THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 18 JULY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014852
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 18, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
July 18, 1975
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declassified only on approval of
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July 18, 1975
Table of Contents
Egypt: A member of Egypt's UN delegation has given
the most specific indication yet of what Cairo
is seeking in return for renewal of the UN man-
date--a Security Council resolution emphasizing
that the UN force is responsible for supervis-
ing Israeli withdrawals. (Page 1)
Egypt
Laos: The Lao communists are moving to eliminate
any foreign diplomatic presence outside Vien-
tiane. (Page 3)
Notes: Portugal; Japan; North Vietnam (Page 4)
Annex: We discuss the problems and options of
Italy's Christian Democratic Party.
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EGYPT
Egypt's second-ranking representative
to the UN told the US mission yesterday
that Cairo's objective on the issue of re-
newing the UN mandate is to include word-
ing in the Security Council resolution
emphasizing that the UN force is respon-
sible for supervising Israeli withdrawals.
This is the most specific indication the
Egyptians have yet given of the kind of
formulation that might satisfy them and
implies that Cairo wishes to facilitate
the continued presence of the UN force.
The Egyptian envoy stressed that Cairo does
not want to upset US-mediated peace negotiations
by its actions at the UN, and he noted that his
government is aware that unbalanced language in a
Security Council resolution could provoke a US veto.
The Egyptians hope, he said, to work in close con-
sultation with the US mission on mutually acceptable
language.
The Egyptian did not comment on the duration
of any extension that might be acceptable to Cairo.
It is doubtful that Cairo would accept the six-month
extension Israel has requested, and it might not
agree to more than a month.
Nor is it clear whether Israel would accept
Egypt's proposed wording on the function of the UN
force. Israel's acting permanent representative
told Ambassador Moynihan yesterday that Tel Aviv
is not prepared to accept anything that goes beyond
the language of past resolutions on mandate exten-
sions.
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EGYPT
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LAOS
The Lao communists, having forced
a drastic reduction in the size and
role of the US mission, are focusing
on the activities of other diplomatic
missions and are moving to eliminate
any foreign diplomatic presence out-
side Vientiane.
The Thai, who have been subjected to virulent
propaganda barrages for months, closed their three
consulates last week because of uncertainty about
the safety of their personnel. The French have
been asked to close their three small military
training missions in the provinces, and the Japa-
nese and Australian voluntary agencies have heard
suggestions that they end all activities outside
the capital.
The communists appear determined to prevent
any foreign observation of their activities in the
countryside and strictly limit non-communist mis-
sions in Vientiane. Although these missions have
been spared intense harassment, diplomats are find-
ing it increasingly difficult to transact even the
most mundane business with the government. In ad-
dition, the government has thrown up bureaucratic
barriers to travel by foreigners outside the city.
Leftist student spokesmen, who were involved in
the anti-US demonstrations, now are saying that
they wish to examine the size of diplomatic missions
and recommend limitations.
The French, British, Australians, and Japanese
provide much-needed economic assistance through the
Foreign Exchange Operations Fund and small aid proj-
ects. The communists clearly want to continue re-
ceiving this assistance, but only on their own
terms. After years of austerity in the caves at
Sam Neua, most communist leaders see no urgent rea-
sons to accommodate non-communist aid donors.
The Lao communists are just beginning to re-
act to the prospect of an end to US aid. In recent
informal conversations with Western diplomats, two
mid-level communist officials expressed shock. One
of these officials indicated that he believed such
aid was due Laos under the Lao peace agreements,
but said that the government would not beg. The
Lao so far have shown no sign whether they will
accept continued diplomatic relations with the US
in the absence of new assistance.
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NOTES
Portugal
Japanese officials are concerned over the pos-
sibility of further violence in Okinawa during the
International Ocean Exposition, which formally
opens there tomorrow.
Leftists are protesting a variety of "injus-
tices," including US and Japanese neglect of
Okinawa since World War II, the large US base pres-
ence, and the continuation of the monarchy in
Japan. The immediate concern of the Okinawa po-
lice, who are being reinforced by some 2,400 riot
police from the main islands, is to prevent fur-
ther incidents directed against Crown Prince
Akihito, Prime Minister Miki, and other members
of the cabinet who are present for the opening of
the exposition. Japanese officials fear any in-
cident involving US facilities or personnel could
touch off increased criticism of US bases and cause
embarrassment to both the US and Japanese governments.
North Vietnam has issued a strong blast against
Secretary Kissinger's criticism of the role of third-
world countries in the UN.
The commentary, published in the official party
journal Nhan Dan, indicates that North Vietnam is
using the Secretary's remarks in an effort to in-
crease third-world support for its own application
for UN membership. The Saigon-based communist ad-
ministration is likely to pursue a similar strategy.
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ITALY
When the leaders of Italy's Chris-
tian Democratic Party gather tomorrow to
debate the implications of last month's
regional and local elections, they will
be preoccupied with one overriding fact:
for the first time, the party is in real
danger of losing its dominant position
in national politics to the Communists.
The Christian Democrats and Communists
have been, respectively, Italy's largest
and second largest party during most of
the postwar period. Until the June con-
tests there have never been less than
10 percentage points between them. In
June, however, the Communists pulled to
within about 2 percent of the Christian
Democrats at the regional, provincial,
and municipal levels.
The 120-member Christian Democratic national
council--the party's principal deliberative body--
faces two basic problems:
--How to minimize the damage to the party's
position in regional and local governments.
