JPRS ID: 9380 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040060-8
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• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 60
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9380
31 ~ctober 1980 ~ -
West E u ro e R e o rt
p ~
CFOUO 44/St~~
FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVI~E
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JFRS L/9380
31 October 1980
WEST EUROPE REPO RT
~ (FOUO 44/80)
CONTENTS
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
PORTUGAL
Defense Minister Amaro da Costa Outlines Defense Policy,
Ob~ ectives
(Adelino Amaro da Costa Iuterview; DEF'.~NSE, .
various dates) ......::............................a.~..... 1
National Defense Policy
Military-Civilian Government Relationshig
COUNTRY SECTION
~ FRAN(~
Antiterrorist Police Group Makes First Appearance
(Georges Marian; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 20-26 Sep 80)..... 10
Renault Director Speak,s on Auto's ProbleuB, Future
(Bernard Vernie~-e-Palliez Intervie~a; CORRIERE DELLA
SERA, 11 Oct 80) 12
Eomposite Materials Production Sales Figures
(AIR & COSMOS, 13 Sep 80) 17
PORTUGAL
Role ~f Armed rorces in Defense of $e~Cllguese Democracy
(Vasco Lourenco; DEFENSAy Aug-Sep 80)..0 20
- a [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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S~AIN
Explosives Theft Poin~s to Reappea~aace of ETA Terrorist
'Apala'
(CAI~IO 16, 10 Aug 80) 24
Weapons Evidence Linked to Reappearance of GRAPO Terrorists
(CAMBIA 16, 10 Aug 8Q) ...............................o... 31
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TH:ATER NUCLEAR FORCES PORTUGAL
_ DEFENSE MINISTER A'!iARO DA COSTA OUTLINES DEFENSE POLICY, OBJECTIVES
National Defense Policy
Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Aug-Sep 80 pp 50-53
[Interview witYe Defense Minister Adelino Amaro da C,osta,by Vicente Talon
in Lisbon; date not given)
[TextJ Adelino Amaro da Costa, the young Portuguese defense minister, is one
of the most distinguished personages in political life in his country. An
engineer and noted intellectual, and a political writer who at times has
even appeared in the Spanish presss with a fluent, extensive command of
Spanish, he is a member of the Social Democratic Center Party, regarded as
_ very conservativer and is therefore also a member of the present Lisbon
government group, the Democratic Alliance. His ideas, which are those of
hia group, are clearly reflected in the interview which we held with him
in his official office, devoid of any protocol, late at night.
DEFENSA: What is the policy of the Portuguese Government insofar as defense
is concerned?
Amaro da Costa: The Portuguese Government's policy on national defense, which
was approved in Parliament early in the year, has seven fundamental ob3ec-
tives: 1. prep~ration for the end of the so-called "constitutional transition
period," that is, the period during which there has existed in our country
an organ of sovereignty, the Council of the Revolution, with powers granted
by the Constitution of the Republic; 2. establishment of a new organic frame
of reference on the political and strategic levels, for the administration,
coordination and execution of ~ational defense; 3. adoption of a new system
of military aervice geared to the present historical, aociological and
cultural realities of gortugal and to the needs for a graduated system of
national alert; 4. dignifying and modernizing the Armed Forces, and carrying
out the pert3nent budgetary effort; 5. establishment of a national policy
on goods and services of concern to national defense; 6, reinforcement of
Portuguese cooperation within NATO; and 7. development of new systema for
the coordinatifln of civil protection.
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D: What -are the main obstacles encountered thua far in the implementation
of that policy, and in which areas?
AC: In all the areas of the government's immediate concern very great
- progress has been made which I shall not describe because it would take too
long. However, it seems important to me to atreas that, for the firat time,
an organic law on the main statutes of the Ministry of Defense has been
passed in Portugal. Before the revolution of 25 April, there were Ministries
_ of the Navy and Army, and the State Secretariat of the Air Force. The inte-
' grate3 view of defense required a minister without portfolio, called a minis-
ter of national defense. With the April revolution, the military ministries
were eliminated from the government's structure, with only the Ministry of
Defense remaining, but without an organized system. I would say that, from
the standpoint of working tools, the lack of organized main statutes of the
llefense Ministry has been the chief obstacle during these few months of acti-
vity. For that reason, I have attached priority, in the legislative endeavor,
to the preparation of such structures. Of course, that endeavor is also
related very particularly to the already cited ob~ective of putting a final
end to the "constitutional transition period."
D: You have talked about a Fourth Portuguese Republic. Does that plan affect
Portugal's concepts of defense and, more especially, its military concepts?
AC: I have talked about a Fourth Portuguese Republic in the sense that, after
the forthcoming constitutional r~vision, some fundamental aspects of the
present 3uridical structure of the Portuguese state which are still associat-
ed with rhe revolutionary period will give way to a more authentic and com- ,
plete democratic system. I do not think that this intensification of demo-
cracy can mean fundamental changes in our doctrine on national defense.
PortugaZ's solidarity within the context of NATO, the strategic importance
attached to the continent-Azores-I~3adeira triangle, and the significance of
the issuea brought up by the exercise of national sovereignty ov~r a more
extensive maritime area than the territorial one will continue along the
same line. But from the standpo~nt of a better integ~ation of the military
strategy in the context of the overall strategy devised by the government,
there will, indeed, b e changes. They will be those resulting from the
� abolishment of the Council of the Revolu*_ion.
D: The Portuguese Constitution calls for the di~solution of the military
blocs. How can this be reconciled with the obvious desires for making
NATO powerful expreased by the government of which you are a member?
AC: It is true that the Constitution calls for the progressive, mutual and
balanced dissolution of the military blocs. But what is the best method
for dissolving the blocs? The military draining of NATU, for example,
through a reduction in its internal solidarity and strength? I don't
think so. Deterrence continues to be the great weapon for pea..e and security.
Dialog conc~erning the sub~ect of disarmament is possible, and we should
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proceed to hold dialog with *_he Warsaw Pact, but without yielding in our
poaitions. Otherwise, we would not be contributing to the dissolution of
the blocs, but rather provoking an attack from the Warsaw Pact against us
in the West. In other words, in the end, instead of Lwo blocs, we would
have anly one: theirs.
D: For many years, excpet for a slight hiatus, Portugal has been a loyal
ally in NATO. In view of that fidelity, isn't the shortage and antiquated
nature of the materiel available to the Portuguese Armed Forces disappoint-
ing?
AC: From 1961 to 1974, Portugal maintained three theaters of war in as many
African territories. The entire logistical effort was made in that direc-
tion and for that purpose. During that period, the modernization of the
Portuguese Armed Forces was geared completely toward the guerrilla war, and
little else. Later, the revolution of 1974 broke out, and the Armed F.orces
had to expend a great effort, after the revolutionary upheaval in the bar-
racks, to restore internal discipline and attain their readjustment to the
new historical circumstances. Pieanwhile, the cou~try was experiencing a
great economic crisis caused partly by external causea and partly by the
internal revolutionary changes. Under these circumstances, it was not pasy
to ach~eve a more accelerated modernization of the Armed Forces. 'This modern-
ization is essential for a great manq reasons. I believe that, if all goes
well, we shall be able to establiah a long term plan whieh, with the proper
mobiliaation of our own reaources and possible external cooperation, will
make it possible to change the cu~rent situation.
Hence, there is no contradiction between Portugal's presence in NATO since
the founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the present materiel staCus of the
Armed Forces. What did exist prior to 1974 was a real discrepancy between
the traditional Portuguese loyalty to NATO in the noliti~al ar~d global stra-
tegy context and the concrete military~defense Effort to which the nation's
resources were directed. The former regime never sueceeded in convincing
our alliea that the wars which Portugal waged in Afriea had specific signi-
ficance for NAT~.
