JPRS ID: 9354 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
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• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 34
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L /9354
20 October 1980
- Sub-Saharan Africa~ Re ort
p
FOUO No. 693
~B~$ FOREIGN ~ROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9354
20 October 1980
SUB-SA~~ARAN AFRI CA REPORT
FOUO No. 693
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Secretary-Generai of OAU Interviewed an Thir.d World
D~velopment
(Ede~ Kvdjo Intesview; THE TIMES, 7 Oct 80) 1
PRC Aid to Tazara Reported
(MARQiES TROPICAUX.Er ME~ITERRANEENS,
5 Sep 80~ oo......o ...............~.a.o.............. 4
ANGOIA
Briefs ~
Representative aC OIC 6
New Vice-Miriisterial Appointments 6
ODP Anniversary 6
CENTRA.L AFRICAN REPLIBLIC
_ President's Position 'Rem~.ins Terribly Unstable'
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Sep 80) 7
CONGO
Briefs
, Energy Straightening Plan 9
Soviet Cement Donatian 9
EQi1ATORIAL GUINFA
Vice President Escapes Assassination Attempt
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 Aug 80) ......o.oa.o,,...........0 10
Poaitical, Economic Coa3itians One Yeax After Coup Noted
- (M~4RQiES TROPICAC~ ET MEDITERRANEENS, 29 Aug 80) 11
- a- [III - NF & A- 120 FOUO]
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- N'UK UP'r'LL1AL US~; UNLY
IVORY CQAST
President's Search for Successor Described
(Jos-Bla.ise Alima; JE~ AFRIQUE, 24 Sep 80) 14
Figures on 1979 Foreign Trade Given .
(I~RCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
29 Aug 80) o::........~ ................o.o........... 19
Plan for a National Cold Storage System
(I~RCHES TROPICA~ ET 1~DITERRANEENS, -
29 Aug 80) 24
LIB ERTA F
1980-1981 Budget Approved
(?~RCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Sep 80) 27
, Brief s
Military Gavernment Functioning 28
SENECAL
Recent Factors in Ecrnwmi.c Situation Noted
(MARCHES TROPI(Y~.UX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
22 Aug 80) .oo...o.........o 29
Reduction in French Technical Ass3.stance
(~fARCHES TROPICAi~ ET MEDITERRANEENS,
22 Aug 80) o .............o.....o..oo...o............ 31
TANZAIILA
Briefs
Petrolet~m Exploration Proposals 33
ZIMBABWE
Mugabe, Wife Sally Highlighted
(Francois Soudan; JEL?NE AFRIQUE, 10 Sep 80) 34
- b -
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- INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
SECRETAItY-GENERAL OF OAU INTERVIEWED ON THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT
LD071257 London THE TIMES in English 7 Oct 80 Europa Supplement p 1
[Interview with Edem Kodjo, secretary-general of the Organization of African
LTnity, by Gerard Viratelle; no place or date given]
[Excerpt] [Question] How do you view the economic situation in the Third
World in general and in Africa in particular?
[Answerl There are more and more dangers. Inflation is running on. Unem- -
ployment is getxing worse, The poor countries' balance-of-payments deficit
in 1980 could be as much as $700,OOOM [Africa's share being $44,OOOM),
whereas the oil-exporting countries' combined surplus is likely to be
110,000 million pounds. At the same time, the industrialized cour~tries'
official development aid is 0.36 percent of GNP this year and 1 ikely to
be no more than 0.35 percent by 1990.
The situation in Africa is especially tragic. The World Bank has described
it as close to catastrophe. It calculates that the African cauntries -
average annual growth rate during the period 1980-90 will be no more than
1.1 percent.
Africa is still a poor continent, ravaged by natural disasters and famine.
Its population will have doubled by the year 2000 and it is likely that it
will then be able to meet only 60 percent of its foocl requirements. Africa
has about 70 million unemployed, the shortest life expectancy and the highest
mortality rate. How will it be able to survive under these cond itions,
especially if it also suffers losses of export trade?
[Question] What solutions do you have for remedying this situa tion? `
[Answer] Two development decades have yielded only very limited results
for the majority of the peoples of the Third World. It is clear ly necessary
to make a fresh start--not to try to make something of past effo rts but
completely to reverse the course followed over the past two dec ades.
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In Afr~ca's case i~. is necessary to bring a new approach to the problem of
development which does not rely on global negotiations and the north-south
dialogue, however important or even essential they may be.
Africa has very substantial resources. It has outstanding proved potential.
But its output is extraverted, geared to supplying foreign markets rather
than to meeting the needs of its populations. This situation must be
reversed.
The African economies need to be reorganized so that the emphasis is placed
on local consumption and satisfaction of essential needs (food, housing, �
health, and so on). Every one claims to be givi^.g priority to food and
agriculture, but this is not so. There is therefore a need for a major ~
ehift in the pattern of investment.
[Question] Is not this the philosophy behind the programme fc- African
development adc~pted by the conference of heads of state at Lagos in April
1980?
[Answer] Lagos reflects our choice of the type of society in ~ahich we wish
to live. This was an occasion on which Atrica resolutely opted for a
courageous policy of change. It made up its mind to aim for "endogenous"
or "autocentric" ~evelopment, in other words a new form of devElopment.
The action programme adopted by the heads of state defines the ways and
means of achievin~ national and collective self-sufficiency. This programme
has become a reference document for the international development strategy
to be pursued during the third decade. How it works out in practice will
depend largely on what is done by individual countries, but progress will
be evaluated on a continuing basis.
[Question] Lo you also consider it desira~le to apply a regional economic
policy and to set up regional groupings? �
[Answer] This is becoming increasingly essential in order to bring a new
approach to the problem of poverty, getting away from the "catch up at all
costs" attitude. After 20 years of independence, little progress has been
made in this sphere. There is no coherent regional development.
One of the themes of the Lagos programme is the need to take account of
regional realities. This will entail the formation of regional economic
groupings over the period running up to the year 2000. This ob~ective will
be presented during the political debates in the OAU.
We have to go beyond a customs union, such as that in East tifrica, and
build a genuine trade community making for the establishment of an African
economic community. Such an approach is not only ecnstructive from the _
development viewpoint, but it should also be con:lucive to a better north-
south dialogue.
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[Question] And the Elysee's proposals for a"triologue" on European Arab
and African cooperation?
- [Answer] The ideas were well received this year by the African heads of
state meeting in Nice with President Giscard D'Estaing. At the African
summit held in Freetown a little later a number of countrie~ called for -
further examination to be made of trese proposals. This task was entrusted
to the secretariat of the OAU which should be submitting its conclusions
by next February. -
[Question] In New York you were very harsh in yo~~r judgment of the oil-
producing countries, stating among other tt.ings that no purpose was served
by raising one objectian after another to get out of cooperation over energy,
or by trying at all costs to link this difficulty to the problems of commo-
dities and multi-lateral negotiations.
You also suggested that an examination should be made af the possibility
- of setting up a collective guarantee system which wouid reassure the holders
of financial surpluses and help:to recycle these surpluses. Would this be
er~ough to help the poorest countries, many of which are in Africa?
~ [AnswerJ The oil-producing countries are not doing what needs to be done.
Most of them--at least those with financial surpluses--are devoting well
above 1 percent of their GNP to aid (the average for the OPEC countries
is 5 percent in 1980 and they are setting up machinery for increasing their
development aid still farther). But the African countries have been left
reeling by the successive oil price increases and they cannot wait.
