JPRS ID: 8709 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 001 0001 8-0
~

is OCTO~R i9T! CfOUO Z8~T9) ! OF i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
� FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/8709
15 October 1974
~ USSR Re ort
~
MIIITARY AFFAIRS
~ (FOUO 28~/79)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information prir,~arily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are transla~ed; tt-~ose from English-language sources _
are transcribed or reprinted, with r_he original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in b:ackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the tirst line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indica~e how the original itiformation was
proce5sed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the ~
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
' Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with tt~e source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this pubLication iti no way represent the poli-
,
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
For f:irther information on report content
call (703) 351-2938 (economic); 3468
{political, sociological, military); 2726
(life sciences); 2725 (physical sciences).
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND F:EGLZATIONS GOVERNING OWi~tERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HE~EIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE REST~tICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ODTLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
- FOR ~FFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/8709
15 October 1979 -
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAI {2S
(FOUO 28/79)
CONT~NTS PAGE
Moral Factor in Contemporary Wars
(Stepan Konstantinovich Il'in; MOR.AL'NYY FA.T~COR V
sov~~~r~v~vY~ vorn~~ 1979) i
Combining Indoctrination and Training
(D. P. Poznanskiy; YEDTNSTVO VOSPITANIYA I OBUCHENIYA, 1977) 41
Training Manual for Field Military Vehicles
(V. I. Medvedkov, et al; USTROYSTVO I EKSPLUATATSIYA BTR-60P,
zlL--i3o, zIL-13i, i978) _
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MORAL FACTORS IN CONTEMPORARY WARS
Moscow MORAL'NYY FAKTOR V SOVR~TYKH VOYNAKH (The Maral Factor in
Contemporary Wars~in Russian 1979 si~-ned to press 28 Feb 79 pp 1-4,
143-191, 221-223 _
J [Annotation, Table of Contents, Introduction and Chapter 6 from 3d edition, ~
revised and supplemented, of book by Maj Gen Stepan Konstantinovich Il'in,
- Candidate of Historical Sciences, Voyenizdat, 30,000 copies, 223 pages.
Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface.] ~
[TextJ The book reveals the role of moral farces of the people and Army as ~
one of the most important factors affecting the course and outcome of _
contemporary war. In showing the moral superiority of the Soviet s~ate and =
countries of the soci,3list community over imperialism, the author analyzes _
ways and means of instilling high moral-political, psychological and combat -
r~ualities in Soviet military personnel. .
The book is intended for off icers and the party aktiv.
Contents Pa~e =
Introduction 3
Chapter 1. ~'he Marxist-Leninist Understanding of the Moral
Factor and Its Importance in War 5
Chapter 2. Contemporary Opposition between the Two Social
Systems and Its Effect on the Moral Factor 3~
Chapter 3. New M~eans of Armed Warfare and the Moral Factor 62
. Chapter 4. The Interconnection of the Moral Factor and New Methods
of Armed Warfare 96
Chapter 5. The CPSU's Concern for Strengthening the iKorral
Forces~yof the People and Army 121
Chapter 6.~ Some Issues of the Moral-Political and ~sychological
Training of Troops under Peacetime Conditions 143
~hapter 7. High Ideology and a Communist Awareness is.the Basis
for the Army's Firm Morale 192
Conclusion 221 .
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
Introduction
The Communist Party is doing everything necessary to keep the USSR Armed
Forces at the level of modern requirements. This was emphasized with new
vigor by the 25th CPSU Congress. "The Soviet people can be sure,"
declared Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the Congress, "that the fruits of their
creative labor are under reliable protection."1
While taking steps to outf it the Army and Navy with the latest combat equip- '
ment and weapons and to improve per~onnel training, the party at the same
time is displaying constant concern for developing the morale of Armed
Forces personnel. The moral and politicai unity of Soviet society
continuously grows stronger and the workers' awareness increases in the
process of the grandiose transformations in our country and the accomplish-
ment of socio-economic, political and ideological tasks. This means that `
the spiritual foundations of our military organization become even firmer.
It is important under present-day conditions as never before to make fuller
use of the favorable opportunities f or strengthening the moral factor with
consideration of the fact that demands are constantly growing for training
of armed defenders of the Motherland. What are these demands and how can
they best be fulfilled? Success in accomplishing this task depends largely
on a thorough understanding of these matters.
Relying on the experience of past wars and conforming to the character and
features of wars of our time, the author examins the signif icance of the
moral factor and provides a substantiation of the ways and methods of its
development. Thi~ problem is investigated with consideration of the
features of the contemporary opposition between the two social systems and -
of those changes which have occurred in military affairs in connection with
the scientific-technological revolution.
This edition of the work provides a more detailed examination of the theo-
retical aspects of this problem and generalizes the experience of moral-
political and psychological training gained among the troops and in the
fleets.
Chapter 6: Some Problems of the Moral-Political and Psychological Training
of Troops under Peacetime Conditions
A tl.iorough clarif ication of the essence and signif icance of the moral factor '
and its sources is important not in itself, but in order to conduct work
purposefully and on a scientific basis in creating high troop morale and
for preparing them for successful operations in a contemporar;~ war. It is
for this reason that the moral-political and psychological training uf
personnel under peacetime conditions and its s~iiied, effective orgait~iza-
tion is a component of this problem.
1, "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU ~ongressj, ~
Moscow, 1976, p 83.
2
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The increased demands placed on soldiers' nonmaterial forces and a reinforced
dependence of the attainment of victory in a contemporary war on the moral
sentiment of the soldier masses--all this required an increase of attention
placed on moral-political and psychological training and a detailed scien-
tif ic elaboration of ways and methods for accomplishing it. It is f or this
reason that more books have been published, more articles have been written
en this problem and more attention is beiug given to it i.n recent years in _
the practical activities of commanders, political workers and party organi-
zations. In this regard it is po~sible to mention such works as "Mogucheye
oruzhiye partii" [Powerful Weapon of the Party] by A. A. Yepishev,
"Voinskaya etika" [Military Ethics] by D. A. Volkogonov, and the collective
monographs "The Soldier and War" and "Problems of the Psyc?lology of the
Military Collective." A number of books wer.e published which were devoted
to the moral-political and psychological training of branches of the Armed
Forces: "Letchik i sovremennaya voyna" [The Pilot and Contemporary War],
"Voyna. Okean. Chelovek" [War, the Ocean, and Man], "Lyudi i rakety"
[People and Missiles], and so on.
Clarification ef the very concept of moral-political and psychological
training and the interconnection of its component aspects is of great
importance for proper and effective work in strengthening and developing
troop morale and preparing them to wage a contemporary war. ~
The concept "moral-political and psychological training" was introduced into
scientific and practical use with the beginning of the contemporary stak;e of ~
our Armed Forces' development. This was caused by the fact that there was a
sharp increase in attention to the problem of preparing a person for success-
f ul actions in a contemporary war in connection with the revolution in mili-
tary affairs which had unf olded and the increase in demands placed on the
personnel's xionmaterial forces. All this then determined a need for special -
scientific elaboration of ways for moral-political and psychological train-
ing of personnel and for articulation of this task in the practical activ-
ities of commanders, political entities and party organizations as well.
But this hardly means that suc:~ a problem did not exist at all previously.
It was merely identified less clearly an3 was viewed in the general course
- of ideological and party-political work.
So~riet military-theoretical thinking views moral-political and psychological
training as a powerful means for shaping the high morale needed in personnel
for victory in a contemporary war.
/M~ral-political training/ has to do with forming in personnel a scientific,
Marxist-Leninist ideology and a sense of high social responsibility for
defense of their Motherland and the achievements of soc:ialism. This is a
~ powerful motivating force which determines people's beha.vior and ability to
perform any mission in a difficult combat situation. The important element
in moral-political training is to arm soldiers with a pr~~found understanding
of the ideology and policy of the party an3 Soviet goverrzment; the character
and goals of war in defense of the socialist homeland; and the requirement
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
to perforrn their military duty selflessly and skillfully. This is directly
linked with sociopolitical and ideolflgical attitudes.
/Psychological training/ has as its purpose to develop and strengthen in
military personnel the necessary p~ychological qualities which allow them to
perform a combat mission. succe~sfully and operate in very difficult situa-
tions of contemporary warfare in full conformity with their convictions and
with principles of commun~st morality.
The sphere of operation of psychological training is the psychology of the
individual and that of military collectives. In the process of this train-
ing such aspects of servicemen's psychology take shape and develop as high
intellectual qualities (flexibility of thinking, quickness of wit, effi-
ciency of thinking and so on), appropriate volitional qualities (self-
" control, courage, bravery, initiative and discipline), as well as socio-
psychological qualities, particularly troop comradeship, collectivism and
mutual help.
Moral-political and psychological training represent a uniform process of
the formation and strengthening of the personnel's nonmaterial forces.l
The unif ormity of moral-political and psychological training is determined
primarily by the fact that we are dealing in both instance:; with a person �
and his consciousness. Both of these aspects of training involve the
development of highly conscientious, strong-willed and courageous soldiers.
A self-suff icing significance is attached to psychological training i~l
armies of imperialist states, and this is understandable. It is benef icial
for the imperialists to view personnel training in isolation from socio-
political factors. For this reason numerous investigations of ways for
strengthening troop morale chiefly involve influence on the soldier's mind,
a development of his psychological stability in combat, and influence on the
basest instincts. But it is becoming more and more difficult for the
imperialists to carry out such a one-sided approach to personnel training.
Ideological conditioning occupies an ever-increasing place in this process.
Its foundation consists of violent anticommunism and falsif ication of events
of contemporary~reality, particularly the character of opposition of the two
social systems.
Psychological training under conditions of the Soviet Armed Forces cannot
have a determining significance, let alone.b~e isolated from moral-political
indoctrination. The soldiers' high ideological conditioning is the basis -
for the development and manifestation of their psychological qualities. The :
psychology of the Soviet citizen is determined by his political awareness,
dedication to the socialist Motherland and a deeply perceived sense of civil
and military duty. At the very same time social ideas and the sociopolitical
essence of particular events are reflected and interpreted in the individual
consciousness, in each person's emotional experiences and in his psycholog-
ical cast. This even more concerns war and the reflection of all its
1. "Soldat i voyna" [The Soldier and War], Moscow, 1971, p 16.
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
complex and specific processes in the soldier's consciousness. This _
_ determines the need for a special examination and study of psychological
training.
Extremely complex situations will arise under conditions of the employment
of new means of armed warfare. These conditions will demand an exceptionally
high psychological stability of soldiers. Ideological conviction and psycho-
logical conditioning must be merged as one, and this will help personnel
overcome any hardships along the path to victory over the enemy.
The formula "moral-psychological training" exists in our literature and
daily practice alongside the concept "mora~-political and psychological
training." This cannot give rise to objection in principle, but only with
the proper interpretation. Two concepts--moral and psychological training--
are combined in this formula. Tnasmuch as mordl training also includes an
ideological-political element aiong with a strictly moral element, which is
determined by the very content of the moral code of a builder of communism
with its explanation lying at the basis of the given process, we always have
to take this into account when interpreting and applying the concept of
"moral-psychological training." Meanwhile, the term "moral-psychological
training" is sometimes treated in the press and in verbal utterances only tn
the plane of psychological training. This approach cannot be deemed correct.
It knowingly leads to a belittling of the ideological-political aspect in
the work of shaping the moral spirit of Army and Navy personnel. Psycho-
logical training and the special measures for accomplishing it are included
as a component element in the concept "moral-psychological training."
The development of nonmaterial forces of Army and Navy personnel is a complex
and many-sided process. It is not exhausted by moral-Folitical and psycho-
logical training, although it does occupy a very substantial place. A _
tho~rough understanding of this process presumes it to be viewed in mutual
connection with other areas of personnel training. The issue /of the
correlation of moral-political and psychological training and military
indoctrination/ is of no little importance in this regard.
An identif ication of the essence and purpose of each of these spheres of
spiritual improvement of personnel is the starting point for this. As
already has been stated, moral-political and psychological training is the
use of ideological work and the entire process of indoctri.nation and train-
ing for shaping in soldiers those qualities which they need above all for
successful actions in a combat situation and for overcoming hardships and
ordeals in the interests of victory over the enemy.
Military indoctrination is a system of influence called upon to shape a
soldier's personality and his specif ic spiritual qualities, without which he
cannot support the functioning of the Army either in peace or war, on the
basis of political indoctrination and in unity with moral and legal indoc-
trination. In its content, military indoctrination reflects and takes
account of the features, purpose and missions of our military organization.
a 5
FOR d~FIG~AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Above all,this includes its inherent very strict centralism, the character-
istic mutual subordination of people and collectives, and constant readiness
- for armed defense of the Motherland and the cause of socialism. In the
process of military indoctrination, such moral-combat qualities develop in
personnel as allegiance to military duty, a highly conscientious attitude
toward mastery of military affairs, discipline and faultless execution.
They reach a proper understanding of the essence and signif icance of one-man
command and so on.
Military indoctrination includes a complex of ineasures and ~fforts aimed
directly at shaping the qualities military personnel need under combat condi-
tions for victory over the enemy. In this instance, too, it largely merges
and coincides with moral-political and psychological training. This is
understandable, since a military person must be prepared for accomplishing
missions the Army performs in peacetime to protect the creative labor of the
Soviet people, but he must be fully armed with the qualities necessary for _
successful operations under wartime conditions should the aggressors unleash
a war.
