JPRS ID: 8435 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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JPR5 L/8435
3 May 7.9 79
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_ TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUR~PE
~FOU~ 26/79)
. ~ .
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� 3 May 1.9 79
T~ANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(~~cro 25/79)
CONTENTS � PAGE
COUNTRY SECTION
DENMARK
Wage Pact Ma,y Foree Davaluation
(VECKANS AFFAftER, 29 Mar 79) 1
FRANCL
Mitterrand Future Viewed in Light of Latest Elections
(Arthur Conte; PARIS MATCH, 6 Apr 79) 2
Nationa:. Economic Policy: RePlections on International
Dependency
~ ( Jeun MMr~..touk; F~TriktIBLES, Jan 79 ) � . � � � � � � . � . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Civil Aeronautics Construction Industry Viewed
(Joe:. Le Theule; AIR & COSMOS, 17 Nlar 79) 15
Briefs '
- Terrorist Kidnapin~; Target 19
~ Soviet Warning Predicted 19
SPAIN
rditorial Scores Single-Mindecusess o~ Politicia.ns
(Editorial; CANffiIO lo, 25 NI~r 79) 20
ORT, FTE 2'o Form United P~,rt~ ~
_ (cAr~zo i6, 25 r~.r 79 22
Editorial Advises Against Negotiating With ETA
( Edirorial, Jw~.n Tomas de Sa1as; CANIDIO 16, 18 Mar 79 25
MLlitc~ry Rei'orm To Yncrease Arap?' s Youthft.il. Look
(caa~zo iE, ii rlar ?9) 27
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUOJ
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CONT~N'I,'~ ( Con~ inued ) p~ge
Briefs
M~artin Vi11a Attempt To Meet Wi~h ETA ~9
Grea~er UCD Diaci.pl~.ne ~9
Uranium Explc~etion 29
SWEDIIV
'Lnported~ Inflation Threatens Wage Pact
(v~cxarrs a~,~, 29 Mar 79) 30
Stat~.atics Office Sees Znvestme,zts Increase
(V~Cx~is ~F~, 29 Msx 79) 33
Briefe
Continued Trade Surplus 35
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ror~ orr7~cr.aL u~~ orr~y ~
c~u~r~tY src~riorr ncv?~iiK
WAGG I~~Ct MAY rOaCG DCVALUATION
Stockholm VIiCKANS A~r1~R1:R in Stvc:dish 29 Mar 79 ~P 37-3~
~'i'exC~ Col~enhugen (V~CKANS ACFXRI:R) --The government warned of a sizable
devalu,ltion of the Danish kronc l;,ter in thc year, when thc Folketing on
� IVcdncsday of this week voted through a new 10-year agreement providing for
annual wage increases of 10 to 11 ~~ercent . Accordi n~; to tlie government's
economists this.gives a real wlse incre:ise of 2 ~~ercc�nt a year to LO [Danish
(~edcr~tion of Trade Unions] meml~ers, but inderendct~t Danish economists ~rc
surc that the wage increase at the end o.f. thc summcr wi.ll be eaten up by a
considerable tightening up of fina~icial policy and a devaluation of the
I)anish kronc, which fol lows the D-ma-rk [of the FRG] .
'fhc automatic feature of thc panish wagc system means that even a mere ex-
tens.ion of thc agrecment will providc wage increases of 7 to 8 percent a
year. 'i'he semiannual wage adjustment in accordance with the price index
is exrected to bring about annual wage incre ases of 4.5 percent, and to this
must be added u wage escalation of about 3 percent. T~ao days longer paid
vac:ation in 1J80 and another three in 1981 cost the employers 2.5 percent,
whilc the extra pay for overtirre, etc., means an extra nutlay of 1.8 percent.
tiVithout an economic tightening up, the b alance of payme~~ts deficit this
yeat� will go up at leust 8 billion Danish kroner. The employers think that
thc wagc agrecment will incrcase unemployment, w}~ich now amounts to
. 19U,()OU, i,y anot}~er 14,OQ0 over 3 years. The L0, on the other hand, is
counting on employment's increasing by 25,000 as a result of the inc~~ased
vacation.
'11ie ~;overnment coalition between the Social Democrats aTi~i the Liberal Party
lia.ti tlir clear objective of reducing ths deficit in the balance of payments
:incl reducing foreign debt by 58 billion Danish kroner. Since the MOMS
(v:il ue ~dcled tax] is al ready a good 20 percent and the excise taxes on
:iutomobiles, lic~uor, and cigarettes are among the highest in the world, in
the o~iinion of tl~e cxrcrts thc govcrnment has no other way out but to de-
valuc ttic kronc, wl~ose exchangc rate is considered to be about 15 percent
too t~ i gl~ . .
i:~f~Ytt::11'I': Ahlen F Akerlunds tryckerier, S;:ockholm 1979
8815
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~o~ nrrxct~, us~ orrLY
COUNTRY S~CTION FRANCE
~
MITTERRAND FUTURE VIEWED IN LIGHT OF LATEST ELECZ'IONS
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 6 Apr 79 pp 52-53
LArticle by Arthur Cont)
L~ex) What can we learn of what the future may hold in store
for us from the latest ~~ection returns?
Th~ first lesson is that the ma~ority received a sharp warning
from the nation~ a warning that it would be unwise to ignore
or forget. It was a defeat for the ma3ority. Of course~ it
was no~ as ba~ as it might hrve been. The social climate is -
so difficult~ and informatir.,n was handled so badly that the
Elysee could have done much worse. Still~ it is a fairly
harsh blow.
