JPRS ID: 10585 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070031-5
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/ 10585
14 June 1982
_ - rar~ Af ricc~ Re ort
_ Sub Saha
p
FOUO No. 776
FOREIGI~ BROA~C~IST INFORMATION SERVICE
.
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, JPRS L/10585
~ 14 June 1982
. SU~-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 776
- CONTENTS
INTF~R-~AFRICAN AFFAIRS
= Role of ~ench Spies ir~ Africa Reported
_ (Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Apr 82) l
� ANGOI,A
_ Oi~ ~rospects and Soviet Assistance
(MARCHES TROPICpTT~ ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 Apr 82) 7
- Bri ef. s
Soviet Dam Aid ' 9
CHAD
- Bri ef s
Canadian Aid to Refugees 10
- International Aid Meeting 10
CONGO
- Briefs '
~ FAC Aid for Eucalyptus ~ 11
P'RC A~.d 11
Congolese-Citoan Cooperation 11
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Bri ef s
F`inancial ITispute With Spain 12
GABON
Expert Iliscusses Problans Fa~ing I3evelopment of Fishing
_ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ?~DITERRANEENS, 2 Apr 82) 13
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUOJ
= FOR OFFIC[AL USE ON~.Y
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Expert Continues Iliscussion on Industrial F`ishing
- (MARCHFS TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Apr 82)
Brief s
- Arrest of Opposition Members 16
- Soviet Scientist~s Visit 16
- Petra~eum Discoveries 16
Arrests for Banditry 17
National Transportation Plan 17
MADAGASCAR
= Malagasy Socialism on Very E'order of Cor?miunist System
(Pascal Chaigneau; PC~UV~IRS, No 21, 1982) 18
- MOZAMBIQUE
Briefs
Cahora Bassa Electricity 26
IdIGER
Fire in Niamey Market C�rave Blow to l~ational Econo~y
_ (NL'~lRCHES TROPI~AU% ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Apr 82 ) . . . . . . . . 27
Briefs
- National Debate on Educatio~i 28
_ Japanese Equipment 28
UNDP Aid 28
NIGERIA
- Nigeria To Remain Firm of Petroleum Prices Despite Profit
Losses
= (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Apr 82) 29
= Fall in Shipments
Production Trends
RWANDA .
Kigali Bank Report on Rwanda Econo~}r in 1981
_ (MARGHES TROPICAU% ET MEDITERR,ANEENS, 16 Apr 82)........ 31
SENEGAL
- Diouf Projects Favorable Economic Prospects in 1982
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEN5, 9 Apr 82) 33
_ 1982-1983 Agricultural Production Goals Set; Latest ftesults
= Noted
- (MARCHES TROPICAU% ET MEDITERRANE~NS, 2 Apr 82) 34
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- Brief s
- Food Reserv~es 35
ZAIRE
- ~ Activity of Bank of I{inshasa Noted in Report for 1980
(MARCHES T,ROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Apr 82) 36
Brief s
1981 GECAMINES Production 38
- 1981 SOSIDER Stesl Production 38
, South Korean Technic~l Cooperation 38
Refugee Statistics 38
I
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- ROLE OF FRENCH SPIES IN AFRICA REPORTED
Paris JEUNE ~FRIQUE ~n French 28 Apr 82 pp 22-25
[Article by Francois Soudan: "French Spies in Africa"J
[Text] To some ;actent, every secret service has its own
specialty, its own "game preserve": Latin America for the
CIA, the Middle East for the British Intelligence Service and
Africa for the SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelli-
gence ServicE;, or rather, the DGSE, the General Foreign
Security Directorate, as Francois Mitterrand's services were
- renamed on 4 Apr~.l. The identiffcation of French intelligence
with the continent is so ca~plete that the invisible hand of
the honorable correspondents of Paris has been iYnagined behind
= every plot and coup d'eCat that has happened in Africa in,the
past 22 years. "There are several hundr.ed businessmen, big
shots in cooperatinn (lodged in the African ministries), mili- .
- tary men and agents fairly well known to the SDECE who have had
- Afri.can nationalism under surveillance since 1960. Their trade,
if I can call it ~hat, their'role, is to keep Black Africa in
the neocolonial fold," Bechir Ben Yahmed wrote six months ago
_ (JEUI~E AFRIQUE, No 1092), Consequently, the actors in this
neocolonial lobby play complementary, perfectly coordinated
_ ~ parts. When a spoilsport, whether it be a newspaper and we
know what we are talking abouti or a president, tries to
- mix up the play, then the players ger their backs up.
- For the ~ast year, Francois Mitterrand has had this bitter ex-
perience,.whose ~ain stages we outline here. There can be no
doubt that this dossier, the doasier of the "betrayal" of his
- services in Africa, will figure prominently among those he
- takes with him on his first presidential tri.p to Africa from
= 20 to 25 May.
What goes on in the head of .an agent when a regime passes or a presidency
- changes hands i~ a state secret. This is undoubtedly why, in the tiny commun-
_ ity of spies, secret police and o;.her fairly honorable correspondents, there
, has been as much talk since the election of Francois Mitterrand a year ago as
_ at the entry to General Headquartera. This does not mean quite the con-
trary that the most famous of them, at th~ Tourelles Barracka (General
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rvn .1rr~a,lAi. uo~ UIVLY
Headquar~ers, at the corner of Boulevard Mortier and the Rue des Tourelles, of
" the SDEC~, newly named the Gen~ral Foreig}~.SE:;urity Directorate sin~ce the be-
ginning of Apri.Z), does nDt close each evening.on a day replete with rumors
and corridor conspiracies.
Privileged Disagreemez~t ~
At the center of a11 the gossip, today and every time the French services
have been in a crisis in.the past 20.years, is Afr.ica, the private reserve
~ and place of privileged di~agreement. Or more pr.ecisely, of the strange
side-sli~ping, manipulations.and other diversions in which, in the shadow of
their African branches, the agents convinced that a socialist government in
Paris represents the absoli~te evil were.engaged. A~ake coup d'etat in
~ N'Djamena, a musical comedy putsch in Bangui, the "Patasse affair," the
succession of Houphouet, French-Gabonese tension: "We are misinformed," is the
Elysee's caustic re*r~ark to the Ministry of Cooperation. "They don't trust us
- anymore," is t:~e unanimous sigh uf�the 2;500 civil servants at ~ourelles. Is
it a premeciitated betrayal or a mere ritualistic criais of adaFtation? One
- thing is practically certain: For the f irst time in 24 years of the Fifth
Republic, a French government is facing a situation comparablQ to the one that
~ exisCed between the White House and the CIA under Carter: div~rce.
- Everything began un a ciay in June 198~1, with the arrival of Pierre Marion at
- the headquarter3.of what was still callec~ the SDECE (Foreign Intelli~ence and
_ Counterinteliigence Service). He was imiaediately viewed with suapicion. During
- the month of transition following the departure of his precedes~sor, Alexandre
de Marenches, embarrassing documents were.feveriahly ahredded, compromising
dossiers stuffed int~,inc~inerators'and truckloads of inemorandums shifted around
behind the walls of the harracks. The SDECE did not~vote for Mitterrand, to
- say the least. There wili be a witch hunt, the rumor went, and already, th~
black lists of the new team Were formulat~d in everyone's..minds. Furthermore,
- Pierre Marion's look was disturbing. The Service had finally grown used to
the whims, the~cigar and gourmet figure~of Alexandre de Marenches, Pompidou's
Porthos, that touchy taskmaster responsible for several massive purges: a
totaZ of 915 agents dismissed or driven out during his 11 years in power.
,And now the "Pool" would be headed by an old Mendes-France follower, a Mar-
seillais and graduate of the Polytechnical School with the look of a piano
mover who had became a leftist Gaullist before shifting to the movement of
Francois Mitterrand. In short, for the "Giscardized" agents.of .the SDECE by
far the majority he was the worst possible type of director, an ideologist
whc would lop o~.headsy given responsibility for cleaning out the stables.
Socialist-Gaullists
When the silhouettes of his "technical advisers" appeared in his wake, panic ' ~
- ensued: From university officer Pierre Dabezies to Admiral Antoine Sanguinett~
- (Alexandre's brother), from~Colonel Passy to Fernand Wibaux (formerly ambassa-
dor to Senega~ and formerly chief o� staff of Gaston Deffferre), all are
- "socialist Gaullists" to some extent. I~t other words, the enemy.
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- !lfrican Section
Nor did it take ~long. Und.er the baton of gendarmerie~officer Michel Roussin,
formerly staf~ director�for Al~candre de~Marenches, and Col Jean-Albert Sin-
gland, formerly head of ccunterespionage, it was a veritable game of musi~a;
_ chairs: Some 40 loyal serva:~ts of the previous director, such as Rene Dalmas,
Jean Bontoux, Yves Beccuau (psychotechnical adviser) or ~en Rene Crignola
(head of the Inf ormation Service branch in the Res~earch Directorate), disa~- ~
pear from the new setup, while Col Georgea Grillot, who was a close aide to
General Bigeard during the Algerian war,.and Gen~Jacques Sy~la Fouilland, an
"intellectual" much criticized witl,in the SDECE, were kept on or promoted,
- against all expectati ons. The fortt:er wen~t to the head of the .famous Action
Service and the latter hecame the No.2�man at Tourellzs.