D: If I remember correctly, in October 1979 NATO's econ~mic commission
aseigned the aecretary general of that organization to create a task force
to aid the weakened economy of Portugal. Has anything been done in that
regard?
AC: I think that you are referring to Direetive 22, approved.at the 25th
annual plenary session of Che Atlantic Assembly,.held.in Ottawa from 22 to
27 October 1979. It was a deciaion among the parliamentarians representing
thz couatries in the Alliance. Henee, the suggestion~to create a task force
to study economic aid to Portugal was not the work of the.NATO secretary
general, but rather of the seeretary general of that assembl.y of parliamen-
_ tarians. Thia means that it does not involve the governments of our allies
nor NATO's international secretary.
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On the other hand, militacy aid to Portugal has, indeed, been studied by
the "ad hoc" group formed by the allied governments to assist Portugal and
Turkey. The efforts of that group led to the preparation of major reports
and the making of iffiportant decisions. For example, in this respect tech-
nical work was done which allowed for the political approval by the 3efense
ministers of the NATO member nations, last May, of aur plan for naval modern-
izat~~.n with three new frigates; a plan whieh was given, and this is the
first time that anything of the sort has occurred in NATO since its founding,
the atatus of a plan for multinational implementation. Nevertheless, the
Portuguese financial and industrial ahare in that plan will be quite sub-
stanti.al, involving, in addition, something of enormous military and tech-
nological significance to our country.
D: Your government has come out in favor of the installation of Euromissiles.
Would it accept them, if NATO were to request it, in Portugal itself? In
such an event, would conditions be imposed?
AC: I do not think that it makes sense to put the question abstractly,
particularly after the Schmidt-Brezhnev meeting and the resultant positions
assumed by President Carter. We are not, nor shall we be candidates for the
installation of Euromissiles or nuclear arms in our terri.tory. Bvt it is
also a fact that, for us, Atlantic solidarity is not an empty word nor a
rhetorical ~ymbol. We h~ve been clearly demonstrating .~his through our
foreign policy positions. Therefore, we shall have to study, at each moment,
what in our view is in the best interest of the Alliance, so as subaequently
to determine the types of our cooperation in the coIIUnon effort.
D: Do you believe that Spain should ,join NATO?
AC: That is a question which is up to the people and government of Spain.
If, some day, the Spaniards should opt fo r integration into the Atlantic
Alliance, Portugal.:caould hail that new anC highly important element for
reinforcing NATO with great ~oy.
D: In 1983, the agreements on the North American military preaence in the
F~~ores will be renewed. Will the present statute be changed in any way?
AC: The foreseeable change in the interna tional sit~ation, Atiantic soli-
, darity and Portugal's interests will be determining factors for the ~udgment
that will have to be made at any time concerning our agreements with the
United States, both with respect to the Azores and concerning all matters
of bilateral concern, within the context of NATO. This holds true as much
for 1983 as it does for today.
D: I understand that a law for national defense is being preparpd. If so,
what would be the content of that law, along general lines, and what course
of action is being pursued to develop it?
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AC: On. 30 ~iay of this year, [he Portuguese C;ouncil of Ministers approved tine
general lines of a bill on nationa3. defense. The bi~.1 has fcur headings:
gPneral principles, organic stru~ture of nationgl defense, special sqstems
(martial law, states o.f emer$ency, states of national alert and war situa�-
tions), and mobilization. Insofar ~a the organic strueture of defenee is
- concerned, it calls fo:: organ~ of leader~hip; supreme politieal leadership, -
the president of the republic; poli~ical and stra tegic leadersh{p, the
- Council of Ministers; strategic military lead~rsh ip, the Council of Chiefs
of S"taff; organs of caardir~tiun: pr~litical and s trategic coordination, the
Superior Council of National I3efense, comprised of the president of th~
republic, all the ministers and the chiefs of staff; strategic coordination,
the Strategic Coordination eommission, comprised of the prime and vice prime
- ministers, the ministers of fo~~3gn affairs, defense, finance and internal
. administr3tion an~ the chiefs of staff; executive orgax~s: the Armed Forces,
the military and militarized corps, and the civil agencies subordinate to
the ministries and of the Autonomoua Regions of tha Azores and Madeira.
The bill is due to be submirted to Parliament as soon as the ger.eral elec- -
tions take place. At thE a~oment, it has been sent, for study, to all the
parties, those of the ma~~ri~y and those of the oppoeitioi: w:.th parliamen-
tary representatian. I consider it fitting that an extensive, open, nation-
- al debate be rield on the sub~ect, which should precede the parliamentary -
discussion in Nove~ber.
D: Finally, what is your opinion of the Conferenc e on European Security and
Cooperation to be held soon in Madrid?
.
AC: I am afraid that it will be nothing more than the funeral for the Final
Act of Helsinki unless, in the meantime, there is ciisregard for what has
happened in Afghanistan. If that should happen, it would be an even greater
' disaster. _
COPYRIQiT: Ediciones Defensa., S. Madrid 1980 ~
Military-Civilian Government Relationship
Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish May 80,pp 52-53 `
[Interview with Defense Minister Adelino Amaro da Costa~by Alberto Miguez*;
date and place not given]
* Alberto Miguez was born in La Coruna in October 1940. Degree in philoso--
phy, Philosophy Section, University of Madrid; graduated in ~~urnalism from
ehe Official School, also in Madrid; took soeiolo gy courses in Paris. He
began his professional career in provincial newspapers, and in 1966 was named
chief of the international section of Che evening _paper MADFID. When that
paper closed, he became permanent eorrespondent for th~ newspaper LA VANGUARDIA
. in Barcelona, where he served as special correspondent in Latin America and
Asia, as well as correspondent in Rabat and Lisbon. In I976, he returned to
Spain to found, with another professional group, the morning paper EL PAIS,
serving as foreign information chief for a year and a half. He is author of
aeveral bc~oks and m~nographs, including "Castelao's Political Thought," "The
~lhilosophical Thought of Besteiro," "Galicia: Exodus and Development," "Galicia,
the Aesthetics of Underdevelopment," Morroco at the Crossroada," etc.
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[Text] Engineer Adelino Amaro da Costa, aged 38, is the third civilian to
hold the defense portfoiio in Portugal since 1926. His predecesssors
(Oliveira Salazar during the 1930's, and Silva e Cunha during the dictator-
ship of Marcelo Ca~tano) left a controversial memory. -
But, in this case, the controversy has arisen without an assessment of the
administration, after !:he appointmRnt itself. Amaro da Costa was one of
the builders of the Democto:ic: Alliance, the conservative-type electoral
coalition that won the ma~ority in the early elections of last December =
(1979). As a result of those elections, the president of the repvblic,
Gen Ramalho Eanes, called upon the Social Democratic leader, Francisco Sa
Carneiro, to form a government. ~ro personages from the Social Democratic
Center (Christian Democratic) Party, its president Diogo Freitas do Amaral,
~nd its vice president, Adelino Amaro da Gosta, were appointed, the former
as minister of foreign affairs, and the latter as miflister of defense.
The very special features of the Portuguese political system (which, it
shoul~i be remembered, came into existence as a reault of a military coup),
known popularly as the "revolution of the carnations," had made it impossible
thus far for a civilian to head}the Defense Ministry. After 25 April 1974, _
the Portuguese Armed Forces experienced various vicissitudes, some of them
_ dramatic, which, rather than open them to the civilian world, closed them in
a professional-political ghetto, the last ve$tige of which is, without doubt,
the Council of the Revolution, a consultative organ of sovereignty to which
the constitutionality of the laws is subject. The Council is due to go out
_ of existence this year, when the chief executorship is renewed. But some
of its members are seeking its survival through some kind of legal ruse.
