JPRS ID: 9399 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/9399
18 fVovember 1980
_ Near East/North Africa Report
(FOUO 41 /80)
FBI$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATiON SERVICE
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JPRS L/9399
18 November 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 41/80)
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Arabs Warned Not To Expect A1-Sadat To Rejoin Them
(AL-WATAN AL'ARABI, 22-28 Aug 80)
Briefs
Israeli-Jerusalem Decision Condemned
Algeria, Mauritania on Sahara
AFGHANI STAN
Japaneae Researcher Reports as Eyewitneas
(Osamu Ishida; BUSINESS JAPAN, Oct 80)...........a...........
ALGERIA
Subtle Blend of Islam, Revolution in Country
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITIItRANEENS, 19 Sep 80).............
IRAN
Official Japanese Source Gives Edge to Iran
(NIHON KEIZAI SHTMBLTN, 8 Oct 80)
Arab Alignment in Gulf War Assessed
(Editorial; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 15 Oct 80)..................
MAURITANIA
Ould Mouknass Under House Arrest
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 24 Sep 80)
Briefe
Cattle Decimated by Drought
Regional Budgets Approved
Iraqi Loan
FEB Grant for Dam
- a - [III - NE & A - 121 FOUO] -
, Vnn nMrT e T. t 1cF ONT.Y `
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MOROCCO
Effecta of Saharan War on Economy
(Ahdelaziz Da.hmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 8 Oct 80) 18
King Hassan's Remarks on Jerusalem Occupation, SahaYan Struggle
(MARCHES TROPICAUY, ET MEDITERRANEENS, 10 Oct 80) 21
WESTERN SAHARA
, Algeria Mitigates POLISARI!J Intransigence
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1 Oct 80).................................... 24
Briefs
= Algerian Role in War 25
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_ INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
ARABS WARNED NOT TO EXPECT AL-SADAT TO REJOIN TIiEt4
_ 1'aris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22-28 Aug 80 pp 22-23
_ [Article: "Three Threats to A1-Sadat, Should He Think of Returning to
Arab Resistance Front: Ref usal To Withdrsw From Sinai; Cutting Off
American Aid; Stopping Rearmament of Egyptia.n Army"]
[Text] The Arabs are mistaken if they think that A1-Sadat could return
to their ranks, even if he wanted to. The United States and Israel have
been able to tie him up so tight that he was barely able to oppose
_ Israel.'s decision to Judaize Jerusalem and make it Israel's capital with
a"temporary freezing" of the autonomy talks until the next American
_ president comes to his help.
Can the Middle East stay as is until the American elections are held in
November, without a great explosion taking place as a result of the
atmosphere o� increased Israeli-Arab tension, aggravated inter-Arab
differences, and clear failure of the Camp David process?
- All maves and developments inepire pessimism. Both moderate and radical
Arab factlons have become convinced that there is no hope for a political
initiative for ajust solution of the Middle East crisis, so long as
Israel can puraue a policy serving its selfiah interests and expanRionist
ambitions without fear of any punishment or rebuke.
Yresident A1-Sadat, who plunged headlong into his own predicament by follow-
l.ng the American Camp David initiative, finds himself in a desperate
poaition. He was forced to turn down a new American proposal to resume
the autonomy talks with Israel, because there was no use continuing them
after Israel's decision to annex Jerusalem and increase Jewish settlements
on the West Bank.
Inatead, he proposed to Israel and the United States the convening of a
third summit meeting to "resuscitate" whatever ia left of the Camp David
spirit. He did so after he saw the Israelis push him into a tight corner
in front of the Arab world. They let him know through their actions that
they would not give him any more than he obtained in the accord, namely
- recovery of the Sinai in return for Egyptian recognition of Israel, the
exchange of diplomatic relations and normalization. Thus, the Israelia
, ruled out progress toward a comprehensive settlement based on evacuating
, .311. occupied Arab territory and granting tne Palestinians even limited
self-rule.
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Nevertheless, following long meditatyon in the Sinai, A1-Sadat did not
develop the courage to admit his failure and return to the Arab-fold--ae
Crown Pxl.nce Fahd has invited him to do. A1-Sadat pref erred to level
charges against the Arabs themselves. He picked the Arab point of
weakness, n8mely internal discord and conf?ict, to hold them responsible
for Israel's annexation of Jerusalem.
Where Will A1-Sadat Stop?
Rs a matter of fact, A1-Sadat is now completely convinced that reaunrr;:ion
of talks wi+:h Israel would be of no use. However, he will not risk taking
a"historic" initiative or decision, because there are a number of factors
and restrictions wh_ich prevent him from doing ao. Therefore, the Arabs
must give up completely any hope of A1-Sadat rejoining them. These factors
Hnd restrictions include:
_ 1. A1-Sadat fears that if he should break off with Israel, his relatious
with the United States would turn soure Carter would not forgive him if
he took such a step at a time when Carter is in great difficulty in hie
- own presidential reelection bid. Carter could punish A1-Sadat immediately
� by suspending American aid and economic grants, which now amount to
$1 billion annually (the Arabs used to give A1-Sadat more than $2 annually).
2. The Egyp tian armed forces are now in the midst of exchanging Eastern
[Soviet] arms and methods for Western arms and methods. It would be
difficult to secure the continued f].ow of Anerican arms if A1-Sadat decides
to abandon Camp David. It would also be difficult to secure the resumption
of the influx of Eastern arms or revival of good relations between Cairo
and Mascow, consider~ng their current deteriorated and strained condition.
3. Should he abandon Camp David A1-Sadat would in all probability face
Israeli retaliation in the form of a refusal to pu1l out of the last third
of the Sinai (from a strategic point of view, it is the most important part),
which is aupposed to be returned to Egypt in 1982.
Shackled by ttiese three fears, A1-Sadat finds himself like a prisoner who
_ has no choice but to accept the fait accompli, keep quiet, and content himself
- with freezing the autonomy talks which have not made any meaningful progress
ln the entire 18 months since t:iey started.
Ztie truth is that the Israelis were not content with driving A1-Sadat into
a corner in front of his people, the Arabs in gerieral, and the world at
liirge. They actually threatened to suspend'the evacuation of Sinai, if
he shoiild undertake any dramatic hange in his policy, or if he should
slow down the normalization process.
A1-Sadat found himself forced to confirm his invitation to Yitzhak Navon,
the Tsraeli president, to visit Foypt and even give a speech to the
Egyptian People's Assembly.
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All of A1-Sadat's hopes are now pinned on Carter's reelection (an uncertain
prospect) and the fall of the Begin govarnment. Israeli elections ars to
take place early next spring instead of in the autumn of 1981. The return
of the Mapai party to power could result in some conceasions to A1-Sadat
_ toward solving the Palestinian issue. But this again is an uncertain
prospect, becauHe even though the position of Mapai differs tactically
from Begin's, it is nevertheless still very far from A1-Sadat's position,
let alone the position of the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in
- particular.