This atmosphere of purges limited purges, it is true, but which Pierre
Marion, manifestly surpris~d by his appointment., mistakenly left to deputies
sometimes .~~ixious to settle their accounts joined with the profoundly anti-
- socialist feelings of.many agents, would bring about a rapid deterioration in
the quality of the ii~formation supplied, ~t~ such a point that Marion was
forced to have reported submitted to him systematically verified by competing
= services. Even more serioua was that after the banishment of General Crignola,
who maintained privileged relations with the Moroccan DGED [Directorate Gen-
eral of Studies an.d Documentation], the Egy~,tian Moukhabarat and the South
African NIS [expansion unknownJ, the entire 4frican section of the SDECE
- went over~ to the active opposition, with~the militant complicity of a neo-
colonial lobby that ranges from the Chadian and Centr�al African cotton indus-
try to the Gabonese oilmen. �
"Gabonese Clai?" ~
_ I
- The first s~rious symptom of tr~is "mutiny": came precisely from Libreville. ~
_ From Maurice Robert, French ambassador being diemissed and former�aide to ,
Crignola, to Colonel Daniel (ELF-Gaboa ~Gasoline.and Lubricants~Company of
France]),and in~Iuding Ger.eral Martin and Colonel Marion (officers in th~
presidential guard), Andre Casimir and Lieutenant Colonel Casterane (security
- services) or ~ven Jorge Jardim (former potentate of the Portuguese seti.lers
~ in MQZam'nique~ who became head of Interbanque) and Paul Bory (owner of the

' Multipre~se-Gahon publishing house), what at Tourelles is commonly called the
"Gabonese clari". would orchestrate a veritable antisocialist campaign with
Libreville authorities. From June to Oe~tober 1~81, until the arrival of the
replacement for Ambassador Maurice'Robert, Robert Cantoni, they would.try to . ~
- pers~iade President Bongo that Mitterrand wanted to "drop him," while stepping ,
up the calculated rumors and articles in the alick periodic:als (such as the
ma~ar. interview with Maurice Robert published in PARIS=MATCH). Nor were they
totally unsuc.cessful. because, in order to reassure a worried Omar Bongo, Elysee ,
_ adviser for African affairs Gsy Penne would have to make more trips to Libre-
ville (see the article by Siradiou Diallo in JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1090).
- There was some r~ervousness in Paris and Marion met *aith Fran~~is de Grossouvre
(adviser to Mitterrand for information affairs) and Minister of Defense Charles
kl~rnu several times. The subject of their discusaions: The American CIA was
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reportedly at the root of this strategy of tension. At ~he end of August, two
of Marior.'s aides went to Langley (Virginia) to th~ headquarters of the CIA
_ and returned half convinced by the vi:rtuous denials of Wi.lliam Casey's deputies.
It was in Bangui on 1 September, when General Kolingba ousted David Dacko,
that the second ac~ of the divorce was played. Th~ coup never actually was
one; this can now.be stated with certainty. With the consent of President
Mobutu of Zaire and President Bongo of Gabon, David Dacko, who was increasingly
_ criticized in Paris where he was labeled the, "awkward legacy of the Gis-
cardian era" and who was conv~nced that the "return" of Ange Patasse had to
= be avoid~d at all costs, turned over.the reins to Andre Kolingba. "I entrusted
- him with a mission," the formex president now hints: "Restoring order and ~
cleaning out the 'Patassists'."
- Local SDECE officials (Colonel Dulaurence and Ma~or Mansion) were undoubtedly
aware that srnnething was afoot. Did they "forget" to inform Paris? The trans-
fer of power from Dacko to Kolingba took nlace at 2000 hours in the evening on
30 August, at Camp Roux~ ~
"Counterforce'�'
The Elysee would not be infcrmed until the following day at 0830 hours and
_ the French ambassador to Bangu3 was not told, through Dacko's p~rsonal physi-
_ cian, a young Frenchman, until two hours later, at 1030 hours. There was
general ~nazem~nt at the Tourelles General Headquarters. Marion, that un-
flappable polyglot with the impeccabl~ manners, exploded, especially since he
had just learned that the American Fmbassy in Bangui was very active in the
we~eks preceding the "coup" and that it had to be involved in what happened.
HF: wanted to take aggressive aetion but his assistant, Gen Sylla Fouilland,
~rancois de ~rossouvre and Louis Sanmarco (a friend of Gaston Defferre who was
at one time governor of Ubangi-Chari), advised caution. ~f they wanted to
scotch the SDECE for Africa, they would have to have a replacement syst.~.m, as
De Gaulle had done at the beginning of the 1960's, in reviving the Foccart
~ networks. The.idea of a"counterforce" was bor~. It was said to have the
backing of Francois.Mitterrand. A discreet work group immediately set to
work at informal but re~ular meet~~gs between the Elysee and the Ministry of
- Defense, setting up the "Grossouvre ~}etworks."�
_ Forcing Paris To Intervene in Chad ,
- Wednesday, 28 October: Act 3. The imagined coup d'etat in N'Djamena. A week
after the "Cancun appeal" of Francois Mitterrand evoking the "urgent need" t~
send an inter-African foree~ta Chad it was, in fact, a matter o� protecting
- ~ President Goukouni from the vacuum created by the imminent departure of the
Libyan contingent an AGENCE FRANCE-PRES3E dispatch citing 11witnesses coming
_ from the Chadian capital" announced a pro-Qadhdhafi coup in N'D3~mena and the
- disappearance of Goukouni. On 29 October, several Parisian~ dailies featured
the coup in their headlines. However, as we would learn several hours later,
there never was a coup d'etat, not even an attempted one. French~authorities,
= feverish, to say the least, immediately spoke of manipulation, daception
_ and misinformatfon and promised an investigation. The purpose of the maneuver,
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it was s*?ted, was ~to force Paris to intervene directly in Chad once again. .
Possibly. The f.act remains that six months lat~r, the promised in~estigation
- into this strange dispatch has not yet yielde'd tangible results. The nama of
an AFP newsman c~ose to the Gaullist.opposition and certain military circles
was discreetly mentioned, but nothing~irrefutable supported the possibility
that he was actually at the.root of the deception.
- Whatever the reasans and motives for that�October mar~pulat~on and ~hey
- must still be c~ax~ified it is .obv~ous that the atmosphere withi~ the French
_ services is not tY,~e better for them; on the contrary. For the f irst time,
in fact, the officers at the Operations Center of Military Information, the
= Second Bureau, were directly stiapected by the.government. And, sin~e the
SDECE "mutiny," it was on this second pillar of French information that re-
sponsibility for the collection of information rested. Gaullists for the most
- part, these officers had previougly been very careful not to join up with the ~
SDECE "Giscardians." However, outraged at having been accused of disloyalt.y,
the most politicized among the..~ would also topple.
November 1981: T`.~~ work group of six officials made responsible, two months
- previously, for working out on paper a new syste~. of information directly under
the Elysee filed its first conclusions. It cat~gorically recotmnended against
the use of benevolent militants such as Ieftist technical assistants or members
of nongovernmental organizations: no French-type Peace Corps. On the other
hand, it did emphasize the importance of Masonic-type solidarities previously
- neglected. In Africa, men such as David Dacko or Omar Bongo are Free Masons
and Guy Penne, the Elysee African specialist, is also. The work group there~
~ fore attached to its report a�complete list of African presidents, ministers
- and high off icials who are Free Masons: all potential "collaborators," it
_ states. A rapidly operational system still has to be set up.
Reviving Foccart Systems
- The conclusions of the officials on this sub~ect are surprising, to say the
_ least: nothing other~than reviving the old Foccart system. Naturally, one
wauld not use the most dubious secret police, those most.highly marked and
_ the least reliable politically, but only tl~ose who "loyally" did their work
an3 that can be classified im the leftist Gaullist movement. Prominent per-
sons such as Roger Barberot, former ambassador to the Central Af rican Republic,
or pominique Ponchardier, formerly head of the services of order of General .
de Gaulle and now head of the Freneh Company for the Development of Textile
- Fibers (CFDi) a joint public and private co~?pany could also provide
useful advice. The anti-Giscardianism of these men, whom De Marenches had
- cast aside, in a sense, and many of~whom had turned to managing hotels and
- night clubs from Abid,jan to Libreville, would be,a pledge at l~east tempor-
ary of the~r loyalty. It would be a risky choice, without a doubt, but,
- unfortunately, there was no other. ~
However, at the beginning of.March 1982, a fourth "affair," once again in the
Central African Republic, would point up the inanity of such a solution and
demonstrate to what extent the divorce between Paris and its African services
is total. On the night of Wednesday, 3 March,�a group of rebel officers tYied
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unsuccessfully in Bangui to oust President Kolingba on belialf of Ange Patasse.
It was elements of the old Foccart networks linked to the cotton lobby who had
promoted Patasse in France and encouraged him to take power in Central Africa
_ (JEUNE AFRIQUE,.No i106). It ia now known that it was officers ia the Second
Bureau posted in B~ngui, Colonel Joubert and Colonel Faire, who helped,
through their reports sent to the minister of defense and then the Elysee, to
give credit to the thesis of a desirable return (in the name of regional
balance) of Ange Patasse. Moreover,, the villa of Colonel Faure, military
attache to the French Embassy, was.searched by Central Af rican soldiers on the
very day af ter~the abortive coup. �Finally, according to rel{.able sources,
Major Mansion (head of the presidential guard with. the rank o= lieutenant
colonel), No 2 man in the SDECE branch .in Bangui, reportedly deliberately ~
allowed General Bozize, co-author of the putsch,~to flee, with this military
- comment: "You are an ass; get the hel:l out of here!" .
_ A few days later, the anecd~te reached the ears of~Pierre Marion and Charles
Hernu. Major Mansion, alresdy called back to Paris a few months ago "for
explanations" following a"confidential" regort published in JEUNF, AFRIQUE
- describing his .excessively ~;ealous police acti~~3.ties at the Bangui airport,
will very certainly be transferred....
- Information Services Against Elysee
Foccart systems, the SDECE, the Second Bureau: It is now clear that it is
the entire Freaeh intelligence community whether active or dormant
that now plays, in varying degrees, again,st or without the Elysee. Nor will
any change in name for th~ SDECE, made public or 4 April, or the new missions
to be assigned ,to it (intensification of ecoitomic and scientific information
research, "a11-.points" strategy without any privileged targets), much less
the great reorganization announced actually, a mere d ismantling of the
directorate of the infrastructure and means be able to remedy the situation,
It is not enough to change the life guard in order far the water in the "Pool"
to become clear. .
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982 ~
11,464
CSO: 4719/948
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ANGOLA
OIL PROSPECTS AND SOVIET ASSISTANCE
_ Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 926
- [Text] . Even though it is not a member of OPEC, Angola paid close attention
_ to the special OPEC conferPnce held in, Vienna 19-20 March (see MTM No 1898
_ o;: 26 Mar, pp 827-828). Luanda counts on oil to provide most of its purchas-
i Ing power (80 to 90 percent), and a lower~3ng of the price of crude on the
world market is bound to hav~ serious consequences for its economy, which is
currently going through a niff icult phase.
