JPRS ID: 10480 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050056-0
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• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 56
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10480
26 Apr~! ~982
- Sub-Saharan Afri~~ Re ort
p
FOUO No. 77Q
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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26 April 1!~82
- SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
k'OUO No. 77Q
CONTENTS
BURUNDI
- Brief s
~ench Aid for Airport 1
CAMEROON
Arief s
New Oil Deposit ~ 2
Company for Uranium, Minerals 2
CHAD
OAU ftole at Nairobi Said To Be Plot Threatening Nation
(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE ASIE, 1-11~ Mar 82) 3
Assembly of All Forces Necessary for Reconstruction
(Jean-Pierre N~Ihaye; JEUNE AFRIQUEs 3 Mar 82)......... 8
Goukouni May Become Mere Faction Chief
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21~ Feb 82) 10
OAU Role in Calling for Negotiations Backed ~
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 24 Feb 82) 12
Foreign Minister Acyl ~;hmad Interviewed
(Acyl Ahmat; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 29 Mar-11 Apr 82) 13
Goukouni Says Kamougue Trying To Talk With Habre
(Abakar Assicik; REUTER, 9 Apr 82) 15
GHANA
Resistance to Rawlings Reportedly Exists
(Siradiuo I}iallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Feb 82) 17
-a - [III-NE &A-'120FOU0]
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Corrnnents on Fragility of Libyan Connection
(Siradiou Ihallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Mar 82) 19
Former No 2 Man Expresses Disapproval of Rawlings
(JEiJNE AFRIQUE, 3 Mar 82) 21
GUINEA
Relations With France Seem Unlikely To Improve
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Feb 82) 22
- NORY COAS`t'
Reorientation of F~ench Aid Effort Reported ~
(MARCHFS TROPICAU% E"'MEDITERRANEENS~ 19 Mar 82) 24
Briefs
Geodetic Survey 26
MADAGASCAR
Brief s
Malagasy Franc Exchange Rate 27
Coup Plotters in Custody 27
. MALAWI
Briefs
Polypropylene Bag Product~on 28
South African Agriculture Aid 28
Container Terminal 2$
NIGERIA
Major Railroad Project, Developments I7iscussed
(MARCHE5 TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Mar 82) 29
Details of Railroad Contracts
Development of Railroad Activity
Briefs
Arms Purchase ~om Switzerland 31
Missile Ships Fr~*n France 31
Police Authorizec? To Shoot 31
Cooperation With Egypt 32
New Salt Production Company 32
Hog, Poultry Production 32
Delegation ~`rom Hong Kong 32
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SENEGAMBIA
Possible Polit~cal Effects of Anticorruption Drive ,
(Sylviane Kamara; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 10 Feb 82) 33
Gambian, Senegalese Confederatioi, Seen for Sernegambia
(Sylviane Kamara; JEO.NE AFRIQUEs 17 Feb 82) 36
Brief s
PPP Candidates 38
SIERR,A I.EONE
Brief s
Elections Deaths, Injuries 39
SOUTH AFRICA
New Gold Bar To Be Introduced
(David Marsh; Tf~ FINANCIAI~ TIMES, 15 Apr 82)............ 1t0
ZAIRE
Reprsssive Measures Reportedly Used To Quell Strikers
! ~ F:'~:iQUE-ASIE, 15-28 Feb 82 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1t2
J
_ Sugar Firm Seeks Vehicles, Equipme~t for Moderni;ation
(MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEEN:i, 12 Feb 82) l~Lt
Brief s
B~ADEA Aid ~ Lt5
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I
I
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BURUNDI
~
~
BRIEFS
FRENCH AID FOR AIRPORT--On 23 February, Jean-Pierre Cot, French minister-
delegate in charge of cooperation and development, who was heading the French
delegation to the annual meeting of the High-Level Franco-Burundian Cooperation
Commission, a meeting organized each year in Bujumbura--and Remy Nkengurutse,
Burundian minister of transport, posts, and telecunununications, signed a 7.6
million French franc agreement relating to phase II of the modernization of
~ujumbura's airport. Since 1967, France has been giving assistance to Burundi
in the area of air service. France has been involved in part via the Central
Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE), in the amount of 60 million French francs,
and in part through an Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) subsidy, initially set
at a sum oF 10 million French francs and subsequently to be raised to 11.6
million French francs. An initial agreement signed in April 1981 related to
the financing by France of a first segment of 4 million French francs, whic.h
made it possible to start up infrastructure work and equipment supply. ThE;
work financed by France, and in particular the lengthening uf the runway to
3,d00 meters, has nearly been finished already, and the first large transport
aircraft are due to land at Bujumbura in a few weeks, as soon as the handlinq
equipment for disembarking and embarking pa~sengers and cargo, equipment
specific to those aircraft, has arrived. jText] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MF�~ITERRANEENS in French No 1895, 5 Mar 82 p 694) [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et
Cie Paris 1982] 9631
CSO: 4719/664
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CAMFRA(1N
BRIEFS
NLtiJ OIL DEPOSIT--At the end of February an oil de~osit was discnvered by ELF-
SEREPCA on its liceased territory PH44 (Douala 2) in Cameroon. The drilling,
made an land halfway between Edea aad Kribi, reached a total depth of 1,900
meters. ELF-SEREPCA has a 100 percent intereat in that license. If the evalu-
ation drillings, to be undertaken over the short term, show that the deposft
made up of ELF-SEREPCA an~:i Natianal Hydrocarboa Companq of Cameroon (SNEi) .
= According to a comonunique from ELF-Aquitaine National Campanq (SNEA) , SNfi and
ELF-SEREPCA believe that this new diacovery may, after the Rio del Rey
, [deposit], open up a new area for oil exploitation in Ca~eroon. [Text]
~[Paris MARC~S TROPICAIIR ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82, p
741] [COPYRIGAT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8568
COMPANY FOR URANSUM, MINERALS--The BRGM's newsletter for January 1982 mentions
that the French Mokta Company and the BRGM (Bureau of Geological and Mining
Exploration) have just created a joint enterprise under the name Cameroon
Uranium Union, an enterprise for the exploration and surveying ~f deposits of
. ur~nium, thorium, beryllium, and their compounds in as detailed a fashion as
possible, and for the furthering of their extraction. The union's mining
domain consists of an operations zone located in the northern part of Cameroon
and a permit for mining exploration within that zane. The creation of this
union is thus in response to the wish expressed in 1979 by the Cameroonian
GUVernment to see the BRGM play ti;a role of developer for uranium prospecting
in Cameroonian territory. In the petroleum axea, SEGAZCAM, the nontrading ~
research company for Cameroonian natural gas development, is starting construction
of a natural gas liquefaction plant which will be supplied by the Victoria
deposit and, very probably, by the sizable reserves currently being prospected
off Kribi. SEGAZCAM has selected the French Oil Company [CFP] to supply it
with the required *_echnical assistance. CFP will turn to BRGM for the work of
surveying the plant's base soil, for the search for 1.5 million tons of
n~aterials for concrete aggregate and stone blocks to construct a barrier, and
for a hydrogeological study for supplying the future plant and its associated
buildings with water. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET tKEDITERRANEENS in
French No 1835, 5 Mar 82 p b87] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982J
963~
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i,
,
, CHAD
~
OAU ROLE AT NAIROBI SAID TO BE PLO~ THREATENiNG NATION
Paris AFRIQUE ASIE in French No 1013, 1-14 Mar 82 pp 10-12, 12
[Article by Ginette Cot: "Who Is Using Hissein Habre?"]
[Excerpts] ...Many individuals and many interests. But
as President Goukouni Ouddei said on his return to
Nd~amena, "Chad is not a protectorate under OAU
tutelage"...or one of its performers.
What role are some people trying to give to the OAU, and who is manipulating
that organization on the Chadian issue? Already the tendentious debate on
the nature of the mission of the pancontinental force in Chad following the
Libyan troop withdrawal has led to a paralysis of the African "blue helmets"
and has enabled Hissein Habre to go on the offensive with impunity and to
capture a number of strongpoints.
For a time, there had appeared to be signs of rallying on the part of some
of the officials in charge of the operation of the pancontinental force. OAU
Secretary General Edem Kod~o, on an information mission to Chad, himself
had affirme~l on the eve of the Nairobi meeting that the misunderstanding
between the pan-African organization and the GUNT [Transitional National
Union Government] oveL the role of the "neutral" force had been eliminated
at the level of Goukouni Oueddei.
. Was this onl.y to help throw off their guard those against whom he was about
to deliver a strong blow? There is every reason to believe so. The limited
summit of presidents and ministers of 11 African states which met in Nairobi
10-11 February issued at its conclusion a number of shocking decisions.
Today we can only conclude that if one wanted to pave the way for the chief
of the FAN (Northern Armed Forces) to come to power and at the same time
throw Chad into a new bloodbath and encourage secession by the sosth, this
would be the way to do it. Thus, we can no longer evade the question as to
what intrigues are being prepared, under cover of the OAU, against the
future of Chad.
~ The "timetable" for a Chad settlement as concocted in the Renyan capital is
known. It amounts to a virtual edict to the GUNT. The "concerned parties"
~ ~
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are "invited" to carry out the following scenario: "Implement an imanediate
cease-fire; i.e., midnight 28 February. Begin, effective 15 March,
negotiations toward a national reconciliation under the aegis of the OAU
permanent committee in an African country to be selected. Draw up, between
1 and 30 April, a pr~visional constitution and approve it. Organize,
between 1 May and 30 June 1982, legislative and pres~.dential elections and
proceed to establish new institutions under the OAU's auspices," Finally,
whiZe the African "blue helmets" have not even started to really perforni
their mission, the date for completion of their mandate and withdrawal of
the OAU force is set for 30 June....
The Edict Resolution
Indeed, the Chad issue was raised right at the start from an unexpecte~
angle, by both the acting chairman and the OAU secretary general--who seems
to have been the stage director of the Nairobi performance. Daniel arap Moi,
Kenyan head of state and 0~`TJ chairman, said in his opening speech: "The
Chad problem is basically political, and we must find a political solution
which will be supported by all the Chadi3n parti~s." And we saw an "OAU
permanent co~ittee on Chad," whose birth was dubious and whose legitimacy
- was questioned by the GUNT in November, set itself up as the supreme organ
speaking and acting in the name of the OAU as a whole--that is, for all the
independent states in Africa. ~
Even more serious, it claimed the right to ~udge and make decisions instead
of, and on behalf of, the Chad people and their government. ~
We also know that the GUNT delegation led by Goukouni Oueddei reques::ed,
to no avail, an adjournment of the session in order to review the meeting's
agenda. Thus it was in the absence of the Chad GoverNment's representatives
t.hat the proceedings ended with the known conclusion. Who were the
signatories to the plan of the so-called "permanent committee" announce3
by Edem Kodjo in Nairobi on 11 February? The question remains. Because
although the OAU secretary general implies that this edict was approved
unanimously, it is obvious that reservations and firm opposition views were
~ expressed. Far example, Mohamed Benyahia, the head of the Algerian
delegation--who attended the meeting as an observer--pointed out during the
debate, among other things, that the "permanent committee's" proposals could
have the effect of encouraging the FAN to step up the war... But all this
was certain?y glossed over at the level of the OAU Secretariat, which does
not seem to hesitate, when the need arises, to resor.t to acts of political
and intellectual piracy. ~ '
An additional and troubling fact may provide proof of this. Several hours
after the closing of the "mini-summit," an OAU press release was issued
linking the mission of the neutral pan-African force in Chad to acceptance
~by the GUNT of elect~Lons under the control of the OAU. This statement,
which was justified--who knows by what ~uridical acrobatics--on the basis
of the Lagos agreements of August 1979, declared that the OAU Permanent
Committee on Chad calls for the organization of national elections under OAU
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supervision within 4 months. "The continued presence of the peace force will
be linked to the GUNT's acceptance of these conditions," the English version
of the communique read, while the French version stated that "the continued
presence of the force wfll compel the GUNT to accept these conditions."
