THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 OCTOBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014920
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 6, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
October 6, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. I 1652
exemption category 5111(1M21.13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
October 6, 1975
Table of Contents
USSR: The 1975 Soviet grain crop may be 5 to 15
million tons less than our earlier estimate of
170 million tons. (Page 1)
Lebanon: Beirut is quiet, but sporadic fighting oc-
curred in the north over the weekend. Despite
the lull in political activity because of the
Muslim holiday, members of opposing sides are
generally pessimistic. (Page 2)
Portugal: Prime Minister Azevedo has intensified
his campaign to restore military discipline,
but continues to be challenged by leftist-ori-
ented units. (Page 4)
Arab States: Syrian President Asad has rejected a
second attempt to reconcile
his differences with Egypt. (Page 6)
India-Bangladesh: We present key points from an
interagency memorandum on the implications of
the Indian emergency and the coup in Bangladesh.
(Page 7)
Note: Morocco - Spanish Sahara (Page 8)
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USSR
The 1975 Soviet grain crop may be 5
to 15 million tons less than our earlier
estimate of 170 million tons. Indications
of widespread use of unripened grain for
forage purposes, abandonment of other low
yielding acreage, and lower than expected
yields in European Russia lead us to re-
vise sharply downward our earlier esti-
mate.
With the harvest rapidly coming to an end, it
now appears that, out of a total sown acreage of
325 million acres, 30 to 40 million acres will not
be harvested as mature grain. The loss of pastures
and forage crops, because of drought, apparently led
to livestock grazing or cutting of immature grain
for green feed. The wide range in our revised esti-
mate of 155 to 165 million tons reflects uncertainty
as to the amount this acreage would have yielded
had the grain been allowed to mature.
So far, the Soviets have purchased about 20 mil-
lion tons of foreign grain. A crop of 160 million
tons--the mean of our revised estimate--will leave
the USSR still roughly 32 million tons below re-
quirements for this fiscal year, even allowing for
stock drawdowns to a minimal level. The Soviets
cannot hope to purchase that much additional grain
and are taking drastic steps to cope with the ex-
pected shortfall. Official data on meat production
and livestock inventories in August confirm that
distress slaughtering has begun. Meat production
was 11 percent higher than a year ago and inventories
of hogs, sheep, and poultry had dropped. Above
average slaughter of hogs--heavy consumers of feed
grains--has led to reduction in numbers by 3 million
head, 6 percent below last year. Further large-
scale slaughter is likely.
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LEBANON
Beirut is quiet, but sporadic fight-
ing occurred in the Tripoli-Zagharta area
in the north over the weekend. Zuhayr
Muhsin, leader of the Syrian-controlled
Saiqa fedayeen organization, reportedly
has gone to Tripoli in an effort to stop
the fighting. The terrorist attack at
the Beirut airport Saturday apparently
was unrelated to Lebanon's internal prob-
lems.
The removal of barricades in Christian and
Muslim sections of Beirut is proceeding, and only
a few thoroughfares remain blocked. Traffic is
nearing normal levels, and businesses are reopening.
Despite the lull in political activity because
of the four-day Muslim holiday, members of opposing
sides are generally pessimistic.
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(continued)
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The terrorist attack on Beirut airport appears
to have been the work of fedayeen fringe elements
who hoped to force Egypt to renounce the Sinai dis-
engagement agreement. No fedaveen organization has
claimed the terrorists.
The
Palestine Liberation Organization, which captured
one of the gunmen, has denounced the incident.
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PORTUGAL
Prime Minister Azevedo has inten-
sified his campaign to restore military
discipline, but continues to be challenged
by leftist-oriented units.
The government apparently decided that the
transfer of disruptive soldiers would provide at
least a short-term solution to growing indiscipline
These moves are being contested by radical troops
who have now banded together in several new organi-
zations. The soldiers' groups are allied with ex-
treme left-wing political parties and probably re-
ceive encouragement from the Communists, who offi-
cially continue to support the Azevedo government.