The Ierueli position is made clear today by the decision to Judaize
Jerusalem and make it Israel's capital; by the increasing Jewish settlements
_ on the Weat Bank; and by Israel's'refusal to recognize the righ ts of the
Palestinians or negotiate with their legitimate represenLative, the PLO.
Israel pereists in its obstinacy. In the absence of a genuine wo rldwide
[moral] reaction ot of deterrent military Arab strengthz Israel is prepared
_ to maintain its policy. Israel does not even pay attention to world opinion.
This is demonstrated by its commitment of fooliah actions, inspite of its
complete isolation, such as by launching commando.raids against P alestinian
poeitiona in Lebanon, regardless of the impact of theae raids on the
interesta of its ally, the United States, and the West in general.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
9587
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
ISRAEI.I JF.RUSALFrI DECISION CONDEMNED--Israel's decision to JudaizP
- Jerusalem and make it Israel's eternal capital has offended the feelings
- and emotions of the Arabs and Muslims to whom this city is a particularly
- holy shrine. They secured, through the United Nations, an international
resolution condemning Israel, and they adopted a Saudi-Iraqi resolution
to impose a political and economic boycott on any country that recognizes
and honora the Israeli decision. It is expected that before the end of
this month, they will secure another international resolution th at will
call upon nations concerned to remove their embaesies from Jerusalem.
The foreign ministers of the Islamic nations will meet in September in
Morocco to consider firm Islamic measures for the ultimate goal of
preserving the Arab character and Islamic holy places of Jerusalem.
- [Text] (Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22-28 Aug 80 p 221
~ ALGERIA, MAURITANIA ON SAHARA--According to leaks from the del.egation which accom-
- panied the Msuxitanian head of state in his official visit to Algeria (28 Septem-
ber-1 October), President Chadli Bendjedid made some proposals to Lieutenant
Colonel Khouna Ould Haydala concerning the Sahara conflict. "The POLTSARIO is
going to have much more difficulty atXacking Morocco from its traditional Algerian
= bases arour.d Tindouf since Morocco is busy seal3ng off that region. Mauritania
muet therefore give more help to the POLISARIO by offering it eafe havens,
while Algeria would give Nouakchott the means to ensure air cover should Morocco
exercise the right of pursuit into Mauritanian territory...." As soon as he re-
turned home Pr.esident Haydala apparently informed the members of the military
committee for national salvation. The proposal was certainly not unanimously
= welcomed and eome officers advocated that Mauritania reaffirm its neutrality in
the Sahara conflict. President Haydala, anxious to reassure them, apparently
also told them that Algeria is prepared to supply Mauritania with... "several
dozen aircraft" for its protection.
CSO: 4400
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~
r
AFGHAI3ISTAN
JAPANESE RESEA.RCHER REPORI'S AS EYEWITNESS
/
Tokyo BUSINESS JAPAIt in English Oct 80 pp 31a 33, 35, 36
[Article by Osamu Ishida, Staff Reporter, Sankei Shimbun]
(Text]
HE Soviet troops equipped with modern weapons that
invaded Afghanistan last December are now tinding
T
themselves mired down as they face the unmitigating
Afghan resistance. Recently I met Eiji Tajima, a 29�year uld
Japanese student from Tokyo doing research on Tibet in
lndia, wiQ'recently returned from Kabul, the capital of
Afghanistan, tu New Delhi. He was the first Japanese to
cross the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and
later the Afghan�Iranian border to closely observe the
- ~ Afghanistan situation after the Soviet invasion. Tajima
- told me about condiEions in tocal cities in Afghanistan. He
- also saw Soviet bombers raiding the guerrillas.
- Tajima has vis(ted Afghanistan four times. With a total
stay of six months, he could easily note changes wrought
upon towns and villages after the Soviet invasion. He went
- there from curiosity, wishing to closely observe this over-
- running of Afganistan, and sharing the tense situation on
the battlefields. The following is his report.
7hough I had asked the Afghan consulate in Peshawar
fnr a visa, it took many days to get it. The consul first
insisted that it was impossible for any tourist to visit his
country during the emergency, but I continued my persua-
, sion by saying, "1 wish to see Afghaziistan and buy
embroidered folk shirts." 1rinally succeeded in obtaining a
visa good for a month.
[ tuok a bus from Peshawar to Kabul. The bus had about
40 passengers - Afghans and Pakistanis. I was the only
foreigner. Nothing happened on the trip up to the Khyber
Yass. Though strict, the immigration officer on the border
let me in. Getting close to Jalalabad, I could see many
Suviet tanks. Both MiG fighters and helicopters were
; circling in the sky. it took me four hours to reach Jalalabad
from Peshawar. There were many trucks carrying Soviet
- troups.
- Destruyed ur burned vehicles and discarded empty
- cartridge cases were scattered along the roads. Many holes
un the felds gave evidence of bombings. The roads out of
town were blocked and 1 found a cheap lodging house to
stay overnight. Citizens with hardened faces were watching
the tanks and saying nothing. Pcwer failures took pluce
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very often perhaps due to Ehe shortage of power or broken
wires. [ couldn't sleep well because ot die constant sounds
= of ritle firing in the suburbs.
At r,ine a.m. next morninR, I left for Kabul. For fear of
being attacked by the guerrilfas, our bus joined a caravan
which cunsisted of a tank at the head, followed by trucks.
buses and pastenger cars_ A second tank assumed the
central position and another guarded the rear. Altogether
50 vehicles were destined for Kabul. To accomudate
ourseives to the speed of the tanks, the caravan was slow in
moving, 30 to 40 kilometers per hour. On the way to the
capital, the fleet was checked many times by soldiers. Both
baggage and our passports were examined. When we saw
the capital, the tension relaxed som.-what.
I found lodging on the second floor of a steakhouse on
Chicken Street, a new area ir. Kabul, for 30 Afghanis,
= equivalent to V 150. Most of the restaurants in the city were
closed. My only choir,e was an eating house near the steak�
hause where many soldiers came tu eat. Nobody addressed
` himself to me. Everywhere in the capital [ saw Soviet tanks.
Most of the Soviet soldiers were Caucasians and I did not
see any Central Asian Soviet soldiers.
The majority of the soliders were very young, 15 to 20
years old, and cney seemed frightened with rit7es in their
hands. Some of them reminded me of tortoises as they
showed only their heads from their tanks. When teking
photos uf the tanks. [ was stopped by angry Soviet soldiers
and pushed around on two occasions. The first time, the
film was pulled ouc of my camera and taken away. One of
the soldiers visited me at the lodging place later and told
me, "lf you offer me a pair of jeans and 2,000 Afghanis
(some Y-10.000). I'll return the rilm."
He was a 17 ur 13 year-old boy from Minsk. When I
replied by saying, "1 can uffer you jeans and a wa:ch," hc
- said. "i'll come again," but he never car,ie back. According
to the peuple in the town. Russian soldiers are ststioned in
Kabul by curns for several months, and when tliey return tu
Russia, they spend all their money huying souvenirs. T}te
money the young soldier suggested to me would probably
have been spent for this purpose.