- Mr Erminio Escorcio, managing director of th~ Angola National Oi1 Company
(SONANGOL), has talked about hfs concerns in thie area with AFP, emphasizing
- among other things that Angola, as a small producer, was not aff ected either
directly or indirectly by the decisions on cutting back praduction.
In 1981, Angola's oil production was lower than expected--only 6.8 million
_ tons, as opgosed to 8-9 million tons--"because of technical problems in
- Cabinda province." In early 1981, the off icial price was $38.75 per barrel.
Normally, Angola's oil is priced to conform with Arabian light except for
some necessary ad~ustments. Presently, Angola is negotiating prices separate-
- ly for each customer. Production of 10.5 million tons is scheduled for 1981.
~ It may well be helpful to describe the structure of Angola's oil operatians.
The majority of prospecting and operating conttracts have been signed with
Western companies--on the basis of 51 percent interest for SbNANGOL, 4y
percent for the foreigners. These contracts deal with offshore depo4its,
- all along the Atlantic coast from Cabiitda in the north to the middle of tr.~
- country the areas in the south have not yet been awarded.
Though Washington and Luanda have not r.ormalized diplomatic relations,
_ AngoZa's main oil partner is an American company, Gulf Oil, which established
itself in the country before independence in 1975. The French company Elf
has made two promising discoveries with its f irst two drilling projects.
Current conditions are not such as to encourage Angola to rest on its laurels.
The country has just signed an agreement with the Italian company, Agip,
for exploration and production at a deposit south of Cabinda (see MTM No
1898 of 26 Nlarch, page 865) and is moving to sign a new contract with Gulf
"that will be benef icial to both sides."
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Also, Mr Pedro Van Ilunem Loy, the country's energy and oil minister, left
- 22 March on a trip to West Europe that is to take him to France, Belgium,
Austria~, Italy and Great Britain--accompanied by Mr Erminio Escorcio.
The latter has been putting emphasis lately on the training of Angolan
technicians, stating that the long-term ob~ective is to create a petroleum
- university. Aiigola, h~ added, is also interested in i.n.cr.easing onshore
exploration and exploiting its natural gas.
As for construction of a s~cond refinery with Soviet assistance, he indicated
that this possibility was not yet being considered, as officials are still
considering the possibility of increasing the capacity of the Luanda re-
f inery that was shut down for 3 months as a result of sabotage.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreixx et Cie Paris 1982
- 9516
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
- SOVIET DAM AID--Three Portuguese companies late in March signed an agreement
with the Sov iets for the construction of a dam on t~ie Cuanza River at Capanda,
south of Luanda. The cost ~f the dam construction, buildings, roads and
the hydroelectric generating station will be borne by the Portuguese firms
and will be on the order of 16 billion escudos (1.4 billion French francs).
The Soviet side is to provide equipment for the production and transmission
of the electricity produced. Installation of a high-voltage line connecting
~ the towns of Quibala and Gabela (215 lan) is also a part of this trilatexal
project. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No
1900, 9 Apr 82 p 982] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 198~] 9516
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= CHAD
BRIEFS
CANADIAN AID TO REFUGEES--Canada will give the UN High Commission on Refugees
- $750,000 in response to its appeal for a program to assist in the repatriation
of Chadian refugees. The funds will come from the Canadian International
- Development Agency via the International Humanitarian Aid Program. [Text]
~ [Paris MARCHES iROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French Na 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 916]
- [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9f~93
INTERNATIONAL AID MEETING--In preparation for the international conference on
aid to Chad, postponed to late sum~er, UNDRO [Office of United Nations
Disaster Relief Coordinator] held a preparatory meeting in Geneva 5-6 April
for donor countries and organizations. The meeting focused on Chad`s needs
- for emergency and humanitarian assistance. The Chadian Government was to
be represented by Mr Taher Souleymane, minister of planning and reconstructiora.
- A high-level delegation from the OAU was.also expected. After describing the
current situat ion in the country, including its needs for debt and budgetary
support, UNDRO was to explain the emergency assistance program and report on
- the status of contributions received to date. [Text] [Paris MARQiES TROPICAUX
ET 1~DITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 97~.] [COPYRIGHT: Rene kioreux
et Cie Paris 1982] 9516
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~OI~GO
BRIEFS
- FAC AID FOR EUCALYPTUS--Three blocks of financing, totalling 410 millioi~ CFA
francs, have been opened to the Congo by the French Fund for Aid and ::oopera-
- l-ion since 1978 in order to increase the area planted in eucalyptus from 3,000
- to 8,000 hectares. A special organization, the Congo Industrial Afforestation
Division, has been created which, in addition r.o the FAC grant, has received
around 800 million CFA francs from the Congoleae budget over the past 3 years.
The 1982 sum will enab3.e planted areas to be increased to 9,000 hectares and
will vrovide maintenance for the 8,000 hectares alr~ady planted with eucalyptus
and pine, with the Congo's 1982 share amounting to 300 million CFA francs. The
FAC financing will cover the cost of technical assistance and durable goods.
According to the French cooperative mission in Brazzaville, all elements seem
- to be united on the scientific agricultural level to assure an effective
contribution to the establishment of a cellulose pulp plant beginning in
= 1985-86. By then, thanks to the financial efforts of the Congo, the FAC ai:_~
= probably the French CCCE [Central Fund for E~onomic Cooperation], the planted
area will exceed 30,000 hectares. jText] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
- MEDITERRANEENS in French no 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 917] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1982:] 9693
' PRC AID---A protocol for agreement between the People's Republic of China
and the Congo dealing with the construction of a 200-bed hospital in the
Loandjili-2 district near Pointe-Noire has 3ust been signed in Brazzaville.
- The wark will. begin in 1984. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French No Y899, 2 Apr 82 p 91.7] jCOPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie P~~is 1982.]
- 9693
CONGOLESE-CUBAN COOPERATION--Congo and Cuba have reaffirmed their desire to
continue to 3oin forces to expand and strengthen cooperation between the two
- countries, according to a final communique published following the work of the
_ third Cangolese-Cuban Joint Commission just held in Brazzaville. Acc~rding ta
the text, the fourth session will be held in Havana next year, and the da~e
will be set through diplomatic channels. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
- ET 1~DITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 973] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
- Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
BRIEF
FINANCIAL DISPUTE WITH SPAIN--Spanish judicial suthorities in Madrid froze
Equatorial Guinea's accounts in the Banco de Espana and the Banco Exterior
on 30 March. The decision to freeze the assets came in response to legal
- action �iled by one of the Equatorial Guinea C~ntral Bank's creditors, the
- Sociedad General Hiapano-Africana de Comercio, headquartered in Alicante,
~ fox nonpayanent of a 15-million-peseta b~!11. A similar freeze, imposed last
- February because the Equatoria3. Guinea Central Bank had failed to honor an
= SO-million-peseta credit note in the t3me allotted, was lifted 14 March after
- the note was paid. According to Mr Manuel Ferri, managing director of the
- above-mentioned firm, ;ahich specializes in trade with Equatorial Guinea, the
Malabo government still owes it 863 million peset~s. Mr Ferri, who is be3ng
represented by a law firm headed by former Spanish presiden~ Adolfo Suarez,
- said that he was dieturbed by thia indebtedness because political relations
l between Malabo and Madrid ar~ deteriorating. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TAOPICAUX
ET I~DITERRANEENS.in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 971] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516
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= i~
GA.BON
EXPERT DISCUSSES PROBLEMS FACING DEVELOPMENT OF FISHING
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82, p 916
~ [Text] According to Mr Rene Ondo,Nguema, Gab~nese specialist on marine affairs,
- quoted by the daily L'UNION in Libreville on 26 March, small-scale or pirogue
fishing supplies 31 percent of the fish consumed in Gabon, compared with 33
percent supplied by the commercial fishing industry. Nevertheleas, Gabon
imports 36 percent of what it consumes, primarily in canned form.
Freshwater fishing, specifies Mr Ondo Nguema, yields an average of S00 tons
annually. It is confined to lagoons and rivers. ~'reshwater fishing's low
yie].d is due to the fact that it takea place for only 3 months during the year,
in the dry season.
As for coastal fishing, it yields 3,000 tons. Coastal fishing activities are
. geographically widespread, but they are undergoing more intensive growth in
- the Cap Lopez area.
In the deep-sea sector, according to the same source, the difference between
the catch and the potential catch remains significant; total consumption can
- be estimated at 10,000 tons per year. In any case, consumption is related
to an effort to modernize the fishing infrastructure. Lack of an appropriate
infrastructure is still the major factor in the discrepancy and results in an
average yield per fisherman of approximately 4 tons per year, or 40 kg per
- day based on 100 working days. It would be desirable, Mr Qndo Nguema feels,
to encourage tishermen to consoli@ate to.make fishing.a full-time activity.
- It is felt in Gabonese fishing circles that such consolidation would make the
granting of credit for fishing equipment, particularly for improvements to
existing refrigerating plants, easier in areas where amall-scale fishing is
experiencing significant growth,~ chiefly in the southern coastal region. All
- this presupposes a satisfactory evaluation of the small-scale fishing effort.
- On the other hand, development of fish breeding remains a priority ob~ective
of the Gabonese Government. This program involves the provinces of Woleu-Ntem,
- Ngounie, Ny~anga, the Estuary, Ogooue-Lolo and Haut Ogooue. L'U~iION stresses
- that small-scale fishing, like fish breeding, has an advantage in that its
development requires a relatively small investment compared to the comm~ercial
fis?zing industry, which is still very localized.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie paris 1982. ~
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_ ~ .
� ~
� GABON
.
EXPERT CONTINUES DISCUSSION ON INDUSTRIAL F23HING
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr ~2 p 972
[Text] In our 2 April 1982 3ssue, page 916, we published a piece on Gabon's
s~nall fishing industry. The same sourc~ quoted in the daily L'UNION--Mr
- Rene ~ndo Nguema, a Gaboneae expert on marine matters--has also provided
some information on industrisl f ishing in the country.
The f ishing industry has been declining gradually since 1973. The industrial
catch has decl3ned from 4,400 to 3,300 tons per year. This decline is main-
ly due to imbala,nces in the utiliz~tion of f ishing zones.
