JPRS ID: 9309 WORLDWIDE REPORT NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030029-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 29
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9309
24 S~eptember 1980
V1/oridwide Re or
p t
NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFEftATION
CFQUO 1 ~/80)
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JPR5 L/9309
24 5ept.ember 1980
WORLDWIDE REPORT
NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLI FERATI ON
(FOUO 10/80)
CO~VTENTS
WORLTJWIDE AFFAIRS
UK Negotiations With U.S. on Fast-Breeder Reactor
Questioned
(Pearce Wright; THE TIMES, 7 Jul 80) 1
Brief s
U.S.-Japanese Nucleax Talks 3
Eurodif Enriched Uranium Shipanent 3
ASIA
INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS
Japanese F`irms To Take Part in Australian Uranium Mining
(JIJI, 21, 27 Aug 80) ................~o............... L~
New Company Esta~lished
Uranium Data to Australia
JAPAN
Nuclear Waste Dumping Prote sted
(JIJI, 11 Aug 80) 5
NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
INTER-AR,AB AFFAIRS
Fifth Arab-Israeli War Expec ted To Be Nuclear
( AI,-WATAN AI,- ~ ARA.BI, 5-11 Jun 80 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
_ a _ (ZII - WW - 141 FOUO]
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wES~r. ~;vxoPE
ITALY
Controversy Surrounds Caorso Nuclear Power Plant Safety
(V3.rio~zs sources, various dates) 15
Overtiiew, Significance of Findings, by Tullio
Fazzolari
Results of Study Refuted
Technical, Methodological Errors Cited
CNEN, ENEL Policies Criticized, by Nicola
Caracciolo
CNEN President's Rebuttal, by Umberto Colombo
Senate Inquiry Praceedings, by Nicola Flarrm~ia
Nuclear Safety Conference Proceedings
UNITED IffNGDOM
Government Repo rtedly Plans To Build Fast Breeder
Reactor
(Adam Raphael, Nigel Hawkes; THE OBSERVER,
22 Jun 80) 47
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WORLDWIDE AFFAIRS
UK NEGOTIATIONS WITH U.S. ON FAST-BREEDER REACTOR QL'ESTIONED
LD071139 London THE TIMES in ~nglish 7 Jul 80 p 4
[Report by Pearce Wright: "Minister Is Challenged Over Secrecy on Fast-
Breeder Reactor"]
_ _ _ _ . - - -
[Text] Confiderctial nego~iations between the United Kingdom Atomic Energy I~uthority
and its couttterpart in tne Ur:tted Stabes, intended to accelerate the development oP the
fast-breeder type of mtclear reactor without iriterruption by a~omic energy oppunents,
have been called into question in a letter to Mr David Howell, seoretary of state Por
ene-.3y, from the Friends of the Earth.
Mr Howell has been told that the llmerican branch oP the erivironmerital group has Siled g
request urxier the Free3om of Information Act for specific documerits relating to those
- Anglo-American talks.
The letter Prom Dr Michael Flood emphasizes the azixiety abo:it the spread oP r~uclear
weapons that becomes :more pxobable with the expansion of a riuclear power pro~amme
using the Past-breeder reactor flzelled by piutoniwn, as the next genersticn of atomi^
energy expansion.
He wants an assurance that negotiations with the Ataericans are not designed to
pre~udge a promised ir~quiry irrto prop~sals to build a demonstration Past-breeder
reaotor in the United Kingdom,
Dr Flood recalls that the scope of that inquiry has not been defined, and that several
ever[ts givP cause to belie~e that developmertts have been advanced secretively.
His letter gives the source of information about the negotiations with the United States.
A*_'eport published in the influential energy daily in Washington~ outlines proposals b1*
the United States (iovernment calling for the United Kingdom and the United Stabes to Porm
a pa.?*tnership that Would build initially five or six fasb-t reeder r.;actors as a~oint
programme.
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A.nother publication, inside DOE, a w~.e'~'i.~r report on t!~e United States Department of
Energy, also describes secret discussions between officials from the Depa.-*tment of Energ;,~
in London, the British Foreign Office, and a high-ranking dele~ation of the United States
Administration conaerning the formation of that psrtnership.
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WORLDWIDE AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
U.S.-JAPANESE NUCLEAR T~LKS--Tokyo, July 16 (JIJI press)--A two-day Japan-
United States consultation opened at the Foreign Office here Wednesday to
prepare for a joint feasibility study on a plan to temporarily store spent
nuclear fuel in the Pacif ic basin area. The Japanese delegation, led by
Atsuhiko Yatabe, the Ministry's councillor in charge of technical and scien-
tifi.. affairs, comprises officials of his ministry, the Internationzl Trade
and Industry Ministry, and the Science and Technology Agency, while the
American team is led by Louis Nosenz~, deputy assist:~nt secretary of state.
The plan, proposed by the U.S. calls for storing spent nuclear fuel for about
30 years at facilities to be constructed on a suitable island in the Pacif~c.
Japan already appropriated about 40 million yen (about 160,000 dollars) in
the fiscal 1980 budget for the first year of the two-year feasibility st:~dy.
[Text] [OW161319 Tokyo JIJI in English 1230 GMT 16 Jul 80]
EURODIr' ENRICHED URANIUM SHIPMENT--Paris 15 Jul--Eurodif, a~oint uranium
enriching firm of four European nations, said here Tuesday it has recently
shipped the first installment of 5 tons of enriched uranium to Japan. The
enriched uranium with a f issionable uranium 235 content of 3 percent will
- be used by Tokyo Electric Power Co and Kansai Electric Power Co for power
generation. Eurodif, oPaned ~oint~y by France, Italy, Spain and Belgium, has
concluded a contract with Japanese power firms to export 1,000 swu (separa-
tive work unit) tons (about 233 tons) of enriched uranium a year over a
decade starting this year. Japan is the first foreign country to purchase
enriched uranium from Eurodif, which started supplying Electricite de France
with the product in April 1979. The company's enriched uraniiim production
- capacity will be boosted to about 10,000 swu tons a year when all of its
four plants are completed in 1982. [Te~t] [Tokyo JITI in English 1333 GMT
16 Jul 80 OW]
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INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS
JAPANESE FIRMS TO TAKE PART IN AUSTRALIAN UNRAIUM MINING
Net~ Company Established
OW201515 Tokyo JIJI ~n English 1430 GMT 21 Aug 80
[Text] Sydney, 20 Aug (JIJI PRESS)--Fo�ar Ja~anese firms, including Kansa3 Eleetric PoWer
Co, will establish a new compar~y to aoordinate their participation in the Ra:~ger uranium
mine developmerit pro~ect possibly in September, aocording to sources here. The three
others are I{~ushu Electric Power Co, Shilooku Electric Power Co~ and C. Itoh and Co. The
r~ew firm, provisionally called Australia Uranium Reso~arces Developnent, will serve as a
channel Por their eciuity parCicipation in Energy Resources oF l~ZStralia (ERA), a Japan-
Australia-Wes~ GermarXy ~oint venture Whiah took over a 50-percent stake in the pro~eet
from the goverrune~t.
' Capitali2ed a'~ 500 million yen (abcntt $2 million), it will be headed by Toshio Tto, vice
presidsrit or Kansai Eleotrie. The four Japanese firms together hold a 10 porcer~t irrterest
in ERA. The s3gning of a formal oontraat among the ERA irrvestors is expected tQ be delayed
untii early Septem~er at Japa.nts request.
Last Monday, the three countries already signed contra~tts to propel the development ot
the Ranger mine, elaimed to be one of the best uranium mines in the world, in the presence
o� Doaglas AtYthor~r, deputy prim,e minister and minister for trade and resources,
ERA with a cap3tal of $A400 million will pat 1~+ percerrt of its shares on stoak exchanges,
The firm plans to procure loans of about $A355 million from abroad. Of the total, it
wants to borrow one-third Prom Japanese finanoial institutions thro'agh the good offices `
ot' the Japanese irivestors.
Uranitus Data to lbis~ralia
OW271447 Tol~yo JIJI in English 1430 (~MP 27 Aug 80--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[Text] Sydney, l~g. 27 (JIJI PRESS)--Japan~s pc,nler Reaetor and Nuolear Fuel Deveiopmer~
Corp Wedr~esday provided the Rus~ralian (~overnment with uranium erm ichment researoh data
through the Japanese Embassy here. This is in line with the Japen-Australia ~oint uranium
enrichmerit research pro~ect. Prime Minister Malooim Fraser and his then Japanese oounber-
part Masayoshi Ohira at their talks in Tokyo last Jaxnaary a~reed to move the pxo~ect ir~o
the second stage fol].owing the end of the first stage in 1978. Recently, the tWo ooun-
tries exohanged notes on proteQtion of oommercial secrets, k,aving ~he way for the dellvery
of the Japanese research da~a to Australia.
Tha goverivdent will have the private researoh gxYiup t3EC}A atudy ~he Japenese deta as we11
as informa~ion reoeived from North America:~ and European aourt~ries ~o draPb a report by the
end oP this yeax on the teasibility of building a uranium enrichmer~ plartt in this oourttry.
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JAPAN
NUCLEAR WASTE DUMPING PROTESTED
OW111421 Tokyo JIJI in English 1354 GMT 11 Aug 80
[Tex t] Tokyo, 11 Aug (JIJI Press)--Six representatives of South Paci�ic islands Monday
visited the Foreign Office and other government agencies to pro~est Tokyo~s plans to dump
low-level rnzclear waste in the high seas of the pacific. At the Science and Technology
_ Agency, one of i~em took the Japanese Government to ~ask f or its failure to give prior
notice to the people of Pacific islands. He also asked why Japan would not dwnp the was te
in the waters near this country.
The agency explained that Japan looked for waters more than 4,000 meters deep or deepez~
than the level stipulated by i~e International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for riuclear
waste dumping.
The government, alarmed by strong opposition from Pacific isl2.nds, will dispatch four
ofPicials of' the Science and Technology Agency to a South Yaci�ic sumin3t, scheduled for
~hursday and Friday in Guam, to explain Japants pmogram, Japan plans to dump 10,000
drwns o� cemen~ed radioac~ive waste into ocean depths abou$ 900 kilameters southeast of
Tokyo from the au~.mmn of next year on an experimental basis,
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
FIFTH ARE1B-ISRAEI,I WAR EXPECTED TO BE i~1UCLEAR
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARf1BI in Arabic 5-11 Jun 80 pp 20-23
[Article: "Arabs an~ Israel: Fifth War Will Be Nuclear; Has Israel Tested
Neutron Bomb Which It Is Reariying to Bomb Baghdad, Damascus and Amman With; .
United States and Europe Have Concealed (Mosad) Agents' Theft of Nuclear
Fuel Shipments"]
[Text] If the outbreak of a fifth I;,lamic Arab war [with Israel] is delayed
until the second half of the 1980's, then it will, in all probability, be a
nuclear war. The reason is that Israel, which is going ahead with its
nuclear weapon plan.s, will force the Arabs to keep up pace with it.
But what nuclear weapons does Israel have and what capabilities do the Arabs
have to catch up with it?
On the fourth day of the October war, Israeli Defense ~tinister Moshe wept
when reports and coded cables on the fearful defeats inflicted on the
Israeli forces on the various fronts began to flow to his office.
The Egyptians destroyed the Bar-lev line with magnificent success before
the Israeli troops could turn on the burning napalm hoses to turn the canal
surface into a flame of fire. The offensivz of the Israeli armored brigade
failed, sustaining heavy losses fr.om the radio-guided anti-armor missiles
which the Egyptian troops enjoyed firing at the Israeli armar from a short
distance.
~
In the Go1an, the Syrians swept through and occupied most of the peaks of
Mount Hermon, leaving behind protruding basalt pockets and rushing forward
toward Tiberias Plain and Upper Galilee with their tanks and their fearful
Frog missiles. '
Moshe Dayan force~3 himself and led his highest-ranking officers to the office
of Prime Minister Golda Meir and explained to her the situation on the various
fLonts.
Old Golda was extremely tired, drained and tense. Her confidence in her -aar
minister, Dayan, who had ridiculed the reports she had been receiving on the
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Arab military preparations for war, had r_ollapsed and in the midst of her
wrath and anger over the catastrophe that had f allen, she agreed to think
of "the unthinkable."
The prime minister issued her orders to the secret Israeli nuclear units to
get ready and the red alert was turned on at the s'"4rategic nuclear command
somewhere under the Negev Desert.
Hardly an hour had passed since the issuance of the prime minister's orders
when 13 aircraft of an unknown type were standing ready on the runway of a
_ well-camouflaged airfield in the Negev Desert, each carrying the secret and
ultimate weapon--an Israeli nuclear bomb with an explosion force of 20 kilo-
tons, i.e, equal in power to the primitive [al-bida'iyah] U.S. bomb dropped
on Hiroshima and then on Nagasaki.
They Sent Everything That Flies to Israel
President Nixon did not give Israel the ~pportunity to use its ultimate
weapon. When he received news of the crushing Israeli defeat and of Israel's
loss of nearly all of its armors in the first 6 days of the war, he ordered
the Pentagon to establish an air bridge to make up for all of Tsrael's weapon
and equipment losse~. His famous order "in hell's name, send everything that
flies to Israel" is still reverberating in the halls of the U.S. Department
of Defense.
The U.S. tanks and aircraft began to flow to the Israeli fronts in enormous
nur�bers and the war scales began to balance and then to be tipped in favor
nf Israel gradually. The danger was eliminated and the Israeli nuclear bombs
returned to settle safely in the bowels of the desert again.