I saw many Russian soldiers shopping for souvenirs in
- the towns. They seemed desperate to buy things. They
would come to a store by jeep. One of them would stay in
- the jeep while the others split into two groups. One group
would enter the store while the other group stay outside
_ with rifles in theu hands, ready for a surprise attack. Their
Faces looked irritated and red; the other; were serioss as
they studied the goods for sale.
Afghans kept silent in the streets of Kabul and local
policemen didn't pay attention to foreign travelers. But
once I entered a bazaar or a store, thay would offer me a
cup of tea and frankly express to me their pent-up griev-
ances against the Russians. Most of their complaints were
- centered around the Soviet Union and the current regime
led by President Babrak Karmal. In many places in the city,
people told me, "We will never be defeated," "Mushahidin.
(freedom fighters) have killed hundreds of Soviet soldiers,"
and "We are not a fraid of MiGs or Soviet tanks."
tn the old parts of the city. I could see women with their
- faces covered with traditional chador, but in the new areas
many young women were dressed in western clothes.
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lnFormation ran quickly through the streets. It surprised
me when I heard that most of the people working at stores
in the ciry knew that I was in Kabul. Often, as I talked with
people in stures, a freedom fighter, or guerrilla, would rush
into the store and hurriedly inform the sales people of
, something. Secret documents, which are called "night
- letters," are not letters at all but such oral communication,
I thought.
There were many strange people in Kabul. Two Amer-
icans, who called themselves Communists, were always
- luuking out from the roof of the hotel. There were also
many foreigners, who did not look like travelers, here and
there in the city, always looking for some information. I
was also taken as a Japanese police agent and had to change
my lodging house. It was a time when rumors of the
Soviets' use of poison gas was still prevailing (See note). On
- nutice boards everywhere in the old town, there were
- photos of poison gas cans with a caption, "Made in USA."
' This must have been the Soviet way of shifting the blame.
I [ personally met a Mujahidin. He was red with anger and
said that the Soviet troops were indiscriminately killing
Afghans with rotating bombs.
After having siayed in Kabul for nine days, I left for
Mazar�i-Sharif, a city close to the Soviet border. Though I
intended to go by bus, no bus was available, and I had to
fly on a domestic airline p(ane. As a foreigner, I had to
_ pay twice the ordinary fare. In the city, there were many
Soviet soldiers, particularly higher�ranking soldiers. There
were many Soviets lodging in the hotel where I stayed.
' They seemed to have mistaken me as being of the Hazra
tribe of Afghanistan an3 watched me with blood-shot eyes.
~ Nobody smiled. In one of the rooms in the hotel, there was
an accumulation of weapons captured from the guerrillas,
_ I could see some 20 pistols with Chinese inscriptions and a
star. They must have been produced in China.
I was invited to the house of a local high�ranking officer
~ with whom I got acquainted when I was watching
� traditional Afghan sports event. He is mure than 50 years
' old. He bitterly complained by saying, "The Russian
soldiers are despotic. Women who- have come to Afghan-
= istan with these soldiers are just as bad."
"How many Russians are in Afghanistan''" I asked.
"There are about 5,000 Russians including their families,"
he replied. In Kabul, it is said, they have buili apartment
houses in the suburbs and are living with their families.
They seem to be determined to stay in Afghanistan for a
long period.
After having spent a night in iviazar�i-Sharif, I tlew to
Maiana, a small town with a population of some 3,000. No
Russian was in the town, nor were there any Soviet
helicopters at the airport. This was the only town where i
didn't see any Russians during my entire trip.
' I took a truck with 20 other passengers from Maiana to
the ci[y of Herat, located in Western Afghanistan. The road
' was a"natural road" made of hardened desert sand. After
having run for an hour, the bus suddenly stopped. Then it
- turned aruund and went back to Maiana. Once again I took
a plane.
;At the Herat airport, I met two Caucasian doctors. They
seemed to be surprised to see me saying, "You are the first
foreigner we have met in the past four months." Then they
advised me by saying, "There was a riot in the old town
yesterday. You shouldn't go there. It is dangerous."

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The city has a population of about 100,000. My
impression was that they were more ar.ti�Suviet than in
Kabul. Soldiers on government army trucks wete holding
ritles at the ready, patrvlling the town. Also, at the fortress
built by Alexander the Great in t}ie old town, the govern-
ment anny was maintainirg its position. Soviet soldiers
- maintained their positions on the outskirts of the city and
none of them could be seen in the town. People said,
"If they came intu the town, we'll kill them." When walk-
ing through the bazaar, someone called out to me, "Where
are you from?" I replied, "I'm from Japan." He was so
- pleased that he took me into his house for tea. I stayed in
Herat for two days and then took a bus for Kandahar
" where [ planned to buy embroidered shirts. Five passengers
were on the bus, each paying a fare of 200 Afgttanis (some
V 1,000). As I had heard that the largest base of the Sovzet
Army was on the way, I wanted to see it.
The caravan this time consisted of a taxi and two trucks
' guing before and after the bus, without convoy. We drove
along for about two hours and passed a village called
Adlaskan. Then suddenly about 10 freedom fighters ap-
peared on the road and stopped us. They were turbaned,
hofding ritles, with gun belts on [heir waist. They de-
manded money. Every passenger gave them five or 10
Afgh;inis, and I ufFered 10. Their attitude was tough and
everyone had to make a contribution.
When we were abuut to leave, we were surprised by two
- MiGs and two tanks.
[t seemed as if they had been waiting for our arrival. The
guerrillas disappeared quickly and from behind a sandhill
they launched a counterattack. The right continued for
about 15 minutes. We were afraid, and fled. Giving up the
trip to Kandahar, we went back to Herat. That was the day
I feit the deepest fear during my stay in Afghanistan. Zhat
no convoy was attached to our caravan was apparently
- intended to lure out the ;uerrillas.
I returned to Herat where 1 stayed for two days. I went
~ to the Herat Theacer which was the unly theater in
Afghanistan where one can see women entertainers. 3ut the
theater was closed anci chere was nothing to indicate its past
spiendor. Though the city vias controlled by the guvern-
ment army, it was said that many guerrillss were hiding
there. In fact I heard the noise of rifle�shooting many
_ times at night.
The manager of the hotel told me that it was dangerous
_ to sieep in bed as I might be struck by a stray bullet, so 1
siept in a sleeping bag on the tloor.
I took a mini-bus from there to tslam-kalar un the
- border. A customs officer welcomed me as 1 was the tirst
Japanese he had seen in six months. He told me that liis
boss, who had been working with him as the only cutoms
_ statf inember, was killed when he was guir,g back to Herat
- by bus at the beginning of March when the bus was
attacked with rifles. All 45 passengers were killed. Accord�
ing to the official, they had been kept busy before the
kussians came as many people passed the border, at a
maximum 2,000 persons a day. He shrugged his shoulders
- saying, "What a sorry state we are in!" I fe(t reluciant to
leave the country, but as I had achieved what I intended, f
passed over the desert border and entered lran.