We do not blame the oil-producing countries for starting the crisis. But
they have made it worse. Nor do we say that they are wrong--on the contrary,
we support their action. But their right to sell their raw materials at a
high price must be matched by obligations. This is why we are calling for
more coherent and more rational energy cooperation. States should operate
- in the market so that recycling is not left mainly to private interests.
� [Question] Do you take nope from the text of the stzategy fur the third
development decade in the 1980's?
[Answer] It is a general document which does not go far enough. In many
countries, such as in Africa, efforts are being made to evolve a new style
of development. The strategy defines general objectives and sets out quan-
' titative data. It is a conventional document which does not challenge the
accepted development models, some of which are copied from the West.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited 1980
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FUR nFF'~CIAI. US~ c~NLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
pRC AID TO TAZARA REPt}RTED -
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Sep 80 p 2201
[Text] China has granted a new loan of $13 million to Tanzania and
Zambia to insure the proper operation of Tazara, a railroad belonging
to both countries, which is iti virtual bantcruptcy.
This loan, granted under the same conditions as the one which made
possible the building of the railroad from Dar es Salaam to the Zambian
"Copperbelt," would make possible the purchase of spare parts for the
rolling stock.
The agreement was reached at the end of August, in the course of the
talks between China and the two co-owners and is included in a third
cooperation agreement between China and Tazara, Gen Kingsley Chinkuli,
Zambian minister of transports, energy and communications, pointed out
on 1 September.
The agreement which was concluded on 30 August stipulates that China
will assign technicians starting with this month to consider Tazara'a
requirements and plan the repairs of its stock.
China will let Tanzania and Zambia purchase new diesel engines to rebuild
in West Germany the locomotive engines for the 1,860 kilometers-long
railroad. Originally, these locomotive engines were powered by West
German diesels.
Furthermore, technical aid provided by West Germany will be used to pur-
chase 14 other locomotive engines for Tazara, 7 of which in each country.
' The $360 million loan for the building of the Tazara will be repayable,
interest free, over a 30-year period, starting with 1983, and after a
10-year grace period. Since its inauguration, 4 years ago, Tazara has
lost $25 million, General Chinkuli stated last month.
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In turn, returning from Lusaka, where he had attended a conference of -
representatives oE China, Zambia and Tanzania, Augustino Mwringira,
Tanzanian minister of communications and transports, announced that
Beijing was dispatching immediately 150 experts to join the 400 Chinese
technicians and interpreters currently working on the Tazara.
Furthermore, China, which will be selling Tazara spare parts at reduced
prices, has agreed to allow the company to make purchases from other
countries as well.
Finally, China will dispatch represer.tatives of locomotive _~ngine indus-
tries to help to improve Tazara locomotive engines which ar~ no longer
giving full satisfaction.
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris, 1980
~157
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
REPRESENTATIVE AT. OIC--i~r?gola has decided to create in London the. post of
representative at tlie International Coffee Organization (OIC). A joint
decree issued by the Ministries of Agriculture and Foreign Relations says
that this representative will be posted at the Angolar~ Embassy in Great
Britain when the latter will be officially accredited. [Text~ [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Sep 80 p 237~4]
NEW VICE-MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS--The Angolan head of state has just com-
pleted his government with the appointment of 4 deputy ministers in the
fields of construction, communications and health, it was officially
announced in Luanda on 12 September. Jose Eduardo dos Santos appointed
Lucinio Tavares Ribeiro to the post of deputy minister of co~unications,
replacing Ilideo Alves Machado. Two deputy ministers were appointed in
the field of construction: Luis Manuel Fonseca Santos and Amilcar Pimentel
Aguiar; the latter will be in charge of material for construction. Dos ~
Santos also appointed Flavio Joao Fernandes deputy minister of health,
while the post of deputy provincial commissioner for Bango [as published]
will be temporarily occupied by Jacinto Pascual Fortunato. With the excep-
ticn of the post of deputy minister of communications and transportation,
the other appointments are of a more technical nature--as noted in Luanda--a
fact which is emphasized still further by the character of the new members
of the Angolan government. Indeed, most of them are technocrats who had been
working in those same ministries for a long time. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET I~EDITERRANEENS in French 26 Sep 80 p 2374]
ODP ANNIVERSARY--The People's Defense Organization (ODP) celebrated on 13
September the fifth anniversary of its establishment, under the chairmanship
of its general commandant Lt Col Paiva Domingos da Silva, deputy minister of
defense and member of the MPLA central committee. In a message to the ODP,
the Angolan head of state noted that this "paramilitary structure" is of
paramount significance to the security of the state and constitutes "a
reliable auxiliary of the regular People's Armed Forces (FAPLA)," "for the
defense of the motherland's sovereignty and integrity." ~he ODP, whose ranks
are mostly made up of workers and peasants, numbers many hundreds of thousands
of inembers, 20 percent of whom are women contributing to a great variety of
tasks such as the custody of official buildings and the fight against smug-
gling, black marketeering and speculation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Sep 80 p 2374]
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
J
PRESIDENT'S P(1SITION 'REMAINS TERRIBLY UNSTABLE'
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Sep 80 p 15
- [Article by Franco~~ Soudan: "Dacko At the Bar"]
[Text] Following is a short letter sent by David Dacko, president of the
Central African Republic, to Henri Maidou, vice president of the same
~ republic: "I ask you to submit your resignation." The brief answer was:
"No, and this is not how it will be!"
In effect, this was not the way it took place: After two fruitless -
" attempts to insure the peaceful removal of his number two, on Friday
22 August, in the evening, David Dacko signed a decree relieving Henri
Maidou of his functions. On the same occasion, Prime Minister Bernard
Christian Ayandho, whose departure was demanded in the streets, was also
dismissed.
That is how, for the time being at least, the political crisis which had
been paralyzing the country since the dissolution of the public salvation
government, at the beginning of July (J. No 1022) was resolved. Henri
Maidou, the very ambitious former prime minister under Bokassa, and the
very unpopular Berr~ard Christian Ayandho, whose head carried a price in
the poor districts of the capital, vanished in the trap of lost illusions.
Why? "Paris no longer wanted them," it is being said in 33angui~ This is
a concise formula but quite accurate. Certainly, it is true that, for a
while, the Elysee was tempted to play the Maidou trump. Here some people ~
still think that the ex-vice president was the only oiie to have the
"stature of a statesman." Finally, however, notice was taken of his lack -
of popularity to the point that Valery Giscard d'Estaing's councillor for
African affairs, Martin Kirsch, had gone in person to Bangui at the begin-
ning of August to ask for Maidou's head. Furthermo:e, no one ignores the
f act that nothing, or hardly anything, takes place in Central Africa in
opposition to France which is still keeping there some 1,000 paratroopers.
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The French pressure, however, was not determining in the summit sweep
which has just shaken the country. A confidential document signed by a
dozen new ministers, members of the government since July, was, in fact,
sent at the end of August to President Dacko. In this long letter those
known as the "young Turks" of the system--mostly greedy technocrats--had
ex~,ressed their "concern" at the persistent social agitation and their
will to "treat the root of the evil," i.e., to see Maidou and Ayandho
disappear from the political stage. Otherwise, naturally, regretfully,
they would be forced to submit their own resignations. This factual
_ ultimatum unquestionably swept off the last presidential hesitations.
In terms of David Dacko this blunt operation, his "barracuda," could turn
out to be politically profitable. Sylvestre Bangui, minister of foreign
affairs, a person with contacts among the opposition, factually become5
man number two of the system.
