THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 OCTOBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977059
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 27, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief.
27 October 1969
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
27 October 1969
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
President Hilu continues his search for a way out
of his difficulties with the fedayeen. There is
still sporadic shooting in Tripoli and elsewhere in
Lebanon. (Page 1)
Chou En-lai's speech at a recent banquet for Pham
Van Dong offers additional evidence that Peking is
moving to soften its position on the Paris talks
and to restore closer relations with Hanoi. (Page 3)
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LEBANON: Crisis With Fedayeen Continues
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Area of fedayeen activity
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96421 10-69 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LEBANON
Fedayeen elements and
control parts of Tripoli.
ernment led by a prominent
Syria's ruling Baath Party
formed in Tripoli, but its
their supporters still
A "revolutionary" gov-
Lebanese supporter of
is said to have been
status is still unclear.
Sporadic shooting continues in Tripoli as well
as in other parts of Lebanon. Some Syrian forces
are reported to have been involved in the actions
along the eastern Lebanese border. Beirut has been
fairly quiet, but tensions are high, with numerous
roadblocks manned by armed civilians.
Army morale seems to be holdin
F-Reports of Syrian support
for the insurrectionists probably also helped unify
the Lebanese Army in support of the government.
The army, however, is small and might have
trouble handling simultaneously widespread
disturbances and serious clashes with the
fedayeen.
though some press reports suggest the
to cool things down, the latest terms
fedayeen leader Yasir Arafat were too
Lebanon to accept.
Al-
fedayeen want
offered by
rigid for
Hilu will have to bow to some fedayeen de-
mands, but he is still hopeful of avoiding
complete capitulation. He is maintaining
pressure on the insurgents in order to
negotiate from a position of some strength.
(continued)
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The unofficial "warning" carried by TASS on Sat-
urday has been accompanied by Soviet press and radio
suggestions that the US is looking for a chance to
intervene. Pravda, with a touch of what may be gen-
uine concern, has tried to link the current NATO ma-
neuvers in the Mediterranean with this thesis. The
Soviets have also taken note of Israeli Deputy Premier
Allon's statement last week that his country could
not ignore the events in Lebanon, which Moscow calls
a direct threat of intervention.
Most of these Soviet statements also serve
to convey the message to the Arabs that
their interests would be best served if
they settled Lebanon's troubles among them-
selves without further violence. The So-
viets probably believe that they stand to
gain little, other than propaganda advan-
tage out of the present,siutation, which
they fear could lead to a larger conflict.
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COMMUNIST CHINA - VIETNAM
Peking may be moving to soften its position on
the Paris talks and to restore closer relations with
Hanoi. The thrust of China's new approach was sug-
gested in Chou En-lai's speech at a banquet on 23
October for visiting North Vietnamese Premier Pham
Van Dong. Chou limited his comments on the outcome
of the war to an expression of belief that the Viet-
namese would overcome "all difficulties" along their
"road of advance"--a vague formulation that could
sanction a wide range of North Vietnamese political
and military options. Chou on this 'occasion also
omitted the standard Chinese call for Hanoi to per-
severe in protracted struggle until final victory is
won, although this phrase was preserved in a Chinese
communique on talks between Chou'and Dong issued the
next day.
Other indications of Chinese flexibility sur-
faced earlier this month during the extended stay in
Peking of a high-ranking NLF-PRG delegation. By re-
broadcasting in their entirety statements by the
Vietnamese delegates, Peking for the first time ac-
knowledged the existence of the NLF-PRG ten-point
peace plan. A reference to this plan was also embed-
ded in the communiqu4 of 24 October. This is in
marked contrast to the earlier Chinese propaganda
policy of editing out all unpalatable portions of
Vietnamese Communist statements mentioning the Paris
talks and a possible settlement of the war.
This shift in approach appears to repre-
sent an attempt by China to relieve its
isolation and assume a more normal and
active diplomatic role in Asia. Peking's
frosty treatment of Hanoi after the start
of the Paris talks in mid-1968 severely
strained Sino-Vietnamese relations and
left China alone in its implacable and
heavy-handed opposition to a negotiated
settlement. By moving away from this un-
productive line, the Chinese in effect
appear to be assuming a new role as cham-
pion of Hanoi's maximum demands at Paris,
a position that promises them greater op-
portunity to influence North Vietnamese
policy and to participate in an eventual
? settlement of the war, should they decide
to do so.
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At the same time, the Chinese may be using
their ideological justification for the
current Sino-Soviet border talks as a
means of preparing for adjustments on a
number of long-standing foreign policy is-
sues, including a rationalization of their
more accommodating line on Vietnam. A re-
cent Chinese broadcast stated that Peking's
"dual revolutionary tactics" of negotiating
while resisting Soviet aggression can be
applied "by all revolutionary people"--a
suggestion that China finally may be ready
to endorse Hanoi's fight,-and-talk strategy.
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VIETNAM
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NOTE
Somali-USSR: A small Soviet naval force has
gathered off the coast of Somalia. Included in the
force are two missile-equipped antisubmarine war-
fare ships, an amphibious landing ship, and four
ships associated with Soviet space events. The ap-
pearance of the miniature fleet may be a precaution-
ary response to the recent coup in Somalia, where
about 150 military advisers and more than 150 other
Soviet technicians are employed. The US Embassy in
Mogadiscio reports that the consensus among foreign
diplomats in the capital is that the USSR was not
involved in the coup. The embassy also notes reports
that the Supreme Council has asked Soviet advisers
to "keep their distance."
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