REVISED DRAFT OF FBIS HISTORY TITLED THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION, 1946-1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05-01429R000100090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 107
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 30, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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I*W
MEMORANDUM FOR: FBIS Historical Officer
SUBJECT : Revised draft ofIS_history titled
"The Foreign Documents Division,
1946-1967"
1. The DDI Historical Officer has read and_..
approved the revised draft of the FBIS history titled
"The Foreign Documents Division, 1946-1967" by
has done an excellent ~o of revising
his rat and the paper is now ready for further
processing.
2. The reviewer has a single suggestion -- that
the present Appendix A "Commentary" be renamed
"Cbriclus o-h"-and made the final_chapter of the history.
Some minor changes, mostly editorial, have been made
directly on the manuscript and are noted for the
record in the attachment.
3. The Historical Staff will-forward this
paper directly to the DDI Historical Board for re-
view prior to final typing of the manuscript in FBIS.
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Secret
CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by
CIA History
Staff and DDI
THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
1946 - 1967
1
VOLUME IV
by
1
Secret
DDI FBIS 5
April 1974
Copy No. 2 of 2
1
PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
DO NOT DESTROY
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
1
1
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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
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I
SEURJ T
Access ControZZed by CIA History Staff and DDI
THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
1946 - 1967
VOLUME IV
by
I
7
Directo
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1974
Copies:
#1 - CIA-HS
# 2 - DDI
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Contents
t
Volume I
Page .
I. Consolidation of Document Exploitation in the Post-
World War II Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Initial Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. The Washington Document Conference . . . . . . 4
C. The Washington Document Center (Advanced) . . 12
D. Consolidation of Exploitation Activities . . 16
II. The Washington Document Center Joins the Central
Intelligence Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A. Transfer of Document Exploitation to Civilian
Control . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B. Problems of Administrative Integration . . . . ' 30
C. Consolidation Completed . . . . . . . . . .?. 40
III. New Approaches to Document Exploitation . . . 53
A. The Move Toward an Exploitation Function . . . 53
B. First Try fora Charter . . . . . . . . . . . 70
IV. The People and the Organization . . . . . . . 80
A. Staff Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
B. Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
C. Organizational Development . . . . . . . . . . 106
D. The Question of Subordination . . . . . . . . 117
A. Community Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B. The Search for Sources . . . . . . . . . . 134
C. Interdepartmental Rivalries . . . . . . . . 146
D. Development of Procurement Procedures . . . 154
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Page
A. Phase-Out of Captured Docent Processing . 164
B. Transition to Processing of Current Materials. 177
C. Special Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
1. Source Curtailment and Security Classifica-
tion Policy . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . 198
2. Transliteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 02
3. Copyright Constraints . . . . . . . . 208
4. Dissemination and Reproduction . . . . .,. 214
volume II
A. General . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . 218
1. Consumer Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
3. Liaison . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . 0.0 231
B. Intra- and Inter-Organizational Relations . . 235
1. The CIA Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
2. The 00 Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . 249
3. The IAC Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
4. The Allies . . . . . . . . ... . . . . 269
5. The Non-Intelligence Sector . . . . . . . 273
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1
Page
B. Translation Coordination: The Central Foreign-
Language Document Exploitation File and the
Consolidation Translation Survey . . . . . . 305
1. initiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 05
2. Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
3. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
IX. A New charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
A. First Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
B. Second Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
C. The New Ccanmittees and Problems of
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 350
D. Sequel: A Revised charter . . . . . .,. . 355
X. Growth of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
A. Reorganization and Reorientation . . . . . . . 364
B. Overseeing FDD Operations . . . . . . . . . . 384
C. Procurement Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
D. A New Reporting Policy . . . . . . . . . . . 402
E. New Procedures and Problems in operations . . 412
F. Special Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
1. Ancillary Activities . . . . . . . . . . . 424
2. Special Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
G. Reorganization of the Reporting Program . . . 436
volume III
XI. Three FDD Staffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
A. Linguistic Support . . . . . . . . . . . 450
B. Propaganda Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
C. Current intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . 471
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XII. Cold War Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
A. Emergency War Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
1. Early Action and the War Planning
Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
2. FDD and the Armed Services Document
Intelligence Center . . . . . . . . .?. 493
B. Vietnam Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
1. Development of Vietnamese Language
Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512
2. Headquarters Translation Service . . . . . 513
3. Personnel Support . . 516 25X1
4. Intelligence Information Reporting
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
C. The Sputnik Flap: A Dissemination Problem . . 526
XIII. Expansion of Service: The US Joint Publications
Research Service . . . . . . . . . . . ... . ... . 548
A. Establishment of the`. Organization . . . . . 548
B. Its Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562
C. Its Relations With Consumers . . ... . . . . 584
XIV. Man Versus Machuie: FDD and the Automatic
Language Processing Experiment . . . . . . . . . . 596
A. FDD and the Georgetown Project . . . . . . . . 601
B. The Division Turns to Private Industry . . . . 618
C. MT Experimentation in other languages . . . . . 637
D. FDD-Air Force Cooperation . . . . . . . 641
E. The Outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 647
1. Development of the System . . . . . . . 647
2. Testing and Termination of the Project. . 666
viii
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Volume IV
Page
XV. End of the Line: Transfer and Merger . . . . . . . 676
A. The OCR Interlude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 677
1. The Transfer and Reasons for It . . . . . . 677
2. FDD Under OCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 683
B. Merger With FBIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 692
1. Formation and Work of the Study
Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 692
2. The FDD Position Paper . . . . . 705
3. The Report and Aftermath . . . . . 714
XVI. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 721
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1
Appendixes
Page
A. Organizational Charts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727
1. 17 December 1946 . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 728
2. 27 June 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729
3. 29 July 1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 730
4. 24 August 1949 . . . ... . . . . . . . . . 731
5. 27 June 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 732
6. 7 May 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
7. 1 October 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 734
8. 1 April 1957 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735
9. 9 June 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736
10. 1 April 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737-
B. Foreign Documents Division Statistics, 1947-1967.. 738
C. Executive Personnel . . . . . . . . . . ... . . 739
D. National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 16: Foreign Language Publications . . . . . 740
E . Abbreviations . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . 742
F. Chronological Table . . ... . . . . . . . 754
G. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 771
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VOIU4E IV
CHAPZER FI 'rEM
End of the Lines Transfer 'and M~sger
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This chapter of the history takes up the question of the
disposition of the foreign-language document exploitation func-
tion in the Agency and the dissolution of the Foreign Documents
Division as an independent CIA element to which had been en-
trusted the operation since its inception in 1946. The inter-
play and maneuvering periodically engaged in by individuals and
components at various managerial levels in CIA who were assigned
the task of resolving the problem of FDD?s disposition led at
times to heated and acrimonious exchanges, and the solutions
reached reflected no unanimity of agreement. The development was
twofold, first the transfer of the division to OCR at the end of
1963 and eventually its absorption by FBIS in early 1967. The over-
riding, though not the only, issues involved in these moves appeared
to be operational streamlining, that is, a consolidation and cutting
back of FDD reportage in the case of the OCR transfer, and primarily
a matter of ecmxmy - in saving of funds and. positions -- in
the case of the' FBIS -merger. In the ' latter instance the question
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of whether or not the contemplated hove was likely to improve
the operation played an apparently secondary role. Perhaps the
hard facts of-life -- the econanic factor -- precluded any other
decision.
A. The OCR Interlude
1. The Transfer and Reasons for It
It was intimated earlier in this account that fredn the very
outset the "neither-fish_nor-fowl" character of FDD operations ---
whether it was to be classified as a library or as a collection
function -- created difficulties in permitting the division to
find its proper place in the CIA administrative configuration. The
settlement, if not solution, of this problem lay in the creation
in 1946 of the office of operations, a sort of catch-all to which
FBID and CD were assigned along with FDD. Participation by all
three in collecting and exploiting information fraan open sources
was the coamon denominator in this arrangement. It was regarded
as desirable to create 00 as a focal point of control for the
three divisions.
With the addition of a higher level, the DD/I, in 1952,
the control exercised by the Deputy Director aver, the resources
available to him resulted in a direct working relationship with
the head of the 00 components, and the need for 00 to serve as
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1
an intennedi ate. managerial level declined. Realization of this
fact periodically led to consideration of abolishing 00 and re-
assigning its components elsewhere. The usual destination
assigned to FDD in these recurrent plans was OCR, despite the
repeated insistence by 00 and FDD that the division was not,
like OCR, a reference facility. The question had been once
again revived in 1957 at the time the NSCIDs were consolidated.
In rebuttal to the effort to place FDD under Paragraph 15 of
NSCID 1, which assigned to the DCI responsibility for providing
central reference facilities as a service of ocammm concern,
the DAD/O, emphasized that FDD was not and
never had been a central reference facility. The decision, he
stated, to regard document exploitation as a reference activity
while treating broadcast handling as a collection function made
the proposal even more difficult to understand. 1167 In this
instance the 00 appeal was successful and FDD, with FBID and CD,
was placed under NSCID 2.
Nevertheless, pressure for change continued. In.the early
surer of 1959 the Inspector General, Lyn-an Kirkpatrick, suggested
to the DCI, among other things, the dissolution of 00 and reassign-
ment of its divisions, but the DCI took no action at that time on
the IG recamendation. 'However, near the' end of 1961 the DCI
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randi m to the AD/O in January 1962 outlining, in effect, an 00
counter-attack. To the anticipated proposal that FDD be placed
under OCR, he suggested that Carey insist that the division not
be separated from FBID because a good part of FBID ? s work (press
scrutiny) and all of FDD?s involved the same medium. He made
the further point that if the divisions were reassigned, their
efforts would be gradually reoriented to the support of their
new masters; thereby their collection potential would be dissipated
and their comma service functions would become secondary. As the
most logical solution,F suggested raising 00 to Deputy
appointed a small Working Group on Organization and Activities
headed by Kirkpatrick to study. the. organizational structure of
the Agency. In anticipation of a recxmi ndation similar to that
of two and a half years before, directed a lengthy memo- 25X1
Directorate and the three divisions to Office level. 1168/
As far as the work of the Kirkpatrick Group was concerned,
fears had been premature, for its recc ru endations 25X1
were never approved by the DCI. The beginning of the end for
00 and the transfer of FDD to.OCR cane about through initiative
from another source. By late 1963 the. new ADD/I. for Management,
Paul Borel, had concluded (without pre-knowledge of, the Kirkpatrick
reccrmnendation) that. the' 00 management level, had long been archaic
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and should be abolished... Thus, on 5. December 1963 the ADD/I
advised now AD/O following George Carey's.retiren nt
in October 1962,. that he'and Ray Clare, the'DD/I, had decided
to transfer. FDD to OCR. The. decision brought to fruition the
wish to make the transfer expressed by Borel in September 1960
when he was.AD/CR. At that time Robert Amory, then DD/I, had
turned down the proposal. 1169 Now, however, the move was corn
firmed by Cline on 18 December. In a rather bitter memorandum
disclosed that no reason had been given
for the transfer except that some savings -- unspecified-- might
accrue. concluded that the transfer of FDD to OCR, a
rove which he continued to deplore because of his view that the
division was a collection and not a reference organization,
presaged the eventual raising of FBID and CD to Office level
directly under the DD/I and the end of 00. 1170 In this pre-
sumption he was quite right, for on 30 June 1965 00 was dissolved
and steps initiated to raise its.remaining divisions to Office
level.*
* The overt collection function of the defunct. 00 was temporarily
assumed on 1 March 1966 by a new. organizational grouping known as
the Intelligence. Support Services .(ISS)., to which were subordinated
the former 00 components plus the Collection Guidance Staff (CGS)
and OCR. I55, whose only director was Paul A. .Borel, was abolished
after 19 months on 1 October 1967 when the fo Her FBID and CD gained
Office status.
