THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 NOVEMBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006146383
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 3, 1969

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/2 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007700020001-0
The President's Daily Brief
3 November 1969
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
3 November 1969,
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
?Some parts of a recent speech by party First Secre-
tary Le Duan contain hints of policy differences
among the North Vietnamese. (Page 1)
The Jordanians have asked Moscow for antiaircraft,
medium, and long-range artillery. (Page 3)
India's Congress Party is again close to a formal
split. (Page 4)
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NORTH VIETNAM
Some parts of a recent speech by party First
Secretary Le Duan, given to district level cadre,
contains hints of possible policy differences in
the North Vietnamese leadership over both the war
and domestic issues.
In an "abridged" version of the speech broad-
cast to domestic audiences Friday, Le Duan argues
that the fighting in the South should continue to
receive high priority because of the tremendous
sacrifices already made. He uses Ho Chi Minh's au-
thority to urge no compromise without "complete
victory."
The dominant theme of the speech is a plea for
party unity. This preoccupation could suggest that
disunity has affected his own position as party
first secretary. Le Duan says, for example, that
"divergent views between two comrades in the party"
are normal, but that discussion should produce "una-
nimity" or at least a "collective" view. It is inad-
visable, Le Duan maintains, "to adopt the opinion
of one person and force all others to follow it."
Although this could be read as another
routine prescription for party consider-
ation of all views before final decisions
are taken, we think it more likely that
Duan is protesting strong-arm tactics by
some party leader powerful enough to act
without taking other views into account.
Had Le Duan been merely explaining the
party decision-making process to local
cadres, he would probably have stressed
local issues, problems of policy imple-
mentation in which there is some room for
local interpretation. Instead, he con-
centrated on support for the war, an issue
on which local officials have little con-
trol. Le Duan did not use party authority
to buttress his remarks; he left an im-
pression he may have been speaking for
himself.
(continued)
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It is difficult to draw hard conclusions
about the leadership or the firmness of
Le Duan's grasp on the party from this
one speech. But it is suggestive of a
serious contest for control. The other
contestant could be Truong Chinh, the
next ranking politburo member.
Assuming that there is a serious power
and policy struggle, Le Duan's speech
would put him in the role of a dissenter
to current policy trends, both with re-
spect to the war and certain domestic is-
sues. The fact that his views have been
broadcast, however, suggests that he re-
tains considerable authority and that
many policy and leadership questions re-
main to be decided.
2
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JORDAN
Husayn says he has approved the assignment of
a Soviet military attache in Amman. The Jordanians
for the first time have also inquired into Soviet
willingness to supply antiaircraft, medium, and
long-range artillery.
There probably is a bit of gamesmanship
in Husayn's informing US officials of
these steps, but he has made it clear
many times that he is indeed desperate
for artillery. He also is in doubt at
the moment about the merits of a British
antiaircraft missile system currently on
order.
The Soviets probably would be happy to
fill some of Jordan's artillery needs.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
INDIA
The power struggle between Mrs. Gandhi and the
Congress 'Party old guard came to a head this week-
end. Her supporters claim they are making headway
in their efforts to remove old-line party president
Nijalingappa. Her opponents have responded by sum-
marily dropping several of her supporters from the
party's governing working committee and then calling
a rump meeting of the group to declare her faction's
activities "out of order."
Neither faction has acknowledged yet that
the party is formally divided, and neither
really wants a split that would wreck the
party. If worst comes to worst, however,
Mrs. Gandhi probably believes she could
put together a new government backed by
most of Congress and by assorted leftist
parties. If the dispute is not papered
over again, she might even prefer immedi-
ate elections to capitalize on her increas-
ing popularity with the electorate.
Meanwhile, a group of state leaders is
trying to mediate the dispute, but neither
Mrs. Gandhi nor the old guard has shown
any sign so far of backing down.
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USSR:
NOTE
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