. /We are moving toward an uncontrolled world whereas,
in the past, it had been controlled by its political and economic organization
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
, .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
and its civilization./ You asked me if I perceive the glimmer of a new civi- ,
izing concept. The answer is no. We are living in a~aorld from which it is -
absent:. To be sure, there are signs and presentiments, but it is not present. ~
Finally, you alluded to my statement of last 11 July. Everything I have al-
ready mentioned shows that we are moving toward a new state of the world and
France which was rather at ease in the former state of the world--although it
experienced trials and tribulations--must adapt to this new state.
We must also disregard that we have to deal with an immediate, short-~lived and
suited-to-the-occasion problem. Our central concept must be quite different: ~
France must find a way to adapt to a new state of the world. This concept may
seem surprising within our political thinking which is always or~ a short term,
- (Question] But you, Mr President, have the go~~d fortune oF having at least 2
years ahead of you, maybe 9. It is a pace which allows you to face danger.
[Answer] My role is indeed to see it and describe it concretely while I make
sure that governmental action is truly going in that direction.
[Questi.on] On 11 Ju1y you also stated: "The government must clearly define
this head-on policy in simple terms. It must avoid two pitfalls: illusion
which exempts from effort and pessimism which deters from trying." These ex-
planations were never given to the French.
[Answer) Let us first discuss th.e state of the world. I believe we would have -
~ made r_onsiderable progress had we been already convinced that we must adapt to -
this new state of the world. The underlying notion that we will return to a
- former situation persists in our whole way of acting.
- Politicians and journalists proclaim: "The French must be told the truth."
If you read the speeches made over the past 4 years, you would note that
everything has been told over and over again. Yet, many Frenchmen sincerely
believe there are not being told the truth. Why? I think they reason as fol-
lows, telling themselves: "To return to the previous situation, we will have
to make sacrifices greater than we are being told. Consequently, we are not
being told the truth."
- /The truth is that we cannot return to the former situation. What we must do
- is try to adapt to another situation./
[Question] In your opinion, it is a worldwide galloping demography which,
- thereEore, seems to delineate the great concern over tomorrow's world. Is that -
the only sign?
[Answer] Demography is an illustration, a kind of central event showing that
we are living in a world set to have a population for which it is not ready. -
I ignore what the o~orld's "normal" population could be, for it depends on tech-
nological advances. However, when the world reaches a population ranging
between 6 and 10 million human beings, it will have to make a tremendous effort
and drain natural resources and space.
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
Another worrisome phenomenon: rural population will increase ver.y little.
On the other hand, we will see a strong increase in the clustered urban pop- -
lation wh ich wi.l.l be accompanied by unavoidable psychological, political,
administrative and cultura.l problems.
'fh~~ Eact that it is depleting its natural resources is the second character-
istic of this new world. It has always corisumed them, but in lesser quantities.
Currently, the rate of consumption is leading to the depletion of many of ~ur
resources. It is the case for petro:Leum and also, in the future, for uranium.
This will present very serious problems.
Food production in developing countries will not follow the growing needs.
The fact that, within some 10 years, we will reach the limit of depletion of
some r.esources already introduces br.utal fluctuations in world economy causing
greater jolts than in the past. It is one of the factor of the disorganization
of world economq. -
There is another important factor: the development of beliefs. We reason ex- 4
- clusively in economic terms, but the life of human societies is largely
dependent upon other factors, especially collective beliefs. We are living in
a wor].d in which very few collective beliefs exist. In the past, nations were
led--or managed themselves--by coll.ective beliefs. The crusades were a phe- ~
nomenon of collective beliefs, colo~.ialism also, in its own fashion. The
yearning f or political freedom was, for Europe, a strong collective belief wnich
gave rise to revolutions. Oddly enough, there is presently very few collective
_ heliefs in the industrialized countries. P4arxism, as an economic and social
organization,was an element of strong collective belief between 1900 and the
7Q's. With certain exceptions, it is not so today.
On the other hand, we must not forget that we are living in a world without a
major conflict and this represents an extremely important and positive factar. ~
We are living in a world which is still preoccupied with security problems, but
which na longer has the idea that war is around the corner. To be sure, there
c3re local conflicts, riots and repressions, but the idea of the "next war" edged
away and that is a positive change.
[Quest:ion) Yet, for the first time, mankind has found a way to destroy itself?
[Answer] Undoubtedly.
[Question] This notion hardly existed a few years back.
[~nswer) Certainly, but if you read newspapers dated before the war of 1914
and those in between the two wars, you would note that the haunting Worry
was this: Will the war break out in 2 or 3 years?" Waiting for the war was -
part of everyday life. Today, this notion has receded. -
I would say that, currently, the problems of world political balance ha~e been
- relatively quelled. On the other hand, problems of economic and social balance -
_ have not yet been mastered.
4
~ FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
w
((1~iesCic~n) Then, you think that the threat of an atomic war is to be ri~led out
- r~nd wc~ h~~ve reached a suir_able balance among the great nations? All the same,
= we do not feel completely shielded from non-atomic conflicts. Some writers, .
G~neral Hackett and Anthony Burgess in particular, are predicting the war for
1984-85. I admit that it is an intellectual game, but the fact remains that
- the possibility of a war persists in the public'g mind. -
(Answer.] In 1914 and 1939, the world was moving toward a war and decisions
were being made to prepare for it and, ob~iously, win it. Currently, outside
the basic problem of relations between the Soviet Union and China and that of
- nuclear proliferation, the world's political system ~.s not automatically drawn
toward a conflict.
- idhat is happening in Africa and even Southeast Asia creates clash situations, _
bur it is obvious that people are avoiding making them into world detonators.
It is important to make allowance for this.
[QuestionJ You stated that the world was no longer keeping its economic system
under control. Why'? Did we come to realize that economy is not an exact
science? And that security locks no longer worlc?
. [Answer] In reality, this system was the result of a dominant situation which,
of course, was that of the United States and the model it was off~ring. This
- domination no longer holds for all sorts of well-known reasons. In order for ~
the economy and monetary system to be dominated, an agreement would L:~ needed
among leading participants, an agreement difficul.t to implement due to their
great number and the strength of their national selfishness. The overcoming of -
selfish interests has not been secured. It is beginning to be in the field af
security. All the nations think that an effort to eliminate war is necessary.
In this context, they accept detente, even if they pass severe judgments on one
another. However, they have not yet understood that, in the end, an economic _
system on a collective scale--even if self-serving interests interfere with it--
would be a wholly more advantageous system.
We are moving in that direction, first because Europe is organizing and becoming
a valid interlocutor for dealing with those problems. Moreover, durfng the `
- Tokyo Summit, I noted--although the result remains naturally ].imited--the birth
of an awareness concerning the necessary control of economic events.
[Question] In your opinion, do world solutions exist to master these events?
[Answer] They will have to be controZied, they can be, but we should not be _
- surprised by ths difficulties er.cour~t.ered in so far as self-serving interests
_ are opposed to their being mastered; few statesmen control these issues; and
organizations are extremely ~cubersome and ineffectual.
[Question] Are then great statesmen only found during wartime?
[Answer] First, there are great men who are not politi.cians: However, great
leaders identify with the people in times of collective trials, that is to say,
until now, wars.
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
_ [Question] Can we pursue this world situation by returning gradually to
France which, after all is our subject. The issue France must tackle ~,s to
_ face up to the situation. How? Must it adapt to what it considers a disaster -
or to something that will give it a chance of survival?
(Answ~r) I believe we must answer this question with much candor. My first
answer. is that Western ~urope--France being part of it--will never again find _
the situation it once had for dominating and exploiting the world~s wealth.
During the 17th, lSth and 19th centuries, the world was c~nder the domination of
West.ern Europe and secondary countries like the United States and European ~
Russia. At the same time, under the guise of colonialism or trade relations
for raw materials, it was a period of exploitation of foreign resources. This
has come to an end due to a change in the world's population. Should we regret
it? Tt is very difficult to say. Those were times which are now being painted
under very favorable aspects, but which gave rise to fratricidal wars, large-
scale clashes and flagrant social injustices. In any case, this situation which
- surely had positive elements, but also tremendous negative ones, will never be
again. In other respects, the growth of the so-called consumer society was
s?~ort-lived. It extended from the 60's to 1973 and yet, it deeply shaped many
institutions and minds. People believed it would last indifinitely. Further-
more, it did not represent a collective belief, but it was expressive of a
collective situa*ion. Everybody was going in the same direction, borne on the
same o~ave. There was a movement of general prosperity, very unevenly distrib-
_ uted~ but everybody was moving in the same direction. ~
_ A certain number flf practices, institutions and mechanisms were created which,
stran~e].y enough, still exist.
/Fundamentally, the French know~that, under this guise, the consumer society is
finished.% Moreover, they were not happy in that society. They know it, they
acknowledge it, but at the same time, /it remains that everything which is
expressed, everything which is organized and all the demands originated in the
~ consumer society./ Our economic and social debates are still debates of the
consumer society. The forthcoming debate will be distinctive, for it will be
the debate of a society organized or; the basis of different objectives and
themes. It should be recalled that this consumer society led to May 1968, that
is to say, to its rejection. P1ay 1968 was an important event inasmuch as it
was both youth's cultural rejection of that society and the rejection of some
of its social consequences, expressed through demonstrations of dissatisfaction.
People should not regret what they have rejected. My feeling has always been -
_ that the consumer society was suitable for neither France nor the French. It
was destroying France. It ravaged sections of our coastal areas, mountains, -
towns, mode of living and culture; it wrought tremendous havoc.
I think that the sober society toward which we are moving is, after all, better
- suited to France which is a country of rural origin, retaining its attachment
to the land and with a sense of time and measure.
6
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE O1~LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
I insist on the fact that all the mechanisms now in place and all the organiza-
~
~ tions voicing their opinion reason in the spirit of the consumer society. This
_ explains the public's difficulty with making sense out of that turmoil. They -
know it has ended, ~~et, everything they are being told is being told in the
l~~nguage and the organizations created for and by the consumer society. _
/I~rancc wi.ll be lost iI, amicist tliis gre~t turmoil and radJusement, lt h.~s tl~e -
idea of finding again and reinstating the past./ Our country will become a
withering zone such as always existed throughout the world. It is often what -
is being offered to the French, under more or less seductive forms. Actually,
on a national scale, we have many assets, but also many weaknesses. Our cul-
~ tural level, the value of our educational system and the position we have
acquired in some lead3ng sectors constitute our main assests and we must
direct our thinking toward that France developing along those lines. Last
winter, we suffered the serious consequences of the iron-smelting crisis, bu*
we also logged in the success of Airbus. The forces involved are almost of the
same rnagnitude. One sector was a messenger of hope, the other needed to be re-
- organized to maintaln it future chanees.
