JPRS ID: 10535 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10535
21 May 1982 ~
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 773
_ FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/10535
_ 21 May 1982
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 773
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS ~
3tudent Unrest Rep~rted Throughout Africa
(Jean-Louis Buchet; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21~ Feb 82)............ 1
Africa~s New Home-Grown Journalists
(Momar Kebe Ndiaye; JEUNE AFR.IQUE, 13 Jan 82) 6
CHAD
Goukouni-Kamougue Split, FAN Takes Town
(Abacar Aswvo; REUTER., 19 Apr 82) 8
EQUATORIAL GUINEA ~
Leader Promises New Constitution
(REUTER, 19 Apr 82),~ 10
GABON
Statis~ics Relating to 1981 Budget Set Forth
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.ANEENS, 19 Feb 82 ) . . . . . . . . 11
British Railroad Contracts
(,MARCHFS TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Feb 82 14
Briefs
President Tours Interior 15
GHANA
Troubled Econom~ Reviewed; Strong Management Urged
(Jacques Latemoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ~
- MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Mar 82) 16
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
CAD ASL7/^T ~ T f iCL� /~1?iT V
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NIGER
OFEDES Experiencing Well Drilling Problems
(MARCHES TftOPICAUX ET MEDITERRANF~ENS, 19 Feb 82; 25
SENEGAL
New Control Shops Established in Cape Verde Area
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET i+IEDITERRANEENS, 19 Feb 82) 27
Bri ef s
Opposition Critique Planned , 29
Paxis Senegalese Days 29
_ Peat Er-_ploitation Company 29
-b-
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IN'~ER-AFRICAN AFFAI~'S
STUDENT UNREST REPORTED THROUGHOUT AFRICA
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Feb 82 pp 16-18
- [Article by Jean-Louis Buchet under the heading "Politics and Economics: In
Africa and In the World": "Students in Opposition to Governments"; investi-
gatior by Sylviane Kamara, Mohamed Selhami and Francois Soudan]
[TpxtJ IJniversities are astir almost everywhere in
Africa. Do governments have reason to be worried?
"Abidjan--On 10 February the Political Bureau of the PDCI [Democratic Party
of the Ivory Coast] decided or. the i~ediate closing of the university and
- university-level professional schools in the capital, the vacating of all
university residence halls and housing, and the suspension of student grants.
The da,y before, a number of students had been arrested following a demonstra-
tion..."
"Rabat--On 11 and 12 February the science faculty observed a 48-hour strike.
Students are protesting against the ban on the activity of the union of the
_ UNEM [National Union of Moroccan Students]; three of the five members of the
UNEM executive committee are in prison."
"Kinshasa--dn Sunday, 31 January, the univeraity and the National Teacher-
Training Institute were closed until further notice by government order rati-
fied by the chief of state. On 25 J~nuary students had begun a strike to
support their demands."
"Libreville--On 11 December (~981) the campus was cleared out by the police
force. The students and certain professors on strike were calling for the
release of the recently arrested rector." ~
These are a few jumbled recent press agency dispatches. Others could be
found. At any~rate these are sufficient to give a picture of an academic
year which at the start of 1982 3oo~CS troubled a].most everywhere in Africa.
y There is no need to look for a hidden hand behind this outbreak, if it is
indeed an outbreak.~ Remember 1968, famous for May in France, and also May
in Senegal; a few months earlier the fever hsd taken hold of the universities
in Berkeley (USA) and West Berlin. The univer~ities in a number of Latin
American countries were to foliow, particularly in Mexico, where thinga were
to turn out very badly.
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Ln the West at that time students wanted to "charge the quality of life."
ln the Third World they had not yet reached that srage. But, going beyond
_ the mos= assuredly different demands and ~oncerns of both the one and the
other groups of ~968 protesters--rich and poor, more privileged and less
privileged--all evidenced the unrest of young people who were suffocating.
Is that the situation today in Africa? Surveys a-nong students, university
by university, could easily show that. But the unrest does :~ot always
emerge into open protest. If a h~1f ~iozen African campuses are occupied or
iii turmoil at the same time, ttiat is a'! so in part a matter of chance. For
the moment ?.here does not seem to be more than a series of specific out-
Uuxsts whose coming together iF creating a stir. H~ence, this is not a con-
certed movement, a]1 the less so because there is no protest beacon to be
found in it as there was in 1968 with the Parisian studenL~s. '
Furthermore, although such a simultar~aity of occurrences has rarely been
obstrved, university disturbances are a constant element of the current
African scene. As far as the last few years are concerned, let us recall
the repeated brawls between fundamentalists and leftiets in Tunis in 1979
~ and 1980, and, in Algeria, the Berbe1 movement in Tizi-Ouzou and then the
confrontations between Arabizers and "Frenchifiera" in Alg:ters in 1980 and
1981. In Cairo, in January 1980, clashes brought religio~ss types into con-
flict with m~dernists. At the same time, Senegalese high school and college
students were dPmonstrating; police inteLVention resulted in one death and .
several injuries.
Tl~at same year Malian college stude.nts and younger pupils went on strike
because of a student grant issue and demanded the reestablishment of their
association. In January and February 1981, Malagasy stuc?ents protested
against the reform ini~roduced by President Ra.tsiraka's F,over~nment. In
Antananarivo, violently suppressed demonstrations pnded in two delths and
dozens of in3 uries.
Each university has its own troubles, as this impressive series shows.
Having said that, the diversity of the s~~tuatians does not prevent one from
groupirig tt~em into three broad categories. First, in the Arab world there
is the appearance of a fundamentalist mov~ment which, to be sure, is not
peculiar to universities, and which intends to impose itself on factions
which are dying out: the left, modernists, and so on. In thi.s case
internal confrontation overrides the struggle for power. Perhaps that latter
struggle will be the order of the day if the "religious types" gain the
upper hand.
- Elsewhere, and for the most part, university grumbling is over matters of
administration [prend une allure corporatiste~, demands revolving mainly
around material issues (lodging and working conditions, scholarships),
studies guidance or the autonomy of student organizations. Since the
authorities generally respond to this with re~ression, the slogans could of
course take a more political turn aftexward.
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Finally, in two of the most recent cases it seems that aspiratio~s for more
freedom played a main role. That is the way it was in Decemb~r 1981 in
Libreville where it all started with a demonstration hostile to ~resident
Bongo and the way it is in Abidjan these d~ys. It is true that in Gabon as
in ivory Coast, the students are more fortunate than elsewhere in Africa,
since they have modern buildings, ample financing and comfortable residences.
On the other hand, what does not change from one capital to another is the
cycle: demanda--~emonstration--repreasion--strike--police occupation of
university faculties. To the extent possible, governments do a great deal
for their students, the future ~lite of their countries. But they distrust
them. As soon as students have any intention of concerning themselves with
their interests or, what is worsE, with the country's affairs, instead of
being conCent to study like good boys and girls, the stick appears.
Since farmers are kept out of the picture, and salaried workers are satisfied
to be salaried, students, a favored lot receiving higher esiucation, are feared
all the more since they are almost the only ones who can thinlc politics
through. Of course this is not to the liking of the supporters of single
parties. Students are capable of questioning the established order, and
because they have knowledge they are able to propose solutions other than
those which are being put into practice.
Let us not forget that in Latin America during the 1960's the universities
provided massive numbers to the guerrillas. That stage has not been reached
in Afri�:a, but African governments would rather take precautions. So these
idealists of today, who will be the technocrats of tomorrow, are isolated,
and are occasionally reminded that they are better off than the ma~ority of
the population (anyrhin~ to make students not very popular) and they are
flatteringly soothed when possible, and the billy clubs are brought out for
the slightest cause.