~
The second lesson is that the president still seriouslf lacks
a large~ hi~h~.y organized~ and deeply based party. He has
been working under this handicap since early in his 7.-year
term. But the efforts which have been made to correct this
situation have obviously been inadequate. What he has is
more like a set ~f social clubs than a combat formation. The `
c~nly advantages he can makE+ use of are those dratvn from his
o~?~n wisdom or his courage. T;, he~ him~ he has in essence
or,ly a sort of strengthened MRP LPopular Republican .~Iovemen).
This is very far from the artillery~ the tanks~ and the avia-
tion support that will Y:~.?re to be found if he seriously wants
to face the harsh years of t~:e 1980s. So for him tnis must
be pr~.ority number c^~: to find both in the party lead~rship
and in the party base the captains~ lieutenants~ and a::~ve
all~ the sergeants~ who are all so terribly missing.
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The third lesson is that the presidont must be protected more
securely than he is now. Either he s~ands too much out in
. the open, or he~is left ~oo exposed. Th3.s is both dangerous
and unh~althy. While this election was in reality more of a
local than a national contest that cou1.d in no way over~tux~n
the country~ we saw too many direet hits against the French
prQSident. More attention wi11 have to be paid to protecting
him from such risks, if they really want to preserve the
spirit and equillbrium of a constitution which has the 3.n-
comparable merit of savin~ us from an Italian-style anarchy.
As the fourth lessun, some people would like to add that the
president himself is too imprudent~ as for example when he
sent his son and son-in-law into the political arena. But such
a complaint does not hold. water. It was actually very pleasing
that Henri G3scard d'Estaing~ with a11 his young man's sin-
cerity~ agreed to draw to himself the shots aimed at his
father. After ~11, he gav2 up a lot to do this; in any poli-
tical undertaking~ most of what you get is~ as Harry Tluman
used to say~ "a lot of ripe tomatoes and rotten eggs." As
this young man obviously has a passion for politics~ he de-
serves a great deal of credit for agreeing to be mixed up in
this sort of clash.
The fifth lesson is that~ as we have often predicted in
previous articles~ the Communist Party has fully recovered
its control ot" its resources and its strengths. The games
- of some of its super-intellectuals on the party fringes are
meaningless. The c~xpectation of the socialists that they
would make the Communist Party's.share of the votes decline
to 15 percent was only a fantasy. So obviously~ Georges
Marchais has in no way given up his fundamental strategy�
to s~rike his harshest blows against the Socialist Party;
to have as his number one ob~ective to break the Socialist
Party; to accept a union of the left only as a purely vote-
getting alliance or as a last resort; to only make use of
the Popular Front in order to prepare for a National Front
once the Socialist Party is destroyed; and to grant no
respite in this undertaking. Let's make no mistake about
it: in the months to come~ Georges Marchais will go after
Francois Mitter~^and more harshly than ever. One would have
to be incredibly naive to believe in the seriousness of what
is called the Union of the Lefts. Despite some appearances
to the contrary~ this is now only a dead myth.
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The sixth Ieason is ~hat the socialis~s~ by obstinately refusing
any change in strategy~ are fatally blocking any chances of
bringing about a change in the system. Obviously~ once more~
they may wel~. be tempted to show off their laurels. For~ by
l.in~ng up the best candidates and by knowing how ~o attract
to these candidates the most varied and contradictory forms
of discontsnt~ they got the most clearcut victory. The ma
legitimately be pleased by this~ even if they must start getting
accustomed to winning a11 the s~condary battles and losing all
the ma~or races. In any event~ they are going to have a mass
of general advisers who will provide them with extremely valu-
able support in all the coming battles. And it is ~ust as
true that any observer must concede that the soci~list message
sti11 keeps its power. And yet~ for a11 this it is no less
true that the most serious part of the problem lies here: the
party has won a battle~ but without a strategy. It has seen
it5 legions carry off a victory~ but without a coherent party
line. And this was the source of the impression everybody
received of the extraordinary confusion reigning on election
night~ Sunday evening. Politically~ France sees only dimly
where it is going because the Socialist Party does not know
where it is going. So this is the question of questions:
where is Francois Mitterrand in all this?
,
Between 1958 and 1978~ his strat~gy was fairly clear.
In reality~ it was based essentially on two convictions and on
two assumptions. The first~ conceived at the time of General
de Gaulle's return to power on 13 May 1958~ was that the Fifth
Republic would only last for a few years, and that General
de Gaulle would collapse~ crushed by problems~ somewhat like
Marshal P,~tain. "You have ~ust voted for Vichy~" Nitterrand
sadly told Guy Mollet who had ~ust announced his support for
the general's return. Not without courage~ he waged his
"war of honor" against the new republic and its leader. He
never gave up.
The second conviction was a sort of rather Ga11ic gamble. At
the age of 43 in the fu].1 bloom of his vigor~ his ambition~
and his talen~~ he found himself the only man in the center
left capable of holding high the flag of the democrats against
Gaullism. Pierre Mendes-France himself seemed to be out of
the picture; he only recovered some years later~ and anyway~
since the war he had felt a dev~~tion for General dE Gaulle
that was as discreet as it was deep. Mitterrand found that
he alone could be Mr Anti-de-Ga~~lle. He felt he had both
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~he strength and the resources for this~ and his whole campajgn
did keep the mark of a certain personal adventurism. Let's not
- make any mistake: Mitterrand's greatest pleasure will have been
to have challenged de Gaul.le~directly~ one against one~ in the
1965 pre siden~ial elections.