Cur national size represents an advantage: in many sectors of advanced tech-
nology (electronics, space research, etc) we probably would have been unable to
develop had we been much smaller. -
- Furthermore, the richness of our land, vitality and diversity of our agriculture _
" and processing of our products represent factors of natural equilibrium and
homogenization of our territory which still need to be substantially improved. _
It seems to me that it is enough to ensure e~.unomic balance and progress in the
standard of living.
This brings me to an important subject: ecology. The fact that our resources
are limited and we must conduct our collective and individual lives with con-
cerns others than quantities springs from what I have stated, namely, population
growtt~, decreasing resources, etc with the result that the ecological movement
is deeply rooted. What is stran~e is that, in some of its manifestations, it _
- seems to believe it can be satisfied with merely being a corrective factor for
a consumer society. It is a complete illusion for that society's mechanisms _
and fc~rces are such that the ecological movement would be squashed in it. It
might lead to symbolic solutions such as the creation of a few natural parks
and sr_attered reserves but, for me, the ecologlcal movement must comprise many
other sectors of collective life, for example, the creation of a type of economic �
development, certain aspects of cultural life, the respect of time and remedies
against nervous tensions, pressure from mass media and advertisment and urban
concentrations, etc. After all, I do not believe we can disassociate the
"green pastures" aspect from the moderation and humanization effort of our
' economic and social system. Consequently, it is desirable that ecological
thinking removes itself from its original milieu.
[Question] If I understand well, we must adapt to a new rhythm. There is no
example of an harmonious society in recessian. .
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
[Answ~rJ Sober growth is not crisis. It should be recalled that the 1979
Frencl~ production will be higher than in any previous years, even 1973, that _
Is to say, prior. to the petroleum crisis and, in 1979, French standard of `
~ living is the highest in our history. There is no recession. Growth ~s -
sl.ocoer, tempered. It does not give rise to the same gratifications: the
quantitative gratif ication of "more" om all domains must be replaced by a
gratification of choice, of quality. /It is the historical,/ and moreover, .
natural, /passag~ of quantity ta quality./ Furthermore, it would not re- -
present an unconquerable difficulty if we did not have to solve the unemploy-
ment problem and eliminate heavy social in~ustices. The unempl.oyment
probl~m must be considered on two levels: worldwide and French. On a world
scale, it is tz-agic because the truth is that this tremendous increase in the
available work force will not be required to producE what the world will need.
The concentration of the means of production and technological advances are
such that the world will not need this increase.
'Che problem will therefore be very diFficult to solve on a world scale. All
the mass products whi~h can be manufactured by numerous and low-paid workers
wi11, of necessity, be manufactured by them. Tension is and will be tremendous.
On a national scale, we must therefore seek out sectors needing specialized and
highly paid workers. Those sectors exist. In metallurgy for example, there
- are m~ny highly technical sectors, accessible only with great diff iculty, which
means that those companies will remain the kind found in typically industrial-
ized countries. It is highly noticeable in the textile industry: in highly
technological coi~ntries, not only do some types of production not regress, but
they progress.
[Question] The ehoice will need to be made. Who will make it?
(Ansc,rer~ I believe there are two level.s of choice. First, there is a community
responsibility for choosing well the new large-scale sectors requiring an
initial research and training investment. The effort put forth in data proces- -
sing is remarkable because it will stop burdening public finances within 2
years and that sector will even be fully profitable. The same is true of the
nuclear and space f ields in which the State must undertake and conduct the ,
basic research.
The second choice is the responsibility of those who produce. We are aware
that renters of decisionsmust be increased the moment we must change to a more
refined and swif.tly adaptable economic system. We must therefore proceed to-
ward a type of economy in which a~.arger.number of companies will have to take
= those decisi_ons. If we try to make inclusive decisions, one error is enough to
b]ock the whole system. /Quality is by nature decentralized./ Moreover, this _
is mur_h more compatible with our national temperament.
[Question] At what level must decentralization take place? _
[Answer~ For example, at company or university levels.
_ Let us return to French demography. Alongside this explosive worldwide crisis,
there are inverse occurences affecting all the long standing countries of
8
F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
Western Europe, the USSR and North Amezica with, ~or the ~3rst time in 10 y~~ars,
~hiCt to negative r.ates. The first country to be a~fected was East Germany
tt~c~n, 2 years aRo, Weat Germany. _
rrance is in a bad situation, but not as bad as this group of countries. This
is probably due to its family and rural structure and also, partly, to the ,
presence of immigrant workers. Our population will sCill continue to graw for
approximately 7 more years but, as far as birth rates are concerned, they are `
_ decreasing and have already dropped below the level needed to ensure popul.ation
maintFnance. It is obvious that everything we are undertaking is doomed to
failure if such a situation continues and we witness a rapid demographic
- decline. ~
Reacti.ons to this situation are interesting to analyze. West Germans do not
react as we do. They talk about it but do nothing to change the situation.
~ They think it is a temporary phenomenon and the extreme vitality of the popula-
tion is such that it will correct itself after it reaches a certain level. -
tn France, it is another debate which, after all, people would like to direct
essentially on benefits, as though they were the determining factor,
As modern demographic research as shown, the demographic problem is a knotty one
revealing the totality of society's characteristics. It involves at one and the
- same time the belief in happiness, evaluation of future opportunities, relations
between parents and children and the role of women in society, all very complex
~ factors expressing a certain quality of the web of society.
[Question] Is not this demographic problem due precisely to the fact that,
feeling a deep anxiety over this new state of the world, western man h as no
- desire to procreate? -
~ [Answer] The difficulty with society's problems is that they include successive
levels of explanation. We can always find one accessible explanation, but
- others are more mysterious. It could be that the demographic crisis is the
counterpart of the tremendous expansion of the 19th century and we are witnes-
- sing a kind of biological deacceleration of the species; a biological
deacceleration which could be the origin of behaviors mistaken for causes.
- Pessimism could derive from a biological deacceleration of the species.
[Question] Is not the failure of religions also a sign of decline?
[Answer] We can touch on religions and collective beliefs.
France is a country where very strong collective beliefs were born and which
adhered to very strong beliefs. It has been the world's Catholic country; then _
the country of the equality-of-political-rights doctrine; and, in the middle of
the 19th century, the country of nationalism. Currently, it has no strong col- _
lective beliefs. There was a strong collective belief around General de Gaulle
during the Occupation, furthermore, a belief which was not heavily felt until
the second half of the conflict. Then, there were the consequences of
~
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R004200010048-0
the decolonization~ Howeyert ~rom 1965-1967# we saw this strong collective
belief grow dimmer. Nineteen hundred and sixty-eight was the il~.ustration of -
> that �act.
- /I believe a society cannot live long without collective beliefs./ I also -
beli~ve that they cannoC be created artificially, for they come from the inner-
most part of human nature.
There is currently in France an encouraging sign and a possible plan of action.
The encouraging sign is that certainties and beliefs are few but rather intense.
Let us take the Catholic religion as an example: practicing Catholics are less
numeratis than 1C~ years ago, but they probably are more earnest and motivations
are stronger. I am convinced the same is ~rue for the other religions. It
expresses a need and, perhaps, an awakening. It is Pncouraging.
/What we can do is intensely promote. cultural development./ And t~?at is not
the state's business, but society's. France must appear as a culturally very
active and, if possible, vanguard country. It is already so: interest in all
forms of music and all kinds of exhibits is tremendous. When we talk about
literature and writing, we are faced with a worrisome predicament: size. One
hundred years ago, worldwide, two-thirds of the people who read could read
French. Currently, this figure is approximately ten percent and in 20 years, -
it will be 50 percer.t. Obviou;~l_y, we shall fight to defend our language, but
wP are faced with the basic pr.:`.: ?m of the position and diffusion of our cul-
ture~ an extremeJ.~ uifficult problem because we cannot force other peop].e to
speak our lan,uage. In my opinion, the cultural theme--which I intend to
analyze mor~ thoroughly this w~nter--is a factor whicn can contribute to the
reppearance of.collective beliefs and it will have to include an aesthetic
component.
[Question] What about politi~s? ~
� [Answer] It has no effect. The idea that, in France, collective beliefs could
emerge from a political debate is erroneous because this debate discusses none
of the needs which the future will have to satisfy. Marxism was the last
- wurldwide declaration. From the moment we no longer believe~tt~at a pol~tical _
debate can supply this answer, a collective '~elief can longer be based on a
political doctrine; today, it is not enough.
[Question] In this sober society, the French will undoubtedly have to relearn
their du*ies and cease to clamor for their rights. Wi11 they have to give up
- some of them?
: [Answer] We were on a boat ca rried by a swift current. We could tell the cur-
rsnt was going in a certain direction, namely, the growth of resources, and we
were discussing among us the distribution of this surplus of resources. Hence- _
for.ward, the current wi11 be slower. Personal projections and more advanced
training will require efforts. It will involve anticipating the future needs
of society and learning those skills related to them. We will have to antici-
pate how to adapt our duties or knowledge much more than we did before. The
effort to be actively involved will be greater.
10
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FON, OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[Quest:ion] You did not speak about the employment probleaa in ~xance, _
[Answer] Let us talk about it. Henceforward in France, we must consider the
employment problem as an objective, not a result. In the past, i.t was treated
- as a result since strong growth was the fundamental idea, the immegration rate
being determined by this growth. We must have a different idea, namely, that _
French society must employ all its hands and, I would add, all its minds. Is
- it possible? Certainly. The question is to know at what level of income it
must be accomplished.
- It can be done at a low level uf income by dividing the existing work and gross
- wages as they stand. It is then a society of full-time workers with a].ow
standard of living. In my opinion, it is not the purpose, for many workers -
aspire, and rightly so, to a higher standard of living. Some believe that we
can set up a job-sharing society at a high level of income. It is an illusion.
- Let us take the car industry as an example: worldwide, there may be 10 or 12
automobile companies, two of which are French: one ranks third or fourth, the _
other sixth. These companies compete with each other, not with other states.
Let us imagine that the decision to share jobs is made in France and the working
week is set at 30 hours. If, at the same time, the other companies decide not
, to share jobs and keep the 40-hour week, the individual who will work 30 hours
will r.eceive a real salary representing only three-fourths of the salary of an
individual working 40 hours. The French standard of living will decline in _
- that sector, as compared to the others.
That is why I do not believe that job sharing at a low level of income can
solve the problem. I deeply believe that we can reach full employment at a
high level of income, providing we seek and develop new activities. The key ~
lies with the development of new activities and, consequently, I am pleased
with the fact that some advanced technology industries are creating jobs, for
they do it a a high level of wages and specialization.
The real choice--and we cannot escape it for long--is to choose between a
- German-type or a Swiss-type situation, that is to say, a high level of employ-
ment and income or, on the contrary, a sharing of 3obs and income.
