THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 17 MAY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976779
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 17, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
17 May 1969
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93478 1-69
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I. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
MIDDLE EAST
The Israelis have asked General Bull to inform Cairo
that the situation along the Suez Canal is "no longer ac-
ceptable" and that Israel "will now take steps to correct
it."
. Tel Aviv has long been making it known in public and
private that the duels across the canal are causing unac-
ceptable numbers of Israeli casualties. Barring a signif-
icant and highly visible de-escalation by the Egyptians,
retaliation of some sort probably is to be expected. The
Israelis face a real dilemma, however, in deciding on the
form of retaliation. A cross-canal operation to silence
the Egyptian guns, for instance, would produce a painfully
long Israeli casualty list. Moreover, one of the main
Israeli arguments against the four-power talks is that the
Middle East crisis shows no sign of getting out of hand,
and they probably are reluctant to call this assertion
into question by mounting a large-scale strike.
Another commando raid into the Egyptian heartland is
perhaps a better possibility. Here the problem for the
Israelis would be to make sure that the raid caused more
damage than the one late last month.
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VIETNAM
Communist military activity again tapered off last
night, with only minor and scattered shellings reported.
Another surge is expected shortly in many areas however. A
wide variety of reports
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attacks in connection with Ho Chi Minh's birthday on Monday
the 19th. We anticipate this round to follow the familiar
pattern of widespread shellings and limited ground assaults
which has marked Communist activity over the past few months.
South Vietnam's Foreign Minister Thanh clearly has major
reservations about some points in the President's speech.
This attitude apparently is shared by others in Thieu's
entourage, judging from the cautiously worded endorsement
issued by Thieu's office. By noting that the eight points
"are compatible with" Thieu's six points and by stating that
the GVN will "study" the eight points, the GVN has demon-
strated its reserve.
Thanh has already asked Secretary Rogers whether the
elections contemplated in the President's address would 'take
place under the present constitution or whether "exceptional"
elections which would be somewhat closer to the idea contained
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in the NLF's ten points were contemplated. The same issue
evoked statements of concern from several members of the
National Assembly who see their positions threatened in any
arrangement which calls for new national elections to form
a new government or constitution.
Thanh also raised a question about "designated base
areas," into which North Vietnamese troops would be grouped.
Thanh wanted to know whether these areas would be in pop-
ulated regions which thus would be removed from GVN control
or whether they would be in unpopulated areas. The foreign
minister went on to voice his concern that if substantial
numbers of North Vietnamese troops remained in the country
at the time of elections, they would have a great influence
through agents, friends, and relatives.
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SOVIET AFFAIRS
The Husak leadership in Czechoslovakia has banned two
prominent liberal publications, suspended three more, and
forced the replacement of the editors of several others for
not heeding previously imposed restrictions. The crackdown
was announced while Husak was in Budapest--probably a delib-
erate bit of timing to underscore the growing effectiveness
of his domestic controls.
As ?a further nod to Moscow, the regime has reshuffled
personnel in the ministry of Interior's party committees
in order to tighten control over the security and police
apparatus.
Husak will be looking for an opportunity to wangle con-
cessions from the Soviets. Withdrawal of some troops or a
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hard currency loan would make his regime more palatable to
the. public., Husak's chance. may come soon if GreChko and
Deputy Premier Baibakov soon visit Prague, as reported.
The Soviets may soon conduct more long-range tests of
the SS-9 carrying multiple re-entry vehicles. Four Soviet
missile range instrumentation ships are moving into the
north Pacific impact area where two similar tests were
carried out last month.
EUROPE
There is nothing significant to report.
II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
NORTH VIETNAM - LAOS
North Vietnamese Ambassador Hien, in an unusual depar-
ture from Hanoi's long-standing policy of avoiding official
contact with the Souvanna government, called on Souvanna
on 14 May. Although from what we have learned of the ses-
sion, Hien does not seem to have broken any new ground, the
meeting itself may be a sign that Hanoi is maneuvering to-
ward a Laos settlement.
The North Vietnamese may be thinking in terms of first
steps toward a settlement among the Laotian factions, out-
side the venue of the Paris negotiations. In doing so, the
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Communists would be undercutting the US position that the
problem of North Vietnamese troops in Laos must figure
prominently in any settlement on Vietnam.
MALAYSIA
The Malaysian Chinese. Association, which withdrew from
Prime Minister Rahman's cabinet on Tuesday, now says it will
rejoin the government. This may help to ease the situation
somewhat, but the association is weaker, both in the legis-
lature and within the Chinese community, than it was before
the elections last Saturday. It is not clear what role, if
any, the association will play in the government's efforts
to restore order.
Rahman and his colleagues have given the strong impres-
sion that they have ruled out an accommodation with any Chi-
nese. This certainly seems true with regard to the Chinese
opposition parties, which did so well in the elections and
are more in tune with the average Chinese in Malaysia than
the upper class Malaysian Chinese Association. These parties
have appealed publicly for an end to the violence but claim
the government has shown no interest in enlisting their help.
Unless the gap between the Malay leaders of the govern-
ment and leaders of the Chinese community can be rebridged,
Malaysia's outlook Will be bleak.
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Top Secret
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