As to th e assumptions~ they were ~ust as claar.
The firs t came from the "historic" lessons that hP thou~ht he
could dr aw from the post-Stalin period. Considering
Khrushch ev~ he said Lo himself that a new Russia was being
born. Khrushchev~ in testimony of his "universal good wi11.~"
had ~ust turned ovar Port Arthur to the Chinese~ had asked
Tito's pardon had agreed to evacuate Austria (wtith the sole
condition tha~ l~ienna would remain neutral and wou7.d ~oin
neither bloc)~ and had begun a ma~or two-pronged caspaign~
against the personality cult "in the party~" and also in favor
of ttiie highly touted pro~ect of "softening up marxism."
~ven if the memory of Budapest still rankled~ and in the
shadows shed by the sinister Berlin Wall~ there could still
be a gre at temptation to believe in the policy of destaliniza-
tion and then to imagine that this would carry the Soviet
party ve ry far along the route towards "socialism with a
human fa ce." Mitterrand believed this; or at least he said
he belie ved it. In any event~ hie whole gamble~ even in the
area of domestic politi~s~ was unthinkable without such a
belief.
The second assumption was derived from the first. Since the
Soviet party would evolve in a gooa direction~ the same would
happen to the French CQmmunist Party. So a democrat~ even
one who said he was not a marxist~ could ~oin it without fear
or regret~ in order to defeat the Gaullist usurpers. The
French Communist Party was quickly found to be a party like
any othe r party, one even capable of governing loyally with
other parties. An alliance with it no longer pxesented any
sort of danger. On the contrary~ working with it~ becoming
friendly with it~ could only lead the Communist Party to `
greater friendship~ confidence~ and loyalty. Mitterrand
remembe red a saying of the American write.r, Emersan~ that
Franklin RoosevElt liked to quote: "If you want to have a
good friend~ be a good friend yourself." By maintaining an -
exemplary frienship with the communists~ the socialists would
soon call forth an ~identical loyalty from them.
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A11 ~he Niitterrandist a~rategy for 20 years came fxom these .
four gambles: the all.iance "to the death" with the communists~
Mitterr and's spectacular enmmitment to the socialist ideal~
the frenz3.ed campaign against all the forces and a7.1 the forms
of Gaullism~ the agreement with the communis~s on a~oint~
highly collectivized government program~ the refusal to enter
into or even consider any other alliance outside of the
'~Union of the Left," and the total basing of the entire _
French left on this sole and unyiel.ding cal.culation. We know
very well what happened to the four gambles and to the entire
strategy.
First of a11~ the Fifth Republic showed it~ was stronger and
lasted 1.onger than expected.
Next~ Mitterrand never succeeded in portraying himself with
the stature of a giant. Neither a"hero" in the de Gaulle
style nor a"prophet" in the style of Leon Blum, observers
even ~hose who w~re di~mayed by it quickly found that he
did not: measure up to the 1eve1 of "History," nor could he
by him:~elf carry off a dazzling personal adventure.
Furthermore~ Brezhnev showed himself to be no less of a
stalin~..st than Stalin himself.
And finally~ it was soon learned that the Communist Party was
only pl.aying its own hand~ with its everlasting scorn for
"social democratic puerilities."
The great dream~ already severely damaged by September 1977~
~ split npart one fine evening in March 1978 when Georges
l~iarchai.s ~ with an unprecedented violence ~ destroyed the Union
of the Left and with it~ all of Mitterrand's plans.
Of course~ it seems clear that Francois Mitterrand still
believ~s in his star. The conviction of being chosen by
destiny may rema3n strong within him. Even though he is now
being slowed down by age and he can no ].onger be as impetuous
as he was 20 years ago~ he seems to be hale and hearty. And �
he was in great form on Sunday evening. ti~1e can recognize the
force o.f his ambition from the energy he is using in preparing ~
for his May congress and for the Metz congress, and in defeat-
ing Michel Rocard. In the depths of his being~ he needs a
lot of energy and conviction to undertake his present trip
- through his sections and federations~ an exhausting round
through out the country. Furthermore~ we may well believe
that the conviction of still being ~ole to assume a national
~
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- dest~.ny is st~.ll deeply rooted in him. To be convinced of -
this~ we need only recall tha force of his television appear-
ance on Sunday evening. Mi~terrand, who traditionally spends
election evenings at his home at Chateau-Chinon~ this time
left up to no other socialist outside of his friends Claude
Eetier and Gaston Defferre the ~ob of interpre~ing the
el.ection results on television. Undoubtedly he remembered
- too clearly the time he gave M3.che1 ~Ro card the ~ob of de-
livering a brilliant speech during the iast round of the legis-
lative elections. On Sunday he totally "wiped out" Rocard~
and people such as Mauroy or Chevenement. He wanted to appear
in person on the three TV channels~ TF 1~ A 2~ and Fr 3. Then
on Monday morning he gave his opinions in person on the radio
networks. This is.the action of a man who st~ll believes in
hims elf .