In the middle term, however, the position of the Central African president
remains terribly unstable. Ayandho and Maidou had focused upon themselves
the frustrations of the common people whose daily life, one year after
_ Bokassa's fall, remains dramatically precarious. Deprived of his scape- -
goats, David Dacko will no longer be able to dodge the blows.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
5157
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r
CONGO
BRIEFS
ENERGY STRAIGHTENING PLAN--The directors of the National Energy Company "
(SNE) met on 11 Au~ust under the chairmanship of R. Adada, minister of
- mines and energy. The directors examined the plan for the recovery of
the SNE which st ipulates the following: the implementat~on of immediate
measures, policy, and targets for 1982 to 1986 and a financial plan
covering the same period. The plan includes a certain number of general
recommendations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAiJX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 29 Aug 80 p 2146] 5157
SOVIET CEMENT DONATION--A donation of 1,OOU tons of cement was presented
on 29 August to the Congolese T_ade Union Confederation (CSC) by the
Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions. The cement will be used for the
building of a complex f or workers' training in Central Africa. [Text]
[Par.is MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Sep 80 p 2198]
5157
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
VICE PRESIDENT ESCAPES ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Aug 80 p 23 _
[Unsigned article: "One No 2 Too Many"]
- [Text] The second vice president seema to have escaped an assassination
attempt during the night of 18 July. A military man armed with a machine
gun seems to have attempted at that time to get into the well-guarded
house of Eulogio Oyo Riqueza, the No 3 man in the regime and president of �
the military tribunal which had passed ~udgment on ex-ptestdent~~.Macias in
September 1979.
In Malabo, where on 3 August the first anniversary of the "Tiger's" fall
was celebrated quietly, discretion regarding this matter is the order of
the day. Oyo Riqueza is regarded ae a rival of the firet ~vice president,
Florencio Maye Ela.
Indeed everything sets the two men apart. Oyo Riqueza is a Bubi, the
ethnic group mistreated by Macias Nguema; Ma.ye Ela, the former dictator's
nephew, is a Fang like him. Oyo Riqueza and Maye Ela took part in the coup
and are both members of the Supreme Military Council. But the former left
his guarded residence to fight against Macias, while Ma~e Ela remained
almost to the end in the dictator`s entourage. The last difference is that
Maye Ela is building up a budding concentration of economic power around
hi~, in particular thanks to Spanish-Guinean ~oiat.ventures (GEPSA [Spanish
Guinea Petroleum] for example). This whole business is one to keep your
eye on.
COPYRIGHi: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
9631 _
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EQUITORIAL GUINEA '
' POLITICAL, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ONE YEAR AFTER COUP NOTED ~
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Aug 80 p 2144 '
[Repor.t: "Balance After One Year ~f Freedom"]
[Excerpts] One year after the fall (3 August) of Francisco Macias Nguema,
who had terrorized them for 10 years, the people of Equitorial Guinea are
relearning how to live in freedom, without the violence of his Youth on
the Go. Over 500 murders have been directly imputed to the tyrant by the `
Malabo Military Tribunal which sentenced him to death on 29 September.
The solemn mass celebrated in the Malabo Cathedral on 3 August to mark
the anniversary of the freedom coup also marked the end of religious
persecution. `
Several attempted coups d'etat, none of them successful, had put chinks
in Macias' reign. The 1979 "Golpe" was successful thanks to the army
chief. Lt Col Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who lived in the capir.al Malabo (on
Bioko Island) had been summoned by the dictator on the continent but had
refused to go. He had no doubt that it would have been a one-way trip,
as the president had already appointed his successor: one of his nephews.
After 11 years of tyranny, the country has been bled white. "Macias had
eliminated the admini~tration, the postal services, archives, and banks.
He ran the country like his own tribe. Huddled in his native village of
rfongomo, protected by his guards, whose great sorcerer he was, Macias had
sent back, 3 years before his fall, his Cuban Praetorian guard, loaned by
Fidel Castro, because of their "grumbling attitude" at his rites.
The fleeing of Nigerian manpower and of the country's youth, and the
exodus of the elite had led the country to economic ruin. Paradoxically,
public finances, having become Macias' property, were healthy. Following
the sale of 4,000 tons of cocoa and 50,000 tons of timber, despite the ~
catastrophic decline in this output, there were some $25 million in the
cash registers, the more so since the dictator paid neither the military
nor his officials who subsisted either as best they could or through
extortions.
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If the country is to be rebuilt it needs its elite. Nearly 2,000 cadres
- who had sought refuge abroad, mainly in Spain, would not be greatly in-
clined to return to the country where a high official earns some 138,000
ekweles (2 ekweles per peseta) or 60,000 CFA francs per month.
If the economy is to be rebuilt it must reach the 40,000 tons of cocoa
beans (best in the world), 300,000 tons of okoume, and 12,000 tons of
fish it produced before independence. Guinea could, furthermore, become
' a small petroleum-producing state, bearing in mind the deposits discovered
on its continental shelf.
"Aware of its historical responsibilities," in a single year Spain has
provideu substantial technical aid; 400 volunteers are at work, 100 of
which in public health and another hundred in public education, the most
neglected of all services.
- Madrid's financial aid is insuring the country's survival with a direct
aid of $24 million (food, transport materials, pharmaceuticals....), $24
million for development (infrastructure), $4 million for fishing, and $20
million in commercial credits. On the initiative of Claude Cheysson, the
European commissioner, the European Development Fund has pledged 6,372,000
units of account (about 1,867,000,000 CFA) for the emergency restoration
of public health, agriculture, public works, fishing, and energy.
French aid hasexceeded 11 million francs (550 million CFA) in scholarships,
restoration of the Malabo port, development of family fishing and g~~o-
logical prospecting in part.icular. -
Present in the country since 1973, the Chinese are building a hydroelectric
dam near Bata (capital of Rio Muni), a radiobroadcasting house in that
city, and roads. 'fhey have completed the Malabo telephone exchange which
opened on 3 4ugust.
Whereas the "discretion and effectiveness" of Chinese aid are frequently
mentioned by the new leaders, relations with Moscow have nothing in common
with what they were under ~Iacias.
The hostility of the populations toward the Soviets is obvious. A huge
contract signed with the dictator had given the Soviets a fishing monopoly,
whereas a total ban on fishing had been imposed on the Gunieans.
A large number. of Soviet people had settled in the port of Luga, on the
island, with a floating dock which repaired their fishing vessels. After
the new leaders asked them to leave, last January, the Soviet armada sunk
the floating dock offshore of Cameroon.
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Today the Soviets l.imit themselves to supplying Guinea with petroleum at
a price which is clearly below that on the international market. In his
speech the new chief of state welcomed the reestablishment of friendship
with the United States. After withdrawing (last May) its recognition of
the Sai~raouie Democratic Arab Republic (of November 1978), the new s~stem
has clearly shown where its sympathies lie, observers have noted.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
5157 -
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IVORY COAST
PRESIDENT'S SEARCH FOR SUi.CESSOR DESCRIBED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Sep 80 pp 38-40 -
_ [Article by Special Abidjan Correspondent Jos-Blaise Alima: "Houphouet ~
Searches for a Successor"J
[TextJ Qn the subject of the succession, the
"Old Man" is letting the applicants do all the
talking. At least until he discerns their am-
bitions.
