THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 JULY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993387
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 2, 1972

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900020001-4
The President's Daily Brief
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Exempt from general
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exemption category 5B( 1),(2),(3)
.declassified only on approval of
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900020001-4
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
2 July 1972
VIETNAM
Heavy rains evidently are hampering the government's
campaign in Quang Tri Province. South Vietnamese paratroopers
are bogged down some seven miles south of the provincial
capital although they have encountered only minor enemy
opposition. East of Quang Tri City, South Vietnamese Marines
and territorial forces consolidating their positions are also
meeting little resistance.
Intercepts indicate, however, that the Communists may
be preparing to counterattack in several areas. Early today
Hue was shelled for the first time in this year's enemy
offensive. North of the city, a regiment of the North Viet-
namese 304th Division was ordered yesterday to mount an
attack on positions east of Route 1. Several North Viet-
namese units have moved into the foothills west of the road,
where they could hit South Vietnamese supply and rear guard
elements. Communist artillery units have also been ordered
to keep firing on the Camp Evans area, the focal point for
logistics and artillery support of the Quang Tri operation.
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USSR
The TASS account of President Nixon's press conference
carried by the Soviet press yesterday reported the following
aspects of his statements on Vietnam: that the US has informed
Hanoi that it will return to the Paris talks on 13 July; that
the US is prepared to conduct talks without any conditions;
that it would not have returned to Paris unless it considered
there was a chance to begin serious and constructive proposals;
that the US will take constructive positions and be prepared
to meet the other side half-way; that reports of US attacks on
North Vietnamese dams and dikes are not accurate; that the US
has ordered that dams not be bombed in view of the very serious
consequences Igor the civilian population; and that this order
will remain in force in the future.
TASS used editing and commentary to call into question
certain of the President's statements. It described the
President's conditions for ending the bombing as contrary to
his assurances that the US is not setting any preeoonditions.
It also observed that the President again left the Viet Cong
proposals unanswered, and characterized US bombing and mining
operations as "aggressive acts" condemned by the world. In
addition, it reported the lengthy question noting the high
level of US military activities in Indochina dnd asking whether
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the President could end the war by next January, in accordance
with his campaign promises. In adjacent columns, Pravda
carried reports of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong reactions
in Paris
TASS' handling of the Vietnam aspects of the press
conference is in keeping with a recent increase in the
volume of Soviet propaganda support for Hanoi which has
also entailed a slightly more critical attitude toward
the US. Soviet commentaries have resumed the use of
pejorative language reminiscent of various pre-summit
periods of heightened invective. Aside from an escala-
tion in language, however, these commentaries do not
indicate any shift in the fundamental Soviet position
supporting a negotiated settlement on Hanoi's terms.
They suggest, rather, Soviet defensiveness concerning the
USSR's public record of support for North Vietnam.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900020001-4
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900020001-4