JPRS ID: 10471 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050047-0
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10~7~
21 April 1982 ~
West Euro e Re or~~
p p
CFOUO 25/82)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST IN~ORMATION ~ERVICE
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JPRS L/10471
21 April 1982
WEST EUROPE REPORT
c~ouo Zs~82)
CONTENTS
ECONO~IIC
PEDEftAL REP'JBLIC OF GE~MANY
- Future Union Leadership Changes Viewed
(Barbara Schardt; CAPTTAL, Mar 82) 1
Fi~ANCE
S~ress on Don.estic Market Seen To Worry Trading Partners
(VALE~JRS ACT'JELLES, 8 Feb 82)..... k
Foreign Trade Balance,by Alain Margaron
Me~hods To Regain Market,by Jacques Ferry
NE'Pi-IEftLy1~T~
Con~identia]~ Government Plan To Cut Spending
(VRIJ NED~'RLAND, 13 Ma.r 82) 9
POLITICAL
FE~~E~AL REPUBLI~ OF GERMANY
Landtag ELections Seen As Crucial For P~P in 198~
(MRrtin Bernstorf; CAPITAL, Mar 82j.� 12
T~ n~1NCE '
Giscard on Pola.nd, Franco-German Ties, Defense, Gas
(Valery Giscard d'Estaing Interview; PARIS MATCH, 19 Feb 82).. 15
Rocard on PoF Policies: Frar~co-German Relations
(Michel Rocard Interview; CAPITAL, Mar 82) 23
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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GE!VEHA.L
FRANCE
Tha~son-CSF Reorganizes. Space Activitie~, Pla~s New Facilitiea
(AIR Er COSMOS, 6 Mar 82) 26
Briefs
S~ECE Renamed, Reorganized 3~
Se:~ior SDECE 4Pficers Fired 30
- b -
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ECONOMIC FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
FUTURE UNION LEADERSHIP CHAN!GES VIEWED
Hamburg CAPITAL in Gern~an Mar 82 pp 93-94
[Article by Barbara Schardt: "Four-Year Plan"]
[Text] German trade unions owe their international
reputation *_o the continuity of their leadershi~. Now
the Gern~an Trade Union Federation faces decisive leader-
ship changes through the middle of the 1980's.
When the de].egates of the German Trade Union Federation congratulate their
newly elected e:cecutive council in Berlin this May, a new epoch will be
starting for the powerful labor organization. They will not ouly have a new
cliairman, executive board member Alois Pfeiffer of the Horticulture, Agri-
culture and Forestry Union, but also f ive new council members in the
nine-member body.
More than that: after Pfeiffer's four-year tenure he will have to retire
and the entire DG~ will no longer be the same. Because by that time it will
not only be 3ust the council which will have a new man at its head but th~
real movers and makers, the heads of the individual trade unions, will all
have different names. This will be particularly the case within the industrial
unions, whose Metal Workers Union ranks as the world's large~t single labor
organization, where leadership will change within Pf eiffer's time in office.
Appr~~ximately half of all DGB organized members, 3,816,294 members in three
un ions, will be electing new heads.
The Long-tenured council members will be headed fcr retirement one after
anotlier:
--this fall Rudolf Sperner, chairman of the Construction, Quarrying and
- Construction Material Workers Union (533,054 members, 6.8 percent of the
DGB total) will retire after 16 years in office.
--Eu~;en Loder~~r, head of the Metalworkers Union (2,b22,267 members, 33.3
percent of the DGB) can look back on 11 years in off ice when he retires in
the Eall of 1963.
Last No~embF.r the chairman of the ~hemistry, Paper and Ceramics Workers
Union ~~~~,973 members, 8.4 percent of the DGB), Karl Hauenschild, began
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tiis last year in office. His tenure will end in September 1984. When the
successors of these three men are appointed, the executive council of the
German Trade Union Federation, consisting of nine members of the national
executive committee and the chairmen of the 17 individual trade ur~ions, will
be made up of two-thirds newcomers who will have been five years or less in
office.
"Far-reaching change" was the term applied by the Institute for the German
Economy in its publication GEWERKSCHAFTSREPORT to the impending change in
view of the undeniable stature of the retirees. Whether this will actually
be the case is questionable. The trade uzions have traditionally been very
careful in the selection of their leadership; chan~es taking place among the
rank and file do not reach top echelons that quickly. For that reason there
is little fear that radical class warriors will be making any long march
through the institutions after the new appointments to the DGB executive
~ council or for the three individual trade unions. On the contrar~, in the
case of both the Metal Workers and the Chemical Workers, clear-hea.ded
successors are even now in sight.