- The only sustained activity still going on is in the Libreville region, while
the real potential for optimum yields, especially in terms of trawler f ishing,
is 3n the southern part of the Gabonese littoral. Thia is related to problems
in preserving and transporting the f ish producta found in that area.
- Nevertheless, industrial fishing accounts for 33 percent of the f ish consumed
- in Gabon and involves both coastal trawler~fishing and open-sea fishing
further out.
Trawler f ishing is possible over an area of 1,800 square kilometers north of
Cape Lopez and in theory could yield as much as 140 kg per hour. South of
_ Cape Lopez, trawler f ishing is possible over a larger area covering 4,500 ~
square kilometers, with yields up to 330 kg per hour.
The region is suitable for both trawler and trawl-13ne fishing. The latter
technique is complementary to the former, as it can be practiced on the rocky
sea-bottom that is inaccessible to the trawlers.
The current f ishing area, which remains l~mited to the Libreville region,
provides 3,400 tons per year. Some species are the subject of much more
trawling than others. Some, in fact, are being overf ished. Some 1,400 tons
of shrimp are being taken, for example, even though it is not rational to take
- more than 900 tons a year.
There are prospects for annual trawler production to reach between 5,000 and
6,000 tona. But the country as a whole probably needs some .10,000 ~ons more
- of fishing products than it produces. Consid~ring only the regions where
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fresh fish can be obtained from Libseville, the shortfall might be reckoned
at 1,000 tons, to which should be added another 1,000 tons to account for
= the growing needs.
In 1978, 27 percent of industrial f ishing sector employees in the group of
coastal countries that are members of UDEAC (Customs and Economic i3nion of
_ Central Africa) were Gabonese. Fishing is now a leading emgloyment factor on
the maritime scene, and its role is destined to increase as the fishing sector
grows.
_ Insufficient production of ice (20 tons per day) causes interruptions in the
supply of Gabonese fish. The result is zigzag production, reinforced by
= seasonal vagar3es that inhibit normal growth of small f ishing An the mainland
during the rainy season. Thus, a period of abundance can follow on the heels
- of a period of shortage, and the repercussions on prices are immediate.
- All things cansidered, the price of fish sold at offloading points is relatively
low, especially for the coastal population. This does not always lead to
prof itable investments. The fisherman, lacking ise, is in fact often con-
_ strained to sell his fish at a ridiculously low price. This is true at
wholesale and retail levels as wel~..
The distribution system is another innpediment. Its defects only reinforce
the disparity between consumption in the urban centers and the rural regions.
The fact that certain key roads are impassible in ttae rainy season means that
the lack of facilities for the storage of f ish results in considerable losses.
~,f; for solutions to the problems in Gabon's fishing sector, Mr Rene Ondo
Tiguema believes that they lie primarily in improvements in the facilities for
icemaking, to bring ice production up to at least twice the current level.
At the same time, it is essential to reorganize facilities for freezing and
_ storage and to make them available wherever needed. This would make it pos-
sible for centers far removed from the fishing sites to be regularly supplied.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie P~ris 1982
9516
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GABON
BRIEFS
ARREST OF OPPOSITION MEMBERS--The AFP correspondent in Yaounde has provided the
- following information on the arrest of more opposition members fn Gabon, fol-'�.
lowing those of last December. Three ~ournalists were brought in fAr interro-
gation between 11-16 March and have been detained in the main prison at
Libreville. They are Samuel Nguema Mba, editor-in-chief of the national
daily L'UNION; FranGOis Ondo Edou, news editor at the Gab~onese national radio
station; and Jean-Baptiste Asse Bekale, a 3ournalist with A~RICA N0. 1. Also
arrested, according to the same sour~e, were Jean-Marc Ekoh, former minister
of educat ion under President Leon Mba and inspectar c~f Protestant private
schools; Michel Ovono, ministry of mining engineer; and a secretary, Miss
- Marguerite Eyaa Nkeme. Mr. Ekoh,was in Makokou when he was apprehended. So
far none of these people has been formally indicted. Their domiciles have
been searched. The search carried out at the home of Mr Samuel Nguema Mba
was under the direction of a"Frenchman in civilian clothes" and fnund nothing,
according to the reports of the journalist's relatives who arrived in Yaounde
= on 5 April. The same reports also speak of "brutalities" and "bullying" in-
flicted on some of those interrogated. Mr Samuel Mba was reportedly made to
strip and sleep on the earthen floor of his ce~.l for the f irst 8 days of his
- detention. Mr Michel Ovono was reported].y tortured with electric shocks.
[Text) [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr
82 p 971] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516
SOVIET SCIENTIST'S VISIT--Dr Anatoliy Gromyko, director of the USSR's Africa
Institu~~e and Academy of Sciences, left Libreville at the end of March fol-
lowing a visit of about 2 weeks in Gabon. The son of the Soviet foreign
minister, Mr Anatoliy Gromyko was touring of Africa on bQhalf of UNESCO,
and Gabon was the last stop on the tour. Tfie Africa Ir~stitute and Academy
of Sciences which he heads in M~scow is plan,ning to carry aut scientific re-
search on the traditianal art of the peoples of tropical Africa. Gabon,
because of its artistic and cultural diversity, will have a prominent place
in the research project. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPII:AUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 971] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris
1982 ] 9516
PETROLEUNf DISCOVERIES--The Gabonese mini~:ier of mining and oil has announced
that the Elf-Gabon company has ~ust Wade two oil discoveries offshore from
central Gabon on drilling sites it holds ~ointly with Elf-Aquitaine (SNEA).
The first discovery involves the No~d Marine 1 Gonelle extension well, near ~
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the Gonelle field, where the Batanga sandstone was found to contai.n oil at
- a depth of 43 meters. The second involves the West Marine 1 Mandaros well,
near t?~e Mandaros field, where the Batanga sandstone was found to contain oil
at a depth of 11 mezers. On the basis of production tested so far, it is
- i~~~~~ ed ~ har ea~h ~f rh~sH weJ.ls has thQ potentLal to produce l00 cubic
_ mEters a day. [Textj [Paris MARG'HES TROPI(:AUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in FrQnch
No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 972] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516
- ARRESTS FOR BANDITRY--The Gabonese criminal investigation department succeeded
at the end of March in arresting a group of criminals (including Nigerians,
Cameroonians and Gabonese) who committed two dramatic thefts in Libreville
sevetal months ago: 48 million CFA francs from the Banque Centrale and 13
million CFA francs from Air Gabon. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERREINEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr. 82 p 916] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693
- NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLAN---On 16 March, in Libreville, lst Deputy P~ime
Minister Georges Rawiri, minister of transport and heavy industry, presented
the National Plan for Gabonese Public Highway Transpor~ation, prepared by
Jean-Claude Ziv, director of the association for technical studies in planning
and urban development at a Paris university. With the exception of certain
points to be reviewed, the plan has received the approval of the lst deputy
prime minister, who will submit it to the next Council of Ministers meeting
for study. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
_ No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 917] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693
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- MADAGASCAR
MALAGASY SOCIALISM ON VERY BORDER OF COMMUNIST SYSTEM
_ Paris POWOIRS in French No 21, 1982 pp 108-116
[Article by Pascal Chaigneau: "A Mode of Socialist Orientation on the Border
: of the System: the Remarkable Case of Madagascar"]
[Text] The Malagasy politic2l structure, taken in the con-
- text of the world communist system as a whole, clearly shows
that this country belongs to the ~tates oriented towards
- so~ialism operating at the very border of the system. The
= ideo2ogical beliefs, ~.he institutional and economic choices,
the option establishing the foreign policy all cont.ribute
to this statement. However, a political and sociological
analysis based on the: very realities and vicissitudes of
- the regime tends to show some non-negligible brakes on the
irreversi.bility of the Soviet influence and on the durability
- of the present structure. Nevertheless, the true problem
consists in perceiving that the concessions already made to
the USSR must be analysed basically in military and strategic
- ~ terms.
After 12 years of militant ar..ticommunism (1960-1972) and an especially troubled
_ transition period (1972-1975), the Great Island [Madagascar], under the leader-
, ship of Commander Didier Ratsiraka, was to see the advent of the Democratic
- Republic of Madagascar, extolled as being "resolutely socialist" in its
conc ep t .
In order to clarify the nua~nces and consequences of such a choic~, we must
therefore ponder first over the phenomena which allow us today to place
Madagascar in the category of states oriented toward socialism and, second,
over the: durability of the system and what safeguards may exist against the
irreversibility of the Soviet presence.
Cor~sidering that the world conununist system can be dividedl into "socialist
p~,rty-states" which form the "community of socialist states," parties forming
the "international communist movement," and "states oriented toward socialism,"
an intermediate stage usually leading t.o a party-state, two different
- approaches a].low us to xntegrate Madagascar into the latter category thus
- placing this country on the border of the world communist system: the choices
_ made by the political decision-makers, and the elements of the Soviet presence
and influer.ce.
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Asfar as political choices are concerned, three essential factors contribute
_ to give credibility to a Malagasy socialis~n that would be more Marxist than
specific: th~ determinants of a fundamental theorization, the economic .
- measures taken, and the data which condition the country's foreign poiicy.
Thus, in spite of multipl~ references to authenticity and specificity, the
, ideological-doctrinal support of the regime, the "Charter of tlxe Malagasy
Socialist Revolution" (als~ called 1�Boky Mena," i.e. little red book), appears
to be a melting pot of ideologies, the true originality of wh~ch is that it
_ brings side by side tYe traditional principles of Marxism-Leninism, loans from
- tbe Chinese doctrine (as f ar as agricultural development is concerned), and
legaciea from Kim-Il-Sungism (especially the theory of the three revoluticns),
= all to provide appropriate reference to the societal background of the country.
Also, institutionally, whereas the Malagasy constitution of 29 April 1959
offered extensive similarities to the F'rench model of October 1958 (apart
from the fact that a unicameral system had been chosen}, the operational
mechanism of the Malagasy constitution of 31 December 1975 will be best under-
stood with reference to the Algerian structure and the Soviet constitution of
1977. Indeed, the legal philosophy of the author of the constitution is es-
pecially clear when it comes to strengthening the state and introducing a
distinction between state power and state administration; the only major de-
viation from the traditional socialist concept resides in this case in a pres-
identialisin which ~ives to the head of the state the powers which, in the
Soviet Union, are given to the praesidium of the Supreme Soviet.
