JPRS ID: 9280 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300020052-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 52
• Content Type: REPORTS

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HOR OFFICIAL U5E ONI.Y
JPRS L/9280
29 August 1980 ~
Sub-Saharan Africa R~ ort
p
FbUO No. 687
FB~$ ~OREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9280
29 August 1980
- SUB-SAIIARA~! AFRI CA REPORT
FOUO No. 687
CONTENTS -
~
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Motives Bei:ind Ethiopia-Sudan Rappro~hement
(Rachid Jawad; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jun 80) 1
'JEUNE AFRIQUE' Group Plans New Publications
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Jul SO) 3
Briefa
_ Tanzanian, Zambian Repayments to PRC 5
CHAD
- French Aid to South Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Jul 80) 6
COMORO ISLANDS
Indications of Political Unrest in Envoy's Resignation
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 1 Aug 80) 8
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Briefs
1973 Constitution Abrogated 11
Slight Budget Deficit 11
Poor Cacao Harvest 11
French Financial Relations 12
EDF Aid 12
IVORY COAST
Plots To Ouat Preaident Houphouet Diacusaed
(Jos-Blaiae Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Ju1 80) 13
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO)
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- KENYA
Briefs
French-Kenyan Relations Hailed 17
Minister on Kenyanization Prospects 17
President Hails FRG Relations 17
MALZ
Economy Reviewed in Context of Co~.ip d'Etat Rumors
(Jacques Latremoliere; MARCfiES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jul 80) 19
SENEGAL
Briefs
New Energy Sources 27
Water Runoff Storage Study 27
TANZANIA
Briefs
Agricultural Situation 1979-80 29
Mining Proapects 29
Tea Farming Prospects 30
Five-Year Plan for Police Reorganization 30 .
_ - b -
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
MOTIVES BEHIND ETHIOPIA-SUDAN RAPPROCHEMENT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 216,23 Jun 80 pp 24-25
[Article by Rachid Jawad: "An Unnatural Reconciliation"] ;
[Excerpt] The various reports from Khartoum and Addis Ababa of a rapproche-
ment between the two capitals are causing obvious unrest in Arab and African
left-wing political and diplomatic circles. They are indeed ~ondering about
the reasons for an apparently unnatural reconciliation between a country
c~aiming to be revolutionary and a fascist regime alined with the imperialists
and responsible for the torture, imprisonment, persecution and assassination
of hundreds of leftist patriots who shed their blood to defend human liberties
in Sudan.
Relations between the two countries began to take a new turn early this year
when an Ethiopian delegation wF_nt to Khartoum to attend the congress of the
Sudanese Socialist Union. Two months later, the Sudanese vice president
and minister of defense, Hamid Khalil, in turn went to Addis Ababa where
he signed a joint communique affirming the two governments' concern for
"scrupulously respecting the territorial integrity, sovereignty and national
unity" of their respective countries. A joint commit�tee was also set up
to e-:amine border disputes. And then on the occasion of the llth anniversary
of the so-called Su~atiese "May Revolution," on 25 May President Haile Mengistu
Ma;-iam went to Khartoum where he told his bloodthirsty counterpart that he
~ was "ready to put an end to passivity and to establish acceptable bases for
achieving the national aspirations of the two countries."
500,000 Refugees
Of course, the speeches and communiques published at the close of Mengistu's
visit to Khartoum did not breathe a word about the real goals sought by either -
partner in this "rsconciliation." But for those closely following the ever~ts
which have characterized relations between the two countries, it is clear
that if the goal sought by the Ethiopian chief of state is to neutralize -
Eritrean guerrillas, whose resistance increases daily, the Sudanese chief
of state was aiming on one hand to get rid of the burden represented by the
500,000 Eritrean refugees on Sudanese soil and also to break the isolation
into which his pro-Sadat and antinational policy has plunged his corrupt
and decadent regime.
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Moreover, accoi�ding to reliable diplomatic sources in Khartoum, the Eritrean
question was the subject of lengthy discussions between Numairy and MengisCu
during their private talks in the Sudanese capital. During these talks,
Numeiry allegedly suggested that Mengistu organize a roundtable discussion
between Addi.s Ababa and the Eritrean liberation fronts to prepare the way ,
for the implementation of a plan for Eritrean administrative autonomy, similar
to that which Sudan has established in the southern part of the country.
But nothing seems to indicate that Mengistu accepted his host's suggestion.
On the contrary, he allegedly pointed out that there was no question of Addis
Ababa "compromising on a principle upheld by the Ethiopian pe~~ple in general."
He allegedly added that if Addis Ababa granted autonomy to E~:itreu, other
parts of the cauntry, such as Ogaden, would demand the same status. The
Ethiopian chief of state seems to have forgotten his solemn prornises, made
~ few months after he came to power, that he would enact a law for internal
autonomy in several provinces of the country. Be that as it may, the attempted
rapprochement by Addis Ababa with Numeiry's regime of terror and repression is
tied to its concern for improving a seriously tarnished reputation and opening _
a d~alog with certain conservative Arab countries.
COPYRIGHT: 19~30 Afrique-Asie _
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
'JEUNE AFRIQUE'GROUP PLANS NEW PUBLICATIONS
Paris JEUNE AFRTQUE in French 30 Jul 80 p 21
[Test] JEUNE AFRIQUE's newest baby, the 1980 yearbook called "Armies
_ and Def ense," (200 French francs or 10,000 CFA, including map)
will very likely surprise some of our readers. "What? While
Africa is tearing itself apart in wars in the Sahara or Chad,
to the point where the very existence of the Organization for
African Unity (OAU) is threatened, you~re publishing a book on
armies?" As if tb assess the means a nation commands to defend
its indepenc~ence or its territorial integrity, or to consider
the threats of intervention by a foreign country on the conti-
_ nent were tantamount to a call to arms.
Defense and Balance -
- "War is too serious a business to be left to generals," said
Georges Clemenceau, who headed the French government during the
last 2 years of World War I. Yes. But only on c^ndition that
civilians know how to avoid it. And hence can fn:-,n an opinion
and make their political decisions on a basis of full knowledge
and understanding. `
The "Armies anci Defense" yearbook seeks simply to provide an
i.nitiation into the mysteries of defense and of the balance of
power for those who are concerned with the future of the na-
tions of Af rica and the Middle East on the global geopolitical
cliessboard. Open the book. In its first portion, ~~Forum," you
will find, in addition to a contributiion from Senegal~s Pre-
- sident Leopold Sedar Senghor, a series of essays from Pxperts
of international standing, under the direction of Jean-Paul
Vecchierini. They deal with topics as disparate as: the stra-
tegic importance of Africa and the Middle East, the influence
of foreign staff personnel in the armies of both regions, the
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threat of destabilization posed by the great powers, the growing military
might of Saudi Arabia, etc.
The second part, "The Market," contains, among other things, a
detailed analysis of the arms industries in the Third World.
A reveali~g (and then some) analysis of the limits to techno-
logy transfers. Lastly, the yearbook would not be a yearbook
if it diti not contain a systematic overview of military poten-
tial, country by country. _
Don~t worry, yo~u economists out there. The next book, scheduled
to appear by the end of this year, will include analyses of the
latest available data on the African and Middle Eastern econo-
mies, 20 years af~er independence, not to mention the outlook
~or development for the next 20 years.