T:~at Franz Steinkuehler's name would be brought up in the leaaership debate
within the Metal Workers Union is now part of the drill. The Stuttgart
regional leader is little inclined to make any statements about his prospects,
t~owever, "He keeps his mouth shut and smiles when he's asked about them,"
his press secretary remarked laconically. This breezy ~rovincial also denies
any coo].ness between him and his chairman Loderer. What is a fact; the
Metal Workers Union chief has only recently given the dynamic southerner
the brush-off. Loderer does not see his successor in Steinkuehler but in
Hans Mayr as an interim solution in the national executive council. Mayr
now heads the union's planning, personnel and press sections.
The prophets regard tt as a sure thing that the congress in Octob er 1983
will give Mayr its votes. Yet that would put Steinkuehler out of the running
only temporarily; Mayr, born in 1921, can only hold the office f or o~ie
legislative period or three years.
Cliemical Workers Union leader Hauenschild, like Loderer, also seems to be
putting his estate in oider. Hardly half a year after Hauenschild's reelection,
it is still a sure thing into whose hands he would like to deliver his office--
the favorite is Hermanr. Rappe. At the momE~nt Rappe, who is also a member of
the SPD fraction in the Bundestag and chairman of the committee on labor and
:;ucial security, func*_ions as deputy chairman, responsible for the departments
of e~iication, vocational education, research and youth. His election (in
September 1984) would assure a longer-term solution because ffappe, then 55
years old, would be able to hold the reins through at least two terms.
Rudolf Sperner of the Construction Workers Union is in no less a hurry to
nominate his suc.cessor than are his colleagues. Although the election is
scl~eduled for this fall, he has not yet set the candidate carousel spinning.
Cuessers give the edge to his deputy Juergen Joens.
Faced with this recasting, it will be the job of the Printing and Paper
Workers Union, the Mining and Energy Workers Union and the Public Service and
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Transport Workers Union to maintain continuity in the DGB. Although elections
among these unions are scheduled by 1986, no changes are expected. Adolf
Schmidt can look forward to another four years from 1984 on to the leadership
of the union with the highest success rate in organizing workers in its
sector, the Mining and Energy Workers Union. Public Service and Transport
Workers chief Heinz Klunker will run again if his health permits. In the
small but militant printers union, which will elect a new executive in 1983,
Leonhard Mahlein will probably remain for another term.
While the printers executive council member, Detlef Hensche, is said to
have ambitions for the position of council chairman, it is thought doubtful
that this left-wing figure will run again in 1986. The reason is that Hensche
is a university graduate and lawyer, and academicians have scant prospects
among the class-conscious printers. Such types, they say, lack the sawy
that comes with experier.ce of the trade.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
98 78
CSO: 3103/356
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ECONOMIC FRANCE
STRESS ON DOMESTIC MARRET SEEN ~0 WORRY TRADLDIG PAR,~NTEBS
Eoreign, Txade Ba:ance
Paris VALEURS ACTUEZI.ES in. French 8 Feb 82 D 58
[Article by ALai.n Margaron wnd.er the head,ing "Fiua~ciaL HighLights" and the
subheading "Trad.e"t "The Cixcular Fl.ow of the Defic~t: The Overval,uation of
~ the F~anc StiI1, Wei,ghs on Our Forei.gn Trad.e and Our Com~etitivenesa"]
~Text] In apite of the good reporta of several bank bulletins regarding
French �oreign trad,e resuLte, Michel Jobert is uneasy; "The external
deficit wi11 reach at least 75 billion, francs these ae~ct 2 years. And. if
we succeed in. hold,ing to tha.t figure we w3.11 be lucky. We are goin,g to
have to be very careful i� we are to atay clear of the 100-billion-franc
mark."
Overall, the 1981 results aze fairly sati~factory. The en,ornwus trade
d.eficit Fran,c.e has h~d �or. 2 qexrs (,60 biLlion) has-~stabiLized in currea,t
francs, i.n sDi.te o� the dol.l.,s,r's risey which ixiczeases oux. oil, bill� and
in sDite o� the econam~c. atagnation whic.h exac erbates comn~etition,
However, the m3niater of foreign trsde notea: "Th3,s im.porvement must not
obscure some worrisome signs: the saggi,ng trend. over the course of the
yearr and the increase in the defici.t with industriaL nations."
He is being politically honest, recognizing that it is the excelleat results
registered from 3~bruary to June 1981 which made it porssible to come out
satisfactorily at year's end.