For the Ivorian political class the countdown has well and truly begun. A1-
ready, in August, the renewal of the basic organs of the PDCI (Democr~tic
Party of the Ivory Coast) had set the tone of the democratic game institu~ed
within the party. Among the outgoing officers, over half the 190 secretaries
general of the subsections had then bitten the dust, which confirmed the ab-
sence of popu~ar foundation for most of t'r?e political leaders. Even xn
Yamoussoukru, the president of the Republic's own cousin, was beaten. So
who will stop this wind of change? The question is really haunting minds.
And the party's preli.minary congress, which was held in 'lamoussoukro from 1
to 4 September, only added to the suspense.
A Hit Parade
Proposals made by those at the meeting, which are certain to be adopted, ex-
cept far a few details, by the actual congress (29 September to 1 October in
Abidjan), will lead to the complete upheaval of the political chessboard.
First, there is the abolishing of the post of secretary ge;~eral of the PDCI-
RDA [African Democratic RallyJ, whose occupant for 15 years has been
Philippe Yace (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1028). President Houphouet-Boigny has appar-
ently decided to take the party back into his own hands now, with the assis-
tance of a technical director. By doing so he intends to prove that he is
still the only master of the game and put an end to speculation about his suc-
cession.
The second important section of the proposals of the preli.minary congress at
Yamoussoukro concexns the politburo and the executive committee, the number of
whose members is being considerably reduced. From 70, politburo members are
now 25, and executive committee members are going from 200 to 100. The least
that can be said is that the battle will be very rough between the old members
and the new first of all, and then will come the fight to occupy the chairs.
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~ut this course will enable the presidei~~ to renew his te;~m. By intro-
ducing eight or nine new figures into it, who will be added to the few ele-
ments he will keep bzcause he recognizes their loyalty. T~ao ministers are _
high on the hit parade of possibilities: Paul Guidibo (Mines) and
Lamine Fadika (Marine): an ambassador, Amouakon Tiemele (UN), and a dynamic
and restless executive, Emmanuel Dioulo, president and general manager of
the Southwest Region Development Authority.(ARSO) and probably future mayor
of Abidjan, to make the great decisions as members of the politburo. In case
the anticipated presidential election took place, the choice uf a candidate
would then be easier: the future presiden~t will be proposed (or appointed)
by said bureau.
It remains to be seen which happy elected representatives will be called upon
to preside over the party's destinies and thus the destiny of the Ivory Coast.
Never have th~ marabouts been so sought after by politicians anxious about
their future. Cut off in his residence in Cocody when he is not Yamoussoukro,
President Houphouet-Boigny receives less often than usual. They say he may
have encouraged the members of his immediate family to go away on holiday, to
avoid potential pressure. He may even have decided on the disappearance o:
the Abidjan parking meters because members of his family were participating in
their management. During this time from salc~.s~in swnp~ous villas in
Cocody and Marcory, but also the people's nEighborhoods of Adjame and
Treichville, and even frnm the inter.ior..o~ the=.eou~txy, echoes are reaching
hi.m of the reaction of the Ivorians to what one young executive calls "the
coup d'etat that allows Houphouet to replace Houphouet."
Shortly after the football finale which for the first time in 20 years saw
the victory of a club from ~he interior, the Entente from Daloa, the presi-
dent explained his step to us: "Fifteen years ago I had asked the population
to accept the 6U percent rejuvenation of the National Assembly. Those young _
deputies were not known to the masses and tr,ey have done nothing to implant
themselves in their respective localities. Instead they considered themselves
the president's elected representatives. And their objective was no longer
to serve, but to be served." -
Today, the time has come for the "Old Man" to measure the popularity of all
of them. Until now President Houphouet-Boigny's custom has been to entrust
the technical. ministries to technocrats, reserving the political departments
for his old companions. This has not prevented the explosion within the par-
ty of the traditional conflict of the generations--~?ncient against modern. In
any case it is now everyone who is called upon to solicit popular votes. In
this context the incumbent ministers are in an uncomfortable position. Of-
ficially, there is nothing to keep them from running in the legislative elec-
tion at the er.d of October or early November. But can they get away when it
involves proving that one is not necessarily a"creature of the president?"
Equal Weapons
On the other hand, it is certain that failure in a popular election of this `
importance means ipso facto the eviction of the government. Consequently it
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is understood that mir~isters from the same region (as in the case o� Daloa, ~
- where Seri Gnoieba (Commerce), Denis Brakanon (Agriculture) and Lorougnon
Guede (Scientific Resea.rch) are in competition) are somewhat embarrassed.
_ The women themselves will defend themselves with equal weapons. They will
confront other candidates. Without distinction as to sex, the quota reserved
for them having been abolished. ~
Dismantlement
This democratic ope~ess within a single party will have its extensions all
t:~e way up to the election of the president of the National Assembly. The
former minister of the Economy, Henri Konan BEdie--who lacer became the top
director of the International Financial Company--has returned to the Ivor~
Coast to run in the legislative election. He would be tempted to bid for
the presidency of the Chamber. But his sensational return on the political -
scene makes no one forget the grievances formulated against him when he lost
his ministry in 1977. The chief of state did not fail to shoot several ar-
rows at him at the preliminary congress. ,
It makes no difference! He or anotherl Provided it is not Philippe Yace!
~ In fact everyone was betting on the removal of the irremovable president of
the National Assembly, Pnilippe Yace, decidedly the most debated-about man in
the Ivorj~ Coast.
The dismantlement of the PDCI apparatus will be o� no help to him. And the
party that was his instrument has become the iiistrument of his loss. An af-
- fair going back to 1978 is taking up the whole drama. With Houphouet resting
in Switzerland, it was Philippe Yace, the second most important person in the
- government, who organized the municipal elections that year. Nothing could
- be more natural. But at the same time, he reorganized the party. For which .
he was continually reproached afterwards. And, in a country that is rediscov-
ering the delights of the politica]. game, alliances are being formed today to
permanently bar th.e way for "Gringrin" or "Big Y," as his detractors nickname
Philippe Yace.
_ The friends of the former Number Two of the regime believe that certain French
circles are not strangers to his disgrace, They gladly recall that several
' months ago Philippe Yace, on a trip to London, declared to British business-
men: "T~re-~Ivory Coast is no one's private hunting ground.'' The allusion to
France was obvious.
Prudence and Pragmatism
The question being asked today is who will profit from Philippe Yace's dis-
grace. In a country where there is an active political elite plenty of names -
are circulating. President Houphouet-Boigny is showing himself to be sparing
of confidences. "nid Mao Tse-Tung appoint his successor?", he points out.
- And he goes on to mention Lenin, Stalin, Krushchev, de Gaulle. He mentions
the Tunisian example, Bourguiba thxnking in turn of his own son, of
Bahi Ladgham, of Hedi Nouira. -
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The "Old ~4an's" step seems to be taking shape this way: put in place a team
that is as homogeneous as possible, from which will emerge the man called
upon to take over the relief. This scheme combines prudence and pragmatism
at the same time. In this case pragmatism consists of stirring up candidacies.
Less to choose successors than to separate the most impatient. Ivorian demo-
cracy being less the people's doing thait Houphouet's doing.
[Box by Jos-Blaise Alima: Mr Presidents]
"I had asked them to step aside to malce room for the young. They shok�ed
self-sacrifice." Thus does Felix Houphouet-Boigny pay homage to his fellow
- travelers, those who have been by his side for over 30 years and who today
hold only honorific posts. The principals number four and the "lowest of
the low" (translation: the people) call them "the cardinals."
All are rewarded with the title of "president," either because of the offices
- they hold (sometimes not for the first time) or in memory of the posts they .
occupied ~.n the past.