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- What impressed me most during my 16-day stay in
~ Afghanistan was that both Afr,han government army troops
and Suviet troops were acting separately in their own way,
:und no cuncerted accions were being taken. While Russian
_ suldiers were riding in new trucks, Afghan soldiers were
using damaged ones. While the Russians were keeping their
eyes upun toreigners, the gqvernment troops did not pay
any attention to us.
_ Only ihe Soviet troops were fighting the guerrillas, and
there was no contact between the government troops and
- the guer*illas, it was said. Such informatiun was given to me
- by the shop owners in Kabul and Herat bazaars. For fear
uf betrayal by the Afghaii croups, the Soviets did not
provide them wlth helicopters or large weapons. The
guerrillas do not intend to fight against the government
troops but only against the Soviets. The Russian troups
- have supreme predominance over their Afghan counterparts
in weapoiiry. But in individual fighting ability, the guerrillas
are superiur to the Russian soidiers who are apparently not
highly trained.
Afghans look intrepid and fearless, but in fact are
courteous and meek. Why should they suffer from such
turments and pains, now that we have progressed almost to
the 21st century! They have been enjoying a tranquil life in
- Hindu Kush. But their anti-Soviet and anti�Karmal senti-
ment has never waned. I felt strongly that they were united
in supporting the guerrillas. One intellectual middle�aged
man 1 met in Kabul emphasized that Afghanistan was
different from Czechoslovakia. The shop owners in the
bazaars also told me tha[ they would never surrender to the
5oviets. The fight of the non-compromising Afghans wili
continue. As an Asian, I sincerely hope that the Afghan
people will be able to restore their own land based on the
_ principle of self�deter�nination.
Note:
- The information that the invading Soviet troops were
- using poisonous gas against the Afghan guerrillas was re-
peated formally and informally by ttie U.S. State Depart-
- ment and other sources from the time immediately after
- the invasion staned at the end of last year. Jack Anderson,
a well�known columnist, has quoted iniormation reportedly
frorri U.S. intelligence sources that these gases were biolo-
gical chemical ones strong enough to kill people 30 minutes
after they have once been inhaled. 0
COF'YRIGtIT : 1980 The Nihon Kokyo Shimbun
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- ALGERIA
SUBTLE BLEND OF ISLAM,REVOLUTiON TIQ - COLTN'FRY
, Paria Mr1RCHES TItOPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Sep $0 p 2279
[Article: "Algerian Chronicle: Implementation Attempt by Revolutionary Islam"]
[Text] Aasociation of the concepts of Islam and of revolution
has long been diffic.ult for westerns to conceive, accuatomed as
they are to classic and often conservative stereotypes of
Moslem doctrine and society. Perhaps it was the FLN in Algeria,
tyiftg together the ide$ of revolution and those of anticolonial
war and liberation, that first gave a clear picture of a
revolutionary overtone to the Muslim armed struggle.
- In any event it was the Alger3an National Charter of 1976 that,
, in recomending a transition from reformist Islam to revolutionary
Islam introduced the latter among the ideological fundamentals of
the Algerian state, and offers it todaq to world opinion as a
political and soc3al reality.
Under the aegie of President Boumediene a few large-scale economic and social
- measures were i'n f.act undertaken, such as Land Reform and Socialist management of
enterprisee, with their implication of bold departure from classic interpretations
of IAlam, especially regarding property rights. Moreaver the reg3me, without
having recourse to official exegesis, allowed itself modern interpretationa of
the Islamtc sources, taking the position for example tha.t in contrast to Roman
law, the Koran only gave sanctity to private property insofar as its uae for
- the general welFare.
- It ia true rhat innovative measures were not promulgated in Algeria in all domains.
Thus it is that in matters of peraonal statute and family law revolutionary
- Algeria ia still holding off from taking a position. It has not yet, and
probably never will adopt liberal solutions for the benefit of women; it appears
- very heaitant about following the example of Tunisia and Morocco, which have made
_ provision by legislation or contract for the abolition or voluntary limitation of
polygamy. Moalem opposition to change is especially vigoroua and obstinate in
Algeria; and subjected to the clandestine but persever3ng action of currents of
Islamic fundamentalism, it is even discernible among the youth.
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Archaistic and Fundamentalist Reactions
- Under the regime of President Chadli Bendjedid, the purpose of dealing with the
_ Coiality of economic and social problems with an enhanced sense of realism surelq
involvas the denial of no principle and upholds the formula consecrated by the
Charter of Revolutionary Islam. But it would seem to imply more reservations
regarding bold socioeconomic interpretations; in rural affairs, for inatance, if
the agrarian revolution continues, concern for encouraging the most profitable
enterprises inspires a number of msasures favorable to the "pxivate sector," an
- area where Moslem practice is generally traditionalist, if not archaistic.
The "clt!an-up" operation begun in the fall af 1979, which contiaues in the form
of a general revision of utilization and exploitatior~ of the territory, as well
as a restructuring of usban and rural housiag, hae often been interpreted, as
aiming towards restoration of morality; the authorities have had to put an end
- to attempts by over-zealous youth attacking couples living together, and they even
~ aspired to exerciae control over what weat on in private hames.
In Algeria one ia faced with a problem of modern Moslem training, alI the more
- difficult to deal with in that it superimposes upon many other very urgent problems
- of training. As for Moslem matters, the first order of business would be to
train the trainers.
Tn the meanwhile, the proliferation of mosques, and conaequent multiplication of
priests, even preachera, mostly of inediocre education, in a traditional way,
persistent cu].ts of marabouts [holy men, priests, shrines] especially in Che
counCryeide; a residual fraternal activity often mediocre in quality, bordering
on charlatanism, all work togeCher to keep popular Islam in Algeria in a partially
archaic state.
An element of forward movement might, on the other hand, be represented by the
young students doing Arabic studies. But their spotty education, their often
narrow-minded outlook, their understaudable anxiety in the face of the danger of
underemployment, impose atrmmary reactions upon theffi.
This samP youth has indeed been observed taking sides vigorously and often
- violently at the time of the L:niversity incidents provoked by the Berberism criais.
- One co uld discern there an admixture of integrist elements, whose thrust, far
from tending towards progressivist action, were oriented towa.rds reaction.
However opposed it may wish Co appear to fundamentalist religious currents, the
_ Algerian government cannot deceive itself on the iseue that the Arabization policy
especially encourages the circles leaning in that direction.
A Doctrinal clarification
The semi--official information media are striving to bring thiags into focus. The
press and radio broadcasting, which play an important role in shaping the
attitudes of this vast public, vigorously oppose these aCtempts to subvert the
- national Islamic effort by integrists and worshippers of the past.
Bearing the title "Islam, Liberation and Progress," the 9 August issue of EL
MOUDJAHID, reporting the ceremonies ofthe "Night of Destiny,1' recalls the
- ii
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- watchword of the social revolution formulated by the Charter for Aigerian Islam,
militant Islam, enamored of justice, equality and knowledge; then clearly
deaignating the integrists without naming them, it denounces "the nebulous
messagea of certain preachers [sic] in troubled waters who abuse the faith of
Ctie Ay.geriaus to drag them into an aberrant moralism, the falling back onto sel�,"
a teaching alien to the principles of Islam. These people would like to "restore
anachxonism in a world that eacapes them, and in the name of purification and
- moral virtue rally under one banner the last survivors of our traditional feudal
caste and big buainesamen who hate socialism and progress." They puraue
"aesimilation by the goatee and the djellaba" [Moroccan smock], a.n allusion to
- the external appearance affected by the young fundamentalists.