I favor the first formula which, I believe, can be implemented when I see all
that remains to be done in many sectors, such as the agro-food industries where
we should rank first worldwide; it is not the case. Tens, hundreds o� thousands
of jobs could then be created. The same is true in the advanced machinery
industry where we lag far behind and where thousands of jobs remain to be
~ created. The situation is identical in the clothing and furniture sectors even
though our prestigious image gives us a worldwide advantage.
[QuestionJ Are not we reacting a little too late? Have not the Germans already
shifted their i:?dustry toward this adaptation? -
[Answer] Yes.
[Question] Could you describe for us the world as it wi11 be in the 80's?
11
FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
[Answer] /What we must really understand is that we must adapt ourselves to an
upcoming world, not an outgoing one./ This idea has not yet occurred to us. I
am not sure it has occurred to you. And yet, it is a kind of switch which sheds -
light on everything needing to be done. _
Qn an international level, France is able to do what the super powers cannot,
~ taking into account what they are and because their efforts are inevitably per-
ceived as being self-serving. We are one of the rare countries to have this
vision of the world, this experience of world aff airs, this geographical pcsi-
tion and central policy. France has a role to play, but we must not make a
' mistake: this role will require an effort. If Charles de Gaulle exerted his
well-~known influence, it is because he gave his country the breadth of a great
power and not because he was an average statesman carried by a great power.
It will always be so for France.
[Qttestion] Is this situation workable?
[AnswerJ It is workable, but ~.t is not secure. It is workable because France -
has a historical tradition and reputation and, in some respects, the position
for making it possible. It is not secure because it will not be asked to play
this role if it does not force itself to do so and i.ts leaders lack the ability
. to perform. Currently, France is holding its own. It originated the North- ~
South and European-Arab dialogs; it initiated the idea of a three-party
disci.~ssion with the Africans and it recommended the creation of the European
C~uncil. A11 these ideas are moving forward and our country appears to be ~
concerned with what should be done in order for the international and collec-
tive organization to progress. We must continue. -
[Quest.ion] You are a practicing Christian. Do you believe that religions are
essential? What do spiritual values mean to you?
[Answer] I am a Christian, but president ~f a secular state...
[Question] The Church has sometimes interfered with state decisions. I am ~
thin'~ing in particular about arms sales, aid to the Third World and, mostly,
- about the abortion law. How do you deal with it as a Christian?
[Answer] There is no difficulty. I am a Christian and president of a secular
state. Knowing what the institutions' basic concept and rule are, I make my -
decisions within the scope of my responsibilities and prerogative. I have my
owri philosophy. I sometimes express it, but in no way do I impose it in the
discharge of my duties. I take the same stand as General de Gaulle.
Cc~ncerning spiritual values, I find it difficult to imagine what collective life
could , be without a spiritual dimension. I cannot imagine it for.myaelf,
but I know that others ~?o so for themselves.
[QuestionJ Do you idpntify spiritual values with religious values? -
12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
- FOR OFF' .
[Answ~r] No, absolutely not. I am currently reading the biographies o~ world
leaders and I noted that those who do not have a certain spiritual dimension
are rarE. It is sometimes quite clear, especially among the Arab leaders and
President Sadat in particular. It is also the case in Tndia,. Latin America and _
even the United States. _
I find it difficult to see how a person can have a conceptual system of soci- _
ety's development excluding any spiritual dimension. At the very least, it can _
be a very deep philosophical belief. Spiritual dimension is not solely
religious in nature.
[Question) Does your own and yoiir anrestors' faith influence your political
behavior?
[Answer] My behavior, probably. I do not use a doctrine in the choice of
political decisions, but in my behavior, my approach to decisions to be made,
the answer is yes: undoubtedly yes.
[Question] Five years later, do you feel as though you have both changed and
remained yourself?
[AnswerJ I believe that after 5 years everybody feel as though they have
- changed.
[Question] Granted, but not everybody have spent those 5 years where you spent
- them.
[Answer] By nature, I am a person who remains identical to himself, but of
course, those 5 years in office taught me a lot.
[QuestionJ Did you learn much from foreign statesmen?
(Answer] Very little, except from some of them who appear to me as being well
experienced in the conduct of their affairs. We talk about it together, but I
would say that it is almost from a professional standpoint. In this office,
our vi_ew of the world is altered by the ease of travel and contacts which are
ours while at the same time being exceptionally complete. In the past, when I
was discharging my duties, for example in Chamalieres, I could see, like an
instinctive image, the map of France around me. During the first years of my
_ presidency, I could see Europe and Africa. Now I see a sphere and on that
sphere France.
[Question] And the French, do you "feel" them better?
[Answer] Yes. I experience a deep feeling of identification with the French.
When I say "the French," I am thinking "We, the French." When they are gloomy
or dissatisfied, I understand that they have both difficulty and a slight regret
~ adapting themselves to the world as it is becoming. I feel the same way, I _
therefore understand them. Of course, I also believe that those are feelings
which must be subjugated because life, in the scientific sense of the term, is -
a continuous progress and it musc be experienced as progress. -
- 13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
_ [Question] Someone said: "We can only suzyive by ascending."
~Answer] I never feel irritated, even momentarily, against my fellow country- ~
men although this feeling is often experienced by politiciana. _
[Question] It may be because you have lnuch experience with rural life. _
How do you feel about criticism? Painfully or are you protected by a shell? Did
you grow tougher over the years?
[Answer] I have no she11.
[Question] One could deduce that you are fragile. ~
[AnswerJ Is that so? Does strength come from the shell? In nature, it is the
lion which eats the buffalo despite its hide. I am interested in the discussion ~
and criticism of my activities~ On the other hand, spitefulness is something
else. I resent it as one of the forms cf evil and as the manifestation of the
presence of ~vil in the world. I do not practice it, but I resent it as much
for others as for myself. -
[Question] Is not this presence of evil derived from a certain permissiveness?
Do you not feel this rise of evil inclusively throughout the world?
[Answer.) I do not +.:hink so. Permissiveness gives it a different mode of expres-
sion, but i� you u~~ce to read again the libels of authoritarian regimes, it was
?ven worse:
I am convinced that we can neither eliminate nor reduce this worldwide evil
tt:r~~u~h simple restraint. It can be eliminated and reduced through a kind of ~
purificaT.ion of the deep web of society. I am convinced that, despite its very -
serious problems with employment, inflation, etc, the French society of 1979 is
less prone to violence and hate than the society prior to 1968. ~
If I left certain polemics unanswered, it is because I believe that moderation
in general behavior and the collective life finally minimizes the influence of
_ evil. Outrage and hate lessen and everybody benefit.
[Question~ Let us come down from those lofty heights. Do you think that you
' have reached a turning point in.your presidency? Is it an important date for
France?
[Answer] Yes. It is an important period because, unlike what some people think,
much has been done. Judging from what is being currently said, nothing is sup-
posed to have been done. People will see that, in 1979, the French economy will
react with much more vigor than the French economy of 1974. People worked~ took
- initiatives, reorganized their production and sought new markets. Much has been _
done and I will compare this period to the crossing of a pass: if people panic,
- they no longer dare to advance and they turn back; if on the other hand they
continue to advance, all of a sudden they discover another thing: a new state
of the world.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 par Cogedi.presse SA
6857
CSO: 3100 11~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICTAT~ USE ONLY
CUUNTItY SECTION FRANCE _
PLANNING LAW REPORT CITES WORSENING MILITARY BALANCE
Paris AIR & GOSMOS in French 15 Sep 79 pp 30-32, 48
[Article: "Planning Law Report Excerpt: 'The Military Balance Between the
~ Western and Eastern Alliance Systems Is Continuing To Deteriorate
[TextJ The statement comprising the title of this article, which could have
been made by the very ones who see in this deterioration a supporting justifi- �
cation for their argument in favor of installing medium-range nucZear weapons
in the European NATO countries, is in fact a statement excerpted from the
report by the prime minister and the minister of defense, in the name of the
French Government, on the enforcement and implementation of the 1977-1982 '
military planning law. The established date for completion of this report
has been set. ~
This 44-page document has just been forwarded to the members of Parliament,
- who are scheduled to debate it in the National Assembly on 2 October. The mem-
bers of the Commission on National Defense and the Armed Forces will meet
on 19 Septembc~r to discuss the report to be drawn up by Mr A. Paecht for the
commission (cf. AIR & COSMOS No 776) after they have heard the testimonies
to be presented the evening before by Mr Yvon Bourges, minister of defense, _
and Jean-Francois Martre, managing director general for armaments, and the _
morning before by Gen Guy Mery, the armed forces chief of staff.
The conclusions drawn in the commission's report will undoubtedly not coincide
in their entirety with those drawn by the prime minister and the minister of -
defense in the report they have forwarded to the members of Parliament, which .
could be summarized in a single sentence: "It can be stated L�hat the balance
sheet for the first 3 years of implementation of the military planning law,
projected to the end of 1979, has met expectations."
For the benefit of our readers, we reproduce below extensive excerpts from this
report, which is divided into three parts: basic national security require-
ments; balance sheet for the first 3 years of the planning law; 1980-1982 -
planning law objectives.
~ l5
FOR OFFICIti;. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Basic National Security Requirements _
The first part of the report was prepared by an interministerial group uttder
thc acg.is of the secretary general of national defense. It leads to the
conclusion that "France must maintain the basic choices of its defense policy:
national independence based on nuclear deterrence, a military capability ap-
propriate to the safeguarding of our interests, continued freedom of evaluation
and decision, solidarity with the allies."
The content of this first part takes on maximum significance at a time when
many Western political and military leaders are denouncing the vulnerabil:ity
of the NATO forces opposed to those of the Warsaw Pact; at a time when the
presence in Cuba of 3,000 Soviet troops is posing a threat to the ratification -
- of SALT II by the majority of the members of the United States Congress; at
a time when the French Government is being accused of gradually returning to-
ward reintegration into NATO; at a time when Mr Kissinger is recalling the
futility of counting on American strategic arms to defend Europe and when
the publication of a German "white book" on defense reveals that, to counter
the tlireat represented by the increased number and the precision of the Soviet
SS20 medium-range nuclear missiles, Mr Schmidt's government views the defense
of German territory as being totally dependent on the Atlantic Alliance and
advocates modernization of the atomic weapons systems on European soil; and
at a time rahen, according to the London IISS [International Institute for
Strategic Studies] report, the European nuclear deienses must be reinforced.
One reads with particular interest in this first part: "France is continuing "
its artuation in favor of detente She approves the efforts being put
forth by the United States and the Soviet Union to limit the development of
their strategic potential But one is compelled to note the fact that
the military balance between the Western and Eastern alliance systems--an
indispensable condition for the progress~of detente--is continuing to deter-
= iorate to the detriment of the Western countries, as much in the domain of
nuclear weapons as in that of conventional forces.