The conversation with the Portuguese defense minister took place pleasantly
- and easily. Amaro da Costa who, before becoming a politician, was a jour-
natist (for a time, he even held the position of Lisbon correspondent for the
newspaper MADRID which became defunct during the Franco era), exudes cordi-
- ality and enthusiasm. It is difficult to ~ithdraw from hia contagious con-
geniality.
The Interview
During a respite in the parliamentary sessions, l�he PortugLese defen~e min-
ister answered all our questions without evading the most touchy or diffi-
cult ones.
[Question] Why a civilian in the Defense Ministry?. Wha~ significance does
such an appointment have in Portugal today? -
[AnswerJ OE course, it was a deliberate option, and it served to demonstrate
several things: First, that there exists a consensus among the Portuguese
military to defend the civilian authority and democracy. Second, that a
qualitative change has taken plaee in ths relations betw~en the government
ar~d the Armed Forces. And, third, that this change is reflected in the
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fact that, for the f irst time in the contemporary history of Portugal,
there is a gover.nment without military participation.
~ [Question] Did not such an event cause distrust, more or iess muffled
protests and even a certain amount of rebellion among some military sectors?
[Answer] To date, I have not noticed any type of unrest or coolness among
the off icers. Since I took over the ministry, I have visited barracks and
instruction centers, as well as institutions associated with the Armed
Forces; and of course the reaction that I could gage wa~ pcsitive, if not
clearly favorable toward my appointment, which ia guided ~y the line of
"democratic normalization" advocated by the government.
[Queation; This "normalization" was perhaps not well explained by the govern-
ment itself on the basis of its Constitution...
[Answer] The government and Parliament are in a position.to contribute to a
- proper defense of the professional, moral and economic interests of the
military, as ts the ease, moreover, in the entire Western world. My appoint-
ment as defense minister was a harbinger of~ the Armed Forces' proper and
necessary integration into the democratic regime.
Up until now, this has been correctly uaderstood by nearly ~veryone, with
the exception of certain members of an organ of sovereignty, who seem to
want the phase of democratic t~ansition tha~. the country has experienced
- during rece}~t years to be perpetuated.
[Queation] Are you referring to the Council of the Revolution?
[Answer] I am referring to some members of the Council of the Revolution,
a minority, who do not want to give up the role of arbiter granted tempo-
rarily by the Constitution to that organ, the aboiishment of which is also
called for by the Constitution itself.
[QuestionJ Is such an attitude ~mpeding the dialog betwe2n the Armed Forces
and the government?
[Answer] I don'tthink so, beeause individual, isolated attitudes are involv-
ed. The government is greatly concerned with learning th~ needs, hopes and
limitations of the Armed Forces which, in turn, must be in.formed of the
principles which guidethe government's action, so as thereby to facilitate
a productive ~ialog. The Minigtry of Defense is concerned with protecting
the Armed Forces from the attacks that it may receive, unfairly, at a time
when they should be concerned~with the material.matters that affect them.
The Political Parties and the Army
[Question] Do the Portuguese political parties advocate the return of the
military to the barracks?
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[Answer] The democratic parties, yes, without any ~oubt whatsoever. They
all accept the subordination of the Armed Forces to the civil authority. -
On the other hand, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) is still d~manding
the presence of the military in polf tical activity, and is oppoaed to a
constitutional revision that wo~:ld impede their presence. Juat a few
weeke ago (January 1980), the PCP's Central Committee requested that the
presence of the military in the executive branch be guaranteed, with a
~ future replacement of the Couneil of the Revolution with a civilian-military
entity having similar features and endowed with the same powers.
[c2uestion] In reality, who controls the Council of the Revolution?
[Answer] We cannot talk abotit control per se, because the trends of thought
that coexist therein are plural. A note.werthy change has occured within `
the Council, from a political component to an increasingLy more professional
attitude. Moreover, it would appear that the initiative has moved from the
representatives of the three branches of the military (12 in all) to the
representatives of the Genral Staff and of the three Staffa. The president
{4 clearly acting as an arbitrary and moderating element. Added to all this
i: the fact that the Council of Chiefs of Staff is gaining increasing impor-
tance, both in the strictly professional realm and in its public pro~ection.
[QuestionJ Then can it be claiffied that, from 1976 to the present, the Por -
tuguese ?.rmed Forces have been brought back to their military status?
[Answer] Of course. There is a.great desire for institutional normality
among the Portuguese military, who want more each day, with gzeater force
and insistence, to become a part of the str ictly military structures, with-
out interfering in the political governing or in the partisan struggle.
There is a deepseated feeling of profegsional dignification, a logical
reaction to the cor.fusion of other times wherein the military were, for
the most part, used. Professional traini~ig and xesponsibility have replaced _
- the political ambitions. The contrast with other Western Armed Forces
(esgecially thoee of NATO, an organization with which Portugal is affiliat- -
ed) has served as a spur for that change.
_ [Question] Is it possible to talk about an integrated Spanish-Portuguese
defense syatem?
[Answer] No. The Portuguese Staffs operate within the framework of NATO, ~
an organization of which Spain is not a member. Therefore, there are no
~oint defen~e plans, although the Soviet threat may be the same for Spain _
and Portugal. In the event that Spanish integration should be achieved in
the Atlantic Alliance (and that.is a problem that th~ Spaniards must resolve
~ themselves, without external in~ervention or f4reign pressure), there would
unquestionably be devised a peninsular strategy whi~h does not exiat now,
amang otT~er reasons, beeause the organic structurea of the two peninaular `
Armed Forces are different.
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. [Question] Does such peninsular cooperation appear to you to be inevitable
in the future?
[AnswerJ If the two countries maintain the present political systems, such
cooperation will inevitably have to occur; but not only in the area of
~ defense, in all areas.... _
COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defensa S.A., Madrid 1980
, 2909
CSO: 3110
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
ANTITERRORIST POLICE GROUP MAKES FIRST APPEARANCE
r
P~~ris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 20-26 Sep 80 p 47 _
[Article by Georges Marion: "When the RG Takes Action"] ~
[Excerpts] In France there is an antiterrorist supersquad. Up until 13
- September, this was a secret...
To crack a big case and beat colleagues from the other services to the punch
- is a dream cherished by all national police bigwigs. As of last Saturday,
Ra~mond Cham, director general of the General Information Service (RG), is
satisfied. 'This was, in fact, one of the services which arrested Jean-Marc
Rouillan and Nathalie Menigon, tl-,e alleged leaders of the Direct Action
Organization (OAD), in Paris last 13 September.
This affair, however, marks the public appearanc~ of a very discreet service,
specialized in antiterrorist action: the Investigation Department of the
Central Administration of the RG, which is under the watchful authority of
its dfrector, Raymond Cham. This service is, however, not entirely unknown.
Under the d?signation Central Operational Squad (BOC), then headed by division
commissicner 3acques Harstrich, during the hectic times that preceded and
_ followed May 1968, it was the m:iinspring for all the "distorted attempts"
born of Raymond Marcellin's in~agination: "bugg.i.ng" of political meeting
places, "burglarization" of inembers' apartments, compromising photos, provoca- -
tions during demonstrations. It also took part in some arrests, like those
- of Gerard Nicoud or Alain Geismar. When Marcellin left the Place Beauvau,
Commissioner Harstrich was discharged and the BOC, which was soon to become
the Investigation Department, slowly entered a period of lethargy.
Precious Incognitu Status
l
But in September 1979 the service was revived. Cham imposed on it his concept
of a specialized RG group which could be immediately set on the trail of the
OAD. Composed of some 20 young and highly motivated inspectors, benefiting
from the RG's voluminous archives and provided with large operational sums,
the InvestigaCion Department is not subject to a logic based on how much it
can produce. Just one case, but thoroughly handled. In March 1980, information
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acquired by the new squad enabled them te question 28 individuals suspected
~ of being OAD members. But in every case i~ is the Criminal Squad that is
responsible for arrests.
