THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 25 FEBRUARY 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992499
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 25, 1971

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The President's Daily Brief
25 February 1971
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
25 February 1971
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Communist forces are resisting the South Vietnamese
operations in Laos with shellings and ground attacks,
but there have been no new large engagements.
(Page 1)
The petroleum crisis in Phnom Penh has eased.
(Page 2)
Moscow views China's UN membership as inevitable but
perhaps delayed because of the Taiwan ejection issue.
(Page 5)
The Japanese resolve to go easy in trying to improve
their relations with China. (Page 6)
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VIETNAM-LAOS
Communist forces are resisting the allied opera-
tions in Laos with shellings and some ground attacks,
but there have been no new large engagements.
The account of a North Vietnamese defector sug-
gests that the Communists intend to commit still more
units to resist the South Vietnamese push into Laos.
As of 22 February, the Communists apparently
were still moving substantial quantities of supplies
through the area southeast of Tchepone./
/there was some decline in truck
traffic on 22 February from the high levels of the
past few weeks. South Vietnamese forces operating
in the vicinity of Muong Nong probably caused some
of the decline, but the North Vietnamese have many
bypasses and alternate routes in this area and only
part of the system has been affected.
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CAMBODIA
Recent deliveries of about 18,000 metric tons
of petroleum supplies to Phnom Penh from South Viet-
nam via the Mekong River have eased the oil crisis.
Petroleum has also reached Phnom Penh by truck over
Route 4 from the refinery at Kompong Som, as well
as overland from Saigon and Bangkok. Land shipments,
however, have amounted to less than a thousand met-
ric tons of petroleum since last December, due to
the continuing insecurity of key highways. As an
alternative to the use of Route 4, the Cambodians
are planning in the near future to start regular
petroleum deliveries by water from Kompong Som to
Phnom Penh in small, recently chartered tankers.
There are now enough stocks in the city's
petroleum depots to meet essential mili-
tary and civilian requirements for at
least three weeks. The petroleum situa-
tion will remain difficult, however. The
Cambodians have not as yet followed through
on plans to purchase petroleum transport
vessels of their own. Their Mekong supply
route is maintained by foreign vessels and
crews, which could suddenly abandon this
service if the Communists increase the
dangers. The hazards of the Mekong pas-
sage were emphasized again on 22 February,
when enemy fire struck six of nine commer-
cial vessels in a convoy, sinking one.
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USSR
(continued)
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USSR-CHINA-UN
The Soviet Foreign Ministry's chief China
watcher, Mikhail Kapitsa, told Ambassador Beam on
23 February that Soviet officials believe China is
Aefinitely interested in UN membership. Kapitsa
pointedly noted, however, that he was "absolutely
convinced" Peking will not abandon its demand that
Taiwan be ejected from all UN organs as a condition
of Peking's membership. A Soviet UN diplomat took
a similar line with a US official on 22 February.
Moscow evidently views China's UN admis-
sion as inevitable but may be hoping that
Western resistance to Taiwan's expulsion
will delay Peking's admission. Despite
its public support, Moscow remains unhappy
with the prospect of Peking's presence in
the UN, fearing the Chinese will use it
as a forum for voicing anti-Soviet pol-
icies and for undercutting Soviet appeal
to the Third World. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that the Soviets will risk up-
setting their somewhat improved relations
with Peking by becoming openly identified
with efforts to delay its admission.
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JAPAN - COMMUNIST CHINA
, Foreign Minister Aichi told the US ambassador
.on 23 February that protecting Nationalist China's
position in, the UN would be a "prime objective" of
Japanese policy, Although the Japanese still hope
for improved bilateral relations, Aichi said they
will not be "intimidated" by Peking. Aichi.talked
of, the need for the Japanese and US governments to
keep in 'step on the China issue He added that Tokyo
was in no hurry to reach final decisions on strategy
before this summer, implying that opposition pressure
in the Diet had been less than anticipated.
Tokyo appears to have concluded that a con-
ciliatory approach toward the China prob-
lem would be unproductive because of Pe-
king's hostility toward the Sato govern-
ment. For the present, at least, the Sato
government will probably continue to sup-
port Taipei's diplomatic position while
making sounds about improving relations
with Peking. Such strategy would be in-
tended to keep domestic political pres-
sures in check.
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SYRIA-USSR
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BURMA
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