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views. on the. FDD transfer. were echoed two months
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later by Edward M. Ashcraft, the'. DAD/O, in a , letter to Paul Borel
in which he stated that after ten years of almost continuous study,
all senior CIA officers had concurred that 00 was properly organized,
as an Office and that FDD, FBID, and CD were rightfully located with-
in 00. It therefore cane as a shock to.Ashcraft to have FDD suddenly
removed to.a non-operating element with "no indication of careful
study or demonstrated reasons, and practically no opportunity for a.
hearing." 1171/ Dismissing the letter as simply an exercise in
special pleading, Borel made no formal reply.
Contrary to what
and Ashcraft believed, however,
the DD/I and the ADD/I did have reasons for the change. They
differed with the 00 chiefs in their interpretation of the nature
of FDD's function. Thus, operationally the transfer of FDD to
OCR was designed to place under the same management all library-
type services (acquisition, dissemination, translation, indexing,
and referencing) for all manner of. published intelligence infor-
mation (books, periodicals, and information reports). From the
standpoint of personnel. policy, the move was designed to increase
career opportunities for professionals in OCR and, k'DD.by broad-
ening the number of assignments available in. a, single career
service.' Moreover,. ecorn ni es 'would be. anticipated as a result
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of a reappraisal by new management of long-standing past
practices. At the same time FBID (as FBIS) and CD (as the
Domestic Contact Service [DCS]) were to be established at the
Office level in recognition of the independent character of
these major activities.
Moreover, with the possibility in mind of a new organiza-
tion for the DD/I as a whole, the change would provide more
flexibility for Cline by giving him a number of roughly equal
components to handle rather than gelling him to deal with
components which included the disproportionately large 00 can-
plex. 1172/
In order to elicit views on the issue from all sectors, in
early December the ADD/I, throug equested from John
Bagnall an objective appraisal of the proposed transfer of FDD to
OCR. Replying on 9 December 1963 in what was one of his last
memoranda as Chief, FDD, Bagnall listed six advantages of the trans-
fer, dealing mainly with activities -- machine processing of docu-
ments, procurement, indexing, etc. -- in which the division had
always cooperated closely with OCR. He cited only one disadvantage,
but this he characterized as "very important." It pertained to
FDD's primary function of intelligence collection fran overt
foreign-language documents. 00, he stated, appeared to be the
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logical organization for this activity, and the transfer of
FDD would mean some reduction of this function and diversion
of manpower to other activities. 1173/
The protestations of 00 and FDD against the transfer
proved fruitless. On 23 December 1963 siunroned a 25X1
staff meeting for the purpose of announcing "a regrettable
change" in 00 organization, 117 and four days later the
assignment of the division to OCR was officially effected. 1175/
Thus, 17 years after the Office was established, FDD's asso-
ciation with 00 came to anend.
2. FDD under OCR
The transfer of FDD to a new Office had little if any impact
on the character of its operations. Some changes inevitably re-
sulted in the long run, but since the duration of FDD's associa-
tion with OCR was rather brief -- only three years -- little was
done to change the general nature of the work. Fbr this reason
this history will not dwell at length on the details of the opera-
tion, which in general continued much as before, or on changes in
the routine or projects of an unusual nature -- the ALP test, for
example -- which have already been treated elsewhere.
This is not to imply that the OCR-FDD relationship was a
stagnant. one. FDD's OCR period may, generally speaking, be
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characterized as one of reexamination and reappraisal. This may
be attributed to a genuine operational need to. tighten up the
organization and to streamline its function.
In an early memorandum to the FDD staff, John K. Vance,
the new AD/CR, spoke of two principal themes which it was his
intention to pursue and develop during the initial year of con-
solidation. The first concerned career planning to encourage.
new experiences and fresh viewpoints, the second, a reexam-
ination of the FDD program to seek improvement in that sector. 1176
An immediate effect of the division's shift to OCR was a re-
shuffling of personnel at the higher echelons in the Office,
including FDD. John Bagnall, after almost 17 years as FDD Chief,
was advanced to DAD/CR and replaced in FDD by here- 25X1
tofore Chief of OCR's Special Register. Another FM officer to
move was ~ -1 who was appointed a branch chief in the
Special Register.. Other personnel changes followed. By the end
of September 1966 the cross-division assignment of scene 30
individuals had occurred. 11727
A retrenchment within OCR, as . a result, of Agency-wide
budgetary reductions in 1964 and 1965 also. had an effect on the
FDD structure. A curtailment and consolidation. In. the number of
FDD and JPRS.reports .took place and will be more-:fully treated
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below... As a result of . a : reduction in force i osed.. in the summer
of 1964 the. FDD T/O, was cut by[ positions..., Consequently, the 25X1
secretarial staff. of the various branches were sharply reduced,
the subject index of.the CTS was discontinued, FDD's editorial
staff was eliminated, and the division's branches sustained
sharp personnel cuts. 1178 The latter resulted in a rather
drastic reorganization of the Asia Branch which entailed the
consolidation of two sections to form a single Economic Section,
thereby eliminating one GS-13 slot. 1179 The curtailment of
service, particularly in the non-Bloc branches, was especially
inopportune at this time fran the FDD standpoint in view of in-
creased interest and demands in the intelligence coanmxnity for
information on Ccemmunist China, Latin America, and the African
countries. On the positive side, the Acquisitions Branch,.
formerly part of the CIA Library, was transferred to FDD on
1 April 1965, thus bringing the division into closer contact
with the major procurer. of its source material. 1180
In December 1964 inconformance.with the earlier Vance
proposal to reexamine all OCR programs as well as with the
economy-imposed, need to eliminate all but essential activities .
in the Office, OCR initiated a review of the FDD publications,
program. Since . the review was conducted-by: Htalter' J. Moberg,
Special Assistant to the AD/CR, it came to be known as the
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Moberg Survey. The. survey had a nunter of primary and secondary
objectives, but in essence its purpose was to. test. the responsive-
ness of the FDD product to Agency and community needs, to eliminate
those parts of it which failed to measure up to the criteria set,
and to consolidate the remainder in order to provide better and
more meaningful service to the consumers. The methodology em-
ployed involved setting up small ad hoc DD task groups or
eouznittees, convening a senior study group in the later phases
of the review for purposes of evaluation, consultation with Agency
and non-Agency consumer offices, interviews with employees at all
levels, and preparation of a final report. It was anticipated that
the major part of this special effort would be completed in six
months. 1181/
Although approved in December 1964, the survey did not get
under way until the following month and then took most of 1965 to
complete. One reason for the slow process was the meticulous
preparation and the detailed investigation involved, but it was
also the result of Moberg?s concern to disrupt normal operations
as little as-possible. Since the. survey involved a total of 128 ---
33 internal (FDD) and 95 external. MRS) -,,,serial publica-
tions and necessitated discussing each with the responsible
officer and the branch chief involved-in producing it and a
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survey by means of questionnaire of all recipients of the report,
it is understandable that the survey was a formidable and time-.
consuming task. In general, it was well received by all partici-
pants. The various people involved were extremely cooperative
in spite of the added chores which the investigation entailed.
As a positive side effect, the survey stimulated a certain
amount of self-analysis in the branches and caused, or at least
accelerated, with positive results some reviews of consumer
requirements and reactions even in advance of Moberg's own study.
FDD personnel participated extensively in the survey, not
only because it was their production which was being investigated
but also because their involvement was encouraged. All FDD branch
chiefs were asked to comment on the Moberg "Publications Survey
Form" with a view to making it more incisive and more responsive
to the survey's purpose. After consultation with subordinates,
all gave constructive criticisms -- some negative, some positive --
and, where feasible, these were incorporated.
With the consumer questionnaire finally hammered into shape,
the survey ofFDD's internal reporting program got under way in
March 1965. In the meanwhile, plans were made and a similar survey
form devised for review of the external (JPRS) program, but this
was not initiated until the following spring. The questionnaires
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for the internal survey were sent out in two. phases, one in
spring to serve as. a preliminary test on. the' basis of which an
improved survey form was devised and the other in fall which
covered the balance of the survey. The questions used were de-
signed to determine the appropriateness of a particular serial
report to the respondent's needs. Scone 433 questionnaires were
sent out, of which 347 were returned. The bulk of the question-
naires were turned in before the end of 1965, and Moberg sub-
mitted a summary of the responses to the Director of Central
Reference (D/CR) in may 1966.
The Moberg report, based on an exceptional response figure
of over 80 percent and representing the views of
analysts, that is, an average of 74 for each serial report, fur-
nished a comprehensive and relatively accurate analysis of
consumer judgment of the FDD product. The view of customer re-
actions provided by the survey, while critical in some instances,
in the aggregate gave.FDD fairly good marks and provided a rough
overall assessment of selected aspects of the processing of open
literature. . A by-product of the survey was the elimination of
sane 83 recipient eoanponents (or about..24 percent of those re-
sponding). ' Apparently many had regularly received serials for
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which they no longer. had a need and had not taken the trouble
to cancel their subscriptions. -P82/
The consumer survey on the JPRS reporting program was also
a pleted, and in January 1967 Deputy Chief of FDD,
reported on these findings. Here again, as in the case of the
internal program, there were a fair number of critical returns,
a few of which were aonpletely negative while others offered
constructive criticism. In general, however, the findings on
the program were favorable and JPRS reports were characterized
as an important source of basic factual intelligence information
for a wide range of Agency consumers. A result of both surveys
was a sharp consolidation of the FDD-JPRS output. The number of
.report titles originating in FDD area branches was reduced from
25 to 12 and in JPRS from 109 to 97. This was accomplished by
merging those with related subject matter to serve a wider range
of consumers and by eliminating those which were shown by the
survey to be of marginal value. 1183
By the time the FDD-JPRS production survey was co leted,
the division's days as an OCR component were already numbered.
Roughly coincident with. the period during. Which the study was
conducted, the DD/I under theDCI`s general guidance undertook
several major, changes which exercised*a profound effect on the
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OCR-kDD association and led eventually to the latter's demise
as an independent organization. These changes involved pro-
vision of new guidance and new guidance machinery to DD/I
collection and processing components, a reduction of the over-
all level of resources previously available to these organiza-
tions as well as a reduction in the relative level of resources
allocated to them compared with those distributed to the intel-
ligence production components, and the reorganization of several
major oomponents, principally collection and processing or-
ganizations.
The total cut in allocations projected by the DD/I for
his Intelligence Support Services group, successor to the de-
funct 00 and including OCR in addition to OGS, FBIS, and DCS,
was on the order of 15 percent. This represented a staff per-
the period FY 1968-1976. Unfortunately for OCR, and thus in
turn FDD, the projected cuts were not to be uniformly distributed.
The reduction was to be much more drastic for CGS and OCR than
for the other two components. In fact, the OCR cut reached
proportions of between a quarter and a third of its perscnnel
and financial resources. 1,184
At the DD/I's request, in late November 1966 Vance sub-
mitted three alternative plans designed to implement the proposed
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one-third reduction of OCR's personnel. strength, that is, from
an authorized strength
rAn of these pro-
posals called for an FDD T/O reduction from the. then current
1185/
The reduction in personnel strength was immediately implemented,
so that by March 1967, when the FDD-FBIS merger occurred, division
strength had been reduced
Financial cuts were similarly stringent. FDD's FY 1967
allotment for contractual funds had originally been established
but in August 1966
had been informally
Since surplus funds were,
however, reportedly accruing to OCR, he decided to continue the
JPRS program at the current rate. 1186 A request for supplemental
funds in January 1967 met with resistance and a severe cut-back
in FDD services was threatened. 1187/ This problem was carried
over to FBIS at the time of the merger but was eventually resolved
in April 1967 with the approval of in supplemental
funds. 1188/
The new trend in the Agency toward consolidation of its
resources designed to increase efficiency and to reduce waste
to a minimum had, as we have seen, a far-reaching effect on FDD
as an OCR cm1ponent. The division had derived some benefits
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and sustained some setbacks as a result of these troves. The
entire publications exploitation effort had been streamlined
and consolidated, and consumers were better served by a
smaller number of more precisely aimed and interrelated re-
ports. New management and key personnel exchanges had also
had beneficial results. On the other hand, FDD had suffered
a severe cut in manpower with no conceanitant reduction in its
obligations to the intelligence coammlity. Was it likely to
stop here? If FDD management had entertained such expectations,
its hopes would soon be dashed. The question soon to be answered
was: is FDD -- as an administrative organization -- really
necessary?