Now last Saturday, RG inspectors themselves "went into action." Were they
forced to? That is their stary. Warned of a meeting between two unidentified
OAD members and foreign terrorists, RG agents had supposedly planned to simpl.y
Cail them. Recognizing Rouilland and Nathalie Menigon, whom they had un-
successfully been looking for for several months, they decided to go ahead and
arrest them themselves at the risk of losing their precious incognito status.
On the contrary, according to other sources, the two terrorists were deliber-
ately J.ured to t.he rue Pergole~e where, suitably intoxicated, they expected
to find weapons.
F: that as it may, we now know that there is an effective group working against
terrorism in France. The murderers of Henri Curiel and of Pierre Goldman as
well as all extreme-right bombplar~ters should know what they are up against.
With the understanding that they too constitute a target for Raymond Cham
and his investigation group.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
11,466
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
- .
RENAULT I3IRECTOR SPEAKS ON AUTO'S PROBLEMS~ FUTURE
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 11 Oct 80 p 13
~ [Interview with Bernard Vernier-Palliez in Paris, by Paolu
- Glisenti]
[Text] '~The European automobile industry is not in
trouble. The only people hurting are the
ones who guessed wrong." The troubles are
in the United States. "FIAT wi11 be giving
us serious competition again." Not true
that the French automobile industry got a
government handout: "Chickenfeed." How
to beat th.~ Japanese.
"To call what is happening in the automobile industry these days
a crisis is altogether misleading.'~ Rising from the table after
3 straight hours of answering questions interspersed with
a splendid poached salmon and the inevitable raspberry cordial
put to him by the select group of reporters invited to lunch
on the 8th floor of the Renault building on the Champs Elysees,
Bernard Vernier-Palliez (at 63 president and general manager of
the company he joined right after the war, rising to its top
spot in 1975) was clearly a happy man. Looking up at the grey
skies, whose first winds of winter were already chilling Paris,
he remarked: '~You have a marvelous view of the Arc de Triomphe
from here. I think it's a fitting landmark for my company's
ambitions.'~
Certainly unique in the industry, Renault has been unscathed by
the crisis and we are assured its immunity will hold. The
figures bear out the claim: in the first 8 montt;s of this year
it has increased its share of the market in every one of the
western countries (in France that share has leapt f~+om 34 to 42
percent, matching the Japanese), despite raising its list prices
more sharply than its competitors. In Italy it trounced Alfa
Romeo in the race for second place (after FIAT) with an incredible
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32-percent surge in sales that put its RS in fifth place among
newly licensed automobiles, the R4 in 13th place, and the R14
in 1$th. A miracle? Is Renault really "Europe~s Ja~anese?~~
[Answer] No. The f act is that there is indeed a market crisis
in the United States, and it is due to the impact of the credit
restrictions imposed by the American government. In Europe we
are seeing a slight slowdown in sa]_es, coming on the heels of
4 years of comfortable growth. In any case, it is something re-
- cent which we were a11 expecting, and which did not put in its
appearance until April, f ar later than our predictions had
called for it. So it would be an exaggeration to call it a
crisis. It is true, on the other hand, that some makers are
paying dearly for the bad image of some of their products, and
t~.at they have a lot less time now to correct past errors. Any
maker these days who, in the view of his potential customers,
puts out cars of shoddy quality and poor reliability, who cannot
~ rely on high levels of energy and enthusiasm in his sales orga-
nization, who lets it be seen that he has no strategy for inter-
national growth is going to be a loser. Product image can also
be hurt by sour labor relations in the plant.
[Question] Would you by any chance be diagnosing the troublE at
FIAT?
[Answer] I remember back in 1970 when we all looked at FIAT with
admiration. Those were the days wher~ we used to tell each other,
"Some day maybe we'll manage to do better than Citroen...'~ and
look how things stand now. No, no. We built our success on our
own strength, our own means: not on other people's troubles.
FIAT? It still has the finest model line in Europe. It may well
become a major competitor to us. We shall have to keep an eye
on FIAT . -
The Research Card
[Question] In France, though, the automobile industry gets a
lot of help f rom the government when the going gets rough, in
expanding research, in achieving greater economies of scale.
You have to take that into account.
[Answer] There has been no political eagerness in France to help
the automobile industry, and as of now we have had no financing.
To cite just one example: the thing that motivated us to play
the research card in developing fuel-eff icient engines was solely
the high gasoline tax. We have aimed all our efforts at that one
goal since 1975� We succeeded in cutting the RS~s fuel use by 20
percent between 1974 and 1980, even though it was economical when
' it first c ame out. The French government has decided to step in
now to back our plan for an experimental car that will be 2$
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percent more fuel-eff icient than current models; it is putting
up 14 million f rancs around 3 billion lire to be split
between us and Peugeot. That's chickenfeed, when you remember
that it costs $00 billion to design a new engine.
[Question] You cannot deny, though, that the French automobilc,
industry has enjoyed some remarkably f riendly treatment, begin-
ning with tax policy...
[Answer] That's not true. Just to give you one example, the
value added tax (VAT) on an automobile in France runs around 33
percent, on the average. So you see we have no edge on the com-
petition. I can understand your astonishment. There has been a
lot of talk in Italy about alleged handouts to the French indus-
t-~y. But it is in Italy, not here, that they are considering
state assistance to the troubled automobile industry, only they
are calling it f inancing for research. In France, state money
has gone only to the electronics, aerospace, and steel industries.
[Question] What is Renault~s winning strategy, then?
[Answer] Our policy, generally speaking, is to offer the broad-
est possible model choice for each type of car, being very care-
ful to adjust the price-performance ratio to consumer tastes.
We offer no less than 14 model choices on the R18:
[Question] Isn~t that bucking the trend? FIAT, for one, is
trying to cut down its range of model choices these days.
[Answerj That may well be, but our decision is paying off.
[Question] The problem, though, is to achieve enough economy of
scale while at the same time you aim at so widely varied a range
of product choices.
[Answer] Let's take some practical examples. We build the en-
gine that goes into the RS at the rate of $,500 per day in two
plants in France and one in Spain. We believe that with this
volume of production our costs are quickly amortized. For the
engines that power the Rl�, the Visa, and the Peugeot 10�, though,
ttie rate of production is substantially lower (2,200 units per
day), and so we decided it would not be a good idea to commit a
plant to every model. These figures will give you an idea of
what we believe to be our production efficiency threshold. For
the future, our goal is to turn out 2.5 million components by
1985, as against our present 2 million. Mark you, though, I am
not talking about 2.5 million Renault cars, but 2.5 million com-
ponents (engines, chassis, bodies, etc.) to go into our own cars
or into those of possible partners.
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[Question] In other words, Renault plans to expand as a build-
er of components as well as of complete automobiles. Here again
your strategy differs from those of a lot of other manufacturers...
[Answer] Not altogether. Take the FIAT-Peugeot agreement. It _
calls for joint production of engines for a range of cars for
which no large volume of production is planned. As for us, we
are out to improve our positions in the United States, ix~ Canada,
and in Mexico, and to sell components to Volvo. If we succeed,
that goal of 2.5 million components is not unrealistic. In Latin
America we are already in good shape, with 26.5 percent of the
Argentine market, 6$ percent of the Colombian, and 15 percent of
the Chilean. In Venezuela we are improving our position. In
Brazil we are doing nothing at all, and that's a stroke of luck
f~r us, considering the way things are going down there. Getting
back to the production questions, though, we intend to deal with
them in the future as we have done in the past. We design a lot
more new cars than we will actually decide to build. We've got
a lot of designs in the f iles. It~s a good policy. You have to
be able to pick the right time to bring out a new model, and
when that right time comes you have to be ready.