The new government'a recovery plaa has led to a great increase in imports:
up 3 per.cent ia volume in Novesnber and then again in December. For obvio~is
reasons of Dr3,ce~ consumers have given qre�erence to Japanese~ German, and
Dutch produ.cts. ~r. household durable goods, the import level went in 1
year from, 50 percent to 56 gercent of the domestic market. Sales of German
cars have greatly increased~ while our automobile exports to Germany went
down by nearLy haI� for the firat 9 mmnths of the past year.
All the �igures for foreign trsde in 1981 show that exchange rate develop-
ments axe yla~yi~ng a decid,ing role. The �rauc has atrengly depreciated veraus
the dollar bu,t i.t has remai.rrced at too hi,gh a rate versus the Deutschemark�
r.he guilder ~ and the y,ea.
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French induatry h~,a beea, gaini,ng market ahates ia the d.olla.r area. Our
traditional de�i.cit wi.th, the IIn.ited. States ha,s beea sl.i,ghtly reduce.d.~ to
23 billion francs. We have ma,xnaged to si.grs si,zable equi$ment contracts in
"Fourth Wor.ld" countries without oi.I (32 bi.Ilioti, ~raacs) aad in OPEC
countries (34 billion �rancs)~ but very few ia industri.al cou.ntries (15
billion) .
Our overall defici.t wi,th the EEC has quintrupled in 2 yea=s. With Germany
it has gone from 11 billion, �rancs in. I979 to 23 billioa f~ancs in 198I,
and with the Netherlands �rom 5.2 to 13.4 billion.
The small October devaluation within the EMS has not been sufficient to
prevent the deterioration of external accounts.
In spite of the soaring dollar, which for purely financial reasons weighs
more heavily on the Deutschemark than it does on the l~ench franc~ it is
still possible for us to permit our curreacy to find its proper rate within
the EMS by Iowering our intereat rates. But the size of our overseas
borrowing needs-~needs that are proportxonal to the trade and budgetary
deficits--rwill soon not allow that anymore.
In its latest economic study on France, the OECD seems to take for granted
a new slide in our currency. It is in disagreement on this point with
Mr Jobert, who attributes the decline in our exports "to a deterioration
in nor~monetary factors of competitiveness: the kind of goods sold, the
quality of after-sales service, the establishment of trade networks."
The minister's program flows from that observation: support exBorts~ a
reorganization of certain branches of industry, and control of imports.
However, it is difficult to support F`rench exports more than they have been
supported the Past few years. Export credits, atill partially unsupported,
are less costly than domestic credits along with having adverse effects:
neglect of the domestic market~ and too much stress on Third World markete.
Banks--the ones established outside our bordera, broadly speaking--give an
exaggerated amount of credit to make it possible for their industrial
customers to land contracts in those countries. An example is Bro~ect
development for construction and public works where we are registering a
very great surplus. The banka finance not only the amounts which will be
paid to French companies under the heading af feea but ~lso the onsite
construction work.
A deputy directorate of DREE (Foreign Economic Relations Directorate) will
be tasked with combatting dumping, sids and subeidiesy and business
~ diversion. Exports o� textiles and chemical products from the East via
the two Germanys are Barticularly targeted. It ia to be feared that this
homeopathic medicine may not be on the appropriate scale of the illness
to be treated.
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According to the OECD, "the (F~ench) goves~mterit will be stron,gly tempted
to take protec.tionist mea,su.tes, bec8uae. its dearsad. ~'eravery progz~am. is
probably going to casue it di8appoixtt~ents."
The repeated declarations in �avor of a domestic market reconq,uest are
starting to frighten many of our trading partners, sometimes ~ustly so.
The goverrnnent has already intervened to limit lesther imports because
that industry is labor-intensive.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs Actuelles"
Methods To Regain Market
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 8 Feb 82 p 61
[Article by Jacques Ferry und.er the heading "Einancial Highlights" and
the subheading "Commentaries": "Regaining the Domestic Market; An
Ambiguous- Formula"J
[Text] Regaining the domestic maxket had already figures prominently among
the objectives of the previous governments. Lately it is being talked about
agai~l ; the Interim Plan and the work of the nationaL symposium on research
have expanded on it at great length. But the formula is ambiguous.
In actuality, there are two processes �or promoting this same bo~ective. One
originates from concerna which are eco n amic right from the start: bringing
the trade balance back into eQuilibriimn. The other is inspired by more
generally political concerns regarding nation.al independence. Even though
these sets o� concerns eventually come together, they imply choices of trade
policy and induatrial Bolicy which of ceurse are not identical and depend
on whether those choices derive their inspiration from socialist conceptions
or liberal conceptions.
