THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 JULY 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992771
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 26, 1971

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
The President's Daily Brief
26 July 1971
27
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
26 July 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Moscow's first authoritative commentary on President
Nixon's planned visit to Peking has expressed some
alarm that improved Sino-US relations might produce
an anti-Soviet combination. (Page 1)
Numayri's forces appear to have consolidated their
control in the Sudan, and bloody reprisals against
the Communists may be in prospect. (Page 2)
The British have provided details of two alternative
proposals Mintoff has offered for a new defense ar-
rangement, and want NATO to make up most of the costs.
(Page 3)
50X1
50X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79100936A009700230001-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-CHINA-US
In Moscow's first authoritative comment on President
Nixon's planned visit to Peking, a Pravda article
yesterday expressed some of the Kremlin's fears con-
cerning improved Chinese-US relations. The article
was attributed to "I. Alexandrov"--a pseudonym em-
ployed to indicate high-level endorsement, but Mos-
cow softened its impact by attributing many of the
views to foreign sources.
The article sought to indicate that both Washington
and Peking are trying to bring pressure on the USSR.
It stressed, however, that the Kremlin still hopes
to improve relations with Washington and Peking, im-
plying that Moscow would not let the Sino-US dialogue
interfere with its own current negotiations with
either party.
Although Moscow said it was reserving judgment on
future developments, a key passage added that it must
take its worst suspicions into account in determining
future policy. In particular, fear was expressed
that the US-Chinese move might lead to a "political
combination" directed against the USSR. Moscow did
not suggest what counteractions it might take.
This temporizing on a future course suggests that
the Soviet leadership is uncertain over just how far
and fast Sino-US relations will develop. One offi-
cial has said the Soviets will want to take a "long,
cool Zook" at the visit's ramifications. Some are
hoping that Taipei will remain a major obstacle to
Sino-US ties. Ambassador Abrasimov in Berlin, for
example, pressed US Ambassador Rush last week to
acknowledge that there is an "obvious conflict" be-
tween the US defense commitment to Nationalist China
and the preconditions for normalization of Sino-US
relations set forth in Chou En-Zai's recent public
comments.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
2,
Declassified in Pal; - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SUDAN
Numayris forces appear to have consolidated
their control, although the country remains under,
a state of emergency and a dusk-to-dawn curfew
Minor gun battles were reported over the weekend as
the government continued to round up the rebels.
ine semiorricial Lair?
udiiy dl-kinrdm nds cirea Sudanese sources in stating
that the secretary general of the Sudan Communist
Party masterminded the coup against Numayri from the
safety of the Bulgarian Embassy in Khartoum, where
he had fled after escaping from Sudanese authorities
last month. Al-Ahram claimed that the party planned
to get rid of most of the actual leaders of the coup
once it had gained control.
Bloody reprisals against the Communists
may well be in prospect. During the
countercoup the junta machine-gunned some
30 soldiers, including a number of senior
officers. One of the two coup leaders re-
moved from the BOAC plane in Libya and
seven others have since been executed.
Numayri told a reporter Saturday night
that 400 persons, including 100 army offi-
cers, were involved in the abortive coup,
and that six military tribunals had been
set up to try them.
On the international scene,- Sudan has broken
off diplomatic relations with Iraq, which had hast-
ily recognized the rebel government, and Numayri
has charged the ruling Iraqi Baath Party with-par7,
ticipating in the plot. Numayri has also announced
that Sudan will join the planned Federation of Arab
States next January..
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MALTA
The British have informed the North Atlantic
,Council that .Mintoff has offered them two alterna-
tive proposals for a new UK-Malta defense arrange-
ment. One, a "wholly exclusive arrangement," would
continue the present British veto power over third
country use of Maltese facilities in exchange for
an annual payment of $72 million. The other, cost-
ing $48 million, would be a "less exclusive arrange-
ment" under which Valletta could grant non-Warsaw
Pact countries use of its harbors and airfields.
Mintoff told the British that other NATO countries
could contribute to London's payment even though
NATO must leave the island; he stipulated, however,
that bilateral development aid from NATO members
could not be counted as part of the payment.
The British have in mind a payment of $24 mil-
lion annually, of Which they would pay less than
half, and are pressing NATO to make up the rest.
Up to now, UK aid has amounted to about. $12 million
a year. London has asked its allies for a firm- re-
sponse by 5 August so that negotiations with Valletta
can resume. NATO Secretary General Brosio, however,
is dubious about the prospects for a special finan-
cial-contribution.
Mintoff, in rejecting the UK's initial
offer last week of $12 million annually,
told the British that their forces would
have to be withdrawn if his demands were
not met quickly, and that he would turn
elsewhere for aid. One obvious direction
would be toward Libya, whose deputy prime
minister is reported to have told Foreign
Secretary Home during a recent visit to
London that Tripoli would be willing to
help Malta with up to $60 million:annually
if the UK would not do so.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHILE
4
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T0-0936A60-9700230001-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTE
South Vietnam: Ky admitted to Deputy Ambassa-
dor Berger Friday that he still lacked about two
thirds of the endorsements needed to qualify for
the presidential election in October and said that
Thieu's obstructionist tactics would probably pre-
vent .him from picking them up by the filing dead-
line of 4 August. Ky claimed that if he failed to
make the list of candidates, "Big" Minh would also
pull out of the race, leaving Thieu without credible
opposition. Minh has been saying the same thing,
although a politician Minh has considered as a run-
ning mate expects Minh to postpone a final decision
until he can judge the fairness of the lower house
elections next month.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A009700230001-5