THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 APRIL 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977415
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 22, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
22 April 1970
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
22 April 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Cambodian Government, lacking significant polit-
ical support and military prowess, may not be able
to stave off collapse. (Page 1)
Hanoi seems to be preparing to launch a new political
front for all of Indochina. (Pace 3)
(Page 3)
(Page 4)
Soviet and Chinese propagandists are trading insults
again. (Page 5)
Lenin's centennial in Moscow brings out all the leaders.
(Page 6)
North Vietnamese in Laos are building up stockpiles
in an effort to beat the rain. (Page 7)
Trinidad's Eric Williams is recovering from his orig-
inal panic, but his prestige may have suffered per-
manent damage. (Page 8)
Continued uncertainty about the result of the Colombian
election increases the likelihood of violence. (Page 9)
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CAMBODIA
Recent Viet Cong attacks within 20 miles of
Phnom Penh and evidence of low-level Communist activ-
ity in the Cambodian interior have sparked rumors in
the capital that the Communists intend to attack the
capital or at least bring it under a virtual siege.
The French mission appears to be the major source of
such predictions, closely followed by US reporters,
who have been shocked at the ineptness of Cambodian
security forces. There are few outward signs of
crisis in the capital, however, and no evidence that
the Cambodian leadership fully shares in this gloomy
assessment.
Communications .intelligence has not yet spotted
any main force Viet Cong or North Vietnamese units
moving westward intO the Cambodian interior from
their regular operating zones, along the border.
Thus the harassments south of Phnom Penh and along
the Mekong River could be activities of rear area
security elements or of recently formed groups of
Vietnamese cadre and indigenous Cambodian elements.
Developments during the past several days'
.make it abundantly clear that Cambodian
forces are no match for the Communists.
If onlya limited number of main force
Viet Cong or North Vietnamese units move
westward out of their border bases, they
could, in conjunction with indigenous and
other forces already operating in the in-
terior, overrun most of eastern Cambodia,
including Phnom Penh, in a matter of days.
The Communists probably could retain
enough troops in their bases to hold off
South Vietnamese forces. However, such
an operation Would run certain military
and political risks, which the Communists
may believe are unnecessary under present
circumstances.
(continued)
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The woeful performance of Cambodian units
against even such relatively limited pres-
sure as they have faced up to now, and
the fact that the Lon Nol regime has been
unable to gain significant political or
military support from other countries may
encourage the Communists to believe that
they can force Lon Nol and Sink Matak out
without taking the risks involved in actu-
ally moving troops into Phnom Penh. The
isolation of the capital from the eastern
portions of the country, increased pres-
sure ?in the countryside, and the capture
of some provincial capitals might cause
Lon Nol's support within the army to
crumble. Under such circumstances, many
of the elements who were only lukewarm
suppdrters of the previous regime might
join a move to return Sihanouk as the
"savior" of the country.
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NORTH VIETNAM.
Over the past few days we have noted several
indications that Hanoi is getting ready to launch
a new political front for all Indochina. The clear-
est sign is contained in an intercepted COSVN di-
rective of 27 March which in so many words called
for the fostering of a "United Cambodian Front lead-
ing to the formation of an Anti-American Indochinese
People's Front."
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR
? In a lengthy., authoritative editorial commem-
orating the centenary of the birth of Lenin, Peking
yesterday issued a particularly virulent indictment
of the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet
-leadership. For the first time insix months, the
Chinese directly blasted the Soviets over the bor-
der problem, accusing Moscow of encroaching on.Chi-
nese territory and making nuclear threats against
China.
This attack culminates a series of Chinese
denunciations designed to discredit the So-
viet leadership on the eve of the widely
touted Lenin centenary celebrations. At
the same time, it clearly reflects China's
unwillingness to remain silent in the face
of Moscow's continued sharp attacks against
China over the past few months. During a
speech in Moscow yesterday, for example,
party chief Brezhnev pointedly blamed Pe-
king's "anti-Socialist" and "nationalistic"
policies for the continuing Sino-Soviet
dispute. The Chinese editorial also sug-
gests that fundamental disagreements over
border problems continue to block progress
at the Peking talks.