Men of the Past
- Philippe Yace (60) is the youngest of this "gang of four." President of the
National Assembly since independence, he was also the party boss as its secre-
tary general from 1965 to 1980. He was at the apogee of his power when
President Bouphouet-Boigny decided to make him his heir in 1975.
Since then his star has e~.immed to the point where his being maintained at the
head of the Assembly appears most hypothetical.
Mamadou Coulibaly (70), a former adviser to the French Union and a former sen- _
a~tor, has s~nce 1962 been president of the Economic and Social Council.
TrPasurer of the PDCI-RDA sincc 23 March 1959, he led the Ivorian delegation -
to the lSth General Assembly of the United Nations, when the Ivory Coast was
admitted to the LN.
Alphonse Boni (71) was minister of Justice in 1959. Since 1963 he has been
president of the Supreme Court.
Auguste Denise (74). Minister of State, he owes his title of president to the
fact that he directed the Ivory Coast Council of Government and the provisional
government of the Republic (July 1958-April 1959), Mr Houphouet-Boigny having
been minister to Paris at that time. It was President Denise who until now
filled in (in case of absence) for the chief of state. His ministerial de-
partment is being reduced to very little. The annual operating budget is _
60,000,000 CFA francs.
Other personalities are part of the officers' mess of the early days. Among
them one might mention Matthieu Ekra, minister of State in charge of the Reform
of Government-Owned Companies, as well as Koffi Gadeau, the Grand Chancellor
of the Orders.
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Not without nostalgia, these "men of the Past" are watching the wheel of -
history turn. With the rise of the "young Turks" their influence has been
crumbling over the years. In a gallant last stand they sought to convince
~ President Houphouet-Boigny not to go far with the reforms. They lost that
final battle.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
8946
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IVORY COAST
FIGURES ON 1979 FOREIGN TRADE GIVEN
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Aug 80 pp 2134-35
- [Text] It was in an international context of clearly increased diff iculty
that the Ivory Coast maintained for the year 1979, a positive balance of
its exchanges on foreign markets. Since 1976, the Ivorian trade is summed
up as follows, in billion CFA's:
1976 1977 1978 1979
Imports 312 429 522 529
Exports 393 529 524 535
Surplus +81 +100 + 2 + 6
In volume, imports for 1979 totaled 4.1 million tons and exports repre-
sented S.1 million tons. The distribution per supplying countries is
thus established (in billion CFA's):
1 France 193.1 21 USSR 4.0
- 2 United States 35.3 22 People's Republic of China 3.9
3.Tapan 31.6 23 Sweden 2�8
4 GFR 27.3 24 Argentina 2�7
- 5 Venezuela 24.6 25 Cameroon 2�5 ~
_ 6 Italy 20.9 26 Mali 2�4
7 Belgium-Luxemburg 19.3 27 Br.azil 2�3
8 Netherlands 18.6 28 R~:nania 2�2
9 Spain 16.9 29 Poland 2�2
10 Nigeria 14.2 30 Algeria 2�1
11 Unitf;d Kingdom 11.8 31 Hong-Kong 1�7
12 Iraq 11.5 32 Czechoslovakia 1.7
13 Iran 8.2 33 CDR 1.6
14 Pakistan 7.8 34 Israel 1.6
15 Taiwan 7.1 35 Portugal 1.3
16 Senegal 6.8 36 Trinidad 1�Z
17 Switzerland 6.0 37 Morocco 1.1
18 Canada 5.0 Others 17.1
19 Saudi Arabia 4.4 T~tal 528.9
20 Austria 4.1
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Crude palmetto and copra oils 4.2 20 000 t
Refined palm oil 1.8 7 300 t
Refined copra and palmetto oils 3 000 t
Margarines and fats 0.1 500 t
Condensed oils 1.5 10 000 t
Glycerin 0.2 1 600 t
Soaps, soapbars 0.2 9~0 t
Oil cakes 0,4 16 000 t
- Coconuts 0,3 14 000 t
Pineapples 13.2 180 000 t
of which:
Fresh fruits 4.3 91 000 t
Juices 1.1 18 000 t
= Canned 7.8 71 000 t
Tuna 6.1 16 200 t
of which:
Fresh 0.3 5 200 t
Canned 5.8 11 000 t
Rubber 4.1 18 100 t
Fresh bananas 3,5 118 000 t
Insecticides 1.9 3 000 t
- Motor vehicles (assembled in I.C.) 1.8 500 -
Plants, flowers 1.5 2 000 t
Tobacco 1.1 12.5 million packs
73 million cigarillos _
Plasticware 1.1 2 100 t
Kola nuts 0.9 34 000 t
Confectionery 0.6 1 500 t
Maggi bouillon cubes 0.6 800 t
Aluminun sheets 0.6 1 200 t
Essential oils (lemon, bermagot) 0.6 170 t
Frozen shrimps 0.5 300 t
Refuse grain 0.5 24 000 t
Bicycle accessories 0.4 -
Footware 0.4 800 000 pairs
Matches 0.3 -
Flashlights 0.3 4 000 000 units
[as published]
Perfumery 0.3 25 000 carats ~
[as published]
Rough diamonds 0.2 800 t
[as publiahed]
CardboarZ boxes 0.2 800 t
Nails 0.2 -
Beer 0.2 700 t
Biscuits 0.2 300 t
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France, lst supplier of the Ivory Coast with 37 percent Ivorian imports, is
followed by the United States (7 percent) and Japan (6 percent); then come
West Germany and Venezuela (5 percent each), then Italy, the Economic Union
of Belgium-Luxemburg and the Nezherlands (about 4 percent for each), Spain
and Niger ia (3 percent each); finally the United Kingdom, Iraq and Iran _
represent about 2 percent of Ivorian imports.
Ivorian exports represent 331.8 billion CFA's of products for the primary
sector (63 percent of the total) and 20,3 billions industrial products.
Following is the detail of exports, in volume and value:
Value
- (Billion CFA's) uantit
Coffee 174.3 264 100 t
of which:
Raw bean s 166.5 260 000 t
Grr~und � 7.7 3 900 t
Roasted 0.1 200 t
Cacoa 154.8 217 100 t
of which:
Beans 115.0 169 000 t
Butter 16.0 16 000 t
Paste 11.8 13 000 t
Cake and Powder 9.5 15 000 t
Chocolate 2.5 4 100 t
Wood 83�~
of which:
Unbarked timber 67.5 ' 192 000 t
Sawn wood and blocks 10.9 250 000 m3
Peeled veneer, cut 1.9 34 000 m~
Plywood 1.S 17 000 m3 .
Miscellaneous 1.9 -
Petroleum products 32.2 564 000 t
Cotton 2~�4
of which:
Bundles, shelled 11.8 564 000 t
Yarns and Fabrics 5.8 35 000 t
Prints 7.2 23 000 000 m
Clothing, Hosiery 1.5 4 000 t
Cottonseed meal 1.0 26 000 t
Gauze, Compresses 0.1 ' ~
Oil Palm Trees and Cocos 16.0 116 300 t
of which:
Crude palm oil 6.4 39 000 t
Palmetto almonds 0.5 4 000 t
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Enameled houseware 0.2 500 t
- Galvanized iron sheets 0.2 500 t _
Paints and varnishes 0.1 300 t
Noodles 0.1 200 t
Cashew nuts 0.1 ~
_ Band saw blades - -
- Cloth, bags, polypropylene
ropes and strings 0,1 100 t
Telephone wires 0.1 100 t
Sisal strings and ropes 0.1 200 t
Ball point pens 0.1 8 000 000
Powder washing detergent 0.1 500
" Miscellaneous 3.0 -
TOTAL 1.979 534.8 4 099 000 t
Thus coffee represents 33 percent (in value) of Ivorian exports, cacao
(2~ percent), wood (16 percent), petroleum products (6 percent), cotton
' (5 percent), oil palm and coco trees (3 percent), p ineapple (2 percent),
tuna (1 percent), rubber (1 percent), fresh bananas (1 percent).