Moral-political training, which is determined by the content and primary
direction of ~olitical indoctrination, develops that initial element used as
the basis for shaping necessary military qualities in people. It has to do
with developing in military personnel a Marxist-Leninist conviction and -
ideological steadfastness--the primary motivating f orce which determines a
steadfast conf ormity to moral principles in a diff icult combat situation.
This presumes that they are armed with the all-conquering ideas of Marxism-
Leninism and an understanding of the character and features of a contemporary -
war and the requirements which it places on personnel and on their indoctri-
nation in the spirit of these requirements. It is understandable that all
rhis is also the foundation of military indoctrination. It can be said that
moral-political training is the heart of military indoctrination with regard -
~ to shaping the spiritual qualities in personnel needed for victory in war.
?'ilitary indoctrination and training are inseparable From soldiers' psycho-
logical conditioning. It is aimed at forming psychological combat qualities
_ (emotional and volitional stability, 311ocation of attention, memory effi-
ciency and so on) and at developing combat expertise (abilities and skills).
It permeates the entire process of military indoctrination. Psychological
training plays an especially large part in shaping such moral-combat and
volitional qualities in personnel as courage, steadfastness, boldness, valor
and the ability to overcome any difficulties on the path to victory. Psycho-
loaical training is carried on chiefly in the sphere of overall training and
_ performance of service. It presumes a profound knowledge of the soldier's -
psychology and a comprehensive training of his mind with consideration of
the demands of a contemporary war. _
The initial propositions on the role and purpose of moral-political and
psychological training are included in the make-up of military science,
inasmuch as the latter, along with other sciences, provides a basis for the
6
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
model of a soldier's personality which meets the demsnds of contemporary war-
fare. At the same time, such training is carried on by diversified party-
political and ideological indoctrination work and by the entire process of
training and performance of service. For this reason it is a sub~ect of
investigation both by military science and by the theory of party-political
work.
- Moral-political training is carried on throughout the process of personnel
indoctrination and training. The question arises in this regard as to the
correlation of /moral-political training and party-political and ideological
work./ These concepts sometimes are made identical in verbal utterances and
even in certain publications. In attempting to clarify this problem, the
following question also is sometimes posed: Which is broader--moral-political
training or party-political work? There can be no unequivocal answer to
this question. Moral-political training is accomplished not only by means
of diversif ied party-political work, but al..so in the entire process of troop
training and the personnel's performance of service. Nevertheless, party-
political work has an enormously broader purpose than moral-political train-
ing. It is designed to reinf orce party influence on all aspects of Army and
Navy life and exert a vigorous influence on all components of their combat
readiness.
Therefore, speaking on a concrete plane, the viewpoint where the party-
political work plan is made identical with the moral-political training plan
cannot be deemed substanriated, alth~ugh many of its activities have that
purpose.
Ideological work, which is a very important component of party-political
work, occupies a special place in the moral-political trai.ning of personnel.
A high ideological conviction and the soldiers' spiritual readiness for -
successful operations in a conte~nForary war are formed pri.marily by means of -
ideologic.al work. Nevertheless, all components of ideological work are
- included to the same extent in the content of moral-political training. In
investigating the correlation of ideological work and moral-political train-
ing, one cannot fail to consider that the latter is accomplished by
ideological means as well as in the process of overall training and perform-
ance of service, and these bear a profoundly ideological character. The
important eleinent, though, is that moral-political training, which is based
on the entire complex of ideas and propositions which go to make up the -
content of Marxist-Leninist ideology and which supply all directions of
ideological work, directly absorbs those spheres of ideology and encompasses
those aspects of ideological work which primarily involve the f ormation of
spiritual qualities in personnel which they require above a11 f or successful
+ operations in armed warfare. It would be incorrect in this regard to
include such directions of ideological work as, for example, esthetic and
atheistic indoctrination, to the full extent in moral-political training,
although they are involved with this process to x~o small degree. In this
regard it is hardly substantiated, for example, to view diversif ied cultural
- enlightenment work planned in the unit or aboard ship to the full extent as ,
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
moral-poli.tical training ~ f ju~rse>nnel . All these activities are components o�
_ ideological work and although they are closely re~,ated to moral-political
training in their direction, their tasks do not f it within its direction and
content.
As already was stated, political and strictly moral elements of consc iousness
~ occupy a leading place in the moral factor. This also determine~ the place
of political and moral aspects in the content of moral-political training of
personnel. It is the basic nucleus of the given process and that is why it
is called "moral-political training." With all this, ideolo~ical work with
a11 its directions and moral-political training are individual concepts
diff icult of articulation even on special examination.
Moral-political and psychological training as an inalienable part of person-
nel training f or defeat of any aggressor is accomplished in peacetime and
under wartime conditions, but it largely is f illed with a different content
in war. /It has to do with a specific enemy and a very specific theater of
militsry operations./ Its content reflects directives and appeals of the
CPSU CC and Soviet government and orders of the Supreme High Command
defining the combat missions of troops and naval f orces in particular
phases of armed struggle. It is carried on directly in the process of
combat operations and thus accelerates the f ormation of such qualities as
courage, 'steadfastness, valor and th~ ability to overcome atl difficulties
on the path to ~~ictory in privates, sergeants, warrant officers and offi-
cers. No matter how well trained troops are in the moral-political and
psychological sense, their seasoning in real combat i~ of supreme importance
for successful operation~s, and it Is impossible to attain this fully under ~
peacetime conditions.
_ It should be emphasized that the importance of moral-political and psycho-
logical training now is not only increasing un~er peacetime conditions, but
these conditions are approaching those of combat at some echelons. This
training is acquiring a largely different scope and content than was the case
in the past, such as on the eve of the Great Fatriotic War. _
This primarily involves the new content which f illed the -oncept of combat
readiness and the new requirements which it placed on Army and Navy
personnel. It stands to reason that troops had to reckon with the need to
be ready to act�urider wartime conditions in the past as well. Constant
combat readiness is ~ne of the determining features in the functioning of
pe~ple and collectives of the military organization and the supreme attribute
of military service. But its importance has risen immeasurably under
contemporary conditions.
The new USSR Constitution states: "It is the duty of the USSR. Armed Forces
to the people to defend the socialist homeland reliably and be in constant
combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor." The
need for constant combat readiness was legislatively fixed for the first
time in the Constltution, which is fully correct si.nce the level of combat ~
. 8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONT.,Y -
readine~s is the most important indicator of the Armed Forces' capability to
perform their duty to the people and defend the achievements of October and
the cause of socialism.
Constant combat readiness now has acquired special significance because the
security of the Soviet state and consequently accomplishments of the tasks
of building communism depend in a most direct manner on the level of combat
readiness of troops and naval forces in our time. This is determined
- primarily by the fact that, in nurturing plans f ~r unleashing war, against
the Soviet Union and fraternal countries of socialism, the aggressive
imperialist forces are placing reliance on a surprise nuclear attack. They
are counting on attaintng far-reaching goals in this manner. The Pentagon
and ringleaders of NATO do not conceal the fact that even now their missiles
are targeted on specif ic objectives of our Motherland and the socialist
community and that a portion of the bomi~ers with nuclear weapons aboard are
in constant readiness for action. Nuclear-powered submarines equipped with
missiles occupy the most favorable positions for a possible attack from the
sea. There is no basis to assume that all these weapons will not be set in
motion suddenly.
It f o~lows that all our troops and especially air defense units, the ,
Strategic Missile Forces, as well as many Air Force units, strategic naval
forces, border districts, and groups of forces must be ready even :Ln peace-
time to repulse an attack by imperialist aggresso?-s literally every hour and
every minute, deny them an opportunity to take advantage of the factor of
surprise or at the very least reduce its effects to a minimum and deliver a
crushing attack against the enemy in turn.
A surprise attack under contemporary conditions even without the use of
nuclear weapons can sharply complicate the situation of the party subjec ted
to the attack. World War II already confirmed this proposition very persua-
sively. The capabilities even of conventional weapons, and the increased
speeds of aircraft above all, now permit the attacker to have even greater
strategic advantages, especially if the surprise does not receive the proper
~counteraction. This very thing was shown by;~ the military conflict in the
Near East in the summer of 1967 and the aftermath of Israel's surprise
attack on the Arab countries.
'i'he ability to counter the suddenness of an attack, especially a nuclear
attack., to disrupt it with a11 types of combat equipment and weapons and
punish the aggressor himself is the chiei'criterion of the troops' prepared-
ness f or a contemporary war and for our Armed Forces' performance of their
high mission of defending the achievements of October and the cause of
socialism.
This is why the Communist Party's demands on the Armed Forces are permeated
with the idea of maintaining constar.t, unremitting troop combat readiness.
The party views this as a necessary condition f or the successful building of
a communist society in our country and for maintaining peace throughout the
- 9
FOR OFFICIAL liSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040140100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
world. I~ is the supreme political mission which Soviet soldiers are called
upon to accomplish. _
~iut it is an extremely difficult matter to ensure cons~ant, high troop combat
readiness. This places new and difficult tasks before commanders, political
entities and party organizations. It is necessary to keep large masses of ~
people in a state of readiness f or i~ediate combat operations for a lengthy
period of time, and this is possible at the cost of a great exertion of
physical and moral forces, a very strict Legime of military service, and a
change in the entire tenor of the personnel's life, especially that of
officers.
All this determines the interconnection of moral-political and psychological
trairing and combat readiness. It does noC follow at all from the proposi-
tion that moral-political and psychological training has to do with shaping
quaiities in soldiers necessary for successful operations in combar that
this training is neutral toward matters of increasing combat readiness. To
the contrary, the deepest and most direct iriterconnections exist here. -
In order to clarify this important issue it is necessary to bear in mind
that new element which characterizes the contemporary content of combat
readiness and the essence of demands which it places on the entire process
of forming moral-combat qualities in personnel. The unity of training and
of keeping troops in combat readiness now is one of the primary principles
of military training and indoctrinatioii of the personnel. Another essential
point is that high combat readiness is the supreme means of disrupting a -
surprise enemy attack ~nd a necessary condition for beginning successful
operations to defeat him. Mar SU D. F. Ustinov points out that ~'combat
readin~ss is the crown of military expertise of personnel in peacetime and
the key to vic tory in waz."1 _
T:n examinang this issue we also cannot fail to consider the fact that the
very accotnplishment of the missions indicated changes to no small extent the
chara~ter of converting people's consciousness from a peacetime to a wartime =
status, espec ially in those troops who are standing combat watch, which is
/the accomplishment of a most important combat mission./ The criteria used
in assessing people's moral-political and psychological preparedness for
waging armed warfare and performing peacetime service, meaning the mainte-
.zance of combat readiness, have converged considerably in a certain sense.
This means that moral-political and psychological training deals not only
with forming in personnel the qualities necessary for combat, but also with
maintaining high combat readiness, and especially performance of combat
` watch.
All moral-political and psychological training is called upon to create in
, our soldiers that spiritual condition where they give full attention to the
assigned job, steadfastly endure previously unknown hardships, and perform
the diff icult duties absolutely necessary for the country's security fault-
lessly and with a feeling of high responsibility.
~
1. "60 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [Sixty Years of the USSR Armed Forces],
Moscow, 1978, p 34. 10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OrFICIAL USL ONLY
An ~lnderstandin~ of the entire complex of demands being placed on the combat
readiness of a unit, ship and subunit under presenr-day condirions and the
degree of exertion of spiritual and physical forces in fu~.filling them repre-
sents a most important indicator of the level of troop morale and of their
cagability to perform any mission in def ense of the socialist Motherland and
_ its state interests. Al1 the work of commanders, political workers, and
party and Komsomol organizations in training and indoctrinating personnel
capable of carrying out a combat order at any moment is focused in troop
combat readinss.
The new demands placed ou troop combat readiness also predetermine a
difterent criterion of soldiers' moral and psychological readiness to perform
dir~:ct combat actions. The transition from peace to a situation of war, even
if an aggressor attacked without declaring war, previously still comprised a
~
morP or less lengthy period of time. Qnly the border guard troops entered
battle in the f irst hours of war. The conversion to a wartime footing
lasted a more or less lengthy period of time for the main mass of troops.
It is now a completely different matter. With the present means of warfare
the peace can be broken suddenly for all Armed Forces and for the entire
country. The troops, and above all missile troops, air defense troops,
nuclear-powered submarines, missile-carrying aircraft arid units of border
guard districts, will be in a state of combat action in a matter of
minutes. There will be no time here for long reflection,and the peacetime
mood will have to be shed in a single instant.
This circumstance cannot fail to be considered both in combat training and
in the moral-political and psychological training of personnel. We are
speaking of ensuring that Che entire process of indoctrination and of the
- moral-psychological conditioning of soldiers provides a situation where, by
the:ir degree of vigilance and exertion of will and energy, they are continu-
ously ready for combat actions during daily service literally every hour and
every minute and that they possess certain knowledge and skills necessary
for immediate use of contemporary equipment and weapons in a comhat situa-
tion.
The task of maintaining constant conbat readiness is accomplisk?ed through
all means of indoctrination and training and by developing an ideological
conviction in the soldiers. Ideological conviction is a characteristic _
trait of the Soviet citizen-soldier and a source of his unbending will,
steadfastness and courage in battle against the foe and�of inspiration in
military labor. The favorable opportunities created by the socialist system
and the benef icial results of the party's ideological work are used widely _
in this process.
The important element is for each soldier to have a clear realization of all
the consequences of a surprise attack, /especi.ally a nuclear attack./ This
must be manifested in constant, unremitting vigilance and combat readiness.