Publication of the yearbooks has been assigned to a new depart-
ment in the Groupe Jeune Afrique. Known as "Research and De-
celopment," and headed b3r Mohamed Mrabet, this department will
be in charge of all periodical publications which the Groupe has
started or will start, with the exception of the weekly JEUNE
AFRIQUE. January 1981 will bring a new look to MARCHES NOWEAUX.
This economic monthly, which will devote considerable spa~e to
information on the various sectors of the economy (industry,
agriculture, transport, telecommunications, etc.) in Africa and
the Middle East, and which will not neglect the international
situation, intends to put thz accent on the specific problems
facing young African middle managers, both at the personnel ma-
nagement and training level, and in the area of their corpo-
rate and national development.
Specific Problems
This means that MARCHES NOUVEAUX will be aimed primarily at eco-
nomic leaders in Af rica and ~he Middle East, whether they work
for ~orporations or in government ministries. Students, however, -
_ will find it helpful as a reference, and foreign investors will
find. discover that it sheds new light on economi~c realities in
Arrica and the Mi.ddle East. Besides this, the ec:onomic guides,
PAYS EN EXPANSION, will coizstitute the indispens~ble quarterly
supplement to those who need complete market studies.
And lastly, a project is just about ready for launching by the
Research and Development department: a magazine devoted to
defense and dipl.omatic matters in Africa and the Middle East,
to which will be added a newsletter on the same subject.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIFS -
BRIEFS
TEINZANIAN, ZAMBIAN REPAYMENTS TO PRC~~Tanzania and Zambia are getting ready
te pay a first installment of $12.4 million to Cfiina in 1983 in repayment
of tfie $360.75 million loan granted to these countries for building the
Tanzania-Zambia railroad, wfiich is managed by TAZARA (Tanzania-Zambia Railway
Authority). The two countries will pay $12.4 million a year to China begin- -
ning in 1983, [Text] [Paris MARCHE'~ TROPTCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
6 Jun 80 p 1329] 8782
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CHAD
- FRENCH AID TO SOUTH REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jul 80 pp 1690, 1691
[Text] After the withdrawal of French troops from Nd~amena and the with-
drawal of the French Aid and Cooperation 2~Iission on Maroua in Cameroon,
the pursuit of hostilities in the Chadian capital and the insecurity over
_ the largest party (but also the least populated) for the national territory
are making difficult the pursuit of the goals of cooperation.
The chief of mission, based in Maroua, is devoting himself first of all to
_ aiding the Chadian refugees with the medical team left in place at Kousseri,
ogposite Nd~amena. Starting 15 July civilian and military teams will be
united and will be made subordinate to the French minister of conperation.
Assistance in the form of food and medicine continues to be distributed to
these refugees. Yet it is in the south of Chad that French cooperation
should develop the most easily, since the situation, which is its own,
removed from the combat zone, allows it to have a well-ordered economic
life, even if it is not truly normal. Let us recall that the south, that
is, the zone controlled by the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT), takes in the
following regions (with their estimated populations for 1979):
Mayo-Kebbi 871,000
Middle-Chari 590,000
Western Logone 336,000
Eastern Logone 390,000
Tandjile 367,000
Thus it has a total population of 2,562,000 inhabitants, not counting the
iollowing zones, more or less under the influence of FAT, in Chari-Baguirmi:
Sub-prefecture of Bousso 58,000
- Sub-prefecture of Massenya 40,000
South Chari Baguirmi 35,000
The provisional administration of the south, whose main difficulty is in
paying its officials, since relations with I3djamena are broken, would thus
affect 2.7 million Chadians out of a total of 4 million. The south is run
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by a perman~~nt committee presided over by Colonel Kamougue. The other 23
members of this cer.tral organ share the tasks by sector, except for Vice
President Roasngar. The secretary general of the perr~anent committee is -
Mr Aligue. There is no secession involved here, and the leaders of the south
_ have persisted in recalling regularly their attachment to a unified
Chadian state, within its internationally recognized boundaries, and retain-
- ing its secular character. It is in this politico-administrative environment
that a French consulate was installed in Moundou. An economic counselor of
the Aid and Cooperation Mission from Maroua still has to be dispatched
there. France sent 4 tons of inedicine to the south. It foresees sending
several doctors there. Other aid programs could also be set in motion if
the situation pe rmitted it.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
8589
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COMORO ISLANDS
INDICATIONS OF POLITICAL UNREST IN ENVOY'S RESIGNATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI'rERRANNEENS in French 1 Aug 80 -
p ].931
['Text] In our 18 July issue (p 1810) we reported ~ormation of the new
Comoran government, established on 12 July by President Ahmed
Abdallah. A few days later_came word that the Comoros1 ambas-
sador to Paris, Mr Said Ali Kemal, had resigned.
~ Onz of the Camoros' best-known citizens, Mr Said Ali Kemal was
in Moroni for a brief stay after ~he preceding governraent had
been dissolved, and President Abdallah offered him the Justice
portfolio, which he refused because of his totai disapproval of
- the president~s domestic policy. Back in Paris, the ambassador
on 19 Ju1y sent the president a letter of resignation which has
~ since been made public, and which deserves quoting in part here
- because it is indicative of the current political malaise.
While Mr Said Ali Kemal had just finished his resignation as am-
' bassador, a delegate from the Human Rights League, Counsellor
Henry, reported in Paris on a recent inquiry in the Comoros, in
the course of which he had occasion to observe "the sorry state
of Comoran political prisoners." The ambassador immediately
informed him of his refusal to accept the justice portfolio and
of his resignation as the Comoran ambassador to Paris, both of ~
which had occurred prior to Mr Henry's press conference.
Since thexi President Abdallah ha~s made a brief and unofficial
visit to Paris, from 26 to 29 July, prior to traveling to his
private residence in France for a few days' rest. _
Here are~some excerpts from Mr Said Ali Kemal~s official letter
of resignation, dated 19 July and ~ddressed to the president of
the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros, Mr Ahmed Abdallah.
O ~ _
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- "Throu,;h th~: troubled hours in which the future of our country
was compromised, we had worked together to set forth the condi- -
tions indispensable to the restoration of civil liberties and
political peace, in the context af economic and social develop-
ment. These new directions were to benefit the greatest possi-
ble numb~r of our citizens, and first and foremost our peasant
~ population, with whose extreme poverty you are familiar.
"It had been agreed at that time that, once restored to our
country, clemency and an unswerving determination to take the �
passion out of ;,he political climate would guide the advocates
of change. A summons to all, of whai;ever political school, who
could make a contribution to Conioran development was to couch
these intentions of change in nractical terms.
"During the first few months, the need for firmly laying the
funclamental and believable bases for the Comoran state on the
international scene might have justified a little stretching of
the rule that had been fixed. -
"I am still astonished, Mr President, at the political spirit
and manners you are introducing. Not only is this behavior
still far distant from the line mapped out at the start, but
it has engendered the re-emergence, on the political level, of
elements from the past which gravely compromise the nation's
f uture .
