THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 MARCH 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992515
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 6, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
6 March 1971
48
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
6 March 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
President Sadat's ambiguous threat to let his mili-
tary chiefs decide on the resumption of hostilities
after 7 March is discussed on Page 1.
North Vietnam
South Vietna Laos.
(Page 3)
Peking appears to have made its case regarding the
threat against China posed by allied operations in
Laos, and in fact may have begun to take a more re-
laxed view. (Page 4)
Pakistani President Yahya has announced that the
postponed session of the National Assembly- will con-
vene on 25 March. (Page 5)
The ransom deadline has passed, but there is still
no word on the whereabouts of the four airmen kid-
naped by Turkish extremists. (Page 6)
The curbing of inflation in South Vietnam since last
July will improve President Thieu's election pros-
pects. (Page 7)
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MIDDLE EAST
President Sadat's ambiguous threat to let his
military chiefs decide on the resumption of hostil-
ities after 7 March is a calculated Soviet-Egyptian
move to bring formal international pressure on Is-
rael. The signal for Sadat's action apparently was
the failure of the Soviets to win a four-power
statement condemning Israel's recalcitrance on the
territorial issue. Egyptian forces have been on a
semialert since December, and press reports today
assert that they and the Syrian forces are now on
full alert./
Further tightening of Egyptian and Israeli
military-alert-postures can be expected in
the wake of Sadat's statement, and there
will be increased danger of inadvertent
or individual shooting which could then
escalate. But a deliberate resumption of
military action by the Egyptian armed forces
Monday morning does not appear likely at
this time.
Egyptian official and press statements of the
past 24 hours have made it clear that Cairo expects
a formal condemnation of Israeli intransigence as
?the minimum price for Egypt's active cooperation in
a cease-fire extension. The Soviet representative's?
insistence on a condemnatory communique by the four-
power committee in New York indicates Egyptian-Soviet
agreement on this point.
(continued)
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Sadat's announcement to Donald Bergus that
he had had "intensive talks" with Soviet
leaders in Moscow on i. and 2 March was
clearly aimed at conveying the notion that
Cairo had Moscow's full concurrence in the
decision not to extend the cease-fire. It
is, in fact, likely that the Soviet leaders
have acquiesced in Cairo's decision, and
that the USSR also supports Egypt's deter-
mination to pursue immediate tactics aimed
at sharp intensification of pressure
against Tel Aviv. The Russians would not,
however, be sympathetic to any bona fide
move by Sadat to leave to the Egyptian
military the question of a possible re-
sumption of hostilities.
Over recent months the USSR has expended
considerable effort urging caution on
Cairo's leaders. Lately, to be sure, there
has been ample evidence of mounting exas-
peration among Egyptian and Soviet leaders
over what they regard as Washington's
failure to bring the Israelis around,
despite new signs of flexibility on Cairo's
part. Frustrated though Cairo and Moscow
may be at the Zack of give in Israel's
stance, however, there is little reason
to believe that they now feel compelled
to resort to significant offensive mili-
tary action. Rather they appear to have
decided, in concert, to up the ante and
play out their strongest diplomatic cards.
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VIETNAM-LAOS
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COMMUNIST CHINA - INDOCHINA
Peking appears to have made its case regarding the
threat against China posed by allied operations in
southern Laos, and in fact may have begun to take a
more relaxed view of the situation in Laos.
The Chinese still refer occasionally to the govern-
ment statement of 12 February, which contained the
warning that allied actions in Laos threatened China
itself, but they have not adverted directly to this
"threat" in two weeks. Speeches by two Politburo
members during this period discussing current mili-
tary developments in Indochina did not even mention
China's security interests. In addition, references
in Chinese media to the possibility of the US using
tactical nuclear weapons in Indochina have virtually
ceased since President Nixon's statement ruling out
this possibility.
The apparent change in Peking's attitude toward Laos
may be one result of top leadership meetings re-
cently held in Peking. These conferences probably
were mainly concerned with domestic political prob-
lems, but discussions concerning the situation in
Indochina were presumably also on the agenda. The
two Politburo members appear to have attended some
of these meetings, and their comments, as well as
those of Chinese officials abroad, almost certainly
accurately reflect current regime thinking on Indo-
china.
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PAKISTAN
President Yahya annoupced today that the post-
poned session of the National Assembly will convene
on 25 March. He said that his failure to arrange a
meeting of political leaders to discuss their dif-
ferences left him no choice but to proceed with the
assembly session. He said that he felt "duty bound
to resolve this impasse by taking a decision myself."
We do not have the full text of Yahya's
speech, but the tone of his remarks does
not suggest much progress in his efforts
to bring about a compromise between the
East and West Pakistanis.
Yahya talked. with Bhutto at some length yester-
day, but there was no announcement as to what tran-
spired. After the meeting, a spokesman for Bhutto's
party. criticized Mujib,and his colleagues for their
"Most unwarranted" reaction to the postponement, but
he refused to say whether Bhutto's group is now will-
ing to participate in the assembly.
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TURKEY
There is still no word on the whereabouts of
the four US airmen kidnaped Thursday. Yesterday's
raid on the Middle East Technical University campus
by several thousand gendarmes and police, assisted
by army helicopters, failed to turn up the kidnapers
or their hostages, although it did have the effect
of disrupting one of the major centers of leftist
extremism in Turkey. In a seven-hour pitched bat-
tle between students and the security forces, at
least two persons were killed and many wounded.
Students barricaded themselves in the dormitories
and fought with guns, Molotov cocktails, and sticks
of dynamite used as hand grenades. Nearly 200 stu-
dents were taken into custody.
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NOTE
South Vietnam: Prices in Saigon have risen by
only one half of one percent since last July, ac-
cording to the USAID index, in contrast to an annual
rate of nearly 30 percent in 1969 and early 1970.
This will remove some steam from one of the most
telling issues used against Thieu, and improve his
prospects for re-election.
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