Consequently there must be a continuous development of soldiers` inner
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
combat readiness, which permits them at any moment to perform all functions
of ensuring the country's security and the aggressor's defeat assigned to
them.
It is essential to have a convincing explanation for privates, sergeants,
seamen, petty officers, warrant officers and officers as to the aggressive
nature of the imperialists' policy and to reveal their specific prepara-
tions for war. It is moreover important to take account of the features of
this work under conditions of detente. If this is not done, there may be a
one-sided understanding of detente on the part of certain people, without
consideration o� the active opposition shown it by aggressive forces; Che
inore so, as now even the most inveterate militarists are doing their black
deeds under the cover of peace negotiations.
~ A surprise attack by an aggressor against our Motherl;:c~d is not precluded at
the present time, regardless of a fluctuation of the political barometer
which reflects the degree of acuteness and complexity of the international
military-political situation. The existing relaxation of international
tension does not guarantee us against a display of adventuristic acts on the
part of the most aggressive circles of imperialism. This all means that
soldiers have to develop a sharpened sense of danger of an aggressive attack
against our Motherland.
A proper understanding by all soldiers of the character and features of a
contemporary war and of the methods for waging contemporary combat has a
very essential signif icance for the moral-political and psychological
conditior~ing of troops. Also connected with all this is the solution to the
problem in moral-political training of explaining to personnel the capabil-
ities which aggressive forces have for unleashing a nuclear missile war.
The~imperialists may resort to such an extreme act under conditions of a
sharp aggravation in the struggle. They themselves admit great reliance is
placed on atomic weapons in a military fight against the USSR. The American
newspaper NEW YORK TIMES wrote on 16 December 1977 that "the White House
assigned the Defense Department to perform a thorough revision of emergency
plans for waging a nuclear war against the USSR." The question is c~ne ~~f
cying in the objectives of nuclear attacks on USSR territory more fully wit:-~
_ the US government's overall political strategy.
A precis~ understanding of these matters by personnel is a necessary condi-
tion for their becoming attuned spiritually to maintaining high combat
readiness and to defeating any aggressor. ~
The military-technical features of a contemporary war and the demands which
. it places on the personnel's moral-combat qualities are widely considered
in the moral-political and psychological training conducted among the troops
and in the fleets. The doctrinal proposition and conclusions of Soviet
military science about readying troops for successful operations with the use
of all types of combat technology, and nuclear weapons above all, are of
fundamental importance.
� 12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
The soldiers' thorough understanding of ~hese provi.sions is attained both by
means of ideological work and in the training process. Propaganda and
ideological-theoretical measures help service personnel thoroughly compre-
hend those changes which have occurred in all spheres of military affairs
and the new demands on combat and political training, and to fulfill them
with understanding. The process of shaping the soldiers' moral-political
and combat qualities contin.ues and their psychological conditioning takes
place in particular in the process of training activities, f ield exercises,
deployments, and the standing of combat watch.
All training and indoctrination work in units and subunits is arran~ed with
consideration of the new demands. It ensures the soldier's comprehensive
train ing for successful operatians in contemporary waifare involving the use
of contemporary weapons.
~ r
The principle of "teaching the troops what is needed in war" is well known.
~
It wholly preserves its force now, but it has been filled largely with new
content. Implementation of this principle is possible only with an enor-
mously greater concentration of a person's spiritual and physical forces.
This is caused by the increasing complexity both of the process of mastering
new equipment an~ of the methods of troop comUat train~ing.
Inasmuch as combat equipment has grown unbelievably more complex, we must
learn to perform operations with it within a sharply reduced time frame.
There were 2,000 electronic assemblies and parts in the B-17 bomber which ~
was in the U.S.Air Force inventory 30 years ago. The modern American bomber
already has 100,000 of them. There have been similar changes in our aircraFt
as well. Over the last 30 years the amount of instruments in the aircraft
cockpit has increased 30 times, while the time for per�orming each operation
of controlling the aircraft, the engine and other equipment has been reduced
6-7 times because of an i.ncrease in flight speed and a change in equipment
operating conditions.l Pilot training on such equipment requires them to
have great moral composure, steadfastness, intensity and exceptional
precision in actions, and it places a great load on their minds.
Or take the training of submariners, who now have ro deal with atomic
engines and missiles aboard ships--technology requiring great knowledge and
diverse skills. But the essence of the matter also lies in the fact that
the operating capabilities of submarines have increased sharpl.y. The
independent deployment of submarines for lengthy periods of time and long
distances has become widespread.
Their cruises under the water for several months now already have become an
ordinary phenomenon, and our navymen demonstrate high moral-political and
psychological conditioning,
1. See "Letchik i sovremennaya voyna" [The Pilot and Contemporary War],
Moscow, 1976, p 57.
w~
1 13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY
Combat activities of personnel of the Strategic Missile Forces and of air
defense are complex and many-sided. There is nothing they can be compared
with from the past in character, co~qplexity c~r importance.
' Great changes also have occurred in training personnel of the oldest branch
of the Armed Forces, the Ground Forces. Their primary power now lies also _
in nuclear missile weaponry. The growing complexity of military labor is
shown by the abrupt increase in rates of advance by combined-arms formations
or the appearance of completely new divisions of troop training, such as
underwater tank driving and so on.
~ Political indoctrination work and training work is intended to take account
of all these features and of the contemporary leve]. of development of mili-
_ tary affairs and in turn to improve the ways and methods of forming moral-
political and combat qualities, to influence the soldiers' minds correctly,
and to direct their spiritual forces toward ma.stery of equipme~a~ and toward ~
preparations for capable, selfless combat actions.
What is important is to prepare personnel carefully for operations with
consideration ot the use of nuclear missile weapons. This is the very
direction in which combat training is accomplished in our Army and Navy.
Personnel in a11 branches of the Armed Forces persistently prepare for
capable, selfless actions under conditions of a nuclear missile war. At the '
same time, there is no let-up in attention paid to training subunits f or
operations in a war involving the use of conventional weapons.
It is typical that in preparing soldiers for actions in a nuclear war,
commanders and political workers have to overcome a contradiction which is
solvable only in the process of war itself. On the one hand, the troops
must receive maximum traini.ng in actions involving the use of nuclear
weapons and other means of mass destruction, and on the other hand, it is
practically impossi'ole to employ these weapons in the process of exercises
under peacetime conditions.
There are broader opportunities for accustoming soldiers to perform combat
missions with conventional technology. Field f ire exercises or driving
tanks over personnel, for example, provide very positive results. It does
not appear possible to do this with.nuclear weapons. In this connection
troop training is conducted at the present time with greater obligatory
conditionalities than before. Such a situation often gives rise to extremes
in evaluating the action of nuclear weapons. In some places there is a
clear exaggeration of the destructive f orce of new means of warfare. In
some classes pictures are painted in excess as to what might happen if the
enemy delivers nuclear attacks against our forces while leaving in the dark
how to act in order to overcome their aftereffects and perf orm the assigned
mission.
In one class with seamen, Lt Ivanov was explaining the character of contem-
porary war at sea. He pointed out that enough stockpiles of nuclear weapons
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
now have been built up in the world that there is now the equivalent of
over 100 tons per person. Then he began Co enumerate the atomic bombs and
missiles which the enemy has for combating our submarines. In telling of
the destructive features of the "Lulu" bomb, the officer announced that,
having the power of 10,000 tons of TNT, it could destroy a submarine at a
distance of 7 km �rom the burst, and if its yield increased to 10 million
tons, the effective radius would increase to 70 km. Of course, he was giving
f igures published in the press, but he did not exp7,ain that these were
optimum data when the enemy was operating under conditions favorable to him.
He did not show that the bomb's effects could be reduced by approximately
7-10 times merely by changing the submarine's submergence depth. He did not
give examples of how the submari.ners could counter the enemy and operate in
the proper manner to disrupt his plans and perform their missions. Had he
explained all this, the p~ychological effect of the class would have been _
difFerent. Facts of this sort unfortunately are not isolated.
There also is another probably more widespread extreme where too light an
approach is taken to evaluating the ditereffects of nuclear attacks. The
~following picture sometimes can be seen in exercises. A situation has been
created: The "enemy" has delivered a nuclear strike against the unit's combat
formations. Meanwhile, the subunits continue to operate as if nothing had
happened: Why take any kind of ineasures, for the attack was conditional'?..
During one exercise a tank company operatin~~ in the second echleon moved up
to Che line of co~itment and awaited the commander's signal. At this time
the "enemy" delivered a"nuclear stike." It seemed the only correct reac-
tion to this was to take steps of protection against nuclear attack. But
something quite different occurred. While all crew members were in the
tanks before the "nuclear burst," after the burst some of them crawled from
the turrets and began to admire the spectacle. And one tanker remarked, not
~ without irony: "The combat engineers worked handsomely. They must have
wasted more than just one ton of fuel."
It is understandable that both extremes are detrimental to the work of train-
ing personnel to conduct combat operations under conditions of a contemporary
war.
The question arises: All the same, though, what can be done to overcome a
large number of difficulti_es? '
Yes, it is a fact that it is impossible to achieve the complete effect of a
. nuclear burst and its aftereffects through simulation. But something still
can be done and already is bei.ng done. The question above all is about a
further improvement in means of simulation, and the opportunities for this
have been far from exhausted. A movie, slides, and posters can acquaint
soldiers with the results of the action of nuclear weapons. They will also
help to some extent create the appropriate psychologicaZ mood in the person-
nel. It is very important to display unremitting exactingness in exercises
and various classes and see to it that personnel strictly perform all
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
necessary actions in negotiating "radioactive" terr.ain, in its decontamina-
tion and so ~n. Where commanders attempt to creat~_ a near-combat situation
by all available means, this has a great psychological effect on the
soldiers.
A deeply perceived desire by service personnel, and especially officers, to
improve their schooling in the maximum possible approximation of a real
combat situation is of primary importance. It is iffipossible to achieve high
effectiveness in combat training without this highly conscientious attitude
of people toward every activity, and especially toward exercises, flights
' and cruises. The accomplishment of this mission is constantly in the f ield
of ~view of commanders, political entities and party organizations.
Exe~rcises "Dnepr," "Yug," "Dvina," "~Dkean," "Sever," "Berezina," "Kavkaz" and
"Karpaty," which were held in recent years, were especially instructive and ~
useful. A distinguishing feature of such exercises was the creation of a _
complex situation which approximated that of combat to the maximum. During
combined-arms exercises there were lengthy ma~r,ches, offensive and defensive
actions, assault landings, and assault crossings of large water obstacles.
They included live f iring by aircraft, artillery and tanks, the negotiation
of minefields and obstacle zones and so on. Units attacked directly behind
the shell bursts or with f iring ovpr the heads of friendly troops. All this
had a strong effect on the people's minds and developed their steadfastness,
courage and ability to overcome any difficulties of the combat situation to
achieve victory over the enemy.
Privates, sergeants, warrant officers and off icers had an opportunity to see
an enormous ma.ss of equipment in action in such exercises, which generated
in them a sense of pride in their country, the Army and the Navy and rein-
forced even more their faith in the f orce and might of Soviet weapons. Af ter
an exercise Pfc Yefanov declared:
"For the f irst time I saw our Army in all its power: There was so much
equ:Ipment i.n the air and on the ground! When the attackers' fire preparation
was conducted, I honestly admit that I had an unusual feeling..."
During the exercise off icers and men felt themselves almost to be in real
combat in many respects. They sought and found bold decisions of initiative
and overcame all difficulties persistently.
"Now I know how soldiers must be tempered and accustomed to the combat situa-
tion," said Lt Minasov. "I am only sorry that this does not always work out
on our own training field."
Systematic and well-arranged party-political work plays a large part in
creating high intensity of an exercise.
Muc:h was done in the preparatory period to explain to soldiers the importance
of the upcoming exercise and the need for capable, selfless actions in its
~6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
course. Attention was directed to the fact that the appearance of new means ,
of warfare had changed fundamentally the character of contemporary war and
had increased the demands placed on soldiers' moral-political and combat
qualities. Party and Kosmomol meetings were held in the subunits to discuss
� how to ensure the soldiers' capable actions of initiative in the exercises.
Topical evenings entitled "Act in exercises as in combat," "Heroic exploits
of Komsomol soldiers in the Great Patriotic War" and on other similar topics
were held in many subunits. There were technical conferences, viewings of
training f ilms and documentary newsreels, and presentations by masters of
military affairs.
The essential element in the content of moral-golitical training of personnel
during a particular exercise was the determination of the leading political
idea under which it took place. Fxercise "Dnepr" preceded the 50th Anniver-
sary of the Soviet state, "Dvina" and "Okean" preceded the centennial of
Lenin's birth, and "Berezina" preceded the 60th Anniversary of the Armed
Forces. This greatly filled the entire process of personnel training with
specific political content.
The purposeful work of instilling hatred toward imperialist aggressors '
occupied a major place in moral-political training. For example, during
preparation and conduct of Exercise "Dvina" among troops of the Order of `
Lenin Moscow Military District, all propa~andists and agitators were armed
with specif ic material on these ma.tters. Various reference material was
prepared for them on the topics "Imperi.alisn is the Source of Wars" and "The
Armies of Imperialist States are Tools of Aggression." A booklet passed out
to the agitators contained necessary informat:ion about the aggressive North
. Atlantic Alliance and its armed forces. Talks were held in subunits about
Israeli aggression in the Near East and about the interveners' crimes in
Vietnam. The atrocities of fascist German invaders during the past war were
shown usi~ng specific examples.