"I have repeatedly called your urgent attention to this matter,
confiding in you not only as your ambassador, but even more as
your f riend.
"When on 9 Ju).y you summoned me urgently to Moroni to announce
your decision to dissolve the government I was the first to
applaud it. I spontaneously offered yo~my help and support.
My most important suggestion to you was that y~ou call new men,
Yo~~ men, into the government. By opening the political door -
wide, you would have showm the Comoran people your readiness to
move ahead with a team aware of present-day problems.
"In the event, my disappointment was profound. The new govern-
ment you were setting up brought back precisely the same men,
with the exception of your offering the justice portfolio to me.
- That position was a snare laid for my feet. At a loss as to what
_ to do about your political prisoners who had become a liability,
you were hoping to see me shoulder the responsibility of their
trials and sentencing. Xou will thus comprehend 'my utter asto-
nishment, my disappointment, and my categorical refusal to be
part of such a government.
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"Prior to my return to France, feeling that you were determined
- to stic k to a line of conduct which I could not countenance,
but that my duty as ambassador would require me to defend, I
sent you a letter in which, in all frankness, I told you of ~ny
misgivings. I also asked you to consider my positi~n...
"In order to leave you complete freedom in your choice of ~'col-
laborators,' and to clarify my situation, I ask you, Mr Pre-
sident, to accept my resignation, effective today, as ambassador
f rom the Comoros to France...~~ -
COPYRIGHT: R~ne Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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t~u~; ~~:ini. uti~: ucvi,~~
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
BRIEFS
1973 CONSTITUTION ABROGATED--Decree No 4 of 3 April 1980 has abrogated the
- constitution of 10 July 1973 of Equatorial Guinea. It had been drawn up by
President Macie as the basis oi his absolute power. The more democratic -
constitution of 22 June 1968 is tfius temporarily in force until the committee
- on legislation drafts texts that are more modern and better adapted to the
present needs of Equatorial Guinea. By this political act, the new authorities
intend to make another break with the totalitarian rules of the preceding
regime and show they are choosing the patfi of liberalism. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1325] 8782
SLIGHT BUDGET DEFICIT--After 8 months spent restoring order, the Guinean
authorities have published the country~s first budget since 1975.. The budget
is almost balanced in expenses (2,025,039,000 ekueles) and r~eceipts -
(1,951,050,000 ekueles), with a deficit of 64 million ekueles. The document
- is intended to be proof of a restoration of the country's finances, which
have been damaged by 10 years of disorganization and anarchic administration.
The fiscal year begins on 1 April in Equatorial Guinea (1 ekuele = Fr 0.06
approximately). The present budget allows for the classification of civil -
- servants in 9 categories (according to their education and qualifications)
and sets the base public service salary at 90,000 ekueles a year. 'I'he invest-
ment budget will be financed by foreign gifts and loans and is being drawn up
under the supervision of the State Secretariat for Planning, Economic Develop-
ment and Cooperation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 6 Jun 80 p 1325] 8782
_ POOR CACAO HAItVEST--It appears that the 1980-81 cacao harvest in Equatorial
Guinea will be compromised because the rormer Spanish proprietors of the cacao _
plantations do not seem to be in a hurry to return to the country even though ~
their properties have been restored to them. More than 30,000 hectares of
cacao are thus half cultivated. The dispute between the former owrxers and
the Malabo government concerns financing the fiarvest. The owners want to
finance it with loans from local banks; the government wants new money and
investment proposals to renew the cacao plantations. A hope appears in that
the ADB (African Development Bank) recently granted Equatorial Guinea a loan
of 8 million accounting units to renovate 5,500 hectares of cacao plantings
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t~c~it c~~~ r i c~ ni, u;~r: c~rvt,v
in the Riaba region. In 1980, 1,000 hectares will be treated. There are a
total of 16 proprietors, who ti~ill be united in a cooperative. Mechanization
will be used to the fullest to compensate for the severe lack of labor on
- the plantations. T'he work should continue without interruption. [Text]
~Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1325] 8782
FRENCH FINANCIAL RELATIONS--Mr Martin Nkoa, vice-governor of the Central Bank
~ of Ec~uatoria~ Guinea, while on a trip to Paris, contacted the Bank of France
and the Credit Lyonnais to establish financial relations with France. The
new Malabo government would very much like to develop its trading relations
with France and countries in tfie franc zone. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET NiEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 p 1325] 8782 -
EDF AID--Back from a visit to Equitorial Guinea, Mr. Claude Cheysson,
European Commissioner in Charge of Development, declared to the AFP
correspondent at Yaounde "that Europe must give maximum help" to this
country. The European commissioner insisted on the dramatic situation of
_ Equatorial Guinea after iiacie's dictatorship: "This country is the zero
state, which makes or.e nauseous. It finds itself in the situation of the
ex-Belgian Congo at.its independence," he said. Guinea "has neither frame-
work nor structures, and yet it owns great riches: cocoa, coffee, wood, -
fishing and breeding grounds for fish, and it has, in addition, a first-
rate strategic situation," added Mr Cheysson. "In its favor we are going -
to do the maximum," he siad. "The first European Development Fund (EDF)
- has been transferred to it, namely two billion francs of the African ~
Financial Community (CFA) of prompt operations, such as the installation
of a grid at Malabo, the only capital in the world without electricity."
As far as help on the second agreement of Lome, the EDF is going to give
Equatorial Guinea three billion CFA, announced Mr Cheysson. Furthermore,
Europe will provide it technical assistance, personnel and training, in
order "to help this country of 300,000 inhabitants open up to the world."
In the riext 10 years, the European commissioner added, Equitorial Gufnea
should find a decent level of development. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Ju1 80 p 1690] 8589
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IVORY COAST
PLOTS TO OUST PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET DISCUSSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jul 80 pp 32-33
[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "Three Plots Against Houphouet"]
[Text] Was there a coup d'etat being plotted in the Ivory Coast last
April? The question does not seem to be keeping the Ivory Coast leaders
awake at night this July, busy as they are in preparing for the great
electoral campaigns which will be launched in September with the congress
of the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast-section of the African Democratic
Rally (PDCI-RDA, see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1016).
A Calculated Rumor
In the view of President Fe1ix Houphouet-Boigny, "one cannot speak of a
- plot because no concrete steps were ever taken." It is a known fact,
_ however, that a police commissioner, Oulai Zoumana, planned to overthrow
the regime on the day of the arrival o� Pope John Paul II in Abid~an last
10 May. In mid-April, the conspirator mentioned this to a high-ranking
Ivory Coast officer, who immediately informed the chief of state of it.
