JPRS ID: 10534 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060047-9
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• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 47
• Content Type: REPORTS

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J~'RS L/ 10534 ~
20 May 1982
- Near East North AfriCa Re ort
p
~~OUO ~0/82)
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JPRS L/10534
~
~ 20 May 1982
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPOR~'
(FOUO 20/82~
, CONTENTS
_ BAHRAIN
London ~TIl~S~ on 'Attempted Coug~ Trial
~ (Robert F`isk; THE TIl~S, 29 Mar 82) 1

~
IRAQ
- ~Aziz Vier~s Nonaligned Surr~nit, ~Iideast
~ (Taxiq 'Aziz; AFR.IQUE-ASIE, 26 Apr-9 May 82) 4
_ LEBANON
A1-Wazzan Discusses Israeli Tntentions, French Relations,
Other Issues
- (Shafiq al-Wazzan Interview; ATrWATAN AL-'AR.ABI,
12-18 Mar 82) 10
LIBYA
- Al-Qadhdhafi Gives Views on Christians~ Nasirites
(AL-WATAN AZ-~ARABi, 16-22 Apr 82) 15
- Briefs
Wage Reduction for Fnreigners 16
SUDAN
Airport Projects Underway Described
- (MARCHES TROPICAU% ET MEDITERR,ANEFSI5, 2 Apr 82) 17
= Brief s
Ara?~ I,oan ~ 18
Livestock Marketing Project lg
New Banks 18
Japanese Aid 19
Air Cooperation With Ethiopia 7-9
Port Project 19
~ - a- t r~z ~ rrE W,~, FouoJ
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= SYRSA
Of.ficial I}iscusses Praposals for Mideast PeP~:e
(Edward Mortimer; THE lIMES, 22 Mar 82) 20
Nai~ional Alliance for Liberation of S~ria Founded
- (AL-WATAN AL-'EiRABI, 26 Mar-1 Apr 82) 22
Ammesty International .Report on Syria
(AL-WATAN AI,-'A1~ABI, 26 Mar-1 Agr Q2) 31
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BAdRAIN
LONDON 'TIMES' ON 'ATTEMPTED COUP' TRIAL
PM291625 London THE TIMES in English 29 1~1ar 82 pp 1, 20
[Robert Fisk dispatch: "Iran Involvement in Attemptad Coup Emerges at �
Secret Trial"J
[Excerpts] Manama, Bahrain, 28 Mar--ihe graffiti on the wa11s of Bab A1
, Bahrain Street have been carefully doct~red. The Arahic words have been
spray-painted over with childlike doodles, but 3ust round the corner from
the crowded Gold B~zaar, you can quite clearly make out the words Yasgat
Nizam A1 Khalifah (down with the A1 Khalifah regi~) inacribed c,n the side
of a disused shop. .
There are black atencil portraits of A~ratollah Rhomeyni on the walls as
well, most of them obscene~y defaced. The Islamic Republic of Bahrain is a
concept which the island's ruling dynasty .rather naturally,wiahes to dis-
courage.
Just 12 mile~ down the coast from Bahra3n'a futuristic capital, however, the
dangers of..an Iranian-backed Shia Musli~ state on the island are being mure
~ ser;~ously debated. In the little vil~Sage of Jao, 73 men--13 of them S~udi
nationals--are being tried far allegedly planning sabotage opeiationa ~.n
- Bahrain. �
'~hat, at least, is what the indictment claims, though the A1 Khalifah family
are we11 aware that the defendants were preparing a coup d'etat, a vialent
and potentially bloody putsch that.wo�ild have marked Iran's first successful
_ exportation of its rslamic revo~utio,~i t~ che Arabian peninsula..
Shaikh Muhammad ibn Mubarak A1 Kh~?ifa.h, the foreign minister, is qui~e blunt
about the whole affair. "The plo~," he told THE TIMES, "was against the
tirabism of Bahrain. It was foreign, non-Arab intervention in our affsirs.
These people should be punished."
And so they probably will be--perhaps with death--thougt~ Bahrain's minister
ot infarniation goea to some lengths to emphasize that the A1 Khalifah govern-
t~ent is a tolerant regime which will always consider mercy.
A far more sensitive issue for the Bahrainis, however, is the patently
obvious--even brazen--involLement of Iran iu the planned coup. It is
1
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primarily for this reasoa that the tri~l of the 73 men, which resum~d this
weekend, has been held largely in secret. Journalists are politely but
firnly barred fxom the proceedi~gs.
lnquiries in Bahrain by THE TIMES, however, have established that the court~
where the a~ccused are defended by 17 lawyera, haa hPard evidence that:
1. Almost all those on trial were given arms and guerrilla training in Iran.
2. Most af the weapor.s found in carefully-hiddea caches in the East Rifaa
District of the islared last Deceml~er--including Israeli-made UZI suL-
mach3neguns, a heavy machtnegun, grenades and explosiv~s were all ~~?-~ught
into Bahrair~ from Iran.
3. The Iranian charge d'affaires in Bahrain, M~ Hassan Shustari, imported
- dozens of two-way radic sets for the conspirators uader cover of dipl~~matic
immunity.
4. M~ore than 50 Bahraini police uniforms found with the weapons, GomplF~te
~ ,aith the Bahraini insignia of cross~d s�,aorda, wer~ manufactured in Tehran.
This was confirmed by the Farsi ide:~tification o~ the back of ~he "off'~.cial"
~ police buttons.
5. The conspirators expected mi.litary assistance fram Iranian troops were
apparently to be landed in the island by sea. Oze source suggested that the
Irania:~ Navy's British-built hovercraft was to be used in this operati~an.
Most of the accuse~i are followers of ??:~jatoleslam Hadi Modaressi, an Iranian
Shaia prelate who is a member of the Islamic Republican Party in Tehran, and
who lived ir exile for three years in Bahrain during the shah's reign. He
was sheltered by Shaikh 'Isa ibn Salman A1 Kha.lifah, the Bahraini ruler,
who did not realize that he wae secretly buildi:lg up r~ range of contacts in
the area.
The fact that the accused men include Arabs oLher than Bahrainis has prompted
the coopera*ion of other Arab Gulf countri~s under thi: auapices of the newly-
formed Gulf Cooperation Security Council. Shaikh Muhammad Mubarak, foreign
minister, revealed to THE TIMES that an Omani and a Kuwaiti were also among
the defendants. ~
It further transpires that Prince Nayif, the Saudi interior minister, flew
to Bahrain witl? a squad of Saudi security men to interrogate the Saudi
suspects.
The Bahraini authorities are aware that several dozen other Arabs are st~:,l
in training in Iran, and that the full facts of last December's planned coup
may still not be known. Officials in Manama are, for instance, particularly
interested in a car bomb e~:~,losion that occurred in London last December, at
ttie time of the discovery of the ca~ip. Three men died in the bomb blast;
two were Iranians, but the other was a Bahraini.
2
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The Iranian charge d'affaires has been expelled from Bahrain, but the island
is almoat defenceless, and the Bahrainis are anaious that their unpleasant
discovery should not be sensationalized.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982
CSO: 4400/237 ~
_ ' 3
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- IRAQ,
'AZIZ VIEWS NONALIGNED SUi~fiT, MIDEAST ~
PM291421 Pari~s AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Apri9 May 82 pp 13-15
[Interview witTi Iraqi D~; ~ty Prime r3inister Tariq 'Aziz by Simon Malleq:
"The Nonaligned Movement Needs New Impetus"-date and place not given]
[Text] Simon Malley: What role could the forthcoming nonaligned summit
play in solving the conflict betwE~n you and Iran? Do you iatend to raise
that question? If other countries were to raise it, would you ob3ect?
Tariq 'Aziz: We will rec~ive anq intention or plan to discuss that conflict
in a constructive spirit. There is no question of our opposing tl. t debate,
and we are prepared to put our viewpoint to all ttie other countries. And if
the heads of state conference intended to take an initiative with a view
to settling that conflict, we would certainly not oppose it. W~e see abso3.utelq
no reason why the seventh nonaligaed stimmnit should not examine that affair.
Simon Malley: Do you not think it useful and necessary for concessions to
- be made to ensure the triumph of that peace which is vital for protecting
our countries against imperialism and Zionism and for al]. energies to be
J mobilized against the peoples' common adversaries?
Tariq 'Aziz: We have no intention of keepiiig territories which belong to
Iran and we have no designs on any Traniaai city. All we ask is for a~ust
and equitable solution to be found to this conflict, whose ~derlying~cauaes
must be settled so that war does not break out again later. It is by
recognizing the rights of both sides that a reasonable baeis for agreement
can be found. Anyboc'ly who talks about "agreement" is naturally talking about
reciprocal ccnc~ssion~.
