THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 FEBRUARY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014726
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 20, 1975

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79-T009-36A012500010005-3
The President's Daily Brief
February 20, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification uhedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2)(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
tirp
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
February 20, 1975
Table of Contents ?
Cambodia: The military situation has continued to
deteriorate during the past week. (Page 1)
USSR-Cyprus: President Makarios is pushing hard
to get stronger support from Moscow. (Page 3)
Notes: Israel; China-Japan (Page 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Government and Communist Strength in the Provinces
THAJLAND
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Lomphat
Keit g
Ko
../Kompcmg
? Chhnang,
Pursat 1,000 ( Kompona
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ik
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In addition, there are 12,000 Communist local force troops Which-cannot be allocated by province.
CAMBODIA
Miles
50
557344 2-75 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
The military situation has continued
to deteriorate during the past week, and
military leaders must find additional
troops to help defend Phnom Penh and as-
sist in reopening the Mekong River.
The Khmer communists have won control of the
two key Mekong River narrows some 25 and 40 miles
downstream from Phnom Penh, and insurgent forces
are beginning to close in on the government navy
base at Neak Luong. In the immediate Phnom Penh
area, the Cambodian army's battered 7th Division,
manning the capital's northwestern defenses, ap-
pears on the brink of collapse after six weeks of
relentless attack.
The Cambodian high command is still position-
ing its forces for clearing operations to secure
the southern narrows of the Mekong River. The
headquarters and two battalions of the 4th Brigade
have been landed on the west bank above Peam Reang
Island, and the brigade is to attack southward as
soon as it is joined by the remaining battalions
from Neak Luong. In the north, a brigade-sized
unit, supported by armored personnel carriers, is
soon to make a renewed effort to clear Route 1 and
the west bank to Neak Luong.
The high command has already been forced to
call in some units from provincial enclaves to help
defend Phnom Penh and reopen the Mekong. These
provincial reinforcements have not been enough, how-
ever, and the high command will have to strip its
provincial defenses even further if it is to suc-
ceed.
The Balance of Forces
Of a total combat force of 60,000
the communists have massed some 25,000
Penh area and another 10,000 along the
Cambodian army has a total strength of
130,000 troops, of which some 45,000 are in the
Phnom Penh area and only 9,500 along the Mekong.
Experience has shown that government forces need at
least a two-to-one manpower advantage if they are to
hold their own against the insurgents.
to 70,000,
in the Phnom
Mekong. The
110,000 to
(continued)
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THE GENERAL RESERVE
Authorized
Effective
Unit
Location
Strength
Strength*
1st Div.
Phnom Penh area
8,786
4,767
2nd Div.
Phnom Penh area
8,786
6,737
3rd Div.
Phnom Penh area
8,786
5,824
7th Div.
Phnom Penh area
8,786
4,134
9th Div.
Phnom Penh
8,786
4,849
Para. Bde.
Phnom Penh area
2,476
1,504
5th Bde,
Phnom Penh area
2,476
1,040
12th Bde.
Kompong Som/Phnom
2,476
1,193
Penh
13th Bde.
Kandal/Kompong
2,476
1,535
Speu
20th Bde.
Kampot/Phnom Penh
2,476
1,672
23rd Bde.
Phnom Penh area
2,476
1,336
79th Bde.
Phnom Penh area
2,476
1,098
80th Bde.
Phnom Penh area
2,476
1,500
*These figures include all personnel in the field
available for combat duty. This does not include
personnel in training, convalescing, or those car-
ried on unit rolls but listed as missing or absent
without leave.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
A massive infusion of manpower is clearly needed
if the government is to redress the situation even
partially along the Mekong. Additional units will
also have to be deployed to the Phnom Penh area to
maintain the army's razor-thin margin there.
With some 65,000 troops in the provinces, the
government would appear to have a ready supply of
reinforcements; in fact, it does not. The vast ma-
jority of provincial troops are assigned to terri-
torial units that perform a static defensive role.
On the few occasions these territorial units have
participated in operations outside their home prov-
inces, they have for the most part performed poorly.
The only units that might be used effectively
as reinforcements are elements of the 24,000-man
general reserve. The five infantry divisions that
form the backbone of this force are already in the
Phnom Penh area as are four of the reserve's nine
independent infantry brigades.
Government Options
In its search for additional troops the army
high command will almost certainly have to withdraw
major elements of the general reserve brigades still
in provincial enclaves. The best of the territorial
units also probably will have to be pressed into
duty along the Mekong or around Phnom Penh. Al-
though government commanders at most provincial cen-
ters should be able to hold on with somewhat reduced
forces, currently threatened enclaves like Kampot
and Takeo may fall if significant numbers of troops
are withdrawn.
Any decisions to abandon holdings in the coun-
tryside will be difficult for military leaders, but
such choices will have to be made soon if the gov-
ernment is to survive even for the short term.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-CYPRUS
President Makarios is pushing hard
to get stronger support from Moscow. He
hopes to use the USSR as a lever against
Turkey.
On Monday, Makarios
reportedly told
that Moscow should
consider joint mediation with the US of the Cyprus
dispute. If Washington refused, the archbishop
said, he would welcome a unilateral Soviet initia-
tive, including a visit by Foreign Minister Gromyko.
In return for stronger Soviet support, Makarios
said he would:
--Welcome a call at Cyprus by Soviet warships.
--Visit Moscow if satisfactory results could
be prearranged.
--Enter into new cultural agreements with the
USSR.
Makarios has
overblown public statements hailing what in
fact has been tepid Soviet support. He has also en-
dorsed Moscow's long-standing proposal for a broad
international conference on the Cyprus situation.
A statement issued by the Soviet news agency
on February 16 regarding the Turkish Cypriot dec-
laration of autonomy was mild, avoiding direct
criticism of Ankara./
Moscow has an added reason to be careful of
its relations with Ankara now that the US aid cut-
off has called into question US use of Turkish
military facilities.
The Soviets have been wary in dealing with the
archbishop and will be suspicious of his willingness
to accord the USSR a lasting role in the Cyprus
situation. Nonetheless, the Soviets will probably
do what they can to strengthen their hand with
Makarios, particularly since their view of a proper
solution for Cyprus tends to coincide with that of
the archbishop. The Soviets may be intrigued by
Makarios' suggestion that they offer their good of-
fices to mediate the dispute.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Israel is continuing to provide military as-
sistance to the Kurdish rebels in Iraq.
Israelis have provided money, small arms, and ad-
visers to the Kurds for several years. Tel Aviv's
support for the rebellion is motivated in part by
a desire to keep the Iraqi army tied down at home
and out of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Israel is
also anxious to stay on good terms with Iran, im-
portant as a source of oil. Tehran, for its part,
probably welcomes greater Israeli support for the
Kurds.
China has agreed to deliver to a private Japa-
nese firm this year 108,000 barrels of crude oil
a day at $12.10 a barrel--a price below that for
comparable Indonesian crude and considerably below
the price of $14.10 that the Japanese were paying
China by the end of 1974.
Talks later this spring with Japanese import-
ers could push China's oil exports to Japan for
1975 above the target of 160,000 barrels a day pro-
jected by the two governments last fall. Last
year, China exported only 80,000 barrels a day to
Japan.
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Top Secret
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