Along the same line, where economy is concerned, we should also note that the
country has taken all the measures characteristic Af traditional socialist ,
countries, viz. nationalization of key sectors, centralized planning and
creation of a ministry to that effect, and the drawing up of "charters" de-
- signed so that, by the year 2000, the national economy should be ruled only
by socialist enterprises, state farms and socialist cooperatives which, in
- their f inal version, will be directly related to the kolkhoze model.2
F?nally, apart from ideological deterrainants and economic data, the foreign
policy choices made confirm the impression of an alignment--at least a partial
' one--on the East, in sFite of a political discourse officially advocating ~
a multidirectional orientation.
_ Thus, the Malagasy leaders have joined the "progressive camp" of the OAU,
supported the PLO artd the POLISARIO, and actively aided movements as strongly
- committed as Militan.t Africa,3 African Progressive Countries and the World
Peace Council.4 In addition, the most obvious materialization of North-Korean
irfluence on Malagasy pctitical thinkers was to be the convening of the Third
Inrernational Seminar on Djoutche's (Kim-Il-Sung) Ideas, at Antananarivo on
29-30 September 1976. Simultaneously, the Conference of 1Vor,aligned Countries
(Havana, 1979) showed that the Great Island had placed itself in the block
which was taking sides with the Soviet and Cuban, and 1980 was to see an
intense diplomatic activizy along the line of "the It?uian Ocean as a zone of
peace."5
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Finally, in.the test UN vote on Afghanistan, Madagascar cle a rly a lign ed
itself on ~he Soviet position. ~
In addition, the key elements of a Soviet-ICorean presence and influence in the
country now allow the observer to place Madagascar on the border of the int~r-
national communist system.
Three major approaches to the study of these problems should be considered:
the military and strategic approach, the use of "relays" aimed at controlling
tlte state apparatus and the military, and internal. partisan support.
In this respect, where~.s the Soviet-Malagasy diplomatic relations established
on 29 September 1972 have, economically speaking, not produced much except
in the mining sector (in spite of the creation of a Joint Cooperation Commis-
- sion in 1979), the situation has been entirely different in the military sec-
- tor since 1977. Thus, as of this writing, and apart from the land forces and
the army service corps regiment budgets, the Malagasy air force consists of
8 MIG-17, 13 MIG-21, 6 MIG-23 and a YAK-40 carrier, respectively supplied by
the Korean Bemocratic Republic and by the Soviet Union, and still piloted and
~ maintained by military personnel delegated from Pyongyang and, to a lesser
extent, from Hanoi.
- In addition, since the USSR almost always links underlying conditions to the
supply of equipment of this type, the MIG 21 ~nd 23 aircraft were accompanied
by another present that could not be refused: three radars design~d to cover
- the Mozambique Channel and the Southwest Indian Ocean.
As a result, from the. giant natural aircraft carrier which Madagascar consti-
tutes, the Soviet Union is now in a position, should the accasior. arise, to ,
launch a large-scale action on Soutii Africa, an essential consideration when
one realizes that the South-African problem (especially in view of the situa-
tion in Namibia) is ~o become a preferred line o.f the USSR policy on that
cor~tinent.
Indeed, while the Diego-Suarez naval base is not yet under Soviet control,6
the problem of that area should essentially be viewed in terms of air bases.
In this respect, huwever, apart from the radar stations which we have already
mentioned, the Soviet already have at their disposal the Ivato airport and the
- former NASA base at Arivonimamo which provide them with the means for a firsr
class airlift in this western part of the Indian Ocean,through which close ta
two thirds of Western Europe oil supplies must pass on their way to rounding
= the Cape.
Simultaneously, the p ast 5 yea rs have seen the beginning of a dual attempt
to control the military institution and the security services where military
- Personnel, Soviet "technical advisors" (some 100) and Vietnamese and North
Korean "relays" (approximately 400) are working side by side.~ In this res-
- pect, in addition to trainin~ and supervising the army proper, North-Karean
nationals are now infiltrating the DGID [Directorate General for Information
and Documentation]--an essential organization of the state apparatus, in charge
of investigations, secr.rity and intelligence--and they have established them-
= selves in the most strategic organs of the internal mechanism of the
government.
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Finally, among the Malagasy political forces, the USSR can rely on a non-
negligible political party to support its implantation process: the AKFNY
[Congress Party for Malagasy IndependenceJ.8 A party of cadres, representa-
- tive of the Antananarivo bourgeoisie, this organization is directed by prot~s-
tantsin a way which does not conf~rm very much to Weberian analysis, and for
23 years now it has rem~~ined faithful to the principles of Marxism-Leninism,
and intrinsically pra-Soviet; it appears to be the political core on which the
USSR is counting. Actually, to influence Malagasy policy in favor of the
- "brother country," this party has assets which range from its infiltration
of state organizations and its influence on political decision-makers~ to
its leadership in associations which have joined the world communist movement,
not to mention brain training, either through scholarships at the Patrice-
_ Lumumba University in Moscow (900 Malagasy students are now studying there),
- or through its conrrol over the protestant college at Antananarivo (through
the president of the party, the Rev Richard Andria-Manjato).10 In this per-
spective, the AKFM is a privileged asset and the privileged place for the
political and intellectual penetration of Soviet ideas in Madagascar.
However, although the above-mentioned elements allow us to classify Madagascar
typologic~lly--both with respect to its choices and to the degree of inf luence
- --among the states oriented toward socialism and acting on the border of the
~ system, we should now consider what safeguards may exist against the irrever-
si.bility of ;.he line it i~ now following.
From this point of view, it seems that two categories of determinants, socio-
political and economic, will interact.
Fro~r. a socio-political point of view, the problems that arise are that of a
- non-receptive societal graund, tr.e existence of a complex multiparty social
fabric, and the inefficiency of the regime structures.
In this respect, the Malagasy population, imbued with an insular nationalism
- evidenced by its ricr. history, proud of its specificity (reinforced by a single
- linguistic vehicle) an~. for whom the concept of national independence has a
powerful connotation, certainly does not offer the most propitious conditions
for a So~-iet-Korean-Vietnamese presence on its territory, as is evidenced
by many pamphlets published in the capital by university circles.
Nevertheless, it is within the parties and political organizations that the
~ main inadequacies can be observed. Thus, if one assumes that a co~unist
- party,or a sin�le party stru.ctured along the fundamental principle of demo-
cratic centralism, is a prerequisite to the materialistic procedures of a
power leaning toward socialism and to its perpetuation, then Madagascar is
' far from filling the bill.
In fact, the Vanguard of thE: Malagasy Revolution (AREMA)--the presidential
- party originally seen as a stillborn oligopoly resulting from an improbable
merger of existing parties--is now experiencing an obvious scission as it
- breaks down into a series of smaller groups and networks. A catch-all party,
beyond the simplistic idea of the absolute domination of a party, the AREMA
bears the scars of the almast total ideological competence of its cadres, of
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i its excessive weakness at the organizational level, and of divisions following
which an entire fraction of the party (the so-callect "isoraka," i.e. right-
' wing, AREMA of Antananarivo) appears to be virtually~ antagonistic to the trend
gathered around the president of the Republic.ll
Moreaver, in the case of Madagascar, the institution of a party monism clashes
with a powerful multiparty tradition which goes back to the eve of World War II,
J or even, in certain of its aspects, to the period 19Z0-1915. This, and the
= fact that temporary structures tend to perpetuate themselves, accounts f or
- the survival of a"Front" which brings together seven groups with widely dif-
ferent ethics and political philosophies, all of whi~.h--except for the AKFM
and certain elements of the presidential AREMA--are crossed to a greater or
lesser degree by anticommunism, antisovietism and self-centered nationalism,
the adoption in principle of the current ideology being perceived only as a
- prerequisite for survival.
- Also, the army has gone far beyond the purely corporatist stage and must now
be considered in ter~ of "military parties", in which the leadership remains
~ monopolized by elements trained in France before 1972, and all the less pro-
= Soviet as the introduction of foreign members inside a military institution on
which the regime must rely to a large extent to ensure its survival has some-
- times caused ill-concealed reactions of rejection.
Faced with this situatian ccnsubstantial to the political f abric, the actual
penetration of socialism is f urthermore complicated by Che fact that the
ope:rational and administrative skeleton of the system, the "socialist Fokono-
- lona," an ancestral socio-anthropological institution adapted to the needs of
an ideological orientation, is going bankrupt and undermining the vary bases
~ of state interventionism. Indeed, the decentralized communities," which were
advocated as the spearheads of Malagasy,socialism, have in practice found them-
i selves emptied of their conceptual substance to such an extent that the
actual ability of the state to relate to the people is now being questioned.12
' Finally, in addition to socio-political facts, the present economic difficul-
ties of the country (less than one day's worth of foreign currencies in reserve
- on 1 January 1982), the global failure of the production system (identical
, choices will prodt~ce identical ef.fects, no matter under what latitude), the
almost total shortage of staples in urban centers, the rise in inflation and
- tl-.e collapse of agricultural production which led to the rationing of rice
~ (a staple food of the people), have brought the public to question the validi-
ty of a doctrine presented in the political discourse as designed to ensure
happiness, and producing a diametrically opposed effect in real life.
Simultaneously with the saturation of society as a whole, the increasing role
- played by France in the economic survival of the country and the development
of a climate of permanent tension and latent crisis are beginning to cause
_ the bourgeoisie--although it has been pampered by thE~ regime--to question the
- objective value of the orientation chosen and the possible inadequac~ of a
way leaning toward socialism for Malagasy socio-cultural realities.
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In view of these many problems, and in the absence of operational results at
- home, the "progressive" foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of Madagas-
_ car musC above all be perceived as an alibi intended to give credibility to
an assumed importance abroad, the better to hide a domestic fail�Y^.
= We should then note that the price of ideology has been first rate military
and strategic concessions which have strengthened the Soviet presence in a
- zone as vital as the western part of the Indian Ocean. .