To tell the truth, the difference is less clear-cut than it seems, apart
from the fact that (and this reservation is a considerable one) in order
to bring down the trade deficiti the present gover~ent seems more inclined
than the previous onts to give in to protectionist temBtations. Its
analysis of the situation is less of an overall analysis and is more
limited, less conscious of the basic trends which affect the international
divi ion of labor. Hence its less selective and mo~e autarkic industrial
policy, placing the immediate innperativea of employment before thoae of
competition, and glso its trade policy, oriented less toward general trade
expansion, which in itself induses growth, than toward a number of sect~?ral
objectivea. And it is not certain that all of these latter ob3ectives
' are attainable at an acceptable cost.
The previous governments� favored advanced technology induatries. This one
claims to be restructuring the whole of French industry by organizing each
sector on the basis of complete pathways, integrating all stages of produc-
tion and processing, and even diatribution, right up to the final consumer.
This is a normative view of the economy which, regardless of the inflex-
ibilities o~ and increase in the constraints of state control which it
assumes, would in extreme circumstances be suitable to a defined area
infinitely vaster than that of our nation. But that defined area does not
exist; industrial Europe has yet to be born.
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That does n,ot msan that one muet teai,gn onesel.� to eeein.g the domestic market
disappear and. therefore resign. on,e8e1.� to seeiug a c.ertain n~ber af the
more particularly threatened indu,stries ju~t pl.sin disappear. But before
or~e thinks about implementing specific mesns,~ the competitive capability
of the induatrial syetem in general must be restored. Fewer burdens,
fewer adminiatrative constraints, and less governmuent intervention in the
management of firms, but more effective sid to research--these constitute
so many prereQuiaitea for that restoration.
Selection Criteria
Assuming that theae req,uirements are satis�ied� one still has to apecify
the sectors where special aid is requiredr Authoritative selection
criteria are not provided by the idea of national independence, any more
than they are by the idea of bringing the trade balance back into
equilibrium. Independence ia not ~udged only by considering levels of
foreign penetration in this or that aector un the domeatic market. In
the context of time, independence is relative, if only because of rapid
and often unforeseeable technological ~hanges; in space it ie relative
because of constantly changing geopolitical aituations. In this regard,
the example of oil is remarkably illustrative.
In the trade area, so is the exatnple of the Airbus 320, which will be
equipped with an American engine. Without a doubt thia is not for reasons
of that engine's technological superiority over a French or Franco-Bri.tish
engine, but simply because that choice is imperative at this time if we
want to guarantee the airplane's com~ercial success in the U.S. market.
What is the best industrial pathway in this apecif ic case? The most
desirable one in theory, which is completely domestic? Or the pathway
which provides the maximum net profit for the trade balance?
One could give many examples. In today's globalized economy there is no
genuinely autonomous industrial policy. The expansion of international
trade is a given element of that. The effort to achieve equilibriiun, which
must be extended to the dimensions of the balance of paytnents on current
account, cannot be made by adding up sectoral balances or by forming large
integrated public sector monopolies. Trade policy ie a atrategy made up
o� reciprocity~ deterrence, and cooperation.
T::;.t i.s the reason so-called domestic market reconqueet actions must be
carried out with a great deal of caution. If they are iinked too directly
to the solution of employment or regional problems, they run the risk in
the final analyais of backfiring on their promoters. Tha is either because
they contravene the GATT agreements or European Community undertakings~
thereby causing retaliatory measures of greater scope, or because atep by
step they tend to become standard practice in the form of unproductive
protectionism, which drags in its wake a gradual establishment of state
control over the economy.
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It is true that not all our partaers honor the �re� txade cade, Zt is
true that certain French ind.ustries ti~at are suf�eria~g more seriously
than othera from the di.stortions o� cam.petition~ need ehort-Lived assiatance.
But it is even n~ore true that it is the whole body of French industry which
needs mobility and room. Market economies cannot be cut up into slices.
Let us be careful, while allowing for exceBtions, not to reason out an
issue in terms of protection which should be analyzed in terms of
competitiveness.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeura Actuelles"
4631
CSO; 3100/378
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ECONOMIC NETHERLANDS
~ CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT PLAN TO CUT SPENDING
Amsterdam VRIJ hTEDERLAIVD in Dutch 13 Mar 82 p 2
;[Text] aae of Van Agt's ministers said last week: "Some of my colleagues will h~.ve
a hard time if the cabinet should fall. Then everyone who has been calling
constantly for more alterat3ons will have to tell where they can be found.
And they cannot do that."
