THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 MARCH 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992537
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 19, 1971

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6
The President's Daily Brief
19 March 1971
47
Top Secret50"
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
19 March 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Peking hp issued its strongest anti-Soviet polemical
blast in nearly a year in anticipation of the Soviet
party congress opening. (Page 1)
Problems in the Communist Chinese leadership are
assessed on Page 2.
A leftist-group in Turkey may try to kidnap a dip-
lomat as hostage for the release of a terrorist
leader. (Page 3)
Five Soviet diplomats have been declared 50X1
persona non grata in Mexico. (Page 3)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6 .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
COMMUNIST CHINA = SOVIET UNION
A joint editorial by the major Chinese propaganda
organs, essentially restating the ideological dif-
ferences that divide the two parties, is the strong-
est anti-Soviet polemical blast in nearly a year.
It appears designed to drive home the point that,
despite recent improvements in state-to-state rela-
tions, the fundamental gulf between Peking and Mos-
cow remains as wide as ever. The Chinese clearly
wish to set the record straight on this score before
the Soviet party congress begins on 30 March; in a
sense the editorial can be viewed as Peking's reply
to the reported invitation from Moscow to attend the
conclave.
In comparing Chinese adherence to "revolutionary
violence" with Soviet "revisionism," the editorial
accuses Moscow of going "all out" in the arms race
while oppressing people at home and abroad, and re-
peatedly denounces Brezhnev by name. Nevertheless,
specific grievances against Moscow such as' the puta-
tive Soviet "threat" to Chinese territory are not
stressed, presumably because the occasion calls for
a more ideological statement of the Chinese position.
Indeed, the editorial appears to have been drafted
with a view to avoiding as much as possible language
that would hamper Peking's diplomatic offensive in
both the Communist and non-Communist world. This
approach is particularly evident in the handling of
Moscow's policies toward Eastern Europe.
Like the classic anti-Soviet blasts of the early
and mid-60s, this attack on the "revisionists" has
domestic as well as international implications.
The editorial dwells at length on themes that were
prominent at the height of the Cultural Revolution,
particularly on the necessity for continued "class
struggle." In this respect, Peking seems to be warn-
ing cadres at home against the sins of complacency
and bureaucratic rote.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
npnlassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6
The shadowy Chen Po-ta, longtime ghostwriter,
propagandist, and ideologue for Mao, had been chief
of the Cultural Revolution Group since its formation
in the fall of 1966. Deriving his political stature solely
from close association with Mao, Chen had generally
been found on the radical side of controversies at the
center.
Kang Sheng, the former chief of the secret police,
had been "adviser" to the Cultural Revolution Group
from its inception. This title and his extreme
statements painted Kang as one of the
prime movers behind the destructive radical impulses
of the Cultural Revolution.
551169 3-71 CIA
50X1
Declassified in Part :Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A069300170001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
COMMUNIST CHINA
On 2 December last year, we reported in-
fighting within the Chinese Politburo,
origins of which probably dated back to
the Cultural Revolution and allegedly in-
volved an attempt by members of the pol-
itburo to discredit an ultraleftist Red
Guard organization and other members who
supported it. We noted that the result
of the infighting could prove embarrassing
particularly to Kong Sheng and Chen Po-ta.
Kang has now been out of public view for four
months, and-a story is circulating in Peking that at
a party plenum late last summer he and Chen., and to
a lesser.extent Madame Mao, were criticized for ''ex?tremist" activities during and since the Cultural
Revolution. Chen has been out of sight. since 1 Au7
gust, and it would appear that both he andKang have
been sidelined or purged.
The issues in dispute are extremely complex,
but it seems safe to assume that the fate
of the fallen politburo members is linked
to quarreling over post.- Cultural Revolu-
tion reconstruction policies and perhaps
over the shape of China's rebuilt party
and government apparatus, now heavily dom-
inated by regional military leaders and
veteran party cadres. Criticism of this
revamped apparatus by Chen and Kang may
have pushed some of their colleagues on
the politburo to coalesce against them.
Whatever the case, the balance of forces
in Peking's unstable leadership coalition
seems to. have shifted considerably since
last fall, and' the political setbacks.suf-
fered-by Chen and Kong cast serious doubt
on the future prospects of other leaders
who were associated with the excesses of
the Cultural,Revolution. The heavy crit-
icism in domestic propaganda of the polit-
ical.performance of senior military and
civilian officials continues to suggest
that whatever issues are troubling the
politburo have not been resolved. More-
over, the regime's failure since last
March to acknowledge publicly any of the
breaks that have occurred in the ranks of
the top leadership indicates that a covert
power struggle of significant proportions
is still being waged in Peking.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Turkey:_//
NOTES
the leftist Revolutionary Youth
Federation- 'maysoon try to kidnap a diplomat or a
member- of his faMily as, a hostage for the release of
terrorist leader Deniz Gezmis?: Gezmis, who as the
self-styled- leader of the embryonic Turkish People's
Liberation Army engineered the earlier kidnapings of
Americans, was captured last Wednesday as he tried
to escape to Syria. 'Another member of the gang was
also captured after being seriously wounded, andtwo
others are still at large.
Mexico: In The President's Daily Brief of 18
March, we reported that the discovery of the Mexican
guerrilla group trained in North Korea could have an
effect on the Echeverria administration's attitude
toward activities of Communist diplomats. Yesterday
the Soviet .charge d'affaires and four other diplo-
mats in the embassy were declared
persona non grata. Although-Moscow had relatively
minor contact with the revolutionaries,
these "diplomats" made them ideal targets
for a display of Mexican displeasure.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6
---
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009300170001-6