THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 FEBRUARY 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992477
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 13, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
13 February 1971
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE:PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIEF'
13 February 1971.
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
There are further signs that the Communists may
soon stiffen their resistance to South Vietnamese
operations in southern Laos. (Page 1)
In northern Laos, there is a growing concentration
of Communist forces west of the Plaine des Jarres.
(Page 2)
Peking's current attitude toward allied cross-border
operations in Indochina suggests no change in its
desire to avoid military involvement. (Page 4)
No early cabinet changes in the Cambodian cabinet
seem likely to ensue from Lon No's illness.
(Page 5)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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550975 2-71 CIA
CAMBODIA (
titung Treng
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LAOS-VIETNAM
Communist units are making vigorous preparations
for both defensive and offensive actions as the South
Vietnamese push into Laos nears more sensitive areas.
Enemy units south of Route 9 have been preparing am-
bush sites on routes they expect the South Vietnamese
to use, according to intercepts, and many units have
orders to "mobilize to strike the enemy." Communist
forces well to the west of Tchepone and to the south
of Khe Sanh, as well as some in southernmost North
Vietnam, have been put on special combat alert against
possible allied ground or air attacks.
In addition to the continuing indications
that enemy resistance in the panhandle may
soon stiffen, there is further evidence
that Communist forces in South Vietnam may
become more active in the hope of hindering
the cross-border operations. Elements of
two artillery regiments and at least three
infantry regiments have been coordinating
attack plans against allied troops just
south of the Demilitarized Zone and appear
responsible for recent shellings and am-
bushes north of Route 9. Recent intercepts
indicate that the Communists may become
more active against targets around Da Nang,
and the Viet Cong radio has publicly called
for the people in Hue and adjacent rural
areas to "increase attacks" on the govern-
ment in response to the move into Laos.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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PROBABLE DEPLOYMENT OF NVA FORCES
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THAILAND
THAILAND
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Vientiane-1
Government-held location
?Communist-held location
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THAILAND
STAT,E1.123
CAMBODIA
KkOORIle
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LAOS
There is a growing concentration of North Viet-
namese forces southwest of the Plaine des Jarres.
Most of the units are from the 316th Division, but
more elements of the 312th, which only recently en-
tered from North Vietnam, are also arriving in the
area; they are deployed generally in an arc to the
west of Ban Na. In the past few days, one regiment
from the 316th and a battalion from .a second one
have shifted farther south and are now about five
miles from Sam Thong, where a sapper battalion has
been operating. In addition, elements of an inde-
pendent regiment located east of Ban Na have moved
closer to the key government installation at Long
Tieng, which was struck by five 122-mm. rockets
early today, without significant effect.
The southward shifts are further evidence
that the Communists are trying to skirt
Ban Na and prepare for early strikes
around Sam Thong and Long Tieng. Enemy
intercepts have indicated that harassments
or siege tactics were more likely than a
direct assault against Ban Na, which con-
tains artillery emplacements supporting
the Long Tieng:- Sam Thong complex. The
Ban Na base is in an exposed position and
Communist shellings and heavy machine gun
fire from the hills surrounding the air-
strip have been creating difficulties for
the government's aerial resupply. opera-
tions.
Neutralization of Ban Na would give the
Communists much greater freedom to posi-
tion their forces against the Long Tieng
complex. Communist intercepts suggest
that they intend to conduct attacks and
create disorders" around Long Tieng in
an effort to keep the irregulars pinned
down while .additional large Communist
units move into the area.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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a
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LAOS
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COMMUNIST CHINA - LAOS
A Communist
officialr 50X1
/has told
that direct intervention by China
is unlikely i a led operations from South Vietnam
southern Laos and Cambodia.,
however, the official implied
that any ground move into northern Laos--specifically
above the 17th parallel--might be considered a di-
rect, threat to China, thus raising the possibility
that Chinese troops might be brought into the con-
flict.
are restricted to
Peking has throughout the Indochina con-
flict shown a concern for the protection
of its own border, and the official's
comments are generally consistent with
this attitude. His remarks about the 17th
parallel may be a means of conveying
China's sensitivity regarding areas near
its border, rather than a hard and fast
demarcation that would automatically trig-
ger Chinese intervention if the line were
crossed.
Peking has had ample time to consider the
implications of allied moves in southern
Laos; it almost certainly has expected
them for sometime, Peking has adopted
a measured reaction to recent developments
and has avoided a high degree of belliger-
ence. Although Chinese propaganda has
been heavy, none of Peking's pronounce-
ments suggests that it views the situation
with immediate alarm. China's propaganda
seems designed to dramatize its concern
as well as its eagerness to throw its pub-
lic support behind Hanoi.
4
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CAMBODIA
Lon Nol, shortly after becoming ill, ttold Acting
Premier. Matak and Deputy Chief. of Staff Sak Sutsakhan
that he did not want to make any ministerial changes
for at least the next three months.
he indicated that he considered
cabinet stability necessary in order to maintain na-
tional unity.
The last major cabinet reshu in Phnom
Penh occurred last summer.
5
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Soviet
in Mongolia
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NOTES
Communist China:
USSR-China:
USSR:? A prototype of the new swing-wing bomber--
Z -A -
/ witn
its test program apparently proceeding smoothly, the
aircraft is expected to be ready, for operational serv-
ice during the 1974-76 period.
USSR: The Soviets appear to be transferring
a Y-class ballistic missile submarine from the At-
lantic to the Pacific Fleet. This would give the
Soviets four of these units in thefl Pacific and en-
able them to maintain one unit continuously on, or
en route to, missile patrol off the US West Coast.
6
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Top Secret
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