THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 DECEMBER 1976

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0006466930
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 22, 1976
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PDF icon DOC_0006466930.pdf233.33 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 The President's Daily Brief December 22, 1976 2 -T,-.Irrtit?&I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E 0 11652 exemption category 513(1 5.121.13) declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY December 22, 1976 25X1 25X1 Table of Contents Saudi Arabia: (Page 1) Egypt-Syria: The plans revealed yesterday for eventual unity between Egypt and Syria probably will never come to fruition, but the announcement underscores, primarily for the benefit of the US and Israel, the two countries' deter- mination to be united on Middle East peace negotiating tactics. (Page 2) Syria-Jordan: Syrian President Asad's desire to strengthen Syr- ian-Egyptian relations in preparation for the next round of Middle East peace negotiations has led him to mute further talk of federation with Jordan. (Page 3) USSR-Japan: The USSR apparently has decided to resume normal relations with Japan in the aftermath of the MIG-25 inci- dent. (Page 4) Notes: South Yemen - Iran; Lebanon; China-USSR (Pages 6 and 7) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SAUDI ARABIA: 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 I --continued FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 25X1 25X1 EGYPT-SYRIA: The plans revealed yesterday for eventual unity be- tween Egypt and Syria probably will never come to fruition, but the announcement under- scores, primarily for the benefit of the US and Israel, the two countries' determina- tion to be united on Middle East peace ne- gotiating tactics. Egypt and Syria probably do not intend to work toward a full mer- ger. Their joint declaration on the subject and subsequent remarks by the Syrian and Egyptian foreign ministers mentioned "relations of unity" rather than "union." A separate communique issued by the presidents of the two countries made only scant reference to the unified political command to be established to lay the basis for "unity." Syrian President Asad and Egyptian President Sadat, who probably still harbor private suspicions about each other, no doubt view the unified political command as a useful mechanism for keeping each other in line. 2 --continued FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SYRIA-JORDAN: President Asad's desire to strengthen Syrian-Egyp- tian relations in prep- aration for the next round of Middle East peace negotiations has lead him to mute fur- ther talk of federation with Jordan. This is particularly true of Asad, who undoubtedly fears that Sadat, despite his disclaimers, could again adopt an independent negoti- ating policy, as he did last year in pursuit of the second Sinai agreement. Asad probably looks on the joint command as a means of better ensuring that Sadat will coordinate policy and of prevent- ing Sadat from again moving too far ahead of Syria and the other Arab countries. Sadat, for his part, has become increasingly concerned over the last year about Asad's rising stature in the Arab world and par- ticularly about Syria's efforts to gain control over the Palestine Liberation Organization. He prob- ably sees the joint command as a way of maintaining some Egyptian influence over both the Palestin- ian movement and Syrian negoti- ating policies. The Syrians are reluctant to move toward more formal ties at present because of their desire to work out a common Middle East negoti- ating strategy with Saudi Arabia as well as Egypt. Asad knows that President Sadat and the Saudis are already deeply suspicious of growing political cooperation between Syria and Jor- dan and would probably oppose a federation. The Saudis balked over financing the Jordanian Hawk missile deal with the US earlier this year partly because of their mistrust of Husayn's ties with Syria. 3 --continued FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY The Syrians at present regard Husayn primarily as a useful channel both for gaining a sym- pathetic hearing for their views in Washing- ton and for exploring ideas with the US for avoiding a negotiating impasse. USSR-JAPAN: The USSR has apparently decided to resume normal rela- tions with Japan in the aftermath of the MIG-25 incident. Asad is likely to continue to fos- ter closer relations with Husayn, taking special care to allay Jor- danian fears of Syrian domination. Whether these ties-take the form of a formal arrangement probably matters little to Asad. Asad clearly hopes that closer military cooperation will ensure Jordanian support in disputes with Iraq, or any future war with Israel. Husayn believes close relations with Syria are essential to pre- vent Jordan from becoming isolated in the Arab world and to enable it to strengthen its position against the Palestine Liberation Organization. Husayn is in direct competition with the PLO for the loyalty of the Palestinians, par- ticularly those within Jordan, where more than half the popula- tion is Palestinian. * * * Late last week, the Soviets in- formed the Japanese that they were ready to schedule two economic meetings they had threatened to postpone because of Japan's han- dling of the MIG-25 incident. They also promised the Japanese an early meeting to work out the problems for Japan that result from the USSR's recent imposition of a 200-nautical-mile exclusive fisheries zone. --continued 4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY The USSR issued a great deal of propaganda on Japan's handling of the MIG-25 incident, but the only concrete retaliation seems to have been the seizure of an abnor- mally large number of Japanese fishing boats in September and October for alleged violations of Soviet territorial waters. The Soviets were reluctant to carry out their threats to retali- ate in other economic areas because Soviet-Japanese economic coopera- tion benefits the USSR as much as it does Japan. The USSR, more- over, did not want to give China an advantage with Japan's new leaders by prolonged remonstrances over the MIG-25 affair. --continued 5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY South Yemen has released the surviving pilot of the Iranian reconnais- sance plane shot down last month. The quadripartite com- mittee charged with overseeing the truce in Lebanon--composed of representatives of Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait--is unable to agree on a course of action for collecting heavy weap- ons from the combatants. NOTES Progress has also been made on the more difficult issue of recovering the aircraft--an F-4--which crashed off the South Yemeni coast. Iran has been concerned lest a communist government gain access to the plane in the course of sal- vage operations. According to an official statement from Saudi Arabia, which has acted as inter- mediary in negotiations, Saudi "experts" will participate in the salvage operations and the air- craft will be returned to Iran. * * * All the parties have been caching their weapons since the cease-fire, and there is little likelihood that any will hand them over voluntarily. Camille Shamun's National Liberal Party has taken a step toward turn- ing in heavy arms, but a spokesman has made it clear that the party will turn no arms over to the Leb- anese government until the quad- ripartite committee has adopted a 25X1 definitive plan. 6 --continued FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY For the second time in little over a month, Soviet and East European diplomats have walked out of a Chinese state banquet. Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien had sharply criticized the USSR during a reception for the visiting South Yemeni head of state, charg- ing that Moscow will be the "main source" of a new war and lambasting Soviet "expansion" in the ArEb countries. Li's accusations are the first high-level Chinese comment on So- viet activities since the Sino- Soviet border talks reopened in Peking earlier this month. 7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400030002-1