THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 NOVEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014945
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 4, 1975

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012900010003-1
The President's Daily Brief
November 4, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. 11652
exemption category 58(1).12).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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November 4, 1975
Table of Contents
Lebanon: The latest cease-fire is threatened to-
day by sniper fire, :just as attention had
begun to shift to the feuding between Prime
Minister Karami and Interior Minister Shamun.
(Page 1)
Bangladesh: Brigadier Musharraf appears to have
gained control of the government with little
or no bloodshed. (Page 2)
Syria: We present the precis of a Special National
Intelligence Estimate, "Syria - The Next Step?"
(Page 3)
Egypt-USSR:
(Page 5)
Notes: Cambodia-Thailand;
West Germany - France - NATO (Pages 6 and 7)
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LEBANON
The latest cease-fire is threatened
today by sniper fire, just as attention
had begun to shift to the feuding between
Prime Minister Karami: and Interior Minis-
ter Shamun.
The uneasy relationship between the two lead-
ers has sharply deteriorated as a result of Karami's
recent accusations that Shamun's National Liberal
Party was partially responsible for the most recent
round of fighting. Karami has also taken over se-
curity responsibilities previously handled by Shamun,
including the negotiation and implementation of the
latest cease-fire. The Prime Minister will hold a
cabinet meeting today to gain majority approval of
the new truce, apparently to head off anticipated
criticism from Shamun.
Past quarrels between Karami and Shamun have
been successfully mediated and, in the latest, Pres-
ident Franjiyah and others apparently are trying to
work out a reconciliation. There is now talk, how-
ever, that Shamun will resign from the cabinet. US
officials in Beirut believe that the withdrawal of
the only effective spokesman for Christian interests
would further erode the authority of the government
and probably would trigger another round of serious
fighting.
The security situation
since the weekend.
security forces have been able to strengthen
eir positions in the luxury hotel district where
fighting had been especially fierce. Although spo-
radic clashes and sniper fire continue in some areas
of the city, violations of the truce seem to be de-
clining gradually.
there is guarded optimism about this cease-fire be-
cause it was negotiated by those actually engaged
in the fighting, rather than by politicians and
other intermediaries of the warring factions.
in Beirut has
improved
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BANGLADESH
Brigadier Musharraf appears to have
gained control of the Bangladesh government
with little or no bloodshed. President
Mushtasue offered to resign, but Musharraf
plans to retain the President
or t e ti.-me being in a figurehead role.
Both the President and Musharraf probably
wanted to avoid serious fighting.
In exchange for the President's capitulation,
Musharraf has apparently agreed to permit the Chief
of Staff, General Ziaur Rahman, and the young ma-
jors who led the coup last August to leave the
country.
Musharraf and Ziaur have been rivals within
the military. Musharraf had a supportive role in
the coup last August but subsequently lost ground
in the hierarchy when he quarreled with some of the
coup leaders.
New Delhi may have been caught off guard by
the coup. India
did not expect any moves by the Bangladesh military
against the government
Musharraf's power grab increases chances of
further anti-government moves, especially by sup-
porters of Ziaur and the majors. Ziaur is extremely
popular in the army as a result of his leadership
during the independence struggle and the war with
Pakistan. The majors probably have a following among
troops who were dissatisfied with the regime of former
president Mujib.
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SYRIA
The following is the precis of a
special national intelligence estimate,
"Syria - The Next Step?" approved yes-
terday by the US Intelligence Board.
Despite Syria's increasingly intransigent public
position on future peace negotiations, we believe
President Asad is still interested in talks concern-
ing a second-stage Israeli withdrawal on the Golan
Heights.
The Syrians, however, are likely to continue to
insist as a precondition that the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization be recognized in some way as a
party to the negotiations before they will engage in
such talks.
Meanwhile, Damascus will exert maximum pressure
on the US and Israel, hoping thereby to underscore
an urgent need for diplomatic movement and to force
concessions to Syria's negotiating demands.
Between now and November 30, Asad's strategy
will be to increase military tension in order to
create concern about Syria's military intentions
and whether it will agree to the renewal of the UN
disengagement observation force.
If necessary, however, Asad will go beyond mere
posturing, and this will lend further credibility to
his "war of nerves."
The Syrians have few, if any, good diplomatic
moves to play. They do, however, have a range of
military options that include:
--Additional troop movements, exercises, alerts,
overflights, reserve call up.
--Military "incidents," including firing across
the UN buffer zone at Israeli patrols, short
incursions into the Israeli disengagement area,
and the facilitation of fedayeen terrorist and
sabotage operations on the Golan Heights.
(continued)
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--Some form of a "war of attrition" involving
artillery barrages.
--Major military operations with the aim of
seizing and holding specific objectives.
--Resumption of major hostilities.
We do not believe Asad will deliberately resort
to full-scale war. He may, however, take military
actions short of war if his current pressure campaign
fails to produce acceptable diplomatic results. Un-
der these circumstances, we believe that:
--Syria will continue to step up its pressure
campaign as November 30 draws nearer. Some
serious "incidents" will probably occur during
this period.
--If this "war of nerves" does not produce
diplomatic results, there is a good chance
that Asad will increase the pressure even
further by letting the UN mandate run out, per-
haps while continuing to abide by the military
limitations of the Syrian-Israeli disengage-
ment agreement. This would create a crisis
atmosphere without provoking an Israeli attack.
--At this point, however, limited military
operations by Syria cannot be ruled out and
these would run a high risk of Israeli retali-
ation and a general escalation of the fighting.
--The situation in Lebanon could deteriorate in
a way that drew in Syrian and Israeli forces.
Fighting between them in Lebanon could rapidly
spread to the Golan Heights as well.
The Israelis, for their part, are reluctant to
take any new diplomatic initiatives concerning the
Golan Heights both because of the area's military
importance and the very difficult domestic political
problems that could be raised. They will be even
less interested in doing so in a situation of in-
creased tension induced by Syria.
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EGYPT?USSR
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NOTES
Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary and
his Thai hosts in Bangkok have apparently estab-
lished a favorable atmosphere for future contacts
between the two countries.
The agreement to establish diplomatic relations
was probably particularly gratifying to the Thai,
who have thus far made little progress in resolving
their differences with the Vietnamese or the Lao.
Nevertheless, the joint communique's vague formula-
tion on the timing of ambassadorial exchanges--at a
convenient date "depending on prevailing conditions"--
confirms that the Cambodians are not yet ready to
permit noncommunist diplomats in Phnom Penh.
(continued)
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After meeting with his French counterpart last
week, West German Defense Minister Leber told Am-
bassador Hillenbrand that he believes France is
prepared to cooperate more closely with both the
West Germans and NATO.
Leber said that meaningful progress had been
achieved in the areas of military planning and arms
standardization. He also claimed that French De-
fense Minister Bourges agreed to have French mili-
tary officials participate in planning with the
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe on hypothetical
military contingencies.
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Top Secret
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