Golda Meir, like all women, did not carry her secret with her to the grave.
She talked about those fearful moments with some of her politician friends
after her departure from power to justify her criminal decision.
The truth is that the Israeli nuclear program started with a decision from
David Ben Gurion in 1957. The Zionist state bought at the time a nuclear
reactor with a 26-megawatt capacity and installed it in (Demona) in the
Negev Desert. At the time, France, Israel's friend, supplied Israel with
the fuel and technological assistance to operate the reactor.
In the eazly 1960's, a special team of the Mosad (Israeli intelligence)
agents was roaming the world to steal shipments of enriched uranium and
bring them back to Israel.
However, the biggest gift Israel got came from Zalman Shapiro, the U.S. Jewish
nuclear scientist, on whom a fortune dropped from heaven suddenly. Shapiro
set up his own agency in 1957 to supply nuclear fuel to the various nuclear _
reactors in the United States.
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Zalman Shapiro's Services
Careful investigations have shown that St~ap:ro has failed to offer any
reasonable explanation for the disappearance of uranium shipments weigiiint;
nearly 800 lbs. by the end of the ].960's.
In 1965 alone, Shapiro paid a fina of 1.1 million dollars because he lost
200 pounds of enriched uranium in one of his sY?ipments.
Israel's agents did not encounter much difficulty in hijacking or purchasing
the nuclear f uel necessary from Britain and France, for example, especially
since enriched uranium is nothing more than powder or small crystal pellets
put in radiatian-proof containers.
The successive U.S. presidents and intelligence agencies have always collabo-
rated to blackout any investigation or to obliterate any information incrimi-
nating Israel. When President Johnson received from the intelligence reports
of the Israeli nuclear fuel "thefts," ne asked Richard Helms, thz then direc-
tor of intelligence, not to inform Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara of the reports. Johnson also asked Attorney General
Robert Kennedy in 1965 to remain sil~nt when the latter received a detailed
report from the FBI on the Israeli nuclear thefts.
The 1970's era witnessed a dangerous turn in the Israeli nuclear weaponry
programs through the establishment of a very firm cooperation between the
Zionist state and the racist statp in South Africa.
U.S. information in this regard says that South Africa has been supplying
Israel with uranium while Israel has been supplying South Africa with the
technology. The Israelis have been shrewder because they have insisted on
treating nuclear fuel in their plants and reactor. This information adds
that the Central Intelligence [Agency] is confident that Israel has been in
possession of severai dozen nuclear bombs since 1974.
[The West] German information asserts that Israel possesses about 13 nuclear
bombs, each with a weight [presumably ~eaning force~ of 20 kilotons that can .
be loaded on Kfir and Phantom planes which can reach their targets in the
Arab capitals surrounding Israel.
The Soviet spy satellites were a.:le to detect a nuclear explosion in Kalahari
Desert in 1977. It later became E.videut to the western intelligence that
Israel participated with South Africa in detonating a nuclear device.
Mysterious Nuclear Explosion at Sea
However, the most mysterious acts of cooperation between Israel and South
Africa has been ~ne operation which was carried out on the cloudy midnight
of 22 September 1979.
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On that night, .~n explosion occurred in the sky of the area where the
Atlantzc and Indian oceans meet.
Artificial satellites uo not fly in the skies of this remote area frequently
and the area is ideal for carrying out a small secre t nuclear explosion be-
cause such an explosion is difiicult to dete~t.
But nearly 3 weeks later, the U.S. Artificial Satellites Agency announced
that a small U.S. satellite of the (Villa) type was cruising the area in
that dark night and that i t recorded a mysterious flash thought to be the
'f.lash of a nuclear explosion.
An international and scientific argument erupted soon afterwards. South
Africa has denied that it has conducted a nuclear test and has claimed thzt
a Soviet nuclear submarine could have exploded ~n the deep waters of the
area.
Several scientific and security sessions were then held in the United States
to verify for sure the information supplied by the (Villa) satellite. It
was found most likely that the flash was actually the flash of nuclear
explosion and that South Af rica's and Israel's fingers are not far from it.
A report by the Central In telligence [Agency] has asserted that abnormal -
activity by the South African fleet was cited in the area on the night of
the explosion.
However, the U.S. administration has again preferred to remain silent and
not to persist in a dialogue with two states whose word this administration
doesn't trust, especially on an extremely secret issue such as that of
nuclear weapons. '
Perhaps the reason f~r the U.S. blackout is due to the fact that persisting
in the open dialogue would embarrass Carter's administration before the
third world where the U.S. administration is exerting open and confidential ~
efforts to obstruct the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, c~eating
clamor over the issue would have threatened the SALT II treaty to which Wash-
ington atid Moscow were app lying the final touches.
This activity re-surfaced timidly in the middle of last February when Israeli
correspondent Dan (Rafi) asserted in a dispatch to the U.S. CBS television
network that Israel and South Africa had actually exploded a nuclear device
last September, r
But why didn't the satellite Villa pick up the brigh t nuclear signal clearly?
Here, some U.S. scientists say that the nuclear device exploded was not a
big nuclear bomb but a neutron bomb which the A.rabs [sic, presumably meaning
the west] intend to produce.
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In prcmoting this w2apon, the west claims that it is an almo;,t "cleau"
nuclear weapon. It is less destructive than the ordinary nuclear bomb be-
cause it explodes in the sky over the area in which it is intended to be r
exploded. Its radia~ion is enough to kill every living t"tiing within a
certain rddius without causing any damage to buildings and property.
Now, why does Israel want the neutron boinb?
Nuclear weapon experts here say that tre neutron bomb is more "reali~tic."
It is fit for use in the areas of direct combat where the warring armies
overlap, as is the situation in the war fronts and lines of the Middle East.
Moreover, exploding this bomb over Amman or Damascus will not cause grave
h3rm to the Israeli cities as the result of nuclear dust or radiation.
Why Israeli Nuc"lear Weapon?
Israel says it will not be the one to begin the use of nuclear weapons in
war with the Arabs. But this claim is belied by the previously told story
of what happened during the October war. Moreover, Israel says that "it
will not be the one to begin" but it doesn't say that it will not be the
"possessor" by evidence of the fact that it has not yet signed the nuclear
weapons nonproliferation treaty.
This determination to possess nuclear weapons confirms that the Israeli
strategy experts have reached the final analysis that secure borders will
not actually be the guarantee for Israel's safety in the face of the Arabs
who surround Israel like a bracelet surrounding the wrist and in the face
of the Arab human numerical superiority in terms of both the number of troops ~
and of population. The Arabs are also on their way toward achieving qualita-
tive superiority through the constant training of their armies and through
_ supplying them wirh weapons whereas Israel's back is straining under the
burden of the deficit in its budget--a deficit which is reflected in its eco-
nomy and in the living standard of its population.
Israel doesn't trust even its main ally, the United States, insofar as the
safety, security and border guarantees are concerned. `~his is why it has
found in nuclear weapoas the deterrent, the guarantee and the effective
factor in winning a war.
Israel was founded on the basis of a single military concept, namely that
it cannot afford to lose a single battle. Israel's loss of such a battle
means the loss of Israel itself because of Israel's narrow area and of its
small population. Therefore, the nuclear deterrent is, in Israel's opinion,
what guarantees its "military and strategic balance" with tl-~e Arabs.
But can the Arabs let Israel go ahead with its nuclear armament plans with-
+ out keeping up pace with it or catching up with it?
The logic of the fateful conflict between the Arabs and Israel requires the
Arabs to enter the nuclear race gate iinwillingly and by farce. Israel is the
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one which has imposed this race and it is ultimately the side solely
responsible for the enormous dangers and catastrophes that may emanate
' froni it.
The fact is that Israel, which has outdistanceci the Arabs by secretly join-
ing the nuclear club a long time ago, cannot--regardless of how hard it tries
and coordinates with the western intelligence--pre~ent the Arabs from forging
ahead with their nuclear programs.
In this regard, the Arabs lack neither the mone,~ nor the scientists and the
experts. If they lack the industrial technology, then money is sure to
secure it.
Will Israel Initiate Nuclear Ldar?
Israel must be aware of what will happen when a kind of a"nuclear terror
balance" is established in the area between itself and the Arabs. At such
time, Israel must think and count up to one hundred before it initiates a
nuclear war.
Israel cannot win such a war even if it J.aunches it by surprise by sending
its aircraft and destructive missiles in the direction of the nearby, and
even distant, Arab capitals and cities.
Though its initial strike may be ~errible and destructive and may inflict
' enormous human losses on the Arabs, the counter-blow or deterrent blow by
the Arabs will be fatal due to the same reasons that have made Israel seek
to arm itself with nuclear weapons, namely its being a small state with
limited resources and population and a small area.
In other wo~ds, if a limited nuclear war erupts in the Middle East--and it
is not unlikely that a fifth war will be nuclear if its eruption is delayed
till the end of this decade--more than one Arab city and Arab citizen may
survive. But there will definitely be no single Israeli city, there will
be no State of Israel and there may n~t even be a single Israeli.
Somebody--perhaps an Israeli--may say that Israel will be able to build a
tight network o� missiles that will prevent the infiltration of its skies
and lands by aircraft or nuclear missiles.
But this possibility is also r~jected. Whoever possesses a nuclear weapon
doesn't want to explode it on his land or over his cities and population
but wants to carry it over to hostile territory. Therefore, when the Arabs
come to possess the nuclear bomb they will undoubtedly think of the means
capable of couveying it to the heart of the occupied land.
Arabs and Nuclear Option
But are the Arab nuclear programs moving ahead with the same speed as that
of the Israeli programs?
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The information available to the Arab countries asserts that Israel owns
- more than one nuclear device. The Arabs find themselves, therefore, forced
to enter the nuclear club, though the entry is through the club's peaceful
_ gaCe and not through the gates of the ciub's war arsenal.
This means that the rich Arab countries started years ago cease].es:. ~f:orts
to set up a nuclear industry, to acquire advanced nuclear technology and to
train a select group of nuclear scientists, experts and engineers.
~ The fundamental inclination of most of these countries to acquire the atom
for peaceful purposes does not negate their capability to turn quickly, if
they so wish, toward the production of nuciear weapons if they find in the
next few years that Israel is forging ahead with its nuclear armament and
that the hope for reaching an honorable political solution to the Mideast
and Palestin~.an issue has been completely extinguished.
However, the dangers facing the Arab iiuclear programs do not lie in the pos-
- sibility of environmental pollution, as is the case in the west which is
jammed with factories and people. The Arab world is vast and effective pro-
tection against the dangers of nuclear incidents, both intrinsic and ir~duced,
can be secured in the boundless desert.
The dangers facing the Arabs lie in the fierce war launched against them by
the western nuclear countries with various means that reach, as has happened
to Iraq's nuclear projects for example, the extent of sabotage and of pre-
meditated murder, not to mention resorting to instigation of the world public
opinion against the Arabs by depicting them as ruthless bea~ts that want to
acquire nuclear weapons at any price to destroy themselves and the world with
these weapons. Meanwhile, a quick curtain is drawn on any Israeli nuclear
activity that surfaces accidentally, not to mention ttie aid intentionally
advanced to Israel by the United States--the most vociferous and clamorous
country against the Arabs
The goal is clear and evident. It is not the fear of one, 10 or 100 Arab
or Islamic nuclear bombs. The Arab bomb scares neither Russia nor the United
States or France. But it does i.n fact. constitute the main danger to Israel
and the deterrent against Israel's expansionist dreams and military raids
in the area.
It is on this premise that the west is launching its unjust campaign against
the nuclear Arabs or Muslims. One of the reasons behind the execution of
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistani leader, was his determination to go ahead
with the implementation of his nuclear program. But the west has been sur-
l prised to find that Bhutto's successor, General Zia-ul-Haq, is no less
enthusiastic for the project, especially since m~nEy is available from the
rich Arabs and since the Pakistani scientists are r,eady to perform the task.
, Iraq~s Nuclear Projects
Iraq is facing today the most intensive, unfair and unprecedented western
propaganda campaign against its acquisition of nuclear power for pe.aceful
purposes. 12
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This is why the two nuclear reactors which France was about to deliver to
Iraq in the Middle of last year were destroyed. The experts estimated at
the time that Iraq's nuclear programs have been delayed for 2 years. Two
weeks ago, a prominent Egyptian nuclear scientist working in Iraq was killed
under mysterious circumstances during his presence in Paris on a mission.
However, there is nothing to indicate that the Arabs, and Iraq in particular,
intend to abandon their nuclear programs.
Iraq relies on cooperation with France, Italy and Brazil in acquiring nuclear
fuel, technology and expertise. Even though Iraq is a member of the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty, there is western insistence that it is capable, if
it wishes, to produce its nuclear weapon before 1985.
Iraq has acquired from France an (Oziris) type nuclear reactor with a capacity
- of 70 megawatts. This is one of the most advanced and strengest nuclear reac-
tors in the world. It will be set up near Baghdad and its costs will amount
to 275 million dollars. Moreover, France supplies Iraq with nuclear fuel and
helps it train its nuclear experts and scientists.
- Iraq has also acquired from Italy four nuclear laboratories valued at 50 mil-
lion dollars to help it separate the plutonium fuel.
Iraq also acquires uranium metals from Brazil.
Now, will the Arab countries become nuclear countries?
Perhaps, who knows?