Glaring Contradiction
Indeed, the decisions of the Nairobi meeting appear clearly to be the
culmination of a virtual collusion--as, moreover, has already been suggested
in several African capitals, including the Congo, Tanzania, and Zimbab~ze--
and a defiance of the whole group of African heads of state, whose previous
decisions respecting the Chad problem have been canceled with the stroke of
a pen. The "proposals" of the "permanent co~ittee" in fact sharply conflict
with the resolution on Chad approved by the last OAU su~it in the Renyan
capital in June 1981, in which all African states participated. At that time,
these states recognized the "legitimacy" of the GUNT and pledged to give~all
possible suppart to the government team led by Goukouni Oueddei.
~ As for the planned pan-African military force--desig:~ed for the implicit
purpose of making the Libyan withdrawal possible--it was intended not only
to help the GUNT establish its own national, integrated army but also, and
above all, to protect and defend the peace, sovereignty, and security of Chad.
It would no doubt have been advisable, in order to prevent any stalling
tactics, to have stated clearly the most imminent danger that could threaten
this peace which had recently been reestablished with so much difficulty.
However, the support for the GUNT had seemingly been sufficiently explicit
to remove all�ambiguity. Finally, it was understood that nothing would be
done without the prior approval of the Chad Government.
~ Today, if we are limited to the "permanent comnittee's" ob3ectives, th~ GUNT
will no longer have any legitimacy. The factions have been revived. We are
bsck to the situation which prevailed on the eve of the August 1979 Lagos
agreements.... The victim and the aggressor are given the same status. Or
rather, everything is managed to favor the aggressor party, which--because
it has conquered a few strongpoints, again violating its commitments--is
being invited to the negot3.ating table. The GUNT, on the other hand,
summoned at its inconvenience, is somehow put in the position of being an
' accused and is called on to participate in a cease-fire process which can
only benefit Hissein Habre, and we know from expe~{ence how little importance
he will attach to it. Who but the FAN chief broke the last cease-fire
agreement, which he had hurried to sign at Lome in December 1980 to secure
his future after the debacle of his forces, while Goukouni Oueddei had
already s~gned the agreement several weeks before?
Indeed, this is a matter of helping Hissein Habre to seize power.
It would take too long to list the extortions that have ornamented the
itinerary of Hissein Habre, who is known for his fanatical tribalism ar.d
the massacres he has committed.
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Hissein Habre certainly incarnates fascist dictatorship to the aembers and
leaders of FRULINAT. And the Chadian people fully comprehend that
description. There is hardly a family in the country that has not suffered
from the FAN chief's eutortion.
As for the legend concocted by Aissein Habre's propaganda agents that he is
a fervent nationalist, this has been shattered in a dramatic way.
In recent m~nths, particularly in 1980 and 1981, the FAN chief has used as
his rallying crq the struggle against the alleged danger of Libya's
establishing itself in Chad. However, this threat has totally evaporated.
Sardly had the last Libyan soldier left Chr~d, however, before Hissein Habre
again plunged headlong into aggression and war....
A final ~~ictory for Hissein Habre w~uid mean cancellation of all the
progressive and revolutionary gains achieved in more than 6 years of struggle
at the cost of heavy sacrifices, including the killing of the best sons of a
whole generation.
Fallacious Arguments
As for the argument made by his supporters that only a"man of authority"
like him can rescue Chad from paralysis and achieve national reconciliation,
it ignores two things. How could a people who took up arms with the very
purpose of combatting dictatorship and regaining their dignity and full
sovereignty agree to accept an even more terrifying dictatorship than the
previous one, and also one imposed from abroad? Moreov~r, who is more
coamnitted to national reconciliation than Gouk,ouni Oueddei, who in July
announced a general amnesty for F~N fighters?
However, this reconciliation cannot come about until Hissein Habre, a
factor of division and unending war, is removed from the Chadian political
and m3litary scene.
The instigators of the plot against the GUNT, who were exposed in broad
daylight at the latest meeting in Nairobi, no doubt counted for their
project's success on the passivity of a people yearning for peace and
tranquility after their sufferings, and on the discouragement that a knife
in the back of the Chad Government might cause.
Challenge R~abuffed
However, the challenge to Chad's sovereignty and dignity by the Nairobi
resolution was promptly and courageously rebuffed in Nd~amena. Greeted by
thousands on his return from the Kenyan capital on 12 February, President
Goukouni Oueddei affirmed: "Certain countries, encouraged by imperialism,
have gravely insulted our country, people, and army. However, helped by
reliable friendly countries, Chadians will succeed in solving their problems
themselves."
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Repeating a slogan on a sign befng waved by the demonstrators, he shouted:
"Chad is not a protectorate; Chad is not under OAU trusteeship."
On 13 February, the GUNT issued a communique re~ecting as nul and void the
resolutions of the OAU "permanent committee" "su~mit " a*~d describing the
proceedings of this meQting as "absurd theatrics." This permanent committee,
the co~unique continued, "has no reason for being, and still less has the
right to act in place of and on behalf of the people and their legitimate
gcvernment
Expressing indignatiun that the Chad issue has been dragged backward to
become a factional problem again, and that the GUNT is being denied it~
existence as a government, the communique streased: "Implementation of the
Nairobi resolutions would surely mean a return to the vicious circle of
war and destruction."
If, as the first reactions seem to indicate, numerous African capitals agree
with this analysis, the GU'riT--now caught in a pincer situation between Hissein
Habre's aggressive forces, which have received explicit encouragement from
the Nairobi resolution, and the pan-African force--will not remain alone in
its resistance to a plot which not only directly threatens Chad's survival
but is a dangerous precedent for the peoples of the continent.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie
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CHAD
ASSEMBLY OF ALL FORCES NECESSARY FOR RECONSTRUCTION
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1104, 3 Mar 82 p 22
[Article by Jean-Pierre N'Diaye: "Chad: Noth3.*+a Should Divide Them"]
[E~~erpts] In 17 years of civil war, many chances for peace have come and gone.
Tlie conferences organized at the revolutionaries' request in Kano, Nigeria, led to
the final withdrawal, in the name of the national interest, of Felix Malloum.
Upon returning from Ndjamena, the leaders of Chad's revolution--Hissein Habre,
Goukouni Oueddei, and Acyl Ahmat, who were comrades in arms--met in Douguia (10 No-
vember 1979), together with Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, the strongman of the south,
to set up the Transitional National Union Government (GUNT).
Everyone heaved a sigh. Chad's troubles were over! The end of the tunnel was in
sight. Then one of the key figures in the picture upset the applecart. Hissein
Habre, minister of defense, seemed to contest the way the GUNT was set up, and in
particular the fact that Goukouni Oueddei was to be the country's chief magistrate.
Habre withdrew with his FAN [Northern Armed Forces] to the environs of Ndjamena.
What is the nature of these disputes? Some say these people are military chiefs
who are incapable of yielding. Others stress the different backgrounds of the two
men--Habre and Goukouni--who, however, are both from the north. One is a revolu-
tionary, more modern, more of an ideologue, an intransigent nationalist. The .
other is more traditional and has closer ties with Chad's northern neighbor, Libya.
At any rate, both are patriots, and both epitomize Chad. There should be nothing
fundamentally serious to divide them and prevent them from working together to
reconstruct a cruelly torn Chad. For Goukouni the trouble is the presence of the
Libyans and Habre's withdrawal from Nd~amena to rebuild his stronghold in the
east, on the Sudanese border, and again begin his long march.
The presence of 10,000 Libyan soldiecs--considered an army of occupation by Af-
rican public opinion--forced Goukuni to call for the withdrawal of these troops.
The inter-African contingent arrived. The OAU`s difficulties in trying to make
peace are due to internal contradictions and rivalries which can't be resolved.
The difficulty of the OAU's mission can be readily understood when one hears the
two Chadians say that their dispute can i~e resolved only by military means, by
outright warfare. But the OAU's presence has had a calming effect on the situa-
tion, attenuating the confrontation and bringing relief to African peoples
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staggering under the weight of poverty, bombs, and exile. And this is far from
negligible.
In this context, made less tense by the efforts of the OAU, another meeting or
~ve~t a roundtable may be possible. It is almost like a film being played over
again. Will there be another conference, this time without the sequel of brothers
at loggerheads? While the situation inside Chad seems to be fixed in the same
pattern as before, the international situation has changed. There has been a sav-
age revival of the cold war.
If a c~untry like Chad can't solve its domestic problems in a dynamic and positive
way, a:.d the national participants in the drama are relegated to the sidelines,
there is an unavoidable risk of uncontrollable foreign intervention in the medium
term.
For the past 10 years, Hissein Habre has been Chad's strongman; he has turned
every situation to his advantage, defeated his adversaries, and made the great
powers yield, and he has done it exclusively with Chadian forces. But let us not
forget all the Chadians who have taker part in the combat; Dr Abba Siddick was a
precursor of this struggle, and he is not finished yet.
All active forces should be assembled for the work of reconstruction. Can Habre
bring about national reconciliation at a time when a country like Sudan :ts again
threatened by the specter of civil war, and when the international sitLation is
so dangerous? In this connection, socialist France, the OAU, and Chadian immi-
grants should make bolder suggestions.
The main point--and this is cause for optimism--is that no Chadian faction has
proclaimed the secession of the territory it controls.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
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CHAD
GOUKOUNI MAY BECOME MERE FACTION CHIEF
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1103, 24 Feb 82 pp 20, 21
[Article hy Francois Soudan: "The Call of Rocky Terrain"]
[Text] The Libyans should not have left so fast. Paradoxically, there are two
men in Chad who could agree with this statement today: Goukouni Oueddei and His-
sein Habre. That is undoubtedly what they have in common, although their reasons
are diametrically opposed. Oueddei has concluded--too late--that the withdrawa'.
of Libyan troops left him with no prutection other than the overly relaxed boys
in his Presidential Guard. Habre thinks the country would have united around him
if Qadhafi's legionnaires had stayed a few months longer. Their similarities stop
there; after 3 months of fulminating blitzkrieg, the rebel Habre now controls al-
most three-quarters of Chad, whereas Goukouni, the President, seems to have re-
verted to the role of a head of state whose authority is contested by his own fac-
tion.
