THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 MAY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015121
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 28, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
May 28, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of C.O. 11652
exemption category,5B( I
declassified onlsi on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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. _
May 28, 1976
Table of Contents
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Egypt:
(Page 1) 25X1
Lebanon: The critical meeting between President Sarkis and left-
ist leader Kamal Jumblatt has been postponed again. (Page 1)
Notes: Cuba; Rhodesia; Mozambique-USSR; Egypt-Libya; Syria-UN-25xl
Israel (Pages 2 and 3)
At Annex we present
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the military capabilities of the opposing 25X1
forces in the Rhodesian insurgency.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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A VA\ AAA. .1-1 A .1%. A-I kJA A- 11. V A %.-1 .L V ./--/
EGYPT:
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LEBANON: The murder
yesterday of Kamal Jum-
blatt's sister by uni-
dentified gunmen at her
home in Beirut has
caused another postpone-
ment of the critical
meeting between the
leftist leader and Pres-
ident-elect Sarkis.
It is unclear what effect the kill-
ing will have on Sarkis' mediation
efforts. Jumblatt himself has
issued an appeal to his followers
not to seek revenge.
Despite some sharp exchanges of ar-
tillery fire, the undeclared truce
generally appears to be holding,
and both Jumblatt and Christian
Phalangist leaders recently have
made conciliatory gestures, rais-
ing hopes that the roundtable dis-
cussions being promoted by Sarkis
will come off.
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WEST
SAN
ALGERIA
LIBYA
MAURITANIA
GUINEA-
BISSAU-
Conakry
Freetown*
SIERRA
LEONE
sa
GUINEA
UPPER
VOLTA
IVORY
COAST
BENIN
( NIGERIA
SUDAN
CA
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
ETHIOPIA ,
EROON
SOMA A
UGANDA
KENYA
GABON CON
RWANDA
ZAIRE BURUNDI
t Luanda
TANZANIA
Atlantic Ocean
ANGOLA
MALAW
ZAMBIA
SOUTH-WEST
AFRICA
(NAMIBIA)
WALVIS BAY
RHODESIA
BOTSWANA
MO MBIGUE
SWAZILAND
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Cuba appears to be
getting ready to open
regularly scheduled air
service between Havana
and several points in
Africa.
Rhodesian security
forces recently killed
two guerrillas about 65
kilometers (40 miles)
northeast of Salisbury.
Mozambique President
Machel's visit to the
USSR produced little
immediate support for
his country's ailing
economy.
NOTES
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The Cubans want
to begin flights this summer. The
most likely landing points are
Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone,
Guinea, and Angola.
This is the first such incident so
close to the capital since the
fighting picked up last January.
The incident may be part of an ef-
fort by the insurgents to demoral-
ize the white community. A popu-
lar white resort near the scene
the clash has closed because of25X1
the "security situation."
The President signed contracts for
medical aid, technical services,
and surveys but these come under
a $10-million credit extended early
in 1975. Moscow may provide addi-
tional credits, but the Soviet
pledge so far represents less than
5 percent of the total world assis-
tance ($250 million) committed to
Mozambique since independence in
1975.
--continued
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GREECE,. 00
,
,
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
NIGER
LIBYA
CHAD
-),
*Sollur?M----1 .,AM t_ruh
Al kiniriyah
TURKEY
Cairo*
EGYPT
/)
SYRIA
LEBANON
15R/41_
tJORDAN
/
Sinai \ t
(ISRAELI- ' I
OCCUPIED)
SUDAN
0 200 Miles
200 Kilometers
1
559838 5-76
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V -A. ? -ILI J.
Egypt is again increas-
ing its military readi-
ness along the Libyan
border.
Syria, in return for
its agreement to an-
other six-month exten-
sion of the mandate for
the UN observer force
on the Golan Heights,
reportedly has asked
that the forthcoming
Council resolution omit
any reference to the
1974 Syrian-Israeli dis-
engagement agreement.
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the naval observation post
at Sollum was placed on alert on
May 25, and a MIG-21 fighter squad-
ron of 13 planes was deployed from
an airfield east of Cairo to Matruh.
Egypt had increased its military
readiness along the Libyan border
in mid-March when relations between
the countries were tense. We do
not know what has prompted the cur-
rent increased readiness.
Damascus presumably wants to avoid
any indirect endorsement of step-
by-step negotiations and under?
-
score its contention that the UN
force will remain on Syrian terri-
tory at Syria's sufferance, not as
a result of any prior legal commit-
ments.
President Asad's willingness to re-
new the mandate in return only for
a visit from UN Secretary General
Waldheim suggests that his freedom
to make foreign policy is not now25x1
significantly restricted by extrem-
ists within the ruling Baath Party.
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Lilong
Lusaka
Zambia
Lake
Kariba
Southwest
Africa Mem' ia
Mozambi ? ue
Mozambique
Channel
Botswana
Road
Railroad
200 MILES
200 KILOMETERS
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RHODESIA: INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
CAPABILITIES
We present below
the military capabilities of
the opposing forces in the Rhodesian in-
surgency. It should be noted, however,
that non-military factors?political,
economic, psychological, as well as ex-
ternal?will be critical to the outcome,
and that the insurgents include these
factors in their considerations.
Although rivalries within the insurgent leader-
ship have served (and will continue) to hinder ef-
fective action, the Rhodesian insurgents' military
capabilities have increased over the past year.
--They are better armed and trained than ever
before.
--Over, the past year, the size of the combat
ready insurgent force has doubled to about
3,500 men out of an estimated total of 11,500
insurgents.
--The availability of sanctuary and base areas
in Mozambique since late 1975 and increased
external logistical assistance have improved
insurgent infiltration and operational capabil-
ities.
--Tanzanian and Mozambican military forces are
playing an increasing role in support of the
insurgency.
Although insurgent capabilities will almost
certainly continue to improve, the insurgents are
likely to achieve only limited military successes
over the next year or so unless they receive exten-
sive foreign combat assistance.
Rhodesian security forces are well trained and
equipped, and they are enhancing their counterinsur-
gency capability.
--Rhodesia will continue to mount cross-border,
hot pursuit raids into Mozambique, at least un-
til insurgent border security and air defense
capabilities improve.
--continued
Al
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.?-? a 111. -X .L/f J. ? V' J. V Am/ J.
--Rhodesia will have to rely increasingly on
blacks and white mercenary personnel.
--Thus far there have been no signs of disloy-
alty among the black security forces, but if
the Rhodesian military situation deteriorates,
some blacks could begin to reconsider their
position.
--Rhodesian security forces will continue to
depend on outside sources for military equip-
ment, POL, spare parts, and ammunition as well
as on the continued movement of such supplies
through South Africa.
The level of insurgent activity will probably
increase, and more sophisticated equipment, particu-
larly air defense equipment in Mozambique, is likely
to be used.
--Rhodesian security forces can probably cope
with the anticipated increases in insurgent ac-
tivities over the next year or so. But a sig-
nificant spread of insurgency beyond the pres-
ent concentrations in the border areas or a
substantial and sustained increase in guerrilla
activity would severely strain the army's lim-
ited capabilities.
--Infiltration into Rhodesia from Zambia and
Botswana would even further disperse Rhodesia's
limited manpower and stretch its limited logis-
tical system.
--Sophisticated air defense equipment in the
border area would take its toll on Rhodesia's
slow flying, subsonic aircraft.
--Rhodesian security forces would be no match
for a large conventional military force with
sophisticated ground equipment and air support.
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