Israel has entered the nuclear club secretly from its back door. Will the
Arabs let their historical enemy enjoy this membership alone?
[Box on pp 22-23] Mysterious Death �
[Text] They saw him in Paris for the last time buying some gifts and clothes
for his wife and children. The time for his return had approached and his
mission in the French capital had been completed.
Dr Yahya al-Mashadd, 48 years, returned to his room on the ninth floor of the
huge Meridian Hotel and never left it.
On the following day, the maid came to get the room ready and found him lying
on his face on one of the sofas while fully dressed and with his overcoat on.
The entire room, big as it is, was smeared with blood. The face of the
prominent scientist was full of scratches and the investigators found in a
corner of the room an iron rod which is thought to have been used in killing
him.
But why was Dr Yahya al-Mashadd killed?
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He was an Egyptian nuc:tear scientist who had specialized in nuclear reactor
engineering in the Soviet Union and had ~varked in the Egyptian Nuclear Energy
Authority and as professor at Alexandria Uni~aersity before he was delegated
to Iraq to work in the Iraqi Nuclear Energy Organization in 1945 [sic) in
which he distinguished himself as one of the brightest Arab scientists work-
ing in the Iraqi nuclear projects.
He chose to remain in his work in Iraq after the end of the period of his
delegation by Egypt. His ability qualified him to supervise the nuclear
coordination and cooperation between Iraq and France. By virtue of his
work, he visited France frPquently to follow up on the production of the
- parts for the Iraqi nuclear reac~ors and to Familiarize himself with every
new development in the field of nuclear engineering and energy.
After his mysterious death, which is evidently a criminal act perpe~rated
by intelligence agencies, sources hostile to the Arabs launched a number of
rumors to intensify the confusion surrounding the circumstances of his
assassination. Israel has claimed that the Libyan intelligence has killed
him because Libya is jealous of Iraq which is about to take the lead over
it with its nttclear programs.
Meanwhile, sources of the J.S. intelligence have claimed that the French
intelligence has liquidated the scientist in accordance with western security
coordination to obstruct the Arab nuclear projects.
The absence of this prominent scientist will not delay the Iraqi nuclear
projects and their use f_or peaceful purposFS. However, his loss leaves a
sad echo in the hearts of his colleagues and of those who have been aware
of his prominent scientific status.
~ COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WAPAN AL-ARABI
8494
CSO: 5100
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ITALY
CONTROVERSY SURROUNDS CAORSO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY
Overview, Significance of Findings
Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 18 May 80 pp 255-256
[Article by Tullio Fazzolari: "Nuclear Power Plants--the Challenge of
Caorso"]
[Text] The American experts of Palo Alto say that the
risks of an accident at Caoi~so are great. The Swedish
technicians reply: you are poorly informed.
Rome--The battle is now in its final stages. And in particular, it is be-
coming worldwide. To combat the nuclear peril, the Italian ecologists or-
ganized in the Friends of .*_he Earth asaociation have brought onto the field
the American experts of MHB [Minor, Hub~ard, BridenbaughJ of Palo Alto,
Californid, who have prepared a long study on the dangers of the Caorso
power plant. The Italian pronu~lear lobby, for its part, is preparing to
do the same kind of thing by adding to its forces the like-minded Swedes
who have already had to cope with the criticisms of the American techni-
cians and who, despite everything, won a popular referendum last March with
58 percent of the votes, getting as much as 70 percent in the very zone of
Malmo where the very strongly disputed Barseback power plant has been
built.
Caorso, like Barseback, has been built on the BWR [Soiling-Water Reactor)
system. With a document of more tl~an 30Q pages and a lonL, series of appen-
dixes, the American experts of MHB present a pitiless analy~i.s of the Ca-
orso power plant. The risks of accident, they say, have become increasing-
ly serious and dwarf the memory uf the Three-Mile Island incident in the
United States. Indeed, the possibility of trouble is no longer, as was
believed, one in a million, but rather "one in 100,000." And what is even
more disturbing, the men of MHB add, the danger of an incident's being of
the most serious type has increased. ~
And that is not all. The American technicians point out in their report
that the threat to the population exposed to radiation has not been proper-
ly taken into account, and furthermoxe that in case of calamity, it would
be difficult to pi:t into effect any plan for evacuation of the inhabitants.
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= The indictment is a heavy one, and in the last analysis is levelled against
not only Caorso--a plant already completed--but also against the entire nu-
clear option. The criticisms of Caorso today can be repeated ton:orrow ~
against Montalto di Castro (also on the BWR system); against the Garigliano
power plant, which has already acted up in the past and which ENEL [Nation-
_ al Electric Power Agen~y] is having changed over to a more modern boiling- -
water installation; and against the Trino Vercellese and Latina plants too.
It is a heavy blow to the pronuclear lobby. It had been consoled 'uy a sat-
isfying success just days earlier. On Monday 5 May, after a long series of
ups and downs, it passed the 100-hour bench test by reaching a power higher
than expECted--about 875 megawatts rather than 860. But the elation of
victory was doused by the report of the American experts of MHB. And the
CNEN [National Nuclear Energy Commissian] and ENEL will have to cope with
these criticisms at a round-table conference to be held in mid-May.
The pronuclear people are therefore sharpening their weapons. And to meet
the offensive of the Friends of the Earth, they are determined to bring all
their forces to bear. Their first objective is naturally to demolish the
study by the MHB experts as far as possible. And to succeed in this, they
are counting on the support and valued advice of other authoritative for-
eign ex?erts: for example, those of the ASEA [Swedish General Electric-
Po~aer Company)-Atom, the mixed company (50-percent public and 50-percent
private) that is building the Swedish nuclear power plants.
Indeed, MHB's document on Caorso is in many respects analogous if not iden-
tical to the one prepared by the same experts on Barseback 2 years ago.
And the ar.guments of the Swedish pronuclear people can prove very useful
to the Italian pronuclear people today. "The three brains of MHB, Dale
Bridenbzugh, Richard Hubbard and Gregory Minor," they say at the ASEA-Atom,
"are three experts who have to be considered seriously when they speak of
technical details in which they have professional competence." Not by
chance, until 1976 the three held positions of responsibility in General
Electric, one of the biggest multinational companies specializing in the
construcrion of atomic power plants. But many things have changed in the
. nuclear field since that time, and the Swedes are not sure that the three
have kept up with the times.
And the report on Caor~o? How valid is it? Is it really acceptable?
Reading it, the Swedish experts find an infinity of points in common with
the report that MHB prepared tor Barseback. And as with that report, they
� are quick to point out a good many instances of imprecision and approximate
evaluations. MHB maintains that the Caorso reactor's containment system is
new and therefore not sufficiently provenwhile the Swedes point out that it `
has already been used for two Japanese atomic power plants. But the
Swedes' counteroffensive against the MHB report goes much farther. They
accuse the American experts of MHB of having taken as term of reference
mainly an inquiry conducted in the United States by Professor Rasmussen.
Other important things that have subsequently been said and written are ig-
nored by MHB, the Swedes say--in particular, the German Birkhofer report,
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: � ,
- ~ ~ . .
f 4'~ ~ ~ ' r .
\ ~r~.�.~~~ ~ ~ - r \ ~'1 j
~ ' ~ T ~ ~ .l
~
� \
? .
~
The Caorso pawer plant
~o which 'hey attach great importance. The result, they add, is that "the
men of MHB evaluate the seriousneas of the nuclear risks in their own way
and always exaggerate too much." And in support of this convictioii of
theirs, they cite also the opini~ns of other experts of vari.ous countries,
according to whom the worst incident described by MHB, both for Caorso and
for Barseback--that is, a meltdown of the core and the explosion of the
ve.ssel--is so improbable that it can be ignored. �
Conversely, MHB makes this one of the key points of its antinuclear philo-
sophy. It insists on presenting the pos.sibility of catastrophic accidents
"with a pessimism which," they say at the ASEA-Atom, "inevitably leads to
exaggerated conclusions." For example, in evaluating the effects of radia- ,
tion on the population, MHB uses a linea.r method that is too invalid when
such radiation is at a low level such as 0.15 rad per inhabitant per year--
a level that corresponds to the dose from natural radiation, without what
is produced by nuclear power plants.
But especially, the Americans' pessimism reaches its apex, according to the
Swedes, when it fails to take into consideration the fact that improvements
can occur in the nuclear field, and especially in the area of safety: "We
are not just standing around with our hands in our por_kets looking at the
dangers that nuclear power involves," they say at t~ie ASEA-Atom; "we are
_ doing everything necessary to combat them and limit them. And we believe
that people in many other countries of the world, including the United
States, where MHB is headquartered and works, are doing the same as we are.
Conversely, MHB does not appear to take into account the techological pro-
gress that i.n various ways is reducing the nuclear risk."
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MHB's Three Crusaders
_ Their battle sign is MHB--that i:;, the initials of Gregory Minor, Richard �
= Hubbard and Dale Bridenbaugh, The three of them are, in the nuclear field,
something like what Ralph Nader is for ~he American consumers and public
opinion. But they are not run-of-the-mill antinuclear people. Until 1976,
all three held positions of responsibility in General Electric. And Bri-
denbaugh in particular had the unpleasar~t task of responding, in the com-
pany's name, whenever there was trouble with a power plant already sold.
In 1976, Bridenbaugh decided to resi~n. Hubbard and Minor followed his
~ lead, and a"political and religious" motivation is attributed to the three
of them. In any case, it is a fact that the three then began their battle
against nuclear power plants--or rather, against the dangers that they con-
stitute. They organized MHB, against which there is no lack of hostility,
especially on the part of the builder companies but also on the part of the .
private utilities that run the Fower plants in the United States by the
sole logic of profit. MHB goes thro+agh difficult times, and its survival
is due to the aid and support of the California ecologists. Then with its
report on the Swedish power plant of Barseback in 1978, MHB rode the crest
of the wave, and is doing the same now with the report on Caorso, which
will not fail to stir up controversy in the already fiery Italian nuclear
war. -
Resul.ts of Study Refuted
Rome ATOMO E If~DUSTRIA in Italian 15 May 80 pp 1, 3
[Article: "The MHB Report on the Safety of Caorso Refuted"]
[Text] On 16 and 17 May, on the initiative of the Friends of the Earth and
with the sponsorship of the Lazio Region, a conference was held in Rome for
presentation of the study carried out, on commission from the Friends of
the Earth, by the American consultant firm MHB. These letters are the ini-
tials of three well-known engineers--Gregory Minor, Richard Hubbard and
Dave Bridenbaugh--who left General Electric noisily in 1976 to become crit-
ics and opponents of nuclear power plants.
_ On the invitation of the Friends of the Earth, the technicians of ENEL and
of the CNEN took part in the conference, and they took the opportunity to
express hard criticism of the MHB report, in which they pointed out serious
deficiencies in basic datay methodology used and objectivity, frustrating
the expectations of the Friends of the Earth, who would have liked to make
this occasion a decisive argument in the struggle against the development
of nuclear energy in Italy.
In their endeavor, the organizers did indeed have the support of the presi-
dent of the Council of the Lazio Region, the socialist Giulio Santarelli,
who, in inaugurating the conference, took the occasion to say he was in
favor of the decision by the mayor of Montalto di Castro to order suspen-
sion of the work on the nuclear electric power plant and declared that the
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freeze "should be maintained until the government and Parliament have given
satisfactory replies to the repeated requests on the matter of safety."
According to Santarelli, there exists in Italy a dangerous mentality that
considers our country's nuclear commitment from the same point of view that
it can be considered from in vaster territories such as Canada or the Sovi-
et Union. That this is not true has beeri demonstzated by the seriousness
and promp~ness with which the experts of ENEL and the CNEN have responded
to all the criticisms (an.d the errors) contained in the MHB report and also
to the assertions--inspired by an obvious polamical attitude, devoid of any
scientific foundation--of the geologist Floriano Vi11a.
At the conference, statements were made for ENEL by Prof Franco Velona, of
whose remarks we give a few excerpts below, engineer Giuseppe Russino, en-
gineer Vincenzo Morelli and engineer Maurizio Mirone. Speaking for the
CNEN were engineer Claudio Sennis, engineer Gianni Petrangeli and engineer
- Remo Galvagni--all three of them department directors with the Central De-
partment of Safety and Protection (DISP) of the CNEN. A reply to the ques-
tions of a geological nature raised by the Villa report, attached to the
- MHB study, was then given by Dr Ciorgio Magri of the Radiation Department
of the CNEN, who showed that the assumption of a catastrophic earthquake in
the Caorso zone in the 12th century is without historical basis, inasmuch
as it is derived from a hasty and inexpert reading of the sources by Doctor
Villa. This argumentation by Magri .-as implicitly confirmed by Villa him-
self, who in the course of the conference specified in a written statement
that he had limited himself to citing what was related by other indirect
sources. We publish the CNEN's position separately, summarized in a press
release from it, and we report here on ENEL's replies to the criticisms of
MHB.
In the course of his statement, Professor Velona pointed out that "the MHB
study makes a comparison between the results obtained from the Caorso ana-
lysis and those obtained by the famc~ss Rasmussen report on analysis of the
risks of the Peach Bottom-2 power plant, equipped with a BWR reactor ar~a-
logous to that of Caorso, even though it is of greater power (1,100 MWe as
against 850 MWe).
"A fair comparison," Velona said, "would have required that MHB first redo
the Peach Bottom-2 study, using the same criteria used for Caorso, and then
craw the comparison. In the absence of this, the inexact conclusion is
drawn that Caorso, independently of the site characteristics, presents a
higher probability of incidents than does Peach Bottom-2.