Is it simply a case of the pendulum's swinging back, or is it a historical neces-
sity? When one wins, the other loses, but always haughtily. �How else can one
explain the truly suicidal policy adopted by Goukouni Oueddei in Nairobi at the
last meeting ~f the OAU's permanent committee on Chad (Nairobi, 10 and 11 Febru-
ary)? By rejtc:ting all of the OAU's decisions--cease-fire, negotiations, elec-
tions--the man who is still President (for how long?) in Ndjamena has lost much
of his legitimacy in the eyes of the OAU. Furthermore, he is leaving the military
and diplomatic initiative up to Hissein Habre--while he is already in a weak posi-
tion on both counts--and his intransigence may well lead to an early departure of
the OAU's white helmets.
This self-destructive tendency is certainly typical of this aristocratic Tubu,
the third son of the Derdei Kefed.ermi. Although used to compromises and hours of
informal negotiations in the shade of a tree, Oueddei is nevertheless more moti-
vated by a sense of honor than by an awareness of reasons of state. And when his
quavering voice loudly interrupted Nigerian President Shehu Shagari in Nairobi
on Wednesday 10 February, while the latter was talking about "national reconcili-
ation" in Chad, tn say that he had not come for that, his listeners were reminded
of the fact that Goukouni Oueddei is a man of sometimes uncontrollable anger. But
above and beyond the real feeling he has of having been betrayed by everyone, and
beyond his personal feud with Habre, for whom he has demanded and obtained a death
sentence by default, Goukouni is perpetually tempted by "the call of the rocky
terrain."
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He has never really thought of himself as a chief of state. Every time he has
spoken freely about himself, and apparently especially since the OAU appointed
him to head the GUNT in August 1979, he has conveyed the feeling that his happiest
days were behind him, when he roamed over the rocky terrain of Tibesti with the
French Army at his heels. Oddly enough, it is Habre, the eternal rebel, who has
always felt that it was his destiny to lead the nation, so much so that he lives
only for that.
But even if Goukouni has never really thought he had what it takes to be a head
of state, he has accomplished the feat of persuading other people that he has:
first the French, from Martin Kirsch to Guy Penne; then the OAU. Everyone be-
lieved him when he said that Habre was finished, that almost the entire country
was united behind him [Goukouni], and that the National Integrated Army (ANI) was
more than a mirage. But Chad, from the GUNT on down, has never recognized Goukouni
Oueddei as its representative. There have been constant rivalries and sometimes
violent quarrels for the past 2 y~ars between him and Acyl Ahmat's pro-Libyans,
the Kamougue's southerners, and Mahamat Abba Said's lst Army. Ten thousand sol-
diers stationed in Chad for 20 months by Qadhafi were unable to stop this perpetual
clan warfare. As a result, ~barely 3,000 men could be found to resist the FAN's
offensive in November and December of 1981, and desertions followed the first de-
feats. Thus Moussa Sougui, one of Goukuni's most effective military aids, and a
hero of the battle of Kotoro Fallata fought at the beginning of December (GUNT's
only victory), joined thP FAN 2 months later on Faya's side with 200 men. Wadal
Abdelkader Kamougue, vice president of the GUNT, after a short visit to the front,
refused to send his troops to participate in this combat between northerners....
The list of "betrayals" of which Goukouni can say he is the victim is long, but
he never had the strength or the will to avoid them. Even his crates of weapons
and munitions sent from Paris found their way, through various intrigues, into the
hands of the FAN....
What can Goukouni do now? Call the Libyans back? But Colonel Qadhafi is likely
. to be very cautious, prompted by American pressures, (discreet) Soviet p"ressures,
the coming OAU summit meeting in Tripoli, and the ghosts of hundreds of soldiers
who died in eastern Chad. France? Goukouni has thought about it. It is said
that he even requested--through Francois Soubestre, the new French ambassador to
Ndjamena--the intervention of the llth Parachute Division.
But France is not going to do anything, because its support for Goukouni was con-
ceivable only as long as the OAU lent him an air of legitimacy. Now the Chadian
President has slammed the door on Nairobi.
What about Algeria or Ethiopia (already approached by Goukouni at the beginning
of December)? For many reasons, neither would think of getting bogged down in
Chad. Will there be nothing left for him but to become once more what he has per-
haps been all along: a faction chief alternating between rebellion and power?
History undoubtedly stammers in Chad, moreso than anywhere else.
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CHAD
OAU ROLE IN CALLING FOR NEGOTIATIONS BACKED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1103, 24 Feb 82 p 20
[Excerpts] Has the OAU reversed its stance, as Goukouni Oueddei thinks, by call-
ing on the President of the GUNT to negotiate with Hissein Habre? Only apparently.
It is true that so far it recognizes Goukouni as the only legitimate authority in
Chad, but only in a specific context: that in which Goukouni heads a transitional
union government for the purpose of holding elections.
In Nairobi the OAU simply took note of a de facto situation. But the situation
has changed in Chad, and the GUNT President doesn't have the support of the govern-
ment or the people. Elections are out of the question now. The transition must
be accomplished some other way, now that yesterday's rebel, Habre, controls so
much territory.
The OAU is now proposing new paths to reach the same objective--namely, the nor-
malization of the situation in Chad. The people of Chad may again refuse to fol-
low this path. But the pan-African organization has stuck to its mission: to
propose nonpartisan solutions and enunciate the law--but without any way to en-
force it.
It cannot be expected to do more. After all, does one expect more of the United
Nations?
. ~
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; CHAD
i
i
FOREIGN MINISTER ACYL AHMAD INTERVIEWED
PM051459 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 29 Mar-11 Apr 82 pp 18-19
[Unattributed report on Chadian Foreign Miniater Acql Ahmat press conference
in Paris: "Nobody Apart Frrna Chadians Can Find a Solution"; date of inter-
view uncertain]
[Text] While internally an effort is being made in N'Djamena to rally and
reorganize the military forces to quell Hissene Habre's rebellion, the National
Unity Transitianal Government jGUNT], which in the past allowed the Armed For-
ces of the North [FAN~ propagandists a free hand for too long, is carrqing
out large-scale activity to make i~t~~position known abroad.
It is within this framework that numerous GUNT leaders presented thewselves
~ to the Parisian press. Among them, on 2 March, during a visit to brief the
French authorities, was Chadian Foreign and Cooperation Minister Acyl Ahmat.
He reasserted the correctness of his government's re~ection of the resolu-
tions adopted in Nairobi in November by a group of African states which formed
a"standing com~nittee" on Chad--resolutions which conflict with the decisions
taken at the latesr sumanit meeting of the 50 African states.
In reply to the question whethhr N'Dj amena envisages requesting Libyan troops
or other countries' forces to help the GUNT crush the FAN aggression, the
foreign minister confirmed that for the time being his government intends to
give the OAU every chance. We are giving the OAU time to take a grip on it-
self and to reach, in agr~ement with the GUNT, a solution to the Chadian
problem," Acyl Ahmat said, explaining that he viewed the OAII as the ensemble
of inembers states, not a club of reactionary heads of state with little re-
spect for their peers' undertakings and motivated by a desire to restore Habre
to the Chadian political scene.
Asked wh~.ther he considers the decision to ask Libyan troops to withdraw from
Chad a"mistake," the GUNT's foreiga minister took the opportunity to very
wittily "relativize" the diatorted image of him provided recently by
Radio France International and other Western media. "I have frequently been
~ called a Libyan agent by Radio France International, whicii has too much to
~ say about me and which does th~ Chadian people much harm. I have, in a
' sense, been denaturalized. I have beea depicted as a Libyan, rather than a
` Chadian.... Acquainted as I am with my country and its internal contradictions,
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I am opposed to Chad's occupation by any other power. But I am very realistic.
Libya is a fraternal country that helped us at the most difficult moment and
that extinguished the blaze that had been burning for 17 years.... And I
expressed the pinion at the time that it was inadvisable to request a Libyan
withdrawal, since we were not confident about the undertakings made by the
others and we were not ready to guarantee our own security...."
Asked about France's stance toward the GUNT and the Chadian problem in general,
Acyl Ahmat, who at the beginning of March met in Paris with Jean-Pierre Cot,
French minister of cooperation and development, and Guy Penne, presidential
adviser on African affairs, was keen to put an end to the questioning of motives
to which Francois Mitterrand's government has been subjected in this regard.
"I must first clarify a misunderstanding," Acyl Ahmat stresaed. "I was with
President Francois Mitterrand and French External Relations Minister Claude
Cheysson. Of course one can never know exactly what happens behind the
scenes. But tn my opinion matters were made clear. Francois Mitterrand told
the GUNT president in essence: 'There is no question of France's asking you to
make the Libyans leave until you are sure about your security.' That is what
I heard Francois Mitterrand say. So people must not say to us that France
exerted pressure on Chadian leaders vta its most autfioritative representative."
With regard to his meeting at tfie beginr.ing of March with the French minister
of cooperation and development, Acyl Ahmat said: "Our position is clear.
As fo r France, it promised, after tfie :~dvent ofthe socialist government, to help .
Chad's legitimate government. According to some radio stations and press agen- ~
cies, however, France has allegedly asked us to move toward a reconciliation
with Hissene Habre. I told Jean-Pierre Cot yesterday (4 March) jdate as pub-
lished]: 'There is no question of France's urging us to sit down at the ne-
gotiating tati.le with Hissene Habre. We are struggling to eliminate the phen-
omenon of the currents that have killed the country. This is not so that
others can force us to revive or multiply them in the future.' So the GUNT's
~ position is clear and I believe that Jean-Pierre Cot's reply was constructive.
In my opinion, France has not changed its position."
With regard to the kind of assistance promised by Paris, the Chadian foreign
minister simply said: "What I can tell you is that France asserted, via its
cooperation minister, that it will continue to help Chad."
Last, asked about t`:e impact of foreign interference in Chad, Acyl Ahmat pointed
out that "Chad's problem is above all a national problem. The inconsistency
of which the GiTNT has been accused is doubtless not entirely unconnected with
the situation being experienced now. But I believe that Chadian people have
learned their lessons from all this, that they have realized that the problems
could nc~t be resolved except by their own will. Neither France, nor the United
States nor any other country--not even the OAU,itself--nobody but the Chadian
people can find a solution. The problem is above all a national one. And
everyone has concluded that everything�~must be done to finally extricate Chad
from deadlock and war."
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CHAD
I
GOUKOUNI SAYS KAMOUGUE TRYING TO TALK WITR HABRE
AB091430 London REUTER in English 1418 Q~lT 9 Apr 82
[By Abakar Assidick]
[Text] Nd~amena, 9 Apr (REUTER)--Chad President Goukouni Oueddei has accused
the country's vice-president of sabotaging his authority and attempting to
negotiate with the rebels in the country's civil war, Nd~amena Radio reported
today.
The Chad leader fa~es increasing political opposition within the 10-faction
provisional government after serious military setbacks against the rebels last
month in eastern Chad, political sources said.
His accusation, in a statement released last night by President Goukouni's
own armed FROLINAT faction, came almost five weeks after Vice-President Abdel
Kader Waldal Kamougue publicly suggested a ceasefire with reb el leader Hissene
Hab re .