Manpower Cutbacks _
[Question] They tell me Renault~s wage costs are 17 percent
higher on the average than Peugeots. How can you carry that kind
of handicap?
[Answer] Simply with a good, steady rise in productivity, with
a drop in absenteeism, and with modest profit margins. If all
three of those conditions are met, it is only f air that the wor-
kers get their share of the profits. We give bonuses for atten-
dance and for quality of output, based on actual hours on the
job, and our wage scales are in fact pegged to the performance
of corporate management. In the past we have made wide use of
internal and external job mobility to restructure oar industrial
vehicle division. We have cut our work force by more than $,000
by means of retirement, retraining courses, and incentives to
employees who want to set up for themselves in small commercial
and industrial enterprises. All this has cost us a lot of money, '
but the success of the policy has been tremendous. This year
we signed a labor contract without a single day of strikes, and
even the communist union organization, which at other negotia-
tions had taken a very hard-nosed position, went along with it.
This is another explanation for Renault's success.
[Question] Now for the mandatory question: Is there a"yellow
peril~~~ And if there is, how should it be dealt with?
[Answer] Look: international trade has to work both ways with
some semblance of balance. True, there are certain specialized
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areas in which some products are more sought-after than others,
but when it comes to automobiles the gap between the numbei~ of
cars the Japanese export and the number they import is wi.lr~ly
out of 1ine: for every 100 cars they sell abroad they buy just
one f rom the United States or f rom Europe. The entire Japanese
economy is orchestrated to keep foreign products out. Distri-
bution is controlled by a handful of Japanese companies, and it
so happens that marketing of foreign cars ~_s controlled by com-
panies owned by the Japanese automobile makers. If the Japanese
th~:nselves do not take steps to rectify this sort of trade im-
balance, it will be politically impossible for the European
countries and for the United States to refrain from taking pro-
tectionist measures. We have reached the point where the situa-
tion has become intolerable. We could agree on the Japanese'
coming in and building some cars here, through joint venture
arrangements, but only on condition that their share of produc-
tion be at least 50 or 60 percent. In this way they would be
operating under the same conditions we do, and coming to terms
with European product,ivity.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere del3.a Sera" s.a.s.
6182
CSO: 3104
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
COMPOSITE MATERIALS PRODUCTION SALES FIGURES
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 13 Sep 80 pp 35-38
[Text] The First three charts accompanying this article were presented
during the course of the ICCM [probably Internation Conference on Compo-
site Materials] by Mr S. Antonioli, office head at the Ministry of Indus-
try, in connecticn with his expose entitled: "Results of the Development
of Composite Materials With Plastic Matrices on the National Economy."
They call for several words of comment. In the first chart, one is
struck by the relatively high �annual rate (25 percent) of growth of the
French market in fibers and the so-called "noble" composites (aramide
and carbon) which can only be done at the expense of the conventional
materials and by virtue of the automobile, aeronautics, sports, and lei-
sure sectors. In the two following charts one will note: the surplus
production capacity of glass fiber, the only real industrial fiber pres-
ently in Europe; that the United States is the sole supplier of aramide
fiber; our production, almost artisanal, of carbon fibers in which Japan
dominates the market, both in quantity and in quality; the take-off of new
fibers, of resins, aluminum oxides, and whiskers; finally, in thermoplas-
tic resins, the poor French position, compensated for on the European
scale, by the FRG, and, with respect to thermal-hardening epoxy resins,
the domination in quantity of Ciba-Geigy.
The fourth chart was also issued during the ICCM, this one by Courta~~lds.
It will be noted that Lhe aeronautics and space share falls from 40 per-
cent in 1979 to 7 percent in 1990, the automobile going from 4 percent
to 40 percent in the same time!
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Chart 1. French Market Figures (in tons)
Annual
Material 1979 1985 1990 ~90-79 Growth
tZate
Glass 45,000 60,000 80,000 35,000 5.3%
Fiber Aramid < 100 500 1,000 = 1,000 =25 %
Carbon < 100 500 1,000 = 1,000 =25 %
Glass 135,000 185,000 240,000 105,000 5.3%
Composite Aramid < 200 1,500 3,000 = 3,000 =28 %
Carbon < 200 1,500 3,000 = 3,000 =28 %
Chart 2, Production of Resins in 1980
Number of Position in French
Materials Producers World P4arket Dependence
France urope
PET-PBT 1 > 5 Moderate ~
ro
Polyamide PA 2 > 5 Moderate ~
. ~
~ Polyacetal POM - 2 Oligopoly-Dupont,USA Great �
-Hoechst,FRG v
~ ~
~ Polycarbonate PC - 2 Oligopoly-G.E., USA Great ~
C -Bayer, FRG ~
u Polycarbonate PPO - 1 Monopoly -G.E., USA Very
F Polyptenylene PPS - - Monopoly -Philips,USA Great U
b Polyester = 10 > 20 Slight
~ ~ Controlled by CIBA ~ ~
~ ~ Epoxide 2 ~ 5 (Switzerland) Moderate ~ ~
_ x~ Phenolic = 4 > 10 Slight
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Chart No 3. Production and Consumption of Fibers in 1980
1980 price Consumption in 1480 French
Francs (in tons) World- Depen-
Material per kg Fiber Production France Europe wide dence
E Class 15 Surplus production 45,000 180,000 Moderate
R Glass 50 to 60 capacity in Europe
Aramid: low
modulus of USA - Dupont 50 1001,000
elasticity 90 to 110 de Nemours' < 50 100 to ~~ry
Aramid: high Kevlar only 2,000 Great
modulus of
elasticity
HR Carbon 300 to 500 Japan - USA
HI~i Carbon 800 to 1300 Great Britain >100 < 200 500 Great
12 tons in France
Boron 2,500 USA - FRG - France Slight < 100
Resins 50 to 150? USA
Alumina ~
U SA
Whiskers 20,000
Chart No 4. CFRP [French Petroleum Refining Company?] Market in the
Western World (in metric tons per year)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1990
Aeronatics & space 225 325 450 600 750 900 1,100 3,500
Sports 225 300 450 6~0 800 1,000 1,250 4,000
Motors 3 7 13 30 70 125 190 7,500
o Transmission 7 12 20 30 75 125 175 3,500
~ Suspension 8 15 25 75 150 225 350 10,000
Chassis/f.ramework 5 10 15 30 50 75 100 2,000
~ Home appliances 6 10 15 30 60 100 200 2,500
~
~ Textile machinery 14 20 30 50 75 95 125 250
~ Chemical plants 17 12 20 30 50 70 125 1,000
Misc factories 5 8 20 30 50 75 125 1,000
Mines 9 15 25 40 75 125 200 750
Civil Engineering 4 8 15 30 50 75 150 2,000
Electrical engineering 5 8 15 30 50 75 125 1,000
Rail transport 6 10 20 30 50 75 125 750
Naval 5 8 15 30 60 80 150 1,000
Medical 2 5 10 15 20 30 40 250
Armed forces 7 12 20 30 80 135 250 4,000
Musical instruments 1 2 4 10 25 40 80 3,000
Miscellaneous 6 13 18 30 50 75 140 2,000
TOTAL 550 800 1,200 1,750 2,500 3,500 5,000 50,000
COPYRIGHT: A. & C., 1980 19
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" COUNTRY SEC'TION PORTUGAL
ROLE OF ARMED FORCES IN DEFENSE OF PORTUGUESE DEMOCRACY
Madrid DEFENSA in SpaniGh Aug-S2p 80 pp 6-9
[Article by Revolutionary Council member Maj Vasco Lourenco: "The Armed Forces
and Democracy in Portugal"]
[Text] If we observe the history of Portugal over the ~ast 2 centuries, we
sha1Z readily discover how important the aetion of~the military hae been.