The structuring c~f Europe, which France is pursuing as one of its
essential objectives, continues uninvolved with questions of defense. France,
however, through its own defense effort, is nevertheless contributing to
European securiEy and is not ignoring the fact that its own security rests
i~ithin that framework.
"I'rance confirms the basic choices of its defense policy: a national nuclear
- effort; solidarity with its allies and a desire to take part in the defense
of Europe while preserving, however, its own freedom of evaluation and of
~ decision in respect to the Atalntic Alliance with regard to the advisability,
timing and conditions of a possible involvement of its forces in any case of
crisis or conflict. France's special contribution to the efforts being
� deployed toward disarmament in no way affects its determination to assure
self-reliantly its own security.
16 �
FOR OFFICII~;, USE ONLY.
_ . ' I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
"Certain developments that have taken place outside of Europe since 1976 have
confirmed the need for forces in combaC readj.ness to support and safeguard
French interests. They have dem~nstrated the role that France can fulfill--
acting alone or within an international framework--in maintaining certsin
- regional balances.
"France's military strategy remains based on the deterrent and combat capa-
- bilit~.es deriving drom the existence of her nuclear and couventional forces,
which mutually enhance each other. -
"Our national defense effort must therefore accord first priority to the
development of the effectiveness and credibility of France's strategic
nuclear forces. Our tactical nuclear weapons, by virtue of their versatility
of employment, must add deterrent capability.
"Our conventional forces--land, naval and air--must complement our deterrent
forces and, in contributing to their safeguarding, must be capable of confront-
. ing d3.verse~situations in Europe and overseas. The special effort that has
already been deployed to improve their suitability for intervention in Europe
~ and outside of Europe must be contined, specifically to augment their poly-
valence, their mobility, and hence their flexibility of employment."
Balance Sheet for the 1977-1979 Period
From a financial standpoint, the report says, "there has been a steady in-
crease in current franc alloc~ztions for defense (+32 percent from 1977 to
1979) and at the same time a i~ore rapid return than anticipated toward an
equitable ratio between operating expendi.tures and capital investments"; ex-
pressed in terms of percentages, the ration between Title III and Title V in
1977 was 59 percent to 41 percent; in 1979 it has been 56.8 percent to 43.2
percent.
As regards nuclear forces, "the balance sheet shows that the effort devoted
to thEm has received priority.
"With respect to strategic weapons, the modernization of the Mirage IV and
of the C 135 tanker aircraft is being carried out, specifically as regards
increased penetration capability through improvement of their weapons sys-
tem, rheir navigation equipment, and their electronic countermeasure devices.
"The P12 missiles with which the SNLE`s [Missile-Launching Nuclear Submarines]
were equipped has been replaced with the M20 missile, having explosive power
in the order of inegatons, increased range and improved capability of piercing
enemy defenses. The production and putting into service of a fourth set of
M20 missiles to equip the SNLE's currently in operation has been completed.
"The ~~2 missiles in Plate~u d'Albion are in the process of being replaced
with S3 missiles equipped with thermonuclear warheads. The first firing -
unit being equipped with this new missile should be operational in 1980.
17
FOR OPFICI!�'. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR UFrIC [AL U5E ONI,Y
"Conforming to the planning law, which provided for completion of the fourth
and fifth SNLE's during the 1977-1982 period, the fourth--the 'L'Indomptable' _
--entered service in 1977, and the fifth--the 'Le Tonnant'--is now in the
process of being tested and will enter service during the first half of 1980.
"Funds were committed to the study and subsequent construction of a new-
generation SNLE with the ordering, at year-end of 1978, of the 'L'Inflexible,'
whir..h wi11 be the first SNLE equipped with M4 missiles and a navigation
system that will improve its performance charactaristics and, its capabilities.
All ~~iecisions have been taken and put into effect in preparation for
the realization, during the next decade, of the new strategic nuclear weapons
systems (SNLE's sea-to-land, new missiles currently under study land-to-land),
that will enable France to achieve nuclear powers at a technological level
- equivalent to that of the U.S. and USSR weapons systems.
"Four air squadrons capable of utilizing the AN52 tactical nuclear weapon are
~ operational; a fifth one is to be formed in 1980.
"Five 'Pluton' regiments have been operational since 1978, studies relative G
to this missile's successor are underway.
"The adaptation of the tactical nuclear weapon to carrier-based aircraft (the
" Super-Etendard) aboard the Cwo aircraft carriers is in progress; one of the
two carriers was equipped in 1978 with special stowing facilities for the
nuclear weapons.
"Lastly, development of the ASMP [Medium-Range Air-to-Land Missile] that
is to equip the Mirage 2000 is progressing according to schedule."
In regard to the Ground Forces, the report states among other things that _
- "the effort devoted to antitank combat has been characterized by continued
ec~uipping of units with 'Hot' and 'Milan' missiles as SA342 helicopters
are placed in service."
~f the 44 SA34~. and SA342 helicopters scheduled to be ordered between 1977
and 1979 (as part of the total of 128 between 1977 and 1982), 42 have actu-
- ally been ordered and received. As regards the "hot" missiles, objectives to
date have been aehieved: 96 have beer. ordered of the 96 scheduled, and 58
delivered of the 61 scheduled for delivery. The situation in regard to the
"Milan" is even better: 420 of the 420 1977-1979 scheduled orders have been
placed, and 540 actually delivered versus 510 scheduled for delivery ~iuring
this period. The 57 Rolands have been ordered as planned, of which 39 (of _
44) have been delivered. ~
It is noted that the VAB AA (VADAR)* program has been abandoned for the SATCP -
[Very Close-Range Land-torAir] program. -
~These acronyms identify a program related to close-range defense against
low-level air attack, by neans of twin 20-man guns mounted on VAB AAs [Front-
Armored Anti-Aircraft Vehicles], autonomously operated or centrally control-
led in groups; exact expansion of VADAR unknown]
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ With reference to the Navy and more specifically the Naval Air Force, the
report states that the latter presently deploys 35 Atlantics and 12 Neptunes
(bein~ retired from service) on sea patrol, and around 100 Crusaders, Alizes,
and Etendard IV Ms, the latter of which are gradually being replaced by the
Super-Etendard. The helicopter fleet consists of some 50 aircraft (seme 20
_ Super Frelons in service, plus ~fG 13 Lynxes which will gradually replace the
carrier-based Alouette III ASM [Anti-Submarine] units.
- "For the Navy, the initial period of the planning law has been one of essen-
tial decisions. The most importanC one has been adoption, in 1978, of a set
of long-range objectiVes. The decision to go ahead with the first new-gene- _
- ration SNLE equipped with the M4 weapons system was also a majcr one."
- It is also noted that the Super Etendard program was cut back from 80 to 71
units, of which 35 have been ordered to date and are to be delivered by the
end oF 1979.
With reference to the Air Force, the following chart shows the situation of
its principal programs. It is noted that "the Super Crotale program has been
abandoned and the Crotale program extended, marking a needed new effort to
improve air defenses at sensitive points. Moreover, orders for Epsilon
trainers and new helicopters will be deferred until after 1980.
"The Air Forces's general profile has not changed since 1976. Its total
manpower has remained stable at around 106,000 men.
~ With reference to air defense, three quadrons of the four are now
equipped with rlirage Fls, while the putting into serive of the Matra Super
530 air-to-air missile--which optimizes the high-altitude intercept capabili-
ties of this plane--should take place at the end of 1979. The initial orders _
for Mirage 2000's were placed during 1979. With the Matra Super 530 D air-
to-air missile which is to be associated with this interceptor, it will be
able to checkmate hostile planes that penetrate at high speeds and low al- ~
titudes.
"To meet the continuing need for low altitude detection--since our radars
currently cover the entire territory and its approaches at medium and high
~ altitudes--the air force is now experimenting with a device of integrating
airdrome approach radars and mobile tactical radars into the STRIDA [French
Defense Data Processing and Presentation System] network, which should go
into service within the next decade. -
"The 'Tactical Air Force, consisting essentially of 21 squadrons of Mirage
III's, Mirage V's and Jaguars, continues at a high level of operational
readiness. _
"The program of equipping air craft with electronic countermeasure devices,
- which is currently in progress, will increase their ~robabilities of success
on missions and in evasive action against enemy missiles. The refueling of
_ Jaguars and Fls in flight by C135's adds a great deal of flexibility and
� feasibility for remote interventions and deployments (stagings and overflights).
19
FOR OFFIC.Il~L USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Orders Deliveries
Planning Objec- Planning Objec-
law ob-� tives law ob-~. ~ tives
Equipment Completed Completed
jectives for jectives for
1977-1982 1977-1979 1977-1982 1Q77-1979
. Jaguar - - 84 75 60
irage F 1 109 86 85 123 35 34
Mirage 2000 127 20 4 la - - _
Alphajet 144 $8 88 142 32 31
Crotale 5 5 9 15 10 12 -
20 mm AA Batteries 152 24 104 48 - 20
Air-air missil.es 1,770 840 620 1,150 1,060 1,256
. Situation of Principal Air Force Programs -
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ "The reinsratement of the production cycle �or C 160 Transalls, modified for
- refueling in flight, and the orders already placed for 12~of these aircraft,
will substantially increase the transport fleet's capabilities both as regards
tonna~e carrying capacity and cruising radius.
"Despite an i.nitial delay, mass production of the Alpha Jet trainer sircraft
is hack on schedule: 88 planes have already been ordered, 31 have been deliv-
ered and will be placed in service between now and the end of the year. The
replacement of the Mystere IV and T 33 planes is thus assured. "
"Lastly, with regard to the air defense of bases and sensitive installations,
the deployment of Crotale close-range land-to-sir missile batteries and of
20 mm anti-aircraft canon completes the effort begun in the domain of camou-
flage and hardening of installations in 1976."
General Objectives
This third part of the report again forcibly expresses the need to maintain
' a sustained effort in regard to nuclear armament.
- "In the face of evolving threats and techniques, we must maintain the credi- -
~ bility and the capability of our strategic forces at their necessary levels
as a national deterrent.
"We must also carry out the studies necessary to enable us to take timely
decisions regarding the development of new generation strategic and tactical _
weapons. From the same viewpoint, we must continue our effort toward the
utilization of space, by way also of satellite studies and possible develop-
mental work. ~
"The coordinated equipping of the conventional forces necessary to our mili- -
tary strategy constitutes our second obligation. This objective requires
that I~heir modernization, the~r training and their maintenan~ce be guaranteed;
special emphasis must be placed on:
--continued modernization of the ground forces' equipment;
. --moderni.zation of the Air Forces through a sustained rate of production
of the Mirage 2000 despite its earlier delays;
- --an accelerated renovation of our navy's surface fleet to palliate to the -
extent possible the coming retirements of older ships between 1985 and 1992;
--the reinforcement of our capability for action abroad."