' Colonel Kamougue, a veteran leader from the predominantly Christian south,
_ suggested the ceasefire as part of a political settlement of the civil war
- leading to the setting up of a new all-party govemment, aeen by the sources
as a return to~the original 1979 11-faction government including Mr Habre.
The Goukouni-led FROLINAT re~ected the suggest and accused Colonel K,amougue
of trying to achieve~a ceasefire with Mr Habre's guerrillas, a proposal also
~ strongly advocated by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).
In what was seen as an effort to boost his credibility as leader of all the
factions in the war, President Goukouni last month tried--and failed--to re- .
gain ground taken over by the rebels in the past five months.
Military sources said successive attempts by the Chad army to regain control
' of the key town of Ou~Hadjer straddling the strategic road frrom tba capital
to the Sudanese bord~r ended in failure, with heavy casualties for government
~ forces.
Since a Libyan military pullout in November last year, Mr Hagre's guerrillas,
' estimated at around 4,000 men, have now control of more than half of the huge
Central African country, military sources said.
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They said only the presence of an estimated 3,800 troops of an inter-African
force from Nigeria, Zaire and Senegal setting up a~ruffer around Ndjamena
was preventing the guerrillas from moving towards the capital.
The force might have to be withdrawn by the end of June for lack of funds, un-
less an agreement can be reached for the United Nations to finance it, the
sources said.
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GHANA
RESISTANCE TO RAWLINGS REPORTED].Y ERISTS
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1100, 3 Feb 82 p 1
[Article by Siradiuo Diallo: "Jerry Rawlings a*td the Intellectuals"]
[Text] Jerry Rawlings certainly had no trouble seizing power for a second
time,in Accra (31 December 1981). But he is obviously having more trouble
governing this time than after his coup of June 1979. Oddly enough, the
bloody repression that the idol of Ghana's youth indulged in (a dozen
high-ranking officers, including three former heads of state, were shot)
at that time did not affect the will of the people of Ghana to resist.
On the contrary.
The stubborn opposition confronting Jerry Rawlings today is evident at
all social levels, starting, naturally, with the merchant bourgeoisie,
who are adversely affected by the "holy war" against corruption proclaimed
by the country's new strongman. The freezing of bank accounts, limits
imposed on withdrawals of deposits, and a multitude of controls introduced
both inside the country and at its borders are not likely to reassure
Accra's rich gentry.
But the gentry are not ~he only ones to complain. Shopkeepers, merchants,
and salesgirls--the famous "mamies" of Nakola (the capital's main market),
Takoradi, and elsewhere--immediately hoisted the flag of rebellion. They
refuse to lower their prices, despite the orders of the Provisional National
Defense Council, the highest authority in the country. In vain the army
plunders and even dynamites their stalls: the merchants show no signs
o� yielding. They hide their wares, thus further complicating the problem
of supplying large urban centers.
Trained personnel and intellectuals do not stop at passive resistance,
either. The professional association grouping doctors, 3urists, engineers,
and technicisns is demanding the speediest possible return to constitutional
government. "Either by means of a restoration of the third constitut3on,
appropriately amended, or by any other legal means decided on by the
people," states the association's communique. There is nothing surprising
about this stance, as Ghana has the largest and most active intelligentsia
of any country in black Africa.
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This social stratum, which is keenly aware of its role in the nation,
has never made any secret of its contempt for politicians and the military.
None of the regimes which have emerged from Ghana's five coups d'etat
has succeeded in winning over the intellectuals. This is why it took
Jerry Rawlings 3 weeks to form his cabinet. Even now he has managed to
collect only a team of "secretaries"--no ministers.
Many well-known and respected intellectuals are said to have been sounded
out and to have refused to join the government. Thus, after forming his
Provisional National Defense Council with eminent unknowns--except for
Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah, chief of staff of the army--the master of Accra
was obliged to recruit his ministerial secretaries from among politicians
whom he was vilifying only yesterday. 1'his did not help his public image.
The national student union, which initially applauded the downfall of
President Hilla Limann and asked its activists to go to the plantations
and help the peasants harvest cocoa (the country's main export), is turning
against [Rawlings]. The students feel that by [picking] a band of "reac-
tionaries" and "professional politicians " to form his government, Jerry
Rawlings has made himself look like the architect of a mere "palace revolu-
tion."
Thus hard-pressed on both the right and the left, the ebullient captain's
margin for maneuver is receding daily. In these circumstances, the only
place for him to go is probably straight ahead. Unless he resigns once
again--but that is unlikely. ~
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GHANA
COI~Il~lENTS ON FRAGIL'TTY OF LIBYAN CONNECTION
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1104, 3 Mar 83 p 16
[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Jerry Rawl?ngs Saved by Qadhdhafi?"]
[Excerpt] Two months after coming to power in Accra, Air Force Captain
Jerry Rawlings is marking time. He had no trouble arresting his prede-
cessor, Hilla Limann, and interning him in Akossombo, or in dissolving
Parliament. But so far he has not been able to form a homogeneous, repre-
sentative government � restore unity aad discipline to the army, or rally
the active elements of the nation.
� It is as though J.J. (Rawlings likes being called by his initials, which
' stand for Jerry John) didn`t know what to do with the pawer he has achieved.
He just harangues the crowds naw and then from the top of an armored car
flanked by armed soldiers, or he thunders at the women selling goods in
the market (he has forbidden them to sell imported products). Otherwise,
! Ghana's new strongman lies low at Camp Burma, where he has set up his
office and, next to it--ostentatiously--an auetere camp bed,
All this is in a small tent guarded by soldiers in combat attire, standing
or lying behind heaps of sandbags. Holed up in this manner at Accra's
main military camp, two steps from the airport, J.J. has closed himself
off in obstinate silence. There is not the slightest indication of a
; domestic policy program or of foreign policy options. Is he overwhelmed
by the enormity of the task of national recovery before he has even begun
to face it?
~
At any rate, the legacy left by his predecessore is in such a state that
it would be hard to make it produce anything positive.
So it is not surprising that in the middle of February, Captain Rawlings
sent a high-level delegation to Tripoli to ask Libya for immediate aid:
; not just oil, but ordinary consumer goods, and of course financial support.
' Colonel Qadhafi, who made an important contribution to J.J.'s return to
pawer, has already supplied him with quantities of weapons, amunition,
and medicine. His representatives, who lost no time reopening the Libyan
~ Embassy in Accra, have been feverishly active there ever since. They
go from minister to minister to find out what the country needs, and
j promise the earth. But the country's needs are immense....
I
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There is very little chance of the Libyan graft .*.aking hold in a lasting
way in Accra. Given the way of life, mentality, and culture of the 14-odd
million Ghanaians, it would be very hard for Qadhafi to convert them to
the precepts of Islamic integrationism as taught by the little green book--
quite apart from the fact that the drop in oil prices and his scraps with
the Western powers have given the Libyan chief of state a lot of problems.
It's like saying Rawlings hasn't come out of the hotel.
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GHANA
' FORMER NO 2 MAN EXPRESSES DISAPPROVAL OF RAWLINGS
~ Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1104, 3 Mar 82 p 50
' [Text] Many young, low-ranking officials who were members of Rawlings'
first team, and who de~cided to leave the country when Hilla Limann's
civilian government regained power, did not participate in J.J.'s second
coup d'etat on 31 December. They were not recalled, either. Among them
: is Major Boakye Djan, the former "No 2" of the Revolut-~onary Council and
Rawlings' former right arm; at the time, he was presented as the Council's
ideologue.
He and his friends, whom we were able to meet with in Londan, take a vpry
dim view of J.J.'s latest activities. "Rawlings thinks it's enough to
' change men to change society," they told us. "If he stays in power now,
Ghana will enter a long period of trouble and chaos." The disillusionment
expressed by Major Boakye Djan and his associates about Jerry Rawlings
was not born yesterday. "When we took power in 1979, we did so to carry
; out a genuine social revolution," they told us. "Untortunately, Rawlings
and his friends wouldn't hear of it. It was because our team was rudder-
less and had no coherent strategy that we decided to hand the reins back
to the civilian authorities in October. We were heading for a catastrophe."
Referring to the latest coup d'etat, Ma3or Boakye D~an told us that
"Rawlings' armed bands liquidated hundreds of the new regime's opponents."
; At least three of the 16 "martyrs" who were buried with military honors
at the end of January were murdered in cold blood by Rawlings' men;
' Rawlings recorded them as "killed in combat."
The ma3or and his friends also confirm the existence of the "Libyan connec-
, tion." "Because of it," they say, "Rawlings is alienating all of the
countries which had been Ghana's friends. The sirplane that was supposed
~ to carry food and medicine from Tripoli the day after the coup d'etat
was really carrying weapons." Rawlings' future? Anything but brilliant,
; if they are right: "The civilian popul~tion has had enough. Sooner or
later, it will realize that it takes more than guns and promises to be
able to survive."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982
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GUINEA
RELATIONS WITH FRANCE SEEM UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1100, 3 Feb 82 pp 30, 31
[Article by S.D.: "Lost Illusions"]
[Text] The members of the Association of Families of Political Prisoners in Guinea
are preoccupied by the fate in store for their families. Comprising several women
citizen~ of France, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands married to Guineans who have
been held in the prisons of Sekou Toure, these women have for years been making
approaches to secure, if not the freedom, then at least some clarification concern-
ing their husbands' situation.
The association has brought its case to the attention of the Pope, international
political and humanitarian organizations, and the governments of many countries.
During his official visit to Guinea (December 1978), the then president of the
French Republic, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, raised the problem with President Ahmed
Sekou Toure. And he obtained a coimnitment that those under arrest would be freed
without delay.
Confident in this promise, Rene Journiac, adviser for African affairs in th~ Of-
fice of the President of the French Republic, hastened to place balm on the wounds
of his fellow citizens.
And time passed. Receiving no tangible sign from Conakry, despite several discreet
approaches by the French authorities, the association resumed activity. On 18 April
1980, the European Parliament passed a motion calling for the liberation of polit-
ical prisoners in Guinea. During the campaign for the last presidential election
in France, the association obtained from the principal candidates the commitmprt
to do everything possible to this end in the event that tney were elected on.
10 May (1981).
President Francois Mitterrand seems to have kept his word. In any case, in circles
close to the Socialist Party it is stated that the discreet visit to Conakry in
October 1981 by Attorney Rolland Dumas, Socialist deputy from Perigueux and a
friend of the French chief of state, had no other t~rpose than this matter. But
Mitterrand's special envoy obtained nothing definite. On the contrary, Mme Marie
Jeanne Pruvot, a Giscardian deputy to the Strasbourg parliament, and author of the
April 1980 motion, knows how things stand.
After having visited Conakry last November at the invitation of President Sekou
Tuure, Mme Pruvot has just received from the Guinean ambassador in Brussels,
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Kourouma Daouda, called Windo, an official letter dated 12 January 1982. The
letter was signed by Guinean Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdoulaye Toure, who
stated, for the purpos~ of finally settling this matter, that with regard to the
eight husbands of the Frenchwomen who were members of the associacion, seven had
been executed since 2~; January 1971. The eighth, Barry Abdoulaye, former office
director in the Min:.stry of Foreign Affairs, had escaped prior to the execution
of the sentence.
