THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 SEPTEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992847
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 6, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
6 September 1971
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE:PRESIDENT S DAILY BRIEF
6 September 1971,
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In South Vietnam, Ky has backed away from his threat
to oust Thieu by force but is continuing his efforts
to win the leadership of the opposition. (Page 1)
Political tensions in Cambodia have eased following
the postponement of the interpellation of the finance
minister. (Page 2)
Laotian efforts to recapture Paksong from the Commu-
nists have been dealt another setback. (Page 3)
India is attempting to negotiate a regional pact
along the lines of its recently concluded treaty
with the USSR. (Page 4)
Iran/
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(Pae' 5)
There are signs of dissension in the new Bolivian
regime. (Page 6)
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Ky's denial that he had threatened to destroy Thieu
by force seems to have been carefully handled to
meet the minimum requirements of the situation. His
unrestrained attack on Thieu would almost certainly
have forced Thieu to take countermeasures if allowed
to stand. For his part, Thieu gave Ky time to re-
consider, saying that he knew nothing about Ky's
threat except what he had learned through the press
and that he was having the matter investigated. Ky
evaded making an explicit denial of the substance of
the reports. Instead, an aide was instructed to
make a general statement claiming that "no one was
authorized to speak as a source close to the Vice
President," an obvious allusion to the fact that
some reporters had violated the ground rules of Kg's
3 September background briefing.
Ky is also trying to organize support from several
political parties.
he has secured the signatures of a number
party faction leaders on a declaration calling
for Thieu's resignation and if he refuses threaten-
ing to hinder the 3 October election by all possible
"legal means. Thieu has little respect for the lead-
ers involved, and it is unlikely that he will be im-
pressed. Thieu may, however, take some measures to
open new divisions among these temporarily united
oppositionists.
The other major opposition leader, Big Minh, has ap-
parently agreed to lead an opposition bloc, which
may include the powerful An Quang Buddhists and
some leftist political leaders. Minh and his staff
were said to have met with An Quang representatives ,
on 3 September to consider future strategy.
Minh had previously
would be willing to lead a united
indicated that he
opposition bloc.
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CAMBODIA
Political tensions in Phnom Penh have eased.
The National Assembly has agreed to postpone; its
interpellation of Finance Minister Sok Chhong and
has signaled its readiness to consider the govern-
ments proposals for major economic reforms, perhaps
as early as next week. Chief of State Cheng Heng
has told Ambassador Swank that Chhong in turn has
agreed to stay on in the cabinet,and to see the eco-
nomic program through the legislature..,
Chhong, one; of Cambodia's few trained and
competent economists, had been under pres-
sure to resign by a small but vocal as-
sembly minority because he was the archi-
tect of some earlier, unpopular government
economicpolicies. Lon Nol and Sink
Matak were anxious to avoid' any Showdown
with the assembly as other ministers were
said to be ready to quit in sympathy with
Chhong. This probably,would have brought
down the government, worsening an already
turbulent political scene agitated by the
personal animosities and ambitions of a
number of government leaders.
The formulation and implementation of one
of the key new economic programs--the Ex-
change Support Fund (ESF), a multinational
aid arrangement--is expected to take some
time; thus, the assembly's acquiesence in
the matter means in effect that the inter-
pellation will be suspended indefinitely
and suggests that the assembly is ready
to cooperate with the government in re-
solving Cambodia's knotty economic prob-
lems. It was also apparently recognized
that the spectre of continued political
instability in Phnom Penh could have jeop-
ardized the ESF as well as the prospects
of .a cash grant now under study in Wash-
ington.
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LAOS: Bolovens Plateau Area
CHINA
'Chong
Sedisn
A R A
THAILAND o,,
Thateng
gom
r
Ban Hounil.
Phak song ong
:Bal9iOns
;
?
Plateau c ?
1.
g- I
25 50 mites
551837 9-71 'CIA
? Communist-held location
? Government-held location
1, 46
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LAOS
The government taSk.force attempting to recap-
ture.Paksong on the Bolovens Plateau-in sOuth Laos
was dealt-anothersetback on 4 September.: North
Vietnamese forces mounted a coordinated mortar and
ground attack agaihst three Lao Army battalions'
manning 'front line 'positions on Route 23 west. of
Paksong.- The three battalions dispersed and were.
reported to be strung out and in disarray for some"
six miles back along the-road-.: Known casualties are
one killed, 36 wounded,,and over 200 missing. Three
irregular battalions at:Ban Phak Kout are to.be
joined by-afourth to form, new' front line poSitions.,
Elsewhere' in south Laos, two Pathet-JJao-_companies?
totaling 77 men-and three political cadre--defected
to the:government'at:a lOcation nbrtheapt of Khong,
sodop.e.
In north Laos, three irregular positions north-
east of the Plaine des Jarres were lost following
enemy daylight attacks. The North Vietnamese also
kept up their shelling attacks and ground assaults
on irregular positions on the northern Plaine, but
no other positions changed hands.
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INDIA
New Delhi's policy makers, who are concerned
about the implications of a Sino-US rapprochement,
believe, they need the protection of a.regional.pact
along.the.lines of their recently concluded treaty
with the USSR. The Indians presumably hope the So-
viets would support such an arrangement, but at the
same time they are anxious to show that they remain
essentially nonaligned and are not solely tied to
the USSR and its allies,
The? Indians have already approached Japan?and
possibly several other Asian countries--about a
treaty. Diplomats in Nepal and Ceylon expect that
friendship treaties will be included on Indian For-
eign Minister Singh's agenda during his good will
visits early this month.
The Japanese were cool to the Indian ap-
proach. They are leery of Soviet involve-
ment and are concerned about their relation-
ship to existing regionaZ organizations.
The Nepalese are also not likely to be en-
thusiastic because o their s ecial prob-
lems with China.
The Ceylonese have led the Indians to
think that although they do not want any
forMal entanglements. with the USSR,, they
mightHconsider concluding,a treaty With
India.
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IRAN
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
BOLIVIA
Dissatisfaction with Banzeros governing alliance
-
has surfaced among Nationalist Revolutionary Party
(MNR) militants.. Although party head Victor Paz
Estenssoro has publicly called for loyalty to the
military., he has also declared himself the caudillo
of Bolivia. Paz is said to have told party leaders
they should regard participation in the
Banzer,government as a springboard for achieving
the MNR's ultimate goal of returning to'_full power.
The party has rebuffed demands from its left wing
that it leave the coalition, and may act to prevent
the return of still-exiled leftist leader Hernan
Sileso
A "Revolutionary Resistance Front," claiming
to represent most of the extreme left, has called
for an armed struggle, and the regime is taking
measures to deal with an expected urban terrorist
campaign. A crackdown now under way against the
violence-oriented National Liberation Army (ELN) is
likely to be directed against all extreme leftists
whether or not they actually have ELN connections.
Banzer-has declared that actions'of.the Torres
regime deemed to have been "demagogic" will be.re-.
viewed, but that the-nationalization of theUS=owned
Bolivian Gulf Oil Company in.1969,is irreversible.
The new government has asked for $20 million in US
emergency grant assistance to stimulate the economy,
and-help the regime through its first.7critical"
100 days.
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