THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 SEPTEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992874
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 22, 1971

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
The President's Daily Brief
22 September 1971
(7
Toi ecret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
22 September 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Peking's decision to curtail sharply the traditional
National Day celebrations on 1 October is most likely
due to some major internal political developments.
(Page 1)
Cambodian forces are continuing their drive to reopen
Route 6 to the long-isolated town of Kompong Thom.
(Page 3)?
In South Vietnam, new acts Of violence have increased
dangers of serious disorders as the date of the pres-
idential referendum approaches. (Page 4)
Israel Egyp
(Page 5)
Brandt's meeting with Brezhnev last weekend makes
him optimistic about Soviet policy toward Western
Europe and West Germany. (Page 6)
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
meets today to plan strategy for obtaining a direct
share in the ownership of Western oil companies
within their borders. (Page 7)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
COMMUNIST CHINA
? Several foreign press services, attributing
their information to diplomatic observers in Peking,
have reported that preparations for the major rally
scheduled for National Day celebrations on 1 Octo-
ber were inexplicably suspended last week.
The cancellation of these festivities is
unprecedented. Peking's decision does not
appear to have been taken by a plenary
session of the party central committee but
by a smaller group of central politburo
figures.
The most obvious explanation for the re-
gime's reluctance to put on its traditional
show with its mandatory leadership turnout
is that a key member of the ruling polit-
buro might be seriously ill. Mao Tse-tung
last appeared on 7 August and his desig-
nated heir, Defense Minister Lin Piao, has
not been seen since early June. Premier
Chou En-Zai, Madame Mao, and other impor-
tant civilian politburo members have made
public appearances in the past few days.
Despite the fact that frequent public ab-
sences by both Mao and Lin are not unusual,
Mao has never missed a National Day cele-
bration and his absence from the rostrum
would immediately trigger intense specula-
tion concerning his health. At least one
Chinese spokesman has already denied that
Mao is ill.
Another possible explanation is that the
jockeying for position that has been under
way within the ruling politburo over the
past two years has taken a new turn. Since
last March four civilian members of the
25-member politburo have dropped from pub-
lic view for varying lengths of time and
all appear to be in serious political
trouble as a result of a prolonged inves-
tigation into extremist policies associated
with the Cultural Revolution. Recently,
there have been tenuous indications that
the investigation has broadened to involve
key military figures. Over the past week,
none of the central military leaders on
the politburo has made public appearances,
a possible indication that they are involved
in further behind the scenes maneuvering in
Peking.
(continued)
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The nonappearance of China's ranking military author-
ities and the cancellation of preparations for the 1
October rally have coincided with the nationwide
standdown of most military flights since 12 September.
Thus., there also may be a relationship between this
unprecedented suspension of flight activity and in-
ternal political developments.
2
50X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
Cambodia
pony Thom
Tang Krasong
Kompong Thmar
21
551898 9-71 CIA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79f00936-A009900200001-6
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMI30D IA
The light enemy resistance that the Cambodian
Army's Chenla II operation has ?encountered since it
was launched a month ago has prompted Lon Nol to re-
verse his earlier decision to halt the drive at Kom-
pong Thmar, at the junction of Routes 6 and 21. Four
battalions of the Chenla II task force have now oc-
cupied Tang Krasang; they are expected to continue
the effort to clear the remaining 15 miles between
there and the long-isolated town of Kompong Thom.
. The success of the Chenla II operation has stim-
ulated the high. commandto begin mapping campaigns
to reopen sections of other key highways during the
next dry season. A senior army officer recently
told the US defense attache that Phnom Penh's plans
call for reocCupying Route 15 north of Prey Veng,
reopening Route 7 from Krek to Tonle Bet, and clear-
ing Route 3. The officer also said that Lon Nol is
still talking about trying to retake Kratie Province,
although other Cambodian leaders recognize that this
would be a very difficult undertaking.
The Communists! failure to offer any sig-
nificant opposition to the Cambodian units
on Route 6 has been in keeping with the
conservative military posture they have
maintained during most of the rainy sea-
son0. Relying on economy of force tactics,
they have focused primarily on harassing
a number of other main lines of communica-
tion..
the Communists also
have been strengthening their supply ap-
paratus (Binh Tram 53) in northern Cambo-
dia in preparation for the dry season.
This will enable them to increase military
pressure in Cambodia and southern South
Vietnam during the dry season.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
Many opposition groups and some political elements
not previously aligned against the government are
likely to hold the government responsible for yes-
terday's attempted assassination of Senator Dat.
They will cite both the fact that pat, an expert on
South Vietnam's constitution and a prominent North-
ern Catholic, was preparing to offer a formal reso-
lution calling on Thieu to resign and the previous
harsh police treatment of antigovernment demonstra-
tors. It is questionable that the government would
use such a crude form of intimidation. It seems at
least equally likely that either the Viet Cong or
non-Communist opposition elements staged the attack
in order to intensify opposition to the government.
The bombing of the home of labor leader Tran Quoc
Buu is much less likely to be blamed on the govern-
ment. Buu has in general supported Thieu, ?and his
initial reaction was to suggest that the Viet Cong
were responsible. The incident, nevertheless, will
add to the tension in Saigon political circles.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT ISRAEL
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
WEST GERMANY - USSR
Brandt came away from his meeting with Brezhnev
last weekend with an expectation of further improve-
ment in bilateral relations even before ratification
of the 1970 reconciliation treaty between Bonn and
Moscow. Brandt conveyed to diplomats of The Big
Three his impression that the Soviets are prepared
to put the finishing touches on long-pending trade
and commercial air agreements. He also anticipates
that negotiations will begin on cultural and scien-
tific-technical agreements and that a commission
will be set up to promote trade.
Brezhnev reiterated Soviet interest in early
German ratification of the 1970 treaty./
viet leader, however,
_A( The So-
gave no hint of a willingness
to facilitate matters by prodding.the East.Germans
to-be.more forthcoming in the inter-German talks.
(Bonn continues to make ratification conditional on
completion of a Berlin agreement, including detailed
arrangements on access to be worked out by Bonn. and
Pankow.) Brandtls close adviser, Egon Bahr, later
told the Western diplomats that he anticipated no
breakthrough in his talks with the East Germans as
a result. of the Crimean talks.
Brezhnev projected an impression of flexibility
on general East-West questions and avoided exerting
any pressure on Brandt. Brandt said he was convinced
that Moscow wants a Conference on European Security,
though not necessarily "in the near future." On the
question of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions,
Brezhnev merely restated the standard Soviet position
that the negotiations should not be limited to the
US and USSR or to the area of Germany, and that for-
eign and indigenous forces should be included.
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
50X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18: CIA-RDP79T00-936A00.9900200001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTE
International Oil: The 11 members of the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
meet today to plan strategy fort obtaining a direct
share in the ownership of Western oil companies
within their borders. The OPEC organization has
been developing a proposal which is expected to call
for an initial 20-percent ownership of oil facilities
and production for member governments. Today's meet-
ing is expected to focus on this basic proposal,.
leaving such matters as the involvement of OPEC gov-
ernments in transport, refining, and marketing for
another time. The meeting also may consider the im-
pact of recent currency revaluations on OPEC's price
and revenue agreements with Western oil companies.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T60936A009900200001-6
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009900200001-6