Last weekend, an army transport training unit
in Porto was disbanded after enlisted men voted to
resist the transfer of two leftist officers and
several enlisted men. Some of these soldiers later
issued a statement warning that the struggle has
not ended. They were immediately supported by a
coalition of six parties of the far left, known as
the Revolutionary United Front, which called for
mass action to protest the unit's dissolution.
Radicals prevented the transfer of more than
40 soldiers--who had been accused of participating
in anti-government demonstrations--from Beja air
base in southern Portugal. Despite the government's
decision to send loyal paratroops to break up sev-
eral hundred leftists gathered outside the base,
the transfer orders were revoked and the soldiers
will be allowed to participate in non-partisan po-
litical demonstrations.
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Prime Minister Azevedo has blamed the far left
for the breakdown in military discipline. He has
told the press that divisions in the ranks are pre-
venting the government from exercising complete
control over the Lisbon area.
(continued)
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Lack of cooperation by General Carvalho, who
commands the internal security forces and the Lis-
bon military region, also contributes to the govern-
ment's inability to tighten control over the mili-
tary.
President Costa Gomes, who returned to Portugal
yesterday from official visits to Poland and the
USSR, may oppose Azevedo's policy of attempting to
deal decisively with defiant troops. Costa Gomes
is famous for his willingness to compromise and has
weakened anti-Communist forces in the past by trying
to avoid confrontations.
In a speech yesterday to mark the founding of
the first Portuguese republic in 1910, Costa Gomes
emphasized the need to heal divisions among the
people and the armed forces, but he also deplored
actions that "prejudice the exercise of authority."
Socialist leader Soares later was attacked by a
crowd of radical leftists, but was rescued by armed
naval police.
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ARAB STATES
Syrian President Asad has rejected
a second effort to rec-
oncile his differences with Egypt.
A week
earlier Asad had refused a unilateral
plea for reconciliation.
Asad would refrain
from personal attacks on President Sadat but would
continue to criticize the disengagement agreement
because he believes it is "treasonous." He flatly
refused to meet Sadat.
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Asad had promised 25X1
to
stop personal attacks on the Egyptian President.
Direct criticism of Sadat, however, has continued
to be featured daily in Syrian media.
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INDIA-BANGLADESH
Following are key points from
an interagency memorandum on the im-
plications of the Indian emergency
and the coup in Bangladesh.
The military-led coup in Bangladesh, unlike
Gandhi's crackdown on her domestic opponents, has
had a considerable impact on South Asian regional
and international relationships. The new govern-
ment in Dacca is seeking to strengthen Bangladesh's
relations with Pakistan and China. This introduces
new uncertainties into Dacca's relationships with
New Delhi and Moscow, although the new leaders in
Bangladesh, fearing possible Indian intervention,
have asserted to a doubtful India that they want to
retain close ties.
The situation in Bangladesh is fragile, and
India, already concerned about the turn of events
in Dacca, may be laying the groundwork for the op-
tion of fomenting dissidence and turmoil or a pro-
Indian coup in Bangladesh. Although there are nu-
merous constraints on New Delhi, there is a signif-
icant risk of Indian military intervention within
the next year in Bangladesh.* A breakdown of do-
mestic order in Bangladesh which caused a flood of
refugees into India would probably lead to a coup
or Indian military intervention.
Indian intervention would be strongly condemned
by China and Pakistan, and both might well engage in
sabre-rattling near India's borders.
Although the odds are against it, in such a
situation India and Pakistan could become embroiled
in hostilities, leading to a serious international
crisis.
*The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the De-
partment of State believes that there is a signif-
icant risk of a coup, perhaps aided by India, within
the next year, but that direct Indian military in-
tervention is much less likely. The chances for
such intervention would increase dramatically if a
coup failed and if refugees continued to stream into
India.
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NOTE
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Top Secret
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