THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 SEPTEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014891
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 2, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
September 2, 19 75
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. I 1652
exemption category, 511( I 1,(2).(3)
declassified onry on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00-936A012800010002-3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
September 2, 1975
Table of Contents
Middle East: Early approval of the second Egyptian-
Israeli interim agreement by the Knesset seems
assured. (Page 1)
China: Factionalism within the Chinese leadership
appears to be resurfacing. (Page 3)
Portugal: NATO may move to restrict further Portu-
gal's access to classified information.
(Page 6)
Note: Ecuador (Page 7)
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MIDDLE EAST
Early approval of the second Egyptian-
Israeli interim agreement by the Knesset
seems assured. Israeli opinion polls show
increased popular support for the accord.
Spokesmen for the government are arguing that
the agreement does not jeopardize Israel's vital
security interests, but sets the stage for further
negotiations toward a comprehensive peace agreement.
Supporters of the accord portray maintenance of the
close Israeli-US relationship as a major achievement
of the pact and acknowledge that Israel has no prac-
tical alternative to accepting it.
In Egypt, government spokesmen are attempting
to minimize the concessions made by Cairo. They are
describing the agreement as part of a general move
toward progress in negotiations on all fronts, in-
cluding the restoration of the rights of the Pales-
tinians. President Sadat, according to the Cairo
press, will soon address a joint session of Egypt's
political party and parliament on the subject of the
new agreement.
The Syrian press over the weekend stepped up
its criticism of the accord. The semi-official
newspaper Al-Thawpah on Saturday attacked the agree-
ment as a "partial settlement that serves only Is-
raeli ambitions and American interests." Damascus
radio asserted that the agreement will lead, not to
genuine peace, but to greater Israeli intransigence.
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam had made the same
point to newsmen last week in Lima.
Syrian criticism has spared Egypt except by
implication. This almost certainly reflects Presi-
dent Asad's desire to avoid disrupting his relations
with Cairo and at least his minimal confidence that
a new round of negotiations between Syria and Israel
can be arranged.
Syria's attacks on the agreement do not match
the severity or frequency of those last spring; they
are probably designed chiefly to head off potential
unrest at home. Contacts between the]
point to matter-of-fact acceptance of, rather than
opposition to, the Egyptian-Israeli accord.
(continued)
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Leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion have intensified their criticism of the agree-
ment. Chagrined at their inability to make gains Or
even become involved in negotiations, they are
moving to protect themselves against attacks by
their radical colleagues. In interviews with news-
men, PLO Chairman Arafat has promised to regain Pal-
estinian lands through force, threatened that the
Palestinians will attack Israeli interests "anywhere
in the world," called for an Arab summit to devise
a strategy for countering the new "American initia-
tive," and asserted that the PLO will persevere in
its campaign to expel Israel from the UN.
Although fedayeen from Lebanon have stepped up
their cross-border attacks on Israel--there were two
over the past weekend--most of what Arafat said was
designed only for internal fedayeen consumption.
He withheld his strongest criticism until the agree-
ment was virtually complete and avoided direct at-
tacks on Egypt.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHINA
After a period of relative calm,
factionalism within the Chinese leader-
ship appears to be resurfacing. Yester-
day's People's Daily carried a major
article that seems to be a thinly dis-
guised attack on Teng Hsiao-ping,
China's senior vice premier who also
holds important military and party
posts and who is currently in charge
of day-to-day activities within China.
The attack is contained in a criticism of a
famous Ming-dynasty novel which has long been known
to be a favorite of Chairman Mao. A similar article
also appeared in the latest issue of the theoretical
journal Red Flag; both have been widely disseminated
by the Chinese news agency. A list of contents of
the new issue of Red Flag, also distributed by the
news agency, indicates that the latest issue con-
tains further articles on the same subject, but
these are not yet available.
Both articles are highly critical of the role
and character of a leading figure in the novel, who
is clearly a surrogate for Teng. The central issue
raised appears to be the rehabilitation of veteran
cadres disgraced during the Cultural Revolution--a
policy which has generally been pursued by Peking
since the early 1970s.
Teng Hsiao-ping is not only an advocate of this
policy but also its most important beneficiary. As
secretary general of the party he was disgraced early
in the Cultural Revolution. He was rehabilitated in
the spring of 1973, reappointed to the Politburo in
December of that year, and made a member of the Pol-
itburo Standing Committee last January.