It is also true that while the involvement and participation of Afr~.can
students in political fighting has never been comparable to that of their
Latin American colleagues, they have sometimes played an important role on
that level. Remember May 1972 in Madagascar: The large demonstrations
which started out from the university were decisive in the fall of
Tsiranana's admittedly shaky regime. But the Malagasy students did not
com~ to power; their victory was seiz~d by the military.
_ Likewise, the French protesters 4 years earlier were quickly passed over.
Nowhere in today's world, in fact, have students come into power. They are a
protest force, and indeed a proposal-making force, but they cannot aspire to
control--and for good reason. They can, on the other hand, be used by the
government as a political base and a means of action. This has been seen in
Mao's China and somewhat in Cuba. It is seen today even in Africa, in
_ Rawlings' Ghana.
It is students who in fact make up the bulk of the shock brigades seret by
. Jerry Rawlings into the country`s interior to repair roads and bring cocoa
to Accra. Small mobile groups of them numbering 100 to 200 c~fsscross the
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country with their field rations (supplied by Libya). Furthermore, Rawlings`
circle of intimates is made up of young r~rofessors and students, more often
than not "Nkrumah-ists." Their influence is great: They are demanding a
radical purge and re3ect any negotiations with the IMF. They are organized
within a powerful association, the NUGS (National L~nion of Ghanaian Students),
~ and they control in particular the Ghanaian people's tribunals.
Ghana is going through an extraordinary evolution and Rawlings' Red Guards
remain the exception. Thep are far from foreshadowing the future of African
students. Quite the contrary, what seems today to characterize African
universities which date from when their countries became independent is their
depoliticization. Let us be clearly understood: Stu~ents still for obvious
reasons constitute one of the few social categories capable of reasoning in
political terms. But they do not get together within political organizations
any more as they did in the past. There were a great number of Marxist-
Leninists in Dakar between 1968 and 1974. Today some of them are in the PS
[Socialist Party] or the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party]; most of them are
in Cheickh Anta Diop's RND [Democratic National Rally]. But their successors
have not picked up the torch; they.are not very politicized and have mostly
maCerialist [corporatiste] demands.
- While there are still organized leftwing groups ~n Morocco they represent a
_ minority. And the UNEM of 1982 is nothing like the UNEM in its heyday, when
it was a force that mattered.
It must also be pointed out that African universities have rcache~ new dimen-
sions: 50,000 students in Moxocco, 15,000 in ivory Coast, 10,000 ln Gabon,
and so on. These dimensions are not yet comparable to .those in Europe or
Latin America but are no longer the small circles of farmer times. Added to
the effect of numbers is the force of the economic slump which results in
governments being less concerned ab~ut their students, on the one hand, and
in the fact that a number of those students are going to become unemployed,
on the other hand. This new phenomenon in Africa, which makes the situation
of African universities more like that of those in the West, is a basic
fac~or in current student crises.
The (new) concern over the future is clearly discernible in Abid~an. It will
be so elsewhere, and to au increasing extent. This allows one to say that
the restlessness of universities in Af rica will, far from abating, probably
Ue growing.
African universities are in some ways beginning a second stage of lifa in
which the fairly great number of students' material concerns will predomi-
nate. So is there anything for governments in office to fear? No, not for
t'_ie time being. But if student demands are not met, a new radicalization
could start up. After all, student unrest reveals the broader unrest of an
entire society. And if that society is frozen...
One begins to feel this, moreover. And if Ivorians and Gabonese are calling
for more freedom it is not accidental. They can allow themselves to do so
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inasmuch as their countries are rich--relatively speaking--on an African
, scale. That is also the reason why changes are expected, and not only by
students.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
, 9631
CSO: 4719/665
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
AFRICA'S NEW HOME-GROWN JOURNALISTS
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Jan 82 pp 66-67
~Article by Momar Kebe Ndiaye: "The New Bards--African Journalists Torn
Between the Desire for Ob~ectivity a~id the Required Allegiance to Authority"]
[Text] In African dailies, the activities of the head of state appear on
page one day-in day-out, unless the space is given to those involving other
government officials. A minor rally led by a minister is covered in great
detail. Official government com~uniques are reprinted in their entirety
and without comment. T~Tire service dispatches are ~either simply reproduced
or dealt with as if they were intended for a European or American audience.
News which touches close to home (shortages of consumer goods, increases
in the cost cf living, unemployment, health problems...) is tucked away in
- the back pages. The same holds true for radio and television.
There is, however, no shortage of ~ournalists in Black Africa. They are
now being trained as fast as possible, like administrative clerks. On
- December 12 in Dakar, CESTI (Center for the Study of Information Sciences ~
and Techniquea) placed at the disposal of the African media 34 new
j~urnalists--19 for the print media, 8 for radio, and 7 for television. Since
1972, 234 "modern-day bards" have graduated from this institution, bringing
to nearly 500 the number of ~ournalists trained for West Africa by CESTI
and for Central Africa by ESIJY (International Higher School of Journalism
of Yaounde). Why then do the news services provide such poor service to
- the public?
~ The former British colonies were the first black African countries to show
an interest in training ~ournalists "on the spot." It was a question of
demanding the "made in Africa" label. As early as 1957, the Journalism
rnstitute of Accra was founded. Two years later, the African Literature
Center of Kit:~e (~ambia) organized regional ~ourna~.ism courses. At the end
of the Biafran War (1970), Jackson College of Journalism, which had opened
_ in Nigeria in 1961, became the Communications Institute of the University
of Lagos. Today, it trains more than 60 ~ournalists each year. From 1963
to 1968, intr4ductory courses in the techniques of 3ournalism were given
in Nairobi for the English-speaking countries of eastern and central
Africa, and in Lagos for those of western Africa. These two experiments
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resulted in the creation of the Journalism School of the University of
~ Nairobi (1970) and the Nigerian Journalism Institute (1971). '
The fever hit French-speaking Africa at the very end of the 1960's, when
training possibilities were extremely limited. It marked the end of sending
- journalists to American and European (French, West German and Soviet)
schools. Since 1970, one produces and consumes African: CESTI students
come mostly from the seven countries of western Africa, while those at ESIJY
are from the six countries of central Africa. The two schools, wt~ose forma-
tion, operation, and programs are nearly identical, also have co~on
goals: "The training of multipurpose journalists and development agents ,
~ c:apable of answering the needs of the media and the expectations of public
opinion." The bet is far f rom being won. Today, although provided with 20
journalism institutes, Africa stitl lacks appropriate training mea~as.
Teaching is too academic and tries to adapt foreign theories and models
above all else. Yet, the role of the media in Africa is not the same as in
the developed countries; they address themselves to a limited public because
of illiteracy and the isolation of certain rural areas.
Even ~ournalist leaves the African schools with certain professional
reflexes, he remains handicapped by a general lack of education. The School
of Journalism and Co~mnunications of the University of Ghana is the only
institution in Black Africa to offer training resulting in a doctorate ~
(third cycle). In creating their own journalism schools, the African
countries wanted to adapt training to the sociocultural context and make
journalists the advocates of political power. Once they are members of the
. profession, journalists ar~ torn between the demands of objectivity and the
servitude of complying with existing authorities. That type of ~ournalism
can lead to everything... provided one cooperates with the government.
