THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 31 JULY 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977597
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 31, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
31 July 1970
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
31 July 1970'
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
/Egypt\
/Soviets. (Page 1)
Recent developments in the Arab states are discussed
on Page 2,,
The Cambodian situation is discussed on Page 4.
The initial stages of the Allied study of defense
problems of the 1970s have underlined European opposi-
tion to any substantial change in US force levels and
in NATO strategy. (Page 6)
West Germany and Poland have reached tentative agree-
ment on a reconciliation treaty. (Page 7)
India)
/ (Page 8)
The recent angry exchange between Thieu and Ky has
hurt both men and the unity of the government. (Page 9)
The Soviets are sending additional warships into the
Mediterranean and probably will conduct naval exer-
cises there in the next few weeks. (Page 9)
Sino
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USSR-ISRAEL-EGYPT
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ARAB STATES
A fedayeen spokesman in Amman announced yester-
day that Arafat will make an announcement today that
will touch on Egypt's recent decision to cut off guer-
rilla broadcasts from Cairo. He will probably also
set' forth the fedayeen position on the US peace pro-
posal.
Arafat,'s stand is likely to be negative on
both subjects. He probably will not attack.
Nasir.pesonally, however, because of the.
latter's great popularity among the Arab
masses.
* *-
Egyptian and Jordanian acceptance of the peace
proposal has produced some divergence between Syria
and Iraq. Although not a party to the proposal at
this stage, Syria has publicly attacked the US initia-
tive. Its private position, however, may be less
intransigent. For example, Nasir's personal repre-
sentative announced after meeting with President
Atasi on Tuesday that there was "full agreement on
all matters discussed."1
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Iraq's.rejection,'on the other i hand, has been.
*uncompromising., probably because it has not lost any
territory and therefore has nothing to gain in a
settlement: Baghdad is_delighted to-be able to por--
tray Nasir and Husayn:as traitors to the Arab cause,
but.it is unlikely to use its 20,000 troops in Jordan
in :a move against: Husayn. The King, nevertheless,
is aware of Iraq's potential for troublemaking and
as a precautionary measure has moved a number of
fighters away from fields close to Iraqi troops:
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Cambodia: Current Situation
THAILAND
cre Noy
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THAILAND
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o Communist-controlled 'location
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CHINA SEA
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99477 7-70 CIA
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CAMBODIA
The government counteroffensive to retake Kiri-
rom, spearheaded by five fresh battalions, is moving
ahead slowly. Progress-was-checked yesterday when
the Communists blocked the one access road to the
town. A small enemy force also attacked a bridge on.
Route 4, east. of Kirirom,.on_the night of 29-30 July,
closinTit.to heavy traffic.
Most of the troops?that-retreated from Kirirom
on 28 July apparently were too battered to partici-
pate in anymore combat, and have been,withdrawn.
Tho immediate purpose of the Communists!
campaign around Kirirom may be. more for
psychological effect than for significant?
military advantage. The,rugged.terrain
around the town and the restricted over-
land access to it make it an ideal site.
for prolonged combat,.with government.
.troops now forced literally to wage an up-
hill battle to retake.it. The Communists
may hope'that.with.a minimum of effort
they can demonstrate the Cambodian. Army's
existing tactical shortcomings and, at the
same timeifgarner more headlines at.Phnom
Penh's expense.
The, continuing presence' of the' North
Viet-
namese '101D Regiment in the areasuggests,
hOwever, that the enemy campaign at Kiri-
rom may have some longer .range objectives
It-may.represent, for- example, the begin-
ning of an effortto establish a secure
rear base of operations in the remote' moun-
tainous' areas of southwestern Cambodia.
Such abase' could be used for Launching
frequent attacks on government positions'
and lines' of. communication, including
Route 43 in the surrounding provinces
Bangkok continues to debate the advisability of
sending-Thai troops into Cambodia.'(
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/Foreign Minister Thanat told the
press in Bangkok on 30 July that the government would
send Thai troops to Cambodia only as "a last resort."