That conclusion can also be drawn from a--highly confidential--report that
a work group composed of ci~~il servants placed before the cabinet's pentagon,
the five ministers who were trying tu set up the Spring Note this week (Van
Agt, Van Der Stee, Den Uyl, Terlouw and Van Thijn). The name of the report
- is prosaic: "Report of the Work Group to Inventory Savings," but the con-
tents are no less explosive for that reason. The mission of the WIB [Work-
group to Inventory Savings], not to be confused with other frivolous Hague
accronyms like NIP [Society for Industrial Pro~ects] and VIP [Progress Com-
mittee for Industrial Policy], was to find 2 to 3 billion guilders savings
which can still be carried out this year in the areas of social security and
support, public health, and i.n the civil servants' salaries. ~f, besides
that, 1 to 2 billion can be gathered in the other departments, you come
nicely into the neighborhood of the 4.5 billion Van Agt and Van Der Stee
want. What makes the 4JIB Report so explosive: those 2 to 3 billion can be
found, but only by completely destroying the ~oalition agreement.
The civil servants--from the Ministries of General Affairs, Domestic Affairs,
Economic Affairs, Social Affairs and Employment, Public Health and particu-
larly many from Finance--did not try to.hide that for a momeat: "In carrying
out the measures inventoried, to the amount specif ied, it will not be pos-
sible to hold the negative effects on the incomes of the groups involved
(benefit entitlees, civil servants, trend followers) to the limits set forth
in the coalition agreement: 1 to 4. (That means that those receiving the
minimwn income would lase 1 percent of their buying power, while those re-
ceiving higher incomes would lose up to 4 percent--the editors.) The nega-
tive effects can go appreciably beyond that."
Such warnings were repeated on page after page. This much saving can be done
in one year, but not without uncoupling the benefits from wages, not without
reducing the minimum wage relative to higher wages, not without interrupting
the trend policy for civil servants [the Dutch equivalent of COLA, where
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civil servants' salaries are adjusted according to a trend established by
business salaries), and not without higher unemployment. Even if you are
willing to put up with the disadvantages in the interest of a good thing--
the recovery of business prof its--the diff iculties are still great, for, so
say the civil servants, "the total of the procedures to be carried out makes
the realization of a possible policy package in a time frame such that sig-
nif icant effects can be felt in 1982 extremely difficult." the WIB mentions
a number of practical impediments: laws are needed, executive regulations,
reconanendations from the SER [Social and Economic Council], recommendations
from the Health Insurance Fund Council, and many more recommendations.
The study group has a solution for that, even though it is a rather unusable
one: "In general, not employing the advisory groups is only possible by in-
voking very special circumstances. The term, 'the national interest' is
used in this respect in Article 42, section 3 of the Business Organization
Act." This can be done, naturally, but it is becoming rather a haliit for
the supporters of what used to be known as a parliamentary democracy.
Undismayed by that, the work group raises radical measure after radical
measure. But it is striking in the report that many of the rather obvious
savings are not even mentioned, such as attacking the salaries of inedical
specialists. On this topic, there is only the cool mention that "negotiations
with professional groups have begun." On the other hand, very many words are
devoted to "reduction of the number of hospital beds" ("8,000 beds as a re-
sult ~f partial or total closing of hospitals"), a payment by the patient
of 10 guilders fur each referral to a medical specialist and an actual con-
struction halt for hospitals. This is troublesome for Hoop Den Uyl [PvdA
leader and minister of social affairs and employment], for, as the work group
drily notes: "The big savings which are called for from this sector can only
be realized with extensive direct negative results on the employment develop-
ment earlier undertaken in this sector." So much for promoting public health.
Apart from the civil servants' salaries, the biggest figures are to be found
in the category of "social security and support." Savings can be made there
by reducing the highest WAO [Law on Labor Disability], WW [Unemployment Law]
and WWV [Law on Unemployment Provisions] benef its (savings: 540 million
guilders in 1983!), by abolishing the tax and premium deduction for old age
and disability (65 million this year alone!) Other small but still profit-
able alterations can be made: take away the support payment for independently
living 16- and 17-year olds (living with your parents can be nice, too!) and
you have 25 million.
Naturally, AOW benefit recipients can keep the survivors' benefits after the
death of Li~c~r spouses, but shorten the period of mourning a little and you
have another SO million next year. And the work group naturally wrote with
a great deal of respect concerning former members of the resistance and those
who were formerly persecuted ("These measures occupy a special place, based
' on the special duty of solidarity with respect to this target group"), but
they are still good for 34 million guilders.
t~
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'Ct~e WIB report becomes curious when the big milch cow of the PvdA [Labor
I'arty] which is also the sacred cow of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal],
the children's allotment, is mentioned. The PvdA suggestion to make the
children's allotment dependent on earned income is called wonderful, but it
- is simultaneously rejected for this year: "From a technical point of view,
it cannot be realized before 1984," and "is very complicated." Thus the work
group has recourse to such measures as lowering the children's allotment by
10 percent across the board as of 1 July 1982 (350 million) or of freezing
the children's allotment at its present level through 1 July 1984 (100
million).