Abdoulaye Toure's letter is troubling, to say the least. First of a~l, this is
because it pro~~es that, while he was promising in December 1978 to free prisoners
who he knew r.ad been executed during or after January 1971, Sekou Toure was clear-
ly making fun of President Giscard d'Estaing. Even more serious, if it is true
that four of these men were shot on 24 January 1971 at the same time as dozens of
other Guinean officials, the statement of the minister of foreign affairs must,
with regard to the four others, be taken with caution.
Actually, Gen Keita Noumandian, former head of the General Staff of the Guinean
Army, and Keita Kemoko and Sylla Fode Saliou, both magistrates, could not have
been executed on the date indicated. And for a good reason, since they were ar-
rested in May and on 7 and 8 July, respectively, in Conakry. As for Barry Abdou-
laye, who, the head of Guinean diplomatic service writes, escaped before the im-
position of the penalty, his case is rather unusual, for he was arrested on 29 Au-
gust 1972 at Sinko, a little village on the Ivory Coast frontier, during his
escape [attempt]. Brought back to Conakry, he was probably also executed.
These revelations, which say a great deal about the manner in which Guinean author-
ities behave with regard to the rights of man, are not likely to encourage Presi-
dent Mitterrand to fulfill a wish very dear to Sekou Toure: to be officially in-
vited to France.
Some African chiefs of state, and not minor ones, have intervened in this regard;
French companies interested in exploiting the rich Guinean subsoil are doing
everything to improve French-Guinean relations. This does not alter the fact
that since the election of Francois Mitterrand, these relations seem dezd. Are
the open wounds caused by Sekou Toure's vio].ent attacks in 1976 against the So-
cialist Party--likening it to "filth," and describing its leader as a"Nazi" and
a "bandit"--likely to heal badly?
The members of the France-Guinea Friendship Association, in any case, plan to make
approaches soon to Minister of Foreign Affairs Claude Cheysson and Prime Minister
Pierre Mauroy in order to find out what Paris inte~nds to do. As for Sekou Toure,
he seems no longer to be under any illusions as to his chances of coming to an
understanding with Francois Mitterrand.
[Toure] seems to be so disabused that he did not hesitate, during his recent visit
to the Federal Republic of Germany (30 November-3 December), to make a long tele-
phone call from Bonn to Valery Giscard d'Estaing to say that he not only did not
regret having supported him during the presidential election campaign, but that he
was solemnly inviting '.:~~T to return to Guinea whenever [Giscard] might wish--and
to assure him in advance that the former French chief of state will be better re-
ceived than in December 1978.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
6ios 23
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!
i
f IVORY COAST
i
REORIENTATION OF FRENCH AID EFFORT REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Mar 82 p 790
[Article: "Toward Reorientation of Cooperation with France"]
[Text] Th~: French minister delegate to the minister of external relations for
cooperatio:i, Jean-Pierre Cot, left Abidjan on 10 March at the conclusion of a
2-day ~fficial visit to the Ivory Coast.
Before leaving the Ivorian capital, Mr Cot stressed the fact that the adjust-
ment of the cooperation between the Ivory Coast snd France--an adjustment de-
sired by the two countries--was not at all a disengagement on the part of
France. On the contrary, he declared, it is a matter of "anchoring (this coop-
�~eration) better and developing it better."
"France," he continued, "intendP to increase its aid to the Third World....and
I want to assure Ivorian public opinion that there is no question of reducing
the scope of our cooperation, but rather of developing it.... We desire the
opening-up of new areas of cooperation--in the matter of rural development, for
example.... The fact remains that we have to examine the possibilities of
handing over certain positi~ns occupied by technical assistants, in those cases
where Ivorianization is posei.~le."
Mr Cot referred to the fact that France favors self-directed development for
the countries of the Third World and encouragement of each country's capacity
to carry out its own development itself. He recalled that France intended to
double its public development aid to the Third World in the course of President
Mitterrand's current 7-year term, to reach 0.7 percent of Fr.$nce's Gross Na-
tional Product, instead of the present 0.35 percent.
For his part, the chief of Ivorian diplomacy, Mr Simeon Ake, considered that
the fundamental principle of cooperation between the Ivory Coast and France
should henceforth be that of ongoing concertation. Furthermore, he continued,
"we unreservedly approve the rrench idea that the necessary updating or read-
justment of development policies should be carried out with respect for th-?
sovereignty of each country, in function of its needs, its interests and iLF
political and economic choices."
In the view of the Ivorian minister, the development efforts should be applied
to three "sparkplug" sectors: agriculture, industry and energy.
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Diversified Cooperation
Franco-Ivorian cooperation covers several areas, both on the level of technical
or scientific assitance and on ehat of development.
Of the roughly 12,000 technical assistants working for the French Ministry of
Cooperation, nearly one-third--3,758--work in the Ivory Coast. Teachers repre-
sent 80 percent of this direct assistance, and the cost of them to France was
CFA 6.9 billion in 1981.
On the other hand, France furnishes its sid to the development of the Ivory
Coast through the intermediary of several organisms: the Aid and Cooperation
Fund (FAC)--CFA 911 million in 1981; the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation
(CCCE)--CFA 12.7 million in loans and participations; and the Studies and Re-
search Group for Development of Tropical Agronomy (GERDAT), which groups eight
research institutes and whose financing is provided jointly by the two parties
--CFA 1.576 billion in 1981.
Finally, throu~h the intermediary of the Office of Overseas Scientific and
Technical Resea;ch (ORSTOM), which has three centers in the Ivory Coast, with
20 scientific disciplines represented, France is subsidizing research projects ~
in the amount of CFA 3.786 billion.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux Et Cie Paris 1982
11267
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IVORY COAST
BRIEFS
GEODETIC SURVEY--From 20 January to 3 March, a group of 10 experts in geodesy
from several FRG universities developed a pilot project for geodPsy using saC-
ellit�es, in collabor~.tia:~ with the Geographic Institute of the Ivory Coast.
This project, carried out within the framework of Ivorian-FRG cooperation, has
the purpose of providing the rvory Coast with 17 geodesic points of very high
precision that will serve as a base for establishment of geographic and road
maps. The project will also be of very great utility for construction of roads
and rail lines, ss well as for carrying out irrigation projects and for exploi-
. tation of mining �cesources. At a ceremony on 3 March marking the end of this
work, Mr Ernst-August Racky, the FRG's ambassador to Abidjan, handed over a set
of geodesic observation equipment to the Geographic Institute of the Ivory
Coast. This equipment, with a value of CFA 40 million, includes, in particu-
lar, two instruments for observation of artificial satellites and three ve-
hi-cies. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES iROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Mar 82
p 725] COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982 11267
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MADAGASCAR
BRIEFS
MALAGASY FRANC ERCHANGE RATE--Antananarivo, 10 Apr (REUTER)--The Malagasy
franc (FMG) no longer has fixed par~Cy with the Fren~fi franc, according to
official exchange rates published by the central bank. T[ie FMG, which has
been worth one fifth the value of the grencfi f~anc since leaving the franc
zone in 1973, is now floating against other currencies. On Thursday, the ex-
change rate for the French franc was 49.94 FMG. Malagasy authorities have not
given any explanation for this change, but informed sources say that negotia-
tions between the Malagasy Republic and the II~' for the redress of the Malagasy
economy "have resumed." These talks came to a standstill seneral months ago
because cf tfie drastic Il~ demands which were apparently difficu~r for the
countrq to implement. Tfie country is currentlq facing an economic crisis and
shortages of foodstufP and essential goods. IText] [AB110726 London REUTER
in French 1334 GMT 10 Apr 82]
~nirv PLOTTLRS IN CUS~'~1DY--AntanAnarivo, 10 Apr (REUTER)--The suspected plot-
ters of a coup aimed at overthrowing the regime of President Didier Ratsiraka
have been remanded into custody after an inquiry by the Office of Investiga-
tion and Documentation (Political Police). This was announced on Saturday by
the daily MADAGASCAR MATIN. The newspaper did not give the names of the sus-
pected coup plotters. According to Malagasy President Didier Ratsiraka, offi-
cers, civilians and clergymen~were involved in the plot. The Malagasy head of
state said last January that "the priest who engineered the plot intended to
call on witches to make lightning strike at the houses of present Malagasy
leaders.'' In case this method failed, I was to be killed by seven sticks of
dynamite at Ambohistsirohitra Palace (preaidential palace)," he added. [Text]
[AB110645 London REUTER in Fsench 1337 GMT 10 Apr 82]
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~
;
MALAWI
~
BRIEFS
POLYPROPYLENE BAG PRODUCTION--In keeping with a plaa to develop activitiies to
replace imports in Malawi, Blantyre Netting Company, a subsidiarq of the David
Whitehead group, will set up a factory to make polqpropylene bags for .packag-
ing agricultural products (grain, fertilizer, etc.). Its annual production
capacity is to be about 4 million bags. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MIDITERRAPIEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82 p 747] [COPYRIGflT: Rene Mor~c
, et Cie Paris 1982] 8568
S~UTH AFRICAN AGRICULTIJRE AID--During ~his receLt visit to Malawi, South
. African Agriculture Minister P. T. Du Plessis announced that his country would .
grant a loen of 1.5 million Malawian kwachas (over a period o� 1~.5 years at 2
percent) to the National Seed Company of Malawi in order te enable it to ea- '
large its warehouses and increase its feed stocka. He also said that his
country would make a gift of 420,000 kwachas to finance the transportation of
wheat which Malawi (whose needs increase at an annual rate :,f 24,000 tons)
normally imports from South Africa. [Text] [Paris MARCE~S TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82 p 747] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1982] 8568
CONTAINER TERMINAL--Lilongwe has ~ust installed a cont ainer terminal (as an
addition to the two terminals already set up in Blaatyre) with aa initial
capacity of 120 units (6 meters per side); this wi~.l s oon be expanded to 370
units. ~e overall cost of the operation is to come to almost 1.5 million
kwachas. It should be noted that 60 percent of Malawi's exports aad 50 per-
c:ent of its imports travel in containers, principally via Nacala, secoad
largest port in Mozambique. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAIIX ET I~DITERRANEENS
in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82 p 747] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris
19822 8568
CSO: 4719/706.
i
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DTIGERIA
MAJOR RAILROAD PROJECT, DEVELOPI~NTS DISC[TSSED
Details of Railroad Contracts
r
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Freach No 1896, 12 Mar 82~ p 739
[Text] Three railroad contracts of $400 milliaa each, recently coacluded in
Nigeria by a French company, a~ugoslav campanq, and a Chinese-Swiss consort-
ium, actually involve f single international-gage railway pro~ect of some 400
km aimed at 3inking Port Harcourt with the future ~ aokuta steel camplex.
The French camp any (Dumez) has been sesigned the Umuahia Enugu sectian, the
Yugoslav company (Partizanski), the Utonkon Makurdi section, and the Chinese-
Swiss consortium (CCECC-Electrowatt Noga) the Oturkpo-Aqangba section (from a
place halfway between Utankon and Makurdi to another place halfwaq between
Oturkpo aad A~aokuta) .