All this facilitated the development of a feeling of hatred for imperialist
aggressors, served as an important means for raising the fighting spirit and
instilled in soldiers a readiness to perform exploits.
Political entities reflected specific issues of moral-political and psycho-
logical training in the party-political work plans f or the period of prepara-
tion and canduct of the exercises.
In the "Dnepr" maneuvers, f or example, the political directorate of the Red
Banner Belorussian Military District prepared specia~ recommendations for
, commanders and political workers. They told of the i.mportance of personnel
having~a f irm knowledge of the situation,, exercise missions, their place in
the combat formation and capabilities of equipment and weapons; and about the
ab ility to master the equipment and weapons expertly under all conditions.
The recommendations encouraged commanders and political workers in all phases
of the exercise to develop and encourage in every possible way the soldiers'
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .
daring, selfless actions, spirit of competitiveness and readiness to test
themselves in a difficult situat:ton, to overcome a11 obstacles on the path
to accomplishing the assigned mission, to put down a party screen against
indulgences, oversimplification, stereotypes ,and overcautiousness, and so on.
Party-poliCical work during the exercise was aimed at successful accomplish-
~ ment of assigned missions. The most varied forms of political work were used
for these purposes. Special attention was given to the personal example set
by party and Komsomol members. An increase in the party members' role as
soldiers and as political fighters was an object of great concern on the
march, in the attack, in assaulting water obstacles and in the defense. _
_ A great deal of attention was given to propaganda of cotnbat traditions and
exploits of Great Patrioti~ War heroes in order to elevate the soldiers'
f ighting spirit and mobil:ze them for bold, selfless actions both during the
preparatory period and ~irectly during the exercise. The most varied forms _
of political work were. used. Aere is the typical content of an express
learlet put out in a subunit of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District
at the height of an attack.
"Guardsmen!
"Fierce f ighting raged on this soil in 1944. The father of our comrade,
Pvt Vladimir Korneyev, died the death of a hero here. The son sacredly
preserves the memory of his father and is proving his allegiance to combat
traditions with his deeds: He drove a prime mover over a diff icult route
_ without a single forced hait. Thanks to his actions of initiative during a
counterattack, the norm wa.� bettered by almost twofold."
Such specific agitation in ~~hich the heroics of the Great Patriotic War and
today's missions of the soldiers are skillfully linked, created in the
soldiers the moral-political`and psychological mood necessary for victory
over the eneury .
Mora1-political training was accomplished during the exercise primarily by
c,eans of mass political work. An indisputable conclusion follows from the
experience of exercises which were held: The nearer the atmosphereto actual
combat and the more complex the operational training situation, then the�
more that means of mass political agitation and individual work come to the
foreground. This does not deny at all the use of various f orms of propa-
ganda, particularly i.n rear services units.
The great saturation of troops with military equipment was a characteristic
of exercises "Dnepr," "Dvina," "Yug," "Sever," "Okean" and others. The work
of mobilizing people for capable use of the equipment and for the interaction
of its various types.was of great importance under these conditions. The
exercises permitted vigorous indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of
confidence in our equipment and the ability to defeat any aggressor with its
help. Meanwhile, the display of an enormous mass of equipment in action also
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
had a certain negative psychological ef~ect on some people. To them it
appeared that the equipment overwl~elmed the person himself. This made it
necessary to direct attention to the need for a correct understanding of
this matter.
The exercises showed convincingly that troop operations now present higher
demands on the personnel's.moral-psyct~ological and physical preparedness.
Consideration had~:to. be giyen to~the �in~.reased~mohility and maneuvefability
of units and subunits and to the swif tness of their actions. It was
important to achieve high eff iciency i.n performing political indoctrination
work and a timely explanation of the rapidly changing situation and co~bat
missions stemming therefrom.
�
During the exercises personnel were trainec~ ta oparate both with and without
the use of nuclear weapons, but the work was arrar.ged with personnel so that
they were ready to act at any moment even under conditions of employment of
nuc.lear means of warfare. Whether activities were being conducted in train-
ing personnel for the offense or the defense, the idea of the possibility of
operating with the use of nuclear missile weapons was contained in them each
time. The accomplishment of ineasures of protection against a nuclear attack
was provided for and the people were kept ready to act under conditions of
radioactive contamination, and so on, on either side.
Suddenly complicated situations are created during the exercises to develop
psychological stability in soldiers. Neuro-emotional stress also may be
created on special trainers.
For example, here is how one class with pilots was conducted. During an
intercept "sortie" the generator failure signal li~ht went on while climbing.
The young pilot who was training switched off a portion of the power
consumers, reported what had happened to the command post and turned toward
the landing f ield. The controls suddenly twitched--the hydraulic system had _
malEunctioned. The situation became more complex and the psychological load
on the pilot rose... While eliminating the malfunctions or reacting to them
under conditions of an extreme time limitation, the pilot began to report
his actions less often and made more frequent mistake.s ir. determining the
aircraft's position in space. When the "fire" signal light went on on the
instrument panel, he became confused for some period of time: After the first
stage of stress came the second--the body`s adaptation to the stress situa-
tion. "Good practice! Almost like an ordinary flight. And the pulse is
even pounding,"1 remarked the pilot after working on the trainer.
The circumstance that the personnel are obligated to be constantly ready f or
_ immediate action for unconditional and precise fulfillment of the combat
mission under any very diff icult condition is taken into account in the _
moral-�political and psychological training of missilemen both of the
1. "Letchik i sovremennaya voyna," p 1.29.
lg .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
i
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Strategic Missile Forces and of the National Air Defense Forces. They there-
fore carry higher moral-psychological, loads in peacetime as well. This
particularly concerns the soldiers who are on combat watch. A sharpened
sense of vigilance and of immediate and proper reaction to a situation which
shapes up suddenly is developed in the missile troops. _
The moral-psychological effect on the personnel of missile troops is varied
and profound when all its elements are brought nearer to those of actual ~
combat. This allows forming emotional experiences and psychological condi-
tions in personnel similar to those which may take shape under combat condi-
_ tions. This is accomplished with maximum efficiency during the preparation
and conduct of live missile launches.
The entire training process of troops and naval.forces must help the person-
nel become accustomed to acute situations involving the use of new means of
warEare to the extent possible for peacetime. "When the first mine passed
astern, the fear of a danger invisible to us went with it," writes submarine
connnander Hero SU I. V. Travkin. "We listened to the scraping along the
sides many times afterward and would stop f irst the port then the starboard
electric motor, but not one of us probably experienced such a heart-chilling
feeling as the first time any longer. i~e 'mastereci' the minE>s, as one of
the officers joked."1
This process of "mastering dangers" is one of the pivotal tasks of psycho-
logical traini.ng and of forming emotional and volitional stability in mili-
tary personnel.
- The spiritual and especially the psychological preparedness of personnel thus
depends to a determining extent on the degree to which it is "entered" in the
process of personnel training, and the latter depends on the extent to which
it approximates actual combat conditions to the maximum. ~
USSK Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov spoke about this at a practical
science conference of political leaders: "We must be even more persistent in
instilling in all personnel a conscientious attitude toward overcoming the
real diff iculties of combat training, bearing in mind the permanent truth
that the more difficult it is in training, the easier it is in combat."2
This statement als~ is of determining importance for the moral and psycho-
log:ical training of troops and naval forces.
Solciiers' /high state of training/ and knowledge of their entrusted equipment ~
and technirues of using it is one of the important foundations of their
moral and psychological readiness for successful operations in contemporary
combat. This helps them act confidently and f ind the most advisable solution
1. "Voyna. Okean. Chelovek" [The War,.the Ocean and Man], Moscow, 1974,
p 100.
2. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 July 1976.
20 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
in any very difficult situation. On the other hand, an inab ility to handle
the equipment and a poor knowledge of.military affairs may lead to a private,
sergeant or even an eff~;;er displaying fear and confusion, which will
threaten to disrupt performance of the combat mission. The following epi-
sode is typical in this regard. During an attack Pvt Korchagin pulled a
grenade from the cartridge pouch at the command "Prepare grenades for
action," but because of poor training was late in preparing it. When he was
ready to throw the grenade he saw that he had fallen behind his comrades and
would not be able tc throw it to such a distance as not to injure them. It
appeared to the private that he already had pulled the safety pin and had
nowhere to throw the grenade. Frightened, he ran up to Jr Sgt Shustov. The
squad commander estimated the situation instantaneously and checked the
grenade.
"The grenade is not armed," he said. "Put it in the cartridge pouch and
catch up with your comrades quickly."
' A convincing example of the soldier's display of confusion due to ignorance _
of his weapon.
One of the important tasks of moral-psychological training is to insCil in
personnel a f irm conf idence in their equipment and weapons. This confidence
is based on the soldiers' firm knowledge of the weapon's tactical and tech-
nical spec ifications and the ability to use it in a combat situation. At
the same time, they have to know the objective data about enemy weapons, not
exaggerated and not understated if at all possible.
The personnel` s firm knowledge of ineasures and means of defense against
nuclear weapons and their being ~nstilled with confidence that it is possible
to operate and win with their help is of very great impartance in this
sense.
...The sub unit was attacking in the depth of enemy defenses. A zone of
radioactive contamination was encountered along the way. If the soldiers
were ignorant as to its boundaries and radiation level, this could cause
uncertainty in their actions. But if they know the radiation situation with
the help of appropriate instruments and if the soldiers learn that the high
radiation level dangerous to life is present only in the vicinity of the
burst's epicenter, they will cross the zone of radioactive contamination
with greater assurance, bypassing the most dangerous places and negotiating
the less contaminated sectors swif tly.
The very same can be said about the protective mask and other protective
gear. An incident occurred in one of the subunits which is typical in this
regard. During underwater tank driving, one of the vehicles was forced to
stop under the water. The tank's hu11 began to f i11 with exhaust gases. The
command came: "Put on protective ma.sks!" Everyone except one person, a
young inexperienced soldier, executed the command precisely. He was about
to put on the mask, but immediately threw it aside as if to say it still
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
wouldn't help. And had it not been for the comrades who put the protective
maslc on the soldier, this lack of conf idence in.the reliability of the
protective gear could have cost him his life.
It is a day-to~day job f or a11 commanders and political workers to instil
confidence in privates and seamen in their equipment and weapons and in the
fact that with their help it is possible not only to preserve life, but also
to operate successfully in combat under conditions of employment of nuclear
missile weapons. It is important here to instil a firm belief in the
private or seaman not only in t'he equipment and weapons which each person
handles directly, but in a11 equipment which our Army and Navy possess and
in the possibility of defeating any enemy witl, its help.
Under peacetime conditions this work is complicated by the fact that, for
understandable reasons, it is not possible to provide the specifications of
our nuclear missile weapons and other new equipment to its full extent in
the press and in verbal propaganda. Nevertheless, there are opportunities
to perform this work effecti~ely in every unit and aboard every ship. It is
in~portant here to provide data on the technical outfitting ~of armies of
_ imperialist states correctly and to a reasonable extent. An attempt by some
propagandists to "divulge" inflated information on the force of certain
types of weapons of imperialist armies and on the status and prospects for
development of their military equipment for the sake of sensation does great
harin.
The Soviet people are doing everything to ensure a high level of technical
outf itting of their Armed Forces in the spir it of contemporary requirements.
Connnanders and political workers are called upon on a daily basis to rein-
force the soldiers' faith in our militaiy-technologfcal might. It stands to
reason that any kind of bragging or horri~ylowing is inadmissible here. In
case of war, our Armed Forces will have t~o deal with a strong, technj.cally
well outf itted enemy. The imperialist ar,aies, and the U.S.Army above all,
have thermonuclear wt+apons, missile techn~~logy, strategic aviation and
missile-carrying submarines in their inventories. A sCudy of the weapons of
armies of imperialist states, the knowledge of the strong and weak points
of their equipment and weapons, and a knowledge of the strong and weak points
of personnel training are an inalienable condition for successful struggle
against an aggressor.
The importance of the troops' combat activenss and the soldiers' creativeness
and initiative has risen in contemporary war. The Soviet Armed Forces
regulations stress that the desire to act offensively and to overtake and
destroy the enemy must become firmly entrenched in the consciousness of each
soldier, officer and general. There is a sociopolitical basis to the high
combat activeness of Soviet soldiers. It is determined by a passionate love
for one`s Motherland, a burning hatred for. the enemy and a desire to defeat
him no matter what. Numerous examples from the Great Patriotic War persua-
sively confirm this proposition.
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The soldiers' combat activeness is formed to no smalX extent in the sphere
of ideological indoctrination work. Soldiers are instilled with combat
activeness including an offensive enthusiasm in exercises and problems w*here
an appropriate situation is created and there.is a decisive banishment of
oversimplification and of attempts at an a~.leviated approach to accomplishing
missions. The vigorous a~tion5 of initiative by personnel are supported and
encouraged in every possible way among,the tloops. Off icers develop a
commander's independence, a creative approach t~ matters, and an ability to
preserve presence of mind in a difficult situation, to assume responsibility
for a very bold decision, but one responding to the situation, and to take
advantage of a11 opportunities for winning victory. Such qualities form in
a near-combat situation. Any alleviation of conditions or petty coddling
does not facilitate the development of necessary command qualities. .