It is bothersome that--unlike the PvdA's plan to make the children's allot-
ment dependent on income--the across the board lowering of the level has a
precisely deleveling effect on incomes. Those receiving the lowest incomes
lose the most. Or, as the workgroup put it in its own jargon: "Lowering the
children's allotment or freezing it as its present level over the whole line
has an increasing effect on the buying power as that buying power is less and
the number of children is greater. A general lowering of the children's
allotment by 10 percent structurally decreases the disposable income of, for
instance, a minimum wage earner with two children by 1.4 percent." Gone,
then, is the promise in the coalition agreement that those on minimum incomes
would not lose more than 1 percent.
Tt1us, the official report contains a number of variations. We will just
mention one more, because this suggestion has served CDA politicians Lubbers
and De Graaph so richly as a source of inspiration: "a general reduction of
the application of the indexes for the minimum wage and the social security
benefits and to the salaries in the collective sector as of 1 July 1982"
(yield: 500 million quilders). According to Lubbers and De Graaf, this
would be a harmless one-time measure. The WIB report with which Van Agt
and his ministers are now wrestling bluntly states what it comes down to:
"It is evident that this possible measure in itself conflicts with the pro-
mises in the coalition agreemznt with respect to the trend-following policy
regarding the employees in the collective sector and regarding the coupling
of the social security benef its."
COPYRIGHT:1982 VN/BV Weekbladpers
6940
CSO: 3105/134
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POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
LANDTAG ELECTIONS SEEIV AS CRUCIAL FOR FDP IN 1982
Hamburg CAPITAL in German Mar 82 pp 102-103
[Article by Martin Bernstorf: "Fourth Party"]
[Text] Guenther Verheugen, secretary-general of the FDP and irrepressible
faith healer of the Bonn coalition, waxed metaphoric when he recently
reaffirmed the liberals unflagging loyalty to the coalition, "When I look around
at all the belles at the ball, I don't feel any urge to dance with a new
partner."
In talking about the belles at the ball he meant, of course, the CDU/CSU--
Verheugen's party is not left with all that many choices in case his urge
should become a matter of necessity. It could come to pass--not in Bonn, but
at the Land level--that the liberals will not be able to pick ":heir own
partner for a cabinet because the possibilities for an alternative Evould be
reduced to one: either with the CDU or not at all. In at least three
Landtag elections it can happen that they will have to put the matter to the
acid test.
As a matter of fact the FDP is already sitting on the opposition benches in a
number of Land legislatures--as in Rhineland-Palatinate--altho~igh they could
have been admitted to the cabinet. In this case they feel bound to the
principle that they would rather allow a party having an absolute ma~ority,
as the CDU does at Mainz, to govern by itself rather than see their own ideas
effected into law by their offer of cabinet participation. But any satisfac-
tion to be found in such virtuous abstinence may soon fade away.
Berlin excluded, the liberals are now represented in seven Land Iegislatures.
Yet they are only represented in the Land cabineta in two Laender: in Hesse,
where the sole surviving "Bonn model" of an SPD/FDP coalition still governs at
the Land level and in the Saarland. If the liberals do not manage at the
Land elections in Lower Saxony on 21 March and in Hamburg on 6 June to return
to these Land parliaments, and if they should fail to attain the 5-percent
mark in Hesse or do not constitute a ma~ority with the SPD, then the FDP would
be left to participate in the government of only one Land, namely the Saarland
_ and there in company with the CDU. How much time is left for the coalition
in Bonn?
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Wl~ut for decades had been a skillfully led thi=d forcehas now become little
more than a fourth party. A party which woulc? no longer matter--if it wsre
not for the circumstance so important for the FDP--that neither of the two
major parties wants to form a coalition with its alternative fraction. Thus
the Berlin FDP fraction, with the sanction of the party headquarters in Bonn
but against the will of the local party organization, was able to at least
tolerate a CDU m~nority government.
Much the same thing could also happen in Hamburg, though there are serious
doubts as to whether the FDP will be able to gain readmittance to the
Buergerschaft, the Hanseatic city-state legislature. If they do, then the
next question is whether the SPD and the FDP can create a majority capable of
taking off ice. Judging from recent opinion polls, it is likely that the CDU
and the Greens together will have more seats than the social-liberals. The
CDU will have no part of the Greens and vice versa. Then the only possibility
of creating a governing majority would be the combination CDU/FDP.