Of the three remaining contracts to be concluded to complete the railway, a
Brazilian company (P arana-Panama), presently under consideration, is to be as-
~ signed the southern Port Harcourt~lmushia section. It is thought that another
French company, Dragages et Travawc Publics, might be assigned the Enugu~Tranko
section. Oa the other haad, it is not yet kno~m which company will be selected
to c~mplete the last section, li.uking Ayangba wi.th the steel complex.
The railroad pro3ect as a whole has been eatablished at $2.5 billioa (more than
half of this amount remains to be invested), and the pro~ect is expected to be
finished before the campletion of the steel complex itself, foreseen for 1985.
We may recall that this complex is beiag built bq the Soviets, headed by a
firm called 1~azhpromexport.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris, 1982.
,
; Development of R$ilroad Activity
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Freach No 1896, 12 Mar 82, p 739
~ [Text] The Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC) is counting on average monthly
~ receipts of 7.7 million naira this pear, or 92.4 million for the 12 months.
' In 1980 its average monthly receipta came to only 5.07 million naira be-
cauae of strikes. Off to a good atart during the first quarter, with a
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manthly average of 7.4 million naira, receipts dropped in May and June due
to protest movements.
It is to be noted that in 1979, monthlp receipts came to only 3.82 million '
naira, and ia 1978 to only 2.78 millian� ~
The increase in receipts expected in 1982 is based on the normal development
of traffic and, according to the railway organization, could be still higher
if there is ~ revision in rates.
In fact, the increase in receipts each year has not kept pace with the cost of
operations, which increases much more rapidly and leaves the organization with
a deficit.
In 1978, with receipts of 33.45 million naira, operational costs increased to
74.77 million, giving a negative balance of 41.32 million naira.
In 1979, operational costs exceeded 100 milliaa naira campared with receipts
of 45.84 million, resulting in a huge deficit.
In 1982, because of increases in wages and other development coats, and despite
receipts of 92.4 million naira, the deficit is expected to reach million
naira at the present rate schedu~~.e.
In another matter, the NRC has been pleased with the technical accord reached
with Rail India Technical and Ecanomic Services Ltd (RITES) early in 1979 for
a period of three years, which expired at the end of 1981. In fact, this ac-
cord permitted the NRC to get b ack on its feet and develop its services.
Thus, with 10.5 million passengers per year, passenger traffic even exceeded
the goal of 10 million established for the end of the period. Freight traf -
fic, which a short time ago was still 230 railroad cars a day, has increased
to 300 cars.
Lastly, in a year and a half, the number of railroad employees has increased
from 30,000 to 35,000.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie P aris, 1982.
8568
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~
. DTIGER~A.
~
BRIEFS
ARMS PUR~CHASE FRAM SWITZERI~+,ND--Swi.tzerlaad.: Nigeria is top customez �or
arms sal.e~ ; Accordin,g to the Swiss m3aiste~ o~ de�eaae~ the rouatzy`s
arms sales totaled 5II.5 m~.Il,ioa Swiss fraac8 laat year. The portion o�
that amount bought bq Nigeria added up to 149.9 million fraacs. Thus, in
thie area Ni,gezia came into the I.ead among Switzerland's custamers~ ahead
of West Germany (I43.7 million francs) and Austria (76.I millioa francs).
[Text J [Paris MARCI~S TROPICAUX ET 1~DITERRAZ~EENS in Freach No 1892,
12 Feb 82 p 396J [COPYRIGST: Rene M~orewc et Cie Paris 1982J 9631
MISSTi.L SIiIPS FRpM FRANCE- A ceremonial Nigerian flag-raisin.g in Cherb~usg
on ~ February marked the delivery of three miseile-launching patrol boats
to Nigeria built by Coastructions Mecaaiques de Normandie. Ttiese patrol
boats- "Siri," "Ayam," and "Ekun"--represent a 450-millioa-franc contract.
They are due to leave the above-~mentioned French port in a few week8 to
get to Lagos at the end of a~ourney lasting 3 weeksy with stops in
Spain, the Canaries, and Africa. In the event Nigeriaa military officials
do not carry out training eacercises with the collaboration of the French
Navy, the three Da~trol craft might,Iea,ve Cherbourg toward the end of
March or in A~ril. Otherwise, the three shi,ps should be leaviag Fxance
later on. The crew size is 50 ~or each of these patrol boata. They are
56 meters in length and~8 meters wide, and their meaas of propulsion is
provided by four 4,500-horsepower engines which allow them to attain
37 knots. [Tejct] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET 1~DITERRANEENS in French
No 1892, I2 Feb 82 p 396] [COPYRIGHT: Reae Moreux et Cie Paris 1982]
9631
POLICE AUTIiORIZED TO SHOC~--Ia January the Lagos golice co~o~nissioner~
A1ha~i Mr~hairmed Gambo, announced that from now on the police are authorized
to shoot persons disturbing the peace by engaging in theEt and murder.
Directives have been given to the police concerning thia. T'he commissioner
atated that the measure hae become aecessary following an increase in the
number of attacks,�the victima of which are reaidents of the city. Theee
attacks are most freq,uently made against motorista and when there are
traffic accidea,ta. ['Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET I~DITERRANEENS in
~ French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 396] [COPYItIGET: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982]
9631 �
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COOPF.RATION WITH FGYPT--On 27 January, Eqypt and Niqeria aigned an economic,
scientific, and technological cooperation agreement in Lagos. On that occasion
the Nigerian federal minister of planning, Mrs Adenike Ebun Oyagbola, who signed
the agreement along with Egypt's ambassador, Muhammad al-Atif Nawani, expressed
- regret regarding the imbalance in trade between the two countries, an imbalance
very much in Egypt's favor. While Nigerian sales to Egypt have greatly
declined, going from 143,000 to 17,000 naira just from 1975 to 1979, Egypt's
sales to its Nigerian partner went from 965,000 to 1.1 million naira during the
same period. In the area of technological cooperation, Mrs Oyagbola made the
additional observation that there are currently some 2,000 Egyptian experts in
Nigeria, mostly teachers, engineers, agricultural experts, and building experts.
[Text] (Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1895, 5 Mar 82
p 686] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9631
NEW SALT PRODUCTION COMPANY- New Nigeria Salt Company, Ltd, a salt producing
firm with an annual capacity of 120,000 tons, installed on Ogha Reki, in
Bendel State, has recently entered into operation. This company, established
with the technical participation of a Spanish comp any, Union Saltenera, cost
about 17 million naira. The Spanish campany is to provide management and ad-
ministration for a temporary period of three yeara. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1896, 12 Mar 82 p 739] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8568
HOG, POULTRY PRODUCTION--Decline in hog production but increase in chicken pro-
duction: Pork production is currently down in Nigeria, while chicken production
is experiencing an increase. That is what the Federal Livestock Department
states in a report recently made public. In fact, farmers raising animals seem
to be more interested in poultry than in hogs, even though the latter are in
great demand. That demand was estimated at about 50,000 tons of ineat per year
(which is 1.3 million animals), compared to local production, which is no more
than 38,000 tons. By 1985, demand is estimated to be around 57.000 tons, with
production to be fairly close to 52,000 tons. According to the Federal Live-
stock Department's report, hog raisers have not tried to expand their pro-
duction--58 percent of them limiting themselves to fattening up only about 50
animals maximum, and only 15 percent fattening up 200 or more. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1895, 5 Mar 82 p 686] [COPY-
RIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982) 9631
DELEGATION FROM HONG KONG--A mission of some 15 members from the Hong Kong
Chamber of Commerce paid a visit to Nigeria in January. The members of this
mission were representing the following sectors: construction materials; the
plastics, electric, and electronics industries; watches; toys; and various
leather and metal goods. It was emphasized that Nigeria is Hong Kong's top
African customer. Its purchases totaled more than 1 billion Hong Kong dollars
in 1980, showing a rise of 180 percent that year compared to the previous year.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in F'rench No 1895, 5 Mar 82
p 685] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9631
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~ ~
~
~
-j
i SENE' GAM131A
~
l
~
~
~ '
~
i
~
t
~ POSSIBLE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF ANTICORRUPTION DRIVE
~ Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1101, 10 Feb 82 pp 22, 23
~ [Article by Sylviane Kamara: "Diouf Against the Corrupt"]
[Excerpts] The arrest on the evening of 26 Janusry of two Dakar physical thera-
pists for forgery, use of forgery, and swindling, and the placing of two physicians
~ under surveillance have aroused excitement in Senegalese medical and paramedical
circles. There is the same excitement everywhere, for the fraud uncovered by the
' state inspectorate seems to implicate not only a few doctors and masseurs but also
a good number of officials who are profiting from a particular social sec~xrity sys-
tem.
The "affair of the budget charges,~" as they call it in Senegal, seems actually to
be quite broad. According to the national daily LE SOLEIL, the state has thereby
lost 1 billion CFA francs (20 million French francs). How? The combine was quite
ingenious. An official falls ill: thanks to a letter of guarantee, a"budgetary
charge," he pays only one-fifth of the medical coats, with the state assuming the
rest of the cost. Let us suppose that the official in question wishes to make a
little money. He pays his share and goes to consult an unscrupulous doctor or
physical therapist. The latter reimburses him his costs, adds a small supplement,
and is paid by the state the remaining four-fifths for medical treatment he never
gave. Since little brooks come together to form big rivers, certain doctors and
physical therapists are said to have acquired more than comfortable fortunes this
way. One of the arrested physical therapists, Siby Faye, owns a housing develop-
' ment near the airport consisting of 20 vil,las. Many Dakarians went there to spend
~ the last weekend of January.
Dr Albert Bachir, a veteran of the RDA (African Democratic Rally), of Lebanese
origin, placed under surveillance on the 27th, and head doctor of a clinic of the
inner city, was known for similar activities. The physicians' Council of Order
launched an investigation of him 3 monti,s ago because he was suspected of engaging
' in the "charges" business. It was therefore no surpriae to the Council. The sur-
veillance of Dr Abdou Niang, on the other hand, seems more difficult for it to ac-
cept. Dr Niang, 72 years of age, is one of the first African physicians. He is
a leading citizen, and a sheikh in addition, and grand master of the Masonic Lodge
of the Grand Orient of France in Senegal. In his case the doctors speak of "neg-
; ligence." After the affair became known, the Council of the Order of Physiciaris
i met to decide on what measures to take. But the idea of a comanunique was reject-
ed, and a comm3.ssion charged with establishing responsibilities was set up. "We
~
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are carrying out an investigation for our part in order to find out if these or
other doctors have participated in this fraud," explained a member of the council.
The physical therapists immediately announced that one of the accused, Becaye
Diarra, did not have the degrees required by the profession, and that they there-
fore had nothing to do with him.
So much for the incident itself. But what is behind and around it is much more
interesting. The affair has assumed such proportions that some Senegalese af-
firm...that it has been concocted out of whole cloth in order to distract atten-
tion from the increase in the price of rice which took effect on 30 January, going
up from 80 to 105 CFA francs per kilogram. Others take it seriously, however.
Unverifiable rumors of panic speak of quick sales of shares or of real estate in
order to escape the roundup which seems to be in preparation. Because the desire
to lance the abscess comes from very high.