On 24 April, 4 days before going to Lagos for the first economic summit
_ meeting of the OAU, Houphouet-Boigny was in Yamoussoukro, his native
village, where the matter was discussed with the participation among others
of the director of the security forces and some higher officers. The con-
spirator had moreover spoken of his intentions to three non-commissioned
army officers. In fact, Oulai Zoumana is a policeman of doubtful reputation
who, on various assignments, has worked in recent years at the Presidency
of the Republic and at the port of Abid~an, by turns, before being trans-
ferred to Bouake. It was at the prison in that town that a violent clash
broke out in early April between~the policemen under Oulai's orders and
civilians serving as volunteer guards for the prisoners. Uulai Zoumana was
reported to have authorized his subordinates to release some prisoners il-
l~citly in exchange for a sum which, the investigators said, was paid to
- Oulai in person. Fouraf! guilty of these unscrupulous actions, he was then
sub~ected to disciplinary measures. The Ivory Coast authorities believe
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that Oulai Zoumana was very simply displeased with his dismissal from a
post which a]lowed him to "make himself a good deal of money."
Numerous people in the Ivory Coast believe however that this is a"calculated
rumor." Others recall that it was in this period (12 April) that a certain
Samuel K. Doe, a master sergeant in his own country, seized power in
neighboring Liberia.
For several months now, the whole of the Ivory Coast has been concerned
with who will succeed Houphouet. Anonymous letters and tracts accusing this
or that minister ~iave been distributed at an unusual rate and personal
attacks have become more and more virulen.t.
Limited Impact
It is in this atmosphere ot settling accounts among more or less admitted
candidates that the army was to make its voice heard, in turn. And by
means of a tract, precisely. This document urged the chief of state of the
Ivory Coast to undertake profound changes immediately in order to prevent
- any imitation of the Liberian example. The distribution of this "open
letter" undoubtedly reflected a certain state of mind going beqond the
mere expression of displeasure.
It was difficult to determine the origin of the document precisely. Some
thought it was the work of Ivory Coast military personnel sent to Kolwezi
within the framework of the inter-African force. It is known that the
Ivory Coast had agreed to join other African countries asked to aid the
government of Zaire in repulsing the attacks of the former Katangan police.
In 1978 it had sent 5 doctors and lOC n.urses, for whom the exposi~tion
served as a kind of sinecure, to that country. On his departure from
Abidjan, each doctor found himself the recipient of a bonus of 2 million
CFA francs, while each nurse received 1 million.
The members of the Ivory Coast contingent also received their full salaries,
plus half again the amount of their wages, paid jointly by the government
of the Ivory Coast and the crganization established for this temporary
operation. The annual equivalent of this compensation was paid to the
beneficiaries at the time of their departure for Kolwezi. After the first
year, the first Ivory Coast contingent was replaced by a second, which
enjoyed the same advantages. But 2 months after the arrival of this latter
contingent in the Shaba, the government of the Ivory Coast decided to put
an end to the mission.
Should the military, under these conditions, return the amount of the
overpayment in the wages paid for a year, since their stay in Zaire did
not exceed 2 months? Some high-ranking officers favored this solution.
Those involved, on the contrary, believed that they should not be penalized,
since they had not asked to be returned to the Ivory Coast. Finally, the
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military won out. And the origins of the "open letter to the president"
remain as mysterious as before.
As to the "Oulai affair," it was finally resolved by the arrest of the
party involved and the dismissal of the three nan-commissioned officers who
had failed to report him. Although in the final analysis this affair had
only limited impact, the security measures were nonetheless reinforced in
connection with the visit of Pope John Paul II to Abid~an. But when he
returned from Lagos on 29 April, President Houphouet-Boigny had the situation
entirely in hand. "There are still people who value me highly in this
country. If three individuals ~oin together to plot against me, one of -
them will denounce the other." =
A Long Tour
It was precisely following a slanderous denunciation that there was talk ~
~ of a plot in the Ivory Coast for the first time. In May of 1963,
President Houphouet-Boigny had le~t the country to go to Addis-Ababa, where
the document establishing the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was to be
signed. This was in fact the beginning of a long tour which cvas to last
4 months. He visited a number of countries at that time. But in that era
the president of the Ivory Coast had decided not to fly. Thus it was by
sea that he made this "little world tour." But 4 months away from his
country--that is indeed a long timel
While he was in Paris, insistent rumors of a plot reached him from Abid~an.
Distance contributing, he gave credence in the end to the assertions of
the security director, Mr Pierre Goba. While en route home,
Mr Houphouet-Boigny ordered the discreet removal from Abidjan, prior to his
arrival, of the presumed "brains" of the plot. Earlier, he had been sur-
prised by the silence of his interior minister, Koffi Gadeau, who had not -
breathed a word of what was reported to be afoot in Abid~an when he visited
him in Paris on several occasions. Questioned later, the minister swore
by all the gods that he had never heard anything about it.
The Ship of State
Without a doubt the president was not convinced, because he invited this
official to join him in his car to make the trip from the port to the office
of the Presidency. It went off without incident, but the presumed plotters
were arrested and given various sentences nonetheless. Jean-Baptiste Mockey,
regarded then as a potential dauphin, was even sentenced to death. It
developed subsequently that what was involved was a coup entirely planned L-
by the security director for reasons which remained a mystery. In any case,
the victims were released in 1967 and then reinstated. Jean-Baptiste Mockey
- became mi:zister of state charged with public health and population, in fact,
on 4 March 1976.