The ].iberals rer~trn to Parliament is thought to be more likely in Lower
Saxony than in Hamburg. At the same time opinion polls give the CDU goods
udds on attaining an absolute majority. If they fail to do so, then the SPD,
the Greens and possibly the FDP would have more seats than would the Union,
though such a three-way coalition does not seem to be in the cards. Since
the SPD and the FDP by themselves would probably have no chance to form a
governing maj ority, the FDP is lef t, in the event that they return to the
~ I.,andtag, with the Berlin alternative: alliance with the CDU or toleration
of a CDU minority cabinet.
It will be in September that the FDP will really feel the heat in Hesse.
Accurding to polls, the CDU would still command less than 50 percent of all
vutes if the election were to be held in Hesse today. That could mean, after
al.l. the votes were counted, more than 50 percent of the seats. The SPD and
the EDP together would be able to count on some 45 percent of the votes, the
Greens somewhat more than 5 percent. Assuming that the CDU narrowly fails
to gain an absolute majority, the FDP will return to the Landtag but cannot
constitute a government with the SPD alone: then they will once again and
Eor the last time face the question: how do you feel about the CDU?
"A fateful year for politics" is what the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE sees coming;
the lesson to be drawn will be: the old alliance is f inished. It no longer
skiows signs of life even in North R}~ine-Westphalia where it all began and
wl~ere the FDP had to leave the Landtag after the last electior.s.
'The consequence does not necessarily have to be the i~ediate collapse of
the Bonn coalition. The maiaise can drag on as a result of the Union parties
then comprising a two-thirds ma~ority in the Federal upper house. This can
lead, if the Christian Democrats want it that way--though the Union heads of
the Land governments are certainly not going to press for this to happen
automatically--to every piece of legislation being blocked.
The reason for all this Free Democratic distress is not so much the lack of
common ground with the SPD. Even without this, Schmidt and Genscher would
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sti.tl be able to govern and if that didn't work, they would at least be able
to continue administering. Common grounds could be rediscovered as they were
needed. The "turning," however, that Minister of Economics Lambsdorff and his
party chairman Genscher were talking about so ominously last fall, can, in
reality, only bring about a change in power relationships. The party heads
draw their power from the voters. When the votes are not there, then even a
Genacher will have to do some strategic rethinking, where until now he has
been able to manage with fairly superficial tactics. And all the established
parties are now beginning to lose votes: the Greens have been nibbling away
at a11 of them.
What Franz Josef Strauss had been trying in vain to do for years on the
right is now suddenly a fact on the left: a new party. The chances are that
it will fade away after a few years, but for the moment politicians will have
to live with the fact that the old three-way functionalism no longer work
There is not one CDU leader any more who would call the FDP a"block par.ty."
It no longer is such and, in fact, is in danger of becoming a negligible
quantity--something to be forgotten about whenever possible.
Rudolf Augstein, for a short time an FDP member of the Bundestag, assu~ted
his readers in his weekly DER SPIEGEL that the party could survive a
resignation by the minister of economics, Count Lambsdorff, who had been
implicated in party donation scandals, but not an election fiasco in Hamburg,
Lower Saxony and Hesse. Party leadership in Bonn, still dazzled by the
results of the last Bundestag elections (10.6 percent) see things differently:
the tide could start to turn in the other direction as early as the elections
next year in Schleswig-Holstein.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co. �
9878
CSO: 3103/355
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I'OLITICAL FRANCE
GISCARD ON POLAND, FRANCO-GERMAN TIES, DEFENSE, GAS
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 19 Feb 82 pp 38-41
[Exclusive interview with former President Valery Giscard d'Estaings "The
Historic Decline of Europe Must be Stopped"; da,te and place not specified]
[Text] PARIS MATCH: Mister President, you have alwa.ys repeated that Europe
should unite to prevent others from dictating the fate of our continent.
Hasn't Europe, in the context of Poland, proven that it is fax from being able
to define its own policy?