B. Merger with FBIS
1. Formation and Work of thel Study Grow-
Precedents for plans and projects to merge or at least to
bring into closer synchronization foreign radio broadcast (FBID)
and press (FDD) exploitation to better serve the intelligence
community were not lacking when the subject was revived in 1966.
Almost from the beginning of the Agency?s existence in 1947
the subject had been periodically brought up, briefly considered,
and then dropped until the next occurrence of duplication or
trespass by one in the other's domain stimulated another exchange.
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While both units were generally agreed that "something ought to
be done" and serious steps were on. occasion resorted to. to
effect cooperation, the* will. t. go all the way in bringing
about a full-fledged merger of open source handling was never
strong enough to carry it off. It was only when the crunch of
ecarieanic necessity began to be felt in the mi.d-1960s that the
Agency faced up to the problem and seriously began to look for
answers.
On 19 April 1966, in a memorandum to the Executive Direc-
tor-Ccarptroller, the DD/I, R. J. Smith, outlined plans for his
Directorate for the caning six years, the main thrust of which
involved a shift of manpower from .the collection to the pro-
duction area. Among suggestions offered to effect this change
was one to save personnel slots by combining radio and press
monitoring. 1189 A study group was established the following
month to examine the feasibility of such a move with a view to
achieving economies in operation, greater speed in receipt of
press information,- and elimination of duplication between the
two media,. Chief. of the.. Resources.. and Industries 25X1
Division, ORR, was selected to chair the gx~oup..and 1 December 25X1
1966 was set as _ the target' . date. for c letian.. of the study. 1190/ 25X1
Members of the.vannittee selected to assist :were 125X1.
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FBIS, of OBI, and of OCI. Others 25X11
participated in the course of the investigation.
At the outset of the study a problem arose in connection
with the statement of the terms of reference with which the
task force was to concern itself. FDD demurred over the initial
wording of the statement which, in FDD's view, implied a relation-
ship between consolidation of the press and broadcast monitoring
on the one hand and the matter of overseas exploitation of the
press on the other that the division declared did not in fact
exist. 1191/ The matter was finally resolved by separating the
two and having the Statement of the Problan read as follows:
This study was initiated by the DD/I to ascertain
whether it is (1) feasible to combine broadcast
monitoring and press exploitation abroad, and (2) to
determine the extent to which the performance of these
and related functions abroad would result in a net
advantage to the US intelligence effort. 1192/
It was under this directive that the Ad Hoc Camnittee for the
Study of Press and Broadcast Monitoring Activities began its
task on 30 June 1966.
The tendentious tone of the investigation was evident from
the outset and the divergencies in the viewpoints of FDD and FBIS
became more pronounced and more firmly fixed as time went on. Each
side, recognizing that the basic requirement was to free slots,
agreed with the other that action was required but differed widely
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on what was to be done. In essence, everything revolved around
the question of the continued existence of*FDD. FBIS believed
that the problem could best be solved by eliminating the FDD
structure, with FBIS absorbing its functions, and thus effecting
savings in costs and positions and, as a side effect, eliminating
duplication by having the major portion of press monitoring per-
formed at overseas bureaus in conjunction with broadcast monitoring.
FDD, on the other hand, having no desire to lose the organiza-
tion and system which it had painstakingly built up and developed
over the past two decades, fought hard to remain independent of
FBIS and presented a well-documented case for bringing about
savings in money and personnel through a series of changes and
reforms in press and radio monitoring which involved the FBIS
operation as much as FDD itself. FDD had no objection to overseas.,
press exploitation, in fact, it enthusiastically supported the idea;
it felt, however, that this function rightfully was within the
purview of the FDD co m on concern charter as defined by NSCID 16
and subsequently by NSCID 2.
As it evolved, the discussion concerned three factors related to
overseas exploitation -- saving of money, freeing of positions, and
speed of transmission -- but it came down basically to the question of
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whether or not to merge FDD with FBIS. FBIS pushed for the
merger, FDD was against it, and it was in this light that the
task force conducted its business despite the resolve to con-
duct an objective appraisal of the problem. Proper obeisance
to objectivity was evinced several times. In one. of the early
, meetings
stated his intention to determine first 25X1
"if any merger is feasible" before going into costing details. 1193/
Moreover, in September, Roger Seely, FBIS Director, declared:
Neither side should take rigidly preconceived
positions in the Task Force. We should "push for
total merger of FDD and FBIS" only as a sequel to an
objective finding by the Task Force that the two
activities should be merged. 1194
Such statements notwithstanding, from the standpoint of FBIS
there was little doubt from the beginning as to the final outcome
on merger; the only issue was to spell out the justification for
the move and to determine how best to implement it. In connection
with the statement above, for example, in August,
who carried the fight for FBIS until 16 September when
replaced him on the ocamittee and
as FBIS spokesman, stated his opinion that the~ task
.force was not conducting a feasibility study but rather an imple-
mentation. study and that, as he interpreted the background memo-
randa, the DD/I was. in effect stating that FDD and. FBIS would be
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merged. objected-to this interpretation and~ 25X1
similarly noted that this was not his. understanding of his terms 25X1
of reference. 1195 Still, in September FBIS continued to stress
its view that the merger had already been decided at the DD/I
level by circulating the DD/I planning paper, which included a
statement of intention to effect the merger. 1196
The investigation by the task force's chairman was conducted
throughout in a fair and highly competent manner, but regardless
of the sincerity of the expressions of objectivity at the beginning
and the appeals to avoid pre-judgment. of the issue, the atmosphere
was highly partisan. The FBIS manner throughout was indicative of
a feeling of confidence that the question was settled and that
merger was only a matter of time. On the other hand, FDD efforts
represented a rearguard delaying action. The task force meetings,
which at the height of the study were held at least once a week,
and the informal conversations and the memoranda and notes which
followed, were pungent with sharp rejoinders and caustic exchanges
and replete with accusation and counter-claims. The contributions.
of the OOI and OBI mi tubers of the can ittee proved, to be minimal
Ovi appeared to favor a merger if it would .rr rove its receipts
and to oppose it if this were not the case. OBI's position was
that map and publications procurement was peripheral to the feasi-
bility study. and would therefore exercise little influence on the
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final decision. ' 1197. .
At the opening session on 30 June 1966 the.chaixman directed
both FDD and FBIS to submit their views on the items outlined in
the o mnittee'.s terms of reference. These reports subsequently
served as the basis upon which further studies were made and dis-
cussions held.. They were fairly voluminous documents dealing
mainly with the structure and functions of the two components.
Of chief interest were the sections in each report discussing
the feasibility of consolidating the two media, representing as
they did the arguments for and against a merger. The gist of
the FBIS presentation was that there was considerable duplication
in the content of the two media and that this led to an unavoid-
able duplication on similar themes. Combining radio and press
exploitation would therefore lead to mare efficient use of lan-
guage skills, avoidance of duplication, and speedier transmittal
of material to consumers.. From this FBIS concluded that, on the
basis of its own experience in radio and press exploitation, this
activity not only could.but should be collocated and that most of
the exploitation could be done in..the.field. 1198
In its report FDD conceded the desirability of overseas
exploitation of.current press material but pointed out that
this category represented only a small. segment of the: FDD function.
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The greater. portion of its mission consisted of basic. exploitation
and ad hoc translation which, required the specialized knowledge
and expertise of. cleared' intelligence officers positioned close
to the consumer. The division also cited the linguistic and
technical skills. employed by JPRS and characterized these as a
national resource. It further indicated that requirements levied
on FDD extended beyond the apparent capability offered by the
sites of the present FBIS bureaus. Moreover, the level of clear-
ance of non-staff field personnel would determine haw specific
the requirements could be and was likely to make it more difficult
to focus on the. real target. The point was also made that it was
unlikely that either an FDD field program or a combined FDD/FBIS
endeavor would result in an appreciable. saving in dollars or
ceiling positions. 1119Y
The task force continued to meet frequently throughout the
balance of the summer and during the early fall, and at these
sessions the various points presented in the feasibility studies
of the two ccamponents were discussed thoroughly, claims and
counterclaims were. examined, and gradually a synthesis of the
points at issue was arrived at by the: chairnnan..This is not to
say that agreement. was reached., by. the. .contending..parties. For
the most part . they held stubbornly,, to their, original positions,
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but the. interplay of the various points.. of view. brought out
many of the. strengths. and weaknesses in the. axgutnentation pre-
sented by the participants.
By the end of August there appeared to be a perceptible
swing in favor of the FBIS position. reported that al-
though the. chairman continued to appear totally objective, he
was obviously impressed by the repeated statements of the FBIS
representatives regarding the speed with which they could trans-
late and transmit information frm the press. judgment
at this point was that the battle was not going well and that
FDD was outweaponed. 1200 FBIS was totally committed and the
fact that they were overseas and were doing press exploitation
plus their.fast cmlmunications capability gave them a decided
advantage.
In the meetings which followed, the corrnittee representatives
reached agreement on a number of points relating to the FDD operation,
namely, that S&T exploitation should not be sent overseas because
of the difficulty of obtaining linguists with the required technical
background, that a certain language capability had, to be retained
in-house to handle classified translation and ad hoc projects such
as the translation of books,. and that JPRS should not be abolished.
This left at issue.the question.of the' feasibility and-cost of doing
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all non-technical translation work abroad. FBIS.believed that
this could be easily done. at its.overseas'..bureaus - the Vienna.
and Frankfurt press scrutiny operations served.as precedents --
and at less cost per linguist than in the United States. FDD
opted for the concept of US embassy-based-press exploitation
which could be.i lemented.without the assignment of division
staff personnel overseas and at lower cost. than the FBIS concept.
The plan would free Headquarters personnel to meet consumer re-
quirements for which no capability then existed. This arrangement,
it recommended, should be carried out under FDD control. 1201
With the target defined, the group set out to study in de-
tail cost estimates, personnel requirements, and anticipated
savings. For openers
suggested supplanting the
Headquarters translation staff with overseas aliens, thus cutting
some 100 from the staff of 167 and leaving the remaining 67 to
provide Headquarters services. To do this would involve not only
immediate processing overseas but also selection there for JPRS
processing. in the United States. 1202 On 14 September FBIS sub-
mitted a study on the costs..and advantages of doing all FDD and
JPRS Soviet translations (excluding . S&T. items) at the Austrian
Bureau. The' study..was intended to shoat, that,the work could be
done with 18: fewer classified' slots than rid. by.. FDD and
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would make current materials available on a daily basis. 1203
A week later FBIS submitted a similar study for East European
exploitation which also promised savings in personnel and
dollars. 1204/
The papers were discussed at length but no results were
immediately achieved. The committee also reviewed problems in-
volved in collocating press and radio monitoring in other world
areas. In the next week or two FDD submitted a recomputatia
of the FBIS figures pertaining to overseas handling of FDD-JPRS
materials and this contribution was in'turn reanalyzed by FBIS.
Thus the give-and-take continued, in general presenting the
chairman with two versions of every issue discussed.