Tabl_e 1. Number of Journalists Trained Between 1970 and 1981
j
By Country
CESTI ESIJY
_ BQnin 29 Cameroon 130
Ivory Coast 53 Central African Republic 13
Gabon 2 Gabon 24
Upper Volta 24 Rwanda 3
Mal.i 44 Chad 33
Morocco 1 Togo 42
Mauritania 6
Niger 9
Senegal 66
~ By Specialty
CESTI ESIJY
Print media 133 Print media 107
Radio 28 Radio 76
Television 73 Television 40
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUYJIA 1981
9939
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C~~iAD
GOUKOUNI-KAMOUGUE SPLIT, FAN TAKES TOWN
AB191536 London REUTER in English 1446 GMT 19 Apr 82
[By Abacar Aswvo]
_ [Text] Ndjamena, 19 Apr (REUTER)--Chad's interior minister has said the govern-
ment will never negotiate with the rebels who now control over half the coun-
try, but an envoy sent by France spoke of a deep split between the president
and vice-president.
Interior Minister Mahamat Abba told Nd3amena traders yesterday that President
Goukouni's provisional government "will never agree to negotiate with the
enemy...we want peace, but not at any price."
Mr Abba, who is close to the Chad leader, said the rebels, led by former
Defence Minister Hissene Habre, "are backed by a lobby made up of African
~ countries, behind which hides international imperialism to dictate our poli-
cies to us." He did not identify the countries.
French President Francois NLYtterrand's African adviser, Guy Penne, who met
President Goukouni here twice over the weekend, said he discu.ssed what
appeared from Paris as differences between the provisional y,overnment's ~ar-
ious members.
The government split became public last week when President Goukouni's FROLINAT,
one of the provisional government's 10 rival armed factions, accused Vice-
President Abdel Kader Kamougue of wanting to negotiate with the rebels.
Colonel Kamougue, from the predominently Christian soui:h, replied that FROLINAT
was attempting to foment trouble in the south. At a meeting in the northern
city of Benoy he said: FROLINAT has pledged tio square accounts with the south."
The vice-president, who has previously called for a ceasefire, teld the meet-
ing that Habre's forces now held the central town of Mao, hitherto believed
- to have remained under government control.
He also quoted Hissene Habre as having said his troops would be in Nd~amena
within a month.
"Everybody is sick and tired of the war, and I shall wo~k for peace," Colonel
Kamougue added.
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Speaking to reporters before returning to Paris, Mr Penne said he discussed
with President Goukouni the role of the African peacekeeping force coanprising
3,800 troops from Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire in Chad since November last year.
According to informed sources, several African heads of state will meet in
Lagos later this week to discuss the financing of the force, which the Organisa-
tion of African Unity (OAU) cannot meet for lack of fimds.
So far the force has been ffnanced by aid from France, the United States and
Gabon, they said, adding that it was costing s~me eight million dollars a
month.
According to unofficial reports, some contingents are not receiving their pay
because of the force's financial crisis.
Meeting last February in Nairobi, the OAU called on President Goukouni to be-
gin peace talks with the rebels to end the war. It threatened to withdraw
the force by the end of June if no progress was made.
Military sources said the peacekeeping force was the only buffer protecting
Nd~amena from attack by the rebels.
CSO: 4700/1162
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EQUA.TORIAL GUINEA
LEADER PROMISES NEW CONSTITUTION
AB191724 London REUTER in French 1557 GMT 19 Apr 82
, [Text] Geneva, 19 Apr (REUTER)--Equatorial Guinea head of state Obiang '
Nguema Mbasogo stated in Geneva on Monday that his government will promulgate
a new constitution as promised by next summer. The constitution will pro-
vide for free elections.
President Oi~iang Nguema Mbasogo, who was addressing a conference sponsored by
the United Nations and aimed ~ raising funds for his country, told newsmen
that the new constitution would be promulgated by 3 Augusr, the third anni-
versary day of his accession to power af~er ousting Francisco Macias N'guema.
After being promulgated, the constitution will be submitted to a referendum
, followed by elections. No timetable was announced.
'~he Malabo government, he said, has decreed general amnesty and hopes for
~ the return of all Equatorial Guineans who went in exile during the pre-
vious dictatorship, in order to participate in the reconstruction.
He denied allegations made by the National Alliance for Democratic Restoration
i --an opposition movement--in a communique issued in Geneva charging the pre-
i sent government with suppressing the opposition and detaining 340 opposition
' members.
Some 20 countri�es; have so far promised financial assistance. UN estimates
~ report that $141 million will be neceasary for the reconstruction of the
economy disrupted by long years of dictatorship.
i
The traditional cash crop of this former Spani~h colony, which became inde-
pendent in 1968, is cocoa which used to earn th e co~mtry up to 80 percent of
, its foreign currency.
~ The sales of the commodity have gone down from 40,000 tons in 1969 to 4,000
tons only 10 years later.
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; CSO: 4719/865
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GABON
STATISTICS RELATING TO 1981 BUDGET SET FORTH
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERFt~NEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 567
~ [Article: "The 1982 Budget in Its Economic Contect"]
[T & t] In our 18 December 1981 issue, p 3375, we gave a general outline of
the Gabonese budget for 1982 which amounts to CFA 453.5 billion. In a recent
study devoted to this budget, and one which very probably uses official
Gabonese statistics, the newspaper L'UNION of Libreville placed the budget
in its economic context. The newsF~aper gave the following "provisional"
figures for 1981 in Gabon:
Consumption rose by a total of 15.2 percent from CFA 361 billion in 1980 to
CFA 416 billion in 1981, with a more sustained rate in the public sector
(+25.3 percent) than in the private (+11.1 percent).
Investments progressed strongly to reach close to CFA 303 billion, or a 43
percent increase compared to 1980. They are distributed as follows: CFA 166
billion (of +35 percent compared to 1980) for private investment and CFA
136.6 billion for public investment, the net amount of subsidies, loane and
capital interests. The proportion of productive investment to total
investments improved by 57 percent in 1981 versus 54 percent in 1980.
The foreign trade balance dropped by 18 percent, from CFA 227.4 billion in
1980 to CFA 185.9 billion in 1981. This drop is principally explained by
imports of goods (+24 percent) and purchases of services (42 percent).
The main economic indicators showed sustained activity in 1981, since prices
and salaries remained stable to all intents aud purposes with a slight
improvement in the level of employment. The number of ~ob offers increased
- appreciable.
These different trends conf irm the consolidation of a recovery which started
in 1980 but in an unbalanced manner since it primarily aff ects the petroleum
sector. This amelioration made it possible for the Gross National Product
(GNP) to improve by close to 12 percent, from 831.5 billion in 1980 to 928
t~illion in 1981. On the other hand, one could see the real timidity of the
recovery in other sectors, including public works and buildings.
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In the monetary f ield, "the Gabonese economic situation was characterized by
unmistakable and quite distinct signs of improvement" writes L'UNION, which
states that credit to the economy has gone from ~FA 125.9 billion to 153.7
billion, or an improvement of 27 percent. Likewise, one sees an improvement
of the situation of the Treasury with regard to the Central Bank: credit to
the state decreased from CF9 38.4 billian in December 1980 to 29.4 billion
in Aecember 1981.
The restoration of Gabonese foreign credits accelerated, reaching CFA 48.5
billion in June 1981 against 26 billion in December 1980. "On the other
hand, the development of long-term savings remained a dismal point. It was
impeded by considerations of repayment, since the quasi-money/credit marginal
rates fluctuated too greatly," our fellow 3ournal emphasized.
Public finances continued their recovery in an appreciable manner, thanks to
the desire to maintain State expenditures within the limits planned in the
budget, but also because of the unforeseen improvement in state petroleum
receipts (CFA +12.3 billion), the result of appreciation of the exchange rate
of the dollar.
The outstanding public debt was further reduced in comparison with 1980;
however the burden of servicing the debt is still high, since it represented
36.3 percent of state expenditures in 1981 against 38.3 percent in 1980.