"But the contrary is true," declared the ENEL spokesman; "the evaluations
of the risks of the two power plants, arrived at by the same criteria ad-
opted today, could only show a distinct advantage for the Italian power
plant, if only because of the evolution of the technology and norms that it
has imposed between 1974 (when Peach Bottom-2 went into service) and today
more restrictive criteria and more conservative assumptions, going in the
direction of ever greater intrinsic safety of the instailations. I want to
point out here that in the Caorso plant, considerable improvements have
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been made as compared with Peach Bottom-2, improvements whcih the MHB tech-
nicians have not taken into account (for example, the steam diffusers in
the damping pool, the tests and analyses made for Ca~rso's containment sys-
tem). In any case, the MHB techn~cians have not indicated any specific
point in which Caorso is deficient as compared with Peach Bottom, and
therefore, a 10-times-higher probability of a core meltdown for Caorso is
to be considered completely arbitrary. With considerations on the meteoro-
oogy and the population density--that is, with a series of hypotheses that
prove extremely unrealistic on the whole--the consequences of such a hypo-
thetical incident are supposed to increase by another two orders of magni-
tude.
"With further distortion of the facts and confusion of ideas," Velona con-
tinued, "this calculated probability of 10-4/reactor X year is then com-
pared with the experimental one (TMI [expansion unknown]) of 10'', a value
termed "close enough" to the theoretical value. But this amounts to com-
paring a hypothetical core-meltdown incident, involving thousands of
deaths, with an incident--a serious one, but without meltdown--that did not
have any victims."
Professor Velona then mentioned the fact that Science Applications, Inc
(SAI)--an American technical and engineering consultant firm specializing
in evaluation of safety risks and problems--is cited at the beginnin~ of
, the MHB report as having furnished assistance to MHB, on subcontract, i~ ~
calculation of the c~nsequences of the incidents for Caorso.
But in the days preceding the conference, SAI had written a letter to ENEL ~
with a copy sent to MHB, declaring that the report in question constitutes
a substantial misrepresentation of SAI's participation, that SAI does not
- agree with MHB's conclusions, and that the material presented in the report
does not constitute an evaluation of the risk in sufficient breadth and
depth that the results could be considered acceptable from the technical
point of view.
Technical, Methodological Errors Cited
Rome ATOMO E INDUSTRIA in Italian 15 May 80 p 3
[Article: "Many Errors and Impreci~ions Pointed Out and Documented by the
AMN (Ansaldo Meccanico Nucleare) on the Report by the Consultants to the
"Friends of the Earth"J ~
[Text) Ansaldo Meccanico Nur.leare has replied in a 25-page document to the
accusations made by MHB against the safety of the Caorso reactor. The AMN
document complains first of all "that the MHB Technical Associates report
came to it indirectly and only a few days before the official presentation
planned for 16-18 May in Rome. Nevertheless, an initial examination of the
MHB report shows that it contains many errors and imprecisions of both a
methodological and a technical nature. The methodological errors derive
from a distorted and inappropriate use of probabilistic procedures for
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estimation and evaluation of the nuclear risk. The technical errors are
due to the fact that writers of the report show lack of knowledge of the
~ details of the project and of the construction of the nuclear power plant
of Caorso."
In particular, the MHB study takes as a reference and bases its ca~~u'~-
tions on the well-known American study Walsh-1400 (the Rasmussen report),
which, however, has unanimously been considered unsuited for calculating
the risk of specific reactors, but is rather considered a valid and inter-
esting guide for research. Therefore it must be "emphasized that the sig-
nificance and 'scientific' scope of the entire MHB report have to be chal- _
lenged and viewed from the perspective of the uncertain validity of the
methods adopted. Unfortunately, in the course of their study the MHB tech- -
nicians minimize and pretend to forget every precautionary observation that
could compromise the peremptory and dramatic conclusions which it is de-
sired to reach.
- "But a close look at the study by MHB Technical Associates shows that it is
much less than the American "Reactor Study" (Rasmussen Report); in fact,
the MHB technicians do not make a complete probabilistic analysis of the Ca-
orso power plant, even with all the limitations that such an analysis im-
plies. In evaluating the Italian nuclear risk, they base themselves in-
stead on the results and the data already calculated by Rasmussen and by
his group for the American reactor Peach Bottom-2. These results and data
are a~jitsted and corrected mainly to take into account the differences be-
tween the Italian situation and, the American one. It is in fact assumed,
more or less implicitly, that the Italian institutions, industries and
agencies are worse than the corresponding American organizations: the Amer-
ican nuclear components and systems would be expected to break down more
often under the Italian skies.
In substance, the probability values assigned to the sequencesof internal
initiating events that had already been defined for Peach Bottom-2 are mod-
ified in the MHB study. But for external initiating events (of seismic,
atmo'spheric origin, etc), the reference is entirely to the Rasmussen re-
port. In modification of the probabilities of the events that initiate in-
cidents inside the power plant, coefficients that are almost always pejora-
tive are introduced. There is no trace of technical analyses that make it
possible to understand and justify the values assigned to these coeffici-
ents. It is only said that they were selected, chosen or set by the au-
thors on the basis of their own personal and subjective evaluation.
"In these operations, a constant reference is the American situation, which
is obviously modified in a pessimistic direction, which among other reasons
is supposed to taken account of a structural incap~city and inefficiency of ~
ours. The conclusion from this continual search foti the most pessimistic ,
situations possible is that in the case of Caorso, the cumulative probabil-
ities of nuclear accidents with immediate deaths are even more than 1,000
times higher than the case of the American Peach Bottom-2 reactor, and the
most serious incidents are at least 10 times more serious than in the Amer-
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ican case. It is clear that at this point, the inexpert person takes
fright; and this is what was desired."
The AMN's documentcontinues with its counterdeductions, though specifying
_ that it is not "intended to make do a point-by-point critique of the MHB
report in what follows. The number of errors, and especially imprecisions,
would require an excessive labor. It is, however, pertinent to bring out
several points that directly inv~lve the planners and builders of the in-
stallation.
"In any case, it will always be possible to discuss these same points and
MHB's other hypotheses and evaluations within the most suitable technical
framework and with the degree of detail and depth that is necessary."
The succeeding part then shows, with documentation, all the most serious
erros (of ignorance and of omission) committed ir, the MHB study.
All the additional safety arrangements that make Caorso a good deal safer
than Peach Bottom-2 are listed; the assertion that the Italian power
plant's Mark II type of containment is the first to go into service is re-
futed, since it was preceded by two similar Japanese installations; a
stringent program of tests (105) has demonstrated the complete suitability
of the design solutions adopted for the containment; special discharge de-
vices (the "quenchers") have been installed, and the validity of the con-
sequent modifications has been fully checked out; an effective system for
pool-temperature measurement has been installed, and a number os sensors
have beer_ positioned at suitable points; the reference earthquake falls
Per the CNEN's indications) between the 9th and 10th degrees on the Mercal-
li scale, while Professor 'v'illa himself indicates the 7th degree as the
maximum hypothesizable earthquake for the Caorso zone; rapid shutdown of
the recirculation pumps has been achieved so as to mitigate the ATWS [ex-
pansion unknown]; there can be no breakdown of suction from the condensate �
storage system to the core-spraying pool is always alined [as published] in
such a way as to suck water from the underpressure pool, while the suction
from the condensate tank is used only for testing the system with the re-
actor turned off during the recharging; those characteristics of Caorso
that make several events less probable than Peach Bottom-2 have not been
taken into account at all; Caorso is capable of tolerating a higher number
of breakdowns and even human errors than are Oyster Creek and TMI 2 before
. totally losing emergency refrigeration; the core-spraying system is com-
posed of two mutually redundant systems, and �urthermore has design capaci-
ty to furnish 250 percent of the refrigerant flow required; in Caorso, 70
percent of the refrigeration water enters from below, and therefore no in-
terruption of the flow can occur because of steam; the formation of stable
voids in the core is therefore unlikely also; MHB takes no account of the
redundance of independent electric-power supply lines, a redundance greater
' than that of analogous installations; simultaneous damage of the vessel un-
der p.r.essure and of the containment to such an extent as to produce re- .
leases is not possible; the report cannot be considered an analysis of risk =
for Caorso because the fault trees and the event trees are those prepared
for Peach Bottom.
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These are only some of the points on which the AMN considered it had to re-
spond with regard to the study commissione d by the Friends of the Earth.
CNEN, ENEL PoJ.icies Criticized
Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 9 May 80 p 6
[Article by Ni.cola Caracciol.o: "Capanna Is Wrong--Victory Ts Possible"]
[Text] Mario Capanna, in an article inT.A REPUBBLICA of 23 April, explains
~ohy he will not, even though he is antinuclear, sign the referendum against
_ nuclear power plants. He maintains that i f there is a vote, it will surely
lose. Television, newwspapers and parties will persuade ttie Italians that
without the dangers and the pollution.of th e atom, economic prosperity is
not possible, and the nuclear plan will theref,ore pass with popular con-
sensus. ~
Despite the esteem in which I hold Capanna, I am convinced of the contrary.
The events of recent weeks as reoards the Montalto power plant, on which
ENEL has been working for a couple of years , indeed demonstrates one essen-
tial thing: the age*?cies which by law muet construct or oversee the con-
struction of the nuclear power plants (ENE L and tne CNEN) have neither the
technical competence nor the moral honesty necessary for such tasks.
I am aware of the fact that this assertion, ~ut in this way, may seem un- `
just. I know very well that there are woz-thy oFficials and technicians
both in ENEL and in the CNEN. The fact remains that the way they are put
together today, these agencies are not functioning. They have demonstrated
total irresponsibility in this matter. Th a t is, they have gone and chosen
a seismic zone for the Morrtalto power plant.
A fortnight ago, the Administrative Court of Lazio decided in favor of the
Co~mnune of _Montalto and its mayor, Pallotti, who asked that an order to ,
suspend the work be approved while more de tailed investigations are await-
ed. The Commune presented a study signed by geologists of outstanding re-
putation--Professor Camponeschi of the University of Rome, and Professor
Villa, president of the association of Ita lian geologists. It maintains
that in the vic~:nity of the power plant there are three "active faults," or
ruptures in thE~ earth's crust capable of producing earthquakes. What char-
acterizes an "active" fault? I asked Camp oneschi this, and I apologize for
going briefly into a purely technical field. There are three precise
signs, he replied, about which there are no doubts in geological science:
(1) volcanic activity, even if low; (2) hot-water springs; (3) mineral de-
posits that have come up from the depths--in this case, iron sulfides and
antimony. All these indications are prese n t for tte Montalto faults. One
of them--that of the Fiora--is 22 km Iong, and appears to come as close as _
4 km from the Montalto power plant. Neither ENEL nor the CNEN had per-
ceived this.
This is not a matter of minor errors. An earthquake can cause a serious
incident ir. a nuclear power plant (a core meltdown, such as very nearly oc-
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curred at Harrisburg), which in turn would cause literally hundreds of
thousands of deaths in the zone running, let us say, from Rom^ to Grosseto.
~ This is an improbably event, agreed, but not so improbable ir the idiocy of
choosing a seismic site is committed.
In reality, though, ENEL had already virtaully decided to go ahead with the
work at Pian degli Spilli in the commune of Tarquinia. To understand the
origins of this, we must go back to July 1975, when, in a deserted room of
the Chamber of Deputies, and without real discussion, law 393 was passed
(the law we are trying to repeal by means of the referendum), which, among
other things, laid it down by authority that a power plant was to be lo-
cated on the Tyrrhenian Sea between Tarquinia and Montalto.
The inhabitants of Tarquinia, though, wanted tione of it, and they rebelled,
supported by their mayor. It was decided to shift the site from Tarquinia
- to Montalto, even though there were apparanetly complete geological studies
for Pian degli Spilli but not for Montalto. But there was great haste to
begin right away. Therefore, tha work was done fast and it was done poor-
ly. ENEL did a geological study in which it asserted that there was no
- reason to think that the three faults were active, and the CNEN--the over-
seeing organism--zealously ratified everything.
In any case, questions were raised even then. The Ministry of Public
Works, which also has power of control in the matter, said three times (in
1976, 1978 and 1979) that it considered the geological studies done to be
inadequate, but no one paid any attention to it.
One might thank that we antinuclear people are exaggerating about these
"active faults." Let us hear what the CNEN says in this regard, the CNEN
being an agency which, if it is not goaded too far, does have some moments
of lucidity. This is what is writtenit~one of its documents, tracked down by
two physicists of the University o~ Rome, Gianni Mattioli and Massimo Sca-
lia (Document Disp [expansion unknown] 772, p 21): "as regards active
faults that are at the surface of close to it, the state of the art does
not make it possible to design a nuclear electric-power plant that takes
surface shifts into account with a level of confidence sufficient to guar-
antee those parts of the installation that relate to safety." In plain
language, nuclear power plants should not be built close to these notorious
"active faults."
Recapitulation for Capanna. I honestly beli.eve that in the face of such
great bungling, the referendum should win. Capanna should keep it in mind
that the case of Montalto is not an isolated one. At Caorso, the power
plant has become "critical"--that is, the reactors were charged with nu-
clear fuel and the operating tests were begun at the end of 1977. Today,
2-1/2 years later, it is still not functioning at full scale. In no other
country have the startup tests for a well-built power plant lasted so long:
a sign that there too, something must no be going right.