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When this matter comes up, Felix Houphouet-Boigny recognizes his mistake
and admits that "whenever I have to choose between injustice and disorder,
I choose the former because it is more easily corrected," And yet it is
necessary to have the time to make the correction. But this doctrine may
perhaps explain his distaste for causing bloodshed. He is one of the very -
few African political figures today who has had none of his political
adversaries executed. In 1973, when a group of young officers led by
Cpt Sio Koulahou organized ritual sacrifices, a practice which is widespread
in the Ivory Coast but the purpose of which in this case was the overthrow -
of the regime, the seven conspirators who received death sentences were
pardoned the fo=l~owing year. Once again, it is true, the plot died
,
a-borning. But in 17 years, rumors of plots have circulated in the Ivory
Coast en occasions. The foundations of the regime were not really
shaken thereby. Each time, the president of the Ivory Coast has answered
czndidates to succeed him with spectacular and often popular measures. The
decision adopted to turn over a good part of his assets to the state in
_ 1977, and the more recent decision to democratize the regime (JEUNE AFRIQUE,
No 1016), wQre among these lightning moves which always take everyone by
surprise. Houphouet-Boigny seems for his part to know full well where he
is headed. With the assurance of a sailor who knows his route, he has
_ sworn to guide the "Ivory Coast ship of state" ir.to safe harbor, despite
wind and seas. "Problems keep me in form," he admits. "When I have a week
without any, I worry that God has forgotten me."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
5157 -
CSO: 4400
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KENYA
BRIEFS
FRENCH-KENYAN RELATIONS HAILED--On 24 July, Chief of State Daniel Arap Moi
received the French parliamentary delegation that arrived in Nairobi on
17 July (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 25 July, p 1867?. Moi expressed satisfaction
with the good relations existing between the two countries and thanked the
French Government for the financial and technical aid which Kenya has re-
ceived for the completion of various projects, He said that the delega-
tion's visit constituted encouragement for the continuation of such aid and
bilateral cooperation. For his part, Emmanuel Aubert, head of the delega-
tion, was impressed with the development achieved by the local infrastruc-
ture and by the Kenyan people's sense of responsibility. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1928] 11,464
MINISTER ON KENYANIZATION PROSPECTS--On 25 July, Zachary Onyonka, Kenyan
minister of economic planning and development, announced that his government
intended to make "a substantial modi.fication" in its policy on foreign in-
vestments "in order to enable citizens to control the coantry's economy
better," he said. Speaking before members of the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, Onyonka said that the modifications would involve the joint pub-
lic and private enterprises, "which do not bring in enough," and conces-
sions made to foreigners. On the subject of j~int ventures in which the
government joins in partnerships with foreign capital, the minister sub-
stantially said: "Foreigners who generally control the management of these
enterprises do not invest a great deal in Kenya and tend to keep all pro- ~
fits for themselves. In some cases, they have even made the government
lose maney." However, the minister emphasized that reforms would be grad- -
ual and orderly. "We shall not take draconian and radical measures," he
said. In the face of the rising discontent and the xenophobic demonstra-
tions of students, one might be led to think that the refor�ns envisaged
must come soon. Moreover, despite the assurances of authorities, such
reforms risk going further than expected and bringing about a much more
far-reaching transformation of the extremely liberal regime that Kenya has
had thus far. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 1 Aug 80 p 1928] 11,464
PRESIDENT HAILS FRG RELATIONS--A delegation froni the Federal Republic of
Germany visited Nairobi during the latter half of July and on 23 July was
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, ?~c~is n~Frcrnr, l1SP: c~rv~,Y
received by Ct,ief of State Daniel Arap Moi. The president described the
- bonds of friendship and cooperation existing between the two countries and
emphasized the similar viPws of the governments on many international prob-
lems. Pre~ident Moi alsa recommended to his visiters the organization of
a conference bringing together industrialized countries and oil-producing
countries for the purpose of examining the deterioration of the world
economic situation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 1 Aug 80 p 1928] 11,464
CSO: 4400
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roR c~rrrcrni, usr: ocvi,r
MALI
ECONOMY REVIEWED IN CONTEXT OF COUP D'ETAT RUMORS
_ Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 pp 1779-1781
[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Conditions of Growth in Mali"]
[Text] Resorting to com~;uters to pinpoint the next coup d'etat in Africa
would probably not be any more effective than the old me thod of the diplo-
mats who, with the latest dispatches in hand, would try to narrow it down
on the map. The inadequacy or absence of regulative mechanisms such as
parties and trade unions or, on the other hand, the ineffectiveness of
police forces have resulted, by encouraging the interven tion of weapons -
sometimes nothing more than a revolver in bestowing a high degree of
uncertainty, even unpredictability, on the outcome of po litical antagonisms,
as was recently the case in Liberia.
~ -
Nevertheless, it so happens that the anxiousness of foreign ministries
joins the unconscious tendency of the media to contribute to the event in
order not to risk missing it and consequently, the situation of a government
may suddenly be deemed precarious. Naturally, such circtunstances presume
previous symptoms of social unrest or financial disorder, but it is their
simultaneous occurrence, the interpretation of the links supposedly uniting
them and the interreaction of worry and alarmism that give the phenamenon
its relief. Dramatization then takes over: Agitation turns into revolu-
tion and penury into bankruptcy. It is generally at such a time that the
coup d'etat takes place, but to the general surprise, on the opposite side
of the continent, where no one expected it.
Consequently, there can be no question of recommending laxity to African
leaders. Those in the Sahel in particular would be ill advised to adopt
such an attitude. The risks of the moment, whether it be a question of a
spread of the conflict pitting Morocco against the POLISARIO Front or the
activities of Colonel Qadhdhafi, devoting revenues derived from the Libyan
subsoil to the pursuit of a Pan-Saharan dream, should suffice to discourage
them from any such policy. The same is true in the Sahel of the steadily
increasing poverty since ttie 19th century, although long concealed by the
federal colonial regime and resulting from its total lack of adaptation to
the market economy, lacking exportable production. This increasing poverty
must inevitably generate social disturbances in precisely that part of
Africa where men are by tradition most inclined to banding together into ~ -
political groupings.
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i~ c~it c~t~ E~ t r, t nr, trst~. nNLv
While these coup d'etat alerts are not to worry govzrnments excessively or
undermine their vigilance, it is, on the other hand, ;aithin the historical
context described above that one must visualize the position of a coun.*.ry
such as Mali. The bitterness of the struggle imposed on a nation of 6 m11-
lion individuals in order to bring forth from its soil a~ustification for
its existence obviously does not constitute a factor of social pliancy, and -
, the changes that have occurred since independence demonstrate this. Rather
than seeing in the convergence of inflation, the drop in certain types of
production, the budgetary imbalance and a student strike the premises of a~
popular uprising, i.t appears preferable, in examining the facts, to rid
them of the Exaggerations that distort them and thereby avoid worsening
by compromising the image of a country abroad the difficulties it en-
counters in overcoming the crisis. It is even a duty for those who consider
man to be the supreme purpose of all economic effort.
Food Self-Sufficiency
Agriculture and livestock raising, which contribute 44 percent of the gross
national production, constitute obvious priorities for Mali inasmuch as due
to the fact that it is henuned in, the insufficiency of food has resulted in
imports that weigh heavily on the trade balance. Agriculture and livestock
raising are also the basis of all exports, with cotton alone representing
57 percent in value. The Malian economic policy is therefore measured by
the amount of resources, whether domestic or foreign, that are devoted to
development of the primary sector. The comparative results obtained give
an idea of the quality of the structures, equipment and management.
The first 5-year plan for 1961 to 1964, drafted and carried out under the
regime of Modibo Keita, devoted 25.2 percent of all spending to the sector,
meaning 16.4 billion CFA francs out of 65 billion. This distribution had
to be revised several times, and the total amount finally reached 78 bil-
lion, including 30 percent tor agriculture. Furthermore, these means were
strengthened by the Five-Year Program for Aid to Production and Diversifi-
cation financed by the FED [European Development Fund], in the amount of
5 million European accounting units. Coinciding with the policy of collec-
tive fields, the results of this financial effort, measured in tonnages
compared with those from 1960, were unfortunately disastrous: a drop of
31 percent for millet, 29 percent for rice, 19 percent for peanuts and
42 percent for cotton.
' The 1969-1972 Three-Year Plan, designed by the new military regime, set as
its essential goal the recti�ication of this situation. The primary sector -
accounted for 22 percent of the updated allocations, or 26.4 billion Malian
francs out of 111.5 billion. As early as 1971-1972, the 1960 performances
e had been reached once again for millet,�sorghum, paddy rice and peanuts and
= exceeded for cotton (74,000 compared with 12,000 tons), a result all the
more remarkable because the program only received half of the planned
Financial allocations.
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Taking the two updates into account, the 1974-1978 Five-Year Plan devoted =
32 percent of all allocations (917 billion Malian francs) to the rural
economy. For 1978, it set agricultural production ob~ectives of 931,000
tons for millet, 300,000 tons for paddy rice, 114,000 tons for corn, 137
137,000 tons for cotton and 228,000 tons for peanuts. The figures pub-
lished in May~ for the 1979-1980 season indicate that these objectives have _
been achieved for millet, sorghum and corn and far exceeded for cotton
(9 percent). The results are 18 percent lower than plans for peanuts
and 39 percent for paddy rice, which suffered from several unsatisf.actory
harvests after reaching the level set in 1977.
