THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 MAY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976761
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 7, 1969

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100050001-3
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The President's Daily Brief
7 May 1969
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAT
The Saudi ambassador in Amman claims that King Faysal
has decided to withdraw his support of the fedayeen "by
degrees."
it would be a severe blow to fedayeen finances
if the ambassador is correct. Faysal will have to tread
carefully, however; not only do the fedayeen retain their
hold on the sympathies of Arabs in general, but a sharp
break in Saudi policy could have an unsettling effect on
Faysal's own hierarchy, which has Palestinians in many
government positions.
If Faysal believes he can withstand strains such as
these the mechanics of withdrawing his support should not
be too difficult.
Faysal could merely
see to it that his money does in fact get spent for human-
itarian causes.
We note that in their talks last Thursday with As-
sistant Secretary Sisco, Ambassador Rabin and Moshe Bitan
of the Israeli foreign office claimed that the talks being
held between the US and the Soviets pose no problem for
Tel Aviv; what the Israelis object to is the four-power
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mechanism. This, of course, is diametrically opposed to
Mrs. Meir's assertion the same day to Ambassador Barbour
that Israel was much more worried about a possible US-Soviet
deal than about the four-power discussions. The fact that
the usually circumspect Israelis have let slip such in-
consistencies is a revealing measure of their nervousness
over possible shifts in US policy,.
EUROPE
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VIETNAM
Hanoi has not yet broadcast any fuller text of Premier
Pham Van Dong's May Day address. Only one radio account of
the ceremonies has been issued--a broadcast of 2 May in
which the premier's remarks were treated in a brief two
paragraphs. This may be all we will get.
n this version, his remarks appear to reflect the
usual Communist confidence in ultimate victory and contained
no new policy initiatives. In the past, when a North Viet-
namese leader has dropped a hint of a new line in a public
statement Hanoi has given it extensive additional coverage.
There have been no further broadcasts of Pham Van Dong's
May Day speech.
In making the comment that the US had already recognized
that it had been defeated and had no choice but to "continue
to de-escalate the war," Pham Van Dong was probably making
the same kind of observation that he made in an interview
with French journalist Broussine in early April. In this
interview, the premier referred to the cessation of the
bombing of the North as the beginning of US de-escalation.
Communist propaganda has always treated the cessation of the
bombing as a US admission of defeat. According to the Com-
munist line, the US decided to stop the bombing because it
had not accomplished its purpose and was too costly. This
decision Pham Van Dong told Broussine was inevitable, ir-
reversible, and would lead eventually to total US disengage-
ment from Vietnam.
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As reported, the premier's remarks on May Day suggest
that his reference to de-escalation was in this long-range
context of. North Vietnamese confidence in ultimate victory.
There is no indication that he intended to contradict or
recant on another current Communist propaganda theme: that
the US is "escalating" the war in South Vietnam., This line
is constructed on specific'actions ?of the past few months
in the South--the rate of B-52 strikes and the number of
allied ground sweeps conducted since the new US administration
took office on 20 January. It was used to justify the in-
crease in Communist military, activity in late February and
to counter claims that the US is working seriously toward
a political settlement.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
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II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
CHILE
Among President Frei's Christian Democrats, pressure for
some kind of action against US-based copper companies is on
the increase. This shift is occurring even though Frei's
administration still supports the agreements it reached with
the companies in 1967 which provide for government participa-
tion in the management. The issue is being emphasized among
the Christian Democrats partly because it is one of the few
on which they seem able to agree, but it is sure to come in
for heavy treatment from all quarters as next year's presi-
dential elections approach,
BOLIVIA
The Bolivian cabinet that was sworn in Monday reflects
the accommodation recently worked out between Ovando and
Siles. In general it seems competent, although it may
prove a bit more conservative than its predecessor.
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