The allotment per client countries is thus classif ied (in billion CFA's
and in percentage):
Billion Total
CFA's percentage
1 France 127.7 24%
2 Netherlands 93,4 17% _
3 United States 51.3 10%
4 Italy 45.0 8%
5 FRG 31.3 6% -
6 United Kingdom 24.0 4%
7 Spain 17.6 3%
8 USSR I4,3 3%
9 Mali 13.7 3%
10 Upper Volta 12.8 2%
11 Algeria 11.4 2%
12 Japan 10,0 2%
13 Bel~ium-Luxemburg E.U. 9.1 2%
14 Greece 6,1 1%
15 Senegal 5,7 1%
16 Niger 5.6 lY
17 Morocco 5,4 1%
18 Nigeria 4.7 1%
19 Republic of South Africa 4.2 1%
20 Israel 3.5 1%
, Z1 Portugal 3.1 1~
22 Cameroon 2.7 1%
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23 Benin 2�5
24 Rumania 1.5
ZS Ghana 1.6
26 Denmark 1.6
27 Yugoslavia 1.4 .
� 28 Switzerland 1, 4
29 Togo 1.3
30 Canada 1.3
31 Taiwan 1.3
32 Gabon 1.1
33 Tunisia 1.1
34 Ireland 1.1
35 Liberia 1.0
~ Others 13�9 3~
TOTAL 534.8
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
9670
~ CSO: 4400
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IVORY COAST
PLAN FOR A NATIONAL COLD STORAGE SYSTEM
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French 29 Aug 80 p 2135
[Text] The ministry of Economy, Finance and Plan of the Ivory Coast
ordered Sema to undertake a plan study for a national cold storage
system.
The existing fixed installations are already important in the Ivory Coast,
- concerning storage as well as hydric ice factories. The volume built is
in the order of 125,000 cub ic meters, or 15 cubic meters per 1,000
inhabitants (200 cubic meters per inhabitants in France). Nevertheless,
the global existing volumes in the Ivory Coast are far from being negli-
gible. However, the Ivorian network represents numerous shortcomings: ~
--most units are very small (about 50 cubic meters) and their operation
costly;
--the regional distribution is not homogeneous, being mostly concen-
trated in Abidjan (80 percent) with more than 100,000 cubic meters;
--the technical value of the installations is very unequal, satisfactory
in Abi.djan, mediocre in the other centers;
- --maintenance is most often inadequate, except f or the large units.
The industrial capacity of ice production is important in the large
cities: Abidjan, Bouake, Daloa and San-Pedro; they exceed needs and .
are used only to 50 percent of the installed capacities.
The transport motorpool is not very important[;] controlled-temperature
vehicles are overly used beyond normal permissible distance limits,
There is little railroad transport, and air transport is relatively
little used.
Moreover, the qualified personnel in char~e of the operating, maintenance
and repairs of the installations is insufficient and badly located,
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In function of demographic increase: 8,5 million inhabitants in 1980,
then 12.8 millions in 1990 and 19.2 millions in the year 2000, Sema
estimated at each of these dates the nezds of the population for food i
- stock, transport and distribution by cold storage system. ~
A first plan was adopted, ambitious in its realization: 1.6 million
cubic meter installations to be built, and in its financing: 135.3
billion CFA's, including a motorpool.
And thus Sema recommends the following plan: -
~ Number of Average Investments
Volume to warehouses volume of to engage
Period be built nPeded warehouses (billion CFA's)
ware- vehicles
(m3) (m3) houses total
1980-1985 110 000 24 4 600 5.4 4.2
1985-1990 150 000 26 5 800 6.6 8
1990-1995 230 000 27 8 500 10 13.4
1995-2000 340 000 28 12 000 13 22
Tota1 830 000 105 7 900 35 47.6
~as pub lished~
The Ivory Coast should be provided with an organizational framework for
administrative and professional activities in cold storage operations.
In the implementation of investments, national resources should be used
to the maximu~?, in order to reduce the outflow of currencies for the
purchase of foreign equipments.
A vast program for the training of cold-storage technicians and electro-
mechanics must start.
Transportation representing an important part of investments and the
~ annual cost of operations deserve a rational organization in order to
achieve an economical management.
- To this end, the following recommendations were formulated:
--use of large capacity cold-storage trucks, preferably on asphalt roads;
--use of controlled-*_emperature trucks, on distances compatible with the
climate, on secondary roads and dirt roads;
--increase of transportation throughput by use of railroads towards
Upper-Volta and beyond, bound to Mali[,] costs being highly competitive;
--study of the use of containers which, closed and sealed, hold tempera-
ture and eliminate thefts.
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It will also be necessary to optimize the management of warehouses by
creating polyvalent warehouses which will also allot capacity for
utilization by public organizations, run by competent specialized
technicians. Such warehouses and the structures necessary for their
construction and their operation already exist in the Ivory Coast (Socef
and Sogeg particularly).
As for financing, the use of publ_.ic funds, at least partially, must be
envisaged, certain warehouses being put afterwards, by means of an
agreement, in the hands of a private operating company in which would
participate diverse noncommercial authorities (local government, chamber
of commerce, etc.), the presence of these authorities guaranteeing
commercial neutrality in the utilization of capacity by public organiza-
tions. The Ivory Coast must put into action an important program for
cold-storage equipment, Considerable efforts must be accomplisY?ed
especially in the planning of operations, feasibility studies, inter-
professional cooperation, in order to avoid wastes. Independently from
the necessity of storage and conservation of its provisions, the Ivorian
national cold storage system could be utilized to develop the exporta-
tion of local products to neighboring West African countries.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
9670
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~
LIBERIA
1980-1981. BUDGET APPROVED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Sep 80 p 2195 ~
[Report: "Approval of the '_980-1981 Budget"]
[Text] On 1 September the Liberian People's Redemption Council approved
= the 1980-1981 budget.
The predicted deficit, initially assessed at $146 million (MTM, 29 August,
p 2141) has been considerably reduced, totaling $75.3 million only,
taking into consideration the grants which the country will receive this
year ($25.5 million already) and the repayment of its debt ($20.2
million).
Revenue has been assessed at $215.5 million with expenditures totaling
$372.5 million (of which $246.5 million for administrative expenditures
and $126 million for investments).
- The theoretical deficit of $121 million, therefore, has been redu;,ed to
475.3 million thanks to such aid. The latest figure is the maximum -
amount accepted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) if Liberia is
to receive from it another aid totaling $85 million in special drawing
rights (SDR) over a 2-year period.
Despite the adopted austerity system, the new budget is some 20 percent
higher than last year's.
Let us point out that the rates of direct and company taxation, have been -
- substantially raised. Conversely, the minimum taxable lev~l has been
lowered from $1,500 to $1,000 per year in order, as the chief of state
pointed out, "to broaden the tax base and introduce some equity among
the unemployed who are the majority of the population."
Furthermore, Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe has pointed out that invest-
ments had been reduced drastically and limited exclusively to current
projects financed by foreign countries. "
_ _ . - .