His conviction of the precariousness of the Fifth Hepublic has
now yielded to another conviction, one ~ust as strong: the ~
fragility of the president. Just as r:itterrand in 1958 was
convinced that Genera.l de Gau11e would not last long in power~
so may he think the same.of V.alery G.i.scard d'Estaing in 1979. ~
Let's even be sure that he feels that not only will Giscard
~ot have any chance of running in 1981~ but even that Giscard
will collapse before 1981. So now he is counting on Chirac~
sa;~ing to himself that Jacques G'hirac~ if the Gaullists come
near 20 percent in the European elections, will manage to
have Giscard censure d? then to have the National Assembly dis- _
solved, and even to schPdule presidential elections earlier
than planned. He may even be flirting with the idea that
Giscard might resign. In any event and we are somewhat
underestimating the role of Raymond Barr~ Mitterrand is
convinced that there will be a ma~or political crisis in the
year to come. This is obviously a conviction that illuminates
as many hopes and plans as did his conviction in 1958� ,
But the situation of the Communist Party is quite d~~fferent.
On one hand~ no matter wha~ changes take place in Russia~
the leaders wYio succeed Brezhnev will impose a first phase
that will necessarily be an ultra-Stalinist period~ which
will last for some years. Logically we have to think that
if Russia one day sheds its Stalinis~ uniform~ it will not do
, so before 1985. That will come too late (if it ever cames)
to help Mitterrand's plan to succeed. ~
On the other hand~ the position of the French Communist Party
vis a vis the social ists can no longer leave any room for
doubt. Georges Marchais has in fact declared an unrelenting
war on Francois Mitterrand~ and Francois Mitterrand is the
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first to realize that a communist par~y's campaigns are never
short. There is even a strong case ta be made that Mit~erran~3
_ personally wi11. never again receive the support of communist
_ voters in a presidential election. Dialectically~ histor3cally~ �
he is the last s~cialist for y;i;.om the c~mmun3.sts will vote.
And that may well bar Mitterrt~nd's way. He can persist in
sticking to the Commuri3.st Party~ he may ber~r with infinite
patience blow after blow~ and he may ~wear by a11 Yiis gods
his "unitar~.an" sincerity, yet he can not ignore himself the
inexorable trqp in which he is caught. Niarchais's eye has a
terrible m,alics when it rests on Mitterrand: the eye of a
hunter or a poacher who Y:olds his pr.ey.
So Mitterrand is le#'t with no strategy at all or to be more
exact~ he is left a prisoner ~f a bafl strategy, and apparently
incapable of changing it~ at l.east until the next congress.
~ But there is also a totally obscured national policy~ and
above a11~ it is impossible for the president to make use of
an "alternation" which would in many respects be quite re-
freshing and salutary.
And this is the seventh and final. ma~or lesson of this strange
caxnpaign which essentially brought a~braken majority into
battle and for which a11 the givens were falsified from the
beginning. Here we have a general political situation wlth
no other immediate solution but te rely on the experience
now in progress~ with all the variables it may include. In
such a case~ we have to say that for the present majority~
no other political wisdom is possible but to tigh.ten ranks
around the prime minister~ who is more often mistreated by
his allies or his pseudo-friends than by his most real class
enemies. A.nd the cantonal elections~ after all~ will have
brought about no change in the course of our rivers.
Unless Mitterrand is concealing some surprise up :~is sleeve~
for after the Metz Congress.
~ COFYRIGf~: 19'l9 par Cogedipresse S4 ~
76 79
cso: 3~00
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COUPII'RY S~CTION ~RANCE
NATIONAL ~CONOMIC ~'OLICYs REFLEC'rIONS ON INTERNATIONAL DEPENDENCY
Perfs FUTURIBLES tn French Jsn 79 pp bb�72
[Artlcle by Jean Matouk, protes~or n~ economics at Che Univer~ity ~~t Montpel-
liert "The Patha ot Explosive CroMth~'~
(TexC~ I recognlze tha~ today the choice ~i bet~s+een on ettitude opQn to tha
aorld, alth tho risks !t entefl� but alao the opporCunitiQe it o!lera, and e
proCectlonnliam which, limited to the natlonal i~vel, can Qnly lead Co di~t�
saClsfection o! the coniumers who ere deprived of certain imported goods and
Eorced draaticelly to ravi~a their aay of 1!ving~ !f oniy to reduce energy
con,umptfon. Novever, such a reviiion, although temporarily paintul, could
in the long run leed to a Nay o! living thet !a in better het~nony vlth the
eco~ysrem, awre netural, end ffnally batter able to guarantee the survlval
a oE the specles.
But if We eliminete thia truly Mrevolutionary~' hypothesis and assua~ that the
maintenance o! our preaent atanderd nnd way of lfving :~equires the maintenance
of a lArp~e tioW of lmporta, end theretore a compensating floa of exports~ I
contest the ~~explosive~~ vlew developed long ago by o~tr liberal governmenta:
this !s the logic o! Che "13th" month ot exPorts !n 1973. Accor.ding to thfs
idea, the exponenClal groWth o! lmports is an lntenglble quantity; conee-
quently, the only salvntion ia to be tound in an indefinlte grrn?th fn exports
at the aame rste. Noi?~ this i� a dangernus, coatly~ end taise vies;. It ia
denqeroua, from the purely loglcei point of vieM, because the ~'time ot a
linfCe world" Wlil arrives the markete of the neW countries and the Eestern
countriea cannot be extanded indQtinitely, conaidering the competition amonR
all the lndustrieliced counCrie� that are exploring the commerciai prospects,
and tNelr o~m development.
