THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 DECEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993008
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 3, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
3 December 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
3 December 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In the East Pakistan ?fighting, the Mukti Bahini and
the Indians have scored gains in several areas. 50X1
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Military reverses are causing political reverbera-
tions.in Cambodia. (Page 3)
Satellite photography of the USSR shows that some
incomplete Y-class ballistic missile submarines are
being modified. (Page 4)
The Warsaw Pact communique seeks to increase pres-
sure on the West to adopt a more forthcoming atti-
tude toward a Conference on European Security.
(Page 6)
South Vietnam
(Page 7)
Tito has intervened with Croatian party leaders in
an attempt to bring them into line with federal
party policies. (Page 8)
At Annex, we discuss Egyptian diplomatic
intentions as the UN begins its annual debate
on the Middle East situation.
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EAST PAKISTAN
"Ip4,44
Jibannaga?
?Jessore
Khu In a?
Reported fighting
55221 3 1 2-71
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INDIA-PAKISTAN
The Mukti Bahini and the Indians have made
gains in several areas. Fighting is underway for
control of Shamshernagar Airfield.(
Guerrillas and Indians have advanced to within a
few miles of Boda and Kurigram
/ The Feni area has been quiet since 30 Novem-
ber, but almost all the Pakistani troops there are
on line with little reserve.
although the initial
attacks last month were made by the Mukti Bahini,
he is now facing Indian regulars. Indian artillery
has disrupted traffic on the road from Chittagong
at a point about 15 miles south of Feni, but the
railroad remains open.
Fighting continues in the Jessore area, but
there is no firm evidence of any significant Indian
gains there.
In numerous public statements over the last
several days Mrs-. Gandhi has insisted that India
will proceed according to what it perceives to be
in its best national interest, regardless of the
advice and actions of foreign powers. Her remarks
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to the upper hOuse of parliament on Tuesday seem
to. indicate India will not be deflected from its
present course of pressing for an early resolution
of the crisis. The Prime Minister did not, however,
refer to demands from the opposition for immediate
recognition of Bangla Desh,.but instead again em-
iphasized the necessity of an immediate dialogue be-
tween Islamabad and the elected Bengali leaders,
including their "undisputed leader" Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman-. India remains adamantly opposed to UN Se-
curity Council involvement and Mrs. Gandhi has pub-
licly-spurned Pakistan's request to have UN observ--
era posted on Pakistani territory near. the Indian
border.
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CAMBODIA
Military reverses are causing political rever-
berations in Phnom Penh. Civilian leaders in the
cabinet have been remarkably frank and caustic con-
cerning the deficiencies of the army,/
The civilian leaders were reacting to the
generals' assertions that the army was
spread too thin to provide better security
for Phnom Penh, and that civilian commandos
would have to play a greater role in the
capital's defense. The meeting took place
before this week's rout on Route 6.
Much of the grumbling is the natural reac-
tion of civilians to battlefield reverses'
and to the military's growing political
role. Although the critics might have
some influence on Lon Nol's policies, they
will not have a major impact on the polit-
ical situation as long as Eon ?NoZ holds
things together. Any serious threat to
political stability would have to come
from the military establishment itself.
There is as yet no evidence, however, of
any restiveness in either the ranks or
the officer corps in reaction to the re-
cent military setbacks.
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USSR
Satellite photography of the Severodvinsk
yard discloses that some of the incomplete Y-class
ballistic missile submarines there are being con-
structed differently than were previous units of
this class. At least one of the? hull sections that
comprise the missile bay has been lengthened. Not
all 15 of the hull sections that-makeup this sub-
marine have been photographed recently, so we can-
not say with certainty that the over-all length of
the submarine will be increased.
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USSR - MIDDLE EAST
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WARSAW PACT
The Pact foreign ministers have issued a communique
following their meeting in Warsaw that is aimed at
splitting the NATO ministers from the US on the is-
sue of early convocation of a Conference on European
Security. The statement stresses that European
states can overcome "certain forces that are placing
preconditions" in the way of a conference. With
France already on record in support of the USSR's
position and West Germany dodging the issue, that
seems to point the finger at the US. The Pact said
it was ready to appoint plenipotentiaries to the
multilateral preparatory talks proposed by the Finns
in 1970 and called on other "interested parties" to
follow suit so that a full conference can.be con-
vened next year. The communique said nothing about
mutual force reductions, an omission that suggests
the Soviets want to see how their conference pro-
posal fares before committing themselves on a way
to discuss troop withdrawals.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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NOTES
Yugoslavia: Tito has angrily, intervened with
Croatian party leaders; trying to bring them into
line with federal party policies The proximate
cause of his action has been the failure of the
Croatian party to put down a strike of Zagreb univer-
sity students, who want tb be free of federal control.