The balance of payments, which showed a def icit of close to CFA 45 billion in
1977, has begun to show a surplus again since 1979, with a maximum of CFA
+20.3 billion reached in 1980. In 1981 the anticipated balance was +16.3
billion; however, one should stress one point of uneasiness: the permanent
deficit in the balance of short-term capital, which seeks better prospects of
repayment outside Gabon.
Budgetary Choices ~
From this point of view, the increase in the general budget in 1982 compared
to the initial 1981 budget (the appropriations bill) is 12 percent; it
improves more slowly if the budget is considered to have been effectively
implemented in 1981, the f iscal year having ended at CFA 427.1 billion.
Receipts should increase by 12 percent in 1982 comp3red to 1981, thanks
especially to receipts from petroleum (+16.2 percent). .
Because of the uncertain nature of Gabon's medium-term petroleum receipts,
the 1982 appropriations bill was paired with a series of provisions, respect
of which, their originators stress, is basic to balancing the budget. The
bill covers personnel expenditures (manner of r.ecruitment, nomination and
promotion) and common expenses (housing for off icials, administrative leases,
mission expenses, discontinued residential charges for water, electricity and
telephone).
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Table. Gabonese Budget (In Billions CFA)
19~1 1982
Planned Realized Planned
Receipts
Totals 404.i 427.1 453.5
Petroleum 2:i$.0 270.0 283.0
Nonpetroleum 13i.5 138.9 152.8
Loans 15.11 18.2 17.7
Expenditures
Total 404.5 427.1 453.5
Investment 135.0 137.5 182.8
Operation 134.8 134.4 150.7
Public debt 134.7 155.2 120.0
As far as investment expenses in 1982 are concerned, their exceptionally high
level (CFA 183 billion including 24 billion carried over) should be emphasized
and particularly the improvement in their sectorial orientation:
The productive sectors are receiving more than 20 percent of resources against
13 percent in 1980 and 19 percent in 1981. Of these, the share of agricultur~
is improving (+8 percent), as well as the amount of investment in ~ater and
electricity supplies which increases by 9 percent.
The infrastructures are consuming close to half of investment expenditures--43
percent for the Trans-Gabonese Railroad and 19 percent for roads. It will
also be noted that sociocollective investments receive 16 percent, especially
national education and public housing.
On the other hand, the relative weight of administrative equipment investments
has been reduced by close to 10 percent af ter the considerable effort made in
1980-1981 (+18 percent).
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
,
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9380
CSO: 4719/648
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~ GABON
BRITISH RAILROAD CONTRACTS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 83 p 568
[Article: "British Contracts for the Trans-Gabonese Railroad"]
[Text] AFP announced in London on 16 February that efforts made by the
British Ministry of Trade to encourage sales by Great Britain to French-
speaking Africa had born fruit for Gabon, where a ma~or breakthrough has 3us*_
been accomplished by several manufacturers of railroad equipment as well as
by Transmark, the consultant service of the British railways.
Different contracts with a total value of s~o?ne 12 million pounds (FR 135
million) have in fact been, or are on the point of being, concluded, and
others for a tota'1 of 60 to 70 billion pounds (Fr 660 to 770 million) are
expected by the end of 1982. All concern the Trans-Gabonese Railroad. The
first orders were facilitated by a 10 million-pound (Fr 110 million) loan
which three of the principle British banks (Midland, Barclays and Lloyds)
have just granted to the Gabonese railway organization, CETRA. The loan is
guaranteed by the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD), the department
of the British Ministry of Trade which insures credit for exports, with a
relatively low interest rate of 8.5 percent.
Apart from the technical experience which Transmark will provide for operation
o� the first segment of the railroad and development of the second, the
contracts deal chiefly with rolling stock, cranea, sections of track and rail
plates.
~ Future orders are expected within the framework of the construction of the
J second Booue-Franceville section. Its construction will probably be entrusted
to Eurotrag, a consortium of 18 European firms in which the British enter-
prises Wimpey and Taylor Woodrow, which specialize in large-scale projects,
now hold a 22-percent interest. As of this writing, the British banks have
promised a supplementary line of credit to cover this British interest.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
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GABON
BRIEFS
PRESIDENT TOURS INTERIOR--President Bongo and his wife, accompanied by a
ministerial delegation, b egan a series of tours in the Gabonese provinces
planned for 11-14 and 21-28 February, as well as 1-2 March. These tours are
; significant in that the head of atate is displaying his desire to regain
control of the country af ter his having crushed the movement in favor of a
multiparty system which emerged last December. That is why in Tchibanga on
12 February President Bongo promised increased efforts for the economic
development of Nyanga Province (reopenin;g of the marble plant, opening of a
barytine mine, the first group of bridge works on Banio Lagoon in Mayumba,
and so on) while blasting "the ingratitude of certain sons of the province
who were implicated in the recent events in Libreville" wanting to create a
"stillborn" political party. The head of state denounced the "leanings"
within the government with divisions between "progressives", "moderatea" and
"convervatives." [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 567] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9380
CSO: 4719/648
~
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GHANA
TItOUBLED ECONOMY REVIEWED; STRONG MANAGEMENT URGED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1895, 5 Mar 82
pp ~57-660
[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "The Fall of the Ghanaian Economy: Jerry

~ Rawlings' Choices"]
[TextJ Two months after Ghana's coup, normalization of relations with neigh-
boring countries has been attained, and Accra's mass psychosis of the besieged
tias abatei~. So the often excessive accounts heard in Abidjan, Lome, and
Lagos from political refugees can now be sorted out. These people are terri-
fied when they recall Captain Rawlings' earlier purges, but they also more or
less nurture the vain intention of bringing about a reaction against him from
the countries where they have found refuge.
ror that matter, has it indeed been establislzed that Jerry Rawlings is the
redl author of the coup? People wished to see proof of this, as well as of
his collusion with Colonel Qadhdhafi, in the short visit he made to Tripoli
in 1980. However, testimonies in Accra since 1979 have agreed on how Dr
Limann's govertnnent succeeded~in keeping him in isolation after a declaration
was made forbidding him to leave. As in Liberia in 1980 and Togo in 1963, the
coup was actually carried out by a small group of noncoffinissioned officers.
These people might have received some Libyan support, as has been claimed;
however, the simplicity of such intervention would have made it of no use
whatsoever. What most likely happened is that once their feat was accom-
plished, their inexperience caus~d them to seek out a label to rally popular
support in their favor. Thus the recourse to Rawlings. ~
They tried in the same way to assemble authorities to pull the state out of
its economic morass. The truth is that volunteers have not come running, and
the Provisional National Defense Co~nittee, which is acting as the government,
has only a modest honors list to offer in this arEa: noncommissioned officers,
students, and a Catholic priest. Its only known members are Rawlings himself
and Brig Gen Nunoo Mensah, who until that time held the position of chief of
-I staff. It is he who today handles the delicate missions, such as reasauring
neighboring governments and Ghanaian businessmen and industrialists about the
true nature of the official ideology. At their request he stopped the limi-
tation of bank withdrawals, at 1,500 cedis for individuals and 5,000 for
corporations, which had completely blocked all activity.
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Of course the Libyan diplomatic service is ready and eager to seize the oppor-
tunity for revenge and the possibility for creating a political bridgeiiead in
~ this region. Revenge, because in November 1980, Dr Limann, following the exam- '
� ple of several other states in the region, expelled Qadhdhafi's representatives, ,
who were accused of having supported an antigoverrnaent movement. Nor is the ~
idea of a"destabilizing" bridgehead foreign to him, but the timing would be
poor if the OAU is taken into consideration. However, a step in this direction
might be interpreted from the fact that since 10 January a delegation has been
flying in to prepare shipments of food and probably of weapons, and to reestab-
lish an embassy for the Jamahiriya as well. It is to be hoped that a responsi-
ble government, and Gen Nunoo Mensah in particular, will have the good sense
not to alienate itself either from the moderate states in whose midst Ghana
must yive, or from Western aid because of acceptance of Libyan assistance; the
possibilities of the latter, despite its immediate and spectacular nature, re- ;
main meager. Although the Ghanaians cannot be very choosy about the origin
of the ai3 they receive, the state~of Libyan finances does not permit great
generosity, either.