So: I believe that (to prescind from any abstract judgment about atomic en-
ergy) few Italians would agree to having the CNEN and ENEL run the power
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plants as is done today. And there is another argument, one that has to do
with the very prospects af the antinuclear Movement: I do not think that
democrats can refuse to submit to the te~t of a vote without at the same
time casting doubt on the validity of their politics and their principles.
In a democracy, universal suffrage is and must remain the court of last re-
course. It seems to me unwise to try to win by other ways.
CNEN President's Rebuttal
Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 15 May 80 p 6
[Article by Umberto Calombo, president of the CNEN: "Who Is Afraid of Nu- -
clear Power"]
[Text] I do not know Nicola Caracciolo personally, and I dislike having
contact with him only through the columns of LA REPUBBLICA. I consider
that he is in good faith, even though I am disturbed by the coincidence of
his attacks with the imminence of electoral events--facts which are too
contingent to make for serene and calm discussion.
The assertions that he makes, in hi: article of 9 May, against ENEL and the
CNEN are rather heavy, and would be such as to lead to a complaint at law
if we were not indeed already in the middle of a legal action regarding
ENEL and the CNEN, initiated by the citizens' committee of Montalto di Cas-
tro. Since our intent must not be a persecutive one but should aim solely
at bringing out the truth in the matter of facts and behavior, the legal
action mentioned will be the most sui~tatle circumstance, and an action on
our part is therefore not necessary.
What is the CNEN accused of? Essentially, of thoughtlessness.for not hav-
ing sutficiently evaluated the risk deriving from the presence of "acti~ve"
faults in the vicinity of the Montalto site, giving its authorization to
the startup, by ENEL, of the construction work for the power plant. Fur-
ther accusations of thoughtless and irresponsible behavior are made against
us with regard to Cuorso.
It seems senseless to me to fire up an alarmist polemic that makes use of
such terms as "fault" and adjectives like "active" that are foreign to the
man in the street without going to the heart of the problem--that is, with- ~
out .asking what effects may derive from them, and whether such effects have
been taken into due account.
, This is the point. The possible effects related to the activity of a Fault
are two: a rupture of the earth, one that arrives at the surface, localized
in the immediate vicinity of the site; and the gentration of seismic
shocks.
In the sedimentary basin of Montalto, the fault that concerns Caracciolo--
the Fiora fault--halts at a distance of more than 10 km from the site, and
is not seiGmogenic. The three "signs" which, according to the geologist
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Camponeschi, specifically identify an active fault are in reality charac-
teristic of the phase of extinction of volcanic activity. In the present
case, this phase goes back to a preceding epoch of 200,000 years ago.
For Montalto, the CNEN, on the basis of its own seismotectonic analyses,
. put ENEL under design and construction obligations such as to safeguard the
installation from the effects of the zone's biggest potential earthquake.
In particular, the seism that the installation must resist without damage
is of the 9th degree on the Mercalli scale: that i.s, one involving stresses
about double the one--and indeed an exceptionally intense one for the zone
--that occurred in Tuscany in 1971, in which 36 persons lost their lives.
I,t seems to us--in all conscience, and backed by the opinion of very au-
_ thoritative Italian and foreign geologists--that the redundance of safety
connected with the seismic factor is such as to provide absolute tranquil-
lity. The amount of precaution in the CNEN's restrictions is indicated by
the fact that Montalto is not considered a seismic zone. It must therefore
be wondered why a ri;sk of this type is mentioned only now, and only with
reference to the power plant, without any request ever being made for
structural reinforcement of all the dwellings and engineering works built
in the zone.
Other countries that have already started decisively down the nuclear road
--Japan, for example--combine an even more accentuated and dynamic seismic
character than Italy's with even greater population density. From a list
of all the nuclear power plants built in Europe and in Japan in the last 10
years, and of those under construction, it is easy to demonstrate that the
Montalto site is among the objectively most favorable ones. Furthermore,
it is well-known that the Montalto site had passed the preliminary qualifi-
cation study for the EURODIF [European Diffusion Agency] installation--sub-
sequently built at Tricastin, on the Rhone, because of a more decisive com-
mitment by the French government--where, to furnish power to the installa-
tion, four nuclear power plants were built, with power of 930 MW each. I
challenge any geologist to demonstrate that the Tricastin situation is bet-
ter than that of Montalto.
Caracciolo then quotes--praising the zeal of Mattioli and Scalia for having
"tracked it down"--the document Disp (77)2, which, however, was widely dis-
tributed by the CNEN, and not only to the two abovementioned professors
(the Disp is an office of the CNEN charged with the problems of power-plant
safety). The sentence quoted, and attributed to one of the rare "moments
of lucidity of the CNEN," is to be correctly understood in the literal
sense of the term--that is, a nuclear installation is not to be built right
on an active fault.
This imperative has been precisely adhered to in the case of Montalto.
Therefore, no contradiction is seen between what was prescribed and what
was carried out in practice.
Nicola Caracciolo has taken as his own the strategy that Virginio Bettini
theorized at the regional conference on energy held recently in Turin, in
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his paper entitled "From Nuclear Protest to Protest of Nuclear Siting." In
other words, the antinuclear people, backed into a corner as regards their
capacity to demonstrate that we can do without nuclear power without run-
ning very serious risks on the level of our country's economic development
and energy availability, are falling back on challenging the sites as their
most effective weapon, inasmuch as this relates far more directly r; ~he
emotive situation of populations who are easily influenced and inadequately
informed and who are asked to receive a nuclear power plant in the interest
of the national community. Here I must admit that in the past the CNEN has
interpreted its role as an essentially technical one and has not done
enough to inform the populations adequately.
Caracciolo's article and--even more--the accusations by the Citizens' Move-
ment of Montalto seem to present the CNEN as the stupid servant of the mas-
ter ENEL, and as unconcerned about the real interests of the country-- in
the first place, the safeguarding of environmental quality and of the
health of the workers and of the populations. For anyone who knows the
CNEN from the inside, and the scrupulous resp~ct for the autonomous role of
the Disp (which represents its control and safeguard component), nothing is
more false than this image. The dialectic between Disp and ENEL has always
been a tight one, and strictly at arm's length. The painstaking detail with
which the startup tests fo.r the Caorso power plant have been carried out
should give the average Italian citizen an idea of the care and attention
being given to the problems of safety. Instead, paradoxically, the dura-
tion of the tests is being taken as a fault of ENEL and the CNEN, as if a
more offhand and rapid carrying-out of such tests were in itself a guaran-
tee of better functioning.
Finally, Nicola Caracciolo's assertion that the Ministry of Public Works
"considers the geological studies done to be inadequate" regarding Montalto
is not exact, inasmuch as it gave its own assent to construction of the
plant, only recommending that before the working design was done, that min-
istry's competent technical-administrative organs be informed about the
studies conducted.
_ I cannot help but note that the tone of these polemics accentuates the
rather widespread tendency in Italy to cast discredit on institutions gen-
erally, in this case ENEL and the CNEN, which, however, enjoy considerable
respect and prestige abroad and which represent one of the country's re-
sources.
We should instead all commit ourselvzs to making their functioning--impeded
today by antiquated rules and by restrictions whose weight is known only by
those who have direct experience with the public agencies--quicker, more
manxgeable and more efficient. Thi~s would be a co:istructive attitude that
would serve not only to get us to do our work in shorter times and at lower
cost, with equal guarantee of safety, but 31so to motivate the thousands of
technicians of these agencies who feel they are the unjust target of at-
tacks by those who make bold to pontificate about things they do not know
and do not wish to know.
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Senate Inquiry Proceedings
Rome NOTIZIARIO COMITATO NAZIONALE PER L'ENERGIA NUCLEARE in Italian Apr 80
PP 84-88
[Article by Nicola Flammia: "Parliamentary Review"]
[Text] Questioning on Caorso
In the Senate's public session of S February, Sen Fabio Fabbri (PSI [Ital-
ian Socialist Party)) conducted the questioning presented by him along with
Senators Riode Firessi, Gino Scevarolli (PSI) and others, concerning the
nuclear power plant of Caorso.
In the certainty that the government will not fail to state its position,
after the recent Venice conference on nuclear safety, in expectation of a
wide-ranging Parliamentary debate on a real national energy plan, Senator
Fabbri is not convinced of the arguments of the "hawks" in favor of the nu-
clear choice, which involves enormous risks.
He instead considers it indispensable to conduct an exhaustive discussion
of the modalities of operation, the management criteria and the safety
stan3ards of the Caorso nuclear electric power plant, so as to keep the
populations of the zone from being guinea pig:; in an experiment without any
strict standards.
Despite the different opinion expressed by the Salvetti Commission, the
choice of Caorso was a superficial one, in the opinion of Senator Fabbri,
not only because the power plant is located in quite a heavily populated
zone but also because construction was not preceded by the necessary ex-
haustive studies of a technical-geological naturz. In addition, exceasive
recourse to the practice of subcontracting has p!�oduced delays whose eco-
nomic damage has been estimated at about 250 million lire per day.
For lack of foresight, there has been a failure to designate an authority
to program and check on the safety systems, and the conflict between ENEL--
which, without worrying too much about fine points, is aiming at getting
the power plant into full-scale operation--and the CNEN, which instead
seems animated by a greater spirit of caution, has been allowed to break
out.
Nor has the trouble even been taken to establish a sincere and democratic
relationship between the state on the one hand, and on the other, the Re-
gion, the local administrations, the workers and the trade-union organiza-
tions, and the seeking of any kind of understanding with the Emilia-Romagna
region, which had not shown itself to be prejudicially hostile, has been
neglected.
Further, as regards the levels of safety, the well-founded observations
made by the United States experts had already been anticipated, in su~-
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stance, by those--local administrators and trade-unionists--who are already
living with the reality of the Caorso power plant.
Therefore a reassuring and unelusive response is necessary, one that shows
the de~ire to adopt truly adequate safety measures, in view of the high
population denisty of the zone, among other things.
As it was pointed out that no emergency plan had been preestablished, Sen-
ator Fabbri recalled that the region, the local administrations and the
trade unions have already put to the government a series of r~quests re-
garciing in particular an overall checkout of the installation, guarantees
of adequate training of the p~wer-plant operators, the preestablishment of
safety standards tailored of the magnitude of the risks, and finally, the
providing of a system for running a continual environmental check.
The Socialists maintain that the organism to carry out the overall check re-
quested should be the Advisory Commission for consultation among the local
administrations and the state that has finally been created. Furthermore,
it may not be thought that in the face of the nuclear risk there can be se-
crets, concealment, shadowy zonea. Moreover, complete information for the
populations is necessary so as to avoid the possibility of needless panic,
and an evacuation plane should be formulated that does not leave room for
risks, within the limits to which this is possible in relation to nuclear
power plants. The Socialists also want to keep the normality of democratic
life from being compromised, because of the presence of installations of
this type, be creation of a police atmosphere, and to this end chey insist
on the establishment of a sincere relationahip with the population and that
themaximum possible control over the installations and the safety measures
be encouraged.
Senator Fabbri expressed hope of an exhaustive reply from the government.
The Government's Reply
The undersecretary of state for industry, commerce and crafts, Sen Fran-
cesco Rebecchini, replied to the questioning as well as to the interroga-
tions on the same subject presented by Senators Silvio Miana (PCI), Flavio
Bertone (PCI), as well as Renzo Bonazzi (PCI) and others.
The Caorso power plant is an instailation built with the safety require-
ments applied to the boiling-water power plants constructed in various lo-
calities in the LTnited States of America, the design and technology of
which have incorporated all possible improvements and updatings of the
norms occurrring in the meantime, as well as all the requests formulated by
the control authorities.
The plant's first criticality was reached on 31 December 1977; the first
hookup to the national grid was made on 23 May 1978, and on that date began
phase No 1, which raised the nuclear tests to 30 percent of power and which
ended on 12 July 1978. Phase No 2, which went to 50 percent of power, came
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to an end on 8 August 1978, and phase No 3, which went to 70 percent, was
completed on 17 February 1979.
At the end of the third phase, in view of the fact that the state of know-
ledge of the functioning of the hydrogen monitors was not guaranteeing
their function in acceptable manner, the CNEN asked for a test program to
be carried out by the supplier and under its own supervision, for the pur-
pose of a complete characterization of the instrumentation in question.
While the results were awaited, the CNEN suspended issuance of the permit
to reach full power.
On the request of ENEL, for the purpose of carrying out several tests com-
y patible with an installation power of 50 percent, the CNEN, while awaiting
the aforesaid results, issued the permit for operation of the installation
up *_0 50 percent, a power level for which the hydrogen monitors were not
necessary.
It was brought out that the startup of the Caorso power plant is reported
to have been characterized by a great many troubles.
Even if this is substantially true, Undersecretary Rebecchini declared, it
is necessary to consider the fact that if an installation is subjected to a
period of tests instead of being raised to full power directly, this is ob-
viously not in itself a cause of trouble.
It happens also in order to bring out all possible defects in the function-
ing of the various systems, individually and as a whole, aud thus to pro-
vide remedies as needed. The so-called "breaking-in" phase is indeed com-
- mon to all machinerv.
In the particular case of a nuclear power plant, this phase is conducted
with even greater attention, sometimes bringing out troubles which in any
other installation would be removed without even an evaluation of the
causes. In any case, the government's representative did reply on several
of the principle troubles noted.