Among the objectives to be achieved in 1982 in the domain of forces' acti-
vities, the report cites "15~ hours of fl~ring, per mohth for each coinoat_ pilot," -
depending upon the evolution of the cost of fuel.
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
" FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY =
Ol~jectives fiy Category of Forces
Wlth reference to the Strategic Nuclear Forces, "the development of their two
main components will be continued between 1980 and 1982, particularly by way ~
of improving their penetration and survival capabilities.
"The priority effort will be centered on the new M4 strategic weapons system
which is scheduled to be put into service on the SNLE 'L'Inflexible' in early
1985. Utilizing multiple nuclear warheads, this new missile will mark a
significant advance over its predecessors from the viewpoints both of its
~bility to~penetrate.enemy defenses and of the fact that in time=-when all
the SNL~'s are equipped with it--it will multiply the number of obj.ectives
that can be brought under threat.
"The S2 missiles of the Plateau d'Albion's two �iring units will be replaced
- with S3 missiles: the first unit in 1980 and the second in 1982. These
missiles will carry thermonuclear warheads with enhanced penetration aids. -
_ The survival capability of the launching sites wi11 be improved.
"Uuring the same period, studies will be carried out on the future of the
Plateau d'Albion and on post-1990 projections for the strategic component, _
~ahich could include use of mobile ].and-to-land ballistic missil~s and cruise
missiles.
_ "Tactical nuclear weapons capabilities will be improved during the planning
period. A third squadron of Jaguars equipped to carry the AN52 nuclear
weapon coill be operational in 1981, raising to five the nunber of Air Force
- squadrons (Jaguar and Mirage III E) capable of carrying this weapon.
"The navy, for its part, will by 1981 have its AN 52 weapons systems in use _
by way of Super-Etendard aircraft, which will endow its two aircraft carriers -
with a tactical nuclear capability.
"The development of the ASMP [Medium-Range Air-to-Land] missile, designed ~
mainly for the Mirage 2000, will continue.
"Lastly, studies will be developed on future tactical nuclear weapons and
especially on those for the land-to-land system to succeed the Pluton.
"As regards the utilization of space, the preliminary studies now in progress
shoudl be completed during the period 1980-1982 and the necessary development
caork started toward the realization of a satellite reconnaissance system and
z satellite telecommunications network."
The Ground Forces are scheduled to put into service the nuclear tactical
~oeapons systems for which they are responsible and complete the execution of
_ their reorganization plan.
During the 1980-1982 period, they will, among other things, lay the ground- `
work for the period to follow by proceeding with or continuing soecialized
studies related to:
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
i
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- --on the one hand, the basic combat missile, the anittank helicopter, the -
_ multiple rocket-launcher, defense systems against low-flying and very low-
flying enemy aircraft; .
- --and on tt~e other hand, a system of battlefield surveillance and attainment
of targets, capable of ineeting the requirements of Che ANT [Tactical Nuclear
- Weapon], and to be installed before second-generation tactical missiles are
placed in service.
As regards the navy, during the period 1980-1982, its tasks, among others,
will be: to assure, as its first priority, the operational readiness and se-
curity of the Strategic Naval Force, the size of which will be increased in
early 1980 by the putCing into service of a fifth SNLE, to maintain the capa-
bilities of the Naval Air Force and especially those of the sea patrol after
_ modification of the Neptunes; and to lay the groundwork for the post-1982
period by carrying out the developmental studies necessary for future weapons
systems and for the renewal of its carrier-based aircraft. In this regard,
it is only after the studies now in progress in the operational, technical and
industrial domains have resulted in a choice of the future carrier-based air- -
craft that the appropriate aircraft carrier can be defined. The go-ahead on
this carrier can therefore not be issued until after 1982.
The air force, while maintaining i.ts operational flexibility and polyvalence,
- must take part substantially in the continued improvement of the strategic
and tactical nuclear components for whose operational readiness it is re-
spons:Cble.
~ "It must also develop and modernize the capabilities of its conventional forces
and must, to this end and amon, other things, during the 1980-1982 period:
assure, as its f irst priority, the manufacture of the Mirage 2000 in its two
versions--air defense and ASMP--so as to maintain a level of 450 combat planes
in the flight line; seek to achieve increased tactical t_ransport, logistical
transport, and in-flight refueling capabilities through the acquisition of
additional C 160 Transalls; improve its low-altitude air defense capability
through the acquisition of ground radars, fixed and mobile, to be integrated
into the STRIDA network; develop strategic and tactical electronic surveillance
_ means; lay the groundwork for the post-1982 period, continuing the corrective
effort it has undertaken in regard to studies on new weapons systems and their
operational environment, expanding, for this purpose, its studies on engines,
new weapons and electronic countermeasures, and instituting the study of a
tactical combat plane (Editor's note: The report does not specify whether this
study is to be a joint undertaking by the three forces); continue its effort
in regard to passive defense of sensitive points. As regards production, the
essential programs have been put into effect. The initial delay in the start
of the Mirage 2000 program can be only partially recovered, because of in-
dustrial considerations even if none other. The 1977-1982 period must pro-
duce the groundwork for the planes and weapons of the end of the next decade.
I
23
FOR OFFICIA:. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000240010008-0
,
I'OR UFFICIAL USl: UNLY
, 1)uring 1980-1982, the report states, "there must be a~.09 percent annual
~rowth in the ratio o� the defense budget to the PIMB [Gross National Mar-
kered ProductJ--which represents around 88 percent of the GNP--as during the
last 3 years. This growth rate must be added to the ratio of 3.67 percent,
which is the ratio of Che defense budget to the PIMB in 1979."
The debate in the National Assembly wi].1 center more on the question of the
actual credits to be allocated to specific operations than on percentage growth
rates.
- COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1979
9399
CSO: 3100
2I~
FOR OFFICIi,;, USE ONLY
. ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PCF, PS SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND DISCUSSED
~ Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 24 Sep 79 pp 28-29
[Text] The ceremony of former halcyon days surrounded the meeting of comm:�unist
and socialist negotiators Thursday morning at 1000 in the Colonel Fabian
Square headquarters of the French Communist Party (PCF). Partieipants could
well have had the impression of reliving the golden hours of the Union of
- the Left. The same heads of delegations: Charles Fiterman, accompanied by
Phili.ppe Aerzog for the PCF, Pierre Beregovoy for the PS [Socialist Party],
accompanied by representatives of the party's different wings, Messrs Chevene-
ment, Poperen, Cot, and Le Garrec. The same ritual too: the meeting opened ~
with each delegation reading a formal preliminary statement. But after 3
hours and 20 minutes, the negotiatdrs 'parted without setting a date for a
future meeting. They published a dull coumiunique in which each party atuck
to its positions. _
_ Nobody had expected anything different. When Francois Mitterrand issued his
20 August statement from Anglet suggesting the possibility of a meeting
between himself and PCF Secretary General Georges Marchais, thE latter
bluntly declined to comment, saying "No trumped-up deals."
The~},concerned about possibly offending leftist opinion, the communists had
eventually accepted the principle of an exploratory meeting between two
delegations excluding the party chiefs. But they had also immediately laid
- down the ground rules for such a meeting: "No make-believe meetings. No
- pretentious statements. No show-off committee," wrote Fiterman in the
6 September L'HUMANITE. And on 13 September, Pierre Juquin admitted: "We
are pessimistic about the outcome of this meeting. Once bitten, twica shy."
The socialists harbored no greater hope. Mitterrand said "I have no faith
~ in the Union of the Left, I admit it."
_ It all seemed, therefore, as if they were going through the motions of a `
reconciliation while knowing such was impossible. It was a show for the
leftist public.
. 25 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
A11 the special elections did, in fact, show Marchais and Mitterrand that,
despite the war between party headquarters and staffs, socialist and
communist voters were continuing to vote regularly for each other's best- ~
placed candidate in the second round of balloting.
This persiatence of the unitary apirit among leftiet voters ia useful to
Mitterrand whose party benefited greatly from the Union of the Left. It
was for the purpose of reviving this dynamic which has carried his party
since the 1972 signing of the common program, that, in August, the socialist
le~der called for formation of a"public safety" ieft based on a rapproche-
ment with labor unions, associations, and parties. It was to channel to hia
a~vantage this unitary aspiration of party members and votere that the first
secretary of the PS adopted as his own the formula of "union at the rank-and-
fi~~.e level," a concept initially advanced by the communists. Lastly, it was
to demonstrate the sincerity.of his unitary convictions that Mitterrand allowed
Jean-Pierre Chevenement, leader of the CERES [Center for [Socialist] Studiea, ~
Research, and Education], to prepare a"socialist plan" that does not fear
to borraw from communist views~ notabl.y from the communist analysis of the
economic situation and assessment of the countries of the East.
Within this context, Thursday's meeting was per se a triumph for the PS.
The same is true about the agreement on united action concluded Tuesday
by the CGT [General Confederation of LaborJ and CFDT [French Democratic
- Confederation of Labor], thanks to Edmond Ma.ire. In both instances, the com-
munist movement felt compelled to simulate unitary behavior.
- Such behavior is absolutely no longer a part of its strategy. The PCF is
not prepared to give up the isolation approved by its 23d congress. Initially
~ defe~sive, that isolation has ultimately proved to be profitable.
Communist leaders were surpr~sed at their good showing in the European
elections after a year during which they had been beset on all sides, even
from within their own ranks.. And at the most recent Gentral Committee meet-
Ing last week, Philippe Herzog was able to say that the downward trend
had now been reversed. (Incidentally, prior to this meeting, PCF headquarters
_ had denied there was any such trend).
These factors give the PCF hope of being able to repeat its European elec-
tions performance in the presidential election. Its increasing role ir~ social
and labor unrest and its taking charge of all conflicts are both designed with
this end in view. The PCF is; in fact, trying to rally all the malcontents.
At L'HUMANITE's recent annual carnival, Marchais accused the PS, and
especially Mitterrand, of thinking nothing but presidential elections.
~
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OF~'ICIAL USE ONLY
To which Jean Poperen, a socialist, replied: "No party is more obsessed by
the coming presidential election than the PCF."
Actually, Marchais and Mitterrand are both thinking of the 1981 election.
Marchais is worrying about the first-round of balloting, and this requires -
_ him to go it alone. Mitterrand is preparing himself for the aecond-ro.und,
and this compela him to seek unity at $11 coate.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "Valeurs actuelles"
- 8041
CSO: 3100
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
- COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
OPINIONS ON BERLINGUER'S 'RINASCITA' ARTICLE
~ ~
Eive-Point Program
Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 6
/Article: Berlinguer's Staic Compromise/
LText/ The historical compromise has been re~ected by all political forces
(except by a sector of the DC %Christian Democrats/) and clearly by the
electorate. But stoically, Enrico Berlinguer does not give up and he proposes -
it again with an accent on "austerity" which also is not desinged to gain
him po~ularity. In the trian,p~ular game between the PSI /Italian Socialist
Part~/, the DC, and the PCI /Italian Communist ~s~rt~/, the RINASCITA essay,
lxowever, achieves one resih~t: It puts the PCI back in the running.