It sometimes happens that a senior chief ineddles in the functions of a
subunit commander without need. After assigning a mission to the off icer,
he ~ontinuously provides instructions, including on many special matters,
instead uf granting an opportunity to acComplish it independently and then
ana.lyze the officer's actions. It is understandable that such an inclina-
tion toward overcautiousness does not facilitate the development of necessary
command qualities.
Soldiers' combat activeness and initiative cannot be formed in isolation from
the development of such qualities as steadfastness, courage and valor.
Truly mass heroism, soldiers' selflessness, and a readiness not to be sparing
of life it~elf at a critical moment if the interests of accomplishing a
combat mission require it are demanded for winning victory in a contemporary
war.
In sending off party members go:ing~to the front during the Civil War, V. I.
Lenin would say that, for them, "there can be no choice. Their motto must
be death or victory."1 This Leninist thesis has acquired special signif i-
cance in each soldier's conduct in a contemporary war, with consideration of
the fact that the danger to life has increased unbelievably.
Boldness, courage and initiative take shape under specific socio-economic,
political and military conditions. These qualities characterize the strength
of an army's morale, which is generally known to depend to a decisive ex tent
on the character of the social and state system and on the political objec-
tives of the war. But this is not an automatic dependence. Sociopolitical
attitudes create only favorable conditions for shaping high moral-political
qualities in Soviet military personnel. Extensive indoctrinational efforts
are requ3red to ensure that these conditions are realized. The entire
system of personnel training i.n the Army is a school of indoctrination ~f
courageous, bold soldiers capable of heroic exploits.
1. Lenin, V. I. "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Work s],
XX~IX, 246.
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100144418-0
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
High moral.-political and combat qualities are developed in soldiers in peace-
- time under cond:Ltions of combat training. M. I. Kalinin said that "a
particular. specific instance of heroism or the confluence of circumstances
uiider whicli heroism is displayed of ten are accidental. But the people who
- performed the heroic deeds were able to take advantage of these random
concurrences of circumstances because they were prepared physically, psycho-
logically, morally and politically to display heroism."1
The heroism, valor and courage o� soldiers primarily represent the fruits of
strenuous wo`rk of shaping their high moral and volitional qualities. The
_ entire training process and all forms of indoctrinational work serve to
attain these goals. -
(:onnnanders and political workers act properly in conducting classes, and ~
especially tactical exercises, when they direct attention to soldiers'
conduct in especially difficult situations and commend those who have
performed bold, selfless acts. During a river crossing in unit "X" a tank
broke through the planking of a bridge near the shore and plunged into the
water. It was necessary to put it in neutral in order to extract it from the
river, and f or this it was necessary to snter the tank's turret underwater at
a temperature of 10 degrees below zero. Lt Val'kov undertook the task with-
out reflection.
There was a detailed account of the officer's selfless act in the unit and a
leaElet was published. This deed was mentioned in classes and in discussions.
The broad publir_ity of the exploit unquestionably leaves an imprint in the
soldiers' awareness and develops in them a desire to emulate the hero.
In developing high moral-political and combat qualities in soldiers it is
difEicult to overestimate well-organized socialist competition. LIt is
generally known that competition is a powerful means for mob ilizing masses
to Eulfill combat and political training plans. At the same time, it serves
as an important factor for indoctrinating personnel. The indoctrinational
effect of the entire training process is reinforced dur3ng such competition.
Socialist competition develops a spirit of healthy rivalry, serves as an
effective means for solidifying military collectives, and helps vigorously
polish all qualities of a soldier's personality and realization of the
- principle "all for one and one for all," which is of no small importance in
the moral-political training of personne]. for successful operations in a
contemporary war. This is one of the circumstances which determines the
unremitting attention to competition on the part of commanders, political
entities, staff s, and party and Komsomol organizations.
The soldiers' physical training is a very important component of personnel
training f or operations in a contemporary war and is closely connected with
1. Kalinin, M. I. "0 kommunisti.cheskom vospitanii i voins~;om dol.ge" [On
Communist Indoctrination and Military Duty], Moscow, 1967, p 682.
24 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
+
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Che formation of m~~ral-political and combat qualities. If a soldier or offi-
cer is not physically fit and if he is not prepared to overcome th~e hardships
of military life, he wi11 not be able Co perform the duties assigned him
successful~;y. This concerns the actions of personnel under conditions of a
contemporary war even more so. In order to endure a physical load in combaC,
the soldier must possess very high endurance and fitness.
But this is not the only problem. ~'hysical training has a direct effect on
the personnel's moral-psychological mood. A healthy, conditioned, physically
fit body is beneficial to thought operations and efforts of will displayed
in a combat situation. There cannot be a full-fledged so~.,ier capable of
overcoming all diff iculties of a combat situation and venturi.ng to perform a
selfless act without suffic.ient physical training. "A healthy spirit in a
healthy body"--this ancient saying, applied to a soldier's actions, is taken
as a need to be physically strong and fit in order to act successfully in
conEormity with one's convictions.
This is why the moral and psychological training of per.sonne.i in peacetime -
p~ovides the necessary results if it is accompanied by an improvement in each
soldier's physical conditioning. Well-conceived, well-organized physical
training classes are of great importance in this regard. The character of
exercises and their degree of difficulty must ensure consistent conditioning
of a person and his volitional qualities. Mass sports work in the unit and
aboard the ship cannot be underestimated in this regard. It is a good
support f or physical development of soldiers and for strengthening their
will. It creates conditions for successful operations in combat.
It is understandable that soldiers are physically conditioned not oniy in
special physical training classes and in mass sports sections, but in all
day-to-day service, especially tactical problems, exercises and practice
_ sessions, if they approximate the conditions qf actual combat.
_ The requirement to bring the entire system of training soldiers in peacetime
as closely as possible to combat conditions also is related directly to the
organization of party-political work in tactical exercises. Any belittling
of the features of contemporary combat and the slightest ignoring of the new
element introduced into political work by the use of new means of warfare
impoverish its content and weaken the effect of ineasures conducted for
preparing traops for successful conduct of a nuclear missile war. -
- There is a practice by many commanders and political workers which merits all
possible aQproval. Dur.ing tactical exercises they thoroughly cover problems
of party-political work in different types of combat with maximum considera-
tion given to the employment of new weapons. Prior provisions are made for
activities which are carried out to mobilize personnel for successful
exploitation of a"nuclear strike" against "enemy" troops for a swif t advance,
for crossing zones of "radioactive contamination," for taking steps of
protection against nuclear attack and so on. All this is important f or the
soldiers' moral and psychological conditioning and for building up experience
in party-political work in a contemporary war.
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Party-poli.tical work of restorin~ the combat e�fectiveness of subunits
sub,jected to "atomic attack" acquires great signif icance. In this situation
it is very im~ortant ro supporC actions simiXar to combat actions, Tf a
unit has come under "atomic attack" or has been subjected to "radinactive
contamination," the entire complex of work to rescue and evacuate Che
"wounded" and to decontaminate equipment and the terrain must be carried out.
The political worker's task in such cases obviously is to see to it that the
party and Komsomol members set an example in this matter and assist
commanders in everything.
During one exercise a subunit came under "aComic attack," as a result of
whic~h, according to estimates which were made, 40 percent of the personnel
and equipment were "disabled." A rescue team was dispatched urgently to the
vicinity of the "nuclear burst." A political worker arrived along with it.
The entire process of evacuating personnel and equipment took place under
near-combat conditions. Personnel decontamination was actually conducted.
" In mobilizing personnel for evacuaCing Che "wounded," towing away vehicles
and so on, the political worker together with the aktiv additionally explained
to the personnel the essence and importance of ineasures taken to prepare for
successful operatiuns in real combat.
Under certain conditions combat operations also may be conducted without the
use of nuclear weapons. With consideration of this, the very abundant
experience of party-political work gained during the Great Patriotic War is
of invaluable importance f or raising the effectiveness of party-political
worlc and the training of commanders and political workers during exercises
and tactical problems.
/High discipline is one of the most important moral-combat qualities needed
by 5oviet soldiers for victory in war./ Our party tirelessly indoctrinates
Soviet citizens i.n a spirit of socialist discipline and faultless fulfill-
ment of their duties to society. The party teaches that unconditional
observance of laws and rules adopted in socialist society not only does not
~ontradict the democratic f;~ux~dations of the Soviet system, but to the
contrary, is in complete unity with them. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev decl~red
that"the essence of socialist democracy is the socialist organization of all
society for the sake of every person, and each person's~socialist discipline
for the sake of all society. It is the party's task to strengthen high
discipline and organization constantly at all echelons of the party and
~ state."1
The November (1978) CPSU CC Plenum emphasized t1~at an important c~ondition
for our success was supreme organization and discipline in all spheres and
in all sectors of work. The measure of responsibility is especially high
for leaders at all echelons to observe discipline strictl,y.
1. "Materialy XXIII s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 23d CPSU Congress],
Moscow, 1966, p 88.
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
This thesis is of exceptionally great importance for our Armed Forces as a
spe~cific organization. Under Army condiCions the principles on which the
relationships and conduct of Soviet citizens are based operate to Che full
exCent and are supplemented by state demands placed on soldiers, expressed
in the military oath, regulaCions, and.the orders of commanders and chiefs.
Mora1 incentives in our Army play an enormous part in mainCaining discipline.
They give a deeply perceived character Co people's actions involving the
observance of military order and the perforu?ance of difficult m1liCary duties.
The discipline of soldier masses always was linked inseparably with political
and class struggle. It was developed and used by particular classes in the
interests of their own policy. In armies of the imperialist states, the
ruling circles and the off icer corps make use of various means including
ideological conditioning to force the soldier masses to obey in order to
con3uct their antipopular, aggressive policy.
The political meaning of soldiers' discipline in socialist society is that,
being in the ranks of the Army and Navy, they are subordinaee to the demands
of socialist military discipline and fulfill them in the interests of their
people, who are building communism. Discipline is an important condition for ~
ensuring our country's security and wrecking the aggressive p3.ans of the
imperialists.
Discipline plays a special role and has its characteristic manifestations in
the Army as a specific organization. In peacetime it is a most important
condition for high combat effectiveness and constant combat readiness of the
troops. Throughout all his service, a soldier is subject to strict military
regulation. He may be required at any moment to carry out a comb~~t order or
display an intensity of all forces, courage and selflessness.
The importance of discipline under wartime conditions rises immeasurably.
Lenin emphasized that there can be no victory in war without strict disci-
pline. In a combat situation the course and outcome of a battle and victory
over the enemy depends in a most direct manner on allegiance to the oath and
fulf illing the commander's order. Under wartime conditions the observance
of military discipline and fulfillment of commanders' orders demands enor-
mously more of soldiers than in peacetime with regard to the intensity of
forces, courage, steadfastness, initiative and the subordination of the
individual's interests to those of the common cause.
Based on the soldiers' high consciousness and on the unity of class interests
of Army personnel, socialist military discipline is the firmest discipline.
The Great Patriotic War conf irmed this vividly. The Soviet f orces' failures
at the beginning of the war did not break their f ighting spirit or undermine
discipline in their ranks. To the contrary, discipline grew constantly
stronger in our Army, while it began to drop in the fascist Army af ter the
very iirst serious defeats.
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
`
FOR.OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Gen Borodin, one of the heroes of Mi.khail Bubennov's novel "Belaya bereza"
[White BirchJ, told very clearly about' the supreme strength oF conscious ~
Soviet mil,itary discipline.
He said: "Our retreat in October will be studied by hisrorians with astonish-
ment and wiCh the same interest with which they study vicCorious offensive
operations. That which I had occasion to observe in our Army during the days
o� October can be considered a miracle. Xes, I am speaking quite seriously.
As you know, it is considered more cofimon for the basest human qualities to
develop in the soldier masses with 5uch a serious retreat--qualities which
in Che final account transform the Arury into a herd. But it happened the
other way around with us. Qur man was never before as pure as in these days
when he was performing noble exploits for Whe sake of the homeland."1
During Che Civi1 and Great Patriotic wars our soldiers defeated the enemy
and displayed marvels of selflessness and heroism primarily becaus~ they had
a high awareness of their duty to the homeland and subordinated their deeds
and their entire lives to the people's coffinand and to the fulfillment of
, orders aimed at deteating the hated enemy.
The course and outcome of combat actions will depend to an incomparably
greater extent under conditions of a contemporary war on the discipline of
personnel.
In its decree dated 21 January 1967, the CPSU Central Committee demands
"assurance of a thorough understanding by all military personnel that the
role and importance of mi?itary discipline grows even more under present-day
conditions, when nuclear missile weaponry is in the Army inventory. Each
soldier is required to have an extremely precise and exact fulfillment of
the military oath, military regulations and commanders' orders, and faultless
execution and eff iciency, since the slightest display of negligence or lack
of discipline can lead to serious consequences."2
Ihe process of industrialization of the Armed Forces has extraordinarily
accelerated in our time, and the importance of discipline is increasing in
direct proportion to it. This is particularly typical of the Strategic
Missile Forces, National Air Defense Forces, Air Forc~ units and contemporary
warships of the Navy. This principle, which determines the interdependence
of ehe development of technology and military discipline, also is typical of
combined units and units of the Ground Forces.
With the present technical outfitting of troops, the people's interrelation-
ships and attitudes have become abruptly more complex, and again in the
direction of greater precision and cohesiveness of actions. It also f ollows
from what has been said that contemporarq means of warfare increase each
soldier's responsibility for performance of.the combat mission.
1. Bubennov, M. "Belaya bereza" [White Birch], Mos~ow, 1952, p 250.
2. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza" [The CPSU on the Armed
Forces of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1969, p 416.