Sometimes holding the reins of power themselves, ar.d at other times backing
those who he~1.d those same reine, and on still other occasions atrongly influ-
encing the direction of politieal affiairs, the fact is that, s3nee 1820, the
military, sometimes as authors or eoparticipants in the attempts ~o libera-
_ ize or democratize the society, and at other time~ as authors or instruments
of the establishment of autocratic regimes, have had a decisive influence on
Che courae of Portuguese history.
In 1974, there still existed in Portugal the oldest afld most enduring of the
fascist regimes in Europe, established about 48 years earlier. It is a fact
that the Armed Forces were never the executing braner for its poliey, because
for that purpose there was the PIDE [~International and State Hefense Police)-
DGS [Security Directorate General] (political police), and the Portuguese
Legion, as well as the judicial system. But it is alao a fact that it was
mainly with the support of~�the Armed Forces as such, and the action of cer-
tain corrupt members of the military, that the regime managed to survive for
~ so many years.
Victory and Difficulties
The situation in our eountry worsen~d rapidly to an intolerable point when
there was imposed on the Armed Forces, by both the political leaders ahd the
top-ranking military commandwra, a colonial war whieh was to end up spreading
to three combat fronts, last 13 years and eventuallq prov~ fntile.. Once
again, the Armed Forces were used by a few for the defense of the latter's
interests and not for the defense of the interesta of the nation as a whole.
What is incredible is that all this occurred without the military in general,
~ including the career personnel, en~oying any type of personal benefits from
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this aituation. Salazar and Caetano knew how to make use of the military,
even while paying them very poorly.
On 25 April 1974, after a process of conscien~ization resulting chiefly from
the Portuguese people's struggle against the tyrannq and experience in colo-
nial wars in which the military became convinced of the uselessness of such
wars and of the inability of the rulers to achieve a political solution for
those conflicts, or~ce again ~he m~litary, partieularly the younger members,
decided to try to put an end to the authoritarian r~gime and to open the
doors for the establishment of a freer, more 3ust and more egalitarian
democratic society.
Taking advantage of the state of genuine corruption that the fascists had
reacized, the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) easily attained its goals; and
~verthrew the usurpers and enslavers of the people.
~ It was with great difficulties, some of which we~e ma~or,.that the MFA suc-
ceeded in implementing the essence of its program, whi~h the Portuguese
peaple had accepted and were to adopt-~vith�enormous enthusiasm and ~oy.
Meanwhile, decolonization took place and new indep~ndent countries became
part of the community of nations. After 50 years, there~was success in
holding free elections in Portugal and in having those elected approv~, by
an overwhelming u?a~ority of over 93 percent, a Constitution for the Portu-
guese Republic. Finally, success was achieved with the organs of sovereign-
ty called �or in that Constitution co~ing into existence democratically, and
directing the destiny of the Portuguese people in accordance with their con-
stitutional powers and missions.
The members of the constituent entity wanted, and T think quite fortunately,
to take into account the specific situation that the Portuguese society was
experiencing, approving P transitional period wherein the Armed Forces would
~ play a specific role in the Qrgans of autr.urity as a whol~; and approved
for thls purpose the existence of an organ af sovereignty that is unusual in
Western democracies, which would have particular powers and would insure the
transition from revolutionary legitim.~cy to demo~ratic legit.ima~y. With the
inclusion of the Council of the Revolution in the Con~titution of the Portu-
guese Republic, the democratic authority resulting from the elections for the
Constituent Assembly attempted to turn over some of its power to the creators
of the situation that had enabled it to assume that power; while at the same
time receiving from the latter the benefits of the pramises of 25 April 1974
which they were continuing to keep.
The members of the constituent body algo bore in mind the nature of the Por-
tuguese society and of its Armed ~'orces, and hen~e the distxibution of speci-
fic miasions among the latter. In fact, if we note the constitutional func-
tions of the Armed Forces, we shall find that they are not confined merely
to defense and the guarantee of national independence, unitq of the state
~ and integrity of the territory. There are others, with special significance:
to insure the continuance of the revolution of 25 Agril 1.974; to guarantee
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the normal operation of the democratic institutions and fulfillment of the
Constitution; to insure the condieions that would allow for the peaceful,
pluralistic transition of tihe Portugueae society to democracy and socialism;
and to cooperate 3.n the tasks of national reconatruction.
Black Clouds
_ The end of the transition period is approaching, a period which we could
discuss, analyze and dissect at length, as we could the results accrued
from the option taken in 1976. Although I am somewhat dissatisfied, I
myself consider the re~ults of the experiment that was carried out to be
positive; because the fact is that today democracy is far more viable than
it was in 1976.
t'owever, some black clouds are appearing on our horizon. Onee again, we in
Yortugal will be put to the test in~:far as the na~ure of our Armed Forces
is concerned. The military of Apri~ wanted, and ~lways strove to restore
sovereignty itself to the people, and to become included in their society
as citizens with complete entitlement; that is all. They are still willing
to fight for thia but, in order to succeed, ~he old principles cannot be
imposed again, nor can the old customs be sugerimposed on democratic concepts.
We must accept a total democratic practiee and not attempt, as military, to
influence the choice that the Por~ugueae people want to make freely. We
must never agai~n see a military commander, as such, try to i~npose his own
position on the people's represent~tives when the demoeratic result is not
, to his liking. (It is symptomatic ~hat th:ts occurs, only when the people's
representatives assume leftist positions...)
Obviously, all this is far easier to say than to do; ~nd it witl be po~sible
only if, in the first place, the political forcea that come to power manage
to contribute to the real inclusion of the ~rmed Forces in the nation as a
whole, and do not, on the contrary, try to use them as a tool for conserving
- that power. On the orher hand, the Armed Forces must become totally subor-
dinate Co the democratic power, becoming a guarantee of the latter, and not
proclaim their desire for subordina tion and later disregard it entirely if
the democratic power does not have its ideological colors.
As for the organization and functioning of the A_-med ~'orees,.i~t is essential
~hat the influence of a democratic society of law be r~flected in its eontent,
- and that violations of human rights or the country's laws not continue within
it. It is impossible to attempt to achieve a demoeratic society and to
retain in the Armed Forces activity that is g~~-m~ne to autocratic sys~ems.
There may be a question about the reasons for these comments of mine regard-
ing a country like Portugal, wh~rein there is sti;l under way a period of
transition from the Revolution of the Carnations carried out by the military
to a democratic aociety. And, strange as it may seem, it is by comparing
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the situation which existed within th~ Portuguese Armed Forces before 25 "
April 1974 and the one which exists today that we shall readily reach the -
conclusion that it was in this atmosphere that the least progress occurred.
It is strange and paradoxical, but it is aii irrefutable fact the explanation
for which would require as much space as we have already used for this
article.
I shall onl~v say that I consider as a principal cause of thi~ situation the
fact that the mil itary of April were incapable of assuming command of the
Armed Forces from the day on which they overthrew the fascist-colonialist
regime. From the beginning, they allowed others who had had nothing to do
with that heroic, historic feat to gradually take possession of the reins
of leadership of the Armed Forces. As the old story relates: "After th:y
- h:id conquered the city, they did not know what to do with it, and they
eturned it again to the deposed king". There are cont~adietions which
existed and which are understood on].y by those who expe _eneed or who are
quite cognizant of all the events t}~at occurred in the Portuguese process.
But, as I say, we shall have to dea]_ wit:i that at another time,.