Finally, he announced that the 5-year development plan which was to have
started last July, will be promulgated not before next year so that the
order of priorities it stipulated could be reviewed.
C~PYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
_ _ _
5157 . _
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LIBERIA
BRI~FS
MILITARY GOVERNMENT rUNCTIONING--In the middle of August Karn Karlor,
coordinator general of the People's Redemption Council (PRC) gave details
_ on the operational system of the provisional military government. The
council (consisting of seven members of the military who participated in
the coup d'etat of 12 April 1980, and 11 associate members, also military,
subsequently co-opted) performs the functions of a parliament. The
ministers (niostly civilian) submit suggestions to the chief of s,tate who
passes them on to the PRC for deliberation and approval. The decision
is subsequently submitted to the chief of state who signs it before
passing it on to the ministers. According to Mr Karlor the chief of
state and president of the PRC is the chairman of the executive branch.
However, the factual presidency of the council is in the hands of the
- vice president, Gen Thomas New Syen. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Sep SO p 2195] 5157
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SENEGAL .
~ RECENT FACTORS IN ECONOMIC SITIJATION NOTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Aug 80 p 2077-2078
[Text] A recent (July 1980) BCEAO [Central Bank of the West African States]
bullet in of economic and monetary statist3.cs was devoted exclusively to
Senegal.
The principal agricultural outputs of the 1978-1979 season rose to 781,000
tons o f peanuts for oil and 33,800 tons of seed cotton sold on the market.
Food crops provided 48,600 tons of corn, 795,000 tons of millet and
sorgh~m and 127,000 tons of paddy rice. In value terms, this harvest
repres ented 32.4 billion CFA francs for peanuts, 31.8 billion for millet/
sorghum, and 5.3 billion for paddy.
At the starC of the 1979-1980 season, the purchase price paid to the grower
was hiked from 41.50 CFA francs per kilogram to 45.50 for peanuta and from
49 to SS for seed cotton.
. The 19 79-1980 peanut season shows a sizeable deficit relative to thE~
previo us one and cumulative purchases by the~end of April 1980 only add up
to 318,900 tons compared with 641,000 tons by the end of April 1979.
Calcium phosphate production (Taiba and Thies) during'the first four month
period of 1980 amounted to 442,100 tons (8,500 tons up from 1979);
aluminum phosphate rose to 624,000 tons (up 18,100 tons). There has been
- 30,100 tons of clinker and 106,500 tons of cement produced.
During the month of January 1980 the contribution made by tuna fishing was
very small; 71,000 tons were brought ashore and delivered to processing -
plants .
In 19 7 9 the Dakar international airport recorded 15,275 take-offs and
landings of commercial aircraft and 566,400 arrivals and departures in
passenger traffic.
At the end of March 1980, the commodity turnover index for ma~or commercial
enterp rises was set at 213.5 compared with 234.5 one year before (based on
1970=100) .
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Excluding oil mills, the industrial production index came out to 179.4 at
the end of 1979 (4.6 up from the end of 1973), based on 1969=100.
At the end of March 1980, the general consumer price index for African
families was at 257.8 compared with 230.6 at the end of March 1979 (based
on 1969=100).
Put into effect on 1 January 1980, the hourly rate of the guaranteed
minimum wage was b rought from 108.05 to 133.81 CFA francs.
During the first four month period of 1980, duties collected by the customs
service totalled 13.4 billion CFA francs, 9.5 percent of it on imports, a
sum comparable to that for the corresponding four months of 1979. 1
The budget for the fiscal year 1 July 1979 to 30 June 1980 was set at 134.2
billion CFA francs (down 2.3 billion from the previous one) for receipts
and expenditures; in the receipts it included 15 billion CFA francs of
foreign financial assistance (down 18 billion) and the volume of capital
goods expenditures was held down to 24 billion CFA francs (down 11 billion).
At the end of 1979, the outstanding public debC rose to the equivalent of
133.1 biTlion CFA francs .(up 28.3 ~billion~ fr,'am� :the . end of 1978) and net
borrowing amounted to the equivalent of 99 billion CFA francs (compared with
86.8 billion at the end of 1978). In 1979 debt service, interest payments
and amortizations, took up 22.6 billion CFA francs (19.8 billion in 1978).
On ~1 March 1980 money in circulation, currency and coins, was at 50.5
bfllion CFA francs (down 0.5 billion from March 1979). The total of demand
and ti~e deposits in banks equalled 133.1 billion CFA francs (up 18.6 billion).
On the other hand, outstanding credit amounted to 253.4 billion CFA francs,
compared to 225.5 billion at the end of March 1979. Credit utilizations in
public or semi-public enterprises exceeded private-sector utilizations.
Also at the end of March 1980 the Senegalese Treasury was domestically a
net debtor by 25.9 billion CFA francs (compared to a debt of 18.8 billion
one year. before); advances from having resorted to the currency-issuing -
Institute amounted to 8.8 billion.
Externally, Senegal was in debt for the foreign exchange equivalent of 83
_ billion CFA francs on 31 March 1980, and the shortfall rose to the equiva-
lent of 58.1 billion by the end of March 1979.
During the first 3 months of 1980 peanut product exgorts classified as
under the 1979-1980 growing season brought in 12,700 tons of unprocessed
oil, 1,628 tons of processed oil, and 33~263 tons of oilcake; the oil
exports were made at a slightly slower pace than that of the fourth three
month period of 1979.
Over the same period, calcium phosphate exports from Taiba totalled
333,500 tons.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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SENEGAL
REDUCTION IN FRENCH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Aug 80 p 2077
[Text] Senegal is go ing to reduce the presence of foreign technical
assistants in the country by 63 percen~ from now to 1985, Mr Louis
Alexandreene, minister of planning and cooperation, announced in an inter-
view in the daily LE SOLEIL.
This means that for France, which is by far the principal supplier of
personnel for foreign aid efforts in Senegal, the number of its personnel
will go from what is currently 1498 to 542 in 5 years.
The minister indicated that this step will allow Senegal to save 4.7 billion
- CFA francs from now to 1985. At present the cost of French technical assis-
tance is in fact estimated at 10.2 billion CFA france, of which France
takes on 5.2 billion, the rest being borne by Senegal. One technical
assistant comes to ab out 5 million CFA francs per year, ~h~ !^inister said.
Mr Alexandrenne stated that a plan for reducing the technicai assistance
l~ad been set up between France and Senegal.
The minister added that France had agreed on an assistance effort of two
billion CFA francs to b.elp Senegal in training the cadres needed to re-
place the technical assistants.
The number of French technical assistance personnel in Senegal have -
continually fluctuated, it is pointed out in knowledgeable circles, accord-
. ing to the needs of the moment. The numbers, which went up to 1656 in
1961, went down to 10 87 in 1974 and then back up again to 1498 at present.
Since the country became independent in 1960, a massive reduction in public
aervices has been recorded. Currently more than 85 percent of the tech-
nical assistants are used in the public school system.
Apart from teaching, technical assistance is now oriented towards accom-
plishing large pro3ects (shipyards, the chemical industry, cement factories,
iron).
