THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 25 JANUARY 1973
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005993725
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 25, 1973
File:
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Body:
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A61-1500610021-6
The President's Daily Brief
25 January 1973
45
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
25 January 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In South Vietnam we have additional indications
that the Communists will try to improve their mil-
itary position before the cease-fire goes into ef-
fect, but so far their action has been mostly con-
fined to harassment and light shelling. (Page 1)
The Thai Army is abandoning large-scale operations
against Communist insurgents in favor of the use of
small, specialized units directed against cadre and
base camps. (Page 2)
Argentine military leaders have reaffirmed their
support for President Lanusse and for proceeding
with the electoral process, despite recent reports
that they were pressing him to foreclose a Peronist
victory. (Page 3)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
US military authorities in Saigon report that
as of 0530 EST there has not been a significant- in-'
crease,in Communist military action, although we
have additional indications that the Communists in-
tend to tty to improve their position on the ground
before the cease-fire goes into effect.
Communist officials have con-
tinued to meet in the past several days to dissem-
inate orders to use small units to expand control
of land and people.
Except for a sharp clash in the western delta,
most of the action remains limited to Communist
harassment and, light, shelling. Some signs point to
main force enemy.attacks, possibly in an effort to
capture a few district centers or even a provincial
capital. the North
Vietnamese have been strengthening their forces in
Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon and now have
at least three regiments there, possibly with armor
support.
South Vietnamese forces have disrupted enemy
staging and storage areas north of Saigon that would
have been used in any push toward the capital itself,
In Military Region 1
the South Vietnamese apparently have abandoned their
effort to retake the Hiep Duc district capital follow-
ing a series of Communist counterattacks on Monday.
In Pleiku Province the government forces lost Duc Co
Ranger Camp earlier this week, and there are indica-
tions that the Communists will try to oust the gov-
ernment from scattered fire support bases in a largely
Communist-controlled area north of the Kontum provin-
cial capital.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THAILAND
? The Thai Army is abandoning large-scale sweep
operations against Communist insurgents--which have
been unsuccessful--and is opting instead to Use
small, specialized Units. Future combat operations
will be conduCted largelylpy 12-man teams that will
concentrate :on identifying and eliminating Communist
cadre and base camps.
This decision against sustaining military
pressure upon the Communists is another
indication of Bangkok's reluctance to ac-
cept the casualties and expenditures re-
quired by an all-out effort. Over the
long term, the development of small, well-
trained units could improve the army's
counterinsurgency performance. The imme-
diate effect of the new strategy, however,
will be to give the Communists welcome re-
? lief from military pressure and opportun-
ity for further growth.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ARGENTINA
Signs of growing Peronist strength and unity
in recent days, combined with a rising level of po-
litical violence, have revived the old anti-Peronist
fears and hatreds within the armed forces.
President Lanusse has been
under growing pressure to take action that would
foreclose a Peronist victory, even if it means post-
poning or canceling the elections scheduled for 11
March.
Following meetings held yesterday, however,
military leaders reaffirmed their support for Lanusse
and for proceeding with the elections. Tighter con-
trols are to be imposed on the candidates.
Lanusse appears to have leaked accounts
of his dismay over political trends in
order to warn the Peroni^sts to moderate
their tactics as well as to obtain this
pledge from the military. He is person-
ally committed to returning the govern-
ment to elected officials and is likely
to do everything he can to keep to his
promise and, at the same time, to keep
the Peronists from winning.
If fear of a Peronist victory becomes over-
riding, however, we would expect Lanusse
to step down and leave to someone else
the unpleasant task of canceling the elec-
tions and dealing with the public outcry
that would follow.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6