By fall, these issues included linguist productivity,
scanning time, and media duplication. FBIS continued to emphasize
that the press and radio treated essentially the same information,
while FDD reiterated its contention that each medium encompassed
an essentially different body of information. FBIS pushed the
point that a combined FBIS-FDD operation would save both slots and
money and would give unproved service to consumers. indi-
cated that such a changeover would have to be carefully handled
and that common sense dictated this could best be done under one
organization. Significantly, informed him that this was 25X1
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an important point, a portent of future decisions. 1205
The likely effect on an ixl house language capability if
press monitoring were moiled abroad was discussed at the 29
September meeting. FDD expressed its opinion that linguists
would lose their skill if it were not used or would seek other
positions and that no new linguists could be hired for essentially
non-linguistic editorial positions. disagreed
and' they and the study group chairman suggested various possi-
bilities for maintaining a language capability for Agency use by
rotating linguist personnel to OTR, to the DDP, and to FBIS over-
seas positions or by using cleared contract personnel. There
appeared to be a divergence of definition as to what constituted
"language capability." At the conclusion of the 29 September
meeting
stated his intention to proceed with the drafting
of a report for camnittee consideration and invited continuing
cxxai nt and supporting argumentation from both sides. The latter
was not long in conning as each side attempted to bolster its case.
Almost imnediately.the Acting D/CR submitted
a ne rorandum, with supporting attachments, to ,the. ADD/I arguing
the case for continued FDD.affiliation with. OCR..:... Much of his
argumentation .rested on facts. already presented earlier by FDD
representatives' on, the
. study .group. 1206....The' .contributions
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from the FBIS oonta.ngent.wore equally ipressive.,.. They included
reference to the. 23 April 1964 memorandum fran ]/State to the
DCI requesting FBIS press coverage. of North Vietnam and character-
izing the FDD effort as inadequate' 1207 and two 1954 Memoranda
written by[::::::= the FDD liaison officer at the FBIS 25X1
German Bureau, and John Bagnall, then FDD Chief, respectively,
urging and approving consolidation of German press scrutiny
activities at Frankfurt. 1208/
The plethora of paper continued, especially from the FBIS
side. This dealt with all aspects of the problem -- costs,
personnel, language, duplication, quality and timeliness of
output, etc. -- all intended to demonstrate the validity of
the sender's case and to sway the chairman's thoughts and con-
clusions as he prepared his report. During the week 13-19 October
FBIS submitted five back-up papers on different subjects to
-- an illustration of the importance with which the pend- 25X1
ing decision was viewed. Despite the confidence expressed
earlier by FBIS was taking no chances that any informa-
tion or insights favorable to its side of. the..argment were
not brought to the. chairman's attention... The .-sau attitude
could be attributed to FDD., but. the, volume. of, paper frcen the
division was. not as great.
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2. The. FDD ?Position Paper
on 15 November 1966, after four and a half :months of dis-
cussion on the pros and cons of the merger question in the
course of which reams of paper supporting each side's views
were submitted, FDD issued a voluminous position paper on the
subject. Defining the problem as the DD/I's search for T/O
positions for intelligence production, author
of the paper, introduced a second question, namely, whether the
option of seeking positions had to be limited either to an FDD-
FBIS meager or to arrangements for increased press exploitation
overseas without being given the broader scope of seeking econ-
cmies by any practical manner in both organizations. In other
words, he felt that a smaller target than necessary and the
least attractive alternative frcrn both an administrative and
substantive standpoint had been chosen. Because the committee
was limited to a single option, he stated, it became apparent
that the only way to achieve savings, except by direct T/O re-
ductions, was to consider. the possibility of having foreign
nationals perform overseas many. of the tasks.., carried out .at
headquarters by staff personnel. It was axound..the pros and
cons of this configuration that the FDD and FBIS positions had
polarized, and the'.oomnittee concentrated its efforts. primarily
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on a comparison between operational costs. and. service capabilities
of this arrangement and the existing MD-JPRS.operation.
FBIS based its arguments in favor of a merger primarily on
the judgment that a merger would eliminate duplication, increase
timeliness, and save T/O positions. FDD, which opposed the merger,
followed the opposite tack in its argumentation. The cost per
1,000 words of FBIS published information, for example, was at
least six times greater than FDD costs, and the reduction in costs
that would accrue from the few positions saved would be offset by
other costs directly related to the merger.
The position paper discussed in detail the factors which in
FDDIs view would have to be considered to ensure a logical solution.
In summary, these discussions led FDD to the following conclusions:
1. There was no logical basis for merging FDD and
FBIS operations since the two cxxtponents consisted of
two distinct intelligence collection systems, each
covering different sources of information and requiring
different methods of exploitation and differently skilled
personnel.
2. The relocation of press exploitation overseas would
yield no real economies.
3. FDD did not duplicate FBIS reporting.
4. The timeliness of FDD reporting was responsive
to consumer needs, appropriate to the substance of the
information reported by, FDD, and consistent with. the
principle of responsible program and. budgetary planning.
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5. The proposed relocation of press exploitation
overseas would have a critically adverse impact on
the Agency's linguistic support operations.
6. The change from domestic to foreign based
operations would have an adverse effect on current
Administration and Agency policy directives relating
to the balance of payments problem.
Having thus outlined the negative effects of the proposed
merger, the FDD position paper then took the offensive and identi-
fied and analyzed in detail areas where substantial advantages
could accrue through increased coordination and cooperation. This
would entail, for example, putting to use uncommitted translation
and editing capability in the FBIS field bureaus, seeking out the
activities in both operations which yielded the lowest output of
intelligence information and securing their elimination or the
substitution of more economical means, and the elimination from
high priority processing of FBIS services not deserving of such
treatment. In the latter category the paper suggested a review
of several FBIS operations.
In view of FDD's conviction that the disadvantages accruing
to the DD/I and the Agency from an FDD-FBIS merger far outweighed
the limited potential for personnel reductions, recatmended
against the merger of these activities and proposed that, if the
transfer of staff positions to intelligence production functions
was mandatory, overall DD/I and Agency interests could best be served
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by a reduction in. funds and personnel for those Qperatians in,
each organization which. did not meet the highest.--standards of
cost effectiveness. 1209
The FDD position paper was fozwarded to. the chairman of
the ad hoc study committee on 16 November by John Vance, D/CR,
with several supporting observations, including a brief analysis
of the differences in sources employed by FDD and FBIS which
stressed in particular the editorial judgments contained in the
press which were not generally characteristic of broadcast traffic.
He also emphasized the continuing need for a sizable staff comple-
ment at Headquarters even if the main effort should be shifted to
a contract operation elsewhere. 1210
FBIS ccaments on the FDD Position Paper, submitted by
dictably negative. The substance of the FDD paper,
declared, 25X1
rested on erroneous premises. He disputed, for example, the FDD
practice of comparing press scrutiny with radio monitoring costs;
he felt that to lump FDD and JPRS output was to blur the picture
since only FDD positions.were under. consideration;. and he char-
acterized the categorical statement of..no dupl cation between FDD
and FBIS as "demonstrably" inaccurate. .Othe r points , including
FDD" s "curious" -use of statistical ocaFputata ons, wem brought up,
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and the memorandum left no doubt that the.JDD paper had done
nothing to change FBIS conclusions.' 1211 A fuller analysis
involving a point-by-point reply to the FDD Position Paper
was issued by FBIS on 14 December, but it merely presented: in
detail the content of the 22 November memorandum.
reaction to the FDD Position Paper and to the
FBIS critique was significant. He informed
found the FBIS comments on the FDD paper "well tempered" and
"responsive" to a number of important points. In contrast, the
FDD Position Paper merely repeated arguments which had been
offered in the course of his co mittee's deliberation and did
not address itself to the original terms of reference. Its
usefulness, he felt, was therefore xm prcmised. 1212/
Meanwhile, the campaign by both sides to influence the
ultimate decision continued bn all fronts. On 18 November the
FBIS Director presented an elaborate case demonstrating the
incidence of FDD-FBIS duplication despite the existence of an
agreement between the two components designed to avoid this; * 1213/
* On 4 January 1967, following a review of the study group working
papers and a discussion with the directors of OCR and FBIS, Paul
Borel, Director of Intelligence Support (DIS), addressed himself
to the issue of translation duplication which had so frequently
been brought up by FBIS in the course of the feasibility study. Al-
though. expressing some dissatisfaction with the scope and coverage
of overall FDD and FBIS production,. he concluded that there was no
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at the same time claims and counter-claims. were put forward on
the currency of reporting and on the receipt of sources- 1215
and on 22 November FBIS once more pointed out, with illustra-
tions, the benefits of -singlepackaging open material on the
same subject. 1216
By the latter part of November, having employed the mass
of arguments and facts presented by FDD and FBIS to support
their respective positions and having applied to this data an
exhaustive method of inductive systems and cost analysis,
had completed his statistical presentation and
had drawn up tentative conclusions and recommendations for the
study committee report. He had made no fast commitment at
this point, but it had become increasingly clear that he was
leaning in favor of an operational consolidation and a shift
overseas of much of the so-called "current" press exploitation.
He fixed on the idea of identifying this as all material appear-
ing in daily and weekly newspapers, which FBIS reminded him had
to include all press items, in order to avoid double-scanning.
* (continued) basis for the FBIS complaint because no real problem
existed. The examples cited by FBIS to back its contention he did
not regard as valid. Moreover, the Moberg Survey earlier in 1966
had found that, out of 347 replies from CIA analysts, only four
claimed total duplication and only 74 noted partial duplication,
which many discounted as insignificant and unavoidable. 1214/
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By the end of November the chairman had devised a model
overseas press operation based on doing European press scrutiny
in London rather than Vienna. The change in locale was based
on the greater availability of English-speaking contract per-
sonnel in Iondon. The Hong Kong PMU operation, he felt, was
well-suited to be used as an Asian model. Consideration was
also given to the possibility of using Buenos Aires, Saigon,
and Bangkok for other world areas. 1217/
The FDD position was beginning to erode by the beginning
of December and- attempted to salvage what he could. On
who had requested. it, the re-
suits of a study of the proposed overseas exploitation of the
USSR and East European press. If approved, such a program would
be conducted at FBIS overseas bureaus but under the management
of FDD staff employees. 1218% In an 8 December reply,
for FBIS sharply rejected the concept of separate manage-
ment of press and radio processing through shared facilities
and, insisted that the opportunities inherent in a consolidation
of operation "not be smothered. in bureaucratic encumbrances" but
rather "be assessed and pursued without regard for traditional
preserves and empires." 1219/ Since it was the FDD "preserve
and empire" which was about to bear the brunt of the study group
decision, this was advice easily given.
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FDD.repeated its opposition to relinguishing control of
press exploitation, whetherperformed.overseas or in the United
States. insisted there was no valid basis for a merger
of FDD and FBIS nor for the "one management and one chain of
command" concept proposed by in order to achieve effective
operation of the London model. He reasoned that as FBIS was not
engaged in any language activity in London, there would be no
occasion to share linguistic assets or for any other joint op-
eration and that FDD would require only logistics and communi-
cations support from FBIS. It was anticipated that a minimum
of five staff employees would be required to handle all
linguistic processing in London. 1220/
That a "consolidation" of FDD and FBIS in some form would
take place was by now a foregone conclusion. was examining
the management problem and weighing alternatives which he felt
should be outlined for the DD/I. One possibility would be to
place the two activities under one overall management. This
would constitute roughly a partnership of equals, an arrange-
ment likely to be preferred by FDD. Another would be the move
suggested by FBIS, that is, the transfer of FDD en bloc toFBIS
and the integration of its functions into FBIS operations. In
either instance ^ hoped' to draw on the experience of both,
groups and to`accomplish the change without.it appearing to be
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a victory for either component:'. 1221/
Both FDD and FBIS had from time to time,.at~
quest, expressed their views on a consolidated press exploita-
tion operation, FDD most recently in its position paper. On
20 December FBIS presented to the"-chairman a detailed memoran-
dum incorporating its suggestions on the structure of an overt
media exploitation organization. This paper outlined in large
part the program which was eventually implemented. It foresaw
the emergence of a new entity reflecting the common features
of both organizations while retaining the distinctive characteris-
tics unique to each. FDD would be transferred to FBIS and the
merging process would then begin. Present modes of operation
would temporarily continue, but as press material entered the
flow from overseas, these distinctions would dissolve. To free
linguistic personnel at Headquarters, press exploitation opera-
tions in major overseas bureaus would be enlarged along the
lines of the models presented. to the committee. Managerial
positions through division chiefs would be filled by either
former editorial or linguistic personnel on the basis of ex-
perience and ability without regard for former affiliation.