He cited the "acrimonious" relations between the Cam-
bodians and South Vietnamese forces operating in Cam-
bodia as an example of the "friction" that can be
avoided' by keeping Thai troops at home.
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NATO
Reacting to a US presentation of the range of
possible future US force postures, the European NATO
Allies have strongly favored maintenance of present
force deployments. There is general willingness,
however, to consider in the Allied defense review how
the US could make modest cuts in noncombat areas if
some reduction were absolutely necessary. The West
Germans, for example, have indicated that they could
accept a reduction in the current NATO logistic ob-
jective: a capability to support a conventional war.
for 90 days. The Germans also would not be opposed
to reductions in the support system and cutbacks of
US troop strength in other European countries.
Strong Allied objections have been raised
to any movement away from the current NATO
doctrine of flexible response' and toward
greater reliance on either tactical or stra-
tegic nuclear weapons. The Germans have
been particularly unequivocal in their op-
position to any, such change. When the con-
cept of putting greater dependence on nu-
clear retaliation was discussed recently
in the German Federal Security Council,
those present, including Chancellor Brandt,
reportedly were "horrified." They felt
that such a change would bring the Alliance
back to a cold war psychology, and would
conflict with the Federal Republic's cur-
rent detente efforts.
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WEST GERMANY - POLAND
At the fifth round of West German - Polish talks
last week, the negotiators reached tentative:agree-
ment on a. treaty text. 'The basic-elements;-in.addi-
tion'to a border.settlementi are pledgesto normal-
ize:relations'and to abstain' from the use of force:
There may still be difficulties' ovet precise wording;
the text is 'to be' regarded-as:a'working document.sub7
jeCt.to revision by both governments.
After discussing the key Oder-Neisse issue at..
length; the negotiators settled on language stating-
that-the existing border the course of which Was
"established" by the Potsdam-Agreement,.constitutes-
the western border, of Poland.. The German official
thought this formulation could 'cause misgivings in
Bonn since it might' pe interpreted as outright rec-
ognition-of the border, rather than- the provisional
"acceptance" that Bonn has .been.. offering
For their part, the Poles flatly refused to ac-
cept,a draft' letter, separate from. the treaty, ac,
knowledging-four-power rights for Germany and Berlin,
lest-such an' act' imply that' the border settlement
was indeed provisional and subject to four-power
arbitration. In view of this, the. German official
said it might'be necessary for Bonn simply to. ex-
change letters_with Britain, France and the US re-
stating their continuing rights pending a.final peace
settlement; Such an exchange would serve to protect_
the Brandt government from charges by the Christian
Democratic opposition that it had. given complete-and.
final recognition to the Oder-Neisse-line:- French
and' British representatives have indicated, however,
that this device would fail to meet their govern-
ment'a requirements.
Despite the remaining difficulties, the German
official sensed that the Poles were eager to reach
early agreement. He said that the two sides would
meet next in Bonn some time between 4 and 15 Septem-
ber.
Both sides are anxious to sign a.treaty if
possible. The West Germans-would view it.
as a positive -movement in.Ostpolitik, while
the Poles could hold. it up as proof' that'
they do not always have to follow Moscow4s-
lead.'
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I ND I A-CH I NA VI ETNAM
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NOTES
South Vietnam: Senior government and military
officers agree that the recent angry exchange between
Thieu and Ky has hurt both men and the unity of the
government as a whole.1
/ The press has
reported the recent exchange in detail, particularly
the two conflicting versions of how the military
leadership decided on the Thieu-Ky ticket in 1967.
The generals involved ?have been be-
sieged by the press for their comments, but they have
decided to keep silent and remain neutral in the dis-
pute.
USSR: The Soviets are sending additional war-fl the Mediterranean and probably will conduct
naval exercises there in the next few weeks. Fifteen
surface ships declared to pass through the Bosporus
between 25 July and 4 August, but only six have thus
far gone through. If none of the Soviet warships now
in the Mediterranean departs in the next few days,
the Soviet squadron would number some 52 ships, in-
cluding 21 surface combat ships and 12 submarines.
Fifty-seven units-were there during similar exercises
a year ago.
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