- In spi te of al.l, and contrary to t he s i t u a t i on in '.:go, none of the under-
- lying conditions which would make it possible to go f,~m a socialist orienta-
- tion to a ~ocialist "party-state" is now present ir.l~Iadagascar. Also, the
threshold of irrevErsibility has not been reached, anu it is significant to
= note tha.t no validly constituted political take-over has yet been ensured.l3
_ Therefore, if the. present regime were to succumb under historical vicissitudes,
i~ is important to note that the Soviet Union does not yet have an "alternate
- solution," since the AKFM itself--because of its "Merina" ethnical coloring--
does not appear ready to assume control of the state apparatus. There remains
the military institution, the last recourse in case of an open crisis, and one
_ wh.ich twice already has had to assume the power; at present, in its most re-
presentative trends, it does not favor eith~:r ideological interferences in
- politics, nor the creation of privileged links which would place Madagascar
~ on the border of the world co~nunist system.
- Nevertheless, we should recognize the difficulties of a prospective analysis
- and, in ~~iis.respect, distinguish between what is possible artid what is
probable in a global strategic context in which the USSR is becoming in-
creasingly interested in the Great Island as was shown, after President
_ Ratsiraka's visit to Moscow in September Z981, by the reception of a Soviet
_ delegation headed by the first ecretary of the Uzbek Communist Party,
last November in Antananarivo.l~
- FOOTNOTES
- 1. See the typology established by A.nnie Kriegel in "The Dimensions of Soviet
Expansionism," a paper presented on 6 January 1982 at the EHESS-IFRI [ex-
= pansions unknown] Symposiimm on "The Form of Communist Expansionism."
_ 2. Charter of Socialist Production Cooperatives, Official Gazette of the
Democratic Republic of Madagascar, 16 July 1977; Charter of Socialist
Enterprises, Official Gazette of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar,
_ 1 May 1978.
- 3,. Let us recall that Militant Africa representsthe "hard-line block" on
this continent, and ~hat it now counts most states oriented toward
socialism among its members: Algeria, Angola, Benin, the People's Republic
_ of Congo and Mozanbique. Soon, Madagascar became one of ~he spearheads of
the movement, and the orgar:ization has been headquartered in Antananarivo
since 8 July 1976.
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4. Meetings of both movements were held in the Malagasy capital, respectively
on 17-19 May 1978 and 23-27 January 1981.
5. On the problems resulting from Malagasy diplomatic activity likely to favor
Soviet tactics which would tend to include the Gulf in the Indian Ocean
zone, see among others: LADOJSKI, A., "The USSR Struggle to Make a Peace
- Zone out of the Indian Ocean," LA VIE INTERNATIONALE, August 1981;
Admital LONG, in INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 21 April 1981, pp 1-2.
- 6. Until now, the Malagasy government has rejected Soviet overtures in this
respecC, the international (and domestic) opinion being sensitive to
- this question.
7. North Korea is to be considered here as a"specialized contributor" accord-

~ ing to the terms of the last of the three criteria defined by Annie Kriegel
- to analyze the relative originality of the states belonging to the world
= communist system: (1) conformity to the dual Soviet model; (2) conformity
in foreign policy; and (3) general or specialized participation in the
= operation of the communist system.
= 8. The Congress Party for Malagasy Independence created on 10 November 1958.
9. The AKFM is one of the seven parties belonging to the National Front for
the Defense of the Revolution which cooperate in supporting the. regime.
10. College of the Madagascar Federation of Protestar:t Churches.
- 11. Under the leadersrip of the minister of Finances, Mr Rakotovao-Razak.aboana,
this "opposition AREMA" also ~srows the blocks which exist within the state
apparatus itself, along with tactical and doctrinal rivalries which can
be seen from the fact that, in spite of the president's instructions,
- Mr Razakaboana refused to sign the Soviet-Malagasy military agreement
at the time of his visit to Moscow in 1980.
= 12. It is quite unlikely that elections at the various levels of the
~ decentralized communities will take place, as scheduled, in 1982.
13. Contrary to tl-~e situation in Brazzaville where the leadership has been
= durlicated through the Central School of the Congolese Labor Party.
- 14. Methodological approach borrowed from Prof Jacques Vernant.
15. The attempted coup disclosed by the authorities on 24 January 1982 (and
essentially based on the divisions of the military institution) and the
- cabinet reshuffle operated by President Ratsiraka after this article was
written, confirm the analyses presented here.
Far from questioning the doctrinal and behavioral bases of the regime,
= the third government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar--which was
installed in mid-January--reflects in fact, through personnel transfers,
- the dual care of the head of the state: to marginalize the.AREMA "opposi-
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tional" faction, and to introduce more "disciplined" elements into the
_ apparatus, or elements more in favor of his personal opinions.
In addi.tion, the rivalries and internal struggles characteristic of the
deeper physiognomy of the regime have not been eradicated, since they still
find ground for their expression and formalization in the Supreme Council
of the Revolution (into which Mr Rakotovao Razakaboana has now been inte-
- grated) and in the political bureau of the National Front for the Def ense
of the Revolution.
The problem is now that the recent attempt at a putsch will of necessity
contribute to strengthen the radical tendencies both of the authorities
and of the opposition forces (31 January 1982).
- COPYRIGHT: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982
92 94
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MOZANIDIQUE
- ~ BRIEFS
CAHORA BASSA ELECTRICITY--Countries in southern Africa may soon benef it from
- hydrogenerated electricity from the Cabora Bassa dam. Returning from a trip
to Lisbon the second week in March, Mr Antonio Branco, Mozambique's energy
= minister, said that this issue had been discussed with Portuguese off icials.
It should be recalled that Mozambique and Portugal are ~ointly in charge of
the dam's operations. We have informatio~? to the effect that two of the
countries that share borders with Mozambique--Zimbabwe in the west and
_ Malawai in the north--are to be the f irst beneficiaries of the new policy.
Hydroelectric power generated by the Cabora Bassa dam--some 11,000 mega-
_ watts--is presently dedicated almost exclusively to South Africa; Mozambique
consumes only 7 percent of it. We note that Mr Branco's talks in Lisbon
~also dealt with possible exports of coal to Portugal and the latter's
= involvement in oil prospecting in Mozambique. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPI-
CAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 982] [COPYRIi~HT: Rene
Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516
= 9516
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NIGER
-7
FIRE IN NIAMEY MARKET GRAVE BLOW TO NATIONAL ECONOMY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 966
[Text] Mr Garba Katanbe, mayor of the capital city of Niamey, in an initial
assessment of the fire that ravaged the city's market the night of 30-31
_ March, said an estimated 5 billion CFA francs in merchandise and installations
_ were destroyed. ~
- The figure does not include the social costs of the disaster. In fact, the
market constituted the hub of the country's commercial activity, and its
- destruction could well lead to major disruptions in trade.
- In aadition, thousands of businessmen have been ruined and are without a
source of income. The great market of Niamey was considered the real "eco-
nomic heart" of the Nigerien capital.
Extending over several hectares in the cQnter of town, it was the place of
- business for thousands of inerchants and also the site of the city's main road
- transport depot. ~
Beyond its economic role of the hig:~est importance to Niger, it was a ver~t-
_ able melting pot, where one could find an amalgamation of national ethnic
diversity. Haoussa, D3ermas and Songhgi, Touareg and Peul. came together in
a buzz of incessant activity.
- In a co~unique on 2~pril the Nigerien Governmen,t noted the "extent and
gravity of the disaster in the current economic environment" and termed the
event a new "tribulation for the national economy." It also launched in "ap-
_ peal. for national solidarity" and decided to build a new market quickly, so
_ that the ruined merchants and vendars can be reestablished.
An interministerial committee comprising the ministers of finance, commerce,
mines and industries and interior has been ordered to study the situation and
_ with the shortest possible delay propose steps to insure the normalization of
- com~ercial activity. The decision has already been made to build a"modern
mar.keting center" on the site of the razed market.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
9516
CSO: 4719/845
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NIGER
BRIEFS
NATIONAL DEBATE ON EDUCATION--A 10-day national debate on Nigerien education
- opened in Zinder on 2Z March. The aim of the debate, in which six ministers,
high level represer.tatives of other ministries, department heads, the tradition-
al chieftainry and community and professional associations are participating
- is to define new directions for the national educational system to make it
"socially integrated and e~onomically accessible." As expressed by the head
- of state, Col Seyni Kountche, this debate, which has been prepared for
over the past f.ew months, should enable the drafting of "the bi.ble on which
- the state will rely in implementing the educational program." Among the
- questions on the agenda, lightening the educational system's burden on the
_ state, reforming the boarding and scholarship system and adapting education
to the social fabric of the country figure prominently. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 910]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693
JAPANESE EQUIPMENT--The 50-ton crane that NIGELEC jNiger Electric Power
- Company] ordered from the Japanese company Tadano within the context of the
- cooperative agreement signed with Japan in September 1981 will be delivered
to Nia~y next June, with construction an the new thermal power plant scheduled
to star~ at the beginning of July. Remember that the total~Japanese-Nigerien
- contract was for some 5 million French francs, in~cluding 1 million for the
- new crane, which is computer controlled. One of the other ma~or gieces of
equipment in this contract is a gas turbine generator from the Japanese com-
pany Hitachi Ltd. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX c,T MEDITERRANEENS in
French No 1399, 2 Apr 82 p 911] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris.] 9693
UNllY AtD--Mr Michel Doo-Kingue, deputy administrator of the UN Development
Program (UNPD) and regional director for Africa, was received recently by the
Nigerien head of state, Co1 Seyni Kountche, with whom he reviewed progress on
a cooperative UNPD-Niger program for 1982-1986. UNPD assistance to Niger
over that period will go from $20 million--the total aid provided during the
previous program pexiod--to $45 million, he jsidicated. Also, Mr poo Kingue
- was in Niger to hold follow-up discussions with the government on the UN
- Conference on the Least Developed Countries (LLDC's), which was held in Paris
last Sep~ember. [Text] [Parie MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 966J [COPYRIGHT: Rene ~Ioreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9516
CSO: 4719/845
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NIGERIA
NIGERIA TO REMAIN FIRM ON PETROLEUM PRICES D~SPITE PROFIT LOSSES
- Fall in Shipments
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1901, 16 Apr 82 p 1031
[Text] In Lagos petroleum industry circles at the beginning of the month
it was generally felt that Nigeria would not reduce its crude oil prices
again.