As early as 21 September, President Abdou Diouf had demanded the opening of an in-
quiry into the "budgetary charges." A routine check, it was said. Actually, the
President decided to act after receiving an anonymous letter informing him of the
fraud. A final report at the end of January confirmed its allegations. The chief .
of state then decided to make the affair public.
Having done this, Abdou Diouf took another step. The creation in June 1981 of a
Court for the Suppression of Illicit Enrichment, and then the removal of certain
high personalities of the regime known for their "business sense," gained for him
the trust of the little people. Nevertheless, some people still wanted to be con-
vinced of the willingness of the chief of state to ha*+~ out punishment. Just how
far will they go this time? This is the question which everqone is asking. "We
will go right to the end," said Prime Minister Habib Thiam, "in conformity with the
instructions of the chief of state." On 26 January, during a meeting of the Coun-
cil of Ministers, Abdou Diouf in fact declared that the Senegalese Government was
willing "to struggle against fraud of all kinds by imposing appropriate punishment,
whoever the perpetrators may be." No one seems to be protected.
Siby Faye is actually the official physical therapist of the wife of the President
and is a friend of the family. He is, moreover, the right-hand man and spokesman
of the caliph of a Tidjania subbrotherhood. When one knows the strength and im-
portance of Senegalese Muslim Brotherhoods, one better understands this thought:
"It had to be done! Abdou does not lack courage."
Some newly rich men must not feel very well at the beginning of this year. It is
not that corruption is more widespread in Senegal than elsewhere; it is rather
less so, as a matter of fact. The difference is that today the government is mak-
ing it a fundamental problem against which it is determined to struggle, and do it
quietly and legally. Where are they headed? In Africa one usually witnesses this
type of operation after each coup d'etat. The newcomers accuse their predecessors
of having filled their pockets, empty their bank accounts, and shoot or imprison
them. One has seen it in Ghana, Liberia, and in Nigeria after the Biafra war.
In Zaire, embezzlement of funds was for a time subject to the death penalty.
It is also true of countries where discretion is the norm. It is arranged within
the family. In Senegal, too, they gladly kept their eyes closed. The perpetrators
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~
of the embezzlements in the National Office of Trade in Agricultural Products,
ONCTAD, that were "uncovered" in 1979 have not been severely punished, and no em-
~ bezzler has ever felt threatened.
' There is no coup d'etat in sight, and therefore no bloody purge on the horizon and
no really repressive 1aw. The Senegalese embezzler had been a happy man. The ar-
rival of Abdou Diouf spoiled the game. In 1 year the government, under his stimu-
lus, has set up th~ structures necessary to suppress illicit enrichment and embez-
zlement. But some people reproach him for not moving fast or firmly enough, and
for not using the instruments which he has created. The reproach is only half
justified. One of the main keys to the personality of Abdou Diouf, like that of
his prime minister, is incontestably his discretion. Discretion, but firmness.
The year 1982 may well contain some surprises, for once the first stage has,been
broached, President Diouf will have to confirm his action or risk appearing to
have engaged in deception.
This is not easy, for precisely in the field of the struggle against corruption
he will have to--he has to now--attack men who gravitate around power and who are
even its barons. This economic and moral battle is actually accompanied by a
parallel political battle. By striking hard, Abdou Diouf risks causing damage
within his party whir_h could hurt him in a presidential election year.
On the other hand, it is difficult for him not to act: corruption is a scourge
which undermines in:;titutions and enfeebles an already sick economy. As a cfiief
of state determined to restore the situation in his country, Abdou Diouf can only
make it his own problem. The struggle against corruption is his fight, a long
and difficult fight which no African chief of state has attempted in similar con-
ditions. Abdou Diouf is walking a tightrope, and this without doubt is the reason
why he is advancing slowly. But surely.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
6108
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SENEGAMBIA
GAMBIAN, SENEGALESE CONFEDERATION SEEN FOR SENEGAMBIA
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1102 17 Feb 82 pp 28, 29
[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "The Free Union"]
[Excerpts] It was expected for 1 January, but it was finally on 1 February 1982
that the Senegambian Confederation was born.
The Senegalese have never valued it. Gambia, they say, is Senegal, and the crea-
tion of the confederation seems to them to be a matter of course. The first to
rejoice about it are without doubt the Casamancians, cut off from the rest of the
country by Gambia and forced to undergo vexations and insults inflicted upon them
by customs officials, police, or ordinary citizens every time they made the ferry
crossing--the Gambians have always refused to build a bridge over the Gambia River.
"They're going to have to respect us now," they say.
On the other hand, some businessmen and all the smugglers are sad, for the Sene-
galese Government has not concealed the fact that the first problem which the con-
federation should attack is contraband (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1081). But the contra-
band sale in Senegal of products imported in excess of Gambia provides a living
for many small and large businessmen. Worse yet, the Gambian state derives two-
thirds of its revenues from the import duties it levies on merchandise with which
it floods Senegal. On the other hand, some Senegalese peasants, businessmen, and
religious leaders find it more advantageous to go sell their crops in Gambia,
while subsidies, fertilizer, and so forth have been provided to them by the Sene-
galese state. The latter must, with the help of its Gambian "half," find a means
of putting an end to this vast mess. But in defending itself, Senegal risks weak-
ening its partner and could in this case feel obliged, while waiting for the re-
covery of the economic situation a.~ Gambia, to make good the difference. Can it
permit itself to do this? What is certain is that patience is the main requisite
for success.
The difficulties do not derive from the economy alone. While an immense majority
of Senegalese favor the confederation, it is otherwise with the Gambians. Its
opponents fall into two categories: those who are against the principle itself
in the name of nationalism, and those who criticize the procedure.
Like all the nongovernmental Senegalese parties, the Gambian opposition represent-
ed in the Assembly wanted, without jeopardizing the principle, for the plan to be
submitted to a referendum beforehand. It is difficult to guess the result. This
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is doubtless why parliament opted for a vote. As a diplomat explained it: "His-
torically, economically, culturally, and socially, the union is indispensable.
Was it necessary to try to bring it about immediately, or to wait while knowing
all the while that there were risks of instability?"
As evidence of its desire not to plunder its neighboring country, Senegal acCept-
ed that the Parliament of the Confederation would consist one-third of Gambian
deputies and two-thirds of Senegalese. This in no way reflects the numerical
- disproportion which exists between the two populations: 10 to 1. What will con-
federation bring to the Gambians? Political stability and security. Also, per-
haps a greater democracy, which shoula benefit the 13 men condemned to death for
the unsuccessful coup in July: their sentences could be commuted to life imprison-
ment. The harnessing of the Gambia River, the development of agricultural research,
and tourism, thanks to Senegalese aid, are also positive points.
It remains to be seen what the future of the confederation will be. There is no
lack of examples of failures. But successes also exist. Tanganyika and Zanzibar
became the Republic of Tanzania in 1964. While relations between Dar-es-Salaam
and Zanzibar have sometimes been tense, the union has nevertheless never been
jeopardized. Nor [has] that of the United Arab Emirates, which have been living
together since 1971. The Cameroon experience is also interesting. The federation
of an English-speaking part of Cameroon with its French-speaking neighbor in 1961
_ gave birth, after a referendum in 1972, to the United Republic of Cameroon. As is
the case with Senegambia, the two sides officially have different languages,,
French and English, but the people actually speak the same languages: Wolof and
Manding, in the case of Senegambia. The Cameroonian federation has evolved toward
a unitary state; the Tanzanian union does not exclude internal autonomy for each
party. .Although the future of Senegambia also appears to be under happy auspices,
one should note the caution shown by the two partners. Gambia, with its own na-
tional anthem and flag, still exists in the UN and the OAU, as doe~ a sovereign
Senegal. Provided that realism remains in force, the confederation will probably
become a federation. This at least is what they intend in Dakar. Furthermore,
they do not hide the fact that a union "in which the particular characteristics
of each sha11 be respected" remains the final goal. This will be the first time
in continental Africa that two sovereign states--English-speaking Cameroon had a
choice only between federation with Cameroon or with Nigeria--will have reached
, a common agreement to erase the absurd frontiers inherited from the colonial
period.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 7.981
h108
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SENEGAI~IA
BRIEFS
PPP CANDIDATES--Ban~ul, 13 Apr (REUTER)--Gambia's rul~ing Peop~.a's Progressive
Party (PPP) is fielding candidates '.n all of the West Africa._n. country's 35
constituencies in forthcoming general elections, officials said today. As
candidate lists closed last night for the May 4 and 5 elections, the PPP had
put up 35 candir"lates, three of them vaopposed, the National Convention Party
(NCP) 19 and th a United Party three. There are also 14 independent candidates.
The PPP currently has 30 of the 35 parliamentary seats with the NCP holding
the rest. Presidential elections are due to be held at the same time, pitting
President Dawda Jawara against NCP leader Sherif Diba, currently on trial for
his alleged role in a failed cou~ last July which was crushed by *_roops from
neighbouring Senegal. [Text] [A$131321 London REIJTER in English 1048 GMT
13 Apr 82 ]
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SIERRA LEONE
BRIEFS
ELECTIONS DEATHS, INJURIES--Freetown, 12 Apr (REUTER)--Several people were
injured and some may have died in clashes in Sierra Leone during recent voting
for candidates for forthcoming one-party elections, according to political
sources. They said 19 people were hurt last Friday when supporters of rival
candidates clashed in the remote northern constituency of Koinadugu East, add-
ing that unconfirmed reports of deatIis and further violence in the nc~th
had reached Freetown. Supporters of Koinadugu's current representa~.ive, Mohamed
Mara, said those of challenger Shehu Sesay attacked them with mache~es,, iron
bars and sticks. An unspecified number of people were in3ured by knives, sticks
and stones in Freetawn West One c~nstituency where the son of President Siaka
Stevens, Alex, i~s challenging incumbent Sylvanus Kamara, the sources said. Re-
sults of primary elections held between April 6 and 11, are due tomorrow,
and general elections are d*se on April 29 and 30, the `irst since Sierra Leone
became a one-party state under the All People's Congress in 1978. [Text]
[AB121032 London REUTER in English 1015 GMT 12 Apr 82]
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~
~
~
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SOUTH AFRICA
NEW GOLD BAR TO BE INTRODUCED
PI~51453 London TflE FINANC7AL TIMES in English 15 Apr 82 p 6.
[David Marsh report: "South Africa To Sell New Gold Bar"]
[Text] South Africa, the world's principal gold producer, is about to follow
the example of the Soviet Union, its main bullion trading rtval, bq introduc-
tng a super-high quali.ty gold bar into its marketing range.
The new bar--of 99.99 per cent purity cumpared with the standard South African
ingot of 99.5 per cent--will be introduced mainly to meet heavy demand for
high-quality gold from Far East markets.
The Soviet Union manufactures 99.99 per cent bats as part of its normal refin-
ing process. The Russian product is prized particularly by the ~ewellery and
electronics industry in Japan, which has emerged as the single biggest buyer
of gold on the international market over the past year.
The South African innovation was announced in parliament by Mr Owen Horwood,
the finance minister. said the South African Chamber of Mines would sell
overseas this summer standard 400 ounce bars with 99.99 per cent purity.
The chamber will also market smaller one-kilo~gold bars with the higher purity.
