THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 SEPTEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014907
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 20, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
September 20, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 511(1),121,(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
September 20, 1975
? Table of Contents
Portugal: Anti-Communist military officers and
representatives of the democratic parties dom-
inate the new cabinet sworn in yesterday.
(Page 1)
Lebanon: Intense fighting continued in Beirut yes-
terday; the army has not yet been brought into
the conflict. (Page 2)
USSR: The Soviets have reached the stage in their
submarine construction program at which--to
comply with the Strategic Arms Limitation In-
terim Agreement--they must dismantle older
ICBM launchers or submarine-launched ballistic
missile launchers in order to compensate for
new submarine ballistic missile launchers.
(Page 3)
Cyprus: Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash will re-
quest authority from the Turkish Cypriot Con-
stituent Assembly on Monday to declare the
Turkish Cypriots independent should the UN
General Assembly take action that Denktash
deems unfavorable. (Page 4)
Panama: Canal treaty negotiations may encounter
new difficulties despite the government's ap-
parent commitment to continue the talks.
(Page 6)
Notes: Libya-USSR; Libya - North Vietnam - Morocco;
USSR-Spain (Page 7)
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PORTUGAL
Anti-Communist military officers and
representatives of the democratic parties
dominate the new cabinet sworn in yester-
day, Portugal's sixth government since
the military coup of last year. The re-
structured Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council is also controlled by anti-Com-
munists.
The division of portfolios among the major
parties corresponds roughly to the results of the
April elections. The new cabinet includes four
Socialists, two Popular Democrats, and one Commu-
nist; military officers, mostly from the anti-
Communist faction of Major Antunes, hold five po-
sitions and civilian technocrats have the remain-
ing three. Despite Prime Minister Azevedo's ef-
fort to portray the new cabinet as a "government
of unity," most Portuguese will probably hold the
Socialists responsible for its actions.
The newly restructured Revolutionary Council,
which was announced late Thursday night, has been
reduced to 17 members. The majority are identi-
fied with the Antunes faction. Only two are con-
sidered Communist sympathizers. One of the first
tests of the new Council will be to reestablish
discipline in the armed forces. If the Council
continues the former practice of weak compromises
and consensus rule, however, it will be no more
effective than its predecessors.
The Communists have Oecided to
present a facade of cooperating with the parties
and the new government while creating disruptions
across the country intended to complicate the new
regime's problems and keep the pressure on it to
maintain public order. In addition to demonstra-
tions, the party will organize strikes against
large landowners in the south and also will en-
courage homeless workers to begin occupying vacant
houses.
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LEBANON
Intense fighting continued in Beirut
yesterday. The government has ordered a
dusk-to-dawn curfew in the commercial
areas of the city where damage has been
extensive. The Lebanese army has not yet
been brought into the conflict. The less
radical fedayeen organizations, Fatah and
Saiqa, continue to remain out of the fight-
ing and to assist Lebanese security au-
thorities.
For the first time in the latest round of
fighting, the Syrians have actively involved them-
selves in efforts to end the conflict. Syrian
Foreign Minister Khaddam arrived in Beirut yester-
day to confer with President Franjiyah. In May
and June, Khaddam helped negotiate both an end to
that round of fighting and the appointment of
Rashid Karami as prime minister.
Syrian President Asad has
approved joint intervention by the Lebanese army
and the Palestine Liberation Organization to re-
store calm to Beirut. Under the plan, the army
would police the Christian areas of the city, and
the PLO would control the activities of the Leb-
anese Muslims and the leftists. Syrian military
units posing as members of Saiqa would bolster the
strength of the PLO. the PLO
leadership favors the Syrian proposal.
Karami met yesterday with Franjiyah and In-
terior Minister Shamun to try to prolong his man-
date for continued efforts at conciliation. Many
Christian politicians and army officers distrust
Karami, whom they consider needlessly conciliatory
toward radical Muslim elements.
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USSR
The Soviets have reached the stage
in their submarine construction program
at which they must dismantle older ICBM
launchers or submarine-launched ballistic
missile launchers (SLBMs) in order to
compensate for new submarine ballistic
missile launchers as required by the
Strategic Arms Limitation Interim Agree-
ment.
Recent missile firings indicate that the first
lengthened D-class submarine has completed sea trials.
It will be some time, however, before the new sub-
marine makes its first patrol with missiles--per-
haps as much as nine months. The lengthened D-class
submarine carries 16 SS-N-8 missiles. Four of these
submarines have now been launched, the second is on
sea trials, and the third and fourth should begin
trials in October and December. In addition, a
standard D-class submarine carrying 12 SS-N-8 mis-
siles probably will begin sea trials in mid-October.
The Interim Agreement stipulates that after
the nuclear submarine containing the 741st submarine
ballistic missile launch tube begins sea trials, the
Soviets must dismantle older ICBM or SLBM launchers
on a one-for-one basis. The dismantling must begin
no later than the start of sea trials and must be
completed within four months for ICBMs and six
months for SLBMs.