Ttie chronicler goes on to say that the important thing is to go much further and
work "a total reform of society by decisive changes that put a definitive end to
obscurantism, deapotism, feudalism." To serve the agrarian revolution, Socialist
mana.gement of enterprises and scientific research does not diminish faith in Islam:
"i[ is a modern way, ajust and non-demagogic way to serve Islam." Instruction
- aims "to deepen Islamic faith in a context of progress and justtce." This faith
must be protected against "seditious and charlatanist elements that try to under-
mine the common task of the revolution and Islam in Alger3.a, by exploiting the
deficiencies and certain contradictiona t:iat have agpeared in society."
In Algeria, Islam and revolution are therefore called upon to make "common cause."
- It is not a queation here of a hollow formula: in many respects the goals of
- Ielamic doctrine and the rew lutionary thinking of Algeria are identical or very
cloae. The etruggle against maraboutism and deviant fraternal organization
activity has very precise social and even medical.justifications, ar;d at the same
= time it suita the devoteea of orthodox Islam by conforming to the need to uproot
deviations based on superstition that are often leftovers of paganiam. The
revision of the relationships between capital arad labor concern not only social
Justice, but equity preacribed by God. The fact still remaina that however clear
- the principlea, the concatenafiion of oppositions by integrista, worshippers of
the past and reactionaries ia often a stubborn reality.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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IRAN
OFFICIAL JAPANESE SOURCE GIVES EDGE TO IRAN
Tokyo ;VIHON KEIZAI SHTMBUN in Japanese 8 Oct 80 p 1
[Article: "Iran-Iraq War Will Last Long; Foreign Ministry Revises its View"
[Text] A Foreign Ministry source on the 7th revealed a view on the Iran-Iraq
- war. He said that "A full-scale war will not last for a long time to come,
because both of the two countries have only limited supplies of weapons and
amnnunition." At the same time, however, he revealed the following views:
"There is little poasibility of cessation of hostiliti.es in the near future,
and the present hostilities will continue, although their scale may be reduced."
_ This means that the Foreign Ministry has revised, in practice, the view it held
unCil recently, or the view thathostilities wi11 not become protracted.
The same source also touched upon the war situation, and pointed out as follows:
"At the start of the war, the Ir.aqi eide was in a superior position. However,
the war came to a sta7,emate around the 28th day af last month." He also said
that the poeition of the Iranian .forces has improved coaspicuously recently, and
that the Iraqi aide ie losing its overwhelmingly superior position. He pointed
oiit that there is sufficient room for the Iranian side 2:0 launch counterattacks
_ upon the enemy, because Iran has not yet brought into use all of its about 1,000
helicopters and the air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles left by the U.S. forces.
_ The I'oreign Minietry source thinks that Iran is in an advantageous position, as
far as air battles are concerned, partly for geographical reasons. He expects
that fierce battles will develop hereafCer for the damination of the air. He
said that the batCles in Khorramshahr inside Iranian territory will gain enough
importance Co determine the future of the war, and stressed the necessity of
watChing the battles in this district. According to this source, neither side
hae gained control of this district as yet.
- Ae for the prospect for the restoration of peace, the same source again empha-
sized that "There is no alternative but to rely on the Islamic nations." He
thinks, however, that there is little possibility of efforts at mediation pro-
ducing vieible effects at once. He also thinks that "The Arab nations harbor
_ strong anxiety over the poesibility of Iraq's becoming a leader of the Arab
world by winning an overwhelming victory in the present war." [Full transla-
- tion] [TN: Some other papers carried similar reporta.]
COPYRIGHT: Nihon ICeizai Shimbuneha 1980
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IRAN
ARAB ALICNMENT IN GULF WAR ASSESSED
Tokya MAII~YCHI DAILY NEWS in Engliah 15 Oct 80 p 2
[Editorial; "Perilous Aspect of Ndideast"]
[Text] . Under the circunistances; the fightlng between
Irag and Iran is likely -to be prolonged for lack of a
_ powerful mediator.- As neither side may win a
decisive victory, the political map of the Middle East
will undergo change.
- A new split is- occurring in the so-called Arab
.unity in -eonnectaon with the Arab-Israel con-
frontation. It is now evident that the Iraq-Lran war
cannot be,analyzed without taking ir.to cansideratlon
the question of Arabs ds. Israelis.
Since two -major countries .in the Gulf area are
engaged in fighting, it is, orily natural that regfonal
�instability will be further escalated. We have called �nn the two belligerents to stop fighting imlmediately,
but there is littIe prospect of an early cease-fire,
mainly because the other courrtries eoncerned have
iio intentian to mediate in the dispute. �
- Both " the United States and the Smriet- Union,
which have played an important role in the easing of
tension in the Mideast, still.remain firm not to in-
tervene fn the current dispute. The two super,powers
-are too ronscious of each other's moves. Such
- Arabian countries as Saudi Arabia and Jordan on the
- list of the "doves" have shown sympathy toward .the
Iraqi cause while the "hawks" ;.ncludfng Syria and
Lfbya have declared support for Iran. 1Vieanwhile,
Egypt, ffsmly maintaining its neutral position, has
- refused to move either way.
� There is no love lost between Syria and iraq over
-the conirontation on the question=of the fnternational
Baath Arab Socialist Party. With the emergence of
,tevolutionary Iran, Saudi Arabia moved closer to the
'.Arab hawks in terms of anti-Israeli strategy. The
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downfall of Iran at th'is time may restIff ia * the dis-
_ engagement of Saudi Arabia from the hawks and
isolation of Syria in the Arab camp. ,
� Verging oa the Israe'.i border. Syr#q. cannot soft-
=pedal its hitherto tough line. Its G jlan 'HeighU sre
still being occupied by'Israel. All this aecouuts far the
hurried visit to Moscow of President Assad and the
conclusion of the Soviet-Syrian Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation. In terms of the Arab strategy vis-a-
vis Israel, however, the hawks cannot toterate the
' . possible dropout of Iraq rrom their lfne. The same thing can be said of Jqrdan and Saudi
Arabia which have sided with Iraq in the ctrrent
flareup. Iran has certainly posed a threat to Saudi
Arabia as a revolutionary country, but it does, not
want the emergence Af a powerful Iraq in the Guli
area as a result of tbe fighting: .
U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim was
_ quoted as saying that the fighting between Iraq and
Iran may last for a year or two. To our regret, the
_ present situation appears to endorse.his prediction.
. COPYRIGH'r: Mainichi Daily News 1980
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,
, MAURITANIA
OULD MOUKNASS UNDER HOUSE ARREST
Parie JEUNE AFRTQUE in French 24 Sep 80 p 37
[Article: "How To Save Ould Mouknass"]
[Text] Former Foreign Miniater (1968-1978) Hamdi Ould Mouknass is back home in
Nouadhibou. He has been placed there in an assigned residence aince 11 5eptember,
the day he wae tranaferred after over a year of imprisonment without trial at
Boumdeid, north of Kiffa (in the South).