- Simon Malley: Let us discuss the nonaligned summi.t for a moment. Iraq will
chair the movement for 3 years. How do you view the role which President
Saddam Husayn will have to play in his capacity as nonaligned chairman? You
know that there are two f~mdamental views which clashed in particular at the
sixth summit in Havana on the very doctrine of nonalignment: The view wh~ich
wants nonalignment to be "strictly neutral," so to speak, between the
- socialist and capitalist camps, between West and ~ast, and the view which
rejects that concept and instead insists that nonalignment should be an
effective contribution to supporting the peoples against the domination of
- imperialism, its agents and its intQrests.
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Tariq 'Aziz: Here in Iraq we feel that the Nonaligned Movement needs a new
impetus in the development of cooperation and solidarity among its ~embers.
Although Iraq is not a big country it nonetheless has ma~or economic, cultural
anu human capabilities. We have given substantial sid to many African, Asian
and South Anaerican countries and, alti~ough our capabilities ia that sphere
- are somewhat reduced by the war with Iran, we will pursue that pol3~cy withotit
any hesitation. Owing to its geographical position, Iraq can form a ma~or
link within the movement. It is in that spirit that the Iraqi chairmanship
will act to strengthen ties between the three continents which form the
_ Nonaligned Movement.
Nonetheless, as far as the Iraqi Govern~.~nt is concerned youx question can
only have one answer: The Nonaligned Movemeat sheuld take clear and balanced
stances an all international questions. But the very essence of ob~ectivity
imposes on us a fact which we cannotc escape: The United States and the
Soviet Union cannot be placed on the same level. In our view the fact is that
the United States supports Israel and South Africa and its racist regime.
~ The fact is that the United Statea is doing nothing practieal to oppose the
aggressions against the Arab nation, especi~lly Palestine, the southern
- African nations (Angola, Mozambique, Namib ia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, the Seychelles
or Madagascar) or the Latin American covntries (Cuba, Nicaragua, E1 Salvador
and so forth). The fact is that the Uaited States supports the anti-people
reactionary regimes in South and Central America.
~5o how can people hesitate between what you describe as the two views o~
nonalignment? In our view t.h.e:~ can onl.y be one nonalignment--the ~ne which
is a guarantee against all threats from imperialismy Zionfsm and racism.
Although we think it necessary to be able to establish diversification in
international relations, it is especially important not to alienate our
independence and sovereignty for anything.
Let us be strictly ob3ective. It is clear that the two superpowers obviously
prefer alignment with their positions. That is a fact which rinonaliCO ad
deny. But, imlike the United States, the USSRis helping many ~
countries against imperialism and against the threats of colonialist and
racist powers. It is supporting the Arab nation against the Zionist enemy.
It maintains good relations with several nonaligned countries. The views
held by some nonaligned covntries are probably not identical w3th those of
the USSR, but that disagreement eannot be compared with the acute hostility
which exists between our countries and U.S. imperialist policy.
Simon Malley: Do you think that the i~onaligned cotmtries could play a role
in reducing world tension, as they did in the period of acute crisis between
Washington and Moscow?
Tariq 'Aziz: Yes, I seriously think they ca~1. Once it has assumed chair-
manship of the movement, Iraq will be ab le to play an acCive role in
mobilizing as many countries as possible espeicailq those whose policy is
truly independent, in order to try to reduce world tension.
Simon Malley: How do you explain the fact that, after adopting a clear-cut
stance against the Soviet policy of aid to Afghanistan, the Iraqi Government
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is r,ow adopti~g`ra more serene attitude and is no longer talking about that
problem? ~
Tariq 'Aziz: Through President Saddam Husayn Iraq proclaimed a position of
princ~.ple back in November 1980. That position has not cl~anged, and the
fact that we ~roclaimed it means not that we were laiaiching or participating
in a campaign against the USSR but that we were drawing up an independent and
sovereign policy. Nonetheless the USSR is still our friend and we continue
to guard that friendship just as we will continue to make every effort to
ensure that a satisfactorq solution for all the parties concerned is foimd to
the Afghan question, so that the Afghan people's sovereignty and dignity can
be protected.
- Simon Malley: But do you not think that Kabul was entitled to call for the
USSR intervention, as moreover the 1JN Charter specifies?
Tariq 'Aziz: Yes, but Iraq has its own political principles which it certainly
cannot impose on others. And I tell you that if I~aq i~ threatened by any
force at all it will not resort to a foreign power to protect its security
and sovereignty....
Simon Malley: Even if that power is stroager th~n the covntry's human,
political and economic capabilities and you are likely to suffer military
occupation an~ to lose your independence?
Tariq 'Aziz: We will never resort to a foreign force to protect our
sovereignty. We will face any foreign intervention with ou~ own mens.
President Saddam Husayn has stated that, if a great power wanted to attack
Iraq, it could occupy the land but would find a land without people because
the entire people would fight....
Simon Malley: Some Arab circles, including s~me progressives, think that
Iraq has hegemonist ambitions. What do you tr.ink of that?
Tariq 'Aziz: However strong it is Iraq will never be any Chreat to its
Arab partners. Remember that in February 1980 President Saddam Husayn
proposed a"national pact" to the Arab nat~ion proposing thaC the Arab
countries pledge never to use armed force among themselves. Is that pact
not therefore a guarantee of our good faith? If anybody imagines that Iraqi
forces could be used as aggression foree against the Arab countries, he is
veiy sorely mistaken. I.raq's entire strength is and remains available for
protecting and winning back Arab lands against the imperialist and Ziomist
threats.
Simon Malley: Vital questions will once again be raised at the sevenCh
nonaligned s uum~it: Palestine and the Camp David agreements, sauthern Africa
and Pretoria's racist and aggressive policy, Namibia, U.S. imperialism's
threats, Kampuchea's status, North-South and South-South dialogue....
6
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Tariq 'Aziz: First let me say that the Palestine problem is a problem for us
all... .Well before the s~mit we wil~. s~art detailQd discussions with our
F~lestiniaa brothers in the PLO and the Arab nation to determine the best
attitude to adopt....
Simon Malley: In that connection c~o you see an improvement in the prospects
for a comprehensive settlement of the~conflict since President al-Sadat's
assassination? ,
Tariq 'Aziz: Unforttmately I do not see a noticeable improvament as regards
a solution to the Palestinian prob lem. However, what must be stressed is that
the Palestinian cause enjoqs support which has been considerably increased
at international level, especially in the past 3 years. That support is a
considerable contribution, an impressive psychological st~ength on the path
to the Palestinian people's liberation. You mentioned al-Sadat's assassina-
tion. Of course tha~ assassination was a symbolic act. Nanetheless it is
- still certain that Camp David has been a lamentable failure. 'd'Eie plan which
al-Sadat built with force and passion and which he regarded as his life's
work, collapsed with the death of its suthor. But what was that assassination
if not the historic failure of the "peace" to which al-Sadat devoted himself?
Today the whole world witnesses that aud will eventually admit it. A1-Sadat
- is no more and his death is positive in that it shows that the path which he
- took had no future and contained no hope.... ~
Simon Malley: Do qou think that Egypt will folloa ~a m~ore reasonable path and
return to the great Arab nation un3er Husni Mubarak's regime?
Tariq 'Aziz: We in Iraq do not try to prophesy. Of course the post-Sadat
period is relatively better, b ut there can be no question of fa].ling into
blind optimism. That is mainly because the dangers of the Camp David agree-
ments still exist and because they have not been denounced or abandoned by
al-Sadat's successors. Camp David has failed but the United States has not
sCopped believing in it. Moreover nor has Isr.ael or the Egyptian Government.
As for President Mubarak, we think that he is a responsible man. He can say
_ and do what he wants. That is why it would not be right for us or Arab
leaders to become caught up in conjectures, to say what he will or will not
do. ~e will have to j udge the Egyptian head of state by his actions and
dealings .
Simon Malley: What about the prob lems of colonialism, of South A�rica and ~
its aggressions? Is it not necessary to go further than condemnations and
"Sim day vows," as they say in the West? Would it not be possible to incude
the movement to adopt and implement more practical measures against the
racist Pretoria regime? The African peoples and the democratic forces are
tired of making do with resolutions attd condemnations....
Tariq 'Aziz: You are absolutely right. But you know that the movement
adopts resolutions and that it is up to its members to implemen,t or forget
them. Nonetheless that should not prevent the seventh summit from considering
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and deciding how it can ensure thaC its resolutions will be accompanied by
practical measures and will not,ultimatelq be ignored. We know tnat there
are several cauntries whtch are still igaoring the resolutions which have ~
been adopted. 'i'he time will come when they will have to ~nswer for their
' respective machitrations. Tha~ applies to South Africa sad to Israel and ~o
all those who threaten t~e sovereigacy and~indepeadence of oppressed,
- threatened and;attacked peoples.
Simon Malley:=^,:'~~~question which the world psess, notablq the Frenah press
.
is raising coricerns ynur relatious with the French Goverc?ment fol~lawing the
victory of the leftwing forces on 10 Msy 1981. You were the first Iraqi
statesman to talk with President Fraacois Mitterrand. What is the present
state uf Franco-Iraqi relstiaas?