This necessarily summary picture of the results obtained by Malian agri-
culture nevertheless calls for several observations. A certain slump in
the rate of production observed from 1973 to 1976 is explained by the ~
years of drought that struck the Sahel and resulted, depending on the re-
gion, in a relative discouragement with regard to certain crops such as
peanuts and a partial return of rural workers to urban centers. Outside
of the controlled areas, it is diff icult to aseertain actual levels of food
production based on marketing statistics alone, which usually involve only
a very low percentage (some 3.9 percent for grain). Mbreover, the
production-marketing ratio tends to broaden in terms of inflation or the
scarcity of imported products on the markets.
Finally, it should be�noted that the production ob~ecti~~s themselves attri-
bute to the Malians themselves only a modest food ration: 150 kilograms
per person annually for grain, plus 10 kilograms of peanuts and 30 kilo-
grams of paddy rice, meaning that any drop in production for climatic rea-
sons makes its effects felfi immediately on the cities.
The very attention with which Malian authorities are following this problem
sometimes tends to exaggerate its seriousness in the eyes of foreigners.
In December 1979, the grain deficit for the 1979-1980 season was an esti-
mated 259,300 tons. Yn January 1980, a World Food Program (WFP)-FAO mis-
sion placed the f igure at 250,000 tons, based on official information.
In May 1980, it was reduced to 167,000 tons, a third of which will be
covered by foreign aid. In fact, the threshold of food self-sufficiency,
which in Mali is 1.2 million tons of grain, should be rather easily at-
tained in the coming years.
Unfortunately, seasonal increases mean that this reassuring observation is
somewhat theoretical for city dwellers. In August 1979, rice and millet
prices were 67 and 54 percent higher than official rates. A new increase
of 15 to 30 percent affected these prices in February. Procedures for
the regulation of prices could be improved if the Malian Agricultural Pro-
ducts Office (OPAM), which is in charge of them, had the necessary means,
which is not always the case.
The balance sheet of Mali's food possibilities must also take its cattle
into account. Even after the heavy blows of the drought, herds still
number 3 million head. The marketing and even exportation of the dried
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and smoked fi:~h production escapes all control, but annual totals very
likely exceed the off icial estimate of lOQ,000 tons. With international
aid financing 90 percent of their infrastructure, numerous pro,jects now
in production (Office of the Niger, Mali-South, Millet-Mopti, Haute-Vallee,
and so on) or others soon to be operational should provide self-sufficiency
by 1982. The recent startup of the Selingue Dam nieans that by that date,
some 55,000 hectares should gradually be irrigated. For its part, U.S.-AID
is subsidizing a 2,420-hectare project at Dire, based on wheat. This means _
nearly 65,000 more land under irrigation (not includir.g Manantali), whose
development shou~~. soon free Mali from the need to import any more �ood.
Industrial Crops
The spectacular development of cotton production spectacular both in
its extent and regularity is the work of the CFDT (French Company for
the Development of Textile Fibers), now the CrIDT (Malian Textile Company)
since 1974, with 40-percent participation in its capital by the French
~oint venture. In 1961, production of cottonseed totaled 6,403 tons, which -
figure rose Co 41,000 tons in 1969 and 127,000 tons in 1979. Figures re- -
cently published for the 1979-1980 season show a record harvest of 150,542
tons, produced on 118,612 hectares, or a yield of 1,268 kilograms per hec-
tare (dry farming), 91 percent of which from the Mali-South operation,
where cotton growing is done together with food and other crops such as
peanuts and dah, the textile fiber for sacks used at San by SOMASAC
(Malian Sack Company).
In 1979-1980, cotton represented for Malian growers a contribution of
12 billion Malian francs, with the 56,540 tons of fiber obtained from
ginning going to the credit of the trade balance of 43 billion. And yet,
its advantages are not solely economic. Within the framework of the Mali-
South operation, it supplied the central theme for initiating growers into
the practices of organic and mineral fertilizer and harnessed plowing and
weeding. In addition, it provided an opportunity for teaching them modern
agricultural management methods adapted to the particular conditions of
- the regions.
For Mali as a whole, peanuts have reached a ceiling of 200,000 tons, with
marketing amounting to approximately only a quarter of that tonnage. Once
the prime export product, it is increasingly consumed locally, at the ex-
pense of the country's oilworks. Production of dah is some 2,000 tons. It
could increase without any problem because it currently meets only 60 per-
cent of the needs of the national market. Initiated in 1966 with Chinese
aid at Dougabougou, sugar cane growing has gradually developed within the
framework of an irrigated operation directed by the Office of the Niger.
It is meant to meet local demand (30,000 tons per year). The ob3ective
seems two-thirds met, with plantations of 2,800 hectares supplying two
sugar mills. French aid anticipates supporting construction of a third unit
in the Sikasso region. In a later phase, a fourth plant could be built at
Dire.
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- In sum, the judgment one might make of efforts made in Mali in the field of
_ agriculture has no reason to be harsh, although it must necessarily be
one of nuances. The size of the problem has never been underestimated.
The structures adopted from 1960 to 1968 and the limitations character-
izing them have naturally yielded deplorable results to be made up for at
the expense of the general growth rate. But allocations provided in the
successive plans and programs have been adequate and while financing
difficulties have delayed their implementation, it is not the government's
fault. It is not clear that a distribution of resources more favorable to
the primary sector would have been effective, considering the length of -
time it tak.es for agricultural projects to mature. Finally, one must not
forget the very harsh blow, both technical and psychological, dealt to agri-
culture by the years of drought.
Despite a number of inevitable abuses and scandals which are not the
exclusive province of Mali severely dealt with, this agricultural policy
has been prudent, sometimes excessively so. We have already noted that one
of the weak points of the system resided in the poor organization of offi-
cial organizations entrusted with the marketing of products and the stabil-
ization of prices, but it is not necessarily their responsibility, insofar
as their funds come from tY?e government and their prices are determined by
social considerations unrelated to the law o� the market.
y Over the next decade, new water projects for agriculture should ensure Mali
of food self-sufficiency as well as appreciable surpluses for ~agri.cultural
industries and export. While there are still dark spots in the picture, _
nothing justifies the pessimistic descriptions of Malian agriculture given
at the end of 1979 by certain organs of the press. In particular, one
should note the announcement made on 22 December by a ma~or Parisian
evening newspaper,.concerning a cotton harvest totaling "under 30,000 tons,"
_ while the harvest, with 150,000 tons, beat all records and surpassed all
hopes.