All those who interceded in his favor with Colonel Khouna Ould Haidalla now hope
that the Preaident will perform another geature by liftfflg his assigned residence
etatus. For Hamdi Ould Mouknaes's state of health requires constant care, as at
age 47 he is seriously ill. The treatment he received in Paris in February, then
in June 1979, was then to be repeated in November or December. The CMSN [Military
_ Committee for National Salvation] muat have possibly found some new resson to dis-
truet him, if they have refused to allow this trip to France. For Hamdi Ould
_ Mouknaes returned punctually to Mauritania after his February and June treatmeats.
And no one has forgotten that in July 1978, after the downfall of Moktar Ould
Daddah, he voluntarily left Khartoum (Sudan), where he was participating in the
fif.teenth OAU Summit as Foreign Minister, to return to his country. Added proof
of his loyalty to his country, over and above whatever regime: he returned with
- two checks Cotalling $10 million in aid, one from Iraq, the other from the United
Arab EmirAtes. But perhaps in the eyes of the CMSN Paris represents too much
of a place nf temptation for an eventual rall,ying of the opposition. If this be
the case, Pxesident Haidalla is well aware that there are other countries beside
France where Hamdi Ould Mouknass could get the care his atate o� health requires.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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- MAURITANIA
_ BRIEFS
- CATTLE DECIMEITED BY DROUGHT--More than 70 percent of the livestock were decimated
i.n the East and Central. regions of Mauritania due to the delay in the rainfall,
according to an announcement on 9 September by Mr Mohamed Ould Amar, Mauritanian
minister of Rural Development. The delay and paucity of rainfall might ruin the
_ season for farming, he said; in July some farming areas got only 40 percent of
their normal precipitation. The consequences of an overly short rainy season will
be catastruphic for the livestock because the fodder plants will not have completed
their vegetative cycle before the season of great heat (October). In 1979, a year
when Mauritania was one of the countries of the Sahel most affected by the drought,
the country's grain deficit was on the order of 75,000 tons, most of which was made
up by the international community (See MTM 25 Aug 80, p 2131). (Text] [Paris
- MARCHES TROPtCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Sep 80 p 22911 2750
RECIONAL BUDGETS APPROVED--The Mauritanian Council of Ministers on 3 September
examined and adopted draft decrees on approva.l of the budgets for FY 1980 of the
Ecllowing regions, budgets which balance in receipts and expenditures according to
the figures that foll.ow (in millions of ouguiya): Brakna: 15.9; Trarza: 29.6;
_ Gargol: 18.2; Tagant: 13.6; Assaba: 15.3; Guidimaka: 9.7. Al1 of these 'oudgets are
- characterized by a drop in operating expenses, in accordance with Che austerity
- pulicy and a substantial increase in the percentage of credits allucated for equip-
ment and development. [Text] (Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
19 5ep SO p 2291] 2750
iRAQI LOAN--A loan of $45 million was granted to Mauritania by Iraq, according to
_ an announcement �rom Bagdad on 5 September. In accordance with an Iraqi-Mauritanian
aKreemenk concluded last May at Bagdad the Iraqi government allocated a long-term
credit of $45 million earmarked for implementation of various development projects
in Mauritania. [Text] [Paris TROPICAIJX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Sep 80
p 2291] 2750
P'ED GI2ANT CUR DAM--With cofinancing of German. aid and other
- [:uropean Development Fund will grant Mauritania a 9,385,000
Unit] grant for the Foum Gleita dam within the framework of
Noir. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
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financial backers, the
ECU [European Currency
the management of Gorgol
French 26 Sep 80 p 23531
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MOROCCO
- EFFEGTS ON, SAHARAN WAR ON ECONOMY
Paris JEUNE AFHIQUE in French B Oct 80 pp 32-33
- [Article by Abde].aziz Dahmani: "It's Not Only the Sahara"]
[Textl Theze xas a skit on Moroccan television last month by the superb _
singing duo, Bziz and Baz, where the humor was only equa,l to ttse insolence.
The ecene took place in the butcher shop. The first customer, an e,verage
Moroccan, offered 20 rials, equal to 1 di.rham or some 55 CFA francs, just to
- sniff a piece o.f ineat, xhich he aould not afford because of the current skyhigh -
- prices. The eecond customer, asoaiety woman, in turn bought all the choicest
pieces on display for her dog.
, Thia scene about daily life and so many others, were unthinka,ble Just 6 months
ago. Horaever, it realistica]ly portrays the situation 3n early auturnn 1980.
There are more and more democratic freedoms and fear ha,s diminished, but the
_ other side o.f the coin is tha.t the economic and social life has become
increasingly difficult. Some point the fingrer: it is caused by the xar in
the Saha,ra....
F'u17. Force
This is paxtial.ly true. The "recovery of the provinces in tha south" was,
_ rough].y speaking, the leaven of democratization, with the need to close ranks
and unite all parties behind King Hasean II. Since 1976, this has led little
. by 1lttlo to removing pressurea, releasing many political prisonexs and
_ grantinq amnesty to all opponen,ts livi.ng abroad....
Hoxever, the costly Sahara war has also made da.ily life more difficult, xith
ita quota systems, deprivations and higher prices. The latter affected
families with modest incRmes full force on 5 September 1980, when sugar, oil,
miZk, butter and fl.our increased 34 peroent because the Compensation P'und
_ co�7.d no longer artifica.lly gupport the price of all these 3taples. The war
is nAt the only cause of all the difficulties in Morocco. It is impossible -
to estima.te its actual cost because mar~y military bills---thanTs to the -
solidaxity of some countries, especia,lly Saudi Arabia--do not coms under the
,jurisdiction of the bookkeepers. 18
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In 1979, for the first time, the petroleum bill (purchase of 4.5 million tons)
wau more (2.437 billion dirhams, apprnximtely 125 bi111on CFA t3anc$) thaxi
the revenues from the sale of phospha,tes (1.878 billion dirha.ms), the
principal wealth of the country. There is another xorry: the sale of citrus
fruits, the eecond l.argest income earner, in 1979 brought in 859 million
dirhams, much leas than wheat purchases (973 million). With equipment outlays,
the trade deficit exceeded 7 billion airhamg in 1979�..in 1980, there was a
~ ~ump in exports: 5.027 billion dirhams for the firat 6 months, compared xith
.5 billion im importa.
Gloor,inesa
With orfic3_ally more than 20 million inhabitants this year, Morocco's main
problem is to hal.t a certain deterioration in the living conditione of most
citizens, withoiit endangering its basic options and its economic liberalism,
and without frightening too much a nationa.l private sector xhich provided
45 percent of the investments for the current five-year (1978-1982) plan.