Tariq 'Aziz: Z woulC like to divide qour q~estion.into two parts. As
regards bilateral relations I must say that they are good in the economic,
military and nuclear spheres because the French Governme~t has officially
pledged to continue exi,sting cooperation in those thYee spheres and it has
promised to conclude new agreements. Since my visit to Paris on 18 and
~ 19 August 1981, our relations have continued in a satisfactory way. As for
the political aspect of your question, ~e examined a whole seriea of questions
in a canstrt~ctive way during my talks in Paris and then during the visit to
Baghda,d by [Fren~h External Relations Minister] ~heysson and [French Foreign
~ Trade Minister] Jobert. We ag~ee with the French Government on a number of
internation~l policy issues, especially the new govemment'~s desire to have
a policy which is independent of the two aup~rpowers. We are fu11y in agree-
ment wich that line. However, we a~e not in agreement with Paris on the
Middle East qu~estion. The new gov~rament maintains ideas and defends
initiatives on which I prefer not to cou~ent at present because Chey do not
- seem to be very clear and we do not knrna wi~ere they are leading....That is
why we informed Claude Cheysson of our dtsire ta have more pol:it3.ca1 meetings
so that each can gain a better understandiue ~f the other's position.
Simon Malley: Are you mainly referriag to the Palestinian affair and to
- President Mitterrand's visit to Israel%
Tariq 'Aziz: I admit that I do not yet know the real results of Mr Francois
Mitterrand's visit. But that visit produced a generally negative impression
which was reflecte3 and conveyed by the Arab press. I do not want to say any
more about that because I would first like to know~ the precise facts about that
visit and the subsequent period. According to my initial information,
although it is limited, Presid~nt Mitterrand made relatively positive� state-
ments about the Palestinian problem. In my view he is the first Western
leader to have made such statements in an official way to tne Ieraelis and~in
- Israel itself. But the general impression which prevails in Che Arab capitals
is that France should adopt a clearer attitude.
Simon Malley: But you met with Claude Cheysson in Baghdad before Prancois
Mitterrand's visit fo Israel....
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Tariq 'Aziz: Claude Cheysson d3d indeed inform ue about Mr Mi~terrand's
visit to Israel, and our answer was alear: The main thing, the es~ential
thing is the results of the vist, especially those r~lating to th~ solutiori
of the Palestinian problem. In my opinion the fundamental question is not the
1?isit but its results. The qu~stion is also how far the French Government
- w ill go in its sudetermination~itotreturnetorheirlhomeland and to~createya
the PLO, to self
sovereian and independent atate.
Simon Malley: What about France's reconstructing the Iraqi ~uc~.ear power
statio:? bombed by the Israeli Air Farce? ;
_ Tariq 'Aziz: During my visit to Paris we reached agreement on the.French
Government's undertaking the construetioni 8ircraft~u Sincerthen nego~iations
to the one which was bombed by the Israel
They wi11 be concluded ~
have be~n continuing and things are entirely normal...�
at the appropriate time. But I would like to add that~so far the French
authorities have been faithful to the guidelines on which we agreed.
Simon Malley: Do you intend to reconstruct the nuclear power station destroyed
by the Israelis? ,
Tariq 'Aziz: We will reconstruct it and we will constxuct others. ,
Simon Malley: What about the danger of new Israeli attacks?
Tariq 'Aziz: You can be certain th~t since that bombing we have taken all
the necessary steps tokeisueverhrepeated,hittwill berepelledaandacrush da
that, if such an attac
Simon Malley: Some Israeli leaders think that their "strategic space" extends
from the Atlantiated thatGany MuslimSArabccountryfhosti edtohIsrael:aw u1d not
Have they not st
be "allowed" to possess such nuclear power stations?
Tariq 'Aziz: The Israeli leaders' Zionist mentality has a logic which prompts
them to want to control the whole world if they could. That is why they
think that there is no limit on the expansionist spirit which guides and
inspires Israel. But if such intentions became dominant in Israel and if the
Zionist leaders wanted to apply them, I am convinced that all the democxatic
forces in the world would un3.te to oppose them and prevent their success.
For our part we have no fear of the Zionist leaders' threats, still less of
their blackmail. The Arab nation will rise up as a single, homogeneous,
united and powerful force capable of defending its rights, its sovereignty
and its independence.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 A~FRIQUE-ASIE
CSO: 4400/247
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LEBANO:V
~ AL-WAZZAN DISCUSSES ISRAELI INTENTIONS, FRENCH RELATIONS, OTHER ISSUES
- Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 265, 12-18 Mar 82 pp 20-21
[Interview w.ith Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan by Florence Ra'd: "Shafiq
- al-Wazzan Tells AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 'This Is the Required Solution';" date and
place not specified] .
[Text] Sarkis refuses an extension oE his term in office.
Deptoyment of the army in the eastern section is still
~ being studied. �
The Israeli withdrawal from Sinai; the possibilities
o� aggression against Lebanon; the presidential elections;
~ the efforts to find a successor for President Etias
Sarkis; and what is new on the Lebanese scene are the
headlines of the interview with Mr Shafiq al-Wazzan,
the prime minister of Lebanon.
[Question] Some sources are expecting Israet to attack in soath,Lebanon before
25 April. How does Lebanon view tliat possibility and what preparations has it
made to confront it?
- [Answer] There is no doubt that Israel's aggressive manner has reached a very
high degree of arrogance and haughtiness; it no longer tempers and conceals its
attacks. It is now announcing and publicizing plans of its aggressive strategy,
and it is even announcing detaits of its mititary plans, including the most
meticulous tactics and detailed instructions. llnfortunately, the Arab situation
today is the worst i[ h~s been in modern history: there is a total breakdown and
~ an unjustified reluceance on the part of more than one agency and more than one
party to confront the crucial and serious conditions that are facing the Arab
nation. These agenctes and parties are not confronting these conditions with the
determination, Eirmness and all-consuming drive they deserve to ward off the
imminent danger. It hur~s me and grieves me to say ehis, but the Arab nation has
divested itsetf of most of its deterrent means. Egypt has been turned.around;
' Arab solidarity has been lost; and Arab energies are preoccupied with wars,
possibilities of war and violent disputes. All this is topped by an inter-
nationat situation that is out of control. Consequently, the entire Arab region
today lies within react~ of an Israeli strike. ~
, ~
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The possibility that the West Bank will be annexed is a re~l and a serious
possibility. And here I wonder: How did the international community deter Israel
from annexing the Golan and before that Jerusalem? So far, the only deterrents
have been resolutions and denunciations. Israel's attitude about that ever since
it was created has been well-known. Its archives abound with UN and non-UN con-
- demnations which it does not hesitate to reject and ridicute on every occasian.
Regarding the possibility that south Lebanon may be attacked and overrun, our
appeal in this regard has for~a long time sought to stir up Arab conscience
against it. There is no doubt that the possibility of an attack fs greater today
based on the circumstances that you outlined in detail. You ask, what prepara-
tions have we made to confront all this?
The responsibitity for south Lebanon, for Jerusalem, for the Golan and for the
West Bank is an integrated Arab responsibility because alt these areas are
within the framework of the national opposition to a vicious Israeli enemy whose
viciousness and sharp grfp are growing every day. We have been working in that
direction, and we did actually get a resolution at the Fez Conference regardii?g
a uniform Arab strategy. A small committee was formed to prepare and approve
such a strategy. We did our best and worked as fast as we could to prepare a
working paper in this regard on behalf of the committee. That task had been
entrusted to us by the secretary general of the Arab League. We were anxious to
get a quick resolution due to the gravity of the situation and the imminence of
the danger. You know about the position that was taken, and you know that the
committee's meeting was postponed till next month. We are hoping that there
are factors, which may be unknown to us, to allow for such a tengthy postpone-
ment. We hope that no Israeli action will soon take us by surprise and make us
blame ourselves for failing to deal with the situation expeditiously on an emer-
gency basis.
As far as Lebanon is concerned, it goes witl~out saying that Lebanon will repel
the attack with all the effort and energy it has left, and we hope that Lebanon
will not find itself alone on the scene of confrontation. .
~ [Question] There has been talk about a new French initiative on the Lebanese
scene. What is new in that regard, especiatly after Mitt~rand's visit to Israel?
[Answer] First of all, there are no plans for the French president to visit
Lebanon in the foreseeable future.
Second, we have no knowledge of a specif ic plan or plans the French president
has with regasd to Lebanon. [None has been] relayed to us during the course of a
visit or through usual diplomatic channels. .