Another interpretation which has run its course in Lome can henceforth be dis-
cuunted: that of an Ewe coup. This interpretation purposes to be based on the
bloody incidents which occur.red in 1981 between Konkomba and Namumba. Some
people would have seen in these a symptom of the state's imminent breakdown,
deemed f avorable by the Ewe Union for an attempt to reunify its ethnic group.
In this plot, or ostensible plot, were mentioned the names of Gilchrist
Olympio, a son of the former Togolese president, Captain Rawling~ himself,
who is Ewe on his mother's side, and such notables as Dr Owusu Ansah, General
Kattati, and John Tetegah. The explanation smacks of a detective story, and
Gen Nunoo Mensah's recent visit to General Eyadema would have done it ~ustice.
Indeed, it is not difficult to detect the motives of the ref~sgees who 'nave
made themselves its propagators, knowing to what extent the Togolese head of
state is sensitive to the problems of North-South rivalry.
It is true that there doubtless were many attacks against human rights at tlie
time of the recent events in Accra. Dr Limann was arrested 4 January at
Koforidoua, 60 km north of the capital. At present he is in a guarded house,
as is former vice president Graft-Johnson. One of the top leaders of the PNP
;Yeople's National Party), the govermaent party, Addai Amoaku, was executed.
The same party's former president, Nana Okutwer Bekoue, is at the present
time the subject of a particularly nasty charge of embezzlement. On the other
h3nd, several ministers close to Dr Limann were released after being held for
several days. Such was the casp with George Benneh (finance), Mr Jantuah
(interior), Joe Rendor (justice) and Francis Acquah (youth and rural develop-
ment).
- It is much harder to derive an idea of the true number of dead, wounded, or
executed. According to news from Accra, the coup was probably responsible
for about 50 dead, as many seriously wounded, and 200 slightly wounded.
Probably about 50 people were executed for political motives. However, we
cannot let pass in silence the horrifying tales, fortunately of questionable
origin, circulating in Lagos, according to which the number of executions
exceeded 700, of whom 100 were police and a dozen were women. According to
the same source, these massacres took place in secret at Camp Burma.
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Fortunately, out of fear of international reaction, the most well-known per-
~ sonalities were spared.
The Coup's Socioeconomic Context
- All there is to say ~bout the permanen~ bankruptcy in which the country is
struggling has alread;? been said. The exchange value of the currency at the
- borders is only 20 per~:.ent of its official value (1 cedi=Fr 2.16). The infla-
- tion rate is 180 perc;enL. The collapse of agr3cultural and mining production
~ is attributable to lack of motivation and means. As for industry, the aquip-
ment cannot be maintained, can be developed even less, and runs at 30 percent
capacity. All this in an environment of goverrnnent-owned businesses, some
having economic worth, such as those dependent upon Akosombo for the extrac-
tion and treatment of Uauxite, but others (Ghana Airways, Black Star Line, an
oil refinery, etc.) operating outside any criterion of profitability, outside
any standard of wages, and in perpetuation of exorbitant pr~ivileges profiting
their directors.
However, significant correctives must be applied to this apocalyptic picture.
If the problem's specifics could be reduced to wnat has ~ust been stated, it
is clear that Ghana's population would have been wiped off the map. No worker
could feed himself in a country where the minimiun guaranteed wage is 12 cedis
a day, or approximately the price of a loaf of bread or a liter of milk, a
seventh of a chicken, or a hundredth of a mediocre restaurant meal. Although
Ghana's 12 million inhabitants in reality suffer numerous constraints, they
fortunately are not aware of the scarcity. A visit to Mkola, Accra's princi-
pal market, gives the appearance of an adequate supply not only of food and
- beverages but of all ing~eaients--household products, clothin~, transistors,
I~atteries, cycles, etc--winich go to make up current consumption. The price
of these objects represents, in the best cases, a considerable portion of a
worker's wages; in the worst cases, a more or less high multiple of them.
This does not prevent their finding buyers.
Despite the drop in the price of a barrel of Nigerian crude from $40 to $36,
wh ich represents for Ghana a weekly savings of $780,000, the state announced
at the end of 1981 a reduction in fuel imports of over 10 percert. This offi-
cial limitation did not prevent the reappearance, less than 2 weeks after the
coup, of a large number of cars on the road, many of the~ having large engines.
In Accra, gas and "super" are rationed only at service stations.
The phenomenon has a simple explanation: the existence of a parallel economy,
from which the official cedi is excluded. Agricultural production, especia.lly
cocoa, the source of 80 percent of foreign exchange income, sells in Tego and
Ivory Coast, to the extent that that is not prevented hy border surveillzn~e.
In 1981, as far as can be known, these countries absorbed more than 50,000
tons of beans; this explains the fact that the officially exported tonnage,
which was 450,000 tons in 1973, fell to 250,000 tons in 1980-81. The differ-
ence between the amount of the decrease and that of the smuggling corresponds
in the first place to the aging of the plants, and then to the consequences
of customs control. The same thing applies to gold production, which f ell
from 900,000 ounces in 1965 to 372,000 in 1979. To explain the reduction in
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tliis case, management errors and wear and tear on equipment can be added to
customs regulations. Smuggling itself is based on endemic stealing observed
In tt~e mines (40 percent). The product is sold across the land borders, but
a.tso in London, which has become the international market for Ghanaian gold.
lt arrives there in the form of ~ewels and necklaces worn around the necks of
- rich female second-hand dealers traveling as tourists.
Gi~ana's successive governments, trained in the British school, have above all
else been sensitive to a commercial development stereotype. They have pre-
Lc:rred to accommodate themselves to this economic duality rather than imple-
ment structural reforms which would permit them to avoid this impoverishment
- by putting production back in its place in the circulation of wealth. Indeed,
in order to succeed, the reforms called for a temporary but radical lowering
i.n ttie standard of living. The elite are less prepared for this than in other
places because of their culture and Westernism. Many Ghanaians have spent
several years of their lives in Britain, practicing the most varied professions
ttiere, and sometimes staying for good (the brain drain is one of the country's
scourges).
These habits are well enough ingrained for Dr Limann, whose government none-
ttieless came indirectly from a revolutionary movement, to have turned down the
proposals of the International Monetary Fund, subordinating the granting of
$800 million of financial aid to a devaluation which could have reached 700
percent. By rectifying the state's credit, this probably would have brought
about, to Ghana's profit, a change in direction in the parallel currency
market. But it would have cla3hed with the opposition of second-hand com-
merce, which by definition is hostile to the control measures for domestic
prices which would be its necessary corollary. It is also tempting, for a
government subject to popular pressure, to seek a solution instead in resources
such as gold, oil, or diamonds. Unfortunately there is cause to believe that
even if these [resources] were double their present level, they would still be
insuff icient.
Not only di.d Dr Limann's government not consent to the reforms, but 18 months
ago it appeared to legitimize smuggling by authorizing imports without a pre-
liniinary allocation of foreign exchange. The unfortunate thing is that this
flight forward imposed a purely cons~ner economy, as it was accompanied by a
slackening c.f border controls that no one dared to implement until they were
suppressed--indeed until the ineitement to smuggling which would have been in
tl~e logic of the system. This [smuggling] goes on, on the other hand, at the
expense cf industry, whose needs cannot be adapted to semibarter formulas; it
is only wi~h great difficulty that a scraper or an alternator can be excha~ged
at the Aflao border station for a few trucks of kola nuts. Industry must, in
_ addition, struggle against foreign competition which is free from all taxes.