However, the gloomy world econony and domestic problems ha.ve meant tha,t less
than 60 percent of the p7.an's ob3ectives have thus far been achieved. To
stir up the humdrum routine, King Has$an TI took charge of some matters
under the jurisdiction of the goverrinient and parlia.ment. He added econorai.c
and socia.l concerns recently to defense and foreiga affa3.ra, his private doraains.
_ Royal Ma.nna
He spent 3everal weelm in Ca.sablanca in July and August, trying to bring oxde.r
to the Qoonomic capital which has 2.5 million inhabitants and attracts rural
- migranta. Hassan II also had to attack the crucial problems of rent and
education, while a comniittee of re�lection, headed by i'rime Minister Maati
Bouabid, examined the economy. Certainly, to soothe social tensions, tho
_ king ordered, on 20 August 1980, a one-thi.rd reduction in the rents of a11
wage-earners ma,king less than 1,500 dirhams a month and he exempted
bui7.dera of residential housing f.rnm taxes for 15 years.
In education, the monarch reversed some decisions af his education minister,
- Azzedlna Tara,ki, who iavors lim3ti.ng ad.fiissions to the universities. The
- king he7.d a co].loquy at I:frane from 28 to 31 August 1980 to di.scuss the
problema o:� na,tiona,l oducation with the ma,jor political groups in the country.
It uas a success. The ber;inning of the sahool year, at the lower and university
tevels, wifolded calmly; this is important because there are some 3 raillion
atudents (2.2 mil.lion in primary schools, 700,000 3.n secondaxy schools and
- 80,000 in higher education,) not including 85,000 teachers and professors.
tdost oi' f,hese teachers held a ao-ca,lled political strike in 1979 dema,nding
tho relea.se of their colleagves and students in prison and the removal of
the h,in on the UNE114 [Nationa,l Union of Moroccan 3tudents]. This strike, like
thoso of the nost office em loyees and workera in the health field,enhanced
the popul.arity o:F the USFP ~Socialist Union of Popular Forces] of lawyer
Abderranim Aoua,bid, who, despite several invitations, never wished to
pa.rticipate in the government coalition.
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He headed the largest o-f the four committees at the Ifrane colloquy, on the
1980-1981. university openi . Tt recommended and obtained a laxger number
of admisqions .for students11imited until then to 14,310 plus 15,000 by
competition, ) increased -facillties for additional facult,y, more achol.arships
and improved hoiisi.ng conditions.
Poox and Ignorant
Thus fa.r., the palace ha.g mad.e many gestures to the USFP to thaw the political
atmoaphere. In a3dition to the measures on education and rents (the USFP
on7y asked tha,t they be .frozen)ithere was the release of political prisoners,
except thQ "pro-PoZiaario" prisoners= amnesty for a. large nwaber of exiles;
among them, AbderrahmaaYous"i (Fkih Basri's case is an exception) and
proFessional reinstatement of ma,ny of the 1979 strikers. Finally, in mid-
September, the trial of the a,ssassins o� Omar Ben3elloun, a ma3or figure in
the IJSi,"P, xas heldt two were sentenced to death.
, The [t,FP ha,s practically besn cornered into participating in the new government
: which the who7.e country has been talk3ng a'bout for ssveral weeks. However,
one wonders if the paxty leaders xant to overcome their quarrels of yssteryear.
Onty the Sahara affair has thim fax made them agrse. Th3s affair no longer
has the importance it did at the time o.f the Green I1arch. This is all the more
- so becausa all danger of a military defeat seerns removed, people say in Morocco.
Suddenly, the field .f.or maneuver is naxrower. The yeaxs 1980 and 1981 may
be crucial if Morocco wishes to meet the economic and social ehallenge of the
year 2000. At the Ifrane colloquy, Hassan II said that if the country kept on
with its present education progra.ms, it would find itself poor and ignorant.
- GOfYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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MOROCCO
zfli~'G HASSAN' S REMARI~S ON JERUSALEM OCCUPATION, .~~gTIt�iGSi3'E".;;,
~ Paris NIARC " TROPICAUX ET ASEDITERRANEIId5 in F'ren;ch 10 Oct 80 p 24,56
~ [Text] The al qo ds ( Jeruttalem) Committee, the offahoot of the Is].wmi.c Conference
founded in 1968 in Morocco, usually rnests in Fez. For King Haussan, it ia a
dipYomatic tool all tho more useful because other circumatances, in part3cular,
. the Seharan matter, hss soured his relations with soffie Arab or Moslem
governmenta. Consequently, the Moiroccan soverEign xaus on hand and gave an
important apsech on 1$ 5eptember 1980l at the opening of the extraordinary
canference of Islamic countries, brought together by this committee to atudq
mea.surea to oppose the Israeli encrnachment on Jeruealem.
apeaking "in the na,me of the I4oslem community," King Hassan told the
= Palestinia,ng: "You are not the only ones who lost a1. Qods, and we are going to
_ rrin it tack together because al Qods is the sacred cause of evezy Maale.m ma.n
and Koma.n." He added the word "djihad" ha,d to be given its ,present meaning,
that of the elaboration of a plan of eff.ective strategic, militarg, psychological
- and political action, and that the support to be given to the ca,use by all
Moslem countries and the means to oppose the enev~y had to be minutely defined.
The latter had fallen into the same tra,p as Nazism: he despiaed religiotug balief
and huma.n dignity s"I.f we can take advantage of his errors. xe oan overcome
his despotism and vanity."
- The Moroccan sovereign Trnew the texm "d3fha,d" was often trans7.ated in the West,
purely and simply, by "holy war," while its full meaning waas "effort in the
peith o.f God." Thus, his rema,rks on this sub ject were also addressed to
Western opinion.
Thia battle to be waged, he speci#'ied, was not a mod.ern version of religfous warR
"but we must form relig3.ous fronts, lea,gues of hixma,n rights, associations,
to stand up to the effarts to plunder the people." Nevertheless,the idea of war
wa.s not re,jected: "When I talk of "d,jihad," it means etrerything...."
The ki.ng's recommandations were reflected apparently in point 23 of the f. ina.1
recommendatione of the eonferences "The Islamic nations announce their complete
Bupport oF the "d�iihad," with the vast huma,n implica,tions involved, knoxing
tha,t it means reaistanee ox struggle against the Zionist eneny in a11 areas--
mil3tary, political, economic, cultural and in the media." The plan of actior,
to be drawn up f.or this end rill have to be, as King Hassan stated initially,
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submittad to the Islamic Summit which will be held in Saud3 Arabia at the
begiruting of the XVth centuxy (year. 1401) of the Hegira, which will.
- "de.finitively c].ose Moslem ran3rs."
Returning to the subject of Jorusalem during a press conference on
~ 21 3eptomber 1980 at tho Ifrane palace, King Haesan stated Jerus alem must first
return to its pre-Six Day War statue and then a definitive solution could be
contemplated; this remark was proba,bly to assuage the aensitivitiss of King
Huesein of Jordan.