28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Take the following situation for example: A battalion is crossing a zone of
radioactive contamination and in a certain sector the radiological monitor
was inattentive in determining.the radiation level, either overstating it or
understating it. This wi11 inevitably, lead either to unjustified losses or
to the subunit perhaps reducing the rate of advance without any basis for
this. In other words, one person's imprecise actions will affect the _
perf ormance of the mission as a whole.
1
It is impossible not to direct attentiou to another factor which determines
the increased importance of mi7.itary discipline in a contemporary war--Che
factor of time. Calculation of time always was an ob~ect of great concern
for commanders and military.leaders. To gain time and anticipate the enemy
in actions is largely to predetermine victory. But in the past, and even in
the past Great Patriotic War,.time was counted primarily in days and hours,
and a gain in time did not have such importance as now.
Not only the days and hours, but minutes and even seconds acquire extra-
ordinary importance in a contemporary war. It now requires a missile
approximately 30 minutes to deliver a nuclear warhead to any target. Every
second must be accounted for in order to accomplish the combat mission
successfully under such.circumstances, i.e., to manage to set the necessary
means of defense in motion and simultaneously deliver a crushing blow against
the enemy with strategic weapons. A gain in time now is of colossal
importance to the progress of combat operations and the war as a whole. This
is why such great attention now is given to reducing the time periods for
placing weapons in combat readiness, to reducing the time taken to maneuver
positions and combat formations, and to mastering the personnel's precise,
- extremely exact and rapid actions with combat equipment.
In interpreting the new element in discipline called forth by the features
of contemporary warfare, we also cannot help but reckon with a rise in the
role of soldiers' initiative and creativeness i.n fulf illing a combat mission
or a commander's order. An active attitude toward the order of a commander
or chief is one of the specif ic manifestations of the conscientious character
of Soviet military discipline. An order must be fulf illed strictly,
prec isely and on time, but its fulf illment will be even more successful,~~the
more initiative~a serviceman displays in so doing. The entire history of
the Army and Navy and the experience of past wars are full of examples of
a creative accomplishment of combat missions by our soldiers.
These remarkable qualities are even more necessary in our time. Contemporary
combat actions are distinguished by high maneuverability and a rapid, sudden
change in the situation. Under these conditions it is necessary to have the
flexible mind and initiative of the soldier, especially the commander, and
his ab ili.ty and readiness to make an independent decision and act in conf orm-
ity with the situation at hand in the interests of successful execution of
the orders of senior chiefs.
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
It is also important to consider the cixcumstance that it is enormously more
difFicult to maintain direct contact beCween the commander and subordinates
under condiCions of the employment of the latest means of war.�are. A situa-
Cion wi11 take shape where soldiers will have Co operate in separate cenCers
as small groups enormously more o�ten.than in the past. It is one thing
where a unik operates as a single whole and when the soldier constantly
feels the effecCs of a precise~.y def ined combat ~ormation, and another when
there may not be such orderliness in the actions o~ a unit or subuniC. In
these instances there comes to the ~ore.the soldier's self-discipline and
the profound inner need and ability instilled in him to subordinate his
actions and his will to accomplishment of the combat mission.
It is obvious that even combat operations with the employment of conventional
weapons will requir~e high discipline and cohesive:ness in the personnel's
actions. There has been a sharp increase in sat~iration of combined units
and units with military equipment, and consequen~ly their missions have
become more complex. Supersonic aircraft speeds call forth a need for
extreme composure and responsibility in each soldier. This is characteris-
tic of units in all branches of the Armed Forces with conventional combat
equipment in, their inventory. ~
A contemporary war thus not only presents high demands on soldiers' disci-
plitie, but also will introduce many new elements to its very content. This
all is considered in the process of troop training under peacetime condi-
tions, since the foundation of soldiers' high discipline is laid down right
during training and daily service.
At the same time, military discipline itself is a primary condition for
accomplishing combat and political training missions. The successful
mastery of sophisticated equipment and its skilled employment on tactical
exercise f ields, on cruises, and in flights is inconceivable without mili-
tary discipline. The soldiers' faultless discipline is a sure guarantee for
high combat readiness of a unit, warship, and subunit.
A soldier's discipline is formed and develops throughout the process of his
'ndoctrination, training and performance of service. Our verbal and printed
propaganda rightfully emphasizes that military discipline is a moral cate-
gory. This means that people's profound perception of the principles of a
moral code of a builder of communism as moral imperatives is of permanent
importance in fulfilling its demands. But this thesis sometimes is
in.terpreted without proper consideration of the fact that military discipline
also is a category of state legality. Consequently soldiers' indoctrination
in a spirit of high discipline is a uniform process of military, legal and.
moral indoctrination.
Moral-p.olitical training has to do with the development primarily of
political and moral elements on which personnel discipline is based. In a
continuous interrelationship with military indoctrination, it forms in
soldiers a constant desire to observe the demands of the military oath and
regulations steadfastly.
FOR OFFIC~AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Observance of the demands of military discipline even in peacetime assumes a
great inCensity of the soldiers' spiritual and physical �orces. Subordina-
tion to the demands o~ discipl,ine represents the greatest difficulty in
military service 1t first for a considerable n~imber of privates. As researCh
in one combined unit showed, over a third of privates surveyed who responded
- to questions about the diff iculties of military service mention above all ~
the transition to sCrict discipline and a rigid routine. Here are the most
typical answers:
--Prior to the Army I did not have occasion to encounter such difficulties
as strict discipline and precision in everything;
--The basic, sole diff iculty is to fa11 out of the habits of the civilian
situation and bec.ome accustomed to Army life strictly by the regulations;
--It was difficult to become accustomed to strict discipline and routine.
Experience shows that these difficulties are overcome considerably easier
and less painlessly by those soldiers who have the necessary moral and labor
conditioning and who perceive their military duty more deeply.
The young people absorb these qualities necessary for defense of the Mother-
land in the process of military service, and the qualities later help them
perform their missions of building communism. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev
directed attention to this aspect of military indoctrination in a report at
the 25th CPSU Congress. He said that "young lads come into the soldier
family without having passed through the school of life. But they return
from the Army already as people who have gone through the school of self-
_ control and discipline and who have received technical and professional
knowledge and political training."1
Indoctrination of soldiers in a spirit of high discipline is the continuous
focus of attention of commanders, political entities and party organizations.
Consideration is given here to a number of new circumstances which have an
effect on accomplishment of this mission.
First of all, great changes have occurred in the postwar years in the quali-
tative make-up of replacements. More lifierate and more well-trained young
people now are coming into the Army. On the one hand, this makes it easier
to indoctrinate soldiers in a spirit of conscientious military discipline.
It is easier to persuade a literate person as to the need f or strict observ-
ance of demands of the military oath. regulations, and commanders' orders.
Meanwhile, the changes which have occurred in the developmental level of
replacements require an improvement in a11 work of instilling discipline in
today's soldiers.
1. 'Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress],
Moscow, 1976, pp 75-76.
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The method of persuasion always was the determining method of indoctrination
in our Army, as it was in all Soviet.society, where discipline is based on
high awareness. V. I. Lenin etqphasized that "we must above a11 persuade,
and then compel."~
M. V. Frunze spoke about the proper correlation of inethods of persuasion and
coercion. He stated that "it is of course impossible to get by absolutely
without any elements of coercion, but~.the narrowest limits must be placed on
their application."2
Several decades have gone by since these thoughts were expressed. The
changes which have occurred in Army and Navy personnel during this time in
the sense of general educational training and an expansion in cultural
horizons reinforce evea more the importance of this thesis in indoctrina-
tional work with soldiers.
This does not at all mean that a need for coercion with respect to undisci-
� plined people no longer arises in our time. The party teaches that intoler-
ance is to be displayed toward violations of social order. And in addition
to that, growing attention is being given to developing the ideological-
moral aspect of indoctrinating Soviet citizens in a spirit of high discipline.
These party guidelines have special signif icance for the Armed Forces. Their
implementation in the indoctrinational process presumes an intelligent
combination of inethods of persuasion and coerc3on with consideration of the
features of the contemporary "human material." In speaking of an improvement
in the method of persuasion, it is important to consider that the contempo-
rary young person who has come into the Army ranks unquestionably perceives
the essence and meaning of his military obligations with greater depth and
thoroughness, but at the same time he also expects a more qualified explana-
tion of the essence of demands being placed on him. General appeals and an
oversimplif ied interpretation of particular issues influen~ce him least of
all. Indoctrinational work in the Army ha~ ~ecome more complex in this
~ense .
't'here is one other circumstance which cannot help but be considered in the
work of indoctrinating today's youth in a spirit of high discipline. In many
instances the young lad who has come into the Army is the only child in the
family. As a rule, he is molded in an atmosphere of the parents' special
concern and attention which does not always facilitate the tempering of his
will and character. On arriving in the Army it is especially diff icult for _
him at first to become accustomed to hard Army life and to act strictly by
the regulations.
1. Lenin, XLIII, 54. .
2. Frunze, M. V. "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Sel.ected Works], Moscow, 1957,
II, 21.
. 32 ~
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Indoctrination~al work with soldiers now requires higher pedagogic expertise
and broader erudition of officers. A young ~ad.who has come into the Army
today carries within himself and 3.r4 his conduct a reflection of those
profound, beneficial processes which are taking p].ace in the country--further
development of democr.acy and a growth of the individual. With a proper
perception of military discipline., exactingness, and strictness uf order, at
the same time he expects a sensitive attitude toward himself and satisfaction
of his increased spiritual needs.
Some officers can be heard to say that it now has become more diff icult to
work with soldiers because they allegedly are oversensitive to interpreting
high exactingness. This is of course not so. Concrete sociological research
provides the basis to draw conclusions of a different sort. To the question
"Which of the officers do you most respect and why?" many privates named high
exactingness among the merits of the off icers they respected. The off icers
- to whom the privates gave respect are exacting, strong-willed commaaders who
are capable of combining strictness and exactingness toward subordina~es with
constant concern for them.
Meanwhile, research shows that a tactless attitude and coarseness displayed
by some officers unsettles the privates most of all and generates a
heightened reaction in them. Contemporary soldiers require more attention
and a respectful~attitude toward themselves without, of course, any kind of
indulgences in observing military order.
Officers now must possess more thorough knowledge in peda~ogics and psychol-
ogy. They have to study the peculiarities of people's characters in more
detail, make broader use of the individual method of approaching subordinates,
and devote more attention to satisfying increased spiritual and material
needs, especially those of young soldiers.
The second element which introduces much that is new to the work of instil-
ling high discipline in soldiers is the growth in the Army and Navy's tech-
nical outfitting. The appearance of new means of warfare has led to a~
further expansion and complication of interrelationships between man and
equipment. And the growing dependence of success of a battle or operation
on people's knowledge of contemporary combat equipment and its capable
employment serves as one of the manifestations of this objective process.
The contemporary training process is above all a process in which personnel
master the combat equipment, weapons and methods of their employment. Use
of the~latest equipment and keeping it in a combat status assume, moreover,
an exceptional precision and synchronization in the personnel's actions. For ~
this reason instilling discipline means increasing in every way the serv-
ice personriel's responsibility for the equipment entrusted to them and for
its capable employment. The demand to fulfill faultlessly the directions
contained in instructions and manual.s for the study of equipment and for
maintaining it in constant readiness for action has acquired great acuteness
in this regard, particularly for missile units, air defense troops, the Air
Force and the Navy. Where this circumstance is not taken into account,
grounds for accidents or the malfunctioning of costly equipment have not
been eliminated.
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
rc~K ur~r'LClAL U5~ UNLY
The strictest observance of the requirements of regulations, manuals and
instructions on caring for and operating equipment and on keeping iC ready
for action is a very important component in the make-up of all work of
indoctrinating people in a spirit of high discipline, since this has a
determining effect on troop combat readiness.
Military-technical progress p~.aces its imprint on various aspects of the
work of commanders, chief s and all off icers and requires them to have greater
eff iciency and composure in their work. The contemporary foremost officer
is not one who achieves necessary resul.ts at any cost, but one who organizes
work capably and in a scientif ic manner and who makes maximum use of equip-
ment and foremost management methods. New equipment requires special
precision and thought in the action~ of all managers.
The third elemerit which must not be forgotten when we speak of indoctrinating
soldiers in a spirit of high discipline is bringing its demands closer to
wartime discipline in a large number of echelons. This proposition is
determined by the increased importance of troop combat readiness to the
country's security.
Under contemporary conditions our Strategic Missile Forces and Air Defense
Forces perform their very, very difficult and important missions in a near-
combat situation. There is an especially important form of service: combat
watch. It is the performance of a most important combat mission in its
purpose and essence. All this places special responsibility on the personnel
and generates additional difficulties in service.
The instilling of discipline of the highest limit, which is necessary on
combat watch, demands great efforts on the part of commanders, political
entities and party organizations. The important element here is for each
soldier to have a clear understanding of the entire importance of his service
to the subunit, unit and the country as a whole, and f or him to realize how
necessary is his faultless performance of duties for erisuring the Motherland's
security.