Water infiltrations into the foundation cavities, of greater magnitude than
anticipated, were encountered: the trouble is to be attributed to local de-
fects in the externa? waterproofing layer. Despite the fact that this
trouble did not pose any safety problem, the foundations were dried out by
the already existing system for pumping out water from outside the build-
ings.
The sagging of several pipe-support attachments to�the rein�orced-concrete
structures was noted; in addition to the repair work already carried out,
the CNEN requested an extensive analytical and experimental check of the
support conditions for piping and installation components, and from it
- there emerged no indications such as to prevent the issuance of the permit
for continuance of the tests.
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A limited number of inspection-bench manipulators showed defects; as a pre-
cautionary measure, all the manipulators of the same type were replaced,
During the st~utdown of the installation, the escape of slightly radioactive
steam from a service valve was noted; this event was caused by erroneous
activating of a system for spraying the inside of the pressure ves~;e:. In
any case, it was ascertained that the workers assigned to maintenance did
not suffer any contamination from the event.
As regards in particular the trouble that occurred on 14 November 1979, Un-
dersecretary Rebecchini pointed out that the power plant was shut down be-
cause of a water loss from an exchanger of the system for removal of re-
sidual heat and was started up aga~.n, after the repair had been done, on
26 November.
In August 1979, the government, to handle the requests coming from Parlia-
ment, from the regions, from the social forces and from public opinion, and
often harassed by information that was not always exact, set up a technical
commission for the purpose, composed of experts of various tenaencies and
~ of proven experience and specitic competence, to formulate lines of inquiry
into the problems of the safety of the nuclear electric-power plants in
general and regarding the Caorso plant in particular.
The line of inquiry regarding Caorso was proposed as follows: that the com-
mission should ascertain whether the safety criteria for the Caorso plant
and for those under construction are in line--as regards hur~an healtli and
the integrity of the environment--wi.th the best sta.ndards adopted for ana-
logous installations.
Ir order to give exhaustive answers to the question formulated, the commi-
sion devoted var~ou~ sessions to the subject and made a special visit to
the installation.
The commission thus decided that it could declare that the Caorso power
plant is in line with the best standards adopted for analogous plants of
the same generation, and that with regard to the troubles that occurred in
the test phase, problems were involved that commonly emerge in installa-
tions of considerable complexity, and that they do not in any case afrect
fundamental aspects of safety.
As regards the outcome of the emergency exercise held at the installation =
on 25 July 1979, Undersecretary xebecchini declared that alhtough it de-
monstrated sufricient preparedness on the part of the personnel, it brought
- out the necessity of making several improvements to Che existing infra-
structures. Such improvements concern in the firs_ place the problem of
the ins*_rumentation with which the radiometer teams are equipped. It was
in fact notea r.hat this instrumentation--previousl}� approved by the Minis-
try of Interior as suitable for field use and capable of ineasuring the lev-
els of environmental contaminatien, corresponding to emergency reference
levels--it is not suitable for measuring the values of environmental con-
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tamination expected in consequence of a hypothetical incident. This is be-
cause such values are considerably lower thati the abovementioned reference
levels, and the apparatuses are not sensitive enough to register them pre-
cisely. It was therefore requested that the instrumentation be integrated
with other instrumentation having higher and more perfect sensitivity.
Following the exercise referred to above, the CNEN also askecl the operator
Co adopt other measures to improve the existing infrastructures, such as,
for example, providing the emergency control center with a system for cata-
loging and storing any eventual environmental samples, to make the census
system for the assigned workers more personal, and to coordinate the com- -
munications with the outside authorities better.
As regards the informing of the workers and the populations, an "advisory
committee of experts for the Caorso nuclear power plant" was set up in the
first phase of construction of the installation, with the task of ensuring
distribution of infor~nation about the power plant itself. On this commit-
tee, in addition to the technicians of the CNEN and of F,NEL, are repre-
sentatives of the local administrations (communes and region~). In addi-
tion, ~echnical meetings are held with the trade-union organizations at the
CNEN itself on the reauest of said organizations.
As regards the professional preparation of the skilled personnel assigned
to the power plant, a special unit with the principal task of seeing to the
training of the personnel themselves functions at the installation, while
the specific training center provided for in ENEL's programs is awaited to
go into opecation.
In addition, in conformity with the understandings arrived at with the
Emilia regions in the meeting that took place at the Ministry of Industry
on 13 August 1979, the CNEN is planning to furnish information periodically
to the region itself, as well as to the advisory committee, on the progress
of the startup activities and certifications of the power plant, in a dy-
namic and open relationship with the region and with the local administra-
tions concerned.
In this regard, the Ministry is entirely available to provide for useful
and timely visits to the power plant by members of Parliament who are in-
terested in doing so.
As regards the external emergency plan, this was the subject of a specific
question put to the nuclear-safety committee, which expressed a substan-
tially positive opinion on Caorso's emergency plan, further suggesting some
improvements of a general nature in relation to all high-risk activities--
not just nuclear ones--to be defined by the appropriate bodies.
Finally, as regards the recovery and use of heat for civil, agricultural
and industrial purposes, the problem is presently under study, in its vari-
ous technical aspects, by ENEL.
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As regards coal-fired power plants, the interregional advisory committee
for economic programming expressed, on 11 January last, the understanding
on the ENEL plan relative to the program for construction of such power
_ plants, per the bill already presented.
This involves about 12,000 MW of new power to be installed in the shortes+~
time possible, with the appropriate port and transport facilities to ~~e
provided for in advance also. For the purpose of the f~stest possible ac-
tivation of this program, and with the implications of a financial nature
and general respect for the country's economy in mind, the government has
taken steps, with the bill approved by the Council of Ministers of 1 Feb-
ruary last, to speed up the procedures--with respect for the power of the
i:~dependent local administrations--as regards siting of the power plants
themselves.
The government, within the framework of the conclusions of the Venice con- `
ference and on account of the more general aspects connected with them, is
_ preparing to examine the operational aspects that follow from Venice in re-
lation to more organic handling of nuclear problems, on the basis of ac-
tions which, in an initial analysis, can be expressed in the following
points:
(1) creation of an organism for supe~vision and control of all high-risk
activities;
(2) the problem of safety viewed not so much from the point of view of pro-
cedure and packages of norms but rather as a system and as an ascertaining
of the competencies necessary for fulfillment of the various activities
connected with the building and operation of the installations;
(3) a single-system choice, as being the approach that permits most exhaus-
tive treatment of the problem areas associated with nuclear installations;
(4) articulation of the assignment of contractual tasks in such a way that
ENEL can effectively fulfill the role that falls to it from its institu-
tional responsibilities as engineer-architect; participation in the design-
ing and construction of the entire installation, with repect for the roles
of the con~truction industries; strengthening and adaptation of ENEL's
structures for the purpose of achieving the aforesaid objectives;
(5) the role of the nuclear electromechanical industry: articulated but ef-
ficient concentration, with clear subdiviaion of tasks in the overall in-
duatrial structure, so as to respond to the real requirements of a concrete
program of construction of more power plants, as proposed by the ENEL plan;
(6) a professional-training center that makes possible, through suitable
instruments such as plant simulators, selection of qualified persannel and
the initial training and periodic refresher training of them in all pos-
sible operational situations of the installation, including the emergency
situations;
(7) the necessity of open information about the problems of energy in gen-
eral and on the aspects related to the big energy installations; a cultural
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campaign on the energy problems throughout the country, through political
forces, local administrations and other institutions;
(8) adjustment and coordination of the present structures established for
the hydrographic, hydrogeological, meteorological, seismic and health sec-
tors, and protection of the environment in general, with adequate prepara-
tion of the specialist competencies that the country needs;
(9) strengthening of the coordination mechanisms at the international lev-
el, and particularly the European level;
(10) an adequate relationship with local organisms (advisory committees of
experts at the local level) for proper participation of the local communi-
ties in the problem of the power plants, as provided for by the present
Caorso and Montalto conventions.
The Debate
Sen Silvio Miana (PCI; stated that he was only partially satisfied by the
reply given by the undersecretary both as regards the specific problems
raised by the Caorso nuclear electric-power plant's going into operation
and as regards the more general problem of recourse to the use of nuclear
energy.
Regarding the Caorso plant, he noted that the undersecretary has furnished
a series of responses that summarize the conclusions reached by the commi-
sion for the safety of nuclear installations. Such responses, earlier re-
quested by his party in the Parliamentary context also and also awaited by
the Emilia-Romagna region, by ttie local administrations concerned and by
the populations, confirm the alarms and doubts relative to the malfunctions
that occurred both at the time of site selection and in the system of con-
struction of the power plant, which did not enable ENEL to exercise manage-
ment of the work and Italian industry to participate actively in all the
phases and made the control system more difficult.
Even if such malfunctions are remedied, there still remain ceveral prob-
lems that the government must urgently tackle in order to give the neces-
sary guarantess to the populations, the local administration and the Parli-
ament. The way in which such problems are tackled will also condition the
Communists' judgment on energy policy, which, while accepting the necessity
of a nuclear component, must tackle the problems very rigorously and with
strict controls on both the technical and cultural levels.
_ From the government's reply it is evinced that the agencies responsible for
managing the Caorso installation do not yet have full mastery of the neces-
sary technology and that the guarantees of safety are not yet complete.
It is therefore necessary for the previously announced general measures to
be brought before Parliament for examination as soon as possible, and that,
while discussion of the system of emergency plans for all high-risk instal-
lations is awaited, an exhaustive reworking of the emergency plan for the
Caorso plant be carried out, without which,reworking the plant must not go
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into operation on full scaie. In this regard, one must indeed deplore the
fact that the proposals put forward from various quarters have not yet been
accepted and that the need to make the population fully informed and aware _
of the ri~ks, and thus to make it capable of participating in the choice,
has not yet been met. In view of the necessity af providing the ~erson~ie~
assigned to the power planr with the highest level of pro�essior~al ~a' ifi-
cation without waiting for the ENEL training centered--expected to open iu
1983--to go into operaztion, Senator Miana concluded by noting that pro-
grams are under study for recovery of the power plant's heat--studies that
shauld, however, go ahead faster by agreement with the authorities respons-
ible for the programming of land use.
Sen Fabio Fabbri stressed that the Socialist senators, whose initiative
' forced the government to face the subject, cannot say they are entirely
satisfied with the response--not from preconceived hostility but rather be-
cause the serious problems of the siting of the plant, the harm deriving
from the delays caused by the subcontracting of the power-plant construc-
' tioln work, the fundamental risk of core meltdown, have not been tackled,
while the necessary clarity has been lacking on the problem of the emer-
gency plan also.
The traditional safety standards, to which reference has been made, are,
according to the experts, to be considered outdated after the Three Mile
Island incident. On the whole, then, the information prov~.ded by the gov-
ernment has not resolved the doubts but has on the contrary confirmed that
the concerns are well-founded. We are in the middle of a very laborious
breaking-in of the power plant, marked by an alarming number of troubles,
~ which for that matter have been recognized by the undersecretary.
The discussion has therefore proven timely; the silence and downplaying are
not justified, and it is advisable to force the government to present to
the Parliament an initial report on the Caorso experiment. The vicissi-
tudes of Caorso, like the Venice debate, do not pave the way for nuclear
extremism but rather convince one of the necessity of seeking alternative
energy sources and promoting their development.
The president of the Emilia-Romagna region rightly stressed, at Venice, the
necessity of promoting mass information and understanding on these prob-
lems. The local administrations concerned in the question of the power
plant--the provincial administration of Piacenza, the commune of Caorso--
have demonstrated highly responsible behavior, which it was expected that
the government would recognize.
In conclusion, the full-scale functioning of the Caorso power plant, which
is now already operating at have of its potential, �~i11_ ud.~ to be preceded _
by an overall positive verification, carried out by authorita~ive technici-
ans whose answers will be impartial, with the consen~,us of the local ad-
ministrations and of the trade-union organizations 2nd with debate and con-
trol by Pa?-liament.
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Uranium Exploration in No~razza
' Senator Rebecchini, undersec:retary of state for industry, commerce and
crafts, alsp replied in the sa~;:e ~~ssion to the interrogation from Sen
Libero Della Briotta (PSI1 concerning the uranium exploration by AGIP [Na-
tional Italian Oil Company]-nuclear and the consequent problems of safety.
He advised that the company SIMUR (Italian Uranium Ores Company), con-~
trolled by AGIP, has so far invested 7 billion lire in development of the
- Novazza mine. The same company has been assigned the task of the future
mining of the uranium-bearing deposit in the locality of the same name.
On the basis of a feasibility study, the EIB (European Investment Bank) has
granted SIMUR special financing to a total of 9 billion lire.
Regarding the ~neasures adopted for the safeguarding of the employees and
the environment, the undersecretary stated that in the course of carrying
out its program, the SIMUR intends to protect and conserve the integrity of
the environment to the maximum degree possible, and especially that of the
mine workers.
SIMUR is at the disposal of the local administrations and of the population
for all information relative to the environmental impact deriving from the
industrial establishment that it is proposed to build. Studies, as called
for, have been carried out by specialists regarding environmental radioac-
tivity, as well as investigations on the vegetation, fauna and foodstuffs.
The design for the uranium-ore processing installation is ready, and con- ~
struction depends on administrative acts by local administrations. It will
be sited near the mine. Appropriate protection of the discharges of wastes
from the processing installation are likewise under study and being de-
signed.
As regards the uranium-ore signs in the Val Vedello, though, AGIP is in the -
exploratory phase in this zone and has so far done 5,577 meters of galler-
ies and 29,286 meters of drilling.