Smuggling is by nature an underground operation, even when it is unofficially
tolerated. The objects involved benefit from an exemption from taxes, but
for the raw materials imported by industry, taxation is the rule. Tax:es do
not affect the sale of smuggled products. That of local industrial Y:�~c'~scts
is subject to the BIC, without loss of exit duties for exports. Th3:s 3spt::t
of ttiin~s explains why industrial circles in Accra are far from hostile to the
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~i~~w rc~~;ime; rightly or wrongly, they expect interventions from it that require
courage, good sense, and equity. Europeans are still numerous here, although
at times they must have recourse to the black market in a personal capacity.
There is no love lost for leaders of past regimes either, be they living or
dead.
Another major disadvantage to the system is that it establishes a completely
unjust distribution of profits among the population. Fram the top to the bot-
tom of the social scale, all those who can index their cedis expressed at the
ofLicial rate,through bribes, comm~issions, tips or by holding more than one
job--called "kalabul" in Accra--ad~ust to it rather well. This reinforces the
privileged situation of smuggling's "great lords"--the carriers and the female
second-hand dealers. The lot of the others is poverty; it is not without
sociclogical interest to mention that prominent among them are subordinate
of.ticers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. General and high-ranking
officers are more discreet; thus the decimation they underwent during the 1979
purge, and the popularity that leaves Jerry Rawlings his rank of "flight
lieutenant."
Unfortunately, it is far from certain whether the new regime is resolved to
carry out a devaluation whose long-term effectiveness, considering well-
conditioned habits, will not prevent painful social consequences. Captain
Rawlings has just come out against it, despite, or because of, a rise in the
dollar, wtiich is traded at the para]1el price of 40 to 1, and at the official
rate of 2.75. National pride, which is at the basis of this decision, is
not necessarily the best counsel. Noble sentiments do not make a good econ-
omy, and this refusal, if it continues, bodes more turbulent days ahead for
Ghana. '
The ~fficial Economy
T}~e double-circuit system, as it operates in Ghana, obviously removes a lot
oE interest from the study of the official economy, such as it appears through
tl~e Central Bank statistics. Foreign debt has undergone several consolida-
tions, the latest in 1979 involving 70 million French francs. Ghanaians repay
ar tlie rate of 2-3 million per year. Under these conditions it is hard to see
t~ow the "Paris Club" could grant them new terms, except by purely and simply
erasing their debts. The current mediwn-term rate of COFACE (French Insur-
ance Company for Foreign Trade) (around 91 million French francs, but 50 of
them pertaining to accident insurance), altho~sgh a modest sum, is sufficient
C~ put a considerable limit on French-Ghanaian exchange~.
I~or a gold and currency resexve of 245 million cedis, the short-term public
debc in July 1981 was 950 million cedis. Medium-term public debt, on the
c~tl~~r hand, does not exceed 178 million (around 6 percent of export income).
'Cl~is figure is explained by the generalized block on international coIIUnercial
credies, but also by the considerable amount of f ree aid received from Great
Kritain (50 million pounds sterling per year), from the Federal Republic of
Germany (SS million Deutschemarks), and soft-condition credits opened by
nttier countries, including Italy and Brazil (it.seems that $35 million was
unblc~cked by this country in 1981). Several organizations, such as OPEC,
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USAIU, the UNDP, the EDF (Economic Development Fund) and the ACDI (Canada)
have also offered, as a reinforcement to the IMF proposals, advances totaling
$150 million under the same conditions.
Ar tl?e end of 1979, the trade balance showed a surplus of $262 million, and
that of current payments $133 million. Since then, these theoretical sur-
pluses have decreased. In any case, they show only the tip of the iceberg.
Only by comparing announced budgets and executed budgets can an idea be
formed of the state's true operating conditions. It is eloquent. The pre-
dicted expenses of the 1980-81 budget were 6 billion cedis, of which 4.8 bil-
lion were for operations; predicted income was 4.4 billion, of which 3.1 were
from indirect taxes. Thus the announced deficit was 1.6 billion. In reality,
tt~ere were 8 billion cedis of expenditures, of which 6.3 were for operations,
and 3.3 of income, of which 2 were f rom indirect taxes. The real deficit was
4.7 billion cedis. In 1981-82, the budget shows 10.4 billion in expenditures,
of which 8.4 are for operations, and 6.2 in income, of which 4 are from in-
direct taxes, or a predicted deficit of 4.2 billion; without any trouble at
all, it is easy to assure that it will be double this amount.
'fonnage produced is undergoing the same drop as trade surpluses. That for
cocoa has been pointed out; smuggling is only partially responsible for the
decrease. The same holds true for gold. There is no underground compensation
to be sought out for tonnage reductions involving bauxite and manganese; re-
spectively, these fell from 315,000 and 409,000 tons in 1975 to 181,000 and
252,000 tons in 1979, simply as a consequence of the deterioration of equip-
ment and tools.
Industry's situation varies according to the sales f acilities for its exported
products and the greater or lesser accentuated liberalism of contracts nego-
tiated with the government, as concerns the granting of import licenses. The
new investment code now in preparation does not foresee any important changes
_ in this area; it focuses especially on reducing the minimum shares held by
the state in the various industrial and cammercial branches: 45 percent for
mines, 20 percent for oil, 40 percent for banks and 60 percent for insurance.
Nationals should retain 50 percent of the shares in corporations with capital
under $500,000. ~
In this context, note should be taken of the efforts to interconnect the Ghana-
ian electrical network with that of Ivory Coast. This was financed, for a
total of 6.8 billion CFA (African P'inancial Conmmunity) francs, with the parti-
' cipation of the BAD (African Development Bank), the BEI (European Investment
Bank), Ghana, and Ivory Coast. An international group, with American leader-
_ 51~ip and the participation of two French banks, is to grant a$28.6 million
loan, guaranteed by the Italian Govertunent, for the creation of an aluminum
lamination unit under the trusteeship of Fata Industriale of Turin, a subsi-
diary of Babcock International. A cement plant to work on the local limestone
deposits, and able to make use of the recently discovered gas at Half Hassini,
would be studied at Nauli, for a simm of 680 million cedis financed by an inter-
national group. Finally, there are projects involving the manuf acture of car-
bonic gas (Peabody Holmes), brickyards, in which Brazfil has shown interest,
and finally, together with Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, the Bui Dam, in the
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Brong Ahafo district, in the northern part of the country. The Kpong hydro-
eiectric dam also remains in the files; it would involve an estimated cost of
_ 6U0 million cedis, and the relocation of 65 villages, not to mention the build-
tng of new settlements.
Besides these projects or completed works which are deemed to have more or
less of a priority, the majority of small and meditmn-size businesses struggle
along under conditions which often are discouraging for .their promoters.
Automobile assembly plants in CKD have practically closed down, be they the
- West African Trading Company (SCOA) for Peugeot, the French Company of West
~frica (CFAO) for Renault, or the UAC for Bedford; each is equipped to produce
1,500 to 2,000 vehicles per year and employed several hundred workers. Ope-
rations conceived at the suggestion of government authorities, which would
liave provided these corporations an outlet for their progressively devaluating
nonrepatriable cedis, have gone under out of the general indifference. This
was the case with the combir~ed poultry farming unit, cofinanced by the Ghana
C~~~mnercial Bank, Shell, and the French Company of West Africa (CFAO), which
was designed to produce 1 million chickens for local consumption; efforts
exerted over 18 months resulted only in the production of 700 tons of corn.
