THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 SEPTEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014895
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 6, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
September 6, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. I 1652
exemption category 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
September 6, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: The removal of the pro-Communist Goncal-
ves leaves the armed forces divided, but may
improve Admiral Azevedo's chances of forming
a new government. (Page 1)
Egypt: Officials seem confident that the Egyptian-
Israeli disengagement agreement is generally
supported within Egypt, despite the outcry
in other Arab countries. (Page 3)
Jordan: Jordan has completed work on its military
fortifications in the Jordan Valley. (Page 5)
Notes: Yugoslavia; Sudan (Page 6)
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PORTUGAL
The removal of the pro-Communist
Vasco Goncalves from the leadership
leaves the armed forces divided into op-
posing factions, but may improve Admiral
Azevedois chances of forming a new gov-
ernment. There has been no public re-
action from the rival factions.
A communique issued after a rump session of
the Armed Forces General Assembly last night said
Goncalves had "declined" the post of chief of staff
of the armed forces. It is clear, however, that he
was forced out by anti-Communist officers in the
army and air force. Goncalves and three of his
closest supporters were also purged from the Revo-
lutionary Council, which has apparently regained
most of its former power as Portugal's dominant
policy-making body.
Goncalves' removal may have been part of yet
another attempt by President Costa Gomes to arrange
a compromise that would not make any faction a com-
plete winner or loser. In addition to the pro-Com-
munist officers purged from the Revolutionary Coun-
cil, Commander Vitor Crespo, a loyal supporter of
Major Melo Antunes, also was dropped.
A membership list for the revamped council
also failed to include Antunes and Major Vitor
Alves, leaders of the anti-Goncalves drive- The
assembly's communique said the council would have
to decide later whether these two, along with Gon-
calves' labor minister Costa Martins, would be asked
to rejoin its membership.
Separate lists for the revised council appar-
ently were drawn up by the individual service as-
semblies earlier this week. The members, all pre-
viously on the council, reflect the predominant
political leanings of the services they represent.
The anti-Communist faction generally associated
with Antunes appears to have a majority, although
that could be changed by the switch of only a few
votes.
(continued)
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This apparent effort at a compromise may de-
fuse the situation, which had moved dangerously
close to a violent confrontation, although there
has been no indication of how either the Antunes
or Goncalves factions are reacting to the announced
changes. General Carvalho was quoted as saying
after the meeting yesterday that it contributed
nothing to restoring unity or tranquility in Portu-
gal.
The principal demand of the Antunes group and
the democratic political parties--the ouster of
Goncalves--was met, however, and Prime Minister -
designate Azevedo may now receive greater coopera-
tion in forming a government. Socialist leader
Soares' demands for elections and a separation of
civilian and military responsibilities, together
with his strong criticism of the Communist Party,
will pose problems, however, if Azevedo continues
to press for a government that includes the Social-
ists, Communists, and Popular Democrats.
With yesterday's decisions failing to resolve
decisively the factional power struggle, there also
remains the possibility of the rightist forces of
former president Spinola playing the spoiler role.
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EGYPT
Egyptian officials seem confident
that the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement
agreement is generally supported within
Egypt, despite the outcry in other Arab
countries.
The US embassy in Cairo reports that govern-
ment officials were reasonably certain throughout
the negotiations that Egyptians would stand behind
President Sadat. This confidence was evidenced by
the government's unprecedented willingness to bare
the details of the accord, including concessions
that a few years ago would have been unthinkable.
Most provisions of last year's disengagement
were kept from the Egyptian public, and the govern-
ment has never openly acknowledged making conces-
sions in that accord.
The government's confidence appears thus far
to have been well placed. The embassy believes
that, although some opposition is inevitable, most
Egyptians will welcome a period of relatively as-
sured stability. The business community is al-
ready expressing pleasure that the agreement pro-
vides a better atmosphere for commercial planning
uninterrupted by threats of war.
Egyptian officials, nevertheless, are distres-
sed by the absence of Arab support for the new
agreement. Only the Saudis are fully backing Sadat.
Syria's virulent attack rankles Cairo the most, but
Jordan's lack of enthusiasm is a distinct disap-
pointment. Algeria has so far not reacted even
privately; Kuwait and the other Gulf states with
large Palestinian populations also have remained
silent.
Opposition from outside Egypt does pose a pos-
sible threat to internal stability. Radical Arabs
who feel threatened by Sadat's policies, or even
the Soviets, could use the disengagement to stir up
subversive elements inside Egypt.
(continued)
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For the present, however, the stridency of
Arab and Soviet attacks has apparently served to
close Egyptian ranks around Sadat. Sadat won pro-
longed applause from his audience of political and
legislative leaders during his defense of the agree-
ment on Thursday night, and these same leaders fol-
lowed the speech with a resolution strongly endors-
ing his policies. Approval is to be expected from
this usually tame group, but this resolution was
uncharacteristically enthusiastic in expressing sup-
port.
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Lebanon
UNDO
one
/AI Q aytirah
Mediterranean
A MAN
ieeicho
Dead Sea
GAZA ST
1949
Armistice
Line
558434 9-75 CIA
20 Miles
210 Kilometers
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JORDAN
Jordan has completed work on its
military fortifications in the Jordan
Va lie y,
in the southern part
of the valley, the most effective defensive posi-
tions are on the road leading from the Allenby
Bridge, where approximately seven large concrete
bunkers have been built into the hills. Jordanian
armor has been shifted from exposed positions west
of Irbid into the nearby foothills where they have
cover and concealment, as well as room for maneuver.
An Israeli attack across the Jordan Valley into the
high ground of the Irbid Plain would now have to
contend with well-placed static defensive positions
as well as a mobile armored force.
Work on the Jordan Valley defenses began last
spring out of concern that Israel might attempt to
outflank Syrian defenses on the Golan Heights with
a drive through northwestern Jordan. The overall
system consists of concrete bunkers and pillboxes,
minefields, and trenches built on key routes from
the Jordan Valley. Two infantry divisions, rein-
forced by two armored battalions, are responsible
for defense of the valley running from the Golan
Heights to the Dead Sea.
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NOTES
Yugoslavia
Forces loyal to Sudanese President Jaafar
Numayri yesterday easily quashed a coup effort
mounted by an officer with reported ties to an
extremist Muslim organization.
According to the US embassy in Khartoum,
Numayri's position was never in jeopardy. Shortly
after Lieutenant Colonel Hassam Uthman, the leader
of the abortive coup, seized a radio station in
the capital and announced Numayri's overthrow,
loyalist troops quickly took control of important
installations in the area and routed the outmanned
dissidents. Numayri charged in a subsequent radio
speech that the coup leader and his supporters had
received financial aid from abroad. The most
likely foreign source would be Libya. If Tripoli
did have a hand in the coup effort, it may have
hoped to block Sudanese efforts to forge closer
ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
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