One of the chief benefits of a consolidation, as FBIS saw it,.
would be.the emergence of a oamnori mission bas
d
t
i
e
.no
on.mad
a
but on requirements; '_1222/
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.. The. feasibility. study had by. the last weeks of December
almost.run its course.: A final brief altercation occurredbe-
tween FDD and FBIS over presentations by the two components of
production figures; it was touched off by what FDD regarded as
an inflated FBIS claim of wordage produced by its German Bureau
monitors.'1223/ Each side had by now presented its case ad
infinitum and had furnished the committee chairman with ex-
had begun the task of writing the
report in November, and all that remained was to put it in its
final form.
3. The jLReport and Aftermath
On 1 February 1967, some eight months after initiation of
the study, ::1 submitted to the ADD/I his report en-
titled "Study of Press and Broadcast Nbnitoring Activities."
This 150-page vehicle encompassed a synthesis of all the facts
considered in the course of the study and presented a total of
16 conclusions and 14 recommendations, two of the latter being
basic and the remainder largely derivative. The study concluded
that it was feasible to combine broadcast monitoring with for-
eign publication exploitation at certain locations abroad and
that a significant reduction in staff positions could be achieved
by using foreign linguists at these locations.. To.realize a
con-parable reduction in expenditures, however, foreign nationals
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would have..to..do.most of the field. editing, as. well. .Such an
arrangement was probably feasible,.but_.recvnmended that
this first be tested against the Soviet and East European press
in London before applying the proposal to other printed media
and adopting it generally for other areas. If the London model
proved successful as a plan for general operations, antici-
pated an eventual net savings of about 100 staff positions to-
gether with greatly improved timeliness, elimination of duplication,
quality maintenance, and retention of an in-house linguistic capa-
bility adequate for most contingencies.
The study also concluded that the similarities between
foreign broadcast monitoring and foreign publications exploitation
greatly exceeded the differences. The examination of these two
activities had convinced that FDD and FBIS had much more
in ccmmn than the former had with its then parent organization,
OCR. He therefore reccanended consolidation of FDD and FBIS as
essential to the pore efficient performance of their present
functions and as indispensable for the successful exploitation
of foreign publications abroade'1224/
Needless to say, though they came as no surprise, the
results of . the Study,were a disappointment to FDD man-
agement and staff .. Two weeks after the . report . was issued,
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directed a memorandum to the. D/CR delineating the
FDD position on tho
Study. Concerning the two basic rec-
ommendations, that is, the merger of the two organizations and
the testing of overseas press exploitation, he concurred in both,
though he did not endorse concept of operations or estimate
of potential personnel savings. Of the remaining 12 recommendations
he concurred in all but three. These pertained to negotiations with
State to allocate to the Hong Kong PM Chinese press exploitation on
all but S&T subjects; contingent on success of the London model,
collocating exploitation of Southeast Asian and Latin American
publications with FBIS bureaus in these areas; and retention of
Acquisitions Branch by OCR. 1225
To aceonpany the FDD Position Memorandum, submitted
a second one in which he urged careful, though expeditious, imple-
mentation of the proposals. He expressed the belief that 25X1
the best means to achieve this step would be to bring the FDD
and FBIS functions into the new organization as equal partners,
each under the supervision of a deputy reporting to a director of
an office of foreign media monitoring. 1226 Since this suggestion
ran counter to the strongly-held conviction of the FBIS represent-
atives on the study group that there should be a single chain of
eoamanand, it appeared unlikely that this proposal would have much
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.chance of.acceptance. Indeed, proposal was 'never
seriously considered.
On 20 February Paul Borel, in recommending approval of the
Report and the transfer of FDD from OCR to FBIS, offered
some interesting comments to the DD/I. He cited the report as
an excellent study but termed regrettable the fact that the
original frame of reference had been so restricted as to obviate
consideration of other alternatives for the disposition of FDD.
In this he echoed earlier complaint. Borel also posed
the interesting questions of why the merger of the two conponents
had not occurred in the 15 years they were under 00 or why in
1962 the,then head of FDD bad offered persuasive reasons why FDD,
having nothing in com on with FBIS, should be moved to OCR. Borel
also noted the fact that the report made no mention of the.impact
on the US balance of payments problems of expanding overseas
operations, a point frequently stressed by FDD in the negotiations
just concluded. He also felt that the saving of 100 positions,
contemplated in the conclusions, was too high a figure to
come out of FDD alone as were also estimates of the ex-
tent to which the management of the translation effort could be
turned over to foreigners. Borel, however, approved of the
basic notion of doing this and believed it would result in
appreciable savings, perhaps 50 or more in FDD. He.thought the
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principle had application in F'BIS as tell. 1227
That the impact of positions lost be.shaxed by the two
components, as suggested by the DIS, appeared not to have been
contemplated. On 14 February chief of the FBIS
executive staff, with other FBIS officers -- no FDD representa-
tive was present -- met with John Bagnall, since 1 November 1965
the DD/I Planning Officer, to discuss plans for the merger. Bagnall
informed the group that the DD/I had decided to reccznexld to the
DCI the transfer of FDD in toto to FBIS. In line with this
decision, for FY 1968 he would allocate to FBIS El FDD staff
positions for the press monitoring program, a 16-position cut
franE:]already approved for FDD in FY 1968. This represented
the savings in positions to be derived from establishing the
London model. Added to the=were five staff positions rep-
resenting the present level of FBIS press monitoring, a total
of_for FY 1968. At the same time the number of positions
allocated to broadcast monitoring and propaganda analysis for
FY 1968 was = Since the Report had contemplated a
saving of almast 100 positions, further cuts would be required.
This was to be accomplished by reducing the press monitoring
positions to 180 by FY 1969 and 143 by,FY 1973. Broadcast
monitoring and propaganda analysis positions would be increased
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to 322 by..FY 1969 and remain at this level .through.FY 1973.
Also under consideration was the possibility. of phasing down
or closing one or more of-the JPRS field offices to free more
staff positions.1228/
By mid-February the DD/I had accepted the _ recannenda-
tions to merge FDD and FBIS activities into a single component,
and the FDD case for independent survival was lost.
accepted the decision in good grace and on 24 February formally
apprised the FDD staff of it, expressing the belief that the
pending changes would prove beneficial to both components by
providing greatly enlarged career opportunities for all personnel
concerned. 1229/
Meanwhile, preliminary to the actual transfer, steps had
been initiated to plan and carry out the numerous tasks involved
in beginning the long-term process of consolidation, including
such matters as plans for the London model, transfer and consolida-
tion of funds, development of a new and broader organization,
space allocations, orientation briefings and many others. In
connection with organizational planning, suggested
assigning.the Chief, FDD, to the FBIS Directoros.Office to.head
a special.merger task force, and this was done-This had .the
double advantage of involving the top FDD.echelon in.the.merger
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process and relieving the Director's. Office of participation
in working out the details. At:the same time
presence at the head of the task force would reassure FDD
staff manbers, some of whom doubtless had qualms about a
merger designed to eliminate slots they now occupied: 1230/
The FDD story ended on 1 March 1967. Effective that day
the division, less its Acquisitions Branch (which was retained
by OCR), was transferred to FBIS. 1231/ For the next two months
it operated-essentially unchanged as a division of the new amal-
gamated organization, but on 1 May the old FBIS administrative
set-up was reorganized, and with this change the designation
"Foreign Documents Division" went out of existence.
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CI PTER SIX'2'EEN
Conclusion
To conclude this history, a brief highlighting of FDD's
20-year career and some random thoughts on these high points
may be in order.
The close affinity between FDD and FBIS operations,
offered at the merger negotiations as the reason for combining
the two components, leads to the question of why the merging
of press and radio monitoring was so long delayed. If it
served to bring about fiscal economies in 1967, would this not
also have been a desirable goal much earlier? The answer is
an obvious "yes," but the reason for failure to push merger
earlier is apparent, too. The two operations originated on
the basis of widely divergent developments in the Wbrld War II
period and, under the circumstances, little if any thought was
given to combining them at that time. Subsequent growth brought?
the development and solidification of separate cadres, organiza-
tions, philosophies of function, and methods. Consequently, a
consolidation of operations, which in the early years could have
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been more easily accomplished, was made many times more diffi-
cult 20 years later by bureaucratic inertia and opposition.
Moreover, the saving in positions, the basic purpose of the
move, could have been accomplished whether the two components
.were integrated or not. The merger fulfilled its purpose,
but it created very little change in operations. As of this
writing (1973), the anticipated integration of press and radio
monitoring, which in the early stages of the merger negotiations
in 1966 was foreseen as an amalgamated function of combined
production branches, has not materialized. Each operation is
.still separately conducted.
Perhaps the single most significant operational event
In FDD history was the establishment and development from 1957
on of the JPRS field office system. It was important because
it constituted an escape fran the quantitative limitations
imposed theretofore on FDD production by required personnel
and security qualifications and, at sane sacrifice of quality
control, represented a breakthrough to almost unlimited
translation capacity at a very reasonable cost. It solved the
division's most pressing and persistent problem -- volume of
material.
On the other hand, the ALP/Mr project to develop machine
translation, designed to expand FDD operations. further still,
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no contribution whatever so far as the division was concerned.
In light of the advances achieved in MT up to that time, how-
ever, it was a test which had to be made.
The transfer of FDD to OCR in 1963 was ostensibly designed
.to effect savings through a reexamination and streamlining of
the division's program. This was largely accomplished. Numer-
ous reports were eliminated and the balance of the reporting
program was reorganized and made more meaningful and responsive,
to consumer requirements. Basically, however, this purpose,
though important, was secondary. The transfer was consummated
as a by-product of administrative changes at a higher level,
namely, the abolition of 00, which had outlived its usefulness,
and the establishment of direct contact in the chain of cc&mand
between the DD/I and two of the three former 00 components.
FDD was not a beneficiary of this change. Some, though less
than serious, consideration was given to the possibility of
advancing FDD to Office status, but this was never carried out.
A word or two on scare of the strengths and weaknesses
of FDD. Without doubt the overriding strength of-the organiza-
tion was the concept. for which it was created in the first
?.place,.to serve as a.focal point for the intelligence
and considerable time and effort, this experiment made 25X1
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coanrn=ty -- expanded later on even beyond this -- for all
foreign literature translation and handling. Through its CTS/DEX
operation the division prevented untold hours of duplicative
and wasteful translation and thereby saved the government
thousands of dollars. Paradoxically, during the merger
talks in late 1966 one of the primary reasons offered for
merger was the duplication factor. As these discussions
brought out, same FDD-FBIS duplication existed despite con-
tinuing efforts to avoid it. It was, however, minimal.
Closer coordination and more stringent supervision could
doubtless have reduced this.even further.
Another strength was the consolidation by the division
of valuable and, in many instances, unique language resources
which offered capabilities in almost every known language
and dialect. required by the government. With FDD as the
central medium, the dispersal of these resources was prevented
.and they were maintained as a ccarmon fund for the benefit
of the ccmnunity.
A weakness often cited.during FDD`s 20 years was the
division?s production delays. The nature and volume of the
source material exploited by the division made such delays
difficult to avoid and created a considerable degree of
consumer dissatisfaction. in the course of time, procedures
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that were at least partially successful were introduced to
eliminate the delays or reduce their effect. Still, the
division never achieved the currency of output that FBIS, for
example, maintained. Perhaps the solution would have been
the early institution of overseas press exploitation to
.,bring the division closer to its sources. Control of the
PPO system would also have helped.
Another weakness - one not of its own making - which
plagued FDD fran the beginning and was never satisfactorily
resolved was its physical isolation from its consumers. The
encouragement of liaison and the establishment of language
service units in various CIA areas were helpful, but it goes
without saying that had the division been located within the
main CIA area, its contribution could have been many times
more efficient and timely.