The new bars will be produced at the Rand refinery in Johannesburg, with market-
ing probably starting in July.
One-kilo bars are proving especially popular at the moment in Far Eastern
centres like Indonesia and Japan, where banks have 3ust started to azell bulliQn .
over the counter. Bullion dealers in London report a lengthy waiting list for
orders to consign small bars to the Far East. It is this gap in supplies
which South Africa will be trying to plug.
The Soviet Union, too, for some time has been considering producing one-kilo
bars for sale in the Far and Middle East.
The world's two main producers claim never to have contact in bullion market-
ing. But they sre~following broadly similar policies in trying to diversify
sales. ~
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South Africa has already been successful in spreading sales away from stand-
ard gold bars. The Chamber of Mines has just anaounced improved demand for
Krugerrand coins, which March s~les of 664,335 ounces, the highest monthly
figur~� for two years. [As published]
~COPYRIGIiT: The Financial Times Limited, 1982
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~ ZAIRE
;
REPRESS~TE 1~ASURES REPOB~EDLY IISED TO QUELI. S~S
' Paris Ab'RIQUE ASZE i~ Bteach No 259~ IS-28 Eeb 82 p 45
~ [Article: "Zai,t1~ ; ReDtession Constaatly Staactia~ IID A~,a.ia~~l
[Text] Th.e Un.iversitq o� Kiashasa and tt?e National Teache~-tra~i,a.ix?~
Institute ~LNP) have been. cloaed uati.L Eurthez notice~ the "ringLeaders"
have been dra~�ted i~,to the army �or "zeeducatioa~" a:W. mcst o~ the other
students have been sea.t back to theix hames. Theae are the r.etal.iatory
meaaurea i now becc~me standaxd Dractice i,n, l~iobu,tu's kingdom,~ wi.th which the
, Zairian Gove~nment has responded to the stud.eat Dtotest whic�h fl.ared. u,p
once more in January.
According to State Comm3seioner (Miaiatet) �or Ix~�o~ma.tion,Rande
~ Dzambulate, theae D~ac.on3an me~auses are ~usti�i,ed. by "ths cha~racter� of
the movRanent� which is de�in.itel,y con�irme.d. to be subvexeive~ aad the
neceseity of ma,intaining orde~ and di,sciDiine." Howevex, the goal o� the
atri,ke atarted bq the students--a atrike which lasted 2 weelcs before the
Dracon,i,an sanctiona fell the ni,ght of 3L Jaaua~q-1 Februarq--~was to auy~ort
~ demand.s �ot basic matexia], n.eeda, and, ia particular~ to p~oteat agaiast
the amouxit �or atudeat graats ~ consid.e~ed. ridiculousl.y low.
Zn. th.e �ace of s3.len,ce on the part of the authorities, the movemeat was
accomDa~nied by etreet demonstrationa-asLd.by outbusats o� anger--anger ~
turned, against an ia,c~easingLy detested. =egime. It was goi,ng too far..
But when you. a~e acquai.ated. wi,th the expeditious methods of M~obutu
"juatice," qou mi,ght well �eaz the worat for the victims o� the measureg
o� arrest aad o� "conscri,Dtion" iato the a~cm.y.
However, one conclusion is already e~erging. It is pointless to use the
most e~ctreme methods of represeion to trq to stifle the voice of a
population. Dramatic blows can be atruck, but after a few weeke or
montha of "cemetery" calm, protest once again reappears right where the
protest mov~snent had been moat savagelq decapitated ahd wiped out. Th,us,
one remembere the ffiighty movemeata of etruggle in 1980-1981 which had
shaken Zairia.n uni,veraities aad higher inetitu.tes. Following thoae
outbreaks, the higher educat3,oa eata.blishm~a:?.u Bad beea cl,osed fot several
mon.ths ~ the ea,tixe Le~dexshi,y o� the onlq studQat uaioa tud beea removed,
a great nwabe~ o� DroEeaeozs aad atud.en.ts had beea arrested~ aad others
had alrer~dq been drafted into the armq. Teas ot youag ~eoyle had "choaea"
the path of exile to flee the repressioa.
1~2
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A few monthe I.ater~ howeve~i eve~cqthi.n~ i8 ataztiag uD a~gai,r,! as has ju8t
been seen,~ even though noth~,ag ~a. the govexnm~en.t's iateati.oas or methods
has changed. On the coattary~ th,e stiudeat str~,kke ha~s tak.eil pl.ace in a
social aad political context marked by the continuation if not intensifi-
eation of what is circumspectly called violatioa of h~an rights. And the
. most dreadful news continuee to croas the borderay evading the tight
vigilance of the Zairian police. More and more, these days, the Zairian
police are heavilq seconded bq Israeli agents~ wnoae expexience in the
area of repressive "tracking down" ie well knowa. Thus~ the bodies of sin
young peoDl,e arrested at Uvira in Rivu on 17 March 1981~ including Sakiki
aad Shindano� were found a short time later in Lake Tanganqika. They had
been shot in the head and killed by the regime's policemen. In May~ Faustin
. Kiauku a.nd. Mi.n,cen.t Waziwazi, me~mbers of the underground I~1C-L (Congolese
Na.tional Movement~Lumumba wing)~ suffered a aimilar fate. But before they
were killed, their teeth had been broken, they had beea whipped with a cable,
and they had been tortured with electric shocks.
More recently~ five students at the Bigher Institute for Applied Techn,ology
--Songo~ Iagindu, Lubakii Mboyo~ aad Nkie~e--~were shot down in the buildings
of the Nations~t. Police (CNRI) [eapansi.on. unka,ownl. Last 27 October those
same CNRI servi.ces proceeded to carry off Mosobda Shg~ack, the traditional
.grand chieftain of the Katango, in Makambo. There has been no news of
him since. : inal.Iy, in January the arrest of a militant Lumumba follower
was announced, Ekongo Paul, "picked up" at hia home bq M~obv.tu police.
Nobody knowa where he was taken.
These are only a�ew euamples, but they are su��icient �oz thoae ptomoti.ng
the African Charter of the Rights of Maa.and. o� Nat3.ons, adopted unaaimously
Iast June in, Nairobi~ to start getting uDset i,n concrete terms about what
is happening in Mobu,tu's kingciom.
COPYRIG~iT: 1982 Afrique-Asie
9631.
CSO: 4719/614
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7yAT~RF
SUGAR. FZRM SEEKS VF�EitCLES ~ EQUIPI~NT FOR 1~i0DER1ZIZA,~IAN
' Paris MAR~CHES TRiOPICAU% ET 1~DITSRRANSSNS ia Fzeach No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 405
~ [Article: "Sugar Induatrq: Supply of Vehicles aad Squ,ip~meat for R~wilu~Igongo"J
~
[Teact] In the context of the SDR [Special Drawing Rights] 20.2 million
(approximately $24 m3llioa) granted to Zaire bq the Interaational Develop~eat
Associstion (IDA, a World Bank affilia.te) to finaace the reaovatioa of the
Kwilu-Ngongo Sugar Com~any and iacrease its capacity, that compaay proposes
to acqu3re the following equipmeat (24 coasignments): 1) 10 small aIl-
8urface trucks~ 5 selt-~propelled fixefighting vehicles (sngarcaae fields),
I self~propelZed �ire�ighting vehicle (industrial buildings); 2) 3 four-
axle diesel lacomoti,nes, .60-meter gage, approaimately 250 horsepower; '
3) 1 forklift truck; 4) 5 dum~ trucks; 5) 7 12.5-kilovolt-am8ere geaerator
units and I 40~kilovolt ampe~ce generator uait; 6) 5 welding aets; 7) 2 high-
pressure clean3ng appaxatusea �or cleaniag machines aad engin~es; 8) 1 chain
press; 9) I cy].inder boring machine and I cylinder gl.aziag machine; 10) 1
test bed for i.njec.ti.on pvmps;, 11) I anivcrsal gri.a~diag ~achines; 12) 1 valve
; cutter and equipment for grinding valve seatiags; I3) 2 lubrication
stations for garage purposea; 14) machine tools for steel work: 1 slide lathe
1.5 meters between centers, 1 slide lathe 1.5 meters between centers able to
make succeseive cuts� 1(variable) capstaa Iathe, and 1 vertical tu~ning mi11;
15) hydraulic press equipment; 16) 1 lathe for grinding sugar refiaery
cylinders; 17) 1 universal milling machine; 18) I computer; 19) equipment
for office complex air-conditioning; 20) water aupply equipment; 21) equip-
ment for renovation of evaporation operation~(ateel, tubing, steam aad.
vacuum valves); 22) equipment for renovation of boilers (various pipes aad
coils of tubing, fireproof biicks); 23) equipmeat for carbon dioxide plaat:
1 freon unit, 1 unit for atoring and weighing liquid carbon dioxidey 1 pump
for caxbon dioxide acrubbing; and 24) various garage equipment: a preasing
machine for vulcanization, a tire removal apparatus, a wheel balancer. The
eQuipment must originate in an IDA mermber country or Switzerland. .
Bidders interested in thia invitation to tender can obtain special schedule
003-81-C.S. in return for Bayment of 150 zaires or 1,000 Belgiaa fraacs to
the following addreases: 1) Compagnie sucriere de Rwilu~Tgongo [K~wilu-Ngongo
. Sugar Com~a~q], 1963, avenue de 1'Industrie, BP 8816~ Rinshasa (Zaire); 2)
Compagnie sucriere de Kwilu~Igongo, c/o Sogesucre [Geaeral~~S+ugar Compaay],
' 13, rue de B~ederode, 1000 Bruxellea [Brussela] (Belgium). Deadline for
~ delivery of bids: I2 March I982.
~ COPYRIGNT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
I
9631 L~1~
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ZAIxE I
BRSEES
BADEA AZD--In.our 4 Decembe~ 1,98L issue (page 3252) we poiated. out that the
Arab Ba~ �on I!~�ticaa Econom3c Development ~I1DFJ~) ha,d, g~caa.ted a I.oaa o�
$10 millioa to Zaise �or finaaciag of a pro~ect to develop aad mode~n,i.ze
river and rail traueportatioa networka. Thta IoaxL ia xedeemable in 10
yeara, in,cluding a 3-qear grace period, and it carries an annual ia,tereat
rate of 8 pezceat. BADEA recea~tly put out a release atating that the
project, �inaaced as described above, csme within the framework of the
five-year plan.for im~estments in the transportation and communications
aector. The pro~ect's goal is to improve the railrosd infrastructure
and ita linkage to ri.ver ports~ which ahould provide for a better flow
of euporta and particularly for getting copper out. It ahould be pointed
out that with this sgreement, the total BADEA commnitment in Zaire goes
up to $36.8 million. Zaire has already benefited from two of the baak's
asaistance e�forts: $IO million for a water sugply Broject, and $4.4
millioa for aa oiI palm cultivation project. From 1973 up to the end of
the firat hal~ o� 198I, Arab assistance contributed to Zaire has reached
$444.4 million. Eighty perceut of that money was given on libera7, terms.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAU% ET 1~DITERRANEENS ia French No 1892,
12 Feb 82 p 405] [COPYRIGHT: Reae Morewc et Cie Paris 1982J 9631
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