I deem it essential that, in a country 5ueh as Portugal, its own features
should always be borne in mind, and that its Armed Forces should not be
viewed as one might view today the Armed Forces of nations with a long demo-
cratic practice. If one attempts to see in the Artn~d Forces only a military
instrument in the service of any allied power, in a sub~rdinate, unpatriotic
manner, as some politicians have been attempting of late, or if one attempts
to use the Armed Forces as an instrument of national seeurity, on truly
policing missions in the defense of sectorial positions, a real crime is
committed and ~nstability is produced within them, precluding their ability
to perform their constitutional, patriotic missions~
This is a real challenge that the Portuguese democrats, both civilian and
military, must and will have to win so tc~lt democracy may be consolidated
in Portugal. Rather than question, as has been done, or put an end to the
Council of the Revolution (an issue concerning which there is a spurious
argument, demagog ically nurtured, because this is a quite well-def ined
problem),we shall have to find the means of including the Armed Forces in
the Portuguese democratic society, so that they ma.y become sub~ect to the
democratic political power and be guarantors of its full operation; so that
the democratic rules are complied with at all times and the momentary con-
quest of power is not used to establish a new autocratic power.
For my part, I trust that we shall be able to attain that goal, so that
dictatorship, whe ther disguised or not, may never again make the Portuguese
people one of its victims. The democratic tradition of Europe will surmount
_ the authoritarian tendency of large movements in the Portuguese society,
and will end by creating solutions geared to the specific conditions of the
Portugueae socloeconomic situation. .
~ COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defensa, S.A. Madrid 1980
2909
CSO: 3110
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COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
EXPLOSIVES THEFT POINTS TO REAPPEARANCE OF ETA TERRORIST 'APALA'
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 10 Aug 80 pp 18-20 -
[Text] "Apala" and Juan Lasa Michelena, the ETA's [Basque Fatherland and
Liberty Group] most bloodthirsty terrurists, have taken ~ip arms again. During
the past 2 weeks they attempted to assassinate 60 policemen and stole 7,000
kilograms of "gum-2." If that were nnt enough, the strange GRAPO [First of
October Armed Revolutionary Group] has been revived.
One of them is tall and slender, with an acute, penetrating look; the other
is short and heavy-set, ostersibly harmless.
They are two individuals who appear to be different from one another; but
they are not so much so. The tall, slender man and Che short, heavy-set
one have one thing in common: both are the ETA-Military's top-ranking
"executioners." .
If that were not enough, they are now working together. Juan Lorenzo San-
tiago Lasa Michelena, alias "Txikierdi," aged 25, and Miguel Angel Apalategui,
alias "Apala," aged 25, born in Ataun (GuipLZCOa), have ~oined their forces ~
(according to the police) in order to assassinate police and members of the
military behind their backs and to put an end to democracy wi~h a clear
bomb explosion. ,
They will not lack "gum-2." "Txikierdi" and "Apala," together with Andres
Izaguirre Gogorza and Francisco Javier Pie de Hierro Hormaechea, are, accord-
ing to the same sources, the main individuals responsible for the incredible,
spectacular theft of 7,000 kilograms of this explosive last week in Soto de
la Marina (Santander), and for keeping the entire country unstable during the
past few days.
A few days earlier, on 22 July, the same terrorists had tried to blow up a
convoy in which 60 policemen were traveling in the province of Logrono.
- Terrorists With a 'Pedigree'
After that explosion which, quite fortunately, only caused one death and 32
wounded among the forces of public order, "Apala" and Juan ~asa Michelena
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wrote the note in which ETA-M took credit for the attack in the eyes of the
public .
In that note, one of the harshest released to date by the terrorists, the
ETA-M organization announced that if the minister of interior, Juan Joae
Roson, did not leave the terrorists in peace, "the organization wi1l resort
to methods of combat hitherto unknown."
According to police sources, this would mean that the Basque terrorist organ-
ization would proceed to a more advanced phase of its struggle for the inde-
pendence of the Basque provinces.
. CAMBIO 1.6 was told: "It would be the beginning of total war, because ETA is
planning the blowing up of barracks of the civil police and national police,
the setting of bombs in military establishments and the destruction of
~ installations of the central authority in Euskadi."
The terrorists do not lack the "gum-2" and "pedigree" to do so. For example,
Juan Lorenzo Santiago L~sa Michelena is the chief of the ETA-M special com-
mandos and the righr.-hand man of Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, alias "Txomin,"
the ETA's minister of war.
The police sources note: "~very time ETA needed to deal a spectacular blow,
to lend the organizati~n prestige, the mark of Miehelena has been behind
it."
In addition, according to the same sources,."Txikierdi" is the ETA-M's cold-
est, most unmereifual and most bloodthirsty assa~sin. A police chief told
CAMBIO-16, "He never spends less than 40 bullets in an 'actirn." And if,
after spending so many bullets, there is any sign of life among his victims,
Lasa Michelena personally dispatches them with a shot in the neck."
This terrorist was the first member of ETA-M to end the ban in the Army's
generalship on 21 July 1978, when he assassinated Gen Manuel Sanchez Ramos,
- ir.. an attack carried out in Madrid. A half a year later, his commandos
brought bloodshed again to the capital: Constantino Ortin Gil, military
governor general, was on that occasion felled by bullets from his machine-
gun. Ffve months later, "Txikierdi" repeated the operat~on, assassinating
Lt Gen Luis Gomez Hortiguela and Co14 Jesus Avalos Jimenez and Agustin Lasso
Corral.
And he did not stop there. According to the police, Juan Lasa Michelena is
also the assassin of Judge Francisco Mateo Canoves and the head of the Gui-
p~+,zcoa Chamber of Deputi.es, .Iuan Maria Araluce,and.his entire guard force;
attacks which wer.e made in the latter part of 1978. His only abortive blow
insofar ae is known was the attempt to kidnap the former mayor of Bilbao,
Pilar Careaga.
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The Reappearance of 'Apala'
The "biography" of "Apala" is no less brilliant. From 14 December 1975, when
Miguel Angel Apalategui shot a policeman for the first time, until the present,
the police have credited him with about a dozen assassinations.
His stay in the Algiers Police AEademy in 1975, where he received military
training, converted him into one of the ETA's "hard" mernbers. Upon his
return to Euskadi, "Apala" took control of the special commandos of ETA-
PM, who were integrated into ETA-M years later.
During that period, Miguel Angel Apalategui was aceused of the kidnappings
of Javier Ybarra, Angel Berazadi and Jose Luis Arrasate. The first two were
assassinated.
.lthough his outward appearance is that of a good-natured, harmless person,
according to the police "Apala" is one of the ETA's members most difficult
to sub~ect to force. When arrested in France in July 1977, he withstood a
31-day hunger strik~ to avoid being turned over to the Spanish authorities.
On 14 October, when we was about to be tried in Aix-en-Province, Miguel Angel
Apalategui disappeared without leaving a trace. To many individuals, includ-
ing sources close to the Basque exiles, his whereabouts was a mystery for the
past 3 years. On one occasion, there was even speculation that he had died.
To tal War
According to the police, the proof that he was not dead is that his presence
was detected a month ago within the country. It is kno~an, specifically, that
"Apala" was one of the terrorists who fired at three police cars on 12 July
of this year in the Guipuzcoan locality of Orio, an attack in which two
policemen were killed.
On that occasion, "Apala" was with Ignacio Maria Gabirondo, who was killed
in the operation, and Jose Andres Izaguirre Gogorza. The latter, who also
took part in the "gum-2" theft from Santander, is another of the moet dan-
gerous terrorists in the country. In the opinion of the police, "It was not
far nothing that he received guerrilla training in South Yemen at the begin-
ning of the year."