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Since France had hit its "ceiling" of foreign assistance personnel in
1977, everything over and above what it was scheduled to cover was borne
by Senegal. But since then inflatioa~ has increased the cost of technical
assistance up to a level difficult for Senegal to support.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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TANZANIA
BRIEFS
_ PETROLEUM EXPLORATION PROPOSALS--A1-Noor Kassum, Tanzanian minister for
water, energy and minerals recently stated in the Tanzanian parliament
that a number of foreign petroleum companies had offered to conduct
petroleum surveys in Tanzania on the basis of "reasonable" possibilities
based on studies conducted so far in the country on land and at sea.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Sep 80
p 2201] 5157
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ZIMBABWE
MUGABE, WIFE SALLY HIGHLIGHTED
Daris JEUNE AFRIQU~' in French 10 Sep 80 pp 20-25
[Article by Francois Soudan: "Mugabe, A Disturbing Leader"]
[Text] The great African tenors of the 1960s are either
dead, old or obsolete. T_he newcomers of the 1970s have
not as yet left a mark on their time. Today Mugabe is
asserting himself as a statesman and is bringing to
Africa a dimension which it has frequently lacked, that
of political realism.
"I have no secret. I have no prescription nor model to sell. However,
10 years in jail and 5 years in exile have brought home to me the follow-
ing truth: Dogmatism is the enemy!" Dressed in black, wearing a blue
tie, drops of sweat glistening on his face, Robert Gabriel Mugabe lapses
into silence. He is tense, closed.
One after another, the lights go off and the cameras disappear in the
shadow of the plateau. Comrade Bob wipes his forehead with a handkerchief,
drinks a sip of iced orange juice, and stretches his legs which he kept
crossed and virtually motionless for a full hour. Admiringly, the
director of the famous American program Meet the Press, whose subject the
prime minister of Zimbabwe was on Saturday 23 August, whispers in his ear:
"You were perfect." With the humble smile of a timid child he affects
when he wants to be ironical, Mugabe whispers: "And that is how Robert
the devil became...Gabriel the archangel!"
Five months after the historical night of 17 April, at Rufaro Stadium in
Salisbury, when the Zibabwe flag replaced on the highest mast of the
country the British Union Jack, and 6 months after his crushing electoral
victory and his appointment by the governor, Lord Soames, to the position
of prime minister, Robert Mugabe has almost broken into the screen, that
of American television, naturally, but also the far more difficult one,
of th~ stage of international politics.
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There has not been a single one of his decisions or moves which has not
been analyzed, weighed, and commented by chancellories and the media.
When he gives the order, as was the case at the beginning of July, of
tumbling down in all cities monuments to Cecil Rhodes, the white founder
of the colony which was to be named after him, or when he welcomes warmly
and with a deployment of his forces the Marxist Samora Machel, paying a
state visit, he remains the revolutionary that everyone knows. However,
- when he jails one of his ministers f.or the murder of a white farmer, and
when he outlines for the decade to come an economic policy which would
not be rejected by any capitalist state on the continent, or else when he
describes Ian Smith as a"sincere patriot," after having wished, only one
year ago, that the latter be shot, Robert the Red becomes, as he has been
described, another Kenyatta or another Houphouet. Unquestionably, Robert
Gabriel Mugabe, the nonidentifiable, is troublesome.
Where is he going, this 55-year-old man with a slightly clumsy walk, with
long delicate hands which emphasize each intonation, this man with a calm
eloquence and a rare smile? To answer this question it may be necessary
to know where he comes from. Let us consider first the childhood of this
son of a peasant-miner born in Kutawa, 90 kilometers west of Salisbury:
His first years were spent between a mother who was authoritarian and
pious--"Mama Bona," who was 76 several days ago, and remains a woman with
an extraordinary vitality--and the mission Jesuits. His youth was spent
at the black South African university of Fort Hare, which was a real
nursery for nationalism, the William Ponty of southern Africa. He
graduated with a teacher's diploma and his fellow students were Oliver
Tambo (the current president of the ANC [African National Congress]),
Robert Sobukwe (the founder of the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress]), and
Gatsha Buthelezi, the Zulu leader of Natal.
In Fort Hare he met with members of the South African Communist Party--
mostly Jews--who made him read Karl Marx' "Manifesto" and Lenin's
"Imperialism." However, at that time he preferred Gandhi who fascinated
him, and attended mass every day.
In 1955 he returned to Rhodesia, to Gwelo, where he taught grammar school. _
Poorly paid, feeling the enmity of his superiors because of his "humanist"
ideas, and also attracted by the rising comet of Kwame Nkrumah, Robert
Mugabe applied for, and obtained, a position as professor at St Mary's
College in Sekondi Takoradi, in Ghana. He stayed there 2 years, the time
to marry Sarah Hayfron, the daughter of an agricultural technician, to
become close with the Osagyefo, and to establish ties with the future
president of Malawi, Hastings Banda. The two men have quarreled since,
Malawi being the only African state to preserve diplomatic relations with
the Republic of South Africa.
The follow-up such as his return to Rhodesia in 1960, his joining the
ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union], headed by Ndabaningi Sithole, his
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10 years in prison (1964-1974), th~ ~eath in 1966 of his only child, 6
years old, from encephalir.is, ~~nd whose funeral he was nor allowed r.o
ratren~~ rhe exile in Mozambique and the armed insurrec.tion are r.he known,
f.hc~ pul~l ic sidr o[ his li(e.
This is a lite which focuses, which integrates within itself, which
digests 20 years of African independence: Mugabe lived the illusion of
pan-Africanism, Nkrumah ty~e. He has known the violence of the white
presence and has understood--his break with Banda was determining in this
respect--the trap of new colonial freedoms and of savage capitalism. How-
ever, he has also seen in Mozambique the errors of. a hasty socialization~
r_he emergence of. a bureaucracy from the left, and the dramatic drop in
economic production. Finally, in a climate marked by internal conflicrs
and settlement of accounts among factions, he has waged 5 years of armed
struggle. No other African leader has focused within himself so much
experience or has been able, like him, to draw so many lessons.
Robert Mugabe's initial balance ma y be summed up in a few words: the
need for political realism. All his actions for the past 6 months have
been noted by the total absence of dogmatism, restraints, or models.
This is surprising and troublesome. Pushed to its extremes, such realism
sometimes resembles cynicism. Thus, Mugabe does not conceal that that
same pendular movement which has made him abandon the churches--"religion
was useful to me when I had to believe in something in order to forget
_ the miseries of my life. This is no longer necessary"--leads him today
to forget a good part of the Marxism which he once proclaimed. "Marxist
_ propaganda," says he, "was important to us in wartime. It no longer is
now when we have peace."
His economic policy which takes up, in its general lines, the plan formu-
lated in 1978 by the assistants of Ian Smith and which emphasizes an
incrPase in the rate of output rather than a redistribution of wealth, is
indicative oi this realism. The way in which he was able to exploit the
"Tekere affai.r"--the mar_ter of his minister of labor charged with the
murder of a white farmer--is equally model. By charging him, Mugabe
blocks the hard wing of his party, the one which blames him for "selling _
out Rhodesia to the *.�.*hites," offers his hand to Joshua Nkomo, his enemy
brother of the ZAPU [Zimbabwe African People's Union], one of whose most
vioient bullies was Tekere, an3 reassures a white communicy reduced to
195,000 people, whose mass departure from the country he would like to
avoid at all cost, preventing what happened in 1975 in Angola and
Mozambique.
This is because Robert Mugabe's realism comes with a sharp feeling for
political. opportunity. Thus, in the field of foreign affairs, so far he
has ref used to the Soviets as well as to the eastern European countries
- to open an embassy i_n Salisbury. It is not that Robert Mugabe particularly
dislikes Moscow, even though the Soviet Union has always played [he Nkomo
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r rump car.~l, and even rhou~;h, followinK his grand return to Zimbabwe in
~ Jaiwary 1980, no repr