~ At any rate our position on the creation of a multi-national force and our posi-
tion on internationalizing the Lebanese crisis in general were declared; they
are well-known matters. These positions are manifested in our rejection of this
aim. What we see in it is not so much a solution as much as an increase in the
parties and the ca~ses of complications in the Lebanese crisis, p~rticularly
since there is a basic Lebanese gro~ip that is rejecting this aim and also par-
ticularly sincc~ at best that aim, wherever it was applied in the world, produced
no more than a stunning and a numbing effect, but no solution and no safety.
'
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~ Enlarging the pre.sent area of deployment for the multi-national force by turning
coward the border strip would put into effect the Security Council resolution "
which created that force and defined its functions and tne area of its deploy-
ment: Accordingly, achieving that does not represent the ptan of any one
country. It actualty represents the international wish that stood behind the
aforementionad,~ecurity Council resolution~ At any rate Lebanon has spe~iEi~~~-~~~
demands in this,rQgard, and these are recorded in the Security Council. These
demands call for increasing the number and efEiciency of the emergency forces.
The Security Council has begun discussing those demands, and we are hoping that
our demands wi;~"~;~ke met, especially the one about incre~sing the number of these
~ .`~Y
Eorces. � ~
~Question] Th~re is grow:.ng talk about adding Arab forces to the Arab deter-
rent forces. What chances of success does such talk have, and what is the truth?
[Answer] This talk started abroad, and Lebanon has nothing to do with its
development. At any rate, we support [effarts to] find an Arab solution to the
Lebanese crisis. The solution that is required is one that fellow Arabs will
agree upon; it is one whose realization will put an end to the crisis or at
least alleviate its burdens and woes which have almost finished off what is Left
~ of the territory, the people and the future of Lebanon. Accordingly, any solu-
tions that can be separated from the over-all Arab Eramework could complicate
matters further and increase the imputation of fractiousness and perhaps [even]
explosiveness. We are hoping that all efforts will be joined together and that
Arab consensus and sotidarity will be achieved through a uniform Arab strategy
on the Lebanese situation in general and on the situation of south Lebanon-in
particular. This is an urgent Lebanese demand which we are stri.ving to realize
by various means and in various fields. ~
What Is New in the Presidential Elections
[Question] What, are the constitutional, political, security and regional merits
of the upcoming presidential elections?
[Answer] In this regard we are facing several facts. The first one ot those
is the fact that the presidential term is expiring. This requires that constitu-
tional conditions in~ the country continue through the election of a new presi-
dent. The second fact is that the delicacy, critical nature and gravity of our
conditions are unprecedented for Lebanon; the whole area has not experienced
such conditions in its recent history. The third fact is that President Sarkis
is refusing extension or renewat of his term for more than one personal and
public reason; he insists he will turn over the leadership office to a new presi-
dent. Hence, the constitutional duthority, represented by the Chamber of
Deputies, has to do its duty in this regard--it is only a matter of a few
months--in the context of a full aWareness of its national responsibility. In
this the Chamber of Deputies will undoubtedly have the fult and whole-hearted
support of the people aho today, more than any time in the past, believe that
the only salvation for this country lfes in its unity, in maintaining the
legality of its conditions and in having the lawful government meet its obliga-
tions and regain its authority over atl the territory of the country, and that
inciudes places, public facilities, fields and battlegrounds.
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Now that this small country with limited capabilities has beccame the principal
starting point and troubleshooter for the rights of the area, and ev~n perhaps
for some of the rights of the world, there i~ no doubt that man~r people are
now prepared to spread news about where they stand on and what their attitudes
are about the presidential elections. Some of these methods of spreading news ir~
Lebanon are almast ordinary and classic. In all presiden~ial elections held
in Lebanon under normal conditions, we cams to know major voters who had an
opinion and exercised influence in this regard. Others are practicing a new kind
ot participation that falls into the context of applying pressure, causing explo-
sions and dealing with others in a violent manner.
- We are then in a stage that requires extreme caution, awareness and a sense
of responsibility. In saying this I am referring to all the sincere national
forces on the Lebanese scene that are interested in keeping Lebanon away from
the sites of explosions, fragmentaEion and destruction.
- We are hoping to do this, and we are strivfng in different directions and
- various fields to achieve it. We are hoping that [by keeping trouble cut of
LebanonJ, power will be transferred to a new president under conditions that we
are striving to make normal.
[Question] What has become of the attempts to urge the government to resi,~n?
- What are the reasons for these attempts?
[Answer] In democratic countries there are those who, rightly or wrongly, are
always trying to force government [o resign and bring others to power.
Ln principle we find no fault with this matter in a country that prides itself ,
on maintaining a parliamentary democracy, despite the turbulence and setbacks it
has had. Lebanon has at least maintained the principal features of that parlia-
mentary democracy. e~s far as my own position as prime minister is concerned
regarding the resignation of the government, I would not accept having anythir~g
determine the resignation of the government, especially under the crucial circum-
stances that the country is going through, except the country's supreme national
interest and what that interest dictates. The positions I and the government
will assume witl manifest that supreme national interest. If these interests
dictate that the government be changed, I will not wait 1 day in office,
especially since holding off3ce under these conditions has become a personal
difficulty and a hardship that is difficult to endure. The fact that we are
continuing to hold office amidst these storms is a manifestation of some oE
Lebanon's steadfastness against storms and dangers. ~
[Question] There is talk about deploying the army in the eastern and western
sections of Beirut. To what extent can this be achieved?
[Answer] This matter is still under considerat~ion due to the fact that the
subject of the army is an important and sensitive subject. Because of the posi-
tions and count~r positions we encounter in this regard, we are becoming more
convinced every day that this is a subject that cannot be solved so as to
benefit everyone unless there is national accord in which this matter would be
a principal articte and a starting point for solving many matters that can only
be solved by a capable and an efficient power. That power is that of an integ-
razed national army whose structure is materially and morally sound. .
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a
What Happened Co'~tl~e Fez Resolutions?
[Question] The recent Fez Surmnit ended in a unanimous resolution regarding
Lebanon's demands. What happsned to the apptication of that resolution, and
what are the ob~~~acles that are impeding its implementa[ion?
~
- [Answer] Despite the sharp and difEicult disputes from which the recent k'ez
Conference had suffered a~~d which produced~only one resolution that had to do
with the situation in Lebanon, the Arab consensus on Lebanon's demands at th~t
conference was an indication of the fact that Lebanon's demands have merit. They '
_ are an urgent and integral part of supreme Arab interests and over-all national
security. The main points oE the Fez resolutions were manifested in the appeal
for a uniforrn Arab strategy on south L.ebanon. On that basis a small committee
- was formed. No sooner had it held its first meeting than that meeting was
adjourned and postponed for reasons that were announced at that time. We do not
wish to go into the reasons or the details of the postponement. What We are ~
hoping for--and we have begun taking a few deCailed practical steps in this
regard--is that efforts to achieve a uniform Arab strategy on south Lebanon
continue and that efforts in that regard be increased and intensified. The dan-
gers that are all around us do not wait on our own private conditions and on
_ our preoccupations and problems everywhere and every place. What we are atso
hoping for here is that existing Arab disputes do not once again become the
- reason for the floundering of this strategy, for the loss of south Lebanon and
for making Lebanon endure more damage and more tragedy.
Copyright 1981 AL WATAN AL ARABI
8592
CSO: 4404/374
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_ LIBYA
~
' .
AL-QADHDHAFI GIVES VIEWS ON CHRISTIANS, NASIRITES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 2.70, 16-22 Apr 82 p 18
[Text] During the meeting which t~ook.place last March in Tripoli, Libya
between the delegation of Lebanese Universitq profesanrs and Col Mu'ammar
al-Qadhdhafi and during which a two-atage dialogue lastiag uare thaa 20
hours took placz, al-Qadhdhafi brought up a number of nect ideas and opiniona
which aroused a great deal of ahasp cri.ticism, as well as dieapproval'aud
condemnation. A1-Qadhdhafi denied the existence of Arab Christians and then
said, "Their hearts are Israeli." ~ '
As for the Nasirites in Lebanon, he said that they were "brigands and
frauds." About the role which Libya is playing in connection with the
supporting of group after another, he admitted the error of this policy.
However, he reflected philosophically on the military support which Libya
had given in the past, saying that it was to create "a balance of terror"
so that one group would not be victorious over the other.
During the dialogue, al-Qadhdhafi directed sharp criticism at 'Abd-al-Nasir
and the Nasirite experiment. fle said, "1"he Nasirite experiment was very
unsuccessful, just as the [Arab] Socialist Union as a formula for the
alliance of the working people was unsuccessful."