FDD no longer exists, but the division's common-service
function of document processing continues. Despite all the
.buffeting encountered, especially in the long interim from
1946 to 1953 when the issue was actively debated, in the
final analysis the fact was accepted that the processing of
..documents, including translation, was better performed as a
centralized operation than dispersed among separate Agency
.canponents.. The.delay on the part of the intelligence vormtunity
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in accepting this. fact was a matter of self-interest mainly
attributable to the fear that a central system was less re-
sponsive to consumer requirements than individual component
translation units would.be. This attitude is difficult to
understand in view of the general acceptance during this
same period of the central service performed by FBIS in con-
nection with radio intercept of materials very similar in
content to press items. Whatever the reason, it required a
..considerable selling effort by FDD over an extended period
of time to convince the consumers of the quality of its out-
put and the economies inherent in the system developed to
service the ccnvunity. Once acceptance had been achieved,
the division played an important role in intelligence collec-
tion. The events of 1967 would appear to indicate that the
importance of this role, if not of the administrative struc-
ture which performed it, continues.
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Appendix A
Organizational Charts
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DOCUMENTS BRANCH
17 December 3.946
Administration
and Security
Office
Screening
Section
Research
Projects
~z
Office of
the Chief
Control -and
Planning Office
Publications
Section
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1
SCI
Library
Section
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T
27 June ]947
Office of
the Chief
John J. Bagna311
acting chief
Administrative
Staff
acting chief
Documents
Source Survey
Division
acting chief
'USM and
Satellites
Division
Far,
Eastern
Division
(Unassigned)
Scientific
and Technical
Division
act' -g chief
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS BRANCH
29 Ju]y 1948
Office of
the Chief
r r ~
Administrative
Staff
Documents
Source Survey
Division
USSR
Division
Document Screen-
ing & Reference
Division
chief
Translation
Service
Division
(Unassigned)
Scientific
and Technical
Division
Eastern
European
Division
acting chief
Far
Eastern
Division
Near East
Africa.
Division
anti chief I
25X1
25X1
25X1
L chief
25X1
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24 August 19119
Office of
the Chief
John J. Bagnall,
chief
Administrative
Staff
25X1
25X1
Reports
Division
Documents
Control
Division
Scientific
and Technical
Division
USSR
Division
LI
25X1
Eastern
European
Division
Far
Eastern
Division
I
Near East
/Africa
Division
25X1
25X1
25X1
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
27 June 1957:
Office of
the Chief
John J. Bagnall,
chief
Administrative
Staff
acting chief
I
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Reports
Branch
Eastern
Europe
Branch
Documents
Control
Branch
Far East
Branch
Scientific
and Technical
Branch
Near East
/Africa
Branch
USSR
Branch
Western
Europe
Branch
acting ?e
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FMEIGN DOCI ENTS DIVISION
7 May 1953,
Office of
the Chief
John J. Bagnall,
chief
Administrative
Staff
Reports
Branch
Scientific
and Technical
Branch
USSR
Branch
Eastern
Europe
Branch
chi?f
Far East
Branch
Near East
/Africa
Branch
Western
Europe
Branch
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I October 1953
Office of
the Chief
John J. Bagnalli
chief
Administrative
Staff
Reports
Branch
Scientific
and Technical
Branch
chief
USSR
Branch
Eastern
Europe
Branch
Far East
Branch
Western
World
Branch
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1
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
I April 2957
Office of
the Chief
John J. Bagnalls
chief
Joint Publica-
tions Research
Service
Reports
Branch
Scientific
and Technical
Branch
USSR
Branch
Eastern
Europe
Branch
Far East
Branch
Western
World
Branch
Administrative
Staff
25X1
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FaREIGN DOCtJMEENTS DIVISION
9 June 1960
Office of
the Chief
John J. Bagnall,
chief
Joint Publica-
tions Research
Service
25X1
I
Support
Branch
USSR
Branch
Administrative
Staff
Asia
Branch
Europe/Africa
Branch
25X1
25X1
- 736
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FEIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
I April ]965
Office of
the Chief
Joint Publica-
tions Research
Service
Support
Branch
USSR
Branch
Administrative
Staff
Asia
Branch
Europe/Africa
/Latin America
Branch
Acquisitions;
Branch
chief
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1
Appendix B
Requirements Foreign Documents
Date Received Screened L
1947 194b
1948 533b
1949 635b
1950 1,443
1951 1,560
1952 2,182,
1953 2,664
1954 2,859
1955 3,150
1956 3,055
1957 .3,407
1958 3,713
1959 3,131
1960 .2,920
1961 3,061
1962 3,358
1963 3,646
1964 3,990
1965 3,956
1966 4,334
1967f 2,990
82,790 (Feb
-Jun 47)
ill, 397b
144,496b
153,171
226,644
252,954
260,901
200,022
194,058
175,986
173,048
173,298
168,143
245,416
244,300
271,700
298,000
395,300
n. a.
n.a.
n. a.
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION STATISTICS 1947-1967
(Fiscal Years)
Foreign-Language
Pages Screened
111,750b
2,7841925b
3,612,400b
4,436,725b
5,666,100
6,444,600
6,649,640
5,111,533
5,026,885
4,462,912
16,511,397e
20,232,471
28,202,000
28,800,000
28,802,500
32,773,500
35,410,000
52,036,000
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Reports Issued
(English pages)
20,407b
51,942b
59,410b
56,608
76,855
119,868
137,795
169,664
163,991
164,963
167,410
184,739
225,060
212,096
335,479
390,861
403,517
434,309
438,069
413,715
268,153
Personnel on Duty Languages Annual Budget Allotments
(start of FY)
.Involveda (dollars)
36
43
47
52
60
72
71
60
51
57
57
n.a.
. 56
n.a,
n. a.
n.a.
52
50
51
46
a The figures in this column represent only the number of languages employed during the year and do not indicate the total language
capability of FDD. In 1954, for example, the Division had a potential of 117 languages and dialects but used only 71.
b Calendar Year.
c Cost for January-March 1947.
d Cost for April-June 1948.
e A new system for computing foreign-language pages was instituted in 1957.
300-words-per-page system was adopted.
f To 1 March 1967.
In place of a miscellaneous, raw page count, a standard
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Appendix C Executive Personnel
CHIEFS AND DEPUTY CHIEFS
Dates
Fran Zb
1 Dec 46 28 Feb 47
1 Mar 47 13 Mar 47
Designation
DB
DB
FDB.
John. J. Bagnall
(acting)
John J. Bagnall
John J. Bagnall
(acting)
Deputy Chief Authority
John J. Bagnall
LEAD/0, 28 Feb 47
AD/0, 13 Mar 47
AD/O, 27 Jun 47
John J. Bagnall AD/O, 24 Oct 47
W 26 Oct 48 14 Feb 49
U
FDB John J. Bagnall
(acting)
Cn 24 Jan 49 1 Sep 49 FDB
14 Feb 49 29 Sep 49
FDB - John J. Bagnall
7 Aug 49 29 Sep 49 FDB.
29 Sep 49 11 Jun 50 FDD John J. Bagnall
(acting)
29 Sep 49 31 Dec 59
.11 Jun 50 23 Dec 63
10 Jan 60 23 Dec 63
FDD
FDD John J. Bagnalll.
FDD
23 Dec 63 31 Jan 64
(acting
AD/O, 25 Oct 48
Benjamin B. Cain Acting Chief, FDB
(acting) 24 Jan 49
Benjamin B. Cain
Benjamin B. Cain
00 No. 45, 29 Sep 49
AD/0, 15 Jun 50
.?. %JCU1 Olt
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Appendix D
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGFZVCE DIRECTIVE NO. 16
FOREIGN LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS
(Approved 3/7/53; CONFIDENTIAL)
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for the purposes enunciated
in paragraphs ' (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council
hereby authorizes and directs that:
1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall insure
the coordination of the procurement of foreign language
publications for intelligence purposes, it being understood
that captured documents are excepted from this provision.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide,
as a primary responsibility, for the following services to
the IAC agencies:
a. Preparing and disseminating English language
excerpts, summaries, abstracts, and compilations from
foreign language publications.
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b. Developing and maintaining indexes, accession
lists, and reference services regarding foreign language
publications of intelligence interest.
3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall insure
the coordination of the above activities, as well as the
coordination of translation services, with similar activi-
ties maintained by the intelligence agencies in accordance
with their needs; such coordination should not prejudice
the maintenance of facilities necessary to meet depart-
mental demands.
4. The intelligence agencies of the Government shall
grant to the Director of Central Intelligence, upon
request, access to foreign language publications in their
possession.
1
5. An Advisory Cannittee on Foreign Language Publi-
cations shall be established to assist the Director of
Central Intelligence in the implementation of this
directive. It shall be composed of the IAC agencies
and other agencies of the Government will be invited
to sit with the Camuttee on matters which concern than.
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Abbreviations
ACFI,P Advisory Ccarmittee
AC ML Advisory Committee
AC of S Assistant Chief of
AD/CD Assistant Director
AD/CI Assistant Director
AD/CR Assistant Director
AD/CS
Assistant Director
on Foreign-Language Publications
on Mechanical Linguistics
Staff
for Collection and Dissemination
for Current Intelligence
for Central Reference
for Canputer Services
ADD Air Documents Division
ADD/I Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
A/DD/I (Admin) Assistant to the Deputy Director for Intelligence
(Administration)
AD/IC Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination
AD/NE Assistant Director for National Estimates
AD/O Assistant Director for Operations
ADP Automatic Data Processing
ADPC Automatic Data Processing Committee
ADPS Automatic Data Processing Staff
AD/RE. Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates
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1
I
AD/RR Assistant Director for Research and Reports
AD/SI Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
AEC Atanic Energy Cc*rmission
APB Air Force Base
AGO Adjutant General's Office
AID Air Information Division
ALP Automatic Language Processing
ALPAC Automatic Language Processing Advisory Committee
A&M Administration and Management
AMS Army Map Service
AP Associated Press.
AM Air Research Division
ARDC Air Research and Development Command
ASC Army Security Center
ASDIC Armed Services Documents Intelligence Center.
ASPIC Armed Services Personnel interrogation center
ATIC Air Technical Intelligence Center
ATIS, SWPA Allied Translator and Interpreter Section,
Southwest Pacific Area
Board of Geographic Names
Basic Intelligence Directive
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BR Biographic Register
BR Reports Branch (FDD)
BST Scientific and Technical Branch (FDD
CA/PROP Covert Action/Propaganda Group
CD Contact Division
CE Counter Espionage
CEFD Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Documents
CEFLD Committee on Exploitation of Foreign-Language
CEE'LP Comnittee on Exploitation of Foreign-Language.