Valery Giscard d'Esta.ing: Alas, yes. We axe now faced with the question of
whether we will be ahle to put a stop to the historic decline of Europe. Over
the last 100 years, the weight of Europe in the fate of the world has not
ceased to go down. The large sta.ges of this decline were the two world wars,
which in reality were civil waxs in Europe. After the second world war~ it
was two big powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which, in a face
to face meeting at Ya1ta~ decided the fate of Europe, in spite of the pre'sence
of a European, Winston Churchill. I profoundly believe tha,t the historic de-
cline of Europe can be stopped. This will require close cooperation and a
Franco-German will. They are not enough. I am thinking here of our other
partners: Italy, Great Britain, the Benelux countries, and the other members
of the EDC. But this Frar~co-German cooperation is a geographic~ economic and
political prerequisite. Cooperation proves itself in actions this is why
Chancellor Schmidt and myself have strengthened the understanding through the
development of the Airbus, the staxting of the European monetary system~ of
which we were promoters together and which has hitherto resisted all the chance
mishaps predicted by the oracles of disaster at its birth, and the construction
of a Franco-German tank and of a direct television satellite. And if I had
been reelected~ I planned to examine with Helmut Schmidt the posaibility of
developing common ideas on the problems of the security of our two countries
and of Europe.
As far as the United States is concerned, there is a contradiction in criti-
cizing successively a weak America and a strong America. I publicly rejoiced,
following President Rea.gan's election, over the fact that the United States
intended to become once again a strong nation, assuming its international res-
ponsibilities. While it is legitima.te to dema.nd a consultation prior to any
decision in order not to submit to constraint~ it is re~etta.ble that the poli- .
tical recovery of the United States has coincided with a hesitant and wavering
attitude on the part of Europe.
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~G~~~~~stion] There is henceforth a common Franco-German position on natural gas,
~:veri though in a different sense than the one you ha.d anticipated during your
7 year term. The French governn,ent has just concluded a contract with the
iJSSR for the supply of natural gas, even though the state of seige is still in
force in Poland, while the German-Soviet agreer~ent had already been concluded
prior to the crushing of "Solidasity.~~ Woul d you, as president of the Republic,
have signed the natural gas contract with the Soviet Union under the current
circumstances?
LAnswer] No. I will give you two reasons for this. First of a11, I would
like to note that such a question must be examined casefully, in the light of
all the interests concerned, and that it was thus le~itimate for the former
government to open such a.negotia.tion with the Soviet Union and, for the new
government, to pursue it. But there is a difference between negotiating and
signing: Was it necessary to conclude the agreement at the quantity levels
which were set and under the political circumstances of the moment? I don't
think so. Here is why: in the first place~ I believe that it is imprudent to
increase F`rance`s energy dependence on any foreign supplier, and thus on the
Soviet Union. We should only accept deliver;~ up to the level at which we would
be caught short in case of a suspension of supply. sy 1990~ France will import
between 32 and ~0 billion cubic meters of gas. At a 15 percent level of these
deliveries, we could interrupt the supply without too much damage to our indus-
try. This constitutes the threshold of our dependence on foreign countries.
You will note that it is located at the level of 5 to 6 billion cubic meters
for a single supplier. If we go beyond that~ we will put ourselves at the
mercy of foreign pressures. And, on the other hand, the circumstances of the
moment leave the signing of the agreement open to criticism, an agreement
which, whatever its economic interest, will enskre significant gains in tech-
nology and in foreign exchange for the Soviet Union~ and which is seriously
felt as a rejection of support for Polish puhlic opinion.
[Question] What conclusions will the Soviet Union draw from this?
[Answer] I think that overall this passivity will have a negative effect on
Ea.st-West rel ations~ because the limit of the mutual actions we accept from
each other will become more confused. I repeat: our attitude toward the
Soviet Union must be very firm and very clear. This is why it is useful to
maintain an exchange of information. Meetings among leaders, even when criti-
cized, have a main goal, tha.t is to avoid any misunderstanding by cleaxly de-
f'ining the limit of actions which axe considered acceptable by both sides.
The worst mistake leaders can make is to a11ow a conflict to develop on the
ba.sis of a misunderstanding or of a waxning which was not delivered in time.
On top of this there is a significant circumstance. We a11 know that the Fe-
deral Republic of Germany is faced with special problems in its East-West re-
lations, which it would be unrealistic to ignore: the division of Germany,
the importance given to human relations between the two parts of Germany~ and
the question of transit. We are awaxe of the vulnerability the special status
of Berlin represents for the FRG. This is why I wanted to go there in the
fall of 1980. The FRG is never safe from Soviet pressure. If only for that
reason, it is unfortunate tnat France and the FRG had different reactions with
regard to the events in Poland. These differences could one da.y lead the
Soviet Union to put pressures on the FRG alone. On the other hand~ when Bonn
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~~r~~l Paris adopt a close common position, the Soviets know that their pressures
would not only affect their relations with the FRG, but also their relations
with France. Such axe the facts,of the problem.
[Question] At the time~ you were accused of i.~t having shown enough firmness
with regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. You were the first Europ~8.ri
hea