To better understand the terms of the "general line" which Berlinguer
proposes to follow in the coming encounter with the other parties, here is _
a resum~ of the "five points" of the article.
Compromise. This word is not without its history. Togliatti used it to
sum up the first post-Fascist governments. It is still valid, ~ust so
long as, as happened 30 years ago, the conservatives are aware of the real E"
conditions of economic life and the political struggle in Italy.
Economic Crisis. There have been many errors of assessment. But now the -
problem is to find agreement between "those who are only intereated in how
much to produce and those who want to know what is produced and why."
Austerity. This does not only mean sacrifices. Above all it means worker
- control oi the use of resources. However, it is necessary to acquire a -
government mentality and to stop organized resistance.
_ The Masses and Politics. The new mod~l of economic development can be
administered only by the large parties which, together with producers and
workers, bring the masses of consumers into line.
28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Democratic Centralism. Intolerantly re~ecting criticism of PCI administration,
Berlinguer warna against indiscriminate attacks agsinst the partiea "because
they are organizations capable of overcoming sacial disunity."
Cicchitto Interview
riilan L'EUROPEO in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 7
/Interview with Fabrizio Cicchitto by G. Fo: "The DC Should Be Punished"/
LText/ /Question/ Mr Cicchitto, how da you evaluate Berlinguer's summer
"essay?"
- LAnswer/ The Italian political system is taken for granted in the PCI -
secretary's analysis. Instead, the ma3or effect, according to Berlinguer,
is to be directed to healing the damage done by the economic crisis.
Now, it is true that when the social forces were left to themselves, thEy
produced distortions and coporativism that caused imbalances and contra-
dictions in addition to dynamic progress. But in reality, the renewed
proposal of the historical compromise by Berlinguer masks the failure to
develop the Eurocommunist rev~ision which pushes the PCI into an agreement _
~ with the DC. .
/Question/ Do you find that Berlinguer's analaysis also contains new
proposals in the economic fi~lds?
LAnswer/ I would not say they are so new. Partially they were already
advanced at the llth Congress. Today th~ PCI restores a part of the
Ingrao line (the so-called "development model"), which at that time was
defeated. In part, they are also socialist themes, though with different
emphases. We agree that it is necessary to have a rigorous selective
_ political approach. However, we must not forget nn what level public
consumption still takes place (ths home, schools, transportation) as well
as certain private consumption, particularly in the south. In regard to
what Berlinguer calls the "weight of the workers" and which we define as
industrial democarcy, it would be wise to recognize that this is a matter
of the critical revisi~n taking place between the more advanced forces of
European soci3l democracy such as the Scandinavian (the Meidner report),
or the British Laborites. This brings to the forefront, positively or
negatively, a theme of confrontation between socialists and communists,
- but also a contradiction within the PCI: A coherent Eurocommunists, but
also a contradiction within the PCI: A coherent Eurocommunist revision is
not achieved by starting with themes of a program that is tendentially ,
socialist.
LQuestion/ Then is unity of the left possible?
LAnswer/ I believe a considerable area of agreement exists on programatic
problems which will be tested and consolidated at the September meeting.
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ON~Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
It will be indiapenaable that on questions such as energy, rate of growth,
employment, reform of the state participation agencies, the united left
- (therefore, including the radicals and the PDUP %Proletarian Unity Part~7)
make its strength fe1C. On the other hand there ia the real danger that
every large DC aplinter will play the leftist parties off agaiast each other
- with preferential relationships and later regroup in order to maintain
power. This August, unlike last year, Berlinguer is the protagonist.
Furthermore he has two positions that do not represent a single voice.
, In the interview with STERN he speaks of a tendcncy to stage a coup in
certain sectors of the DC, but he does not repeat this theme in the
RINASCITA article. Then is this danger of a coup real and really attribut-
able to some sector of the DC or is it not? And if this analysis were true,
how could the proposal of a historic compromise be reconciled with a party
that tendentially favors a coup? Would this not also be a surrender to
necessity? .
_ LQuestion/ But what are the possibilities of evolution in the political
framework?
1A,nswer/ It is necessary to start with the need to redimension the DC
hegemony. This can take place in two ways: Either with an emergency govern-
ment in which all democratic political forces are represented, including the
PCI; or through a government of national solidarity with a socialist president. '
The DC seeks to avoid both solutions, perhaps trying to play the PSI off
againslt the PCI. This, too, must be discussed in September. -
Paggi Statement
_ Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 7, 8
/Statement by Leonardo Paggi: "These Are Our Errors"/ .
LText/ Reflection on and analysis of the form the party should take is _
today a real problem for communists and it cannot be exorcized by fashionable
formulas. But I add immediately that it is a"functional," not ideological,
problem and as such it deserves to be dealt with. Asor Rosa is right when
he says that the debate on democratic centralism does not call into question
matters of principle, but the problem of the party "machinery," I would say
rather of the "political capacity," of an organization. Therefore let
us not create confusion: The K factor is not involved.
If, then, we wish to deal with the question from a lay point of view and -
aside from any mechanical approach, it is ne~essary to start seriously
from those objective tendezcies toward bureaucratization of politics
which are an integral part of contemporary capitalist society.
In a"take-all" party of conservative inspiration, the bureaucratic
supergrowth certainly implies mass passivity. But a mechanism of representa-
- tion based on pure mirroring of constituted interests guarantees and even
- imposes the political transmission of the part of society referrred to.
If anything, the risk is failure to express a political ine that goes beyond
the exterior sum of special interests. This is now the case of the DC.
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
A functional relationship between politics and society, paradoxically, is
much more complex and much less automatic in a party of renewal in which
political support is produced by the credibility of a program. The element
- of. sub~ective construction is predominant; the timeliness with which changes
in the social order are interpreted is decisive. In its more general terms .
- I would say that the PCI today is paying for the insufficiency of a"pedagogic" ~
structure based mainly on transmission and the diffusion of the {~olitical _
line from the top to the rank and file. I should like to recall only -
three matters. _
1. The enormous growth and cultural unification of the nation and the
- change of social personalities which have immeasurably elevated the quality
of political demand. Shorn of its original aims, the pedagogical movement
risks becoming a repetitive ritual, perpetually subjected to the real -
demands present in the body of the party.
2. A structure based on transmitting and propagandizing the line inevitably
- wincls up contradicting the party's tasks in the government. Taken together,
tt~e aims are not specifically analyzed, are not enriched by a study of
_ specific situations or problems and end up remaining always identical to
themselves, ignoring the quantity of input available to a capillary organi-
zation such as the communist organization.
3. In the absence of a sufficiently articulated and differentiated debate ,
on specific content, the method of .choice becomes dominant in the formation
of leadership groups perhaps creating too great a distortion in the phase
of assigning duties.
- Ho~a has the organization reacted in the most recent and delicate phase of
Ita'lian political life? Enrico Berlinguer said, in a moment of post-
electoral reflection, that the nature and scope of the ongoing clash was
not made sufficiently visible. To me this seems an important point of
reflection which, however, contains elements that must be further explained.
If we do not want to limit ourselves to noting that the effort to explain
is :Cnadequate, the discussion shifts to the relationship between the form
of the party and the form (or forms) of the present crisis. Are the cracks _
in Italian society more complex than those that might interpret the
present political structure? Further, does the accumulation of questions
coming from very different social strata require, even in the identification
of forms of political initiative, a process of unification that is less
Jacobin, and of a longer and more difficult effort?
Claudio Petruccioli has pose3 an important problem for discussion: That of
the relationship between the concept of party and the affirmation of the
existence of a class as a historical subject in an overall change in social
- relations. I do not believe it is a matter of.communists once more discussing
what has been more recently defined as worker centrality; but rather to
- better understand the extremely complex way in which it is constituted,
above a11 at a time of noneconomic crisis in development. It cannot be
forgotten that both in the communist and in the social democratic tradition
forms of rigidity and sclerosis in party forms are always accompanied by
worker-oriented ideologies. �
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
After all, the problems cannot be circumscribed by the forms of political
initiative, but it also influences the way analysis and plans are developed.
I agree with those who believe in the utility, during the present economic
- period, of a clear expl,.anation of the PCI's refoxmist vocation.
_ ' However, thinga are perhaps much more complex than they appear to _
Eugenio Scalfari when he again proposes, like a kind of ace in the hole,
the alliance between the working class and the healthy, praductive entre-
preneurial business class. In the history of the past 3 years, I should -
like to see a single instance cited in which the PCI disregarded a
specific disposition toward an antiparasitical and antiwelfare attitude
by Italian businessmen. The reality is that through the timid, and immediately
unsuccessful, attempts of the foremost center-left, real proposals of
bouregeois reformism deserted the Italian political scene.
What has a11 this to do with the party problem? In my view, a great deal.
If we do not wl.sh to see the problem (which is certainly not secondary) -
of moderatism result in paralysis, it is also necessary that the entire
left know how to find new and extremely flexible forms of relationships
and democratic leadership in the social conflict, which inevitably is
destined to go through moments of bitterness.
Boato ~nterview
Milan L'Europeo in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 8 ~
/Interview with Marco Boato,By G. Fo: "The Compromise Lost"/
LText/ Marco Boato, of the PCI, is a founding member of "Lotta continua,"
an exponent of Catholic dissent, and a radical deputy from Trentino. He -
is considered one of the PCI's spakesmen, so much so that they asked him
to participate in the "special':' on radicals published by RINASCITA. Boato
says, "Since Berlinguer goes back to Togliatti to legitimize the compromise,
I also would like to go back to a quote by Rosa Luxemburg which says, ;
'This concept considers the imperial phase not as a. historical necessity,
not as the decisive struggle for socialism, but as the perversity of a _
- small group of special interests. This concept tends to warn the bourge-
oisie that imperialism and militarism are distressing to it from the same
point of view as its specific class interests, tends to isolate the group
of special interests and to develop a proletarian bloc with broad stratas
of the bourgeoisie in order to attenuate imperialism.... The general
struggle for the elimination of the historical conflict between zhe prole-
tariat and capital is transformed into the utopia of a"historical compromise'�
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.' As we see, there is nothing -
~ new under the sun."
LQuestion/ Conditions have changed.