Environmental characterization studies are being conducted by AGIP and the
CNEN. In particular, a study regzrding the geological environment, the
stability of the slopes, review of the hydrogeological limitations and a
general examination of the waters has been commissioned by the mountain
community of Valtellina from a team of experts; the costs of this action
will be borne by AGIP. ,
The company is in constant contact with the local administrations, partic-
ularly with the cor.*W.une of Piateda-Sondrio, to which it reports directly on
the work done and on the programs that it intends to carry out.
In the Novazza concession, the confirmed reserves of uranium as of 31 De-
cember 1978 can be estimated at 1,200 tons of uranium content, and for the
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two abovementioned valleys, at a probable total of 2,000 tons, taking a -
production cost of between $80 and $130 per kilogram of uranium.
At considerably higher costs, the reserves can be estimated at between
5,000 and 10,000 tons of uranium.
The entry of the ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency) group into the fiel.d of
uranium exploration was in 1955. The exploration was assigned, within the
framework of the group itself, to SOMIREM [expansion unknown].
Intensive exploration activity, on th~ surface and underground, has been
carried out in the areas with indications of uranium. The prospecting on
the ground has involved 20,000 square kilometers, including 7,000 with de-
tail work.
Exploration activity was resumed interai~~~ly after the energy crisis of
1973. In Val Seriana, AGIP developed basic geological-structural studies
that made it possible to localize the areas with uranium manifestations.
In Val Vedello, in addition to helicopter-borne spectrometric prospecting
campaigns and detailed radiometric cacr,paigns on the ground, exploration
work was carried out with drilling anc~ galler�ies that brotight out many im-
portant indications of uranium. �
Exploratinn is being developed in other zones of the country in addition to
Val Seriana and Val Vedello.
In the Western Alps in particular, exploration activity was considerable in
1979; it has been articulated in helicopter-borne spectrometric observa-
tions, detailed geoiogical work and a drilling program.
At present there are 49 permits out for radioactive-cres exploration, cov-
- ering a total o` 6,050 square kilometers of territory. Work programs are
being carried out regularly in them under the control of the mining dis-
tricts.
The safety and heaith protection of the workers in the extraction industry
and of the populations against ionizing radiation are legally protected by
the decree of the president of the republic of 13 February 1964, No 185,
and by the decree of the president of the republic of 5 December 1969, No
1303, together wiCh the provisiotis of the ministerial decree of 13 May
1978.
The chief engineer of the mining district, with the technical assistance of
the CNEN, ascertains the potential existence of risk from radiation, estab-
lishes the determinations to be made, and lays down he legal requirements. _
' Sen Libero Della Briotta noted that the purpose of the interrogation was to
obtain information on the delicate and complex question of uranium explora-
tion by AGIP in particular zones, and on the consequent problems of safety
for the workers and the populations--a complex subject that certainly can-
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notbe left to those assigned to the work. Uranium exploration has obvious
economic significance, but for the Socialists, the problem of safety is a
priority one, since one may not barter health for jobs and bigger pay en-
velopes. Among other things, in the territory involved in the uranium ex-
- ploration, the construction o~ power plants designed for exploitation of
hydroelectric enc~gy has already left a legacy of many dozens of invalids
from silicosis, since the safety measures were not adhered to.
Senato r Della Briotta noted the positive response in the matter of making
means available to the mountain community of Valtellina and on the rela-
tions established with the commune of Piateda, but he declared himself dis-
satisfied with the information on the measures for protection of the work-
ers, since there is no systematic recording of pollution data. Some ob-
serva tions lead to quite alarming conclusions regarding the concentration
of ra don, while serious concerns have been raised by the enarmous quantity
of ma terial that will have to be worked to extract the uranium from it, in
a zone that in the past has already been subjected to calamity by the ex-
ploitation of the mines.
He th erefore said he was only partially satisfied by the government's re-
- sponse, stressing his political group's firm intentions in bringing this
set of problems again to the attention of the executive.
ENEL' s "Blackout"
In th e 12 March session of the Chamber of Deputies, the deputies Mauro Mel-
lini, Maria Adelaide Aglietta, Aldo Ajello, Marco Boata, Emma Bonino, Ro-
berto Cicciomessere, Marcello Crivellini, Francesco A. De Dataldo, Adele
Facci o, Maria Luisa Galli, Mianluigi Melega, Marco Pannella, Domenico Pin-
to, F rancesco Roccella, Leonardo Sciascia, Massimo Teodori and Alessandro
Tessa ri, of the Radical Group, put an interrogation to the ministries of
Industry, Interior and Health, to ask what evaluations and what information
they are capable of furnishing with regard to the proposal--the test opera-
tion for the execution of which have already been started by ENEL--to sus-
pend the furnishing of electric power, on a rotating basis, to the various
districts of the major cities.
TheEtadical deputies are asking whether the government considers it legiti-
mate, on the part of an agency that has the specific task of carrying out a
publi c service of prime necessity, to suspend the furnishing of power with-
out verification of the absolute necessity of such suspension, and whether
it co nsiders that such necessity has been ascertained --in particular,
wheth er the actual effectiveness of such suspension of the furnishing of
power has been evaluated, in terms of achieving ~ny appreciable energy sav-
" ir?g, with a:;count taken of the greater consumFtion owing to resumption of
opera tion of the plants, interrupted on account of the power failure; and
to consumption caused by the expedients that will be taken in order to cope
with the interruptions (such as, for example, deeper freezing, etc). Tt?ey
are a lso asking whether ENEL has furniahed the government with documenta-
tion that demonstrates the aforesaid necessity as well as the impossibility
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of achieving reduction of consumpt ion by less "brutal" and aporoximate
means, and whether ENEL or any other organism has carried out a study of
the consequences for the safety of the citizenry and the injury that will
be caused and may be caused by the suspension of the power supply also in
terms of the energy consumption ne cessary to produce commodities thay may
deteriorate, etc, as well as wheth er measures have preQstablished ;har are
at least capable of preventing injuries to rersons and of ensuring aid in
emergency situations.
. The Radical members of Parliament further want to know, especially in those
instances where a precise and reas suring reply to the questions put is
lacking, whether it is not to be c onsidered th at the main objective of
ENEL's initiative is of a psychol:~ gical character--that is, consisting in a
kind of "energy terrorism" by whic h to generate in public apinion that if
one does not go along with the nuc lear option proposed by ENEL, one will
have to adapt to the most disconce rting and ahocking sacrifices: an idea
already explored through the mass- communication media, including the public
ones, with the alternative "nuclea r power or candlelight."
Finally, they ask whether the gove rnment considers that in such a situation
it should recognize that the crime of interruption of a public service is
- being committed, and whether, oa t he other hand, the inertia in the face of
initiatives of such seriousness and so difficult to justify means that the
gov-.rnment shares the aim of promo ting, even in this way, the conditioning
of public opinion so as to overcome the resistance to the nuclear choice
anri counter the "success" of the nuclear-repeal referendum.
Nuclear Safety Conference Proceedings
Rome NOTIZIARIA COMITATO NAZIONALE PER L'ENERGIA NUCLEARE in Italian May 80
pp 19-22
[Article: "Conference on the Nucle ar Risk--Friends of the Earth-Lazio Re-
gion, Rome, 16-17 May 1980"]
[Text] A conference on "The Nucle ar Risk," organized by the Friends of the
Earth, with the patronage and financial support of the Lazio Region, has
been held in Rome.
The purpose of the conference, wh i ch was held at the headquarters of the
Lazio Region on 16-17 May, was to present the report entitled "Study of the
Safety of Reactors in Italy" (done for the Friends of the Earth by the U.S.
consultant firm MHB Technical Ass ociates), followed by a public technical
discussion with experts of ENEL and the CNEN,
MHB Technical Associates is the cornpany set up in the United States in 1976
by Da1e Bridenbaugh, Richard Hubba rd and Gregory Minor, the three nuclear
technicians who, after working in management positions in the Nuclear Reac-
tors Division of General Electric, resigned, considering nuclear energy in-
sufficiently safe.
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The MHB study, the subject of discussion, had been presented in Italy with
lots of publicity, of which the press noted essentially the most negativQ
and most striking aspects.
It purposes to formulate an evaluation af the risk of the Caorso installa-
tion by analysis of the probability of eventual incidents of catastrophic
type and of the consequences they could have on the sur.rounding population.
Such analyses are done by comparison with those ot the well-known Rasmussen
repo rt (WASH 1400), which took the Peach Bottom-2 power plant as a refer-
ence for the BWR system.
The president of the Regional Council of the Lazio Region, Giulio Santarel-
li, stressed in particular, in opening the conference:
--th e present government's intentions with regard to energy policy within
the framework of program declarations;
--the institutional aspects relative to the working-out of such a policy
and the management of it;
--th e problems regarding the siting and safety of the nuclear power plants;
--the role of the Region and of the local administrations in promoting en-
ergy policy and putting it into effect.
Having 'stressed that the Region has responsibly taken on the burden of the
national energy problems, Santarelli lamented the lack of safety guarantees
because, in his opinion, of the deficiency of activity by the CNEN in this
sec tor and the institutional uncertainties, expressing hope of closer co-
ordination among the ministries of Industry, State Participations and
Health and among the government, the regions and the local administrations.
The president of the Italian section of the Friends of the Earth, Dr Mario
Signorino, pointed out that the purpose of the conference was to bring to-
~ gether, for a technical-scientific discussion and not a purely polemical
one, nuclear experts with different points of view along with representa-
tives of the Region and of the Friends of the Earth.
The session af Friday 16 May was devoted entirely to a detailed exposition
of the MHB study carried out by Bridenbaugh and Hubbard. From this exposi-
tion it would appear that because of its characteristics and its location,
the Caorso power pla:_~ presents a risk several tens of times greater than
that estimated uy Rasmussen with reference to Peach Bottom-2.
They have particularly stressed the fact that incidents with meltdown of
the core could have health and environmental consequences not only in Italy
but also in the neighboring countries.
The morning session of Saturday 17 May was devoted to the reply by the ex-
perts of ENEL, engineers Franco Velona, Maurizio Mirone and Giuseppe Rus-
sino. They began with several considerations of a general nature, in
which, among other things, they expressed their disappointment at the fact
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that in analyzing the probability of the various individual events, MI~B
systematically adopted pejorative factors, factors which moreover are en-
tirely arbitrary and which, in adclition, amplify the magnitude of the con-
sequences in an unjustified manner. They subsequently made a point-by-
, point examination of the imprecisions, errors and arbitrariness cont;.+in~d
in the MHB as contrasted with the real characteristics of the Caor.,n ,ower
plant.
On Saturd4y afternoon came the statements by the CNEN technicians, engin-
eers Claudio Sennis, Gianni Petrangeli and Remo Galvagni. They pointed
out, on the general aspects of the conference, rhe inexactness of several
assertions by President Santarelli and of thc ..:sentation of the MHB study
itself as "the first scientific study on a nuclear power plant situated in
Italy"--assertions that appear to wilfully ignore the notable activiry car-
ried on in this field by the CNEN, as its specific institutional task, for
more than 15 years. With regard to the MHB report, they pointed out its
general character, which makes it more a subjective compilation of consid-
erations on the BWR system than an individualized technical study of the
Caorso power plant.
On the other hand, they cited and gave examples of the extensive and ex-
haustive authorizational and control activity relating to the Caorso in-
stallation and the scientific-tectinical support activity, expecially in the
field of risk anal}~sis, underlining the fact that it emerges from these ac-
tivities that the installation is in line with the highest international
safety standards ap~:~icable to it.
During the conference there was aa.so a debate on the seismogeological as-
pects between Professors Villa and Camponeschi: and Professors CapoZZa
(F.NEL) actd Magri (CNEN) on the seismic characteristics of the Caorso and
Montalto sites. In particular, in reply to the general criticisms by Pro-
fessor Villa, Professor Magri showed the precise deductions relative to the
seismic history and the tectonic characteristics on which the antiseismic
design data of the respective installations are based.
At the conclusion of the conference, the president of the Friends of the
Earth stressed the importance of public technical debate, calling on the
agencies institutionally responsible for management and control of the in-
stallations to respond constantly to the requirements of public informa-
tion. In closing, Council member Cancrini, for the Lazio Region, set out
the Region's position particularly on the question of the work on the Mont-
alto di Castro power plant, asking for specific guarantees of safety and
information.
Apropos of the conference, the CNEN has made public, in a press release
which we publish in its entirety, its own decidedly negative position an
the study presented. It has also distributed documentation giving examples
of the activities carried on by its Central Department for Nuclear Safety
and Health Protection. We give a list of this documentation on the last
page of this report.
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CNEN Press Release--17 riay 1980
The CNEN, which with its nuclear-safety experts has participated in the de-
bate organized in Rome by the Friends of the Earth, with the support of the
Lazio Region, has expressed a decidedly negative opinion of the results of
the safety study of the Caorso nuclear power plant conducted by the Ameri-
can consultant group MHB on commission from the Friends of the Earth.
The report is general, the CNEN declares; a large part of the data is mere
compilation. The specific part regarding Caorso is full of errors and im-
precisions due to inferences, prejudices and �alse assumptions on the tech-
nological data for the installation, on the construction capacities of the
Italian industry, and on the geological and seismotectonic situation.
The results of the MHB study are therefore to be rejected. Consequently,
the alarmism is also unjustified in the j.udgment of the CNEN, while the
tendentiousness of the study and the way it has been nresented are extreme-
ly shameful.