To bP sure, the French seem to ignore him. On 6 May of this year, upon his
return from "vacation" in South Yemen, the Freneh State Council's Cotmnission
of Refugee Appeals granted~Izagc~irre Gogorza a political refugee card.
Counting on this refuge in France, the terrorist only had to cross the Pyre-
nees on 22 July to approach th~ Rio~a locality of Villam~diana where, with
"Apala" and "Txikierdi", he plaeed 45 kilograms of "gum-2" under a bridge
which a police convoy was going to cross a few hours later.
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� Fortunately, the "gum-2" was in poor condition. As a result, only a quarter
of the charges exploded, enough to kill the corps lieutenant, Francisco Lopez
Besos, and to send 32 policemen to the hospital.
A few moments later, one of the wounded policemen told this magazine, "This
is total war. If the explosive had been at its maximum pow~r, and all the
charges had exploded, this would have been a catastrophe, a slaughter."
The Robbery of the Century
Of course, so few deaths must have made the E~A madmen feel bad. And "for
big ills, big remedies " must have been what the ETA members were thinking
on 25 July, 3 days after the abortive slaughter of the policemen in Logrono.
~ n that day, ETA-M was to commit, in Soto de la Marina, a little town in
Santander Province, located less than 200 kilometers from Bilbao, the biggest
robbery of explosive material in history.
~ At 2330 hours at night, Juan Lasa Miehelena, Miguel Angel Apalategui, Andres
' Izaguirre Gogorza and Francisco Javier Pie de Hierro approached the gate of
the powder magazine, dressed as policemen and riding in a Simca 1200, with
the institution's mobile fleet license plates.
At the time, in the powder ma.gazine surrounded by corn, potato and sugar beet
gardens, there were only two guards under oath charged with guarding the
entire premises. According to the explosives regulation of 2 March 1978,
they were supposed to be separated, each at his station, in constant commu-
nication by radio, and in toueh with the outside and the alarm systtm, which
they were supposed to have`within arm's reach. The regulation notes: "Explo-
sives have become dangerous per se socially as well, particularly because of
their possible use by terrorists."
However, this regulation must not have been heeded by the guards because,
according to the Ministry of Interior, "at the time of the robbery, they
were both together, outside of the stations and beyond the reach of the
alarms. Also, their duty was not to open up for anyone, but first ascertain
the identity and purpose of visitors; making prior telephone calls that '
might be necessary, and with one of the guards at all times in the station,
to sound the alarm if necessary."
According to the Ministry, all that was disobeyed. And ETA-Military, 20
minutes after penetrating the powder magazine without the s?~ightest resis-
tance, had loaded 7,000 kilograms of explosives on a truck previously stolen
from the old di$trict of Bilbao, and was calmly bound~!.or i~he Basque Country
taking the guards under oath and the driver, tied and.gagg�ed in the trunk
of the vehicle.
I~~.xring the ~ourney, the truck did not stop until it reached Bllbao, 2 and a
half hours after the robbery had been committed. So, the terro�riste had
another 6 and a half hours more to conceal the stolen explosives.
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According t~ the police, the "gum-2" was in the Greater Bilbao area, where
the terrorist commandos unloaded the truck between 0230 and 0300 hours in the
morning, before abandoning it in the Bilbao section of Bolueta.
Up in the Air
According to police sourcES, this conclusion wae reached after it was found
that the amoiint of fuel used and the kilometers covered by the vehicle were
only enough to travel from downtown Bilbao to the 5antander powder magazine
and return.
Obviously, between 0300 hours in the morning and 0900 hours the next morning,
the time when the theft was digcovered, ETA-M had enough time to change the
location of the explosivesand even to distribute them in small portions
throughout the Basque Country.
In any event, the biggest robbery of explosives in the century had the entire
Spanish political sector up in th~�a.ir.during the�Ia~est :'b~idge" frdm San-
, tiago. The president of the government, Adolfo Suarez, as soon as he heard
the news while preparing for his recent trip to Peru, called an urgent meet-
ing with Vice President Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, Defense Minister Agustin
Rodriguez Sahagun and Interior Mtniater Juan Jose Roson.
During the meeting, the country's top-ranking authorities agreed that all
possible police facilities must be used to detect the hiding place for the
explosives.
Immediately, several helicopters and all the available supplies of police
dogs trained to search for explosives were sent to Euskadi. Nevertheless,
no suspicious vehicles unloading goods in isolated settlements were detected,
_ ~ from the ai~, r...~ di3 the d~vg get tii~ scp^.t of the "gum-2."
Six days later, with exasperating and ineffective checks in Madrid and all
the Basque provinces, the extensive police operation to detect the "gum-2"
had not brought any positive results.
What Can Be Blown Up?
' With the 7,000 kilograms uf "gum-2" stolen in Santander, approximately the .
following number of attacks could be committed: seven buildings of the
telephone company type could be destroyed; 140 at~acks similar L�o that on
Correo Street could be made; 230 attacks like that on Carrero Blanco could
be made; 1,170 attacks similar to those in Bara~as, Chamartin and Atocha
could be made; 1,400 attackg like that at 47 California could be made; 7,000
cars could be blown up; and 70,000 letter-bombs could be made.
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Miguel Angel Apalategui, alias "Apala", strikes again
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~1~ ' ,4 ' rs4' _ "
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Lasa Michelena, Izaguirre Gogorza and Pie de Hierro: the commandb group whici~
stole the "gum-2"
COPYRIGHT: 1979, INFORMACION Y REVISTAS, S.A.
2909
CSO: 3110
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COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
WEAPONS EVIDENCE LINKED TO REAPPEARANCE OF GRAPO TERRORTSTS
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 10 Aug 80 pp 18-20
[Excerpt] GRAPO [First of October Armed Revolutionary GroupJ Has Revived
But the misfortunes were not to occur alone. On Tuesday, 29 July, in a
Madrid virtually taken over by the police, four individuals carried out an
attack against the general for health of the Land Army, Arturo Criado.
At 0930 hours in the morning, two youths.dressed in aports attire took advan-
tage of a"yield" signal located at the lntersection of Alvarez Mendizabal
and Luisa Fernanda Streets to fire 22 machinegun . bullets and two from a
piatol at the military man's car.
_ Upcn realizing that he was being attacked, General Criado fell to the floor
' of the vehicle and managed to escape unharmed. However, Private Florentino
Garcia Siller, who was acting as his guard, lost his life in the incident.
Two hours later, the police were~in a position to state that the perpetrator
of the attack was the mysterious GRAPO, which has once again survived its
diamemberment after the escape of five prisoners from the Zamora ~ail on 17
December 1979.
TF~ere were several pieces of evidence which made it possible to reach this
conclusion, including the type of car used in the attack, an R-12 typical of
GRAPO, and the theft by one of the terrorists of the machine gun from the
murdered aoldier.
The definitive evidence arrived.when a ballistic analysis was made of the
shella that were found. According to the police, they could only have been
fired by an SV submachine$~ of Czech manufacture, which only the GRAPO �
_ members have; and the same held true for the Capua make bullets, of Finnish .
manufacture, which only that organization uses.
Finally, there is the testimony from Gen Arturo Criado who, at the police
headquarters, identified GRAPO member Enrique Cerdan Calixto as one of the
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perpetrators of his attempted murder. The poli e, on the other hand, claim
that the identification is not very certain, and that any of the other
escapees from Zamora (Abelardo Gollazo Arau~o, Francisco Brotons Beneito and
Juan Martin Luna) could have been imglicated in the attack, as could Rafael
Alvarez, who is currently considered to be the aecretary general of the
PCE (r) [Spanish Communist Party/Reformed].
COPYRIGHT: 1979, INFORMACION Y REVISTAS, S.A. _
2909
CSO: 3110 END
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