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL WATAN AL "RABI
CSO: 4504/282
;
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LIBYA
BRIEFS
WAGE REDUCTION FOR FOREIGNERS--It has been learned that the Libqan leader-
ship, undex the pretext of "belt tighteaing," has decided, because of the
financial crisis from which Libya is suffering, to reduce bq 25 percent the
wage= of all non-Libyan workers and employees. The ma~oritq of these are
Arab citizens who work~in various educational, medical, agricultural, and
industrial fie~ds and who number m4re than 1 million. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 270, 16-22 Apr 82 p 19] [COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL WATAN
AL ARABIj
CSO: 4504/282 � ~
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SUDAN
- AIRPORT PROJECTS UNDERWAY DESCRIBED ~
Paris MARCIiES TROPICAUX ET 1~D~TERRANEENS in Ftench No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p'905
[Text] The Sudanese Department of Civil Aviation plans'to extend.the runway
~ at the existirib Khartoum airport~ by ,4.50. a~et.ers: ~ Aa ~offer submitted by, the
_ Yugoslav con~pany Partizanski, which has just completed reinforeement of the
runway, y'nould be accepted very soon when fiaancing (2 to 3 million Sudanese
� pounds) is assured, probablq from local sources. In addition, an entrq hall
is now being constructed with loca].financing. .The existing::building wi11
then be reserved for.departures. , ~ �
_ With respect to the new Rhartoum ai,rport pro3ect, the final report�aud the . '
_ drafting of the call for.bids will be finished in April. It will be recalled
that the average total cost of phase 1 is �$250 million, $50 million.from local
sources. With respect to the rest, $100 mill~.on have beea aliocated by Abu �
Dhabi, but the remaining $100 million have aot been found. Despit~ certain
rumors circulating in Khartoum, it would be'unlikely'that with the funds now
available, the Civil Aviation Department~would dec3de to~build the uuain.runway
(3,700 meters long), the taaciways and�parking areas soon. ~letually, the air-
port will be nonoperational (lack of servicea) and the obtention of the addi-
tional financing remains:rather hqpothetical at~present. The airport will be
- located in No~th Khartoum, 20 k#lvmeters from the downtown area, and will
probably require construction of a new road and perhaps, if the alternative
is accepted, of a bridge over the Blue Nile. �
Regarding the new Port Sudan airport, the contract'has'not qet been awarded.
The two companies that still have a chance of obtaining the contract are Sir
_ Alfred McAlpine (Great Britain) or the Costain-Amey Roadstone Construction
Company (Great Britain)'. Work is scheduled to begin in July 1982 and will
- take 20 month~. As for the.financing, $23 million have been allocated by the
Saudi Fund and $7 million by the Islamic Development Bank... .
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982 ~ ~
; 11,464
CSO: 4519/161
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SUDAN
. BRIEFS .
~
ARAB LOAN-The Arab Monetary Fund has ~ust graatted a long-term loaa of $18
million to Sudan. After meeting with the Sudanese minister of finance and
planning, Ibrahim Munim Mansur, who is paying an official visit to the United
Arab Emirates; the president of the fund, Jawad H~shim, said on 14 Ma.rch ia
Abu Dhabi that the loan is intended to help the Sudanese Government carry out
its program of economic and financial reform. Furthes~ore, Sa~id Ghubash,
- minister of planning�of the ~lnited Arab Emirates, examined with Maneur the
means of implementing joint pro3ects and bilateral and technical cooperation.
~ [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET I~DITERRANEENS in French No 1897,
- 19 Mar 82 p 785] [COPYRIGHT: Reae Morewc et Cie Paris. 1982~] 8796
LIVESTOCK MARKETING PRaJECT--The main purpose of the Sudanese pro~ect for the
marketing of livestock (Sudan Livestock Marketing Pro~ect) ie to create, over
a 6-year period, a marketing distribution chain and an industrial infrastruc-
ture capable of providing an adequate supply of ineat for the country and of
starting a flcw of exports to countries of the Arabian Peainaula. Since most
of Sudan's livestock is in the west of the country, the main problem lies in
transporting the livestock. A system of traneportation by specit~l trains will
be introduced on the rail line between Nyala, A1-Ubayyid, and Khartoum. T'he
pro~ect has a total cost of $43 million; the foreign currency portion will be
financed by the World Bank to the tnne of $25 million and by Che British Over-
Seas Devalopment Administration to the tuae of $3.1 mfllion. The Liv~estock
and I~eat Marketing Corporation ~.s the recipient of these funds. The pro~ect
includes puschasing locom~tives and cattle cars9 buildiag cattle petna, creat-
ing a telecom~unications network and a chain of ma~or axid secoadary markets,
and acquiring vehicles for transportation by road. Aa additional pro~ect
(Srockroute Project) envisagea the establiahment of 70 watering points (einlc-
ing wells, and installing pumps aad water.xanks), aervice facilitiea, veter-
inary control posts, and fodder depots aloug the railroad line between Nyala,
A1-Ubayyid, aud IQlartoum. The same agency will be in charge of this pro~ect,
which has an estimated cost of $11.5 millioa, with the World Bank financing
the foreign portion of it. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS
in French No 1897, 19 Mar 82 p 785] [COPYRI(~iTt Ren~e Moreux et Cie Paris
1982.] 8796
NEW BANKS--The National Bank of Sudan is opening its offices in Rhartoum. With
an initial capital of $8.5 million, due to increase of $20 million between now
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t 1,-�.~,
and Juna 19~;`thia bank wae founded by the folloWing partners; Patra Bank of
Jordan, Micro Bank of Lebanon, and a group of Sudanese busineasmen. Another
banking establiehment, the Middle Eaet Bank of Dubai, reportedly waats to
ncnrt oPerating in Sudan, jZ~ext] jParis MARCHES TR~OPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS
No 1897, 19 I~arch 82 p 785] [COPYRIt~iT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] ~
8196
JAPANESE AID--At the beginning of the year, Japan granted the Sudan $12 million
in nonrepayable aid to be used to f inance the following pro~ects: food produc-
tion pro~ect, $4 million to purchase fertilizer, chemical products for agricul-
ture and machinery; water and electricit3?.ianprovemeat pro~ ect, $2 nillion to
buy generators; Jebel Aulia Lake fishing project, $2 million to purchase and.
supply the necessary products and services for the.eonstruction ot.packing
units, boats and various types of ~quipment; social pro~ ect, $2 million to
purchase powdered milk by the government; and the�Blue Nile health pro~ect,
$2 million to purchase insecticides, medicines and equipment for the~prevention
and control of malaria.~ [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANLENS
in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 90~5] [COPYRIGvT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris
1982] 11,464 �
AIR C~OPERATION WITH EZ'HIOPIA--As the result of a cooperation pro~ect between
Sudan Airways and Ethiopian Airlines, the maintenance o~ the Boeing 707's.and
737's will be done in Ethiopia~and no longer in Great Britain and '~~rland.
Ethiopia actually has the largest Boeing maintenance unit in Africa. [Text]..
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 905].
[COPYRIGHT: ~Rene Moreux et Cie Paris~1982] 11,464
PORT PROJECT--The port that is to be built for the Sudan on the Mediterranean
at a site given to t'he Sudan by President Sadat (see MARCHES TROPICAUX of ~
31 July 1981,.p 1989, and of 1 January 1982, p 20) wi11 be called New Sudan.
- The South Korean company Daewoo has.been given re~ponsibility f or studies,
which have already begun. ~The cost of tr~ese studies fs an estimated $1 milliort.
However, Khartoum admits that the project, which results from a decision that ~
is more political than ecoMOmic, will not fail to encounter financing diffi-
- culties, especially since three other ma3or_port projects are p,lanned on the
Red Sea. Fears of an overcapacity havQ already brought iuto question the .
- rehabilitation of Old Suakin; financed by the EEC, and the second phase of
work to expand Port Sudan, financed by the IDA [Interna.tional Development � ~
Association]. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 905] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464
CSO: 4519/161
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~ SYRIA
~
OFFICIAL DISCUSSES PROPOSALS FOR MIDEAST PEAGE
PM221519 London TflE TIMES in English 22 Mar 82 p 1
[Report by Edwara Mortime~r: "Syria Demands 'Not To Be Ignored
[Text] Syria cannot be igaored in the search for a peaceful settlement of
the Middle East conflict, Mr Ahmad Iskandsr, Syrian informatinn minister,
told T~iE TIMES this weekend. It genuinely wants peace with Israel bu~t sees
little or no chance of ach3eving ~t in the light of present Israe].i and
American policies.
This is the gist of what Lord Garsington will hear when he visits Damascus
next month having previously been to Israel, said Mr Iskander, who was
visiting London fo r a medical check
up. Se had a brain operation here
last year.
Mr Iskander criticized Lord Carrington for "ignoring" Syria during the second
half of last year when he was cha3rman of the European Council of Min3sters.
In that capacity Lord Carrington v3sited the Saudi capital in October and
expressed strong interest ia the Saudi eight-point peace plan. Subsequently
this was not adopted at the Fez Arab summit, due partly to Syrian opposition.
Since then, however, Mr Iskander has restated Syria's own views on the elements
of a 3ust peace which, in su~stance, are not very different from the Saudi
- plan. In one respect they are more explicit, since they refer to "ending the
state of war between the Arabs and Israel," where the Saudie speak only of
"the right of all states in the ar~ to live ixi peace."
