THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 OCTOBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977065
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 30, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
30 October 1969
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
30 October 1969
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
There were new clashes in eastern Lebanon this morn-
ing, amid signs that Fatah was willing to come to
terms with the Lebanese. (Page 2)
The Vietnamese Communists seem to be strengthening
their forces (Page 3)
Franco has made extensive changes in his cabinet.
(Page 6)
Castro's speech launching the 1970 sugar harvest
displayed a preoccupation with the problems of man-
power efficiency and discipline--an indication even
he may be anticipating a shortfall in the 10-mil-
lion-ton quota he has set. (Page 7)
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SOVIET UNION
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LEBANON
Fedayeen units in eastern Lebanon near the Sy-
rian border attacked Lebanese troops again today,
according to press reports. The clashes came only
a few hours after Fatah had announced a 24-hour
cease-fire. They also followed hard on the heels
of an announcement in Cairo that the talks there
were progressing well and that Yasir Arafat of Fatah
?had been invited to join them.
Fatah, concerned that it was
overextending itself, might be willing to
come to terms if Lebanon permitted the
fedayeen to maintain operational bases in
the country. This morning's military ac-
tion was probably initiated by other,
more radical fedayeen groups, who are
habitually unresponsive to Fatah's lead
and who have no particular interest in
reaching an accommodation with the Leb-
anese.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
The influx of North Vietnamese regulars
into the delta this year probably is
aimed at shoring up the Viet Cong, whose
position there has been declining since
Tet 1968. Maintenance of a strong posi-
tion in South Vietnam's most populous
and richest agricultural region is clearly
of crucial importance to the Communists.
Thus far, the new Communist units in the
delta have largely avoided combat and
seem to be concentrating on improvement.
of their logistics networks in base areas
along, the Cambodian border and the Gulf
of Siam. They may be preparing to chal-
lenge the Vietnamization program by test-
ing the South Vietnamese Army in this
area.
Accumulating evidencer
points to mid-November as the probable opening of
the Communists' nationwide "winter-spring" campaign.
The current disposition of the enemy's main force
combat units, as well as other good indicators, sug-
gests that the new offensive round will be similar
to the summer "high points," relatively light shell-
ings and occasional ground attacks. The Saigon
government's pacification program will probably be
under more pressure than before.
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WEST GERMANY
In his ambitious program for domestic reform,
outlined to the Bundestag on 28 October, Brandt
characterized German democracy as "at its begin-
ning," and he envisioned a decade of change in
German society to improve and deepen it. To engage
the people in this effort he proposed, for example,
a reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18 and in
the age for holding office from 25 to 21.
Brandt also talked at length of the reform of
existing institutions. His government will examine
the educational and legal systems, government ad-
ministration, and the defense establishment.
Modernization was another constant theme.
Problems such as modern environment, greater re-
source allocation to basic science to close the
technological gap, and longer term financial plan-
ning will be tackled.
As a measure of the program's scope and ambi-
tion, Brandt has committed the government to issue
six major reports in the first half of 1970, and
four more in the second half. These reports will
cover such topics as the state of the economy, the
situation in German agriculture, science, transpor-
tation, and health.
The program projected a large increase in ex-
penditures, but the government plans to spread the
tax burden more evenly through reforms of the sys-
tem rather than increase taxes.
Brandt's statement was probably intended
less as a realistic program for his vote-
shy coalition than as a testament to
Socialist ambitions to become the major-
ity party of the future.
Although there is seemingly something in
the program for all segments of German
society, including economic guarantees
for the conservative farmers, the spot-
light fell particularly on the urban pop-
ulace and on youth. It is these groups
that the Socialists view as the most
promising target for future electoral
gains.
(continued)
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Pankow gave its initial reaction to Brandt's
foreign policy statement in a report issued yes-
terday by the East German news agency. The agency's
summary is short and free of polemics. It also
fails ?to mention Brandt's offer to negotiate with
the East.
The East Germans doubtless plan to study
the statement thoroughly before commit-
ting themselves. The basically unin-
formed East German populace, meanwhile,
probably has received the impression that
nothing has changed in Bonn.
ci
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SPAIN
Franco has shaken up his cabinet, placing
economic specialists in charge of both domestic
and foreign affairs. Foreign Minister Castiella
is to be replaced by Gregorio Lopez Bravo, who
has been the minister of industry.
With these appointments, Franco has
shifted the balance toward the techno-
crats who favor economic liberalization
and increased ties with Western Europe,
although the government's National Move-
ment (the Falange) and the military are
still represented.
As foreign minister, Castiella has been
associated with the provocative Gibral-
tar policy. He is also blamed by the
Spanish military for the difficulties
which attended the renewal of the pres-
ent defense agreement with the US. His
successor is less combative and more
sophisticated; he is not likely to alter
Spanish policy on US bases significantly,
however.
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CUBA
Castro launched the all-important 1970 sugar
harvest with a highly emotional speech on Monday.
As in earlier talks, he committed Cuba to an un-
paralleled 10-million-ton harvest and placed "the
honor of the revolution" at stake in attaining
the goal.
Castro stated that there is enough cane to
produce 10 million tons and that success will de-
pend on the output of the worker in cutting and
milling it. His obvious misgivings over the ca-
pacity of the Cubans to work efficiently enough
was reflected in his frequent allusions to Ehe
critical manpower problems that must be overcome.
He emphasized that the "question of discipline is
basic." He discussed at length the serious harm
that could be caused by worker negligence and
carelessness.
At the same time Castro promised no relief in
economic pressures on the population, at least un-
til the harvest is completed in mid-1970. The
Cubans, who have experienced a steady decline in
living conditions, apparently will be forced to
suffer further.
Despite the mass mobilizations and other
special measures, 10 million tons seems
an unreachable target; sugar experts in
the US and elsewhere consider even eight
million tons an optimistic estimate. The
recurrent emphasis in Monday's speech on
manpower problems suggests that Castro
himself may be anticipating a shortfall
and may be preparing to shift the blame
for it to the workers.
Neither the failure to fulfill the har-
vest quota nor the added economic burdens
which we forsee would greatly weaken the
government's hold on the country in the
short run.
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