The Soviets got an early start on dismantling
by placing 17 above-ground SS-7 sites--34 launchers--
at a reduced state of readiness several years ago.
Most missiles, warheads, and missile-related equip-
ment were removed, but the dismantling of permanent
facilities has begun at only five sites.
The pace of the submarine construction program,
however, requires that ICBM dismantling now begin
in earnest. The second lengthened D-class subma-
rine, which began sea trials in late August or early
September, contains launch tubes 730 through 746,
and thus by early January at least six SS-7
launchers will have to be fully dismantled under
the Interim Agreement. By December, the submarine
containing the 790th SLBM probably will enter sea
trials, requiring that by March, 50 older ICBM
launchers must be dismantled.
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CYPRUS
Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash
will request authority from the Turkish
Cypriot Constituent Assembly on Monday
to declare the Turkish Cypriots inde-
pendent should the UN General Assembly
take action that Denktash deems un-
favorable. He cited two possible de-
velopments at the UN--refusal to per-
mit him to address the Assembly as
the spokesman for the Turkish Cypriots
or passage of a resolution unduly
critical of the Turkish position on
Cyprus--as justifying a move for in-
dependence.
Denktash will probably obtain the Assembly's
support, although opposition leaders have expressed
reservations about the wisdom of linking a declara-
tion of independence to possible UN action. While
the vote by the Constituent Assembly will indicate
the extent of community backing for Denktash's
proposed course of action, the Turkish Cypriot
leader must look to Ankara for final approval.
Turkish Prime Minister Demirel has avoided
taking a direct stand on the subject. He displayed
considerable lack of enthusiasm for Turkish Cypriot
independence last week, however, noting that it was
not something envisioned in his government's program.
Opposition leader Ecevit has indicated that he op-
poses independence.
The Turks probably view independence as fraught
with uncertainties and potentially serious problems
including:
--the negative impact it would have on efforts
to lift the US arms embargo;
--the probability that only a handful of na-
tions would recognize an independent Turkish
Cypriot state;
(continued)
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--the possibility that Greek Cypriots would
then move for union with Greece, which the
Turks fear would mean the buildup of Greek
forces on Turkey's southern flank.
Denktash's threat appears to be chiefly a ploy
aimed at forestalling UN action detrimental to the
Turkish Cypriot cause. The Turks, moreover, will
lobby extensively at the UN General Assembly to
avoid the kind of resolution that might cause Dem-
irel to commit himself on the issue of independence.
The likelihood that the debate on Cyprus will be
postponed until October, probably until after the
Turkish senatorial elections on October 12, pro-
vides time for both Greeks and Turks to maneuver
against a move both wish to avoid.
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PANAMA
Canal treaty negotiations may en-
counter new difficulties despite the
Panamanian government's apparent commit-
ment to continue the talks.
General Torrijos reportedly was angered by re-
marks made this week by Secretary Kissinger, Ambas-
sador Bunker, and General McAuliffe, commander in
chief, US Southern Command. The controlled Panaman-
ian press has attacked the statements, claiming
that they indicate a hardened US position. Members
of Panama's negotiating team are said to be dis-
couraged and talking of an impasse.
The official foreign ministry communique is-
sued Wednesday at the conclusion of the latest ne-
gotiating round cited "very little progress." It
reflected a marked change from the considerable op-
timism expressed prior to Ambassador Bunker's ar-
rival on September 7. Despite the US desire for
secrecy, Torrijos has ordered, according to press
reports, that a "public account of the talks" be
published by today.
Panama will probably seek to continue negotiat-
ing and try to rally public opinion to the govern-
ment's position. Torrijos almost certainly believes
that a well-orchestrated show of domestic and in-
ternational opinion favoring Panama will induce the
US to make further concessions.
Student demonstrations protesting the state-
ments of US officials have been peaceful so far.
The gradual escalation of the Panamanian campaign,
however, with official disclosures and a more le-
nient attitude toward student demonstrations,
carries the danger not only of stalled talks but
also of unplanned violence.
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NOTES
Libya may soon receive TU-22 medium bombers
from the USSR.
Photography of early August showed two TU-22s
at an aircraft plant in the USSR, Markings on both
aircraft resembled insignia of the Libyan air force.
Libya reportedly is to receive at least 12 TU-22s
from the USSR,
Libya will be only the second country to
receive TU-22s from the USSR; Iraq received 14 of
the bombers in 1973. Although the aircraft will
eventually give Tripoli a medium-range bombing capa-
bility, the poor quality of Libyan pilots will be
a limiting factor for some time,
The C-130 transport aircraft Libya
has bought from Vietnam apparently will be loaned
to Morocco.
Qadhafi offered to provide Morocco with C-130s he
was acquiring
Libya
eight C-130s from Vietnam.
purchased six to
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