Faced with a difficult economic situation due to the drop in sales that
has continued since the last OPEC summit in Vienna (the import bill for
- February would amount to $2.5 billion compared to revenues barely equal to
half this sum), Nigeria in fact is still the "weak link" in the OPEC chain. '
The drop in shipments of Nigerian crude oil, which is the root of the con-
- cern in Lagos, is not due to the petro~.eum companies but rather to the
- trading companies, it is felt in the same petroleum industry circles. The
producing companies who have been accused of putting pressure on Nigeria to
bring about a drop in OPEC prices in fact indicate that their purchasing
level has remained the same these past months but that the "traders" to .
whom the national company, NNPC [Nigerian National Petroleum Company], is
- selling part of its oil refuse to pick up petroleum that they can resell
on the spot only at a loss.
_ "We are currently in a period of a worldwide reduction of stocks whose specu-
lative character is not obviots," indicated the manager of a petroleum
company in Lagos, and if OPEC holds to its strategy of maintainin g price
levels, "the market should restabilize, even if it means establishing new
- lower production ceilings." Accarding to the same source, it is obvious
- that Nigeria, which has no more options, should not be affected, and if
OPEC wants to "save" its prices, reductions in production of around 2 mil-
lion barrels per day should basically be borne by the "haves," especially .
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. These countries should also lend money to Nigeria
- to enable it to "hold out" until the recovery, which should occur between
- June and August, according ~o the same source. .
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"We feel that the petroleum industry still has good days All~'A(~ uf it , but
we must hold on until then, even if we are currently losing more than $5
per barrel," says the manager of Elf-Nigeria, who also feels that this
effort by the companies on the country's behalf wi11 be rewarded in Che
long run.
- There is currently no conflict between us and the NNPC, they add in the same
circles; except for the problem of profit margins, which is being negotiated
at this~time. Nigerian profits are currently around 50 cents per barrel,
whereas they approach $4 in certain South American countries.
- With President Shagari having recently reconfirmed his country's total
- cormnitment to OPEC, it then seems, as noted earlier, that Nigeria will not
lower its prices again, which would isolate it from OPEC and even, it is
- felt, cause a world slump.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.
Production Trends
- Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1901, 16 Apr 82 p I031
[Text] Company-by-~ompany analyses of production figures shows that with
the exception of Elf, whose production increased slightly compared with the
month of February, the four other large companies (Shell, Mobil, Gulf,
- Agip) have all reduced their production significantly (down 270,000 barrels
- per day for She11, which produced only 357,000 barrels per day in March).
According to a high-level executive of a company located in Nigeria, examina-
tion of these figures also shows that Mobil, Gulf and Agip clearly resumed
production at the end of March--close to a 100-percent resumption for Gulf,
_ which produced 277,000 barrels per day in February, with mid-March produc-
tion estimated at 80,000 barrels per day and actual production at the end
- of March at 153,000 barrels per day. The same is true of Mobil (195,000
barrels per da~y in February, 100,000 barrels per day estimated in mid-March
and 153,000 barrels per day produced at the end of March) and Agip. But the
source did not indicate whetheY OPEC "threats" with regard to companies
- operatin g in Nigeria are the cause of this resumption of activity.
- According to the same source, only Shell, which produced 630,OOQ barrels
per day in February and anly 357,000 barrels per day in March, did not in-
_ crease its pumping volume at the end of the month.
Rumors circulating in Lagos still mention the possibility of a Saudi loan
to Nigeria to "hold them until sales recover," and it is iiidicated ~n this
- regard that several officials from the Nigerian Ministry of Finance recently
went to Vienna to negotiate the terms of this loan.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.
9693
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- RWANDA
: KIGALI BANK REPORT ON RWANDA ECONOMY IN 1981
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1901, 16 Apr 82 pp
1040-1041
[TextJ The report of the Bank of Kigali for the fiscal year 1981 (1 January-
- 31 December), presented to the 30 March 1982 regular shareholder's m~eting,
provides some interesting information on the development of the Fwandan
economy over the past year.
- Despite the drop in coffee, tea and ore exports, the trade balance reveals
a deficit of only 800 million Rwandan francs. The aet currency positj.on
at the end of 1981 amounted t~ slightly more than 13 billion Rw~andan francs
(1 U.S. dollar = 92.84 Rwandan francs).
As for business itself, it experianced a visible decline: businesses'
sales volumes sagged, and some frequently resorted to credit. Ground and
air transportation were very stable: few problems arose in this area.
The paving work on the Kig~li-Butare highway, which provides a link with
Burundi, has been halted and is not to resume until the end of the year.
~ On the other hand, a Chinese road construction company has begun work on
- the Kigali-Ruhengeri highway. The cost is 3.5 billion Rwandan francs. The
_ same comapny has been commissioned for th~e Ruhengeri-Cyanika section, pro-
viding a link with Uganda, for the amount of 450 million Rwandan francs.
The Butare match factory began production at the beginning of 1981. It
produced 16 million boxes of matches during the year; studies are under way
to increase the capacity to 60 to 80 million boxes per year.
As coffee has been and continues to ~ie Rwanda's chief export, it must be
admitted that the low prices recorded at the beginning of the Rwandan coffee
harvest, in other words around May-June, aroused some concern. Fortunately,
_ prices gradually recovered, reaching an average of U.S. $1.1385 per pound,
- with prices for the :nost recent~contracts exceeding U.S. $1.33 to $1.35
per pound. Production increased from 26,000 metric tons for the 1980-1981
_ harvest (May to December) to 26,662 metric tons for the 1981-1982 harvest
_ (same period). The quantity exported dropped from 33,430 metric tons in
1980 to 22,185 metric tons, a 33-percent decrease, which leaves a very large
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rux urrl~i~ u~~ vcvLx
- amount of coffee to export. The export quota originally established by the
International Coffee Organization [OIC] at 21,600 metric tons was increased
- to 28,800 metric tons for the OIC 1g80-1981 year (1 October to 30 September).
For the 0IC 19t31-1982 year, the quota has been set at 22,500 metric tons.
= Tea production is at a slightly lower level than in 1980--5,591 metric tons
compared with 5,717 metric tons. Exports fell by a~out 14.5 percent, or
from 6,130 to 5,245 metric tons. This drop is due in part to a shortage of
tea chests during the year. Plant construction continues in tea-growing
= regians. The Mata (Gikogoro) tea plant, financed by the European Develop-
- ment Fund, opened in July 1981; it cost 520 million Rwandan francs.
- Su~ar productian remained stable at 2,367 metric tons compared with 2,364
= in 1980. The country continues to import sugar to cover its needs.
Quinine production fell about 61 percent, from 646 metric tons in 1980 to
250 metric tons in 1981. Exports decreased proportionately; they totaled
- 246 compared with 673 metric tons.
_ In the mining sector, production and exports experienced a general decline.
- The trend is summed up as follows:
1981 1980
Product Produced Exported Produced Exported
Tin ore (m. tons) 1,869 1,4~35* 2,069 2,058
Wolframite (m. tons) 535 415 678 675
- Colombn-tantalite (m. tons) 61 47 59 59
Beryl (m. tons) 60 60 107 100
Gold (kilos) 40 30 29 20
* Exports were slowed to establish the stock required to launch the foundry
- planned for February 1982.
As for the activities of the Bank of Kigali itself, for the 1981 fiscal
- year, it showed a business volume of 4.3 billion Rwandan francs and a profit
- of 62.5 million. The Bank of Kigali Ltd, with 250 million Rwandan francs
in assets, is headed by Mr Jean-Marie Visnney Nyalihama; Mr Leandre Degroot
is the managing director, and Mr Aloys Bizimana, the executive director.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.
9693
CSO: 4719/872
- 32
- EOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
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SENEGAL
DIOUF PROJECTS FAVORABLE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS ZN 1982
Paris i~fARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 pp 961,
- 962
_ [Text] Mr Abdou Diouf, speaking to the Senegalese Economic and Social Council
late last March, said Senegal's economic praspects for 1982 appear better than
in 1981, a year of drought and decline in damestic production, external. trade
= and the government's financial condition.
The groundnut harvest, the pr3mary source of peasant income and government
~ hard currency, will approach 700,000 tons (compared with 190,000 tons in
1981), according to President Diauf. He emphasized that the marketing of this
~ harvest will make it possible to in3ect more than CFA Fr 50 billion into the
rural sector and lead to a recovery in domestic demand. The upsurge in ex-
_ ports of groundnut products--pro3ected to be more than CFA Fr 40 billion (com-
pared with 8-9 billion in 1981)--will reduce the (136 b illion) trade deficit,
- he added.
~ The Senegalese head of state also predicted a heavy wave of investment over
_ the next 2 years, with completion of the Senegalese Chemical Industries (CFA
Fr 70 billion for the production of phosphoric acid and it~ derivatives),
expansion of the Mbao refinery and the Rufisque cement-works (20 bil.lion)
and the start-up of construction work on the Koalack textile company and the
Diama dam on the Senegal River.
- President Diouf also announced the creation of a rural credit bank to finance
the equipment and machinery needs of growers, fishermen, stock-raisers and
craftsmen, the completion of a program of water works costing CFA Fr 10
- billion and including the drilling of wells ~.n 'the regions and preparation of
a plan for the renovation and modernization of the stock-raising sector.
_ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
9516
_ CSO: 4719/845
= 33
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' SENEGAL
1982-1983 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION GOALS SET; LATEST RESULTS NOTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 906
[Text] Senegal's agricultural production goals for 1982-1983 have been set
_ at 822,000 mptric tons of peanuts, 47,550 metric tons of cotton and 690,000
metric tons of millet, according to Mr Abdou Diouf, Senegalese head of state,
J addressing his party's (the Socialist Party) national council meeting in
- Dakar on 28 March.