Publications
Corporation for Econcanic and Industrial Research
(firm)
C/M
COAPS
CODIB
Clearinghouse for Scientific and Technical
Information
Collection Guidance Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Central Intelligence Group
Coordination and Management Staff
Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff
Committee on Documentation, United States
Intelligence Board
Clandestine Services
CIA Transliteration Committee
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CTS Consolidated Translation Survey
DAD/O Deputy Assistant Director for Operations
DAD/CD Deputy Assistant Director for Collection and
Dissemination
DAD/CR
DAD/NE
DCI
DCID
D/CR
Deputy Assistant Director for Central Reference
Deputy Assistant Director for National Estimates
Documents Branch
Documents Control Branch
Director of Central Intelligence
Director of Central Intelligence Directive
Director of Central Reference
DCS Dcmestic Contact Service
DD/A Deputy Director/Administration
DD/C Deputy Director/Coordination
DDCI Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DD/I Deputy Director/Intelligence
DD/P Deputy Director/Planning
DD/S Deputy Director/Support
DD/S&T Deputy Director/Science and Technology
DEX Central Foreign-Language Document Exploitation
File
D/FI Division D/Foreign Intelligence Staff
DIS Director of Intelligence Support
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(lTl1T TT
DNI Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of Defense
Division of Research for the Soviet Union
(OIP/State)
Econanic Cooperation Administration
Electronic Data Processing
European Cartnand
Foreign Branch
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIB Foreign Broadcast Information Branch
FBID Foreign Broadcast Information Division
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FDB Foreign Documents Branch
FDD Foreign Documents Division
FE Far Eastern Division
FECQM Far East Camrand
FIASC Foreign Language Service Center
FIWG Foreign Language Working Group
FOLIO For Official Use Only
FPB Foreign Press Bulletin
FID Foreign Technology Division (Air Force)
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1
GAO General Accounting Office
GAT Georgetown University General Analysis Translation
Project
GOD General Counsel's Office
GHQ General Headquarters
GMDS German Military Docimients Section
GPO Goverrnnent Printing Office
GSA General Services Administration
GSUSA General Staff, United States Army
GU Georgetown University
QUILL Georgetown University Institute of languages
and Linguistics
HKPMS Hong Kong Press Monitoring Service'
IAB Intelligence Advisory Board
IAC Intelligence Advisory Ccanittee
IAD Intelligence Acquisitions Division
IBM International Business machines (firm)
ICAPS Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff
ICC International Control Cannission
ICC International. Copyright Convention.
ICC Industrial Catalogue Cards
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11
IC mm Interagency Cam ittee on machine Translation
Research
Intelligence Division
Inspector General
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State
Department)
Industrial Plant File
Industrial Register
Inspections and Security
Intelligence Support Services
JALPC Joint Autanatic Language Processing Center
JALPG Joint Autanatic Language Processing Group
JCCC Joint CamLittee on Contemporary China
Joint Camlittee on Printing (Oongress)
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Intelligence CaYmittee
Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean. Area
Joint Intelligence Group
JIPC Joint Interrogation Planning Camdssion
JMIA Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency
JPRC Joint Publications Research Camnittee
JIC
JICPOA
JIG
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JPRS Joint Press Reading Service (US Embassy, Moscow)
JPRS Joint Publications Research Service (FDD)
JPRS/DC Joint Publications Research Service/District
of Columbia
JPRS/NY Joint Publications Research Service/New York
JPRS/SF Joint Publications Research Service/San Francisco
LCS Linguist Consultation Service
LPU Language Processing Unit
LSS Linguistic Support Staff
NAT Machine-Assisted Translation
MICA Monthly Index of Chinese Accessions
MIS Military Intelligence Service
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MLRA Monthly List of Russian Accessions
MT Machine Translation
MTI Machine Translation, Incorporated (firm)
NIA National Intelligence Authority
NIH National Institutes of Health
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
NSCID National Security Council Intelligence Directive
NSF National Science Foundation
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NYK Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (Tokyo)
Office of Collection and Dissemination
Office of Current Intelligence
Office of Central Reference
Office of Canputer Services
Office of Defense Mobilization
Office of Econanic Research
Office of Intelligence Coordination
Office of Intelligence Research (State)
Operational Intelligence Support
Office of Logistics
Office of National Estimates
Office of Naval Intelligence
Office of Operations
Office of Personnel
Office of Reports and Estimates
Office of Research and Reports
Office of Security
Office of Scientific Intelligence
Office of Special Operations
Office of Strategic Services
Office of Training
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1
1
OTS Office of Technical Services (Qzrar rce)
P&A Personnel and Administration
PACNaRS Pacific Military Intelligence Research Service
P&C Planning and Coordinating Staff
PCS Permanent Change of Station
PERT Program Evaluation and Review Technique
PMU Press Monitoring Unit
PPO Publications Procurement Officer
PRC Project Review Committee
PSD Printing Services Division
PSI Programming Services, Incorporated (firm)
R&D Research and Development
RID Records Integration Division
RLP Research Language Processor
RPB Radio Propaganda Branch
RPD Radio Propaganda Division
RC,/OIS Requirements Staff/Office of Intelligence Support
SCAP Supreme Ccznnander for Allied Powers
SDS Special Documents Section
SEATIC Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation
Center
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SPFLP Subcommittee on Exploitation of Foreign-
Language Publications
Surgeon General's Office
SIC Scientific Intelligence Committee
SILO Soviet Scientific Institute Locator file
SINTIC. Sino Translation and Interrogation Center
SIR Scientific Information Report
SLATC
Special Library Association
Special Libraries Association Translation
Center
Steno Mark Reader
Special Operations Division
Standard operating procedure
SPFLP Subcommittee on Procurement of Foreign-
Language Publications
SPEW Subco mittee on Referencing of Foreign-
Language Publications
SRI Southwest Research Institute
SSRC- Social Science Research Council
S&T Scientific and Technical
TDY Temporary duty
TICD Translations on International Cmnunist
Developments
TIS Translator and Interpreter Service.
T/O
Table of Organization,
752
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n son-Rani -Woo1drige (firm)
Technical Services Division (DD/P)
Translation Service Division
Universal Copyright Convention
United States Armed Services Exploitation Center
United States Intelligence Board
United States Information Service
UCC
USASExC
USIB
USIS
WDC (Adv)
WDGS
WDP
War Department
Washington Dooment Center
Washington Document Center (Advanced)
War Department General Staff
War Documentation Project
Western Hemisphere Division
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Chronological Table
1944
6 Sep -- PACNIRSactivated at Cane Ritchie, Maryland.
28 Dec -- First Washington Document Conference begins,
ends 15 Jan.
'1945
29-31 -Aug -- Second Washington Document Conference held.
19 Nov -- MC (Adv) document team arrives in Japan for
six-months survey.
17 Apr -- PAGMIRS, Op-32F141, and old HDC combined to
form the expanded Washington Document Center;
Capt. Ranson Fullinwider, USN, appointed chief.
May -- Special Documents Section established at Fort
Holabird, Maryland.
.Jul -- appointed chief of
MC.
17 Oct -- Office of Operations established in CIG.
30 Nov Documents Branch moves from Steuart Buildincr
5th and K streets, N.W.,
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25X1
25X1
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1
1
1 Dec - WDC passes from Armed Services to CIG control;
subordination transferred from ORE to 00,
retroactive from 31 Dec 46; WDC renamed
"Documents Branch."
16 Dec -- CIG policy change announced ending assignment
of Allied personnel to W)C, retroactive to
1 Dec 46.
document procurement mission
ccxnpleted 30 May.
to western Europe (Wannsee Collection) commences;
Feb - DB releases first captured Japanese S&T documents
to the public through Commerce Department.
1 Mar -- John J. Bagnall a inted acting chief, DB,
vice E: 70
10 Mar -- DB begins participation in ORE's "Sunshine
Project," involving source survey at Hower
Library in California.
13 Mar -- Bagnall appointed chief, DB.
2 Apr - DB begins first "current" production - abstracts
from USSR and Far East periodicals - in new re-
port Periodical Abstracts.
27.Jun -- DB reorganized and redesignated "Foreign
Documents Branch" ; GM S and SDS transferred
to FDB, effective 29 Jun 47; Document Source
Survey Division created; Bagnall appointed
deputy chief and acting chief.
11 Jul -- Bagnall proposes commencement of document
"exploitation" by FDB.
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.15.Oct -- First steps taken to formulate an NSCID to
..cover foreign document exploitation.
20 Oct --I appointed chief, FDB.
23 Oct -- ICAPS-00 study group gives approval for
Air Force to proceed with document exploitation.
1 Dec -- Industrial Plant File (subsequently Industrial
Card File) transferred by FDB to Reference
Center; eventually incorporated in CIA
Industrial Register.
..22 Dec -- Translation Service Division established in
FDB to furnish centralized service for CIA.
13 Jan -- First NSCID (No. 8) draft for foreign document
exploitation formulated.
26 Jan -- FDB begins press exploitation; first Soviet Press
Extracts published.
10 Feb -- Bagnall makes first proposal to alleviate FDB
translation load through use of commercial
translation firms.
..12 Mar -- First draft for FDD`s contingency wartime organiza-
tion drawn up.
.25 Mar.-- New FDB weekly publication Bibliography of
Russian Periodicals initiated.
1 Apr - FDB completes cataloguing of 1,478,611 captured
Japanese documents and their transfer to National
Archives.
4 May -- "Sunshine Project" transferred from ORE to FDB;
terminated 30 Sep 48.
4.Jun - Direct foreign document procurement arranged
through State Department.
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2 Jul -- Yugoslav documents procured through State
Department as first step toward a coordinated
IAC program for foreign document procurement.
9 Jul -- SOCHI Project, "third country" Soviet document
procurement through state Department, initiated;
phased.out in Nov 49.
..12 Jul --I document procurement mission to western
pe begins; completed 19 Sep.
29 Jul -- First major reorganization in FDB; three new
divisions added: Document Screening and Reference,.
Eastern Europe, Near East/Africa.
? 18 Aug -- FDB.learns of Air Force establishment of "Treasure
Island" translation project.
1 Sep -- 157,685 captured documents transferred to Library
of Congress.
3 Sep -- FRB's translation coordination function (CTS/DEX)
formally established.
.26-Oct. -- transferred; Bagnall designated
acting chief, FDB.
8 Dec -- CIA Transliteration Committee established;
Bagnall named chairman.
1
1 Jan --.Dulles Report recomriends FDB subordination
under ORE; seconded by NSC 50 on 1 Jul 49 but
never implemented.
10 Jan -- First meeting of Ad Hoc Committee on Central
Translation held.
..24 Jan -- Benjamin B. Cain designated acting deputy chief,
FDB. .
10 Feb Central clearing house concept for translation
coordination approved by government components.
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14 Feb -- Bagnall appointed chief, FDB.
17 Mar -- CIA Document Procurement Committee formed;
Bagnall designated FDB member.
11 Apr -- Final meeting of Ad Hoc Committee on Translations;
replaced by temporary Ad Hoc Committee on
Foreign Document Exploitation.
27 Jun -- Uniform policy on use of transliteration
systems adopted by IAC.
.25 Jul -- Translation control procedures of FDB formally
recommended by CEFLD (subsequently approved).
1 Aug -- FDB moves from) to Tempo "Y"
Building, Constitution Avenue and 21st Street,
N.E.
..24 Aug -- FDB.reorganized: Documents Control and Reports
Division established; TSD abolished.
29 Sep -- FDB redesignated "Foreign Documents Division."
18 Oct -- First Consolidated Translation Survey published.
16 Dec -- First attempt to obtain NSCID for foreign
documents abandoned.
9 Jan -- Legal title to all captured Japanese documents
transferred by CIA to Library of Congress.
11 . Jun - Bagnall promoted from acting chief to chief, FDD.
30 Jun -- First FDD discussions held with Armed Services
relative to future interagency coordination in
wartime captured document exploitation.
25 -Oct -- Bagnall.begins two month document procurement
mission in the Near East.
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27 Oct -- CIA (FDD)-JIG collaboration on wartime captured
source material planning formalized; Cain
appointed CIA representative for captured
documents.
.Nov -- 00 Task Force set up to explore FDD/TBID propa-
ganda analysis potential.
6 Jan -- Project UT , FDD' s
first venture into field operations, authorized
by DCI.
18 Jan -- Periodical Abstracts (Scientific) discontinued
at OSI request; shortly thereafter resurrected
at IAC insistence.
. 21 Mar --.Project UT begins operations.
. 29 Mar -- Effort to formulate NSCID revived.
7 Apr -- EARWIG Project, for procurement, through OSO,
of Chinese Conmunist documents, instituted.
9 Apr -- ASDIC established.
. 27Jun --- Western European Branch activated.
6 Jul -- CIA agreement with JCS on policies and procedures
governing operation of wartime captured documents.
centers formalized.
29 Jul -- FDD field. survey team sent 25X1
to Far East to survey worm vyarriiana -iorean
.captured documents.
.Jul -- FDD begins field scrutiny of the Vietnamese
press; assigned to FBIS Saigon Bureau 25X1
for one year.