" Th e Sy rian proposals contain only three points. These, according to Mr Iskander
are: first, unconditional and cowplete Israeli withdrawal from all Arab
territories occupied during the June 1967 war, including East Jerusalem.
Second, assurance of the legit3mate and inalienable national rights of the
Palestinian people. This includes the right of the Palestinians to return
to their hQmes in accordance with United Nations regulations, the right of self-
determination, and the right to bui.ld an independent state on Palest3n ian soil
under the leadership of the PLO.
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Third, as a result of the first two po3.nts, "the end3n.g of the state of war
Uetween the Arabs and Israel."
But he said, since Israel had declared Jerusalem its indivisible cap3tal and
had also declared the Golan Heights part of Israel, he did not see what Israel
expected the Arabs to negot3.ate about.
The road to a conrprehensive, just peace in the Middle East was blocked by
American support for Israel and by the m~.].itary imbalance between Israel and
the Arabs "which enables Israel's leaders to behave with the arrogance of
power," he said. ~
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982
CSO: 4400/254
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SYRIA
NATIONAL ALLIAI~CE FOR LIBERATI01~ OF SYRIA FOUNDBD
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 267, 26 Mar-1 Apr ~2 pp 32-36
[Article: "Aamascus: The Cha~tei of the New Republic--A Aistoric Ivat~.~~nal
- Alliance to Bring Down the Regime"]
[Tea:c] A Parliamentary Constitutional System Wi11 Give Back
to Syria lts National,~Pan-Arab, Islamic and International
Role.
`raking Up Arms Is a Natural Reaction eo P~~-~tical and.
Sectarian Discrimination, Sub~~gation, and riictatorial
Repression.
Islam Wi11 Be the Official State Religion, [Islam Will
Provide] Strategic Deptti for the Arab World, and the
[Non-Arab] Muslims Will Back the Arabs. Deep Com~itmea~t
to Total Liberation and Nan-Alignment in Foreign Policy.
The creation of the Charter of the National Alliance for the Liberation of
Syria was a decision which puts a historic responsib il~f~y on the shoulders of
those who signed it. Ttne respansibflity is that of saving Syria and restoring
Syria its national, pan-Arab, Islamic, and international role. For the first
time the real representatives of the Syriau people are getting toge~her in a
front which is fighting to bring down the current reg3me and establish a
parliamentary coastitutional regime on tYie bs~sis of separation of powers,
granting of freedoms, and respect.for human dignity. :
For the first time we find the Muslim Brotherhood, Arab Socialist Ba'th ~
Party, Islamic Front, Arab Socialists, Nasserites, and Independents alongside
- each other in tlne same trench. In doing so, their purpose is ta proclaim
that the Arab world has made peace with Islam, to declare their deterinination
to rebuild the Syrian army and economy, and to reaffirm their absolute belief
in the liberation of Palestine and their.battle solidarity with the Palestin- ~
ian revolution and'the struggle to achieve Arab unity and to take practical
steps of unification iu this direction.
This is a pan-Arab national awakening which aims at"sav3ng" Syria from rule
by a single family and which also aims to establish close fraternal ties
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between Syria and the Muslim world, to liberate ~t from the policy of
polarization, and to have it follow an independent foreign policy which is
comnitted to the principles of the non-aligned movement.
It is a plan to have a new republic of Syria, and there are grea.t hopes for
the success of this plan both in the Arab warld and throughout the Muslim
world.
The charter was signed 11 March 1982, and its text was broadcast in Paris.
It had the force of an explosion among Arab and Muslim circles, and it also
attracted the interest of the Western media. The reason for this was that
the announcement of this charter occurred af ter a series of international
reports which conde~ed the excesses cammitted by the Syrian regime and the
bloody suppress3on by this regime of the rights of the Syrian people as well
as the rights of the Lebanese and Palestinians. The Hamah massacre was the
evil culmination of these excesses.
The charter also has arisen at a time when we are witnessing a collapse of
al!1 of the human and moral values and principles which have ~ustified the
establishment and continuation of any government authority in Syria. The
Syrian regime has been div~rted from its crucial national concerns by the ~
~ pracess of internal repression and massacre during the [current] state of
emergency. During the last few years there has been an intensification of
the tyranny which it has been practicing. Furthermore, Syria has been
afflicted with the sickness of po~itical sectarianism which it had never
lcnown during its long history.
� By means of this charter, Syria, which is [now] a wealt country, will regain
its belief in itself and its capabilitp to achieve advancement. This will
be true even though the road toward achieving this is still difficult and will
- involve new sacrif ices through armed popular resistance. The complete text of
the charter is as follows:
The more severe hardships are, the greater people's determination becomes and
the more their collective will merges, and the more sincere they are, the
fewer differences they will have and the more their resources and potential
will come together. Is there any cause greater than the cause of Syria--in
terms of ideology, nation, and territory--which can gather people tAgether
and unite them?!
Tt~e glorious and independent nation of Syria has asked 3ts loy.al sons to
render their duty as sons, to preserve what is sacred, and to shoulder their
noble mission. All of the representatives of Syria`s people meti, held a
serious dialogue, and are impelled by great hopes and by a feeling of
- responsibility for the future. They have created a charter which they have
called the National Alliance for the Liberation of Syria. Those participating
in the shaping and formulation of the charter were the leaders of the popular
political orientations and organizations in Syria, especially the Muslim
- Brotherhood, Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, Islamic Front, Arab Socialists,
Nasserites, and independent political personalities who represent all of the
various national orientations in the Syrian arena. The charter will throw
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.f .
light on and~~u3de this alliance which hae been sought both for the present
and for the future.
The great tragedy which the people in Syria are experiencing under the heel
of the Haf ia al-Asad regime is something which is unparalleled in history.
This regime has imposed upon its people forms of bloody domination and terror
which have made this regime cease to be nationalist in nature and have made
it a real enemy of our Syrian people and all of the Syrian people's values
and aspiratians.
This criminal regime has resorted to suppressing both public and private
freedoms, filling Syria's jaila with arrested people, practicing the worst
forms of torture on them, and killing hundreds without either investigating
them or giving them a trial. This is what happened in tt~e Rastan prison when
120 wo~~n were killed, and this is what happened in the horrible Palmyra
prison massacre when--by direct order of Rif'at al-Asad--7Q0 detainees were
killed there. This regime has unleashed gangs of murderers and criminals,
and they have come to constitute the regime's basic support for ruling the
- country. The regime has given them a free hand in Syria's cities and they
have been allowed to commit all manner of savage and barbarous acts, to rob
and plunder, to violate people's honor and dignity, to step on and tear apart
the pages of the Koran, to destroy mosques and churches, to slaughter and
mutilate Syria's citizens, to tear of women's garments of modesty, and to kill
anyone who stands in their way.
During the last 2 years this tyranny and oppression has intensified. Whole
cities and areas of cities have been sub~ected to search and destroy opera-
tions. These search and destroy operations have included Damascus, Aleppo,
Homs, Hamah, Dayr al-Zawr, Idlib, Jisr al-Shughur, Sarmada, and Latakia, and
they have involved robb ing, plundering, killing and assault.
We have clearly seen the regime's purpose in humiliating the Syrian people,
ignori.ng their dignity, and ehallenging their religious beliefs and national
_ feelings. The regime even went so far as to issue Law Number 49 of 1980
which stipulates the execution of anyone who is proven to be a member of the
Muslim Brotherhood, and tempting rewards were offered to anyone who kills any
- of the Brotherhood's members. This law was used as a pretext to kill anyone
who raises his voice or opposes the regime's crimes. The purpose of this was
to induce the largest possible number of the regime's henchmen and cutthroats
to participate along with the regime in these crimes.
The tyranny and c:rimes of the head of this regime reached the stage where they
made him unf it for any responsibility and rule when he procla.imed, numerous
times, that he would physically eliminate his opponents and those in opposi-
tion to him and pursue them both inside Syria and abroad. An abominable
statement of this sort was also made by his brother Rif'at, and the two
murderers together undertook numerous assassination operations both inside
Syria and abroad.
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The Hamah Crime
The regime's destruction of the city of Iiamah was a crime which surpassed all
tyranny ever recorded by history. This city, fighting for its freedom, was
surrouneded, water and food were cut off from it, and then its buildings,
houses, mosques, and places of worship were shelled and bombed by all sorts
of weaponry, including artillery, rockets, airplanes, ~nd tanks. Whole
areas of the city were destroyed, the people in those areas were killed, and
the regime's henchmen were allowed to commnit unprecedented acts of robbery,
- plunder, and rape there. Then Hafiz al-Asad prohibited thosE who had managed
to leave the burning city from returning to it, just as the Zionists had done
in Palestine.