Social and Political Context
Malian industry has been the subject of major allocations for successive
development plans and programs: 4 billion CFAfrancs for the first, 27.6
billion Malian francs for the 1969-1972 Three-Year Program and 240 billion
for the 1974-1978 Five-Year Plan, with financing and completions coming
only irregularly. It now contributes same 19 percent of gross national
production but is not a part of exports, consisting totally of an industry
replacing imports based, for its healthiest portion, on the processing of
the products of the soil. Another characteristic is that out of 50 enter-
prises exceeding the number of workers in commerce or handicrafts, 20 are
national or joint public and private enterprises, while they,use two-thirds
of a total of some 19,000 workers. '
It is the food industries that have achieved the most remarkable growth
rates over the past 5 years. From 1973 to 1917, their turnover went from
8,5 billion Malian francs to 32.6 billion. The growth of the textile
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industries is more modest, going at the same time from 5.1 to 10.2 billion
Malian f rancs. These two categories of industries alone represent 65 per-
cent of the cumulative turnover. The evolution of the industrial develop-
ment index (base figure of 100 in 1974) shows within th e branches, from
1976 to 1979, an increase from 132 to 142 for the national sector, from
171 to 280 for the mixed sector and from 129 to 215 for the private sector,
thereby accenting the underlying evils which, in Mali as in other African
countries, undermine the operation of national companies.
Considering the scarcity of investors, it is unfortunately difficult here
to envisage operations of reform, merger, restoration of private ownership
or outright suppression decided upon elsewhere. Gen Moussa Traore recently
deemed it necessary to deny certain rumors on this subject, stating that ~
"it was not a question of selling off the enterprises that remain the back-
bone of the Malian economy." Such measures, insofar as they affect oli-
garchies of civil servants all the more powerful because the economic
structures are less liberal, conrain an explosive charge encouraging caution.
The poor management of national companies obviously heightens the deficit
in public finances. The largest ones food and textile industries
also experienced a disturbing regression in 1979. The disorders noted in
Bamako at the end of the year are nevertheless only remotely linked to the
situation in the industrial sector, whose activity on the whole remains
marginal, even if its concentration in the cities increases its social im-
pact. The fact is that through corporative student dema.nds, incited and
maintained by the teaching corps, these disorders stem much more from a
financial crisis than from strictly economic difficulties. No latent de-
fect can be pointPd out in the agricultural or industrial structures, ex-
cept for management. However, the financial weakness appears in the high
figure of the foreign debt: 185 billion Malian francs, or 61 percent of
the gross national production, and in the consistent deficit in the balance
- of goods and services since 1970. In 1978, that deficit exceeded 87 bil-
lion Malian francs, and the balance was restored, with respect to the
balance of payments, only by means of the high total of transfers without
counterpart funds (50 billion) and capital transf.ers, all elements charac-
teristic of a way of living exceeding the counrry's means.
Foreign Debt in Mali on 31 December 1979 (in millions of Malian francs)
_ Wor.ld Bank 31,126.2
U.S.-AID 2,650.8
France 15,966.1
Federal Republic of Germany 22,408.6
_ USSR 66,091.2
China 38,156.8
African Development Fund 4,157.7
At the government level, this weakness is expressed in an annual budget
defir_it that has varied between 1 and 5 billion Malian francs since 1960,
with peaks of 10 and 11 billion in 1975 and 1976. The policy of austerity
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applied in 1979 apparentl.y made it possible to reduce the debt to .73 bil-
lion francs, which unfortunately also explains the end-of-year riots. For
1980, the budget has been drawn up to total 70.8 billion francs in receipts
and expenditures, but it is naw anticipated that 7 billion francs in special
receipts will be needed at the end of 19$0 to wipe away a deficit stemming
from 1979 as well as the regular fiscal year.
Mali's Balance of Payments (in billions of Malian francs)
1971 1976 1978 .
A. Goods and services - 18.5 - 46.1 - 87.7
B. Transfers without counterpart funds + 13.1 + 24.6 + 49.8
A+ B - 5.4 - 21.5 - 37.9
C. Long-term capital movements + 2.9 + 17.8 + 29.9
A+&+C - 2.5 -3.7 - 8
D. Short-term capital movements - 0.8 - 12.2 - 0.8
Total Balance ~ - 3.3 - 15.9 - 8.8
While the cont~xt of the December riots is first of all financial, it is
also political. The abolition of the "common portion" of secondary educa-
tion acted only as a pretext, or~ both sides, one might say, for the govern- ~
ment did not hesitate to yield on this point in order tu restore calm, which
was accomplished by payment of the back salaries to teachers and scholar-
ships to students, not only in Bamako, but in the Malian embassies in Paris
~ and Brussels as well. Beyond that, the demand for the elimination of com-
petitive exams for entry to the major professional schools, as absurd as
it may essentially be, expresses the rancor of the "subsidized" young peo-
ple, who believe they have the right to some wealth and even diplomas, on
a par with their comrades in other nations more favored by geography. It
is this rancor that is expressed by the demonatrations of school children
and students and also by the opposition of the men of the old regime, fol-
- lowed by that of the former comrades of Gen Moussa Traore, who find that
the future is a long time coming. -
The only response one can give to this rejection of reality, which should
not give way to resignation, is that Mali's relatively simple economic
structures should facilitate a basic reconsideration of government struc-
tures in the sense of a compression and that beyond a certain degree of
development, this economy does not require the unlimited use of foreign
investment characterizing the Ivory Coast. Another response is the one
given in 1979 by Franae, the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada by
canceling their Malian debts and initiating the conversion of operations
begun wi.th loans into operations using grants.
Nothing would apparently justify any change in regimes in Mali. At least
there is no sign of the far-reaching improvements a change might make in
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roK ~i~FTCinr. us~ onri,Y
the country, barring the discovery of oil or uranium. But such a change
- might be heavy with consequences at a time when the Sahara is echoing with
the sounds of war to which the Sahelian nations as a whole would be well
advised to pay attention.
COPYRIuHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
11,464
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SENEGAL
BRIEFS
NEW ENERGY SOURCES--Fields of peat have been discovered, in the Senegalese
regions of Cap-Vert, Louga (Center-North) and in Casamance (South), it was
- revealed on 17 June by Mr Cheikh Hamidou Kane, Senegalese Minister of
Industrial Development. Studies on the importance of the fields will be
launched this year, the minister explainedy in a speech given on the occasion
of the kickoff of a campaign i:o conserve energy. Mr Kane indicated, on
the other hand, according to the AFP, that the results of the oil prospecting
being conducted by seven companies in Senegal, would be forthcoming in the
next 2 or 3 years, and that the analyses of the heavy-oil field discovered
- off shore of Casamance and the studies of its being exploited would soon
get under way. According to the minister, Senegal, which, as we know, will
spend 50 billion CFA to pay its oil bill in 1980, and, thereby, has
"reached and even crossed the limit of the supportable," is going to
concentrate on exploiting its new resources in order to insure its energy
independence. In other respects, indicated Mr Kane, in less than two years
bioenergy (utilization of the energy of plants) will be utilized beginning
with the peanut shell for the production of electricity and even of "shell
coal: in two Senegalese oil works. Nevertheless, the anticipated coal _
production is only 25,000 tons, whereas the Senegalese consumption of wood
and charcoal is estimated at one million tons. While waiting for the
exploitation of these resources which the oil crisis has made profitable,
Mr Kane presented as an imperative the reduction of Senegalese ener~y
consumption. He announced in this regard the improvement in charcoal
manufacturing techniques, the perfection of new coal stoves, the broader
use of diesel for certain vehicles, speed limits and tax increases on the
big gas guzzlers. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 27 Jun 80 p 1624]
WATER RUNOFF STORAGE STUDY--The African Development Fund (FAD), an organ
dependent on the African Development Bank (BAD), recently granted Senegal
a loan of 1.02 million units of currency (approximately 263.2 million CFA)
to finance the possibilities of stocking tiie streams in the regions of
Casamance, of western Senegal and of Sine-Saloum. The loan is to be paid
back over a 13-year period including a 3-year deferred amortizement. The
goals of the study are: to harness all the water resources available on
the territory south of the 800 mm isohyet; to correct the poor geographic
. 2~ -
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distribution of the usable water resources by providing hill reservoirs
to the areas lacking in other sources of water each time the topography,
the geography, the geotechnology and the hydrology permit it; to recharge
the underground water-tables of the coastal regions and to protect them
against the invasion of the salt waters; to harness the irrigable zones
beginning with the streams thus accumulated. The study of stream stocking
involves in all a territory of 75,000 km2 located south of the 800 mm
isohyet. It will be accomplished in two phases. This study comes under
the goals of the government's regional development and the projects to be
identified will give it the means of attaining these goals. It will be
carried out in 1'l months by a consultant chosen following an international _
appeal for offers according to the FAD's usual procedure. The person
responsible is the Senegalese Minister of Equipment, Directorate of
Hydraulic Engineering, in Dakar. [Text] [Paris riARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Jun 80 p 1624]
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TANZANIA
~ BRTEFS
AGRICULTURAL STTUATION 1979-80~~Last year, Tanzania shot~ed fair results in
agriculture, But tfie production of rice, grains, and sugar will soon be
insufficient. Tfie 1978-79 year was better tfian the year before for cloves
and tea. Cof�ee production was estimated at 51,000 metric tons, 3/4 of which
was Arabica: It is to be improved in quality and quantity by a 4-year plan
financed by the EEC. Tea production was 17,500 tons; pyrethrum was down to
1,603 tons; cotton was 55,000 tons at most. Sisal production was 92,000 tons;
1979-80 forecasts of 115,000 tons were considered optimistic by specialists.
The 1979 clove harvest sfiould exceed tTiat of 1978 by 12,000 tons and earn
700 million shillings in exports. But.only 17,100 tons of tobacco have been
harvested instead of tfie 20,000 tons expected; some 23,000 tons are forecast
for 1980. At 70,000 tons, tfie casfiew nut harvest was well below that of
1977-78. Because of fraud, Only 370 tons of cardamum could be sold, instead
of 580 tons. The harvest of sim-sim (oil-bearing seeds) came to 6,500 tons
and was entirely exported for 52 million sfiillings, Only 100,000 tons of
sugar were produced instead of the 130,000 tons planned. Wheat had to be
imported--15,000 tons of it from Canada--because the harvest came to only
26,300 tons for 75,000 tons consumed. Similarly, 79,000 tons of rice had
to be imported from Japan and the.United States to add to the 23,000 tons
sold on tfie domestic market. jText] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 6 Jun 80 p 1329] 8782
MINING PROSPECTS--A new mining law was passed at the end of Ocotber; it
increases the role of the state in developing geological resources. Plans
have been made to tap a 30 billion cubic meter sea-bed gas deposit discovered
at Songo-Songo in 1974; they involve building a fertilizer factory, which
will produce 300 metric tons of ammonia and 400 tons of urea a day; it will
be built with the aid of Indian capital. Although only traces of hydrocarbons
have been found, AGIP [Italian Petroleum Enterprise] and the American firm
Amoco are participating in petroleum exploration in Tanzania. The UNDP [UN
Development Program] is contributing to nickel and copper exploration in the
Northwest, on the Burundi border. The very large iron ore deposits will soon
be opened up. The southwestern part of the country is estimated to have 50
million tons of coal. A West German firm has gotten a monopoly on uranium
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prospecting, and the Union Carhide Ex~loxati.on Cox~, has a monopoly on
niobium and rare earths, Diamonds are still tfie main source of mining
income in Tanzania. Some 2,979 diamonds were mined in tfi e�irst 10 months
of 1979 a1d brought in 252 million shillings. jText] jParis MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDTTFRRANEENS in French 6.Tun 80 p 1329] 8782
TEA FARMING PROSPECTS--In 1977, Tanzania produced 16,730 tons of tea, .9
percent of world production. Exports totaled 12,000 tons, bringing in
177.8 million shill.ings, 4 percent of all foreign exchange receipts. The
purchasing counr.ries were Great Britain (78.9 percent), followed by the
Netherlands, Canada and Pakistan. Tota1 tea production in Tanzania should
reach 25,000 tons by 1985, which will represent about 1 percent of world
tea production. The Tanzania Tea Authority (TTA), a public organization
.~nder the Ministry of Agriculture, has its main office in Dar es�Salaam
and its four plants are located in Rungwe (Katumba region), Njombe (Lupembe
regian), Bukoba (Bukoba region) and Lushoto (Mponde region). In 1977, the '
TTA produced 4,000 tons of tea, 24 percent of national production. The
TTA heads tea development programs in Tanzania. During the 1980-1984
period, the IDA [International Development Association] ($1 million),
NORAD [Norwegian Aid to DevelopmentJ ($1.3 million) and the Tanzanian
Government ($3.2 million) anticipate financing the following operations:
construction of a new plant in Ukal2wa, completion of the Mwaketili plant,
expansion and reequipping of the plants in Katumba, Lupembe, Bukoba and
Mponde ($6.2 million); constitution of a vehicle pool for the tea harvest,
a stock of spare parts and the ~xanting of transportation facilities for
the main off ice and the plants ($2.8 million); replacement of energy pro-
duction units using fuel by units using wood ($0.5 million); a program to ;
plant 20U hectares of tea in Njombe ($1.2 million); constructior.. of two
warehouses in Dar es Salaam ($0.3 million); construction and maintenance '
of 176 kilometers of roads in order to ship tea; and the financing of for-
eign technical assistance ($1.5 million). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1929] 11,464 -
FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR POLICE REORGANIZATION--According to a 5-year plan to
reorganize Tanzanian police recently published by the Dar es Salaam govern-
ment, 5,000 police officers will be recruited in the next 5 years, 500
vehicles will be purchased by the police, along wiCh radio equipment and ~
walkie-talkies, and 350 residences will be built for police officers. In '
1979-1980, the Tanzanian Government noted an increase in crime, armed rob-
beries in particular (1,751 for the fiscal year, 185 more than the preceding
year), in the country. Rustling is also on the increase: 2,235 cases re-
ported comp ared with 1,117 for the previous fiscal year. The establishment
of a police unit to fight livestock thefts has reportedly resulted in a
drop in the number of animals stolen: 45,133 head of livestock in 1979-
1980, compared with 48,467 head in 1978-1979. The government's effort on
behalf of the police can be explained in view of this statement. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Aug 80 p 1929]
l1,ti64 -
END .
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