Continuing lliploma.tic Effort for "Moroccan Sahara"
D?Lring the same gress con.ference, the sovereign again optimistically mentioned
the recommendations approved 11 September 1980 at Freetot+n by the OAU Committee
of Wise Men*, although his mini.ster of foreign a,ffairs, Mr Boucetta, stated
the document contained nothing new and stigntatized "Africa's flight .from its
= responsibilities." King Hassan felt that " Freetown II was better for Morocco
than Freetorrn I." However, a referendum in 6lestern Sahara, under the super-
viBion of the OAU and the United. Nations, i.n no way meets wi.th Morocco's favor;
~ it feels tha,t the people haee already cleaxly and adequately expressed their
ohoice 3.n its favor.
By insisting that the Freetown recommenda,tions be submitted to a aonfersnce
at the OAU Summit which he xill attend, King Hassan perhaps is revealing part
of his pl.an. Morocco will certainly insist that the decision 3e made by a
' txo-thirds majority, and the king hopes, careful not to commit himself too much,
that somo African head.s o.� state will support this p1an; in that
case, it is 11ke].y the Freetown text xill not be approved. All the diplomatic
~ work patiently done in the OAU framexork will be thue made useless.
Meanwhile, the Moroccan Government is shoxi.ng the importance it attaches to
, the .fact that pro-Moroccan Saha.ran organizations received a hearing in Frsetown
; 1.ike the Polisario. The best-known organization is AOSARIO [Aasociation of
Natives of 5aguiet al Hamra and Rio de Oro.] There were nine other sma.ll
graupa at Freetown and their var:tety, in the face of the aingle party of the
Polisaxiol should bear witnesa to the democratic freedoms in Moroccos
_ MOREHOB [Revolutionazy Movement of the Blue Men]i FLU [Front for I,iberation
and Unity] and PUNS [Party of 5aharan Nationa.l Unity]....
- According to certain observers, several participa,nts at the Freetown conference
noted with interest that the president of the Alg+erian Republic, Mr Chadli
BeixUedid, who attended the fi.rst day's meeting, spoke in a subtle, moderate
me.nner. He indicated Algeria's willingness "to iae.ke all possible efforts to
e.liminate the true causes of tension and conflict," recalled hi.ts country
"haci no texxitorial or economi.c claims," and atressed his position on the
- se1-P-detorminat:ion of the Saharan peopls and his wish to aid the latter to
exercise this right derlving from pri.ncip7.es which could not be negotiated
"but this doos not mean we oppose the brother Moroccan people, toxard xhom
*See MARCHES TRO PTCAUX ET MED7:TERRANEENS, issue 1819, 19 September 1980, p 2285
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we �eol. a11 sentiments of friendship and esteem."
Rurnoxs about possib7.e secret negotiations were rife, but there is nothing to conf. irm them. On the contraxy, it has boen noted tha,t the Algerian media ;
continue$ to follor+ a hard line; it publiaized, among other things, the
Fbl.isaxio'6 capture of militaiy equipment of South Africa,n ori.gin; in ~
part.iculax, tanlcES used by the Morocean forces.
Continued C'ighting in the South
- "r'ighti.rg r,antinuea in f,he territory of the former Spanish Sahnra and in
"uncontested" southern Morocco. The Moroccan media stateg ~hat the Polisario
- wi11 a?.xays, during African diplomatic meQtings, step up o2erations to
incrE~asa its credibility. Ea,ch belligerent has, moreover, in the c=rent
stago of ho:3tilities, rea.sona far claiming the advantage.
The 3aharane continue to harra.se Maroccan gAx�risons often in the former Spanish
terxitory; but, no doulrt bacause of the Moroccan air force activity, the
Pol isario no 1.onger commits large numbers of troops in this zone; it has,
_ however, carried out large operatious, for example, agai.net Smara (23 and
24 pug�st 1980) and especia7.ty againet Laayoun, by sea (18 Segrtem'ber 1980.)
On tho othQr hand, in southern Morocco, the trnops committed are sizable on
both sidosi the Moroccan farces claim to ha,ve the initiat,irre with their
combina.tion of large garrisone and mobile units [DIR - Rapid Intervention Units]
which attract the Saharans to suffioiently fortifiad places i+hich ca,n be rield
against surprise attacks and thus expos e e them to harsh counteratta.ck.
, . From now on, it rrill be a war of attrition which the Saha.rans can only feed by
r.ecruiting in ne3.ghboring countries, like 14suritania whiah provides one-thirci
of their troops and w3.th whom the Polisarie rema3ns on good terms by regularly
_ relesaing some of its Niauritanian prisoners. Consequently, relations between
htorocco and Mauritania are deteriorating.
coPrxzcHr: xene MoreuX et aiA Paris 1980
~ 9479
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WESTERN SAHARA
ALGERIA MITIGATES POLISARIU INTRANSTGENCE
- Paris JEUNE AI'RIQUF in French 1 Oct 80 p 33
[TextJ A battle took place between the POLISARIO and the Moroccan army on
18 September east of Tarafaya in uncontested Morocco. The guerillas ambushed
- several units of the Lsrak group (JA No 1029). The result: a serious "loss" on
both sidea. Each of the twa antagoniats apeaks of a clear victory with an impressive
liat of dead and materiel destroqed or recovered from-`tihaeadversary.
Thie battle, started "from position" by the POLISARIO, occurred at a point named
after Freetown TI (the meeting of the OAU wisemen, 9-12 September). The Front is
thus avoiding the demobilization of its troops, which suffered several reversals
lately. And it is showing its friends that it is not at an impasse.
For the rreetown meeting led to an inextricable situation. The counnittee of the
wisemen cA11ed for the organization of a referendum among the Saharan population '
without requiring that the Moroccans leave.�the Sahara region, either administratively
or militarily. Thia is something new. The omission passed for a gesture towarde
Rnbnt, a gesture which would not have been possible if Algeria had not tempered the
inCransigence...of the POLISARTO. ,
,
In his 10 September hearing behind closed doors Ibrahim Hakim, the SDAR [Saharan
Democratic Arab Republic] minister of foreign affairs first refuaed any consultation
with the populations, affirming that "self-determination has already been achieved
by the War of Liberation." That very evening PreaidenC-Chadli,.Benjedid convaked the
PQLISARIO delegation at his vi11a. The next day, still behind closed doors and again
- through Ibrahim Hakim, the POLISARIO took a step backwards.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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_ WESTERN SAHAIiA
BRTEFS
ALGERIAN ROLE IN WAR--Precisely because cf the atmosphere of trust reestablished
between the two governments on the occasion of Jean Francois-Poncet's viait to
Algiers (18-20 September) and the good relations which Paris has maintained with
Rabat, Algeria would like to aee France play "a role" in finding a solution in the
Sahara. President Chadli Benjedid evoked this posaibility when receiving the French
head of diplomacy. It aeema, however, that Paris is not inclined to depart from its
"neutrality," but will encourage the parties to the conflict to find a solution
themaelves. Moreover, Algeriana and Moroccans met again secretly in early September.
But Algeria deplores the Moroccan intranaigence, itself being unable to drop the
POLISARIO too roughly. The latter would then have Libya for ita aole aupport and
"manipulator," [Text) [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Oct 80 p 47] 9380
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