Tito has called the students "counter-revolutionaries"
and believes that Croatian leaders ,are encouraging
the youngsters by their toleration, of the strike,
Titois more concerned, however, that this episode
could lead to a significant awakening of Croatian
nationalism that would greatly complicate his task,
and that of his successors, in maintaining a unified
state. Croat. leaders have Met Tito part way on the
strike issue, but apparently they believe that this
kind of intervention by- Tito jeopardizes the dura-
bility of the liberal reforms so painstakingly
de-
veloped over the. past-five years. They are likely
to insist on keeping the autonomy they have gained
during that time.
USSR-Cuba: The two Soviet naval TU-95 recon-
naissance aircraft that flew to Cuba on 25 November
left Havana's Jose Marti Airfield early this morn-
ing and are currently en route back to the USSR.
The TU-95s may overfly the US Navy task' group, in-
cluding the aircraft carrier Kennedy, that is now
in the mid-Atlantic on the way to the Mediterranean.
The Soviet. Kresta-class.missile cruiser, one F-class
submarine, and the tanker are east of Bermuda and
also heading for home. The Kashin-class destroyer
and other F7class submarine remain in the port of
Mariel on the northern coast of Cuba-. These two
units operated with Cuban Navy ships on 30 November,
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EGYPT ISRAEL
Sadat, having disparaged US mediation efforts and
having affirmed a decision to fight, has succeeded
in raising the temperature in the Middle East. The
diplomatic and military evidence indicates that his
tactics are geared to the UN debate rather than im-
minent military action.
The Diplomatic Ploy
Up to this point the Egyptians have appeared willing
to accept a moderately worded Middle East resolution
and to waive demands for a reference to sanctions
against Israel if, by doing so, they could obtain US
support and isolate the Israelis. Their minimum de-
mands include an endorsement of the 1967 resolution,
reactivation of the Jarring mission, and a call on
Tel Aviv to respond to Jarring's memorandum of last
February requesting Israel's views on a settlement.
The Egyptians have probably calculated that, should
their effort to gain US support fail, they could
place the onus on Washington for its "obstructionist
tactics" and float a harsher resolution, which would
then have a better-than-even chance for passage.
This UN initiative serves for the moment Cairo's
purpose of keeping world attention on the issue,
and justifies holding military moves in reserve.
In talks with US officials earlier this week, For-
eign Minister Riad indicated considerable flexibil-
ity on the timing for another round of fighting,
thus softening the impact of Sadat's dramatic pro-
nouncements two weeks ago stressing the inevitabil-
ity of hostilities. It is true that Egyptian forces
are better prepared now for any sort of engagement
with the Israelis than they were in 1967. But they
cannot force the Israelis out of the occupied ter-
ritories, or even hold a piece of the east bank of
the Suez Canal for more than a few hours.
The Soviet View
The Soviets appear to be taking Sadat's tough talk
in stride. Since the six-day war it has been cus-
tomary for Moscow to put the best face possible on
the more extravagant remarks out of Arab capitals.
Moscow went to great lengths to play down Sadat's
speeches in July branding 1971 as the "year of de-
cision." The USSR, according to a Soviet Foreign
Ministry Near East expert, viewed Sadat's recent pro-
nouncements as tailored for domestic purposes. At
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two public lectures last month, Moscow audiences
were told that Sadat's rhetoric was "a pressure tac-
tic on Israel to carry out the 1967 Security Council
resolution."
Soviet inability to devise a
strategy that will produce an Israeli withdrawal
from Arab territories remains a sore point between
the Soviets and the Egyptians and probably contrib-
utes to Cairo's frustration.
(continued)
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The Short-Run Outlook?
If Egypt fails:to win any political victorieS at
the UN, Sadat's warlike talk could play a part in
? slowly conditioning the masses. to an inevitable
"battle." While Cairo can, to some extent, manipu-
late the popular mood; there is some danger that
over time the media,will.amplify the militant propa-
ganda, a bellicose and cocky mood will spread, and
Egypt's leaders will come in some measure to believe
? their own propaganda. The period just before the
1967 war demonstrates how quickly.the Egyptian na-
tional mood can shift from everyday concerns to
"the battle of honor." This kind of pressure, plus
the hope that the great powers would have to ex-
tricate Egypt from any disasters, plus sheer frus-
tration could well persuade Sadat that the time for
military action was at hand.
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