The rehabilitation issue has long been a bone
of contention between the "left" and "right" wings
of the Chinese party, involving as it does the
larger question of the efficacy and legitimacy of
the Cultural Revolution, which has been at the heart
of Chinese domestic politics for a decade. The
articles define rehabilitation as accepting "royal
amnesty" while planning ultimately to betray the
revolution.
(continued)
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The phrase "royal amnesty" raises the question
of Mao's status and his role in the present contro-
versy. For two years, Chinese polemics, arguing by
historical analogy, have treated the emperor-figure
as a surrogate for Mao; the Chairman has, moreover,
clearly associated himself with Teng's rehabilita-
tion. In a passage that seems to bear directly on
this issue, People's Daily comments: "In a feudal
country, the emperor is the highest ruler, the gen-
eral representative of the landlord class and the
big boss of all feudal bureaucrats. The peasantry
must oppose the emperor in order to oppose the reac-
tionary rule of the landlord class. If the peasan-
try only opposed corrupt officials, but not the em-
peror, it cannot shake the rule of the landlord
class," adding that the evil Teng-figure and his
friends "did not oppose the emperor and were loyal
to him."
This passage seems to claim that in order to
preserve the revolution it may be necessary to op-
pose Mao himself; at the very least it appears to
imply that Teng has pulled the wool over Mao's
eyes by stressing his personal loyalty to the Chair-
man. The Red Flag article, however, is more ambig-
uous. While also criticizing the idea of "royal
amnesty," it refers favorably to another character
as the "founder of the revolutionary cause" chron-
icled in the novel.
This spate of articles--at least one more ap-
parently was published in the Peking newspaper Kuang
Ming Daily?appears at a moment when the central
theme of Chinese propaganda has been unity and dis-
cipline and when the central authorities appear pre-
pared to crack down on dissident activities and
strikes in factories and in the transportation in-
dustry. The attack on Teng could have been insti-
tuted by his opponents because they see his current
stress on unity as an indication that he is trying
to consolidate his position and ensure his place in
the succession before the Chairman's death.
(continued)
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The implications for Mao in the current de-
velopments are ambiguous. The Chairman was almost
certainly weakened to some extent by last year's
divisive anti-Confucius campaign. Erratic treat-
ment of Mao's role as "founder and commander" of
the Chinese army, in the context of observing Army
Day last month, suggests there is continuing contro-
versy regarding Mao's direct control of the military.
It is possible that the Chairman's running quarrel
with the army has left him vulnerable to criticism
from other quarters. Mao's political acumen is
still considerable, however, and he retains great
reservoirs of prestige among the general populace.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PORTUGAL
NATO security officers have recom-
mended that the alliance further restrict
Portugal's access to classified informa-
tion. If NATO political authorities
agree, Portugal will be denied NATO=
Secret documents?approximately 80 per-
cent of NATO's classified information--
and will not be able to participate in
meetings of many NATO committees.
NATO officials have long been apprehensive that
classified documents might be compromised by the
Portuguese. With the situation in Portugal as uncer-
tain as ever, security officials believe that
stringent restrictions must be imposed on a regular
basis. They and many other NATO officials are par-
ticularly concerned because of the recent appoint-
ment of the pro-Communist General Goncalves as Por-
tuguese armed forces chief of staff.
NATO's political authorities must approve
these recommendations, and they will again have in
mind that actions of this type might lead to adverse
political consequences in Portugal. The US mission
believes, however, that most of the allies agree
that further restrictive measures should be imposed,
and that it may be preferable to do so now rather
than later.
There were no major developments in the Portu-
guese political situation yesterday. The Melo An-
tunes group continues to try to force Vasco Goncalves
out of his position of armed forces chief of staff.
The Socialist and Popular Democratic parties are
taking a hard line on participating in any new
government, insisting on Goncalves' ouster as a
prerequisite. It is still unclear when Prime
Minister Admiral Azevedo intends to present his
new government, although some reports say an
announcement will come this week.
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NOTE
The Ecuadorean government quickly suppressed
an attempt to oust President Rodriguez Lara yes-
terday.
Most units in the armed forces throughout the
country remained loyal to the President. Forces
available to Army Chief of Staff General Gonzalez,
who led the attempted coup, apparently amounted to
only a few tanks and several hundred supporters.
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Top Secret
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