THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 JULY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993392
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 5, 1972

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900050001-1
The President's Daily Brief
5 July 1972
4 7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900050001-1
Declassified in Pari- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T06936A010900050001-1
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(21.(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900050001-1
Declassified in Par-:t - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900050001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
5 July 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
South Vietnamese paratroopers are reported to be in
Quang Tri City and so far have encountered only
light resistance, but the Communists may be planning
unusual measures to stem the offensive. The Commu-
nists are maintaining some pressure on Hue, but
there is evidence they have been forced to scale
down their objectives. (Page 1)
On Page 2, we analyze the announced agreement be-
tween North and South Korea.
Tanaka wins party leadership post in Japan and is
scheduled to become prime minister tomorrow. (Page 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900050001-1
104
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
South Vietnamese paratroopers are reportedly
in Quang Tri City and are encountering only light
resistance. The Communists, however, are evidently
resorting to unusual measures in an effort to stem
the offensive. Intercepts state that North Vietnam-
ese antiaircraft units are to use their weapons and
personnel against South Vietnamese infantry and ar-
mored vehicles and that at least one company from
each regiment is to be "sacrificed" in rear guard
action in case the regiments are forced to retreat.'
One message specifically commanded that "all units,
from the regimental commander on down," must hold
their positions.
Despite such exhortations, one regiment re-
ported to its headquarters that it had "failed" in
the mission to defend Quang Tri City and that there
was a possibility of "even more failures.." Another
regiment assigned to hold the city reported that one
company "abandoned its weapons and ran away" under
attack.
To the south, the Communists are maintaining
some pressure on Hue. Enemy shelling attacks ap-
pear to have caused about one fourth of the city's
resident; who had returned following the earlier
fighting, to leave again.
Despite the recent flurry of attacks
against Hue, there is some evidence that
the Communists have been forced to scale
down their objectives.
Viet Cong cadre near
Hue are now being told that there will be
no significant assault against the city
until October at the earliest and that
the Communists will confine themselves to
artillery and sapper attacks in the.inter-
vening months.
Although things are going badly for them in
the north, the Communists have increased the pres-
sure on government positions throughout the Mekong
Delta. The heaviest action has been in Kien Phong
Province, where enemy ground attacks forced govern-
ment territorial forces to withdraw from several
support bases yesterday. Additional bases were re-
ported. to have been isolated in nearby Dinh Tuong
Province, while farther south, in the An Xuyen -
Chuong Thien provincial area, several positions came
under heavy mortar and rocket fire.
1
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25X1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
KOREA
The communique issued with the announcement of the
recent secret talks between North and South Korea
indicates that Seoul successfully resisted Pyong-
yang's efforts to move the next round of talks to
a substantive political level. It focuses instead
on less controversial subjects such as humanitarian,
economic, and cultural relations while mentioning
political unification only in general terms. The
cautious South Korean leaders will be likely to in-
sist on tangible progress on the side issues before
committing themselves to substantive political dis-
cussions.
The agreement makes no mention of a summit meeting
between Premier Kim Il-sung and President Pak Chong-
hui--one of the goals of the North Koreans. It also
failed to specify the duties, membership, and future
responsibilities of the coordinating committee that
has been set up. President Pak had earlier told
Ambassador Habib that he did not want the committee
to function on an official political level and hoped
to staff it with junior officials.
The announcement will create some political diffi-
culties for Seoul. Opposition politicians are
strongly objecting to the fact that the agreement
was made without prior consultation with the legis-
lature, and they can be expected to be highly crit-
ical of the government at the current special ses-
sion of the National Assembly. After twenty years
of describing Pyongyang as the epitome of evil,
Seoul will need to reassure conservative elements,
particularly in the military, that it is exercising
caution. It must also restrain popular expectations
about where the talks will lead. CIA Director Ii
in his press conference after the announcement sought
to scotch speculation that the agreement will mean
unification in the near future by stressing the
need for continued vigilance.
There will also be increased pressure on Seoul to
lift some of the emergency measures and anti-Commu-
nist laws directed at protecting the nation against
subversion and aggression from the North. The op-
position is calling for an end to the emergency sit-
uation, and Yi's remarks indicate the government
may be prepared to give some ground on this score.
(continued)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The announcement will also have significant implica-
tions for the Korean question at the UN, where both
sides will endeavor to use the talks to buttress
their positions. In addition, Seoul's public accept-
ance of the principle of non-interference will be
used by Pyongyang to press for accelerated US with-
drawal from the peninsula.
In the tightly controlled society of North Korea,
Kim will face far fewer problems in writing off two
decades of hysterical propaganda directed against
the South. A plenum of the party central committee,
which began on 1 July, focused almost exclusively
on the reunification question. In his opening report
Kim almost certainly provided details on the talks
and guidance on how the matter should be explained
to party members and the general population and
Pyongyang is giving extensive domestic coverage to
the announcement.
In the international sphere, Kim hopes to derive
additional prestige and diplomatic recognition from
the dialogue with the South. Japanese Government
officials, for example, have already indicated that
the talks could have an effect on Tokyo's attitude
toward North Korea.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900050001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900050001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTE
Japan: As expected, Trade Minister Tanaka was
elected leader of the Liberal Democratic Party today
on the second ballot. He thereby succeeds Prime
Minister Sato as majority party leader and he is
scheduled to be chosen formally as prime minister
in a special ?session of the Diet tomorrow.
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Top Secret
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