LAnswer/ Certainly. However the basic problem remains the same. What
possibilities are offered for the workers movement in a prolonged crisis of
capitalism? Should the bourgeoisie be taught to "function in their own
true interests" as Togliatti mainzained, or should an alternative to power
_ 32
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
be developed? After all, a year and a half after RINASCITA's article, -
both communists and socialists were ejected =rom government. The phase
of the alliance had served once more to launch accumulation and allow the -
DC 30 years of almost undisturbed power. Even now for 3 years the PCI
has been used--knowingly--and then cast aside. All this is absent from -
the Berlinguer text.
LQuestion/ This time, however, it was not 18 April 1948, but 3 June 1979,
and the DC, with its center allies, seems incapable of forming a stable
government.
/Answer/ That is true. This ungovernability is a p~tentially betCer
condition under which to build an alternative power. Berlinguer ignores _
- this possibility completely, even if only to criticize it. He instead
dismisses the entire debate on party form which has occupied:. the PCI
- Central Committee after 3 June (perhaps all the speakers wanted to "attack
the parties as such?") and directs a moralistic appeal to the DC.
LQuestion/ Then Berlinguer has flunked. Without appeal?
LAn~wer/ There are some new things in this article, and they are the things
that the commentators have been most silent about. Asor Rosa had criticized,
in L'UNITA, the fact that Berlinguer's remarks in his Genoa speech a}~ear
ago fell into a void. Now it is the PCI secretary himself who returns to
and amplifies questions such as the qualitq of life and youth's re~ection
of labor.. In regard to the latter, Berlinguer says that "hasty charges"
were made that the entire population of young men and women did not want to
work (or did not want to study) mainly because they are guilty of askin~
themselves and wanting to discuss the "why" of work (or the "why" of study).
Very well. Without saying so, Berlinguer makes a significant self-criticism
because he himself was the "hasty one". Also interesting is the renewed
proposal of austerity without the Amendola-sty],e nonsense about "workers
frugality" but linked to the question of energy. All the new economic-
social analyses are however canceled when the question of the ranks is
considered.
LQuestion/ But will Berlinguer meet Craxi?
/Ans~aer/ This is the least that could be done on the terrain of political _
initiative after months of paralysiz..
Manti Interview
Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 9
/Interview with Mario Monti by E. Au: "Austerity in A Fog"/
LText/ "My first consideration after reading Berlinguer's article is not
really economic. In fact I note that the palitical debate continues to
search for necessary aggregations of power to push the economy toward _
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
certain general goals. We are still at the point of a choice between the
great alternative models (or presumed to be such), while the discussion of
"means" is almost always entirely absent. And instead I have been profoundly -
convinced that these discussion can also be fruitful for nations more advanced -
than our own, but that in Italy we are still very far from the great cross-
roads that demands strategic choices. I mean to say that in our phase of
development, we should seek nece~sary consensus to make the social and
economic machinery function more efficiently. Without this administrative
work any goal becomes unrealizable as is demonstrated by the �ate of some
reforms in recent years."
Prof Mario Monti is, among the young economists, one who has fought most
consistently in recent years against Keynesian illusions and the harmful
effects of state intervention in the economy. Monti considers the Berlinguer
article interesting because it again submits the themes of accumulation and
structural rehabilitation even though, as an economist, he hesitates to
comment on it because of the indeterminate nature of the economic model
whic.h is behind certain statements made by the communist leader. For
~ example, what does better quality of life mean? -
/Answer/ Today, for most people, this means having water where there is
- no water, functioning transportation systems, well-organized hospitals, -
greater security, and furthermore laws that protect the consumer and regulate
the market. All these things are done in other countries with that dose of
"obtuse pragmatism" that Berlinguer criticizes, but perhaps is necessary
in Italy.
LQuestion/ But what means should be used according to the PCI?
LAnswer/ That is precisely the point that needs further clarification.
In the first place it would be necessary to understand how, according to
the PCI, individual energies can be used for socially accepted aims. A
~ model would be needed that would create a mix between individual convenience,
moral tension, and control by authority. And this mix is defined both in _
the liberal system and the communist system of the Eastern nations, while
it is lacking in Berlinguer's program. Instead there are openings regarding
_ accumulation and control by the workers. For the first time, it seems to
me, it is recognized that most private savings belong to the workers and as
a consequence, the trade unions should be concerned not only with the distri-
bution, but also the protection, of wealth.
LQuestion/ The most specific part of Berlinguer's speech is the part that -
_ is wanting. In.fact there is no mention of use of power by the DC except
that by its inefficiency it worsens the quality of life. Why?
/Answer/ Because in Italy the PCI, but also other parties, prefer to -
dramatize the ultimate aims of the economy rather than set forth a tight _
confrontation concerning which party has the most accurate programs needed
to make the present system work better.
31~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
/Interviewer's concluding remark:/ -
It is clear that in economic terms, Berlinguer's speech was written on "
water. The speech is different from the political point of view. But
- does the postFonement of the confrontation concerriing responsibilities not
- f.avor those forces which want to change nothing?
D'Arcais Article
Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 6 Sep 79 p 9 ~
/Article by Paolo Flores d'Arcais: "In Love With a Coup-Oriented DC"/
LText/ Austerity, historic compromise, worker centrality, these are the
main points of a strategy reaffirmed by Enrico Berlinguer.as the present `
philosophy of Italian communism. This is a platform for resuming the dialog
with an improbable Moro-style DC, but it is also--and this is most interesting--
a definition of the terrain on which the PCI intends to carry out the
unifying contacts with the rest of the left. And since without the unity ~
- of the left, as things are today, no reformist project can become a govern-
ment activity, Berlinguer's philosophy merits the full attention of the
- left. Its defect is that it is contradictory. The DC, in fact, is presented
botti as a democratic mass party, the irreplacable contractor in a new and
more advanced social pact, as well as a party that would potentially stage
a cc>up the day that the left, backed by a majority vote, would imagine that
- it could eject it from government. An ambiguous party, then but such a
special. kind of ambiguity that it brings to the �orefront a single logical
conclusion; The impossibility of removing the DC from the government of the
country since that right is inseparable from maintenance of the democratic
system. Therefore, one should not be surprised that Zaccagnini's supporters
immediately showed their appreciation.
- The proposal submitted to the left is certainly unifying, but unifying and
perpetually subordinated to DC hegemony. And that is not all. What is
striking in Berlinguer's article is not so much the reaffirmation of the -
historic compromise as a long-term strategy by virtue of which a government
of national unit would be more than an economic therapy for an exceptional
emergency situation. Nor is it striking that in this way, the regulation of
alternating governments, that is the physiological functioning of a democratic
system, may be projected into the future with no frills. What is striking
is the theoretically definite and definitive, therefore philosophical
character of Berlinguer's iejection of alternation.
Having to defend the rule of democratic cnetralism from the objections that
are multiplying even in the communist area, the PCI secretary lets himself -
go to an authentic call to complicity: The attack on democratic centralism -
is presented as an attack "against the parties as such (against the so-
called party form)" and it would be only the main point of the reactionary
"furious attack gainst the mass parties in general." Berlinguer seems :
- 35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY
to auggest that we are all democratic centralista. This is partially true.
A democracy ~ased on a millennial monopoly of partiea that are increasingly
separated and which oppose civil society has ended up by "extinguishing"
- internal party democracy. But the accusation does not affect all the -
parties to the same degree and doea not eliminate the fact that the PCI's
democratic centralism is the most complete form of this extenction! If
Berlinguer means that there is increased hostility against "partyocracy,"
against the reign of the apparatus, against the oligarchy of secretariats,
he is right. He is wrong when he considers this criticism a"furious attack"
, by the reactionaries, since today the surest form of reactionaries.politics
is achieved precisely by the daily humiliation the "partyocracy" inflicts
upon the most energetic forces of civil society.
The nation's crisis is certainly also economic, but it is above all political
and moral. And, unfortunately, it is of a piece with the crisis of the
left, of its parties which so far have been incapable, to considerably
- varying degrees, of being parties that were "less of a party" than the
others; of "remaking policy" according to the indications advanced by the
most lucid and realistic poZitical reformer of our parliament, Leonardo -
Sciascia. llnfortunately, this is not the suggestion that Berlinguer accepts,
in order to refine it and articulate it in a concrete and viat~le program of
"struggle against the government" to be submitted to the entire left.
COPYRIGHT: 1979, Rizzoli Editore
- 6034
CSO: 3104
36
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUDTTRY SECTION ITALY
IMPORTANCE OF PCI LEADERS' EUROPEAN TOUR WEIGHED
Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 11 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD
[Article by Frane Barbieri: "But the Real Objective Is Not Eurocommuniam"] ~
[Text] Berlinguer, the reluctant visitor, has suddenly become a great
traveller. He has begun a tour which, following the first two Iberian _
stops, will take him to Greece and finish in Scandinavia--a journey around
the perimeter of the continent, so to speak, but one which has Europe's
future as its central topic. �
Berlinguer has acted under. the banner of the "new internationalism" rather
than to provide a new thrust to Euroconununism. In certain reapects this
concept substitutes Eurocommuniam and in others it even embraces it. The
"new internationalism" has already been outlined by the PCI leader in his
report to the latest congress, in the spring. At the time it seemed like -
- an ecumenical recipient for a11 the leftwing forces gathered together at
the communists' initiative as a motive nucleus for progress. Within _
Berlinguer's ecumenical framework once again we found a hazy dividing line
between a new democratic concept of communism and the traditional authori-
tarian concept--the only one actually being implemented. ~
The differences between Eurocommunism and Sovietism were historicall}r
"objectivized" to the extent that they appeared once again as twQ variants
of the same strategy, aimed at a single goal. The characteriatics of thia
ecumenical and pancommunist outlook are still preaent behind Berlinguer's '
international mission: To show that Cunhal and Carrillo are not so differ-
ent, after all, to announce that communist parties must not be aplit into
Eurocommunists and noneurocommunists, to maintain that such a coritradictory
attitude toward the EEC creates no split between the communist parties and
to emphasize that the verdict on the Soviet syatem ia not a deciaive distinc-
tion [discriminante], since the USSR is a most important reference point for
everyone.
_ In ahort, several of the demarcation lines drawn in red by Eurocommunism
- are being colored over in much more subtle ahades, disappear3ng into gray _
at various points. Though confirmed as a term, Eurocommunism does not
37
~'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240010008-0
i
FOR OFFTCIAL USF. ONLY
emergz strengthened from Berlinguer's pilgrimages either as a concept or -
as a current organized on a conCinental ecale. However, the blueprint
for the "new internationalism" does emerge better delineated and more -
detailed. Eapecially where it linka Europe's future to that of the Third
- World.