- The objective of this bloody policy of repression on the part af the Hafiz
al-Asad regime is to change Syria's historic and demographic character. The
xegime wants to do this by means of combatting Arabism and Islam, imposing an
alien and artif icial status quo upon the country, eliminating the Arab
nationalist of the country, cutting its profound ties with Islam, and threat-
ening to dismember it into sectarian petty atates.
This regime has afflicted Syria with the disease of political sectarianism
which it has never known t~roughout its long history. In Syria relations
between the peoples of the varia.s religions and doctrines have served as the
model ~~f a country where relations between the country's citizens have risen
to the level of brotherhood and friendship.
W:~en we say political sectarianism," we do ~ot mean plurality of religions
and doctrines. That is a problem which has its roots in history and which
finds its solution in people working together and caexisting. We are speaking
of a political sectarianism which is the fanaticism of a faction constituting
a regime which is isolated from the people and which has been utilized by the
regime in order for it to survive, rule, and tyrannize the people. Such
political sectarianis~ is one of the inventions of this regime--a small group
of people who deal in sectarianism and sow disunity. It is a regime of a
ruling tribal sectarian minority which spreads terror among some of the sects
- and gives them the impression that they are threatened with danger from the
other sects if they do not support the regime and rally around it. It is a
regime of opportunistic sectarianists who have occupied basic and sensitive
positions in the government, army, and security apparatuses as well as
positions of power where decisions are made and the implementation [of such
decisions] is overseen. It is a regime which has practice a policy of
sectarian discrimination which has harmed all of the citizens of our nation.
This even includes those belonging to the sect of the ruling regime which the
- regime has attempted to exploit and has consequently put in the category of
being hostile to the Syrian people and nation.
The DisaStrous Regime
The regime of Haf iz a1-Asad is a real disaster which has befallen our people
and nation. It is a disaster because it has resulted in Syria losing its
pioneering role in the Arab world, bloody military domination of Lebanon after
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the destructi~~~rnd dismemberment of the Lebanese people, destruction of the
National Movement in Lebanon, the assassination of a number of this movement's
leaders, and the slaughter of thousands of Palestinians in Ta11 al-Za'tar,
al-Karntina, the Nahr a1~Barid [River], and other placas. It has also been
a disaster because it resulted in the bloody confrontation with the Palestin-
ian Resistance movement in Lebanon after Syria closed, in the face of the
Palestinian Resistance movement, its border with the occupied territories.
The purpose of this action was to curtail the Palestinian Resistance movement
and transform it into being merely a pliable tool in the marketplace of
international bargaining which seeks to impose upon the Arabs a,solution which
involves their capitulation aad seeks to insure the existence of the Zionist
entity.
The regime in which Hafiz al-Asad was minister of defense, commander of the
army, commander of the.air force, and a member of its higher political
- lesdership, bears responsibility for the Arabs' defeat of 1967. Haf iz al Asad
also bears the greatest responsibility for the disaster which occurred when
he did not permit the Syrian Arab army the honor of doing battle with the
enemy and handed over territory to the Zionists without a f ight. This is what
happened when he arb itrarily ordered the army to withdraw and announced the
fall of al-Qunaytirah before the enemy had even reached it.
The responsibility which he bears concerning the 1973 War was even greater
and more significant. When the officers and soldiers of the army believed
that the opportunity had come for the army to regain its honor, ].iberate all
of Syria's territory, and contribute to the liberation of Palestine, Hafiz
al-Asad acted in a way which was against the wishes of the army and the
aspirations of the people. When the courageous Iraqi army reached the battle
front and helped to repulse the Zionist advance toward Damascus, and when the
two armies began to prepare to undertake their counteroffensive, he gave
orders to cease f ire. The practical results of this war were that the
Zionists occupied more territory belonging to our country. fle continued his
conspiratorial golicy and cdncluded the disengagement agreement with the
Zionist enemy, and then UN observer forces wtare stationed inside our territory.
Hafiz al-Asad off icially accepted UN Securitv Council Resolution 338 which
recognized the Zionist entity and demanded that the Arabs capitulate to it
be means of negotiations.
The Conspiracy Against Iraq
His actions in the Arab or international arena were no different from his
disgraceful actions against our people in Syria. Hafiz al-Asad attached n9
importance to Syria's national interest nor to Syria's Arab and Muslim aspir-
ations. He made Arab unity a game to be fooled around with, something to be
indulged in and then abandoned, and something to be plotted against--without
any feeling of responsibility toward it. He regarded it as something to
be entered into together with this or that Arab country only to be later .
abandoned and forgotten. The aim in all of this was to dilute the feeling
of Arab unity and sow the seeds of doubt concerning the possibility of
- achieving it. Even when the higher Arab interest required Arab solidarity ~
which would achieve a minimum of coherence and steadfastness on the part of
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the Arab nation, Hafiz al-Asad did not hesitate to sabotage this solidarity
and conspire against it. This is what happened when he mobilized his forces
- along the border with his fellaw-Arab country of Jordan, whea he tore apart
the Arab ranks, when he boycotted the Arab sum~it canferenc~:s, and when he
endeavored to keep the Arab natians unable to formul~ate any serious policy fox
confronting the Zionist entity.
- In view of the center of power which Iraq represeat when any Arab confrontation
is concerned, Hafiz al-Asad has made special efforts to conspire and commit
treason against this fello~Arab country. fle entered into an alliance with
the shah of Iran, with Zionism, and with imperialism in order to dismember
Iraq and keep it occupied interaally. Todaq he is allied with the Persian
regime, backed by the Zionist entity, in order to exhaust the human and
material resources and capacities of Iraq and in order to keep the Arabs unable
- to put an end to the deterioration [in their situation] and unable to resist
the challenge of Zionism and of the enemies of the Arab nation.
~ The policies of the Hafiz al-Asad regime amount to the following: Its internal
policy is to weaken and exhaust Sqria, to spread f ighting aad destruction
throughout it, to cause forced migratio~n in the country, to threatea to
dismember the unity of its people and its territory, to combat its Arab char-
acter, to attack Islam within the countrq, and to ruin its academic courses
of study, especially Islamic educational courses of study. Its policy with
_ regard to the Palestiniane and the Arab world is to dismember Lebanon into
mutually hostile sects, to conclude agreemeats with the Zionist enemy in order
to partitian Lebanon--as in the famous Red Line agreemeat--to conspire against
Arab unity and effective Arab solidarity, and to ignore the profound historic
ties which exist between Islam and the A~cabs.
The~e policies of Hafi~ al Asad, in realitq, merely serve the interests of
Zirnzist plans in the Middle East, turn him into an instrument which executes
Zionist policies, and transform him into a poisonous dagger for the Zionists
to plunge into the bodq of Syria as well as into the body of the Arabs and
Islam.
When this regime deprived our people of all rights of citizenship, imposed
this f earful poisonous atmosphere upon the country, and made sectarian dis-
crimination its permanent policy, our natioa saw itself forced to fight for
its existence and to defend its rights aad freedoms- with all possible means,
especially by means of an armed struggle.
The fact that our people took up armg--although this is a right which has been
established by all laws, both divine and man-made, amd although.this is a
duty imposed by the demands of reli.gion. patriotism, self-respect and honor--
was a natural reaction to the fact that the regime has engaged in suppression,
, in3ustice.political sectarian discriminstion, military and dictatorial
- repression, intellectual terrorism, deception by the informational media,
conf iscatiou of freedoms, abaadoning human rights, causing the disappearance
- of justice and law, allawing corruptian to set it, and allowing the spread of
illicit wealth.
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Thfs grave, ,~reacherous, and criminal role which is being played by this
~ regime and which has impelled our people to reach for their arms, shoulder
the burden of couzageous resistance, and offer up the lives of thousanda of
righteous martyrs, requires that all national figures, organizations, and
parties completely shoulder their responsibilities in an effort to support
the revolution of our freedom-fighting nation, to promote the revolution in
order to cut down on pain and suffering, and in order to enable the wounded
national body of our nation to regain its health and strength.
' An Open National Alliance
For this reason, the national figures, organizations, and parties which are
determined to save Syria- by means of a serious and responsible dialogue--are
in agreement~sbout bringing about the downfall of the treacherous regime of
Haf iz al-Asad and establishing a parliamentary constitutional regime, on the
- basis of separation of powers, which would guarantee a plurality of parties
and orientations and which would provide equality to all of Syria's citizens
in terms of rights and duties. This regime which is aspired to would be based
on respect for human dignity and would guarantee both public and private
freedoms within the limits of the constitution and the law. This regime would
reject all discrimination among Syria's citiizens of different religions,
doctirines, and [political] orientations. Only a regime like this would be
- able to enable Syria to once again play its national, pan-Arab, Islamic and
international role. This is something that Syria can never do as long as it
has an individualtstic orientation, tyranny, a return to a regime of one-man
rule and political sectarianism, repression, and terror.