Jul -- FDD completes first world press reaction report
in connection with propaganda analysis feasibility
studyo
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27 Sep -- New report series entitled Reference Aids
initiated;, this. responsibility transferred
to OCR at end of 1955.
13 Nov -- Jackson Survey report submitted to DCI;
recommends issuance of NSCID on document ex-
ploitation; also retention of FDD by 00.
28 Jan -- 00 Task Force reports on need for propaganda
analysis in both press and radio and notes 00
capability to carry it out.
1 May -- First test project successfully completed by
FDD and FBID on two media approach to propaganda
analysis.
First CIA representation at a formal meeting,
at MIT, on machine translation.
.Jun.-- assigned to newly approved post
of Language Consultant on staff of FDD chief;
after Jan 1953 this also included function of
coordination of language training.
8 Sep - Agreement reached, in connection with SE-27
Intelligence Deficiencies Statement, for FDD,
in cooperation with CCD, to investigate and
identify all Chinese Communist literature in
US.
attained by the division.
22 Sep -- FDD T/O increased
highest
7Oct --I designated FDD Coordinator for
Propaganda Analysis.
24 Nov -- FDD Language Consultation Service established in
M .Buiiding.
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22 Dec - Bagnall submits negative analysis on GAT MT
project to AD/O.
11 Aug - FDD T/O reduced
4 Mar -- CTS/DEX activity expanded to include non-
intelligence and non-government organizations.
7 Mar - NSCID 16 approved; ACFLP established.
17 Apr -- FDD SE-27 survey project completed.
Apr -- FDD branch chiefs and deputies reclassified to
GS-14 and GS-13, division chief and deputy to
GS-15 and GS-14.
1 May - Establishment and first meeting of SEFEP.
7 May -- Documents Control Branch dissolved and re-
constituted as Foreign Branch/CIA Library.
8 Aug -- Screening section set up to conduct document
screening activity formerly carried on by
defunct Documents Control Branch.
19 Aug -- FDD Propaganda Analysis Staff dispersed; only
Coordinator retained.
14 Sep - on PCS to FBID? s German Bureau; 25X1
first FDD officer so assigned.
1 Oct -- Near East/Africa and Western Europe branches
tentatively reorganized to form Western World
Branch.
7 Jan -- GAT Project conducted for practical MT
demonstration -- 250 words. .
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28 May -- Division-wide report Selected Briefs from the
International Press initiated; forerunner of
FDD's international C.omDmmism reports.
31 May - FDD abandons use of guide-type requirements
from consumers.
May -- Last analytical report coarpleted by FDD's
Propaganda Analysis Staff.
1Jun - Publication of FDD Periodical Abstracts, one of
earliest FDD.reports, discontinued.
Jun - FDD's German exploitation consolidated with
FBID press scrutiny.
.Jun - FDD and Air Force coordinate a division of
labor in abstracting S&T publications.
.Jun - FDD begins scheduled reporting program.
10 Jul - Establishment of Western World Branch formalized.
.15 Jul - First steps taken to coordinate FDD and HKPMS
exploitation of,Chinese-language publications.
13 Aug
1 Nov
FDD examined byl Survey task force..
Dec -- Language Consultant Service and Division
Language Training Officer combined to form
Linguistic Support Staff.
Apr - Foreign Publications Exploitation Review issued
for first time.
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May -- Project PBJOINTLY initiated; FDD participation
terminated end of 1958.
15 Jun -- FDD begins participation in Operation Alert 1955,
a three-day war-planning exercise.
1Jul -- FDD begins participation in War Documentation
Project on captured German
documents.
19 Nov -- Report on FDD by IG Survey Team issued.
28 Nov -- FDD discontinues issuance of Reference Aids;
function transferred to OCR.
7Dec -- FDD Propaganda Analysis Officer transferred to
FBID; formal propaganda analysis operations in
FDD terminated.
9 Jan -- Linguistic Support Staff post established at
Barton Hall to service OSI.
23 Mar -- Nbnthly sunurary Scientific Information Report
inaugurated.
7 May -- Lin stic.Support e opened
1
20.Jul -- FDD begins participation in six-day government-
wide war-planning exercise Operation Alert 1956.
7.Aug -- SEFLP initiates action which leads to establish-
rrent of USJPRS.
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Nov -- FDD ceases exploitation, first undertaken in
1948,
Mar -H named FDD representative for
GAT Project seminars.
1 Apr -- JPRS/NY begins operations.
26 Apr -- Pilot issue of Survey of the Soviet Press pub-
lished.
8 Jan -- FDD report issued on measures taken to conform
to IG Survey recoanrnndations.
1 Mar -- DCI approves JPRS project.
3 May --
19:Jul --.Current Intelligence Staff established..
16 Aug -- JPRS/DC begins operations.
12 Oct -- Distribution of Survey of the Soviet Press to
US academic coarmunity approved.
28 Oct -- FDD initiates action to provide, through
OTS/Commerce, its product for public consumption.
..25 Nov -- New York Times article published on US lag in
exploitation of Russian open scientific litera-
ture.
10 Dec -- Bagnall and DCI present briefing on CIA exploita-
tion 'of .Russian .scientific .publications before
Killian. Scientific. Advisory.Conmittee.
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16 Dec -- Move initiated to consolidate existing 17
NSCIDs, including NSCID 16.
16 Dec--- NSF Working Group on Russian Scientific
Literature formed to make Russian S&T literature
more accessible to the public; Bagnall
designated CIA member.
1958
21 Jan -- NSCID 2 approved by IAC membership.
31 Jan - Language laboratory established in FDD.
Feb - CTS, SIR, and 12 other FDD reports issued
in unclassified form to the public for the
first time.
30 Apr ~
becomes first FDD employee
20 May - Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language
Publications created, with Bagnall as chairman;
ACFLP and SEFLP abolished.
2.Jun - First meeting of CEFLP.
4 Jun - FDD reorganized; section functions consolidated
and number of sections reduced from 41 to
..22.
1-Jul - Corr tierce Department's COTS begins service as
clearing house for government unclassified
S&T translations.
1
8Jul -- CIA Panel on Exploitation of Foreign-Language
Publications formed and first meeting held.
.Jul -- Sharp decline begins in source receipts,
particularly Chinese Conn unist publications.
.Jul - FDD Scientific Information Report placed on
.commercial distribution through Commerce
.Department.
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17 Dec -- Linguistic. Support Staff post) closed.
31 Dec - Benjamin Cain, deputy chief, FDD, retires.
1 Jan -I appointed acting deputy chief,
FDD, vice Benjamin Cain.
Jan - JPRS approached by JCCC and SSRC about ex-
panded release of non-S&T translations to the
academic ccamnu ity .
Feb - Bagnall attends IBM MT presentation; first
FDD contact with IBM on ALP/MT..
awarded Intelligence Medal
of Merit; first FDD officer to receive this award.
1 Apr -- Linguistic Support Staff posts at M Building
and Barton Hall closed.
May -- FDD begins phasing out scheduled reporting in
favor of a new press research program; new
program formally proposed on 20 Jun; approved by
DD/I and CIA Office Chiefs on 15 Jul and by
CEE'LP (USIB) on 9 Sep.
9.Jun - FDD reorganized; six branches consolidated into
four; T/O reduced
9Jun -- New daily Foreign Press Bulletin on Bloc press
first issued; discontinued 14 Oct.
. 20 .Jun - JPRS facility opened in San Francisco.
1.Jul -- FDD begins use of dictaphone for classified
translation.
Jul - ASPIC and ASPIC.canbined to form USASExC.
3.Aug -~~designated CIA member on JIPC.
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Oct - JPRS operational headquarters moved from New York
to Washington.
31 Dec - Unclassified SIR, issued by FDD through OTS,
discontinued.
30 Jan - FDD moves from Tempo "Y" Building to Matomic
Building, 1717 H Street, N.W.
Mar - FDD completes Phase I of its contribution
(4 million.Russian words) to GAT Project;
Phase II (9 million Russian words) completed in
May.
May -- Three area branch chiefs upgraded from GS-14
to GS-15.positions.
:Jun - MT program reaches evaluation phase.
1Jul - Expanded non-S&T report dissemination program
by JPRS gets underway.
25 Aug - FDD begins reportage on insurgency and counter-
insurgency.
23 Sep - FLASC established in Headquarters Building.
Oct - FDD collaboration with Air Force on MT develop-
ment begins.
5 Mar - JPRS/SF.completes move to new quarters at
. 214 Front Street.
.11-22. Jun -- First ASDIC/ASPIC training seminar held at
Fort Holabird;
30 -Jun - JPRS facilities moved to TenpoBuilding T-30.
in.Potomac Park.
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Jun - FDD discontinues press research program and
reverts to current serializedscheduled.reporting.
.Jun - FDD becomes involved in Project CHIVE.
4 Sep - Support Branch reorganized; two deputy chiefs
appointed.
Sep - CEFLP disestablished as USIB organ and trans-
ferred to CIA as coordinating point.
18-Oct - IBM submits formal proposal to install
ALP/Stenowriter System in FDD.
designated FDD
representatives on Project CHIVE.
4 Dec - ADPS.evaluation group recceamends acceptance of
IBM ALP/Stenowriter System proposal.
1.Feb -- Translations on International Communist
Developments report errloyed for comprehensive
coverage on international Ccamninism.
4 Apr --
31 Jul - JIPC dissolved.
Jul - FDD enters into.general agreement for coopera-
tive use of Air Force MT system.
7.Oct - FDD participates in five-
. day command post war-panning exercise.
26 Nov -- Training of flexotypists started in FDD to
prepare for receipt of ALP/Stenowriter system.
29 Nov - IBM formally notified of its selection by CIA
to provide ALP/Stenowriter System for the
Agency; installation, . subject. to. successful text,
set.for.15 months.hence.
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20 Dec -, DDCI approves promotion of Bagnall. to DAD/CR;
interim acting chief, FDD.
17 Jan -- FDD begins cooperation with Air Force (FTD)
in MT operations.
31 Jan.-- I lappointed chief, FDD.
1
29 Apr - First meeting between CIA (FDD and OCS) and IBM
personnel on implementing ALP test.
Apr -- ALPAC organized.
18 Jun -- CIA signs contract with IBM to acquire
ALP/Stenowriter System.
23 Jun - JPRS facilities moved to Tenpo Building "E"
on the Mall.
Sep - JPRS/SF moved to new quarters at 100 McAllister
Street.
4Dec -I recap nds discontinuance of CIA
investment in non-Russian MT.
16.Dec - ALP Acceptance Test Criteria established;
Test Procedures issued 18 Mar 65.
Dec - Moberg Survey of FDD/JPRS reporting program
begun.
22 Mar - Monitoring of Dominican press initiated, on
eve of April. revolution.
1 Apr -.;Acquisitions Branch, formerly of CIA Library,
.,transferred to FDD.
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15 Apr -- FDD-FTD cooperation in MT operations discon-
tinued.
16 Apr -- FDD moves from Matarac Building to Key Building
in Rosslyn, Virginia.
28 May -- Development problems in ALP system disclosed
at meeting with IBM.
15 Jun -- FDD-ADPS meeting with IBM reveals further
shortcomings in ALP system development.
15 Sep -- ALP system hardware delivered to CIA.
4-15 Oct -- FDD and ADPS test ALP system for acceptance
by CIA.
Nov -- FDD begins year-long pilot project to test ALP,
system under operational conditions.
23 May -- Ad Hoc Carmittee for the Study of Press and
Broadcast Monitoring Activities 0 Task
Force) established; begins its investigations
on.30 Jun.
12 Oct,--I announces termination of the ALP experi-
ment.
15 Nov -- FDD Position Paper setting forth FDD's anti
merger case presented to theF---]Task Force.
1
1 Mar -- FDD transferred to FBIS; Acquisitions Branch
retained in OCR.
Report advocates FDD-FBIS merger.
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