This exploaive aolution is alao expensive, because the real "exceas coet" of
the sale o! a frnnc tor distant export, with long stays in Oriental attte-
chambers (including tlps)~is much hlgher than the temporery marginel coat of
e balancing aubsidy granted to a lame duck during the tlme necessary for !ts
rec:3nverslon. Ffnaliy~ Che exploaive salution is lalse becauae France can, at
thra price ot �erloua pl~nning that !s aimply but truly atimulating,quickly
r+cover part of its i~ternal market and develop substitutes tor the expensive
imports on its o~m soil. illthout Nanting to reduce the French to a Chinese
frugality, it is n question o! "counting more on our otm strengths;as I have
suggeated elaeMhere. 9
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With Che~a ~esarv~tione, I willing~y ndmie ChBC Ch~ ~ndusCrial lmperaCfve
remafns Che order of the day~ both to conquei,forelgn markeCa and to re.
conqu~r ours. Md rhat tho proC~ctionlst and narroWly netionallstic tradf-
Cions of certaln ~conomtc agenCs end policic~l, pnrtics must be opposad.
But I m~:gt recell that if Che ~rench fnduetrial fabric ig r.oa no longQr
capeble of rea~ating forelgn penetrarion, i~ it !e much looger and more
Eull of holes thaa th~ Cerman febric, tih~: reaponelb~lity for thie lelle to
20 y~ar8 of ~hort-sighted policiea~ tim~ and again, w~th at leeat lour
atebllitat~on pians and a seri4ua elump~ Which have t'avored the dissolukion
of thia indueCrial lebrlc and preventad its recreation. In Chie respect, '
the ,~oint reaponsibilfty of an absurd system of crpdit margln completely
contrary to libarallsm and the outdated example of the French banking
system !s ennrrt~us~ eapecially in th@ very 1oW induatrial birth rate !n
Frence. 1 am noC hiding the fact that on this polnt, apart from felr
aords and publicity opererlons~ Chinge have changed a great deal in the laaC
tew mon!:he.
_ The d~agnoaia o! the pre~ent eituation requires three remarkst a) capitalism
1s e aall-detfned economic syatam~ !n f~a verlous forms competitive,
ollgopolistlc~ etc. For ua~ ~t !s undermined by e certa~n number of besic
contrndlctlons, 1lke the othor clesa 8ystem8 ~hat preceded it. Th~s doea noC
meati as a certein "leftlaC nnessianiem~~ might leed one to believe thet
!t is lneviCebly doomed in the ahort term. It can find aithin itself the
neces8ary rasourcea to adapt. IC hse already done so. It can chenge lnto
enother claas syatem~ ,~ust as oppre~sive !or those aho ere not in power.
The Kaynesian revolution ia capitalism~s adeptaCion to e structural chenge
in !ts induatrlel base. This haa gone from large pieces of besic equipment
to consumer inclustries. In order for the chenge to succeed, e profouad change
in the living conditions of the salaried Workers had to take glace. Thia aes
~'Fordlsm.~' The generel theory is the loglcal expression of the nea, inev-
iCable operating rules of the syatems one of the essential changes Which is
included, and rarely commented on, is the fixing of the nominal eelary, ahlch
corresponds Well to modarn conditions. I do not aant to deprecate Keynes Who,
at the same tlme, expleined the cyclical slumps, even alth Marxist arguments.
I only aant to situate his contribution in the development of capitalism. -
We ere noa living through a nea chenge to which capiteliam has bean led by
the convergence of: the automation ahich !s itself due to the urgent neces- '
sity of permenently aubsCituting cepital for labor; the discoveriea connected
with this euCometion~ and verioua public initiatives (NASA, military research, ~
aeronauCica, eCc.); a certain sdturation of demand in the developed countrles~
end the unsuitability of the gooda they produce for the demand of the nea
countries.
One muat therefore go from household appliences, autonwbiles~ oil~ and trad�
~tional chemistry to automated equipment, telecoamiurtications~ plasma metel-
lurgy, nuclear energy~ biochemistry, genetic engineering~ etc., but elso to
~he larRe-scale production of modernised pieces of treditional equipment for
the new countriea. In this way one can explain (I cannot go into detail here)
the structurnl, lasting unemploymenC and lnflation in the industrialized cotm-
tries ahfch the Keynesian pollcy~ Fordism, !s ap~arently unable to solve.
10
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b) Thfe mlump aeema Co affecC Ch~ indust~ialiaed capirallst counrrlas dif-
f~rently. It seem~ tio aPfec~ Cr~~r Br~taln and Itely more, Cermany and `
Jepen lese. Today !t is etfecting the UntCad SCaCas~ which up Co no~r has been
abla Co mftigata ft� effecCB by the imparial~~sm of the ~olier and plain
imperialf~m tFro rypea of lmparielirm rhat the m~ltinatlonal corporatfons, _
mo8tly of Americen orlgin~ are tighCing vigorousiy.
T'he~e difEerences among advancad countriea depend on h+o caueess their aCarCing
siGuatlon afCer Che wax (WOrkable mtnes or lack of tl~em, nvaileb~lity of coal
or energy dependance, abundance o! ekilled labor or lack of 1t) and the cMolco~
made 1n reconstructing ~he1r lnduatry lnlrial cholces of the parlod 1945-
1955, and Chen addltionai or rnplacement chofces in 1960-1970.