--How to prevent the Communists from duplicat-
ing or improving on their performance in the
next national parliamentary election, which
must be held no later than 1977.
There is probably not much the Christian Demo-
crats can do about the regional and local situation.
Two weeks ago, the party's executive directorate
called for the formation of center-left govern-
ments--i.e., coalitions composed of Christian Demo-
crats, Socialists, Social Democrats, and Republi-
cans--wherever possible. But the Socialists, whose
moderate gains gave them the option in many areas
of either joining center-left governments or link-
ing up with the Communists, have so far shown a
preference for alliances with the Communists.
(continued)
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proposal for an
operation among
level.
"historic
the three
The Christian
Democrats face a
particularly diffi-
cult problem in de-
ciding the line to
take with the So-
cialists. Both the
Socialists and Com-
munists emphasize
that their coali-
tions are open to
all parties except
the neo-fascists.
This forces the
Christian Democrats
either to relinquish
their share of power
in many areas or
join the Socialists
and Communists in
local governments.
Such local alliances
would inevitably be
regarded as a move
toward Communist
chief Berlinguer's
compromise" aimed at co-
parties at the national
In an effort to turn the situation around, the
Christian Democrats will be critically reassessing
their leadership and policies. Although Christian
Democratic leaders generally say they do not want
to make a scapegoat of party chief Amintore Fanfani,
most seem to have concluded that he has to go. An
overwhelming majority in the party's executive di-
rectorate broke with Fanfani on the issue of whether
to postpone the reassessment until the party con-
gress next fall. Prime Minister Moro.
is expected to withdraw his support
at the council meeting. Thus, even if the council
does not vote Fanfani out now--he says he will not
resign--it will at least pave the way for his de-
parture. He is likely to be out no later than the
party congress in the fall.
Maneuvering for a successor is already under
way among the Christian Democrats' six factions.
The largest of the center factions--which includes
Foreign Minister Rumor and represents about a third
(continued)
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of the party--does not now hold either the party
leadership or the office of prime minister and may
well provide the new leader. A front runner is 60-
year-old Flamini? Piccoli--leader of the Christian
Democratic delegation in parliament's lower house.
Although regarded as a conservative, Piccoli ap-
pears to have had some success during the last few
weeks in mending fences with Christian Democratic
left-wingers, whose approval will be essential to
anyone wishing to succeed Fanfani. Other promi-
nent contenders are Rumor and Budget Minister An-
dreotti, who leads his own faction.
The Christian Democrats will also have to de-
cide on the composition of a government to follow
Moro's Christian Democratic-Republican coalition--
supported in parliament by the Social Democrats and
Socialists--which everyone regards as a stopgap to
bridge the June elections. The Christian Democrats
do not have many options. They can:
--Pay the price the Socialists are demanding
for their return to full participation in the
center-left coalition. That would involve po-
licy and ministerial concessions to the Social-
ists, along with a larger chunk of patronage.
There are signs that the Socialists may also
insist on some form of indirect participation
by the Communists, such as formalized consul-
tations on legislative matters.
-Insist on the traditional center-left for-
mula, in which the Christian Democrats would
continue to hold most of the power. The So-
cialists would balk, however, and the ensuing
political battle could lead to an early na-
tional election.
--Try to revive the centrist coalition, re-
placing the Socialists with the small and con-
servative Liberal Party. Although mathemati-
cally possible, the nationwide decline of the
Liberals in the regional elections would make
the centrist alternative just another stopgap.
(continued)
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In addition to these immediate problems, the
Christian Democrats will have to address the longer
range issue of their relations with the Communists.
The election results suggest that Italians in in-
creasing numbers view the Communists as a legiti-
mate national party, so it will be difficult for
the Christian Democrats merely to reiterate their
opposition to the Communists on ideological grounds.
The Christian Democrats are not likely to make a
deal with the Communists, however, unless forced to
do so by a decisive defeat in a national election.
Still, there are bound to be pressures for a more
open dialogue with Berlinguer's party, not only
from the Socialists but also from the Christian Dem-
ocratic left.
The heterogeneous nature of their party will
make it difficult for the Christian Democrats to
reach a consensus on these issues. Any course of
action will alienate some of the party membership.
That dilemma is particularly acute now, because Fan-
fani's campaign strategy resulted in a shift of the
party's image to the right at a time when the coun-
try seems to be moving left.
It will be hard, too, for the Christian Demo-
crats' diverse factions to break the ingrained
habit of maneuvering for internal advantage even
after policy decisions are taken. One symptom of
this tendency is the party's chronic inability to
impose discipline on its representatives in parlia-
ment when controversial issues are up for a vote.
The Christian Democrats could field new faces
capable of improving the party's tired image only
with a major internal upheaval that would risk al-
ienating traditional supporters.
As the Christian Democrats struggle to overcome
these problems, they will be competing with a Commu-
nist Party that seems united behind Berlinguer and
bent on proving that it is a moderate party with
the answers to Italy's problems. The latest exam-
ple of the Communist post-election strategy came
last week, when Communist labor leaders took the
lead in encouraging Italy's major labor federation
to seek maximum employment and temper wage demands
in major contract negotiations this fall. The fed-
eration's strategy should encourage less protracted
bargaining in the fall, unless some of the militant
constituent unions refuse to go along. Deputy Prime
Minister La Malfa, a frequent critic of labor's po-
licies, praised the Communist-sponsored proposals
as eminently sensible.
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