Being conf ronted with this impending danger, which is threa.tening to tear
apart Syria's national unity, fragment its people, and cause ft to be the
~ target of the Zionist and imperialist onslaught, there was no doubt that all
parties would rise to the level of historic responsibility which they must
assume due to the nature of this stage [of their history]. They are casting
aside their differences, they are overcoming the negative phenamena, contra-
dictions, and mi~takes of the past, and they are seeking a joint framework'
which would include all of the citizens of this nation so that they can work
together, by means of common princ.iples, i.n order to put an end to the
artificial separation between the Arabs and Islam, and in order to create a ~
national alliance of these forces which would be open to everyone. By the
grace of God, such an alliance will be able to bring about the dawnfall of the
treacherous Asad regime and f irmly anchor the sound bases of an open and
active political life which will enable Syria to become a source of inspira-
tion in all realms~�national, pan-Arab, aad Islamic.
' The 16 Principles ~
In order to give expression to their lofty national aims and to their
_ coamdtment to them, the partieg in this alliance have come to agreement about
~ the following principles: .
~ 1. Serious and persistent efforts to bring about the downfall of the current
'regime. This is to be done by all means--political and military means as well
I
I
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as using the media and the masses--in order to achieve this goal, with the
principal means being the armed popular s~ruggle.
2. Bringing to trial the high officials of this regime because of the crimes
which they have committed against the Syrian people and their nation.
3. Formation of an interim government which will be established right after
the downfall of the current regime and which will endeavor, as quickly as
possible, to oversee the election of a constituent assembly for the purpose
of f ormulating a permanent constitution �or the country.
4. Islam shall be the state religion, and Islamic law shall be the nation's
basic source of legislation and lawmaking. This is to be so by virtue of the
fact that Islamic law is the civilizational and theological-legal heritage of
all Arabs and Muslims as well as being a legacy to all of mankind. The
= application of Islamic law shall not affect the rights of non l~uslims as far
" as their convictions and religious observances are concerned, and they shall
be permitted to apply their own laws among themselves with total freedom and
security.
5. Guarantee of public freedoms to a11 of Syria's citizens. This involves,
above all, freedom of belief, freedom of eacpression., freedom to hold meetings,
and freedom to form political parties.
6. Rebuilding of the Syrian Arab arnry and all of the other institutions of
the state on the basis of loyalty, capability, and the principle of equality
of opportunity. This will restore and preserve national unity in Syria and
will guarantee its pioneering role in the region.
7. Dealing with the deteriorating economic situation.and rebuilding the
Syrian economy on firm foundations. This will decisively put an end to the
[current] situatiaa which is characterized by exploftation, robbery, plunder,
and bribery. It will also involve inviting experts and qualified personnel
who are living abroad to participate in the rebuilding of the country.
8. Saving the workers, peasants, and laboring classes f rom the abuse which
the regime has committed against their gains and achievements, and striving
to consolidate these gains which they have been achieving during the course
of their long struggle since independence.
9. Review of the acad2mic curricula, scientif ic institutes, and all state
institutions. This will save them from their current situation of deteriora-
tion and enable the country to fully shouldex its responsibilities.
- 10. Total compensation paid to the relatives of martyrs and those who have
suffered damage or been in3ured during the course of the struggle against tre
treacherous regime [of Hafiz al-Asad].
11. Absolute belief in the liberation of Palestine from Zionist uaurpatioz
and imperialist domination. In order to achieve this liberation, all pos~vible
means which do not abuse the rights of Arabs and Muslims should be utilized,
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and efforts should be made to mobilize all human, military, and political
resources and capacities.
12. Solidarit~r in battle with the Palestinian revolution and with its sole
legitimate representative, the PLO, in order to achieve the goals of the
Palestinian people which are national liberation and the regaining of their
homeland.
. 13. Engagin~~~ti a serious struggle to establish Arab unity and making all
possible effo~f~ to take practical steps leading toward such unitq.
14. Serious efforts to establish close fraternal Arab ties with Syria's
fellow-Arab n ions, and to mobilize all capacities and resources to deal
with the da~~eis'which threaten the existence of the Arabs.
15. Establishment of fraternal ties with the peoples, nations, and organiza-
tions of the Islamic world. This will reinforce the role of the mission of
Islam in the whole world since Islam represents strategic and fundameutal
- dep*:: For the Arab world and since the Muslims constitute a strang pillar of
_ support for the Arabs and basic supporting forces for the Arab people.
16. Non-involvement in international conflicts, non-alignment with inter-
~ national blocs, commitment to the principles of the non-aligned movement, and
adoption of an independent foreign policy.
: Syria, which was the f irst country in the Arab world to achieve total
tindependence, is a country which deserves to overcame the tragedq afflicting
it. The parties ~articipatiug in this alliance hope that this charter will be
the focus of this current movement and will be a framework for. the coustitu-
tional and practical future of the policies followed by Sqria. All of these
~ parties hope that the future republic will be the cherished hope of all
persons in the Arab and Islamic world.
The parties in this alliance desire, in the course of their movement, to
pursue a policy of both authenticity and modern outlook, of both high moral
standards and progress, and cf both ~ustice and the freedom to utilize
i capacities and resources. They ask that God grant them success and that fle
' grant them victory. They ask the peoples and leaders of the world to support
them in their just struggle to save Syria fram the tragedy which it is
; suffering from. God will bring victorq to those who are f ighting because
they are being oppressed."
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL WATAN AL-'ARABI
9468 . ~ ~
CSO: 4404/410
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SYRIA
= ArII~1ESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON SYRIA ;
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Araliic No 267; 26 Mar-1 Apr 82 p 36
[Article: "Syria As Seen in a Swiss Painting"]
[Text] "Rights and Freedoms in Syria" is the title of a report recently put
out in Geneva by the Swiss Association for the Defense of Freedom and
Political Prison~rs in Syria. '
The report contains information furnished~by the organization Amnesty
Internatianal concerning the system of suppression of freedoms and tortures
wi~ich is being prscticed in Syria under the rule of Iiaf iz al Asado
Am~~esty International says that its reasons for being concerned about. the
internal aituation in Syria are due to information which it has received
conceming "the lack of respect for human rights, particularly when this
concerns the exercise of political rights, the long imprisonment of a number
of pers~ns in the opposition without any charges being made against them and
without a trial, the kidnapping, bq the Sqrian auxhorities, of a number of
_ Syrian, Palestinian, and Lebanese persoris'residing in Lebanon, throwiug them
into prision, utilizing means of torture in order to obtain particular
'confessions,' and finally the lack of any legal guarantees--which has led to
the passage of many sentences of execution, with the crime being 'political
opposition'."
The report says that a large number of political prison~rs in Syria have not ,
yet been brought to trial, the preteact being that of the stat~ of emergency
law which has been in effect since 1965. The report does not say how many
such people have been involved in these internal dev~elopments.
There are various groups of prisoners involved, including thoae accused of
belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood, membera of the Arab Sxialist Ba'th
Party, and groups of people from communist, Nasserite, and Rurdish parties,
in addition to a number of Palestinians and Lebanese who oppose Syria's role
as guardian of the Palestinian Reeistance movement and the Syrian role iu
Lebanon.
These people have also been put in a number of ciwi.lian and military 3ails,
including the Halbuni, Qabun, Shaykh Hasan, Sha'~',~~ Qisa', Rawdah, Mazzah,
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and Palmyra prfsons. These prisons are characterized by a lack of sanitary
conditions and hygiene, and they lack even the most basic necessities.
Mostly they are places for various types of brutal torture to be conducted.
The torture involved includes beating, "cracking" (where the prisoner is
put into a rubb~r inner tube and is then beaten with rubber truncheons),
electrical torture, pulling out their nails, and buraing by means of fire
and cigarette,butts.
The report meations the names of nine prisoners who have been sub~ected to
torture. Th!ey'~~-are 'Abd al-Wakid [as published] , Isma' il Rhalif, Zuhary
Shakir, Safi Mubarak, Subhi Salih, Tariq Haydari, 'Adil al-Rayali, 'Abd
al'Wahid Tayib, Muhammad Aghab, and 'Abd al-Ghani 'Attar.
...:F,~`.t.
~ Furthermore,~lt~e- Syrian authorities passed sentences of execution against 17
persons between �1975 and 1978. Ten of these executions were carried out in
public squares. Also, 15 persons accused of being members of the Muslim
Brotherhood were executed in June of 1979.
The report refers to the Syrian lawyers' strike which toc?lc place in January
of 1980 as a protest against the regi~e's illegal practices. It also refers
to the Palmyra prison massacre which claimed the lives of more than 600 �
prisoners.
Naturally, the report does not refer to the recent Hamah massacre because this
occurred af ter the report came out. The horror of this massacre was greater
than that which is taking place inside Syria's prisons, and it claimed the
lives o~ more than 10,000 Syrians!
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
9468
CSO: 4404/410 END
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- FOR OI~'FICUIL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060047-9