Let us eay that Cerineny and Jap~n, ahlch Were destroyed, did a good job of
reconstructfng end chooeing, whlch expiafns their succesa in exporC~ng. Bue
this s~~r~asa~ by guaranteeing n groWing appreclaCion 1n Che value oF their
currQncy, ~nebled them eitlier to lnvest even more or atrongly to brake their
inflation. '~t~ia !a the oppoeite or' Che vicfous circle. Slnce the middie of
the 1960s, 1t nas been esaentlaliy baged on c.urrency. But up to the laet
Chlrac government~ the virtuas of devaluaCian Were still believed in France.
c) France aea ur?able or unWilling to make these cholces~ or made Lhem bndly.
Hoaever, the colon~al Wara and rhe political disorders produced some very
promising !n!ClaCivea on tf~e part of certain leaders of the Fourth Republic,
who thought in a di!lerent wey from many of those 1n the Fifth Republic
(I em thinking, among oChers, of Pierre Mendes-France~ Felix Geillard~ -
~ Edgar Faure in h!s ~'flrsC phase"). They aere uneble rsally to introduce
modernity in e reconstruction which, conaidering Che existing equipmenC
Which Wes much more extenaive than in the devastated country of Germany Was
performed almoat homothetically. They reconatructed in the literal sense of
the worA, ahen they should also have modernised both the means of producCion
and the social roletions. In thls area, the only innovations outaide of the
natlonallzationa Were the paid vecaCions and the business commfttees~ vfiich
have constantly been muzzled since their inceptior?.
But the aorst !s that later, under De Cauile, when enything aas possible,
~ the second round of choicea, that of the 1960s, Wea lef t to the complete
freedoc~ as I dare to sey !n contradiction Co the present propaganda of
"NineCeenth Century~~ buslness leeders~ Whoae only a!m Was to take back the
modest aocial gains of the Fourth Republlc. Nere I am speaking of the ~'major"
bosses or the large companies. Exceptions? There Were some, of course. But
not enough to form a critical masa. The moat obvlous is thc behavlor of the
iron�master8, Who were aided by the government in 1966 With an annuity. Even
tho economic behevior of many heeds ot nationalized companies was scandalous.
Why are elecCriclty, dQmestic fllghts~ and telephone calls in France today
among ~he most expensive !n Che world for th~ consumer?
Md the PM~ [Small end Ftedium-Sise Buainesses~? They are the lance-heed of
Cerman lndustry !n exporta. Our PME heve often Wanted to modernlze. There aas
a ahole geaerarion nf young heeds of businesses Who made the right choices on
their o~m level. But the economic end monetary policy in 1963-65~ 1970~ ard
1913�75 made tham, almdst aystematically~ the flrst sacrifices on the eltar
of a recovery thet ia not over yet. u
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~'bR n~'rICIAL US~ dNLY
Coupi~ad alCh nn unfavorabia endowmenC fn naCural x~sources Although our
for~s~s ~~nd our agriculturnl potenCiei are underdaveloped tihia absence of
lndusrr~al cholceg led ro rha pregent aituatlon.
To cnunr on rhe haAda oC Che bip businesa~s Co cnrry out the chengas that ~re
necaseery Coday~ whlle eWelling their prof.frs by meana of decontroiling
, prfcea~ smacke of naivery or disingenuous~eg~. Indeed, unless there Were
a preeain~ incentive from the governmenti, would you lnvest 10 or 100 million
francs in ~rench lndugCry tomorroa, !f you got them out of the blue? The PrlE
wl11 do it thelr horizon !9 narroWer. Hut therc3 are noe enough of them
any more~ and the employea~ who want to opan their o~rn busfnQSS cannot do so.
0?~ly lmpararive induaCrlal planning at Che fevel of tt~a inveatmenCa of the
largeet buslnesaee several o~ Which, morQavor~ shouid b~ naCionalized
can meke ft posalble to caCch up a l~ttl~~ and correct th.~ choices~ Only strong
measures to nid in th~ creaCion of busine8ses and to pro~sct Chem during
their FirsC years can make our induatrial fabric more dense. This wili
take time. For S or 6 yeara, Cermany Wl11 hava to agree to support .:he Euro-
peen curreney elone~ W~thout developing !ta political hegemany. The dip-
IomaCs~ ,~ob Will bA es hard es Chat of th~ men responsible for industrial
policy.
- More especlally as a slow groath, ~hfch is nece9sary to evoid mas;aive im-
ports, hea Co be unequally ahared in order Co be ~?ncially tolerable. Much more
tor Che most dletavored~ and lesa even much lees for those ahose incomes
are higher than everege. This !s a difficulC policy for a rightist government
to pursue.
But the neo-liberai,s speak of self-management, of reduction in the range of
incomes, of the crestion of responmlbilfty, etc. In fact, they are !n favor
of anarchical seif-managemenC that is, a situation in Which an ot~mer, and
Che banks, tace an unorganized personnel. I regret to say that this is also
- a Nineteenth CenCUry concept. It must finally be admltted that there is a
�unctional antagonlsm betxeen prlvate capitalie+; bosses (tomorrnW a class
of techno-bureaucrats, like !n the USSR) end their employees~ to say nothing
of the side claasee. Soclety ia tull ot contradlctions and contlicta. The
it~telligent capiralfst solution consista o! admitting the existence of this
coaflict and institutlonalizlag its development. Our ma~nagera began to under -
stend Chat in 1968. The reeuit !s that in addition Co a colieborationist
unlonism thet ia, one that accepts the capiCalist frameWark (FO [Horkers
Force~) end anoth~r unlonism that re)ecta it but is Wtlling to tek~ a
position on the union plan (CFUT [French Desocratic Confedsration of Labor~),
there has qro~m up a unionlsm rhat is very closely nsaociaCed With the prfncipal
opposition party, !or in vleW of the manageriel bottleneck, the only outlet
seems Co be taking over the government. i~hence the importance of a OGT [G~neral
Confederation ot Labor~ thet ia an opposltlon government in the nationalized
buslnesses, end often takea poaitions in the private sector that are contrary
to Che reel future lnteresta of the French economy. But it and its ective
members have all klnds of excuaes, con~ti~ering the obvious collusion bet'~?een
maneRemQnt ~nd government for the lest 20 years. Md on this last point,
there hes been no ndW tr~nd since Aprl1 1918.