Under present-day conditions the degree of people's discipline in all units
of any branch of the Armed Forces or combat arm is viewed primarily through
the prism of combat readiness. From this standpoint, for example, even
isolated instances of alcohol abuse are absolutely intolerable under Army
conditions. One sometimes can hear certain young soldiers say: "What's so
special about that? We drank at home and nothing happened." These ~udge-
ments reflect a lack of understanding that with today's sophisticated equip-
ment requiring special attentiveness, a person with a clouded con~ciousness
or with a mind traumatized by alcohol cannot perform his duties precisely
and, moreover, he may do irreparable harm to the cause. This is one of the
most important circumstances making it necessary to take the strictest steps
to eradicate drunkenness under Army and Navy conditions.
3~+
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
And fourth is something very important to consider in the work of 3.nstilling
in soldier.s a spirit of h~,gh discipline. It is the col,lective nature of
contemporary weapons. The fact thatnew t~chnology is activated through the
collective efforCs of sold3ers determines each person's increase in responsi-
bility for performance of his duties in the team or crew at his station or
at the battle station.
The interdependence and interchangeabi~.ity in servicing equipment,which was
widely displayed in past wars only on the batt~,e~ield, has been transformed
into a mandatory element of daily troop life with the presenC-day means of
warfare. W3thout the firm discipline of each soldier individually, not one
subunit will be able to perform the mission assigned it successfully. It is
important here that.each soldier's conduct be "synchronized" in the collec-
tive and that he have a develop~ed sense of responsibility f or performance of
the missions being carried out by the subunit.
On the other hand, new weaponry increases the collective's responsibility
for each soldier's conduct and action. Therefore a knowledge of the
features of a military collective's psychology is of great importance for
instilling discipline in soldiers with consideration of present-day demands.
Making military collectives cohesive on a fundamental basis must be a sub~ect
of great concern to commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol
organizations. The well-known principle of "one for all and all for one"
acquires importance as a mandatory norm of behavior for all service personnel.
The importance of bringing up soldiers in a spirit of collectivism, mutual
responsibility, and Soviet troop comradeship increases in this regard.
The development of genuine collectivism and mutual responsibility also
presumes the e.radicati~n ofimaginary comradeship and unprincipled, unen-
lightened friendship. Even before, if mutual backscratching was displayed
in some instances, it did much harm to the cohesiveness of military collec-
tives. It now may have enormously greater consequences.
The heart of all work of indoctrinating soldiers in a spirit of high disci-
pline is f ormation of their /faultless execution/ and unconditional fulf ill-
ment of military regulations and the orders of commanders and chiefs. The
success of a subunit, unit or warship under combat conditions is inconceiv-
able without this quality.
Some bourgeois military theorists attempt to place execution and initiative
in contemporary battle in opposition. For example, in an article by French
military specialist D. (Shavan) entitled "On the Rehabilitation of Disci-
pline," he writes: "Contemporary methods of warmaking, use of various types
of weapons, decentralization, and the un~oreseen element in the unfolding
of combat actions a11 require more in3tiative than subordination. In addi-~
tion, at the present time soldiers primarily are not profess3onals. They
are very much informed and wish to act independently more and more." The
author correctly poses the issue~of an increase in the role of initiative in ~ ~
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
con temporary combat, but he does not take i.nto account that this does not at
all mean a weakening of discipline or execution of person~el in perf ormance
of combat missions. Employment of contemporary means of warfare presumes
that Che initiative and creativeness of service personnel are combined with-
out fail with the performance of plans, orders and insCructions of superior
commanders and chiefs.
The enCire pracess and content of moral-political and psychological training
are inseparable from those spiritual values which have been created in the
Armed Forces throughout their.entire historical path. The glorious combat
traditions of our Army and Navy and their systematic, purposeful propaganda
among personnel are of enormous, permanent importance in this regard.
French writer Victor Hugo once said: "Events go into the past. The people
who have seen them at f irst hand close their eyes forever. TradiCions die
out with the years ~ust as the light in a fireplace."
In his works Hugo was faithful to the truth of life, but in this instance he
erred. There is an enormous mobilizing force contained in traditions, and
in leading traditions above all. This can be said in particular about the
combat traditions of the Soviet Army and Navy. Not one army in the world
has such a very rich, truly heroic history as the USSR Armed Forces. There
_ are many combined units and units among the troops and in the fleets which
bear several Soviet Union orders on their colors. And what very vivid
examples of heroics saturate the combat careers of our guards units and
combined units!
The unfading light of combat glory is the life-giving source for the forma-
tion of high morale in troop personnel needed for victory in contemporary
war; the source of inspiration for soldiers to perform noble deeds in peace-
time.
_ Much experience in this regard has been gained in the Armed Forces. A broad
.~etwork of military museums and rooms of combat glory is actively used in
bringing up soldiers in combat traditions. Large numbers of books are
published about the combat deeds and exploits of combined units, units,
ships and their personnel. But it must be said that the task of creating
meaningful material of high quality concerning their history and combat
path has not been resolved in all combined units.
Veterans who have participated in war have made and are making an invaluable
contribution to the propaganda of the Army and Navy's combat traditions.
Unf ortunately they are becoming fewer and fewer among the troops and in the
fleets, particularly in units and aboard ships, where the process of person-
nel indoctrination is directly carried out. An even greater significance is
acquired in this regard by the propaganda of combat deeds and the heroics of
_ the war years and peacetime using diverse forms and means, especially
involving the use of mil.itary-historical work.s, memoirs, relics, and works
of fiction and art. ~
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_
,k.~..,. ~~.,i.,,.~ . . . ~ . ' ~ . ' . . - - . . ~ .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Indoctrination in the heroics and the grand exploits which our personnel
perEormed in battles to defend Che socialist Motherland is of special
importance.in using combat traditions in the interests of the personnel's
mor.sl-political training. These very traditions pale and their effect on
the soldiers' consciousness is reduced without this component, which largely
determines the content of combat traditions. l~ heroic exploit is an example
f or emulation in a dif~icult combat situation. Meanwhile, this is not always
taken into account. For example, during a survey in a unit, a majority of
soldiers even in the first year of service could state the key element in
response to the question "What do you know about your unit's combat tradi-
tions?" Seventy-four percent of the soldiers could give the battles in which
it took part. But a little over 13 percent of the soldiers responded to *_he
f ollowing question, "What eYploit performed by the unit's soldiers stuck in
your memory?"1 A.~1 this attests to insuff icient attention given in some
units to propaganda of heroic examples and exploits of countrymen in battles
f or the Motherland. It is theref ore so important to fill in the propaganda
of combat traditions more fully with the heroics of past years. -
The experience of indoctrination in combat traditions and the heroics of
past years in one of the guards units is instructive. This unit has
performed great services to the Motherland. There were 2,918 personnel in
the unit decorated with governmental orders for exemplary performance of
combat assignments in the Great Patriotic War. Seven of them were presented
with the title Hero of the Soviet Union. The names of six soldiers who
performed tLeroic exploits in battles against the fascist German invaders were
entered in the unit rolls forever by order of the Minister of Defense.
The soldiers maintain and develop the glory of their countrymen in peacetime.
Many of the unit's personnel were awarded combat orders and medals for
courage, valor and high expertise in performing assignments of the command
element in peacetime. Troop traditions are alive in the military deeds of
otlichx~iki and leaders of training.
Much is being done here to bring up the personnel in combat traditions. The
f irst political classes at the beginning of a training year are devoted to
the unit's combat path. There is much work conduc ted continuously in a well-
arranged room of combat glory. Portraits of heroes who have been entered
f orever in the unit rolls and descriptions of their exploits are hung in the
barracks. Displays devoted to the combat traditions of the Armed Forces and
the unit ha~e been arranged in the Lenin rooms and there are portraits of
heroes of war years and peacetime here. It has become a good rule to hold
regular meetings of privates, sergeants, warrant officers and officers with
war veterans. Movies and belles-lettres are used widely to indoctrinate
soldiers in the heroics of the past.
1. See "Voyenno-patrioticheskoye vospitaniye molodezhi v sovremennykh
usloviyakh. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov" [Military-Patriotic Indoctrination
of the Youth under Contemporary Conditions: Collection of Scientif ic
Works], Novosibirsk, 1975, p 20.
37
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The experience nf indoctrination in combat traditions has been gained in a11
units anc? aboard all warships, including those which have no rich combat
history.
The missile tro~ps, air defense forces and units acCivated after the war
widely propaganciize Armed Forces' traditions and the combat glory of units
whose numbers and designations were received by some missile units. Here -
they create, elaborate and continuously augment the traditions of the missile
troaps themselves and extol the exploits of mis~ile personnel perfor~cad in
postwar times and the patriotic deeds of otlichniki and of soldiers who
- perform service faultlessly.
An important role is played by propaganda of the military oath and military
regiilations in indoctrinating soldiers in a spirit of allegiance to their
military duty and in.forming their high moral-combat qualities. The oath and
regiilations contain demands of the Communist Party and Soviet government on
armed defenders of the socialist state and on the training and indoctrination
of Soviet military personnel.
~
The military oath defi.nes~the primary qualities of the Soviet soldier needed
for victory over the enemy. It contains in writing those sacred obligations
wher.e the high consciousness and fervent.patriotism of Soviet citizens are
displayed in their fulfillment. Theref ore the military oath and military
regulations, being the Foun.dation of military indoctrination, at the same time
also largely determine the content of moral-political and psychological
training.
From his very f irst days of service, each soldier must become imbued with an
awareness that the oath is a sacred vow of allegiance to the country and
that it reflects the people's will and orders to their armed defenders.
Propaganda of the oath's requirements is carried on systematically, from day _
to ciay, among the troops. They are explained to inore than just the young
privates and seamen. All personnel also are constantly reminded of their
vow to the people. Daily purposeful work of propagandizing the oath permits
ir.stilling~ its ideas and demands in the awareness of each soldier and seeing
that: he fulf ills it throughout his service.
Interests of the country's defense demand that every step and every act by a
soldier throughout his service be synchronized with the high, inviolable
rlemands of the military oath--a vow of allegiance to the Motherland.
~'he entire meaning and directio:i of the work of commanders, political workers
dnd party members in moral-poiitical and psychological training and ~ondi-
tionin~ of personnel consisi:s of thoroughly preparing every soldier under
peac:etime conditions for skilled, sel,fless actions in a contemporary war and
for achieving victory over any aggressor.
. 38
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Conclusion
The Soviet socialist state has stood firmly and inviolably for o~.,er 60 years
now. Soviet citizens look back proudly on the path they have covered and at
the successes achieved in all fields of the building of communism. The Land
of Soviets, born of October, has been sub,jected to serious tests more than
once along this historic path and has been the object of imperialist aggres-
sion. Our Motherland and its Army always have come out of these tests with
honor, crushing every enemy.
Our Communist Party invariably has been and is the builder, indoctrinator
and inspirer of our Armed Forces and of their glorious victories over numer-
ous enemies of the Land of Sovi_ets. Our ideological indoctrination and the
entire system of soldier training is built on the basis of party policy,
directives and instructions, shaping the high, noble qualities of Soviet
patriots and selfless defenders of the Motherland ready to give their all
and, if necessary, life itself for the sake of her prosperity and f or defense
of the countries of the socialist community. ~
In a report at the 9th All-Russian Congress of Soviets in 1921, V. I. Lenin
said: "We are stronger than anyone else morally, not understanding this
thought from the viewpoint of abstract morality, of course, but taking it as
a correlation of actual forces of all classes in all states. This is tested
in fact. It has been proven not by words, but by deeds. It already has
been proven once and probably will be proven more than once if history
swings around in the familiar fashion."1
These remarkable words of Lenin about the superiority of our people's and
Army's moral forces over armies of imperialist aggressors have been confirmed
~ repeatedly by life and by the practice of the wars which our socialist state
waged against invaders.
_ The development and strengthening of the spiritual forces of the people and
Army always were and remain an object of the Communist Party's unwavering
attention. Thanks to the guiding influence of the Communist Party and its
Leninist Central Committee, ideological indoctrination work becomes a more
and more powerful factor for strengthening the combat effectiveness of the
Soviet Army and Navy.
If enemies should dare attac~C us again, the Soviet l.and and its Armed Forces
would rise up to their gigantic height and again demonstrate their political,
economic and spiritual might and ideological superiority over imperialism
and its corrupt ideology, this time not alone, but together with fraternal
countries of the world socialist community and their armed forces. ~The
mighty and indestructible spiritual forces of our people and their soldiers
will have a most important significance in such a development of events.
_ 1. Lenin, XLIV, 300.
39
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Accomplishment of the entire complex of tasks of shaping a high morale in
soldiers both in peace and in wartime is possible only in the course of the
systematic, purposeful, a11-encompassing work of commanders, political
entities, and party and Komsomol organ'izations in the ideological-political
and military indoctrination of our Army's personnel. The armed defender of
the nation who is building communism and is capable of performing any of the
very difficult tasks of defending the peace and security of our Motherland
and the grand cause of co~unism is shaped and tempered through all forms
of ideological work in the unif orm process of training and indoctrination -
. and by the entire system of military life.
COPYRIGHT: Vuyenizdat, 1979 .
6 904
CSO: 1801
40 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
OOMBINING INDOCTRINATION AND TRAIN?NG
Moscow YEDINSTVO VOSPITANIY'A I OEUCHENIyA (Uni.ty of Indoctrination and
Traini.ng) in Russian 1977 signed to press 1$ Nov 77 Pp 1, 2, 3-4
[Annotation, Table of Contents and Foreword from book by D.P. PoznanslQ ,
Ordena ~~Znak Pocheta~~ izdatel�stvo DOSA.AF SSSR~ 30,000 copies, $0 pages~
[Text] The author of this book~ Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences
D. P. PoznanslQy, discusses the comprehensive approach to the ideological-
political indoctrination ~f students of DOSAAF training organizations.
