THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 NOVEMBER 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977782
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 6, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
6 November 1970
46
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY 13111EF
6 November 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Hanoi has made some moves which suggest it may be
preparing a new ingredient for the negotiations in
Paris. (Page 1)
The Chinese are still on the disputed Damanskiy/
Chen-pao Island near the Soviet border. (Page 3)
Rumors associated with the possibility Premier
Thanom might step down have intensified political
maneuvering in Bangkok. (Page 4) ?
Recent satellite photography has provided further
evidence that troop training for Chinese MRBM.crews
is in progress. (Page 5)
The Soviets are preparing another.lunar mission.
(Page 6)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese seem to be paving the
way for some new move. We know there have
been North Vietnamese UP flights between
Hanoi and Moscow and Peking, and we think
this means the Vietnamese Communists have
been consulting with their major allies.
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//Our guess is that
Hanoi is preparing to add some new ingre-
dient to the negotiations: possibly an-
other installment in the "diplomatic of-
fensive" launched in September with Madame
Binh 's eight points; possibly a more sub-
stantive response to President Nixon's
peace initiative last month.
The fact that Xuan Thuy has finally ac-
cepted the US initiative for a private
meeting Lends further support to this con-
jecture. We are inclined to think that
the North Vietnamese stalled on this mat-
ter mainly because they believed the US
might use an earlier acceptance as evi-
dence of progress in Paris, and they did
not want to do anything that might help
the Administration in this week's elec-
tions. This conclusion is reinforced by
their acceptance coming on the very day
of the elections. Whatever the timing of
the private talks, the diplomatic comings
and goings at least raise the possibility
that the Communists have been making the
necessary arrangements before engaging in
serious talks with the US.
A great deal has happened since the con-
tact with the North Vietnamese in August
1969. We have no evidence to suggest what
tack Thuy may take at the first private
meeting, but we think the North Vietnam-
ese are unhappy with current trends in
the war. in Indochina, and they may be
more interested than they were a? year ago
in exploring the possibilities for nego-
tiating with the United States.
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FOR THE PRESIDEINI-T-DNLY
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WEST GERMANY
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USSR-CHINA
? Satellite photography of late October indicates
that the Chinese continue to maintain a presence on
disputed Damanskiy/Chen-pao Island and continue to
occupy defenses in the area. Some weapons positions
on the nearby hillsides along the Chinese side of
the river were occupied and trenching was observed
in the area. Bunkers under construction in June
1970 now are earth covered.
Kosygin and Chou En-lai apparently reached
an informal understanding during their
meeting in Peking in September 1969 that
each side would employ restraint along the
border and permit the other to remain on
disputed territory it then held. Accod-
ingly, the Soviets apparently tolerate a
Chinese presence on the island in order
to avoid an incident that might disrupt
the Peking talks and lead to a renewal of
border skirmishing. The lack of fighting
during the past year suggests that the
Chinese also have been circumspect with
regard to disputed territory, occupied by
the Soviets.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THAILAND
there is increased po-
litical maneuvering behind the scenes in Bangkok..
Followers of Premier Thanom start rumors or create
provocations designed to postpone the day when
Thanom will lose his power position, while partisans
of Deputy Prime Minister. Praphat are taking similar
action to hasten the day of Thanom's departure. Thern
result of all this backstage churning is consider-
able confusion on the Thai political scene.
Although Thanom has announced that he will
retain the prime ministership until parlia-
mentary elections in early 1973, most po-
litical observers in Bangkok believe it
unlikely that he has either the inclina-
tion or power to hold on that long. After
almost' seven years of unimaginative but
steady stewardship, Thanom has become a
casualty of his own style of leadership
and of problems at home and abroad over
which he, or any Thai prime minister, has
only Limited control. Although Thanom's
self-effacement was .ideally suited to the
sort of collective rule by which Thailand
has been governed since Marshal Sarit's
death, there is a growing feeling that it
is not appropriate for the tough decisions
that the country now faces.
In the handling of controversial legisla-
tion?the tax bill, the budget, the pro-
posed press act--the government has been
divided and indecisive. Not only has
Thanom had trouble whipping parliament
into line, but the government's own ranks
have become increasingly divided and un-
responsive to the prime minister's lead-
ership. He himself has grown increasingly
weary of the political wars.
Thanom is nonetheless under some pressure
from his supporters to continue in office
as Long as possible while they build sup-
port for either a congenial replacement
or another potential rival to Deputy
Prime Minister Praphat, who now appears
almost certain to replace Thanom.
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COMMUNIST CHINA
Satellite photography of late October shows
MRBM equipment at the Wu-wei surface-to-surface
missile school in west China. The equipment was
similar to that previously associated with a mis-
sile being tested to a range of 600 to 700 nautical
miles at the Shuang-cheng-tzu test center.
5
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NOTE
USSR: Preparations are under way for a lunar
mission similar to the Luna 16 flight which soft
landed on the moon and returned to earth in Septem-
ber.
6
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