12
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_
F'dI~ n~'~ICYAL US~ dNLY
In Eect~gelf-manegement 1s Che beaic insClturfon of aocfalfsm, and ~s fully
reali~~d only With Che suppreasion of prlvate ownership of the means of pro-
ductfon, and oF salerie8 (~van wlehout privare oaner~hlp). In capitalism,
it mey be turned asld~ from fts $oal~ if ft is not ineegrated lnto a tiruly
orgentzed planning and ~f it te not backed up by powerful unfonism. We ere
far from ChaC. Farther than Germany, ite are all the tarther in thet I have
heard Calk nf noChing for monChs excepr elimineting the social coverage gained
by ehe Work~r8 1n their srruggle. Now can one hope for thefr cooperation on
auch a basis? Whnt !s the nntlon wlChout Chem? To be aure, the ebuses muati
be elfminated, but they wfll dieappear by themselves wfCh unemployment end
the change in aork~ng conditiona~ and Che manegement of the health sector for
profft. There ae encounter induaCrial planning and the nationallzation of
Che ma,~or groupa. Thim cennot walt. The constanC hyauns to 1lberallem have
aaakened !n e certein aector of management the '~NfneCeeneh Century" devil
Whfch wae sleeping. First there will be layoffs and e reducCion in aocial
coverage, end then one will wait in vain for the "social party." I believe
thet preeent policy !s a dead and. One cannor hope to stimulate the defen-
sive, regenerative reactlons of e moribund industrial fabrlc. Only a series
of dEllberate grefts can sav~ it~ and rhen r~,iuvenate it. It Will quickly
be reallzed as soon as we enter tha Europ~an moneCary system ~hat the
new pulicy !a economically end aocially unteneble. Therefore We wl11 chenge
!t. Nence my optimtsm for Che lOng run.
Albert~s 'fheorem
The report on the adaptetion of the 5eventh Plan, preaented in S~ptember
1978 by Mfchel Albert, general commiseer for planning~ ~peclfies that iE
the arrengement of the Seventh Plan is maintained~ its adaptetion eims es-
sentially at three mein goals. 1) The lasting recovery of our foreign trade
balance. ~verythlnL depende on thia !n Che medium terms the rate of groWth
and the level of employment, the aolldlty of the aurrency, the inde~rer.dence
of the country, and the buying poWer of ita citizens. 2) The adaptetion of
our industry to more and more diffie;ult internationel competition. Industry
alone provides four fifths of F'rance~s exports. The economic controntetions
ahich heve continued to be intenairled since the oil crisis bear essenCially
on lndusCry. 3) The lmprovement of aorkinq cond~tions. This fs a question
of responding to the demenda of the working people end facing the necessary
industriel conversiona and the consequ~,nces of a sloadown !n growth.
These three goela ere cloaely related. Indeed, the authors of the teport
edd: "Whet ia the principal cause of the sudden~ simultaneous rlse in unem-
ployment in all the developed countries, folloWing the oil crisis? Apparently~
the sudden, eimultaneous drop in the rate of groath, Which aas elready in
embryo fn the ~cceleration of lnflntlon since the end of the 1960a.
~'What limlts the raCe of Arorrth fn France todeyT Above ali, the ~foreign con-
straint,~ the necesaity !or a natlon like ours, Which !s concerned with its
lndependence~ to belance !ta purchases With !ts sales and to guarantee the
value o! its currency.
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F'Oft Ot~'~ICIAL USL dNLY
. "Md what should we do 4o that France cnn manage~ relaC~vely epe~,'~~ng, Co
sell more and buy lese4 There ia only on~ soluL�fon outgide og Che g~nerai
impoverfahment of the Frencht the orrengChenfng oE busineases end of thelr
comp~eiCive capabilfry."
Thus whaC hA$ been named ~'Alb~rt~s Theor~m'~ and is rh~ gource of the nea econ-
omic poltcy cen be expreased ae followes ~~EmploymenC is linkad tn groath.
CroaCh ie linked Co Ch~ foreign trade balance. The foretgn Crade balance
!s linked to the adapCation of our fndustry.~~
Solde en millluds dn p * Escimulon ~
? SO ~
* I
I
+~o ' i
i
_ ! i
;
?30 . _ ~j
~
J ~
,~~o ; . ~ ~
. ;
.
: .
t
?10 industrla N~ ~ N~~~~...
~y~ ~.r~~~~ ti~.~
~IM b i
r~ I
O ~~r~..y~~ ''~ti ~
Atrtculcu~e " Tot~l
~nertle
-10
-10
--~0
.
-60
-70 *
. 1962 63 64 6S 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 7S 76 77
FiRure 1: Foreign trede balence by 8ector. Ordlnatet balance in blilfons of
Erancs; sters estimetes; sour~ls Seventh Plan Indices~ No 6.