It t~ad to be terminated because of a lack of foreign exchange currency which
would have provided for the importation of necessary tools.
'Che situation is worse yet for the national corporations, the creation of
whic}i was the work of Kwame Nkrumah. To the factors of nonprofitability and
I~roduction slowdowns there is the disadvantage of extravagant management; in
Ghana, as in many other countries in Africa, the benef its of these constitute
a"nomenklatura" which comes in handy for defending its interests under the
cover of political parties where one would not expect to find them. The two
best examples of this are the Black �~tar Line, a national maritime shipping
company, and Ghana Airways.
'I'he former, having ceased its payments in September 1980, saw its ships seized
in foreign ports by its creditors, while the 20 units remaining in Ghana, or
three-quarters of the fleet, inunobilized at Tema and Takoradi by striking
crews who had not been paid for several months, had to be turned over to the
navy. A technical assistance and management agreement was negotiated between
tl~e West German company Woerman Lines and Black Star. The Limann government's
- true objective was to succeed in selling it--a difficult goal, considering.
the advanced age of the equipment. Nonetheless, four ships were turned over
- to c~r.eek shipowners, while replacements for them were ordered at a South
Korean shipyard.
I)espite the recent acquisition of a Fokker Fellowship by Ghana Airways, and a
considerable increase in the company's fares, its situation is hardly less
critical; a partner is being sought in Canada to share the financial burdens.
lt is the same tune and the same quests for the Ghana Railways Corporation,
wl~ich has undertaken negotiations with Indian and Canadian f irms, and for State
Transport, where 120 buses out of a fleet of 250 remain in operating condition.
At the time when, as a consequence of this situation, the logical tendency to
~ go into private hands becoffies apparent, the state unfortunately is compelled
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to take over the wealth of private firms. Firestone, for instance, had been
reduced to producing 300 tires per day out of a capacity of 4,000; since they
fi:id to pay 11 million cedis in taxes, they preferred to sell, at a miserably
low price, their local facilities, including the hevea plantations of Ghana
" kubber Estates Ltd. Their promissory notes still will not be paid for 5 ye8rs
hy the Central Bank; within the framework of a three-way agreement, the cedis
obtained must be turned over for the expenses of the U.S. Embassy in Accra.
Tlie only condition imposed upon this arrangement by Firestone, wh3ch is leaving
some technical advisers there, is the promise not to turn these facilities over
to a rival firm. It is highly unlikely that any should appear on the scene.
This trend toward going into private hands, which is general throughout all
AErica (it is especially evident in ivory Coast, Mali, Zaire, and even in the
(:ongo), clashes in Ghana, in the same way as monetary devaluation, with a
popular sentiment of which Captain Rawlings is the expression. Thus, he would
contemplate denouncing the agreement reached between Woerman Lines and Black
Star, and he has decided to rehire the wage earners, laid o~f by the preceding
regime, of the Ghana Industrial Corporation, a particularly inefficient and
impecunious state holding company.
Oil. and Mining Resources
French-Ghanaian Relations ~
'fli:i.s attitude on the part of the Provisional National Defense Comanittee cor-
responds both to the still prestigious memory af the Osagye jKwame Nkrumah],
- who died in exile in Guinea in 1972, andto the idea that the nonviability of
liis econo~nic ideas was only illusory--that the implementation of national re-
sources development, which would have assured a balance, was abandoned by the
profiteers of the regimes that succeeded him, to the profit only of inercenary
activities.
Great hopes were based on oil. Up to the present time, reality has not justi- '
fied them. The Saltpond and Bonsu offshore deposits, being operated or
readied for operation in shallow water off Accra by Agri-Petco International
(USA), t~ave limited reserves of 7 million tons. And extraction from these is
undergoing technical difficulties. Total production capacity does not exceed
3,OOU barrels per day. In 1980, Phillips Petroletun announced the discovery,
at the b4undary with Ivorian territorial waters, of the Half Hassini deposit,
tor which production is estimated at 1,500 barrels a day. This annual contri-
bution of 250,000 to 300,000 tons of crude will be able to lessen the severity
of ttie oil bill but not guarantee the stabilization of the economy, even when
implemented b~~ the gas reserves recently found 30 km from Half Hassini.
Ghana Consolidated Diamonds, a joint economy corporation, the majority of
wtios~: shares belong to the state, showed a drop in production of more than
- 100 percent between 1976 and 1980. More than 25 percent of its wage earners
tiad to be laid off. It continues to operate only through the advances of one
oC its stockholders--Consolidated African Selection Trust, a subsidiary of
British Petroleum.
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Pro~pects for production of gold might be more encouraging. To stimulate this,
llr Limann's government sought investors ($3 billion was deemed necessary), con-
tcmplated tax facilities which would pro~it development corporations, and with
~I~is in mind organized an international seminar in Accra. When it was still
ccilled the Gold Coast, Ghana, with 34 tons, held the rank of fifth largest
world producer, following South Africa, the USSR, Canada, and the United
Stat~s. Despite the existence of high-content ore in thick veins that
often can be developed through surface mining, production, which had been
900,000 ounces in 1965, fell to 527,000 in 1970, 402,000 in 1978, and 362,000
_ in 1979. These figures are official, from the weight exchanged at the Bank of
(;liana at the rates prevaiiing at the time. There are a few corrective f actors:
1~remiums allowed the price to be increased by 20 percent, but this was insuffi-
cient, despite the rise in gold prices, to offset thef ts in production and
smuggling, estimated at 40 percent; thus, real production in 1979 would be
13 tons.
'l'I~is situation alone would be sufficient to explain the drop in production,
wi~V~out even taking into consideration the difficulties of maintenance; the
l.ack of foreign exchange currency, facilities, and tools; or the defects in
_ a 5tate management which has affected most operations since 1969 except that
uF tl~e Lonrho firm. In their case, the state has only 55-percent participa-
tion, and their technical train~ng allows them to be able to guarantee two-
~1lirds of national production. A state holding co~pany, the State Gold Mining
Corporation, whose position is not specifically indicated, groups together
timall mines which keep their financial individuality.
Gul.d is probably the only resource whose reasonable development could contribute
to reestablishing confidence in Ghanaian currency and, by so doing, attenuate
tl~c ot}ier flaws in the economy. It was in this context that Jean-Pierre Cot,
on his recent visit to Accra, looked into the possibility of French interven-
tion in the Tarkwa mine. This would be financed by the Central Fund for Eco-
nomic Cooperation; the position of COFI~CE (French Company for Foreign Trade)
~~ould be relaxed by the guarantee of commercial credits. Contacts were made
l~ut were not followed up; they have perhaps reawakened certain sensitivities
dating from the colonial era. It would be quite surprising if Accra's young
revolutionary goveriunent took them up again on its own.
Another project, involving the creation of oil stations in the port of Tema,
was studied by the Central Fund, which operates in Ghana through the inter-
mediary of its agency in Lome. Although such action falls more within the
purview of export credits, it could be the opportunity for French cooperation
to renew relations with Ghana; these are at a standstill, with the exception
of a low-cost experimental study on ~oint financing to be carried out by the
~ Institute for Rubber Research in Africa (IRCA). The question can be taken up
again as soon as a partner able to negotiate for Ghana is named. It is
~lainly to be wished that Captain Rawlings' teatn, whose past excesses have
heen equal to the corruption of which this country has been the victim, not
' deceive itself about the real causes of the evil. In order to remedy it, they
must demonstrate a rigorous management more effective than that of submachine
i guns.
i
; COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
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NIGER
OFEDES EXPERIENCING WELL DRILLING PROBLEMS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 562
[Article: "OFEDES Board of Directors: Problems with Hydrology Pro3ects"]
[Text] The board of directors of the Nigerien Office of subsoil Waters
(OFEDES) met in Zinder on 27 January with Minister of Hydrology Yahaya
Tounkara presiding.