- President Diouf felt that the results of the last agricultural campaign were
good on the whole, thanks to good rainfall and to measures taken to promote
agriculture (raising producer prices and absorbing farmers' debts over 20
billion CFA francs). ~
According to estimates by the Senegalese minister of rural development,
production amounted to 878,365 metric tons of peanuts for oil, 5,342 tons of
- peanuts for consumption, 35,521 tons of cotton, 736,412 tons of millet and
sorghum and 25,809 tons of beans. As for marketing, as of 8 February of this
year, it had sold 633,748 metric tons of peanuts and only 12,116 tons of
millet.
The Senegalese head of state indicated that the same producer prices will be
maintained for this year's agricultural carnpaign, despite the drop in world
prices for peanuts, Sengal's chief export product.
The Senegalese president also revealed that the production goal for fishing
- will be 400,000 metric tons of fish in 1985; the 1980 catch totaled 359,000
= metric tons, or 36 million CFA ~rancs, worth. Basic efforts in the fishing
sector, he said, will deal with infrastructures as well as with cooperation
- with neighboring countries.
= In stock breeding (23 million head of cattle; 3.2 million sheep and goats,
500,000 horses, donkeys and camels, 300,000 pigs and 9 million fowl, according
to the minister of rural development's estimates), the emphasis will be on
extending and improving pasture land and protecting it against brush fires
and on creating small feed plants, as well as on promoting rural water
resources. Finally, the 165 breeders' cooperatives will be activited.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.
9693
= CSO: 4719/835
34
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_ F( ,
SENEGAL
BRIEFS
- FOOD RESERVES--In other matters, According to the Iocal press, Senegal will
b~ provided with a food security stock of 70,000 metric tons of millet.
Thanks to the National Solidarity Fund's 1.86 billion [currency denomination
not given], financing has been acquired for 30,000 metric tons. Senegal is
~ going to make an appeal to the international community for the remainder. The
- food stoc.k should put an end to fluctuation~ in production due to rainfall
conditions, correction of .regional disparities in millet distribution, and
also regulation of the millet market which varies greatly depending on produc-
~ tion. The st4rehouses intended to receive the millet have already been
completed. There are 54 located throughout the country. Their capacity is
~ 74,000 metric tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 907] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.]
9693
CSO: 4719/835
35
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
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- FOR OFFiC1AL IJSE ONL'~
ZAIRE
ACTIVITY OF SANK OF KINSHASA NOTED IN REPORT FOR 1980
Paris MAI2CHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 pp 1159-
; 1160
! [Text] The report for 1980 of the Bank of Kinshasa emphasizes that the most
~ important event of this period was no doubt the commemoration of the lOth anni-
- versary of the bank. On this occasion, the management committee published a
brochure reviewing the evolution and the activities of the company in the course
= of its first decade (1970-1980).
In 1980, the course of the bank's business was marked by an increase in the
- demand for credit from bank customers. In the first 9 months, credits out- ~
' standing increased noticeably. From January to October 1980, the level of the
use of credits went from 96.8 million Zaires to 163.8 million Zaires. The
- credit ceiling of 120 million Zaires, established by the Central Bank, was
- exceeded by 33.25 million Zaires on 30 September 1980.
Horaever, exceeding the credit ceiling was not limited to this bank, because as
= a whole the cr~dits granted by the banks to companies and to private persons on
- 30 September 1980 totaled 1,237,900,Q00 Zaires, as against an authorized
c.eiling of 888,800,000 Zaires. The relative portion of the Bank of Kinshasa in
- this overall excess of credit amounted to 9.5 percent. Faced with this
situation, to put a brake on the expansion of credit, the Institute of Emission
[of the currency] ordered commercial banks to reduce their outstanding credits
to within the established credit ceilings before 31 December 1980 and warned
_ that any new excess of credit would be subject to monetary fines. Also, exceeding
the credit ceilings would involv2 suspension of the reaiscounting of comme~cial
paper by the central authorities and the suspension of a bank's accounts.
_ During the last 2 months of the year, the Bank of Kinshasa had to make a
special effort to obtain repayment of certain lo~:ns outstanding, particularly
- agricultural credits on coffee that could not be exported an time because of
= difficulties in transportation and spec~ilation involving export prices, which
have been declining since 1 January 19E0.
= The Bank of Kinshasa continued to take an active part in coffee matters. How-
ever, it was able to become involved in the export of only 8,250 tons of coffee,
- compared with 9,000 tons in 1979. This decline is due to fraudulent export
- transa~tions and the difficulties referred to above.
36
= FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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_ In the course of the first 6 months of 1980, measures associated with the
demonetization operation of 25 December 1979 continued to have a major, negative
- effect on~the resources of the bank and to disturb its activities. In effect,
_ after the end of *_his operation, which did not develop as desired, certain
problems arose over a period of weeks, in particular concerning reconstitution
_ of the cash holdings of the banks, disturbances to commercial transactions and
- the financing of agricultural activity. The banking system, which was no
= longer subsidized, as had been the case, by the Institute of Emission, was
unsuccessful in arranging for the freeing of all of the funds demanded by
- depositers. For a number of. weeks the banks had to make use of a certain
- rationing of cash withdrawals so as not to depZete their stocKS of cash,
which were reconstituted with great difficulty. On the other hand, the almost
~ total unavaiZability of demanc~ deposit accounts and the shortage of inean; of
= payment favored the establishment of a market for funds outside the banking
= system, which handicapped banking activities. Demand deposit accounts were
not entirely freed again until September 1980.
- Customer deposits increased from 61.2 million Zaires, or 22.8 percent, a total
= of 268 million Zaires. The increas~ in interest rates, however, clearly made
itself felt with regard to term deposits. Interest and commissions paid into
= term deposits went up from 2.8 million Zaires to 3.7 milli.on Zaires in 1980.
International interbanking transac~tions intensified following the restamption of
GECAMI?VES [General Quarries and Mines Company] operations and the participation
of the bank in imports of petroleum by the Zaire-Sep Company. External assets
_ recorded an in~rease of 49e6 percent, while the debt position with correspondent
_ banks abroad also increasec7, going up from 3.5 million Zaires in 1979 to 13.8
million Zaires in 1980. The extent of this increase is also related to banking
needs arising from commercial transactions.
The securities portfolio of the Banlc of Kinshasa at the end of 1980 was va~ued
at 362,677 Zaires, or 77 percen~ above the level at the end of 1979. This
- increase is due to new subscriptions for stock valued at 144,350 Zaires with
the Development Finance Company (SOFiDE},
Net profits for 1980 increased by 36.3 percent and totaled 5.2 million Zaires.
This increase is evidence of the major activity the bank was involved in, par-
_ ticularly as a result of its involvement in the financir,g of agriculture and
other forms of essential local production, as well as in import transactions.
This result reflects the net development of the total balance sheet, which
- stood at 433,100,000 Zaires on 31 December 1480, an increase of 120,600,000
- zaires, or 38.6 percent, compared with the end of 1979.
Regarding the expansion of ~he bank to the interior of the country, the management
committee took the necessary action to open branches at Kananga and Mbujimayi in
the Kasai area. The management committee, moreover, is carrying out studies
with a view to opening agencies in Bandundu and Equateur Provinces. Con-
- struction activity to expand the building af the bank agency in Matadi was
= actively continued and was to have been completed in 1981. The bank agency in
_ Soma was officially inaugurated on 14 June 1980.
- The Bank of Kinshasa has a capital of 4.9 million Zaires. Its president and
- director general is Dokolu Sanu.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
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_ CSO: 4719/930 37
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ZAIRE
BRIEFS
1981 GECAMINES PRODUCTION--According to the annual report of SOZACOM [Zairian
Company for the Marketing of Ores], the General Quarries and Mines Company
_ (GECAMINES) in 1981 producec~ 468,000 tons of copper compared with 425,616 tons
in 1980 and 11,159 tons of cobalt comgared with 12,408 tons in I980. GECAMINES
= surpassed its projections for zinc by producing 57,600 tons compared with
44,056 tons in 1980. As for cadmium production, this amounted to 230 tons in
1981 compared with 165 tons in 1980. [Text] (Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1160] 5170 �
1981 SOSIDER STEEL PRODUCTION--The Steel Exploitation Company (SOSIDER) pro-
cessed in its smelter 12,930 tons of scrap iron in 1981 compared with 12,600
~ tons in 1980 and 11,425 tons in 19?9. The president of the management committee
- of the compar_y, I~bangu Tshirut-Binen, has cammented that SOSIDER is currently
- operating at only 10 percent oi its productive capacity due to pxoblems involving
its finances, raw materials and spare parts. These problems have led to the
- closing of its cold rolling mill. [Text) [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1150] 5170
- SOUTIi KOREAN TECHNICAL COOPERATIOt7--The delegation from the National Associ,~tion
of Companies of Zaire (ANEXA), which last March visited South Korea MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 12 March, p 704), had meetings with several
ministers, with the Korean Foreign Trade Promotion Company (KOTRA), the
Federation of Korean Enterprises and the Daewoo Group, the largest Korean
Commercial and industrial group. The del~gation also visited a number of
_ factories belonging to the Samsung Group. Possibilities for the use of
Korean technology in Zaire and the financing of trade between Zaire and South
- Korea were examined in the course of this visit. [Text) [Paris MARCHES
TR~PICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1160] 5170
REFUGEE STATISTICS--There are currently 350,000 to 400,000 refugees in
- Zaire, wh~ere UN High Com,mission for Refu~ees [HCR] spent some $15 million
in 1981. In a communique published in Geneva, the HCR estimates 1982 re-
quirements at $10.5 million. Th~ese financial needs are in the process of
being�revised to take into account the continuous arrival of Ugandans in
- the country. In fact, there are some 130,000 Ugandans in Haut-Zaire; else-
- where in the country, approximately 11,000 refugees from Burundi, 20,000
~aandans and some 1,800 Zambians are recorded. Small groups of refugees of ,
various origins are also found in Kinshasa. The HCR continues to assist in
- the voluntary repatriation of Angolan refugees, 21,000 of whom are bene-
- fitting from its assistance. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEUITER-
RANEENS in French No 1901, 16 Apr 82 p 1036] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et
Cie Paris 1982] 9693 E~
- ~R
' . CS4: u"~19/872 FOR OF~[CIAL USE ONLV
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