The book is intended mainly for supervisory personnel, teachers and in-
struc�cors of the defense Society~s clubs and. scl-iools~ and for DOSAAF
activists.
Contents Page
Foreword ~
Chapter 1. The~Comprehensive Approach
The Main Trend for 3
Improving F,.ffectiveness in the Indoctrination and
Z`r'ai.ni.ng of the Youth 5
Chapter 2. Unity of Indoctrination and Trainirig-The Guiding
Principle in the Traini.ng of Draftees 25
Chapter 3. The Tasks of Instructors and Supervisors at DOSAAF
Schools With Respect to Insuring Unity of
Indoctrination and Training for Their Students 6z
Foreword (To The Reader)
The increased tasks placed upon the Armed Forces of the USSR by the c.on-
temporary international situation, the qualitative changes occurring in
the technical equipmerit of the troops and the nature of modern warfare
are continuously increasing the requirements made of So~r~.et fighting men
and of their ideological-political and their moral and combat qualities.
� ~1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY "
. ,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
'Ifie CPSU therefore attaches great importance to improving effectiveness
in the trairiing and indoct:rinatio~ of the fighting men and that of the
draft-age youth. This task has also become more important as a result of
the reduced terms of military service. How rapidly the young fighting
; men settle into the formation and, consequently, the combat readir_ess level ~
of units and, subunits of the Soviet Army and Navy~ depend greatly upon the
qual-i.ty of the training received by draftees and izpon their ideologi.cal
level and discipline.
The A11-Union Order of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner Volunteer Society
for Cooperation With the Arrtiy, Aviation, and Fleet (DOSAAF USSR) has a
large role in the creation and development of good moral and combat
qvalities in the draf`tees and in the training of the youth for military
service. ~~The defense Soci~~y, which is expected to thoroughly build up
our state~s military might and its defense against a possible enemy
invasion," stated Comrade,Z.I. Brezhnev, ~~not only trains military reserves
for the So~riet Armed Forces~ but also~ throughout its work, helps to ftarther
solidify the workers around the Communist Party and indoctrinates them in
a spirit of Soviet patriotism and self:~_ess devotion to that great cause,
the building of communism in our nation.~~
Carryir~b out instructions from the Communist Party, the $th All.-Union UOSAAF -
Congress has reviewed questions pertaining to the further improvement of
the training of specialists for the Armed Forces of the USSR in accordance
wi~th today~s demands and with the general educatipn, cultural level and
technical sophistication of the draf`t--age youth, and has adopted a decision
to expand and restructure the training materials base and to improve training
and indoctrinational work in DO5AAF schools and clubs.
Observance of the principle of unity of indoctrinat~on and training consti-
tut,es an extremely important condition for the dev~elopment of good moral
and combat qualities in the f~ture fig~ting men. This principle forms the
key e'lement in the comprehensive approach to the training of students at
the defense Society~s training organizations. The administrators~ in-
structors and teachers of those organizations have the main role in the
implementation of that principle.
With ~this in mind, the 8th DOSAAF Congress demanded that the defense Society
committees take steps to strengthen the staffs of DOSAAF organizations
and to systematically improve their qualifications and the methodological
~ level of instruction. .
Most supervisors and instructors at DOSAAF training organizations possess
the required method.ological slalls for training the students and for
implementing the principle of unity of training and indoctrination. At
the same time, many new workers lacking experience have recently joined
the Society to perform training and indoctrinational work. As the DOSAAF
Congress ncted, this sometimes results in a situation in some organizations
in which proper attention is not devoted to the military-patriotic
42
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFF?.CTAI. USI: ONLY
indoctrination and the moral-psychological training of the pre-draf`t
youth for military service.
In the interests of generally improving the work of DOSAAF training organ-
izations~ this situation urgently demands the fhrther development of
ways of 'improving the training and indoctrination and of making it a
comprehensive and unified process.
The ob3ective of~this booklet~ which is based on decisions of the 25th
CPSU Congress and subsequent documents of the Party and the Soviet Goverrr-
ment, as well as decisions coming out of the 8th DOSAAF Congress and the
experience of the defense Society~s progressive schools and clubs, was to
explain the nature of the compreher~sive approach to the training and in-
doctrination of pre-draft youth at DOSAAF trai.ning organizations. Naturally,
the author does not claim to have ftiill.y clarified this complex issue. He _
hopes~ however~ that the booklet will be of.certain assistance to workers
performing the noble job of training and indoctrinating f~ture defenders
of the homeland.-Author
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel~stvo DOSAAF SSSR~ 1977 ~
1u+99
CSO: 1801
43
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ,
~ _ _ _
_ . _
_ - , . _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
TRAINING MANUAL FOR FI~,~D MILITARY VEHICLF~S
Moscow USTROYSTVO I EKSPI;UATATSTYA BT&-60P~ ZTL-130, ZIIr-131 (The Design
and Operation of The B'i'1~-60P~ ZIIr-130 and ZIL-131) in Russian 197g signed
. to press 26 Sep 78 pp 1, 2~ 3-1~
[Annotation, Table of Contents and Introduction from book by V. I.
Medvedkov, Yu. N. Komarov and A. F. Lobzin, Ordena "Znak Pocheta"
izdatel~stvo DOSAAF SSSR~ 55,000 copies~ 312 pages]
[Text] This training manu,al explains the basic principles underlying the
design and the operation of the BTR-60P wheeled armored personnel carrier ~
and its modifications and the ZIL-130 and Z1I,~--131 motor vehicles. It
embraces the program covered in DOSAAF technical schools.
~ The training manual can also be used as an aid to enhance the training
of drivers of armored personnel carriers and motor vehicles.
Contents ~ Page
Introduction 3
Chapter I. The Overall Desi~ of the B'I'R-60P Armored Personnel
Carrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. The Function and the.Main Types of Armored Wheeled Vehicles 5
2. Overall Arrangement of the Armored Personnel Carrier g
3. Combat and Technical�Characteristics of the Armored
Personnel Carrier . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Chapter II. Overall Design of the ZII,-130 and ZIIr-131 Motor
. Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Function, Overall Arrangement and Characteristics of
~ the ZIIr-130 Motor Vehicle � � � � � . . . . . . . . . 17
2. ~nction, Overall Arrangement and Characteristics of
ZIL-131 Motor Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~
. . 1~.l~.
� FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .
~
. .
. ,w~u
.
.
n ~ , . . .
_ti . ~ _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
F'Ull Uh'l~ LCfAI, US}s UNLY
Page
Chapter III. Power Unit Systems and Assemblies 28
1. Overall Arrangement of Power Units . . . . . . . . . . 28
2. Crankshaft and Connecting Rod Assemblies and Valve
Gear Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3. Zubrication System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~.6
1~. Cooling System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5g
5. Fuel System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Chapter N. Electrical Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
1. General Electrical Equipment Scheme ~ � � � . . � . . . 90
2. Electric Power Supply � � � . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9/~
3. Electrical Engine Starter System � � � � � . � � � . . � 101
L~. Engine Ignition Systems � � � � � . � � � . � � . . . . . 103
5. Zighting and I,ight Signaling Devices . � . . . . . . . . 109
Chapter V. Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
1. General Transmission Dia~ams � � � . � � � � . . . . . 118
2. Clutching System � . � . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 �
3. Gear Boxes and Power Take-0ff Systems 130
1~. Dis~;ributor Boxes � � � � � � � � � � . � . � . . . 11~0
5. Universal Drives � � � � � � � � � � . � � � . . . ll~b
6. Main Drives � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 153
7. Differential Gears � � � � � � � . � � . . . . . . . 161~
8. Wheel Actuators � � � � � � � � � � � . . . . . . lbq _
Chapter VI. Undercarriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
1. Frarr,e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
2. Suspensior~ System � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1,~r1
3. Axles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lg7
1~. Wheel Drive � . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lgl
5. Tire Pressure Regul.ation System . . . . . . . . . . . 19E
Chapter VII. Steering System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
1. Steering System of Armored Personnel Carri.er e 211
2. Motor Vehicle Steer:ing System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
Chapt er VIII. Brake Syst em . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . d 231
l. Running Brakes � � � � . � . . . . . . . . . . . 232
2. Parki.ng F3rakes � � � � � � � � � � � . � . . . . 25~
Chapter IX. Special Equipment on Armored Personnel Carrier
and Motor Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 25g
l. Equipment Ma~d.ng It Possible for Axmored Personnel
Carriers to Move On Water � � � � � � � � . � . . . . . . 25g
2. Wrenches and Towing Devi.ces � � � � . � � . � � . . . . 26$
45
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
_ FOR UFFICIAL~USE ONLY
Page
Chapter X. 0 rgani.zing the Operation of Motor Tr~ansport and
Armcred Equipment in the Armed Forces . 2.~3
l. General Principles � � � . � � . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2g3
2. Technical Condition of Vehicles � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 2g5
. 3. Procedure for Using Vehicles � � � � � � � � � � � � � . 2~#6
Technical. Servicing ~~f Vehicles � � � � � � � � � � � � � � g
5. Care and Maintenance of Vehicles � � � � � � � � � � � � � ?gp
6. Arrar_gement of Vehicles Pools and Internal Service Therein � 292
7. Safety Techniques for Worldng In the Equipment Pool and
Or: the Vehicles � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 3~5
Introduction
The development and manufacture of wheeled vehicles as a military equipment
item are closely linked to the development of the automotive industry~s
production base and with the overall achievements of our national economy. ~
The Soviet automotive ind.ustry has developed rapidly from semi-primitive
production to a modern, highly organized industrial branch. This develc~
ment was made possible by the planned expansion of all sectors of the
national economy through the efforts of the Communist Party and the Soviet
people. The~production of steel and rubber, gasoline ar~d lubricar.ts,
synthetic materials, machine tools and tools~ rolling-contact bearings
and automotive glass, and the construction of service stations and roads~
taken t.ogether, have all created the possibility of develo~ing a modern
automotive industry.
A plan of continued national economic development has been established in
accordance with directives of the 25th CPSU Congress~ which, among other
things, calls for extensive motorization of the nation. By the end of the
Tenth Fiv~Year Plan we will have produation capacities capable of turning
out 2,296;000 motor vehicles in 1980. Enormous plants, outfitted with the
latest of modern equipment, have already been constructed and are operating
at full capacity in Tol~yatti and Izhevsk; the first section of a giant
automotive plant has begun operating in Naberezhnyye Chelny; and such
huge motor vehicle enterprises as the ZIL~ AZLK~ GAZ and others have
undergone modernization.
Each year~ our nation receives hundreds of thousands of the new GAZ~ ZIL~ ,
KamAZ~ BelAZ and other trucks; a base is being created for improving the
conditior~s and quality o.f technical servicing for transport equipment.
All of this is conducive to equipment bf the Soviet Army with new models
of automotive equipment and wheeled armored vehicles. Army motor vehicles
and wheeled armored personnei carriers are now one of the most commonly
used types of equipment in the Armed Forces of the USSR. This equipment
has an especially important role in the Ground Forces~ providing today~s
troops with the important quality of mobility.
. 46 ~ .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
~ �
. ~ _ .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0
FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
It is mi7.~~tary motor vehicles and wheeled armored personnel carriers, to
a cc~nsiderable degree, wh7.ch provide the troops with the ability to cor~ciuct
� combat operations at a rapid pace and to great depth. According to the
type of vehicle, they may be designated for the performance of various
combat and auxiliary f~nctions.
The~chassis oi' military motor vehicles provide the base upon which weapons
and special equipment are installed. Army automotive equipment is used Sor
hauling large freight to the troops and as the final element in composite
transport operations t~rlth other types of transports~ ort it operates as the
intermediate element linld.ng other types of transport.
Army motor transport depends to a lesser degree upon the road network than
does rail transport~ for example. It gives flexibility to transport oper-
ations and is less vu]nerable to w~eapons of mass destruction, since it has
greater dispersal and shelter possibilities. Damage to individual vehicles
does net put an entire echelon out of action and does not entail the ex-
tensive delays which can occur in the case of rail transport.
When troops are moved great distances motor transport may be charged with
the task of hauling various types of tracked vehicles. The latter are
hauled ~n special heavy-duty, trailer-tractor units in order to conserve
their running life.
Wheeled armored personnel carriers are used for trar~sporting troops on
the march and to the battlefield. When the combat situation and the
terrain~are conducive~ motorized riflemen on wheeled armored personnel
carriers can interact with tar.ks in a battle. Certain types of wheeled
ar;nored vehicles--reconnaissance patrol vehicles, for example-are desig-
nated for the performar~ce of reconnaissance and patrol ftznctions~ and
wi.th the installation of special weapons, for the performance of other
combat missions as well.
Soviet-produced wheeled armored vehicles and automotive equipment have
good combat qualities ar~d good technical operating features. These
features have made it necessary to increase the structural comp.lexity
of these vehicles to a certain degree, however. Full application of the
- good technical operating features of motor vehicles and wheeled armored
vehicles in peacetime and, especially~ in time of war~ however~ is only
possible with a solid lmowledge of their structure, their operation and
adjustment~ with the ability to locate and eliminate possible malf~anctions
of the mechanisms and systems, and with a lmowledge of the operating
mat~rials employed and of the peculiarities of their operation.
COFYRIGHT: Izdatel+stvo DOSAFF SSSR~ 197g
11J~99 ~
CSO: 1g01 END
47
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100018-0