On this occasion the minister indicated that "with respect to the implementa-
tion of our planning set forth in the 1979-1983 5-year plan, it can be
considered satsifactory despite numerous problems of an administrative nature
and diff iculties with materiel and manpower.
"With respect to the physical ob3ectives set by the plan, f rom 1979 to
1 January 1982 we drilled 905 OFEDES-type wells, or 40 percent of those
planned; 376 boreholes in the substratum, or 20 percent of those planned; and
. 30 deep boreholes, or 50 percent of those planned.
"During the f irst 2 years of the plan, performance was poor owing to the
time required to set up funds and equipment. The annual rate of drilling for
the first 3 years is, nonetheless, good. By the end of the plan this rate
will guarantee us with certainty a minimum of 1,627 OFIDES-type wells, or 71
percent of those planned; 1,800 boreholes in the substratum, or 100 perceat;
41 deep boreholes, or 205 percent."
With respect to the operations in progress, Dr. Tounkara pointed out that "by
5 January 1982 a total of 228 boreholes had been drilled; of these 144 were
positive and 84 negative or an average failure rate of 36.84 percent within
the framework of the drilling program. But Maradi and Zinder Departments in
particular have experienced the greatest failures.
"Of the two, Zinder is the more disturbing since of 81 boreholes drilled 43
are positive and 38 negative, or a failure rate of 48.90 percent, while
Maradi and Niamey Departments record 23.18 and 14.82 percent respectively.
Such a result obliges us to revamp this program and prompts us to be careful
with subsequent programs of this type so that the state will not pay for work
that is largely unproductive."
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The ECOWAS program involving 1,500 sites, 100 ~oreholes and 400 village
wells, the launching of which was planned for 1981 in Niamey, Zinder, Diffa
and Maradi Departments, is marking time for lack of a firm and def initive
commitment .
The 200-borehold program for Liptako (with WADB [West African Development
Bank] and Nigerien fi�aancing) should begin shortly after several months' delay
_ resulting from slown~ss in setting up f inancing and obtaining necessary
equipment.
UNDR [United Nations' Development Program]-UNICEF program of drilling 250
boreholds in Zinder Department continues to suff er from administrative clumsi-
ness relating to the recruitment of international experts. Operations listed
in the second Danish loan, which involves 150 wells in Zinder Department and
- the drinking water supplies of the cities of Guidan-Roumd~i, Tibiri, Aguie
and Gazoua in Maradi Department, will soon enter the phase of concrete
accomplishments af ter having been the victims of administrative misadventures
for months on end.
The drinking water supplies of five secondary centers--Madarounfa, Gotheye,
Tera, Torodi and Gaya--and the determination of new collection zones for the
water supply to the city of Zinder,which has FRG f inancing arranged by the
GKW [expansion unkno~an], are nearing their end on a note that is not very
reassuring for the city of Zinder, which is decidedly running the risk of
remaining the cit~ of thirst. In fact, the results obtained up to now do not
- presently indicate underground water levels capable of covering this city's
needs.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
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SENEGAL
NEW CONTROL SHOPS ESTABLISHID IN CAPE VERDE AR.EA
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893, 19 Feb 82 p 557
[Article: "Trade: 50 New Control Shops"]
[Text] Some 50 new control shopa will be establishe~d in the~Cape Verde area,
bringing to 76 the number of these shops run by yaung Senegalese. The
Senegalese Government has ~ust cleared a fr118 million support �und for the
extension of the control shop operation which started in the Cape Verde area
in 1975.
The operation was devised to make possible the creation of nonsalaried jobs.
It was also a question of modernizing and expanding the retail distribution
network by ~*_-eating functional atores with all essential products at lawful
prices. Th~ third ob3ective of the pro3ect was the Senegalization of the
sector which is monopolized by non-Senegalese (especially Mauritians and
Guineans).
In 1975 a first group of 15 stores was financed by SONAGA [Na~ional Company
for Commercial Insurance and Assistance] and SOPIADIS [National Investment
- Company of Senegal]. The first:company is haudling planning and equipment and
the second the f inancing of the initial stock. Al1 this for a to~cal of
approximately 2 million, repayable in 6 years at a reasonable rate. In late
_ 1980, 11 other stores were opened with the assistance of the 2 companies and
of so~~e local banks.
The office of domestic trade and prices is handling the hiring of the young
managers who must first attend a 6-month training cou~rse at the Dakar
prof essional center.
The control shops should not be confused with the �rontier shops. The
frontier shops operation has the ob~ect of making staple foodstuffs available
to the residents of the frontier villages in order to prevent their crossing
frontiers for provisions. In view of ttie difficulty of obtaining provisions,
the Senegalese who live near the frontiers were exchanging products for goods.
It was in order zo discourage this practice that the now defunct ONCAS
' (National Officer of Cooperation and Assistance for Development] financed a
certain number of shops, especially in West Senegal and Casamance.
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~
After ONCAD was disbanded, the regional cooperation associations took over.
Some regional associations set up several shops without waiting for any
financing. Soon 10 of these shops will open in West Senegal, and another
6 in Casamance and in Sine-Saloum. State f inancing is expected for the
construction of 39 shops.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
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,
SENEGAL
~ .
BRIEFS
~ OPPOSITION CRITIQUE PLANNED--Eight Senegalese opposition parties announced
their intention to form a committee for critical study of the Senegalese
Election Code, a revision of which is presently beiug worked out. In a press
~ release dated 14 February the eight parties emphasized that they had not been
~ consulted concerning the revision of the Senegalese Election Code. They say
that they will submit their conclusions and proposals to the president of the
~ republic, the government and public opinion. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 557] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
-i et Cie Paris 1982] 9380
~
~ PARIS SENEGALESE DAYS--On Wednesday 28 and Thursday 29 April in Paris, the
~ CNPF [National Council of French Employers] will organize 2 days--or, more
precisely, 3 half-days--of information on Senegal. The Senegalese delegation
which will come to Paris should be headed by Toure~ the minister of the plan
~ and cooperation. The ob~ectivs of these Senegalese days will be threefold:
~ presentation of the new Senegalese development plan, presentation of the new
' Senegalese Investment Code and, finally, presentation of the new formula for
~ the~Dakar Free Industrial Zone. Five committees--mines and energies, construc-
; tion materials, metal and electrical engineering, fishing and fishing
'i industries, fr~e industrial zone--will bring together the Senegalese delegates
i and French businessmen interested in Senegalese projects. [Text] [Paris MARCHE
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 557]
; [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9380
~ PEAT EXPLOITATION COMPANY--A Senegalese Peatery Company (CTS), a semipublic
corporation with capital of CFA 100 million, has been created in Senegal with
, a view to exploiting the 50 million cubic meters of peat discovered in the
~ country. The CTS should start production 3n 1986 with the construction of two
30-megawatt peat powered thermal power stations, which would represent 45
percent of Senegal's energy consumption. For the first year and a half, the
company will function as a research corporation in order to complete the
preliminary studies begun 2 years ago; the cost of these studies is estimated
at CFA 1 billion. Financing for this research is being provided by France, the
' FRG, Canada, Fintand and Ireland. The new company's capital, open exclusively
to Senegalese during its first phase, is held by the atate, SENELAC (Senegalese
~ Electrical Energy Company) and SOFISEDIT (Senegalese Financial Company for the
' Development of Industry and Tourism). With the exploitation of peat, Senegal
~ will be able to diversify its energy sovrces; up to the present all power
-i stations built in Senegal have been por~ered by fuel oil. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
~ TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 557] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
~ Moreux et Cie Paris 1982; 9380
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