The PCI secretary general often seems tortuous and reticent in launching
his plans for greater flexibility. The reason probably lies in his exces-
sive--and in fact ecumenical--concern with progressing without any wrenchea, _
gtanding apart without clashes and criticizing without breaking away. This
- time we feel we can interpret his theses as fo~lows: Europe is experiencing -
a profound structural, and not merely temporary crisis. At the same time
the crisis in the Third World is eacalAting. The common denominator in
both crises is the outdated relationship between exploitera and exploited, -
north and south; consequently both crises can find a solution only within ~
the framework of a new economic order, for which Europe must act as promoter
together with the Third World countries. But only a Europe with united
_ leftwing forcea can achieve this. This is the point of the "new inter-
nationalism"--an internationalism which can embrace a11 the continent's
leftwing torces (to introduce a new lifestyle and more of consumption in
the West) and all the Third World progreasive forces (to build the relationa
of mutual trust essential for reaching the new order together).
Berlinguer is undoubtedly well aware of the interdependence between the
world crises, the fact that the Weatern criais stems from the Third World
and that the Third World's crisis stems from the West, or rather from th~
developed north. He is also well aware of the circumstance that in the -
quest for a new economic order it is not Europe, inspired by the principles
of justice and altruism, which is saving the Third World, but Europe which
is saving itself, since the present machine~y for exchanges--raw materials
at low cost and technologies at high cost--is about to explode, or has to ~
a large extent already exploded, with much more alarming consequences for
European civilization than for the civilization of the emergent countries.
, While Europe is being shaken by the clasa atruggle--to use Berlinguer's
terminology--a class struggle of much broader proportions is now shaking
the world as a whole, setting the underdeveloped countries againet the
industrialized countries. In this struggle even the European and Western
working class is in many respects on the side of the "exploiters." Although
it regariis itself as exploited, it must be acknowledged that, on account
of its lifestyle and the consumption spiral in which it is caught up, the
European working class owns a considerable proportion of the wealth taken
_ from the Third World countries. In order to restore a fair share of that
wealth to its rightwing owners all developed societies and economiea as a
whole, whether "exploiters" or "exploited," must decide to abar.don their -
privileged conditions. Western privileges lie not only in capital, but
also 'n wages. 'It goes without saying t~iat auch a radical change cannot be
carried out without the leftwing forces. It is equally likely that the -
_ leftwing forcea can carry out this task better than anyone else. And of
= 38
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
all the world alinements I:urope seems the beat auited to proceeding toward
tliese goals with credibility and like2ihood of auccesa. -
Hence the importance of the "new internationalism," conceived in the Euro-
pean context and projected onto the Third World. Whi1e paying homage to
the intentions of Berlinguer's new concept, one cannot avoid pointing out
' also ita unilateral and manipulative traits. Portraying the vast frame-
- work of the new view of internationalism, the Botteghe bscure [PCI Head-
quarters] daily went as far as to maintain that the scale of the new con-
cept surmounts even the issue of rela~ions between the PCI and Moscow,
_ which involves outdated, antiyuated schemes and prejudices. It is Crue
that the PCI's autonomy is now determined in Rome and not in Moacow. It
is also true that the concept of the "new internationalism" appears to be ,
purely Italian. Nevertheless--and, moreover, for this very reason--one
is strur_k by the fact that the PCI regards its relations with the USSR as
absorbed or rendered non-decisive on account of a broader and more global
world view and the somewhat late discovery of a Third World.
- It seems to us, however, that the plan for a Europe outstretched toward
the emergent world implies new points of differentiation and detachment
from the USSR, rather than eliminates the existing points concerning the -
inter-European relations. Moscow's policy vis-a-vis the Third World is
is based on an entirely different kind of internationalism--the old kind
aimed aL- hegemonizing the new countries, transforming them into a kind of
impoverished appendage of the Soviet Bloc and driving them toward a radica2
break away from the developed West, partly with the aim of forcing Europe
to find in the Soviet Union the only alternative for survival, the marke~
and raw materials which the old continent risks losing in the Third World.
_ The Soviet strategy emerged clearly also in the discussions surrounding
the nonalined conference.
Europe can onlq find a aolution to its crises in the emergent countries by
wrenching that scope for cooperation from Soviet hegemonization. If it ia
the "new internationalism" that is to resolve the crisis in relations be-
tween our continent and the underdeveloped w~r~ld, then it will inevitably -
be set against the old-style internationalism still manipulated by Moscow.
The result of an attempt to make the two forms of internationalism converge
_ and to maintain that the new form is absorbing or superseding the old one
would be to expose both Europe and the Third World to Soviet penetration
at the same time.
Europe can count on an advantage in the decolQnized countries, insofar as
it does not present itself as a superpower. To acquire credibility it must
in fact present itself in contrast to the superpowers--against both, and
not juat one, of them. Because both the United States and the USSR offer
their own forms of hegemony to the Third World.
The second objective of Berlinguer's visit, namely leftwing unity, would
not have much chance of success in the ecumenical embrace with the USSR.
39 .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Precisely because of ita aima to eliminate the preaent demarcation line
between the two Europes, between capitalism and socialiam, it is more
necessary than ever to estaUliah a clear demarcation line between Che two
ways of looking at and implementing socialism.
The appearance of the new problem by no means impliea that the old one no
longer exists. Indeed, it seema more unresolved than ever. Following
Brezhnev's latest challenge--a somewhat explosive mixture of promises and
_ threats--the European leftwing forces' responsibilities are greater than
ever: A Europe defenseless in the political, social, ideological and now -
even military fields would be unable to aim at the goals announced by -
Berlinguer. The failure to mention thia circumstance makes one being to
suspect that Berlinguer's European visit in fact began in Moscow this
summer, with his unexpected meeting with Brezhnev.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editr. LA STAI~A S.p.A.
CSO: 3104
L~0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
COUNTRY SECTION iTALY
PCI'S PA,TETTA ON TIES WITH PCP, PCE, CPSU, PRC
Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 3 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD
[Luca Giurato 2 October in~erview in Rome with PCI directorate member Gian
Carlo Pa~etta: "Berlinguer Seeks 'New and More Specific Content for Euro- ~
: communism~' ]
[Text] Rome--Berlinguer left yesterday on a visit in search of "Eurocommun-
ism." In Lisbon he will meet with Cunhal. Then he will go to Madrid, where
Carrillo is expecting him. He will spend 5 days in Portugal and only 2 in
Madrid. We asked PCI International Affairs Department Chief Gian Carlo
Pajetta the reason for this difference. Is it more difficult to convert
Cunhal to "Eurocommunism" than to try to reconcile Carrillo with~Moscow? ~
"It takes longer to see Libson than it does to see Madrid!" was Pa~etta's
reply. "Last summer in Hungary, where I spent my vacation, I saw a great
deal of Cunhal. On questions of principle his standpoints do not conflict _
with our own." ~
[Question] You have the same policy line. Do you think the same things?
[Answer] I wanted to emphasize that the Portuguese communists, like the
Italian communists, have always believed, at moments of polemics and of the
_ greatest differences with the socialists, that leftwing voted as a whole are
a positive element for resolving the problems of all democrats. The Portu-
guese communists do not fight the socialists when their positions differ,
when they are polemicizing. However, one could speak in terms of an anti-
= communism which sometimes manifests itself within the socialist parties.
[Questi~n] At least until recently the PCI has often criticized the line
. of the Portuguese communists as being too pro-Soviet and has almost always
shared the line of the PCE, zhe spearhead of "~urocommunism." Has the
situation changed now?
[Answer] When the Portuguese Communist Party called for the dissolution
of a party calling itself Christian Democratic and when it supported the ,
seizure of the paper A REPUBLICS by its ~rinting workers, we confirmed our
opinion on the freedoms of organizatian and expression; we expressed our
disagreement and our doubts. There have been differences and polemics.
Now things are going better, though one could not speak of identical posi-
tions. For that matter, we are not seeking identical position with snyone.
41
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ ~ ~ t
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
ALBANIA'S POSITION AS LAST BASTION OF STALINISM VYEWED
Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 17 Oct 79 p 1 LD
[Article by Frane Barbieri: "Albania's 'New Road
[Text] From time to time a report reminds one of the existence of Albania,
camouflaged in its self-isolation and "nonalined" to such an extent that
it does not even want to associate itself with the nonalined countriea.
This time Albania is emerging from oblivion thanks to a report announcing
Yugoslav Foreign Trade Minister Rotar's arrival in Tirana. He is the first
top Belgrade official to cross the neighboring country's borders for 31
years, even since the split.
~With hia visit Tito's representative is not opening the first door but
rather setting the seal on overtures which have already taken place. "
Though still modest, exchange has increased almosC five-fold in as many .
years. The cultural currents between the Albanian region of Yugoslavia,
Kosovo, and Albania (there are 2 million Albanians on either side) have
reached such a level that lecturers from Pristina University are teaching
in Tirana and vice versa.
In the economic field Albania is trying to secure supplies of industrial
_ goods, which have been scarce aince China cut off supplies. It is paying
in oil, preserves and iron and steel products. The impreasion was that
- the barely opened borders might be closed again when Bei~ing traneferred _
its friendship from Tirana to Belgrade.
After some limited polemics in the Albanian papers, however, everything
moved toward a measured but progressive normalization. Moacow, with ite
- sights on the Mediterranean, yearns for the uae of Albania's, as well as
Yugoslavia's, ports. Both countries would facilitate its plans if they
clashed.
The autonomy of what are undoubtedly the most independent Balkan countries
is based, paradoxically, on the first instance of explicit anti-Stalinism,
in Yugoslavia's case, and, in Albania's case, is motivated by the only
surviving instance of Stalinism; their relations a~e regulated by the
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
threadbare formula of "good-neighborly relations and cooperation despite
differences of system and ideology."
The formula was repeated even during Tito's viait to Koeovo, which began
a few days ago. Yugoslavia places the emphasis almost excluaively on the
first part, the positive part. The Albanians, however, find it more diffi-
cult to forget ideology. Especially since their split with China. They
- distribute their charges of subversionism and betrayal fairly equally
among Beijing, Moscow, Belgrade and the Eurocommunists.
- But it is the post-Maoists who are Hoxha's obaession. Resentment toward
the Chinese leaders has even led Tirana to repudiate the three worlds
theory, which basically provides autonomous scope for whoever is unwilling
to submit to the two blocs, and to fall back on the basically pro-Soviet
theory of the two opposed worlda--socialist and capitalist.
The foraiulas would be of no importance were it not for~the fact that they
caused damaging practical consequences. In Albania's case here is an ex-
ample of these: At the United Nations the Albanian representative voted
with the USSR on the Kampuchean case. He justified himself by saying that
he was voting for Vietnam, alongside Cuba. His anti-Chinese obsession
made him forget that he was thua also justifying military intervention in
the name of revolution--the only disaster, in fact, which ~ould befall the
last remaining proud bastion in Europe and the world to retain pictures of
Stalin and Mao in its emblems.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
CSO: 3104 E~
45
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200010008-0