The CNEN, as is known, fulfills, with an autonomous Department for Nuclear
Safety and Protection (DISP), the function of a public agency for safe-
guarding the environment and the health of the populations. More than 300
technicians, engineers, physicists, geologists, biologists and experts in
radiation protection are involved in this activity. In particular, safety
analysis for the Caorso power plant continu~usly occupied several dozen
technicians who, in a strictly arm's-length relationship with ENEL and with
close checking on the Italian and foreign supplier industries, finally ar-
rived at authorization of the construction and operation of the installa-
tion.
The strictness and complete autonc::y of the CNEN in the process of author-
izing Caorso are demonstrated by the dozens of plant modifications, includ-
ing some very impartant ones, adopted by the electric-power agency on in-
structions from the CNEN. What is asserted by the Friends of the Earth is
not true--namely, that the study commissioned by them is "the first scien-
tific stL+.dy carried out on a nuclear power plant situated in Ita1y." On
the contrary, the CNEN, as is its duty, has carried out a whole series of
detailed and specific studies on the safety of Caorso, using methodologies
common to all industrialized countries. In addition, as long ago as 1977
the CNEN published a study of the safety of the iight-water nuclear power
plants, carried out by its own methodologies but with a correct choice of
the starting da~a.
This study by the CNEN confirms the fact that the Friends of the Earth's
assertion that the Caorso power plant is 10 times more dangerous than the
American one taken as a reference (Peach Bottom) is to be rejected. Caorso
is more modern than the latter, it has additional control equipment, and it
has been subjected to specific safety tests under the control of the CNEN,
during the startup phase.
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Finally, the CNEN's experts consider superficial and completely unfounded
the observations regarding the seismic danger made by the geologist Flori-
ano Villa, who demonstrates that he has not read what is said on the sub-
ject in the CNEN's safety reports r.elative to the siting of the Caorso and
Montalto di Castro installations.
The CNEN has in fact required the Caorso power plant to be designed and
built in such a way as to resist ~aithout clamage sei.smic shocks of intensity
up to the degree of 9.5 on the Mercalli scale.
In the judgment of the CNEN, conFirmed by the experts of the International
Atomic Energy Agency oF the Unitecl Nations, this norm is to be considered
highly precautionary. The CNEN considers it o~ the highest importance for
public opinion to be informed on the problems of nuclear power in a correct
manner and not a tendentious one. To this end, it has distributed to the
conference participants scientific documentarion that gives examples of. its
own contribution to deeper understanding of tl:e problems of nuclear safety.
In a pi~blic meeting to be held at the headquarters of the CNEN on 16 June,
there will be in particular a presentation of the results of the geological
investigation that led to the siting of the hiontalto di Cast-ro power. plant.
Joint Communique of the Province of riacenza and the Commune of Caorso
The period of approval-testing of the Caorso nuclear power plant Pnded re-
cently; now begins the phase of transition to the normal operation of the
installation.
The Emilia-Romagna Region and the local administrations of the province of
Piacenza have stressed--at the recent Venice Conference on the Safety of
Nuclear installations also--the necessity oi specific actions, summarized
in the seven points stated by Presidei~t Tuxci, as the i.ndispensable condi-
tion for guaranteeing the safety of the power plant and for going ahead to
normal operation of ir.
rlnalogous conditions have been stated by the trad~-union organizations al-
so. Such actions are even more urgent both in order to assure the sur-
rounding populations and to give an immediate response to public opinion in
consequence of the recent article~ that have appeared in the national press
and at the Conference oti the Ni.~clea~ Risk held in Rome under the auspices
of the Lazio Region and the Friends of the Earth Association.
In particular, they concern modification and adaptation of the Emergency
Plan in accordar.ce with the precise indications of. the local administra-
tions, whi.ch could rapi_dly find an approprzate place in the Regional Health
Plan; the actions with a vieia to greater organizatioi~ of work and better
qualificution of the personnel, as requested by the union and with regard to
wt?ich it is only now, after a new phase of struggle, tnat greater availa-
bili_ty on the part of ENEL is emerging; full publicit:y for everyti~ing re-
lating to the functioning of the power plant; and definition of inethods and
structures for information.
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These requests fall within the framework of a revision and general amplifi- ~
cation of the safety legislation and structures.
The totality oE these positions represent the most recent development of a
constant involvement and elaboration that have marked the whole long time
span necessary for the construction and startup of the power plant, permit-
ting important results such as: the Advisory Committee of experts; con--
struction of the environmental monitoring network, with radioactivity in-
cluded; construction of the Radioprotection Laboratory; initiation of an
epidemiulogical investigation.
The central objective has always been the maximum expansion of the instru-
ments of participation and of control, as the essential condition for de-
veloping--through the unitary action of the populations, the workers, the
J.ocal administrations and the trade unions--confrontation an~, if neces-
sary, struggle, so that the government and the competent agencies will car-
ry out with full responsibility what it is up to them to do to guarantee
protection of the populations and the safeguarding of the environment.
Ttierefore there is a constant effort to give positive concrete form to the
requests for guarantees, in order to build effect instruments of informa-
tion, participation and control, and equally great is the attention to
whatever that is new and constructive may come from other experience, na-
tional and international, and may be contributed by the various forces in-
volved in this field, on the understanding that the realization of an ef-
fective system of control and safety, in this sector in particular, re-
, quires constant attention and adaptation vis-a-vis the continual evolution ~
of the problems and of the state of knowledge. The experience of Caorso is
therefore of great value, and the conditions set by the democratic forces
for going on with this new phase of the life of the power plant are fu?ly
well-founded. The attitude of the government, which so far has not met
these requests or the same commitments made at the Venice Conference, there-
fore appears all the more serious and irresponsible; in fact, there has not
even been any discussion in Parliament yet on the conclusions of that con-
ference, nor can the encounter just barely begun in relation to the re-
quests put forward by the local administrations and the trade-union organ-
izations be considered satisfactory. The Province of Piacenza and the Com-
mune of Caorso therefore stress the necessity of an urgent and precise com-
mitment by the government to solution of the problems still open, as abso-
lutely necessary ronditions for proceding to this new and binding phase
_ that should lead to the normal operation of the Caorso power plant, and
thay express their full commitment to developing unitary action together
with the populations, the workers and the local institutions in order for
it to come about with the necessary guarantees for the safeguarding of the
" environment and the protection of the workers and of the populations.
Statement to the Press by Paolo Ciofi, Vice President of the Council of
the Lazio Region--17 May 1980
- "The technicians of ENEL have sustained the position contrary to that of
the technicians of MHB--i.e., that the Caorso power plant is safer than
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~ that of Peach B~ttom. The Lazio Regional Council does not go into the mer-
its of the technical choices, but rather poses a problem that has clear po-
_ litical aspects: the safety of the Montalto power plant.
The agreement on the safety of the Montalto power plant has not been ad-
hered to by ENEL. This agreement required the setting-up of a joi:~~ c~,m-
mittee that would follow step by step the problems that arose from time to
time, especially that ~f safety. In substance, the co~unittee has never
functioned, and the safety protocol itself has never been written up.
The position of the Regional C~uncil, in this situation, is articulated in
the following points:
(1) the government should immediately name a committee of experts of undis-
Futed competence to examine all the problems of safety (the composition of
this committee will have to be discussed and approved by the relevant Par-
liamentary committee);
(2) in the absence of precise guarantees on safety, the Regional Council
considers that the work on Montalto may not be resumed;
(3) it is indispensable to get a precise and adequate emergency plan going
with the assistance of the Region ar.~i of the local administrations, a plan
which the Regional Council commits i.tself to putting into the regional -
health plan, already approved by the Council;
(4) as regards the functioning of the power plant and the risk connected
with it, the broadest publicity and information have to be ensured."
Documents Presented to the Conference by the CNEN
"Overali Considerations on the IRSS [expan~sion unknown] Report by MHB Tech-
, nical Associates," April 1980
"Considerations on the Seismic Risk"
"Summary of Inspection Activity Conducted by tne CNEN on the Caorso Power
Flant"
"Summary List of the Competencies Put into Effect r�~ithin the Framework of
the CNEN for Controls on the Caorso Power Plant"
. "Safety of Light-Water Nuclear Electric-Power Plants: a Methodology for
Evaluation of the Consequences of Low-Probability Incidents," by F. Feli-
cetti and R. Galvagni--Disp Doc (77)7
Excerpts relative to the seismic and geological part of "Technical Report,
per Article 39 of the DPR [expansion unknown] 13 February 1964, No 185, for
the Siting of a Nuclear Electric-Power Plant in the Alto La2io (Pian dei ~
Cangani Site)," Disp Doc/AL(76)2
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"Antiseismic Designing of the Caorso Power Plant"--Disp Information Note
for the Advisory Committee of Experts for the Caorso Nuclear Power Plant
Capanna Is Wrong--Victory Is Possible"--article by Nicola Caracciolo in LA
REPUBBLICA of 9 May 1980
"ENEL and the Nuclear Power Plants"--letter from the president of ENEL,
Francesco Corbellini, to LA REPUBBLICA, 13 May 1980
"Who Is Afraid of Nuclear Power"--article by the president of the CNEN,
Umberto Colombo, in LA REPUBBLICA of 13 May 1980
"General Catalogue of Italian Earthquakes," by M.T. Carrozzo, G. De Visin-
tini, E. Iaccarino and F. Giorgetti--RT/PROT(73)12
"Macroseismic Atlas of Northeastern Italy from the Year 0 to April 1976,"
by E. Iaccarino and D. Molin--RT/Disp(78)8
"Collection of Macroseismic Information for Northeastern Italy from the
Year 0 to April 1976," by E. Iaccarino and D. Molin--RT/Disp(78)7
"Probability of a 9th-Degr~e Shock in Italy," by E. Iaccarino--RT/PROT
(73)40
"Seismicity of Italy in the Past Centuries," by E. Iaccarino--RT/PROT(73)7
"Seismic Map of Italy 1500-1972"
"Map of the Epicenters of Earthquakes from the Year 0 to 1893"
"Seismic Map of Italy 1893-1972"
"Map of the Epicenters of Earthquakes from 1893 to 1972"
"Seismic Map of Italy: Curves of Mean Annual Isoprobability of Shock of the
9th Degree Mercalli"
11267
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UNITED KIIvGDOM
GOVERNMENT REPORTIDLY PLANS TO BUILD FAST BREEDER REACTOR
LD231225 London THE OBSERVER in English 22 Jun 80 p 2
[Report by Adam Raphael and Nigel Hawkes: "Go-Ahead for UK Fast Breeder"]
[Text] A commercial scale version of the controversial fast breeder reactor will be
built in Britain, the government has decided.
Energy Secretary David Howell is expected to make a statement in Parliament before the
summer recess committing the government to the fast breeder, but without sayirig when
and where the first one will be built.
With time allowed for a public inquiry and for detailed approval of the desi~ by the
nuclear safety authorities, it is not expected building will start befbre 1985. Whether
Britain will build the reactor on its own or in collaboration with other countries de-
pends on the outcome of discussions which have been going on with the United States, `
France, and West Germany.
The fast breeder is a new desi~ of nuclear plant, the principle advantage of which is
to make much better use of uranium f1ze1.
Prototype fast breeders have been running for many years in several countries, including
Britain, but the step to a much bigger commercial plant will be a ma,~or commitment of
cash and technical resources.
Despite its advantages over conventional reactors, it is strongly opposed by nuclear
critics who claim it is unsa�e and that the plutonium it produces will encourage the
spread of nuclear weapons.
The government has been under pressure from the atomic energy authority to make an
announcement supporting the fast breeder, even though no site has been selected and
no firm timetable established.
The prime minister is enthusiastic, though some other min~st�ers feel that making an
announcement so long in advance of building will give the ~:nti-nuclear groups plenty
of time to marshal opposition.
Talks have been going on in some secrecy with the French, who are already building a fast
breeder in co-operation with the (3ermans and Italians.
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More surprisingly, there have also been talks with representatives of the American '
admini.stration, whose policy is nominally opposed to building commercial breeders
because of the rnxclear weapon proliferation threat.
A high-level delegation from the U;S. nevertheless visited Britain earlier this year,
led by Energy Under Secretary John Deutch. They had an uripublished meeting with Sir
John Hill and Dr Walter Marshall, of che AEA, Ivor Manley of the UK Department of
Energy, Ned Franklin, chtef executive of the Nuclear Power Company, and Robert Allston,
head of the ~oint nuclear unit in the Foreign office.
The message the American delegat3on brought was that they would be prepared to extend
existing agreement on research and development into fast breeders, but that there was
no prospect of a~oint agreement to build breeders so long as President Carter remained
opposed to them and was still ~;n office.
They emphasized that the United States could not possibly enter into an agreement with
Britain to build four or five commercial breeders, as had earlier been suggested in
ta?lcs between the AEA ar~d some American utilities. According to this plan, the first
plant would be built in Britain, the second in the U.S. and so on.
Both British and American representatives at the intergovernmental meeting agreed such
_ a plan was premature, s3nce neither country seems likely to start work on the first
commercial breeder until 1985 or so.
The British Government is anxious to find some way of sharirsg the costs of breeder
reactor development, and France at the moment appears a more obvious partner. But it
is not clear what Brita:Ln has got to offer France--apart from money--which would
persuade the French to agree to co-operate when they are already several years ahead
in building the first commercial fast breeder near Lyons.
i
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