COPYRiCHTs Msociation Internationele Futuribles 1979.
8429 14
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~ox o~~rc.rni, us~ orrLY
c~u~~Y s~c~rroN ~nivc~
~ CIVIL AB~tONAUT?C9 OONSTEiUCTIUN INDU52'ftY VIEW~D
Paris AIA ~ O~SM03 in French 17 Mar 79 pp g~ ii
[Report on preeg ronferenee of Minister nf ~anaport Joel I,e Theule]
[Text] Minister of Transport Joel Le Theule devoted a nia3or part ~f his
prees conference last week to the I~'rench civil aeronautics conetruction
induetry.
French civil e?viation aanufacturing nax accounte for approxiaately one-third
nf all F~ench aeronautical cane~,ru~tion. Nhereas in 1975 ~t had ahoxn a
deficit~ it Sa nox contributing to the surplus in the balance of trade in
the aeronautice indu~try as a xhole. Thia contribution aaounte to approxi-
Nately 1 bi111on fycence if you take into account the purchase of foreign
aircraft by FYench companiee~ and npproxi~ately 2 billion f~anc8 for civil
aviatian manuPacturing properly apeaking.
300 Airbusea Marketed
The miniater pointed out thaL the spectrw of civil aircraft built in I~ance
is quite broad~ ranging from li~t airplanes~ executive airplanes and heli-
copters all the xay to transport aircraft~ The Rinister dxelt especially on
the sub~ect of the Airbue. He noted that in the case of the B2 and Btf planes
21 cdmpanies had placed orderg for a tatal of 131 planes and taken c::�ions
on 63 more. The final figures for iq78 shox the A300 to be the best-selling
large transport p2ane in the xorld after the Boe~r~ ?47. LQSt year ita
ealea equaled the eum total ~of the sales of the DC-10 and L-1011. ltoreover~
there are definite prospecta for nex salesi to Laker (10 aircragt) ani the
Japaneae 2~OA [exganaian unknown~ co.~,r (6 aircraft)~ and various covp~nies
of the Middle ~ast and A,frica are currently negotiating for the purchaee of
a total of 37 aircre~ft. The eigning of theea contracts xould ~uickly bring
to 231 the total of Airbua A300'e either definitively sold or on option.
3ince la8t July a nex eleRent hae been introduced into this epeet,ruae the
A310 haa been put on the oarket~ and the notices of intention to purcbase
thia uodel imol~e a total of apgzoxLately 80 air.craft for aeven difterent
countries. SMissair has 3u$t announced ita deciaiun in principle to buy
10 of theae planea.
1
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I~OR U1~t~ICIAf~ U~l:' UNLY
The mini~~er conclud~d by eayi.ng tha~ at the p~esent time mo~e ~than 300
Airbueea have either been ordered~ optinned, or a~ade the ob~eot of opeoific
noticee of intention tc~ purchase on the part of the air tr~nspor~ comp~niea.
Le Theule eetiaa~ted the French indu~try'~ ohare o� the total value n:f this
aircraft conetruction to ba 4~ peroent and stated that this a::are breaks
doxn to 37 Pereent for airframe~, 27 pereent fnr engSnea and more than 50
pex~ent for equipa?ent. Comparing theee ftgurea xith tho~e for the Caravelle
Program~ ~he e~inister i;~dicated that the ronfSr~ed orders for the Airbus
alone already con~ti~ute~ for the F~rench e,viation manufacturing industry~
a backlog of orders greater t,han th~ total produ~tian repreaented by the
entire Caravelle program. The fact ia that xhen concluded~ the Ai.rbws
pro~ram x~.ll represent 4 to 5 timeg the production of the Caravelle program.
The Industry Will Meet the De~and
_ There is concern today xith reepect to the capacity of the ~ench and
European aviation induatry to aeet the deaaand. La Theule declased~ hoxever,
that thia concern Sa no longer founded on the skepticism of last euamer. On
th~ basis nf ~Ehe increaee in ss~les as of the end af 1978~ Airbus Industry
had alreac~y taken--at that ti.aie--its decision to ir~crea8e the rate of
production fro~ txd planes per month to aix by 1y83. The succeases achieved
aince the firet of the year have cxused the schedule to be revised upxard.
It is not impossible that the rate of aix per month xill be achieved by 1982 ~
and that the rate of eight to 10 per month xill conceivably be neceasary
beginning in 19g3 ~n order to ueet the stated requirevents of the air
trar~sport companiee.
AEROSPATIALE [National Induatrial A,,~~xospa,ce Compa,ny] should provide for this
eharp increase in production by con.cinuing the efforts to increase produc-
tivity that it has already initiate~.,. To thie end:
1. As a firat step~ it is preparing all its various divisionss and ita
affiliates to operate at full capaci;:y.
2. It is diveating iteelf of non-avia~:ion related act~vitiea in order to
devote ita full potential to the tasks that pertain to its vocation.
3. It is ruaking an appeal to all firms in the aviation industs~�, and in
particular to the eubcontractora~ to participate (son~e of the subcontractora
are being called upon to expand by hiring additional personnel).
4. Un the ba81s of ita exieting factories, it is aubcontsacting extensively
among regional industrial enterprises, especially thoae in the Toulouee and
Basse-Loire regione.
5� Yith the aid of the g+overnaient~ it is atudying the possibility of
entruating certain types of xork to non-aviation related co~pRniea that are
currently having difficulty in obtatning ordera.
16
Fok arr