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USSR
The opening of the Soviet celebration of Lenin's
centennial yesterday was the first time in more than
four months that all the members of the Soviet Po-
litburo appeared together. Brezhnev again held the
spotlight, delivering his fourth major televised
speech in the past ten days.
Brezhnev chose to deliver an assessment of the
USSR's current situation rather than a theoretical
discourse on Leninism. He nOted that the Soviet
party's 24th Congress "is at hand" and revealed that
the long-awaited five-year plan is "nearing comple-
tion." He attacked the economic planners, however,
injecting a partisan note into the festivities. He
also offered a routine warning about the danger of
"bourgeois ideology," and commented that the task
of improving living conditions cannot be accomplished
"at one go." Brezhnev also promised that the mili-
tary's needs will not be shortchanged, but he gave
no indication that the USSR is about to accelerate
military development.
Brezhnev broke no new ground on foreign policy.
Speaking to the present condition of world Communism,
he warned of the growing dangers posed by nationalism
and by "right and left opportunism." Proponents of
these deviations came in for firm criticism. On
other world issues, Brezhnev s remarks were stale
and uninspired. ,
Except in Yugoslavia East European observances
were held earlier so that the leaders could journey
to Moscow. All of them are there except Tito, who
sent a substitute as a mark of his disapproval of
present Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia. Like Tito,
Romania's Ceausescu, prior to going to the USSR,
vigorously excoriated the "Brezhnev doctrine," ob-
jecting by implication to Moscow's "great power
chauvinism and hegemonistic tendencies."
Hungary's Kadar was considerably milder, but
quoted Lenin to the effect that blind imitation of
Soviet models could lead to errors. Celebrations
were low key in other places, although in East Ger-
many the ceremonies took on a special character be-
cause party chief Ulbricht is the only surviving
Communist leader who knew Lenin personally.
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LAOS
Additional North Vietnamese logistic units con-
cerned with the movement of supplies into northern
Laos have been identified. One rear services unit
in North Vietnam has shipped a large quantity of
food to north Laos within the past week.
It is possible that the Communists are
trying to build up their stockpiles for
an all-out push against Long Tieng before
the heavy rains expected early in JUne.
The relatively Zow level' of Communist mil-
itary activity around Long Tieng over the
past several weeks,. together with the re-
cent movement of elements of the 312th
Division. southwest Of the PZaine, suggest
that the Communists are husbanding re-
sources for a larger effort.
The Long Tieng airstrip came under rocket attack
again on 20 April. There was little damage, and the
government's resupply effort apparently was not af-
fected. The accuracy of these attacks is improving,
however. In the latest shelling, two rockets nar-
rowly missed a weapons warehouse, and another im-
pacted on the main aircraft parking ramp.
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TRINIDAD
Prime Minister Eric Williams has been under the
gun for several weeks, and his increasing concern
that black power activities might lead to serious
disorders seemed confirmed, yesterday when he received
reports of a mutiny in his Defense Force
the 30
to 50 insurgents still at large are well armed and
are a formidable force for the island's loyal secu-
rity forces to handle,
Williams has lost much of his political
capital by his inept handling of the unrest
that has been building up. Much of the
unrest stems from economic problems and
labor union militancy as well as the black
power campaign. Moderate political leaders
are now disappointed in Williams. The op-
position probably believes it can continue
to exploit black power themes.
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COLOMBIA
The government has declared a state of siege in
order to deal more effectively with the disgruntled
followers of Rojas Pinilla, but vigorous demonstra-
tions continue in major cities. Rojas and his party
are keeping the demonstrators stirred up by charging
that National Front candidate Pastrana gained his
late lead by a fraudulent vote count.
The charges of fraud are based on suspi-
cion rather than evidence, and in fact
were anticipated before Sunday's polling
began.
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